

Antonius Andreas (born c. 1280, Tauste, Aragon, died 1320) was a Spanish Franciscan theologian, a pupil of Duns Scotus. He was nicknamed Doctor Dulcifluus, or Doctor Scotellus (applied as well to Peter of Aquila). His *Questions on the Four Books of Peter Lombard's Sentences* are so faithful to the thought of Scotus and so closely follow Scotus' own commentaries on the *Sentences*, while at the same time being so much briefer and more immediately accessible, that the questions constitute a sort of Summa of Scotus' theology. For this reason some translation of the work is presented here. Scotus' thought is otherwise and ordinarily so hard to track or comprehend. Even Jerome of Montefortino's *Summa*, which is basically a re-ordering and re-arranging of Scotus' own writings, remains hard going. Of course Andreas, like Jerome, was not using critical editions of Scotus or distinguishing texts from different periods of Scotus' career (though Andreas must have been personally acquainted with some at least of Scotus' theological development). But no matter. The Subtle Doctor's theology, just as such and without the scholars' qualifications and updatings, deserves to be much more widely known and so needs to be made available in easier forms. Not everyone has to be a scholar or familiar with the scholars' findings to attain a basic and salutary grasp of Scotism.

The translation of Andreas' *Questions* is in progress. Note that the numbering of paragraphs is not in the Latin but is added in the translation for ease of reference. The Latin text is taken from the 1578 edition published in Venice. It is downloadable from Google Books here:

<https://books.google.com/books?id=WZVJAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=antonius+andreas&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SxCYVc3iPML1-AGOgpKQBA&ved=0CFEQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=antonius%20andreas&f=false>

Comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

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A SUMMA BY ANTONIUS ANDREAS OF SCOTUS'
THEOLOGY
OR
QUESTIONS ON THE FOUR BOOKS OF PETER LOMBARD'S
SENTENCES

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Book One

Prologue

Question One

Whether for man in his present state there is need for some special doctrine to be supernaturally inspired that he cannot attain by the natural light of his intellect

Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.1 a.1

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* Prologue q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* Prologue q.21

John Bacon (Bacconitanus) *Sent.* Prologue q.21

1. About the prologue to the first book of the *Sentences* the question is first raised whether for man in his present state there is need that some special doctrine be supernaturally inspired which he cannot attain by the natural light of his intellect.

2. Proof that there is not: a power is able to perform its act about anything that is per se contained in its primary object; the per se and naturally adequate object of the intellect is being; therefore the intellect can naturally understand any being, and consequently any not-being that is such an intelligible thing, because negations are understood through affirmations. The major of this argument is plain from an induction about sight and all the sense powers, because they are able to sense all the possible sensibles contained under their primary objects, as in the case of sight about everything visible, and so on in the case of the others.

3. The major is also plain through reason, because the superior is included in the inferior, and so, if the intellect cannot perform its act about everything that is per se contained under the formal idea of its primary object, the result follows that that object is not the first and adequate object of the power but exceeds the capacity of it. The minor is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6 (72rb), when he says that being and reality are what are imprinted on the soul in its first impression and that they cannot be made clear to it by anything else.

4. Again the senses are able by their natural power to perform their act about anything sensible; therefore the intellect can too about anything intelligible. The proof of this consequence is that nature is not deficient in anything necessary to it (*On the Soul*, 3.9.432b21-22) and so, if it is not deficient in the lower powers, much less is it deficient in the higher ones.

5. Again, if the intellect cannot attain its proper purpose and ultimate end by its own power but needs some supernatural aid, this is because the intellect is not proportioned to it; so it must be proportioned to it by something natural, and then, by parity of reasoning, it would be proportioned of itself to this something natural. Either then the intellect will be made proportioned to it by something supernatural, and so it will not be proportioned to this something supernatural but will have to be made proportioned to it by something else, and so there will be an infinite regress, which is impossible (*Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-b31). Or a stand will be made at the first stage, namely that the intellect will of itself be proportioned to it.

6. On the contrary. The Apostle says (*2 Timothy* 3.16) that all doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof etc.

Opinion of the Philosophers

7. On this question the philosophers and theologians are not in agreement. For the philosophers say that our intellect can naturally acquire all knowledge necessary for it to attain its ultimate end, as is proved by the remark in *On the Soul* 3.5.430a14-15 that the agent intellect is that whereby the soul makes everything and the possible intellect that whereby it becomes everything.

8. From this the argument goes as follows: when an active and passive principle are adequately disposed and proximate to each other and are not impeded action necessarily follows; but the agent and possible intellects are of this sort with respect to anything intelligible. The major is plain from the fact that action naturally depends of itself on such things as on its immediate and sufficient cause; the minor is plain in the cited authority from *On the Soul*.

9. Again, to every natural passive power there corresponds a natural active power, otherwise such a passive power in nature would be vain; but the possible intellect is naturally passive with respect to any act of intellection, because it is perfected by any act of intellection.

10. Again in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18-19 it is said that there can be no habits of speculative science other than metaphysical and mathematical ones, because these cover all beings fully in themselves and in their parts; but all these habits can be naturally acquired; therefore etc.

11. Again, anyone who can naturally know the principles can naturally know the conclusions contained in them; but the first principles are naturally known and all knowable conclusions are contained in them; therefore etc. The major is plain because knowledge of conclusions depends on the principles (*Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12), and the terms of the principles are like doorways into a house of which no one is ignorant (*Metaphysics* 2). The minor is also plain because the terms of the principles are the most common terms of all.

12. On the contrary. An agent whose knowing is for the sake of an end, and man is this sort of agent, necessarily needs a distinct knowledge of the end; but man's end is God, and no distinct knowledge of God can be had naturally; therefore etc. The major is plain because such an agent acts from desire of the end, but nothing can be desired that is not known first; and that man is such an agent is plain (*Physics* 2.5.196b17-22). The minor premise is plain from *Metaphysics* 2, where it is said that the intellect is related to what is naturally most manifest as the eye of an owl is related to sunlight.

13. But an objection is raised against this reasoning [n.12] as follows: every created nature is dependent on each of its per se causes; therefore man's nature is naturally thus dependent on its end, which is one of this nature's per se causes (*Physics* 2.5.196b17-22); therefore, since man's nature is naturally knowable (for it is not disproportioned to our intellect), his ultimate end, which is God, can be naturally known through his nature, at least as to knowledge of the fact and perhaps as to knowledge of the what too, because anyone who is able to know the foundation is able to know the way the foundation relates

to him, and consequently can know the terms of the relation, and know it with the same kind of knowledge.

14. And if it be said that this argument is only valid of man's natural end, which is one of his per se causes, then on the contrary: an effect depends as much, nay depends more on the supernatural end than on the natural end; therefore if the effect were known by this dependence, the supernatural end would be more known than the natural end.

15. Again, man naturally desires beatitude; therefore he is naturally ordered toward it; therefore he can, from this ordering, naturally come to a knowledge of beatitude.

16. Again, it is naturally knowable that being is the natural first object of our intellect (according to Avicenna above [n.3]); it is also simply knowable that the best thing under the first object is the goal of the power, because in this best thing the power rests (*Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23); it is also naturally known that the divine is the best thing in the whole of being; therefore it is naturally knowable that man by his intellect is ordered to God as to his ultimate and perfect end; therefore etc.

17. To the first of these objections [nn.13-14] I say that it proceeds about the end as it is the final cause and not about the end as it is attained by action; and God as he is beatifier of the created intellect is of the latter sort.

18. I also say that our intellect as it is capable of grace and glory is not naturally knowable to us. And so the sort of respect that is founded on this capacity of our intellect cannot be naturally known to us. Nor even is our soul naturally known to us in this present life save as to the common and general nature that is abstracted or can be abstracted from the senses.

19. To the second objection [n.15] I say that the sort of ordering in question, whereby man tends toward God as to his beatific end, is founded on man according to his proper and most proper idea, and according to this idea man is, in this wayfaring life, not naturally knowable to us, as will be plain below in its proper place.

20. To the third [n.16] I say that although being is the first and natural object of our intellect by firstness of adequacy (for whatever is understood is, formally or virtually, being), yet what naturally moves an embodied intellect is not formally the idea of being but the quiddity of sensible being, as will be said below. So it is not naturally knowable that being in its whole generality, namely as it embraces sensibles and intelligibles, is the natural object of an embodied intellect. However, Avicenna went astray here, for he posited, in his *Metaphysics* 9.7 (107ra), that the separated soul, by its own natural powers, perfectly and distinctly knows separate substances, which however is false.

21. A second argument against the opinion of the philosophers is as follows: the knowledge of separate substances is the most noble knowledge (*Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23), because it concerns the most noble class of being; therefore this knowledge is most necessary for us because, from the fact of its being the most noble, it most perfects the intellect, and the knowledge of what is proper to separate substances is thus more necessary to us than knowledge of what is common to them with sensible substances. But these proper features are not naturally known to us either by knowledge why or by knowledge that. Not by knowledge why, because only our own substances are known to us with such knowledge, but the separate substances are naturally unknown to us, at least with perfect and distinct knowledge, because our intellect is disposed to them as the eye of an owl to sunlight (*Metaphysics* 2). Nor can they be naturally known by knowledge that, namely by knowledge through effects, because no effect is, especially as

to some of their properties, caused by them. For the first property of the first substance is that it subsists in three suppositis, but the first substance does not cause anything as it is such but as it is one, and so its effect leads us rather to the opposite understanding. And if it caused anything by some other properties, then the three suppositis cannot naturally be known by these effects. For a philosopher would argue from the effects that God has produced everything from eternity, and not contingently but by necessity of nature; and he argues that the separate substances are perpetual and necessary and many other such things which are all false; therefore etc.

22. A first objection against this argument [n.21] is as follows: all necessary propositions whose terms are naturally known can themselves be naturally known; but all revealed propositions regarding the deity are of this sort, as that God is Three; therefore etc. The proof of the major is that either the necessary proposition is immediate and then it is known when the terms are known (*Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25) and it will be naturally self evident; or the necessary proposition is mediate, and then, since, as was said, the extremes are naturally known, the intervening terms will be known, and so, by joining mean to extreme term, either I will get to an immediate proposition and so will know all the other propositions through it, or I will get to a mediate proposition and then I will do the same as before until I come to an immediate proposition by which I will know all the others. The minor is also plain because the proposition ‘God is Three’ is a necessary proposition and the terms are naturally knowable, for the term God is naturally known (*Physics* 8 and *Metaphysics* 12) and also the other term Three is naturally known; therefore these terms can naturally be conjoined and put together into a proposition.

23. To this objection I say that, when the extreme terms are naturally known perfectly and completely as to all the ideas, both essential and particular, that are contained under those terms, then all the mediate terms between those terms are naturally known, and through these ideas and mediate terms can be attributed to the extremes everything that is compossible with or attributable to the extremes; but in the issue at hand things are not so. For the reason that this predicate Three is attributed to God is a certain reason particular to God, and it is not essentially contained under God as he is naturally known (in *Physics* 8 and *Metaphysics* 12). Therefore the particular reason in God that is the middle term for knowing the Trinity about him is not naturally known in him. An example: man is naturally known and white is naturally known, and yet the proposition ‘man is white’ is not naturally known, because I might not naturally know the particular reason in man that makes whiteness to be present in him; which reason indeed, since whiteness is not essential to man, is not known immediately as soon as man in all his essential features is known; through the senses indeed it can be known with knowledge as to the fact, but sense knowledge has no place in the case of the Trinity; therefore etc.

To the Question

24. I reply to the question by drawing a distinction: a passive thing is sometimes in a state of natural power and sometimes in a state of force or violent power; sometimes it is in a neutral state, and sometimes it is in a state of supernatural or obediencial power. I say then that natural and forced and neutral power are taken precisely and formally in respect of a thing’s form; but supernatural or obediencial power are taken in respect of an agent, and these points I first explain as follows:

25. A power is natural when it naturally moves the thing to a form natural to it, as when a heavy thing tends to a lower place; and the same power is force when it moves a heavy thing upwards, for going upwards is opposed to what a heavy thing naturally tends to. The power is neutral when a thing tends no more to one condition than to its opposite, as in the case of a body with respect to being white or black. The power is supernatural or obediential when a thing can be supernaturally affected as to some form by a supernatural agent, the way souls can be as to grace.

26. Now the fact that what is natural and what is forced are understood with respect to the form of the thing affected, and not with respect to the agent, is proved as follows. A cause of some effect is a sufficient cause of it when, first, the effect follows although nothing else is posited save the cause itself, and when, second, the effect does not follow although everything else is posited save the cause. So it is in the present case. Therefore etc. The major premise here is evident. The proof of the minor premise is that, when the tendency of a heavy thing to go downwards is posited, although an agent and everything else in the world are removed, the natural power of the thing to go downwards is immediately present, and that, when this tendency is removed, no natural power is ever present in the heavy thing however much a relation to some agent is posited in it. So it is too in the case of what is forced [sc. that it requires in the thing affected a natural tendency to the opposite of what force is moving it to].

27. Suppose you say that in the thing affected by an agent there need only be whatever the natural power is capable of, which is its capacity to be naturally affected by the agent.

28. I reply that unless the natural power causes some form in the affected thing, that is some tendency or the like, the natural power will never be sufficient; the point is plain from the fact that here the tendency to the form is precisely not removed, even though some relation to an agent is added to it at the same time. The like holds of the forced and the neutral, as is plain. But that a supernatural or obediential power is understood from comparison with the agent is plain from a similitude. For when the disposition of the passive thing to the agent is in place and everything else is removed then, if the passive thing can be naturally changed by the agent, the passive thing is said to be in natural potency with respect to the agent; if it can be supernaturally changed, it is said to be in supernatural or obediential potency.

29. But there is a doubt here. This disposition does not seem to be in any way excluded from the form that the agent is able, whether naturally or supernaturally, to give to the passive thing; so it seems that a supernatural potency in the passive thing is not taken precisely from its disposition to the agent when everything else is removed.

30. I say that the contrary is expressly manifest were God to annihilate matter or do something else of the like; for it is plain that matter is, with respect to God, in obediential potency for being annihilated, and yet matter does not receive any form by this annihilation.

31. Again the whole thing can be proved as follows: for although it is impossible for any form to be induced in a passive thing without an agent, yet, as to the persisting of a natural or forced or neutral form, the form can exist in a passive thing when every natural agent is removed; but a supernatural form cannot exist either as to being induced or as to persisting without a supernatural agent; therefore a natural or forced or neutral potency is

understood by comparison to the form, but a supernatural potency by comparison with the agent.

32. I say then to the matter at issue that, since every act of intellection is a sort of form in comparison with the intellect, no intellection will be said to be supernatural with respect to the intellect, since what is supernatural, as was proved, is not understood by comparison to form. On the contrary, since every act of intellection is a form, it will, as concerns itself, naturally perfect the intellect; therefore the intellect will, with respect to it, always be in natural potency and not in forced or neutral potency, and yet, with respect to the agent, that intellection alone will be called natural to it which the agent intellect (being the natural active principle of intellection) causes in the intellect; and because the agent intellect does not operate without phantasms (*On the Soul* 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10), and everything in a phantasm is something sensible, so only sensible cognition is natural by comparison with the agent, and nothing non-sensible can be known naturally by argument from sensible effects; and because God as he is Three is not anything sensible, nor does he cause anything as he is Three, so his Threeness can never be known naturally by us. Also, because this knowledge, namely of God as Three and of the other articles of the faith, is needed by us for salvation, so the supernatural infusion of some doctrine was necessary for us so that by it we might know the things we could not know naturally.

33. The first argument given above against the opinion of the philosophers [n.12] is in favor of this opinion. It is confirmed by Augustine when he says (*City of God* 17.41 n.3) that the philosophers, being in ignorance of what end things should be referred to, spoke falsely. See therefore how prior knowledge of the end is necessary for an agent that acts for an end, as this first argument [n.12] said.

34. The second argument given for the same result [n.21] is also confirmed by Augustine when he says [*City of God* 11.3] that as regard things remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others for them. See how the knowledge of separate substances is necessary for us, as the second argument said; and because we cannot attain it naturally, we need the testimony of others, which is the principal question being asked here.

Solution of the Opposing Arguments

35. To the first proposition from Aristotle [n.7] I say that, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18, knowledge is generated from knower and thing known, and so the agent and possible intellects are not enough without the object. But not every object can be given in a phantasm, and the agent and possible intellects only make everything or become everything to the extent action on phantasms belongs to them respectively, and in particular as it belongs to the agent intellect; therefore etc.

36. To the second argument [n.9] I say that the major is false; for an organized human body that is sufficiently disposed is in natural potency for receiving the intellectual soul, and yet no active natural power is able to produce it. An active natural power can, however, introduce the required disposition, and then the first agent, which can be called natural insofar as it is the principle of the ordering of the whole of being, introduces the soul. Nor is the passive natural power rendered, on account of this fact, less worthy but rather more so, because it is capable of a more perfect form than a natural agent could

give it; a passive power is not vain, therefore, if it can receive a more perfect form than a natural agent can give it, but is rather more noble for this reason. An organic active power would, indeed, be vain if it did not have the organs whereby to be able to do its required acts, as is said in *On the Heavens* 2.8.290a29-35, that if nature had given the stars the power of walking it would have given them feet.

37. To the third argument [n.10] St. Thomas replies in *ST* Ia q.1 a.1 that a diverse way of knowing introduces a diversity of sciences. For the astronomer and the natural philosopher both prove the same conclusion (namely that the earth is round), but the former does so through a mathematical middle term abstracted from matter and the latter through a natural middle term understood in matter; hence nothing prevents the same things that the philosophical disciplines treat of by natural light from being treated of theologically by revealed light.

38. On the contrary: if there can be other natural sciences about the same knowable things that theology is about, then theology will not be simply necessary. The consequent is absurd, but the truth of the consequence is proved by his own example. For if one were to suppose that knowledge of the earth's being round were necessary for salvation, then it is sufficient for me to know it by a natural middle term, notwithstanding that I might know it by another middle term.

39. I say therefore to the argument [n.10] that, even if the humanly acquired sciences treat of all knowables, yet they do not treat of them as to everything knowable about them; for the separate substances have certain properties that cannot be investigated naturally, and about these properties theology deals by the light of faith.

40. To the fourth argument [n.11] I say that the second part of the major is false. In proof whereof I say that the most common term, which is being, does not contain everything either formally or virtually, because it does not contain the properties of being nor the ultimate differences of things (as will be plain below); therefore by the most common terms of the first principles we cannot naturally know the conclusions in which some particular property is asserted, as that God is incarnate and the like. So I say that although the first principles could naturally prove the common properties of inferior things, yet they could not prove the particular ones. An example: by the principle that every whole is greater than the part it can be naturally known that four is bigger than two, but it cannot be known by this principle that four is double of two.

41. To the first argument at the beginning [nn.2-3] I say that being is not the natural object of the intellect for this present life such that the whole of it be naturally attainable by our intellect; but it is the natural object in that our intellect is naturally ordered to being and is so ordered even with a primacy of adequacy, as was said above; and Avicenna should be so expounded. But a fuller discussion will be given in the third distinction below, where what the natural object of the intellect is will be shown.

42. To the second argument at the beginning [n.4] I say that, as was made clear above, it happens to be the case that the possible intellect is capable of a greater perfection than the first natural active principle can give it.

43. To the third [n.5] I say that our intellect is as naturally un-proportioned to theological conclusions as it is to the light of faith or to the light of glory; however, as concerns the obediencial potency which it has in respect of God, it is proportioned to the light of faith and to the light of glory, and, by means of these lights, it is proportioned to revealed theological conclusions; therefore etc.

Question Two

Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture

Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.2

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* Prologue q.3

John Bacon (Bacconitanus) *Sent.* Prologue q.1

1. The question raised is whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture, and argument is given that it is not.

2. Knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is never lacking to the human race, but Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature; therefore such necessary knowledge is not had from Sacred Scripture.

3. Further, there seem to be many superfluous things in Sacred Scripture, as histories, ceremonies, and the like, which rather confuse the intellect to prevent it understanding what needs to be understood; therefore etc.

4. Further, there are many sins that one cannot know with certitude from Sacred Scripture are sins. Therefore etc.

5. On the contrary is Augustine when, speaking of Catholic Scripture, he says [*City of God* 11.3] that here we get faith about the things that it is not expedient to be ignorant of. Therefore etc.

To the Question

6. Concerning this question one needs first to consider the many heresies that condemn Sacred Scripture, as is plain in the books of Augustine and Damascene about heresies. For some people accept nothing of Sacred Scripture. Some accept something but nothing from the Old Testament, as the Manichees who say that the Old Testament is from the bad principle. Some cling to the Old Testament, as the Jews. Some accept something of both, as the Saracens. Some hold to statements in the New Testament that they understand badly, as some heretics do, for example the statement from *James* 5.16 about confessing sins to one another, where an error about the sacrament of penance has arisen. For they say that it can be done before anyone who is not a priest, which is false.

7. Against all these heresies there are eight ways of rationally arguing against them, namely: prophetic foretelling, the agreement of the Scriptures, the most careful authority of the writers, the rationality of what is contained in Sacred Scripture, the irrationality of the separate errors, the firmness of the Holy Church, the carefulness of the recipients, the clarity of the miracles. Look in Scotus about all of them, and when you have considered them you will grasp against all these heretics that the Catholic Scripture is altogether most true.

8. But second one must consider whether Sacred Scripture is necessary and sufficient for the wayfarer to attain his end, or whether it has been sufficiently handed down.

9. I say then that this is so without doubt. For in Sacred Scripture are most clearly handed down that things necessary and sufficient for attaining the ultimate end, namely the Ten Commandments above all, about which Christ says “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments,” *Matthew* 19.17, about which there is also *Exodus* 20.1-17. The explanation of these commandments, or the making clear of them as to what must be believed and what must be done, is contained in diverse places of Sacred Scripture in the New and the Old Testament. Knowledge too about immaterial substances and the properties of them are handed on in Sacred Scripture as far as this is possible and useful for the wayfarer. Handed on it too is what the end is, even as to all its circumstances, as about when it will be had by immortal man, namely after resurrection in soul and body together.

To the Arguments for the Opposite

10. As to the first argument at the beginning [n.2], I concede the major. As to the minor I say that although Sacred Scripture is not in the law of nature, yet such knowledge could have been handed on in another way. For a little inspired doctrine was in some way or other sufficient for them.

11. To the second [n.3] I say that the things in question are not superfluous; and when it is said that they seem to confuse the intellect, I reply that because what lied hid beneath the literal sense is more sweetly grasped than if it were expressly stated, therefore, in view of devotion, things that are of themselves manifest are more often veiled beneath figures.

12. To the third [n.4] I reply with Origen (*Homily on Genesis* 2 n.1). No sentence clearly explains everything that is to be known in it but only that from which such things can be adequately elicited; for many necessary virtues are not explained in Sacred Scripture even though they are virtually contained in it.

13. And if it be said [n.4] that in human acts are many things that there is doubt are mortal sins, even when on the supposition of all Catholic doctrines, I reply that the way of salvation is not doubtful, because a man should avoid such things as if they were most dangerous sins, nor should he expose himself to danger in any way.

Question Three

Whether theology is about God as first object or first subject

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 Prologue q.1 a.1
 Alexander of Hales, *Summa* Ia q.1 p.3
 Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.5
 Thomas, *ST* Ia q.1 a.7
 Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* Prologue q.6
 Durandus, *Sent.* Prologue q.5
 John Bacon (Bacconitanus) *Sent.* Prologue q.3

1. The question raised is whether theology is about God as first object or first subject.

2. That it is not. For it is not about any subject, therefore it is not about God. The consequence is plain. The antecedent is proved in many ways, and first from Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.2 n.2 that all Scripture is about things or signs.

3. Again, theology has four senses, namely the literal, the tropological, the allegorical, and the analogical; therefore it has four subjects corresponding to these.

4. Again from Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.2, that a simple form cannot be a subject; God is a simple form; therefore etc.

5. Again *Physics* 2.7.198a24-27, that the matter does not coincide with the other causes, namely the final and efficient causes, either as the same in number or as the same in species; but God is the end and efficient cause of theology; therefore he is not its subject.

6. Again, after a science's subject there is need first to have parts and principles and properties, but God does not have any integral parts, since he is a singular being, nor principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because there can be no accident in him since properties flow from the number of accidents, according to Boethius; therefore etc.

7. On the contrary is Augustine *City of God* 8 ch.1, that theology is discussion or reasoning about God.

First Side Question

Whether theology is about God under some special idea

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 Prologue q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* Ia q.1 p.3

Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.1

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.1 a.7

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* Prologue q.6

Durandus, *Sent.* Prologue q.5

John Bacon (Baconitanus) *Sent.* Prologue q.3

8. On this question I ask whether God is the subject here under some special idea.

9. That he is: Hugh of St. Victor at the beginning of *On Sacraments* maintains that the works of restoration are the subject; therefore God is the subject under the idea of redeemer.

10. Again Cassiodorus *On the Psalter* pref. maintains that Christ is the subject; therefore God is subject as incarnate.

11. Again, God under his absolute idea is the subject of metaphysics; therefore he is not the subject of theology. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23, that metaphysics is the noblest science because it is about the noblest genus; but this genus is God in his absolute idea; and later the Philosopher calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

12. Again, since this science is the noblest it should be about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of good, which is the idea of end, because end and good are the same. Hence Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (95rb) says that the science that is about the final cause is noblest; therefore God is the subject under the idea of good.

13. On the contrary. Knowledge about a subject with a restriction presupposes an absolute knowledge about it without restriction; and this latter is prior and more certain; so there would be another science about God under his absolute idea, and there is not.

Solution to the Questions
As to Theology in Itself

14. As to the solution for these questions I will first distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will assign the idea of the first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts.

15. On the first point I say that theology in itself is that which is of a nature to be had about its subject by an intellect proportioned to it. But theology in us is what is of a nature to be had about the subject by our intellect. An example: if some intellect were unable to grasp the principles of philosophy and yet could believe them, it will not have philosophical science but faith, and yet there is a true philosophical science in itself, because evidence about its object can naturally be had by a proportioned and well disposed intellect. Theology in itself, then, is what can be had about God by a proportioned intellect. Theology in us is what can be had about him by our intellect.

16. On the second point I say that the idea of a first object of a science is its being adequate to the scientific habit whose first object it is – firstness being taken here in the sense of firstness in adequacy; and then I say that the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of which it is the first object.

17. I prove this as follows. The first object is the cause of the habit; therefore the first object is the adequate cause of the habit whose first object it is (since firstness is here taken for adequacy); but the adequate cause contains virtually the whole of the effect, for otherwise it would not be adequate; therefore the first object contains virtually the whole habit, that is, all the truths of the scientific habit of which it is the object. An example. Suppose that man is the first object of some habit, and that in this habit are contained all these truths or conclusions in order: man is rational; man is capable of laughter; man is a tame animal; man is two legged. Then it is certain that man contains virtually all these predicates, but in such a way that man contains the second through the first, the third through the second, and the fourth through the third, and contains them such that man depends on none of them in containing them but that they depend on man. For if it be supposed, *per impossibile*, that they were all removed and the concept of man remained, then they would still all be virtually contained in that concept of man.

18. Against this second point an argument is made first as follows. As the first object of a power is disposed to the power, so is the first object of a habit disposed to the habit; but the first object of a power is a something common to all the things under it that can move the power, the way ‘sense object’ is related to all objects of sense; therefore the first object of a habit does not consist in virtual containment, or in the object as you speak of it, namely that it is adequate cause of the habit of which it is the object, but it is something common to all things under it.

19. Again, and by way of confirmation (for the example seems to show it): the object of metaphysics is posited to be being, and being is something common to everything treated of in metaphysics.

20. To the first of these [n.18] I say that the example is not similar. For an object is related to a power as mover to moved, or as agent to patient, and therefore any particular contained under the universal object can move the power and move any other power of the same idea, for any visible object can move any power of seeing; but an object is related to a habit as cause to effect, and not anything that has the idea of such a cause can cause the same effect. For if some hotter thing can generate fire in wood, it does not follow that a less hot thing can do the same. For ability to cause requires more than ability to move, as is plain. And therefore the first object of the intellect should be assigned to it according to virtual containment, and not, as with the first object of a power, according to commonness.

21. To the second argument [n.19] I say that it is accidental to the first object of a habit that it is something common by way of commonness of predication; commonness of application suffices. What is required per se in such a first object is that it contain things virtually. For as will be said below on this same question, the Divine Essence, as it is supremely single, is the first object of theology.

22. On the third point [n.14] I say that some theological truths are necessary, as that God is three and one and the like, which are referred to what is inward in God. Other truths are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and all those that are referred to what is outward from God. And it is plain that these truths are theological, because they belong to no other science.

23. There are therefore two integral parts to theology, namely necessary truths and contingent truths.

24. On the basis of these premises and in answer to the first question about theology in itself (following the distinction given in the first point and as concerns truths according to the distinction given in the third point), I say that the first and adequate object of it is God. I prove it as follows:

25. The first object of a scientific habit contains all the truths of the habit; but nothing contains all the truths of the necessary propositions in theology save God; therefore etc.

26. The major is plain from the second point above. Proof of the minor: for nothing contains these truths as cause of them, because divine things have no cause; nor does anything contain them as effects of a demonstrative proof, for no effect leads to the knowledge of the fact that God is three and one; therefore etc.

27. Again, this kind of theology is about an object naturally known to the divine intellect alone; but only God is naturally known to the divine intellect; therefore this kind of theology is about God. Proof of the major: for since God's intellect is infinite, it is naturally cognitive of more things than any other intellect is; therefore if theology is not about an object naturally known to God alone, it will not be the most noble and first science. The major of this proof is itself proved by the fact that everything other than God is finite, and consequently it can be naturally known by a finite intellect.

28. Again, in no science is as perfect a knowledge taught about what is not its per se subject as about what is its per se subject. So since metaphysics is about God then, if theology is not about God, a more perfect knowledge will be had about God in metaphysics than in theology, which is false.

29. I say accordingly that theology also with respect to its other integral part, namely its contingent truths, is, truly considered, about God as about its first object; the reason is that the same thing and under the same idea is the object of a habit as to all the habit's

integral parts. But the first object does not contain the contingent and necessary truths of the habit in the same way, for it contains the necessary truths determinately but it is in a state of indifference as to the contingent truths and their opposites.

30. However, one should note that there is an order in the contingent theological truths. For some belong to the whole Trinity and there is an order in these, for the first contingent truth is that God creates, the second that he conserves what he creates, the third that he governs it, and so on about the rest. But other contingent truths belong to the Person of the Word, of which the first is that the Word is incarnate (for human nature in the Word is as it were the first property, and through it are the others ones present, as that the Word is born, and so on about the others).

31. To understand my reply to the second question [n.8] I posit an example. Man is understood as rational, as substance, as capable of laughter, as the most noble of animals; but it is clear that to know man as substance is an imperfect and universal knowledge because it is knowledge of him under a common concept and in confused way. Again, to know man as capable of laughter is an imperfect knowledge as well, because it is knowledge through an accident. Further, to know him as the most noble of animals is also imperfect, because it is knowledge of him with respect to another, and knowledge of a thing with respect to another presupposes an absolute knowledge of it without any such respect. But to know man as rational is perfect and quidditative knowledge and proper to the subject.

32. So therefore as to the matter at issue [nn.8-13], some posit that God is the subject under a sort of universal idea, because under the idea of infinite being.

33. Others posit that God is the subject under a sort of accidental idea, because under an idea attributed to him [sc. the idea of good, n.12], although this attribute does pass over into identity with the essence because of the infinity of the essence; nevertheless in its formal idea this attribute is a sort of property of the essence, according to Damascene (*On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.4).

34. Others posit that God is the subject under the idea of a respect, because under the idea of redeemer or glorifier or the like; others posit him to be the subject under the idea of his proper essence.

35. I argue against these three opinions. Against the first [n.32] I argue that a concept of God under the idea of infinite being can be naturally known to us, but theology is about a subject naturally known to God alone, as was proved in the solution to the first question [n.27]; therefore etc.

36. Again, a concept of God under the idea of infinite being does not contain the theological truths belonging to the divine persons, as that God is three and the like; therefore an object naturally known to us under such idea is not primary. The consequence is plain from the second point above [n.16]; the antecedent is proved by this sort of argument: the concept in question is naturally known to us, but the particulars are not naturally known to us; therefore etc.

37. Against the second opinion the argument is as follows: if the attributes were essentially distinct, they would not be really caused by the essence; therefore the essence would of itself only have the idea of uncreated, but would have an attribute not of itself but from the essence (with which the attribute is really the same and, because of which identity, is infinite and has the idea of uncreated); therefore the knowledge of the essence

under the idea of essence is prior and more perfect, since the essence is per se infinite and uncreated while the attributes are not per se so but through the essence.

38. This opinion can also be argued against as was argued against the first opinion, that God is naturally known to us under such idea of the attribute goodness etc.

39. Again (as touched on above [n.33]) this knowledge of God would be knowledge of him as it were through an accident, but the knowledge of quiddity is more perfect (*Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a36-b2); therefore etc.

40. The first and third arguments made here against the second opinion also work against the third opinion, but there is a special one against the third as follows: every respect of God to what is extrinsic to him is a respect of reason; therefore theology would not be a science of what is real but a science of what is notional, as logic is, which is about second intentions adjoined to first intentions; the antecedent will be plain below in d.30; the consequence is patent.

41. Again, something absolute and something relational do not make a one per se but a one per accidens; but knowledge of something united per accidens is not first, for it presupposes knowledge of each part of the union (as is plain of subalternate sciences); therefore theology would not be first and most noble.

42. Again no respect to what is extrinsic is necessary in God but contingent; therefore no part of theology would be about necessary truths, because it would not be about God in respect of what is necessary but in respect of what is contingent, the opposite of which was stated above in the first point [n.15].

43. I concede the fourth opinion then [n.24], namely that God under the idea of his proper essence, and of the essence or quiddity of this individual, is the object of theology as theology is in itself and as it exists in the divine intellect (which is the intellect proportioned to it) and as it exists in the theology of the blessed.

As to Theology in Us

44. Speaking, however, about theology as it is in us, I say in response to both questions together [nn.1, 8] that no first object can be assigned to it but a first known can be; and I say this both as to necessary truths and as to contingent ones.

45. I make this clear as follows: the first and adequate object of any scientific habit contains all the truths of the habit not only absolutely as its object but also as known through the habit; otherwise it would not be the adequate object of the habit; but the habit of theology as it exists in us contains the necessary and contingent truths, at least all those that are articles of faith and are necessary for salvation (as is plain), although however it contains them less perfectly; therefore, if a first object can be assigned to theology in us, and if that object, as known to us, contains all other truths, then as a result the habit of theology in us is not a habit received by faith in another but is a habit in the proper sense, having evidence from its object. But this is false, because we only see by faith that God is three and one and the like. So I say that one can assign a first known to our theology (and this a concept belonging to our frailty), because we resolve all other concepts back to it. For we concede that God is three, is able to create, is able to be incarnate and the like, because we know him to be infinite. Nor is it surprising if it was said above that God is the subject of theology by reason of his singular essence, because he himself is of himself

his own essence and his own singularity, and no idea of virtue or of genus or the like is abstracted from him as is done in the case of creatures.

46. Another opinion is also posited here, that Christ is the subject in the whole theology of the blessed and of wayfarers. Dionysius [or Grosseteste] explains it as follows in his *Hexahemeron* ch. 1, that Christ has a double unity, one essential with the Father and Holy Spirit insofar as he is God, and another personal with the supposit of the Word insofar as he is man; he has a third mystical unity with the members of the Church of which he is the head. And in accordance with this triple unity all the propositions of theology are saved, both the necessary one and the contingent ones, as is plain.

47. But the arguments given above against the third opinion [nn.40-42] work against this one.

48. There is also a special one against it: if the Word had not become incarnate, theology would not be of the same species as it is now and as it was in the prophets before the coming of Christ; therefore etc.

Solution to the Arguments

49. To the first argument of the first question [n.2] I say that Augustine is not speaking of the first and proper subject of theology but of its common matter.

50. To the second [n.3] I say that it belongs to the perfection of theology that, while being single, it has many sense, although this feature cannot belong to other sciences; therefore a plurality of senses does not take away the unity of the subject, because all these senses are reduced to one; for a sense that is mystical in one part of Scripture is literal in another. An example: King Ahassuerus made a great feast etc. [*Esther* 1], and this signified the future feast of Christ with his disciples, which afterwards Christ literally so did.

51. To the third [n.4] I say that Boethius there is speaking of the subject of an accidental form and not of the subject of a science.

52. To the fourth [n.5] I say that the Philosopher there is speaking of first matter or of the material cause, which indeed, since it is of itself without any act, cannot have the causality of any other cause belonging to it; but the subject of a science is not like this, as is plain. I say too that in fact the subject of a science is not reduced to the subject of the material cause but to that of the efficient cause, as was made clear above in the second point in the solution to the first objection [nn.16-17]. And when the subject is called matter, this is because of a certain likeness that the subject has with matter; for just as we see that real extrinsic operations are about some matter, as the operation by which a chest is made is about some matter, so does the intellect concern itself with a certain object.

53. To the fifth [n.6] I say that the divine essence, because of its perfection, happens to be of itself a this, and consequently it does not have subjective parts. Or one can say that the divine persons are as it were the subjective parts of the essence as it is this essence, although the essence, because of its perfection, is not counted up in the persons as a universal is in its particulars. The attributes, however, are as it were properties of the essence, as was made plain above.

54. As to what is said about principles [n.6] I say that the subject of a science does not have to have principles of being but principles of knowing; for being taken absolutely is the subject of metaphysics but being so taken does not have to be a principle of existence,

for then every being would have a principle and so God would have a principle, which is plainly false. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing with respect to all the attributes, both because they tend to identity with the essence and because they are proved more certainly through it and of it.

55. On the contrary: the principles of being are the same as the principles of knowing, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31.

56. I reply that the subject of a natural science is not simply simple but composite; so the parts that compose the subject make for a composite proposition, which is the middle term to demonstrate the property of the subject; and for this reason does the Philosopher say that the principles are the same. An example: animal and rational, which are the principles of man, make a composite proposition which is the principle or middle term for proving that man is capable of laughter, as is plain. But this does not hold in the matter at issue, where the subject is altogether simple. Therefore etc.

57. As to the first point in the second question [nn.9-10], I reply to Hugh and to Cassiodorus as I did to the first argument from Augustine in the first question [n.49].

58. To the third [n.11] I say that being is not univocally common to God and creatures, as will be plain below. But if metaphysics were not about being in general and absolutely but about being in some contracted sense, namely about divine being, then metaphysics would not be the first science but there would have to be some other prior one that would be about being in general and absolutely. Therefore God is not the first object of metaphysics but the primary and principal known thing, and this clarifies the meaning of the authority from the Philosopher [n.11].

59. To the fourth [n.12] I say that in one way the idea of good and of end states a relation, and in this way it is not the most perfect idea, as is plain. In another way it states the proximate foundation of that relation, and then, even given that goodness is an absolute idea and formally infinite, there remains still the idea of the quiddity and of the essence, which idea is the root foundation of all perfections; and by reason of it are all the absolute perfections infinite, and by the fact that it is ultimate it is the more perfect.

Second Side Question

Whether theology is about everything by way of attribution to the first subject

Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.3
Thomas, *ST* Ia q.1 a.7

1. The question asked is whether theology is about everything.
2. An argument that it is not is that ordered quiddities, as they are distinct from the divine essence, contain all truths about themselves virtually, and as a result they can cause a sufficient scientific habit about themselves in any intellect whatever. Proof: for if those quiddities, with everything else removed, were, per impossibile, uncreated, they would still contain the sorts of truths in question, as is plain about line and number in respect of immediate propositions about them; therefore theology, which is about God, does not need to be about everything.

3. On the contrary. The divine essence, which theology is about, contains everything virtually and eminently.

To the Question

4. I reply that theology as it is in itself is about everything, because it is about the divine essence as about the first object that contains all quiddities virtually; and so it contains virtually all the truths about the quiddities that are contained in those quiddities. Now theology as it is in God is, for this reason, about everything and is God's total knowledge, because although the quiddities are of a nature to generate in any intellect at all, considered as such, the truths that they contain, yet the divine intellect, because of its eminence, is not susceptible to causation from anything outside it (for his intellect would thus be cheapened, *Metaphysics* 12). And so there are not distinct scientific habits in God but whatever he knows he knows with theological knowledge, that is, with the knowledge whose first object is the divine essence as it is a this, which is the theological object.

5. Now the divine essence, as it is a this, causes in the divine intellect a distinct and most perfect knowledge of itself and of the truths it contains, namely that it is three, one, good, and the like, and causes this knowledge in the divine intellect in the way that causation can exist in the divine intellect in the first moment of nature. Then, in the second moment of nature, it causes the most distinct knowledge of all the quiddities, created and possible, that it eminently contains. Next in the third moment it also causes a most distinct and perfect knowledge of all the truths about the quiddities that the quiddities contain, because the divine essence eminently contains the same truths. I prove this as follows: the divine essence is primary object, containing everything eminently; not however by way of commonness of predication, but virtually; now if science is had about anything in virtue of something other than the first object, or if it is had in virtue of itself, then the first object, namely the divine essence, would not contain everything virtually, which is false; nor is there any order of causality of a second thing to a third, as is plain, but there is an order of two effects subordinate to each other in respect of the same cause. For, as was said, the knowledge that the quiddities of themselves contain is not caused in the divine intellect by those quiddities but by the divine essence itself; this divine essence causes, in the second moment, knowledge of the quiddities, and causes, in the third moment, knowledge of the truths of the quiddities. An example: according to some people the sun causes heat by means of light, so that light and heat are effects, subordinate the one to the other, of the same cause – but understand these to be eternal predicates.

6. Now the theology of the blessed and of wayfarers is about everything to the extent it is about the divine essence, which eminently contains everything. But the theology of the blessed is distinctly about the divine essence itself, which they see distinctly, and about everything that God voluntarily shows them; for the divine essence is a voluntary mirror; and such theology is not the blessed's total knowledge, because they can have habits of knowledge humanly acquired.

7. The theology of wayfarers, however, is distinctly about the truths that God voluntarily reveals to them, whether through himself or through created substance; they can also have other scientific habits, as is plain.

8. And thus the answer to the argument on the contrary [n.3] is solved.

Third and Fourth Side Questions

Whether theology is wisdom or is a subalterning or subalternate science

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* Ia q.1 p.3
 Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue q.4
 Thomas, *ST* Ia q.1 aa.2, 6
 Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* Prologue q.2
 Durandus, *Sent.* Prologue q.7
 Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* Prologue q.14

1. The question asked is whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalternate or subalterning with respect to any science.

To the First of these Questions

2. I reply to the first question by saying that, as is plain in *Posterior Analytics* 1 when science in the strict sense is defined it has these four conditions, namely that it is certain or sure knowledge, that it is about a necessary object, that the object is evident or gives evidence to the intellect, and that it is caused by a syllogism proceeding from premises to conclusion. The first three conditions state a perfection in science, as is plain, but the fourth states an imperfection, both because the principle causes a knowledge of the conclusion that is less perfect than is the knowledge of itself (and so not a knowledge univocal with itself but equivocal), and because when the intellect has knowledge of the principle then, since principles are naturally known first, it is still in passive potency for knowledge of the conclusion.

3. Theology in itself, therefore, or as it exists in the intellect of God, is most truly science as to the first three conditions but in no way as to the fourth.

4. The theology of wayfarers, by contrast, is science as to the first, second, and fourth conditions, but not as to the third, as is plain. It can, nevertheless, be absolutely called science, at least to the extent that science is distinguished from its opposite and from supposition or opinion (as taken in *Ethics* 6.4), because it is a habit whereby we assert truth determinately.

5. The theology of the blessed, however, is science as to the first three conditions, as is plain.

6. Whether it is science as to the fourth condition is unclear. One can say, it seems, with Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15.15, that “perhaps our thoughts will not be in movement there, but we will possess our whole science in a single intuitive grasp,” and so not discursively.

7. The opposite also seems it can be proved, because discourse does not require an order of time but of nature. And so it is here, that the quiddities of things are contained eminently in the divine essence and the truths about them are there as it were extrinsically.

8. So they therefore first by nature cause a knowledge of themselves in the intellect, and these are principles, and then cause a knowledge of the truths about them, and these are conclusions.

9. So a discursive process is found there. The authority of Augustine also does not seem decisive, because he is speaking doubtfully in that place. One can, however, assert

positively about the divine essence and its essential features that the blessed see this non-discursively because intuitively.

10. But against this view seems to be that, according to it, God would also understand discursively, since he would understand the quiddities in a prior moment of nature before he understands the truths that they contain, as was made plain above in a previous question.

11. I respond by saying that God understands things as they require to be understood. And because they require to be understood in this way, namely that the quiddities are understood first in nature before the truths they contain are understood, therefore etc. However, they are not thus understood because they thus require but conversely, for God's science is the cause of things and not the reverse, while the science of the blessed is caused by the things and so, properly speaking, it is discursive from cause to effect.

12. But there is still a doubt, namely whether the theology of contingents is a science as to the first three conditions. And it seems that it is not, because contingents are not necessary but are rather in the opposite division. So the second condition is lacking and consequently also the first, because a contingent thing does not cause sure knowledge about itself. The third condition too is lacking, because a contingent thing is not of a nature to cause evident knowledge about itself because it does not cause sure knowledge.

13. I say that contingents in theology, as the articles about Christ's humanity, are innately seen in the Word and thus they possess infallibility.

14. I also say absolutely that that the whole of theology can be called wisdom rather than science. For it is about the highest causes as about its first object.

To the Second of these Questions

15. To the second question [n.1] I say that theology is neither subalternate nor subalterning. The first point is plain because, although its subject is in some way contained under the subject of metaphysics, yet no theological conclusion is proved by any metaphysical principle nor by any metaphysical conclusion, as it should be [sc. if it were a subalternate science to metaphysics].

16. The second point is plain too, because no science humanly acquired resolves its truths to theological truths, which however it should [sc. if it were a subalterning science].

17. But on the contrary. All truths of all sciences can be resolved to clear vision of them in the Word, where they are more certainly seen than in any other principle, as in a self-evident principle. And such vision is theology and in such way is it theology.

18. I reply that the condition for a subalternate science is that its truth be caused by knowledge of the subalterning science. But the vision of truths in the Word is not the cause of the truths or of the conclusions that are contained in a self-evident natural principle, save in the sense that God's science is the cause of things, which however is a different matter. For the quiddities caused by God's science contain virtually in themselves the truth about themselves by virtual containment.

Question Four

Whether theology is a practical or speculative science

Scotus, *Sent.* Prologue qq.4, 5
 Thomas, *ST Ia* q.1 a.4
 Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* Prologue q.6
 Durandus, *Sent.* Prologue q.4
 Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.48 q.2
 John Baconitanus, *Sent.* Prologue q.4

1. The question asked is whether theology is a practical or speculative science.
2. That it is not practical. *John* 20.23, “These things are written that you might believe;” but belief is something speculative, because vision succeeds to it.
3. Again, in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 and *Ethics* 1.2.1094b7, 21-22 it is said that the subject of a practical habit is contingent, but the subject of this habit of theology is not contingent but necessary; therefore etc.
4. Again, Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.2 assigns three parts to speculative science, one of which is theology.
5. Again, speculative science is nobler than practical; but no science is nobler than this science of theology; therefore etc. The proof of the major is first that speculative science is for its own sake and practical science is for the sake of use, and second that speculative science is more certain, from *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14-16, 25-28.
6. On the contrary. *Romans* 13.10 says that love is the end of the law, and *Matthew* 22.40 that on these two commandments, namely love of God and love of neighbor, hangs the whole law.
7. Again, Augustine *On the Praise of Charity*, *Sermon* 350 n.2, says that whoever keeps charity in all things keeps whatever is plain in the divine sayings; but this is not something purely speculative; therefore theology is not purely speculative, etc.
8. A question asked along with this one is whether a habit is called practical from comparison to its end or to its object.
9. Response is made that it is from comparison to its end. In *On the Soul* 3.10.433a14-15 it is said that the intellect becomes practical by extension to work; therefore the habit becomes practical in like manner.
10. Again, in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 it is said that the end of speculative science is truth, and the end of practical science is work; therefore something is called speculative or practical from its end.
11. On the contrary. In *Metaphysics* 6.1.10225b18-28 the Philosopher distinguishes the practical and speculative by their objects.
12. Further, in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 the Philosopher assigns to practical science the good as its object – not any good, however, but the doable and contingent good; therefore a science is practical from its object.

To the Question

13. I reply that, since it is commonly conceded that a practical habit is in some way extended to praxis, the first thing to see is what is meant by praxis; the second to see how a practical habit is extended to praxis and what such extension is; the third whether a

habit is called practical from extension to praxis or from comparison to its object, which is the principal thing here being asked. Once these questions are seen the truth about the present fourth question [n.1] will be evident.

14. On the first point, then, I say that praxis is an act of a different power from the intellect, posterior in nature to understanding, and of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason.

15. The first condition here is plain, because praxis is the term of extension of the intellect, or the term of an extended understanding; so it is not an act of intellect, because then logic, which considers acts of the intellect, would be a practical science.

16. The second condition is also plain, for acts prior by nature to understanding, of which sort are acts of the vegetative, sensitive and appetitive, and the nutritive powers, are common to us and brute animals; but the whole practical element or practical knowledge, as concerns the extended act or an act of extension, is foreign to the brutes.

17. From the two stated conditions [n.14] follows one corollary, namely that praxis is an act of will, either elicited or voluntary, because only such acts are something posterior to understanding, as is plain; however praxis cannot be an act of intellect commanded by the will, both because this is excluded by the first part of the definition [n.14], and because intellect is not said to be extended to anything save extensively, while praxis is an act of extension of an understanding.

18. The third condition [n.14] is plain too from the aforesaid corollary. For every act elicited or commanded by the will can be in conformity with right reason. As to an act elicited by the will the point is obvious; as to a commanded act the point is plain because such act can be made conform by command of the will, which is a free power.

19. From the second and third conditions [n.14] another corollary is plain, namely that praxis is per se and primarily an act elicited by the will, but it is a commanded act per accidens, namely by command of the will, for a commanded act gets from the will that it is posterior in nature to understanding and that it can be conform to right reason.

20. Now from what has been said, especially from these two last conditions of praxis, the first and second principal articles [n.13] are plain, about which articles I say that praxis consists in two relations, those of natural priority and conformity; however it is so in such a way that these are not relations in act but in aptitude, for otherwise the same habit would sometimes be practical and sometimes not, since he who has the habit is sometimes actually considering and sometimes not. From the second article a corollary is plain, namely that speculative and practical are not essential differences of the habit but accidental ones, for a relation does not belong to the essence of something absolute but a habit is something absolute, since it is in the first species of quality. A definition, then, through proper features in this way would be like saying of animals that one kind is capable of laughing and another kind capable of roaring.

21. As to the third principal article [n.13] some say that intellect, act, and habit are not called practical in the same way, but intellect is called practical from the object while the act and habit are called practical from the end, namely from extension to praxis.

22. But others say that intellect, act, and habit are called practical from the end, namely by extension to work.

23. Quickly running through this question, therefore, which Scotus treats of at length, I say that, according to him, it seems we should say, following his statements, that a habit is called practical from its end, namely from praxis. For the idea of the practical consists,

for him, in a double habitual respect, namely of natural priority and conformity; but such a double respect is not of the habit to the object but to praxis, as is plain from what was said above; therefore etc.

24. However Scotus means that any act and habit can be called practical by extrinsic denomination, namely from the end and from praxis. He means nevertheless that this is not the first cause for denominating an act or habit as practical, but the prior cause is from the object. The reason is that act and habit get from the object, by which the act is caused and the habit caused by means of act, the fact that they are extended to praxis. Hence, because the object is of this sort, the habit or act caused by it is the same sort. For the habit does not get from the power (of which it is the habit) that it is practical or speculative. For it is by respect to the intellect that every habit present in the intellect gets the fact that it is of the intellect and is not something else, and that an act gets the fact that it is an act of understanding and not something else. But from praxis itself one cannot get that a habit or act is speculative or practical, for praxis is posterior; therefore they get this precisely from the object. So it is because the object is of this sort, to wit a thing to speculate, that it makes the act and habit to be speculative; and it is because the object is of this other sort, to wit not only a thing to speculate but in addition a thing to do in praxis, that it makes the act and habit practical as well as speculative; so practical and speculative are taken from the object as from their prior cause.

25. Peter Aureole (*Sent.* Prologue q.1 a.5) says that neither habit nor act are formally called practical from the object, nor from the end that is praxis, but from something intrinsic; for he says that every intellectual habit gets partial activity in respect of an elicited act that is an act of considering, and the habit is not called practical from this activity for then every intellectual habit would be practical. But some habits get activity in respect of a further cause, which is operation and praxis, and the act from this activity is formally and intrinsically practical, and a habit that does not have this activity is speculative. An example of each habit: medicine not only has an activity with respect to the act that is the act of considering health, but also with respect to the act that is the act of working on health, and it is formally practical because of this second activity; but a philosophical habit performs no act about physical things save with respect to considering them, and so it is speculative and not practical. So Aureole says that if God were to give to the speculative habit of physics some activity with respect to a physical thing, to wit that the natural philosopher, by means of that habit, could produce a natural rose tree as a doctor produces health, then the habit would be truly practical. He also says further that this activity, by which the habit is called practical, is not actual but habitual. Now an act of the habit has actual activity with respect to operation, and by this activity it is formally practical; but an act of a speculative habit has no activity and so the act is speculative. He says again that the activities of the act and habit, by which, as stated, they are formally called practical, are not elicitive activities of the agent but determinative ones. For he says that, as fire can be called hot because it is able to heat and also because it has in itself the form of heat, yet the former denominating of it would be extrinsic and the latter formal and intrinsic; so act and habit can be called practical by extrinsic denomination from the end (which is praxis) and from the object, but nevertheless they would be formally and intrinsically and properly called so from the aforesaid activity. Thereby he says, in consistency, that there is no need that the praxis, to which the intellect is extended, be the act of a different power from the intellect; reason can there be the act of

the intellect to which the habits are said to be extended, if they have with respect to it the stated activity. So he says that grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric are truly practical sciences, because they not only have their particular activity with respect to the act of considering their objects and the properties of their objects, but they also have a further activity with respect to operating about those objects. For logic not only considers syllogisms but also produces syllogisms, and so with the others. And now it is the case that wherever such activity is found in a habit or in an act, there the true idea of the practical will be found, regardless of variation in the material, as is plain, because a triangle made of ash has three angles just as does a triangle made of gold. So whether the operation that is praxis is in the intellect or outside it, the habit that has the stated activity with respect to it is truly practical.

26. From this he says, consistently, that the division of habits into speculative and practical is not an accidental distinction, as Scotus maintains, but an essential one. This is plain from the mind of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6 when he divides intellectual habits first into speculative and practical and next subdivides the first member, the speculative, into mathematics, metaphysics, and physics. But it is certain that the subdivision of the speculative is an essential one; therefore the first division was an essential one too, otherwise the Philosopher would have misunderstood the art of dividing.

27. And if it be argued against Aureole that a relation or a respect does not belong to the essence of an absolute, but the idea of the practical, even on his view, formally consists in a respect, because the activity, although it is not about as familiar a term, is only a respect; therefore the idea of the practical is not a difference essentially in the habit.

28. Aureole says in reply that, according to Simplicius on the *Categories*, essential habits and things in the first species of quality are put in that category, that is are made known and denominated, by a respect, namely because they essentially include a respect; so consistent with this he says to the first question posed above that theology humanly acquired is truly practical, because it truly has activity not only with respect to the act of considering, but also with respect to the operation that is making plain the articles of faith, and with respect to the operation that is knowing and loving God and neighbor and the like.

29. From what has been said consider that, according to the opinion of Aureole and perhaps of Scotus, it can be said that everything practical is speculative but not conversely, because practical seems to do nothing other than add to speculative the activity spoken of by Aureole or the double respect spoken of by Scotus. But Scotus says to the first question [n.1] that the whole of theology necessary for the created intellect is simply practical, for which the reason is as follows: a habit having a natural priority to and a conformity with true praxis is simply practical; but theology is of this sort; therefore etc. The major is plain from the second article of the principal question [n.13]; the proof of the minor is that the whole of theology is about God as about its first object, as is plain from the third question of this prologue.

30. Again, every act of will is truly praxis, as is plain from the first and second corollaries of this question [nn.17, 19]; but God naturally determines the created intellect to knowledge of himself in advance of every will, as far as concerns himself, and he is virtually conform to every right volition, since all rightness in volition is taken from him;

therefore all necessary theological knowledge is conform to right volition, which is true praxis, and is of itself naturally prior to praxis; therefore etc.

To the Arguments

31. To the first argument of the first question for the opposite view [n.2] I say that faith is not a speculative but a practical habit, and that the vision that succeeds to it is not speculative but practical. For it is by nature prior to fruition or enjoyment and is apt to be elicited in conformity with right reason and right vision, and thus there is a priority and conformity of vision to enjoyment, which is true praxis, and likewise there is a priority and conformity of faith in the wayfarer to love of God.

32. To the second argument [n.3] I say that there is no need for the first subject of a practical science to be contingent, but it is enough for the praxis to which it is extended to be contingent; and so the subject is there taken for term and end.

33. To the third [n.4] I say that Boethius is using theology there for metaphysics.

34. To the fourth [n.5] I say that the major in the argument is false, and to the first proof of it I say that things that have an order to something more perfect are not by this fact less perfect but more perfect. An example: the sensitive power in man, which is ordered to the intellective power, is more perfect than the sensitive power in brutes; so it is here, that theology is for the sake of enjoyment, which is the noblest act. Hence if Aristotle had posited the true enjoyment that we posit, he would have conceded that the science that is for the sake of it would be the noblest. And to the second proof of the major I say that every science is equally certain in itself, because any science at all resolves its conclusions ultimately to first principles; but not every science is equally certain by reason of its object, for some objects are more and some less necessary. As it is, however, because Aristotle posited that practical science was about contingents doable by us, therefore he spoke as he did. But because we posit that the praxis that is the end of theology is the love of God, and because God is the supremely necessary being, therefore etc.

35. To the first argument for the second question [n.9] I say that the solution is plain from Scotus' response and from the body of the question above; I say the same about the second argument [n.10].

Book One

First Distinction

Question One

Whether enjoyment is of the ultimate end only

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2 a.3

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.1

Thomas, *ST IaIIae* q.11 a.3

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.3

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.1

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.1

1. About the first distinction a question is asked whether the object of enjoyment is the ultimate end.

2. That it is not. Augustine in *83 Questions* q.30 said that enjoyment is of invisible goods; but man has many such goods; therefore etc.

3. Again, the capacity of the soul is finite, so it can be satisfied by something finite; but it should enjoy whatever it can be satisfied by; therefore etc.

4. There is something greater than the capacity of the soul, as God, who suffices for his own capacity which is something greater; and there is something less than it, as the body; so there will be something equal to it, which will be less than God and greater than the body, and this will satisfy it.

5. Again, any form satisfies the capacity of matter, so any object satisfies the capacity of a power. Proof of the consequence: a power has regard to its object through the form received in it, so if a form satisfies matter intrinsically then an object received through a form will satisfy it extrinsically. Proof of the antecedent: if a form were not to satisfy matter then matter would remain under a form by force of violence, as is plain about a light thing being downwards.

6. Again, the intellect assents to any truth more firmly than to the supreme truth; therefore the will too will assent more firmly to a good other than the ultimate good.

7. On the contrary: Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.5 n.5 says that what we should enjoy are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and these three are something one.

To the Question

8. Reply. I first distinguish between ordered enjoyment and enjoyment taken generally. Second I will say what the primary object of disordered enjoyment is. Third I will speak about the object of enjoyment in general. Fourth I will say how the statement that enjoyment is about the end is to be understood.

9. As to the first of these points I say that enjoyment in general is prior to ordered enjoyment, because the will is free in such a way that it is not determined to an ordered act but is indifferent as between an ordered and a disordered act. And that enjoyment can be a disordered act is plain from Augustine, who says (*83 Questions* q.30) that the will is

perverse when it uses what it should enjoy and enjoys what it should use. Therefore enjoyment absolutely taken is more universal than ordered enjoyment, which connotes enjoyment along with its due circumstances.

10. As to the second point I say what Avicenna says, *Metaphysics* 9 ch.4 (104vb-105rb), that the first intelligence causes a second, and the second, by its act of understanding, causes a third, and so on, from which it follows that the third intelligence enjoys the second with perfect enjoyment, and thus the object of blessed fruition is not the ultimate end only. The consequence is proved by Proclus (*Theological Instruction* ch. 34) when he says that each thing is naturally disposed to turn to what it proceeds from, and in this return there seems to be a completed circle and so perfection; therefore a produced intelligence is perfectly at rest in the producing intelligence; therefore etc.

11. An argument against this is as follows: the soul is the image of God and so has a capacity for God; therefore, because it has a capacity for God, it cannot be at rest in anything less than God.

12. Again, the soul is created immediately by God, so it rests in God alone.

13. But these arguments are not properly directed against the philosophers because, as is plain, the fact that the soul is the image of God and that it is caused immediately by God is held only by faith; and thus the philosophers would deny it.

14. So I argue against Avicenna in another way, and first as follows: a power is not perfectly at rest save in that in which the idea of its primary object is most perfectly found; but, according to Avicenna himself, *Metaphysics* 1 ch.6 (72rb), being taken absolutely is the object of the intellect; therefore the intellect is not at rest save where it finds the idea of being most perfectly to be, and God alone is such.

15. Again, a power that is of itself inclined to many things is not perfectly at rest save in something that perfectly contains all it is inclined to (to the extent that some one thing can contain it all); but only God contains virtually and perfectly all the things that the intellect and will are inclined to.

16. Again, when Avicenna's third intelligence [n.10] it understands the second intelligence, either it understands it as finite, and then it is not perfectly at rest in it because it sees that there can be something greater; or it understands it as infinite, and then its understanding is false and consequently it is not in a state of bliss, because blessedness does not consist in false understanding; or it understands it neither as finite nor as infinite, and then it is not in a state of bliss because such an understanding is imperfect.

17. As to the third point [n.8] I say that the object of enjoyment in general is either the true ultimate end or a false ultimate end, according as, in the latter case, this false end arises from an erring reason or by prescription of will, namely when the will determines itself to some good by a willing of it as if it were the ultimate end. The two first cases are plain. The proof of the third is that, since the will is free, then, just as willing and not willing are in its power, so also is the mode of willing; thus it can will one object for the sake of another and not will it for the sake of itself; consequently it can, by willing this object for the sake of itself and not for the sake of another, fix it before itself; and thus would a prescribed end be for it the ultimate end.

18. As to the fourth point [n.8] I say that end as such does not belong to the idea of enjoyable object, because end is said to be a respect of reason [sc. and not a respect of will], and also a respect does not belong to the idea of something absolute, but enjoyable

object as such states something absolute (both because what is more than this is a respect of reason and because if, *per impossibile*, the supreme being were not the ultimate end, it would still truly be the beatific object). But the respect of end is goes together with the enjoyable object of ordered enjoyment, because ordered enjoyment is of itself such that the supreme being is its ultimate end. However in disordered enjoyment the respect of end is consequent to the act, for because the will of a glutton delights in food therefore does he fix food before himself as ultimate end. Behold then how the idea of end here follows the act that is delight, but how it went together with the object in something else.

To the Arguments

19. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say either that enjoyment is there taken broadly for love of the fine as distinct from love of the useful and pleasant, or that plurality is there taken, not for a real plurality, but for the plurality of ideas of perfection existing in the enjoyable object, all of which ideas are ideas of enjoyment although what they state is perfection simply.

20. To the second [n.3] I say that the relation of a power to its object is not a relation of likeness and equality but of proportion, and so the relation does not require equality in the terms. Hence, although the capacity of the soul exists in a finite nature, yet it can have a different term that is infinite. And therefore, the soul cannot be satisfied by anything finite, just as if it were capable of infinite existence.

21. To the third [n.4] I say that nothing is greater than the capacity of the soul. However, the capacity of God is greater on the part of the subject, and so he will grasp the same object more fully. An example: if there is a whiteness of ten grades and there is someone who sees it according to five grades and another with sharper sight who sees it according to the ten grades, the excess here would not be on the part of the object but on the part of the act.

22. To the fourth [n.5] I say that there are many appetites in matter, as many in fact as there are forms that can be received in its potency; so I say that no form totally satisfies matter in respect of its whole appetite (unless the form is the most perfect and includes every form that matter can receive). And the way matter rests is not like the way the will rests, because any finite thing can rest in any finite thing that is received intrinsically within it, and because matter is not at rest under a form by force of violence, for prime matter is disposed indeterminately to all forms. A power, however, since it has regard to an object extrinsically, is only satisfied ultimately by the most perfect object, which is the supreme good.

23. To the last argument [n.6] I say that the cases are not alike. For the intellect assents to any truth and does so according to the evidence of that truth itself; but the will assents with more intensity to an object just as it pleases, because it is free.

Question Two

Whether the ultimate end contains only one idea of being enjoyable

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.6

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2

1. The question is asked, secondly, whether there are in God many ideas of being enjoyable, sufficiently distinct that the will can enjoy one without enjoying another.

2. That there are. Aristotle in *Ethics* 14.1096a23-27 and Averroes [Eustratius *Explanations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 1 ch.6 (17E)] say that just as being and true are in all the categories, so also is good; therefore just as relation has its proper entity so it has its proper good, and thus, since in God there are distinct relations, there will really be in him distinct enjoyable goods.

3. Again, just as one is convertible with being so also is good. But in God truth is an essential and a personal feature, so goodness too is an essential and a personal feature.

4. Again, when there is one idea on the part of the object there is unity on the part of the act; but, since we believe that God is Three, there will be three things believed, and consequently three acts of believing; thus there will also be three visions, because vision succeeds to faith; but vision is part of enjoyment; therefore etc.

5. On the contrary. God is one efficient principle under one idea, and a principle that is single with so much unity that one divine person cannot effect anything when another does not; so God is one ultimate end under the idea of such unity, because one person cannot fulfill the act of enjoyment without another; nor does one attributal idea in God exist without another, since these are less distinct than the persons are.

6. Again, in any essential order there is only one first, so there is only one first in the order of enjoyment too.

7. Further, to a first efficient cause there corresponds one end; but the first efficient cause is one only; therefore there is only one end in respect of which there is enjoyment.

8. Again, just as God is one kingship so he is one goodness; but because of his kingship a single adoration so fits him that it is not fitting to adore one person without adoring another, and so not fitting to enjoy one without enjoying another.

To the Question

9. Response. This question can have a fourfold difficulty according to four distinctions that exist in divine reality. The first of these is the distinction of essence and person, the second the distinction of person and person, the third the distinction of essence and attributes and of attribute and attribute, the fourth the distinction of essence and ideas. Now as to the third and fourth distinctions there will be an extensive discussion later, so for the present I will speak first of the enjoyment of the wayfarer as to its possibility; second of the enjoyment of the blessed as to the absolute power of God; third of the enjoyment of the blessed as to the will of God; fourth of the enjoyment of the blessed and wayfarers as to what is *de facto* the case.

The First Article

10. About the first article [n.9] I say that the wayfarer can with ordered enjoyment enjoy the essence without enjoying the person, and can enjoy one person without enjoying another.

11. I prove the first point [n.10] from Augustine *On the Trinity* 7 ch.1 n.2, that no essence as such is said relatively, because everything said relatively is something after the relative has been removed. Hence Augustine concludes that, if the Father is not something absolutely, he will not be something that can be said relatively to something else. The point is made clear by reason, because, since essence is a being absolutely, the divine essence can be conceived such that in its concept relation is not included; therefore the divine essence can be conceived without conceiving person (for relation is included in person), and the essence as so conceived states supreme good; therefore the intellect may rest in the essence as conceived without relation, and by parity of reasoning so can the will, because the essence contains the idea of every good.

12. I prove the second point [n.10] as follows. Although the Father as Father is said relatively to the Son, yet he is not as Father said relatively to the Holy Spirit; therefore he can be conceived as Father without the Holy Spirit being conceived; but when the Father is conceived the idea of every good is conceived, since the essence is included in the Father; therefore a wayfarer will be able to enjoy the Father without enjoying the Holy Spirit.

13. He will also be able to enjoy the Father without enjoying the Son, even though these are understood together. For although relatives are understood together, nevertheless, because enjoyment is an act of will, one relative can be enjoyed without the other, that is, one relative can be willed without the other. Nor would this enjoyment be disordered, as is plain at least from this, that it is possible to enjoy the creator without the creature, and, as is plain, being able to enjoy God as creator without enjoying the creature is being able to enjoy creator without enjoying the correlative, which is creature.

14. The proof of the first part here [n.13] is as follows, that there are, as regard the three persons, three distinct articles of faith corresponding to the persons; therefore one person will be able to be conceived when another is not conceived; and in the person conceived is included and understood the idea of the supreme good. And if you say that the persons are correlatives and so, if one is conceived, the other is too, I say that, even though knowledge of one person requires knowledge of the other, yet there is no need that he who knows them and is enjoying one should be enjoying the other.

The Second Article

15. About the second article [n.9] I say [but provisionally, n.21] that in no way can the blessed intuitively see the essence without the person, or see one person without another.

16. The proof as to the first part [the distinction of essence from person, n.15] is that the essence is something common to the persons, and so, if it were seen without the person, the knowledge of it would be confused and indistinct; but the beatific vision is most distinct; therefore etc.

17. Again, intuitive vision focuses on the essence, and in this respect it is distinguished from abstractive knowledge which abstracts from the essence and from its direct presence, as will be said below; but the essence only exists in the persons; therefore etc.

18. Again, nothing can be intuitively and distinctly seen unless all the parts of it are seen that, from the nature of the thing, are distinct in it; but the persons, from the nature of the thing, are distinct in the essence; therefore etc.

19. Hereby to the other distinction [of person from person, n.15]: for from the fact that the essence without the person cannot be seen without the person (since it is with equal reason seen in one person and in another, for it is equally disposed to one person and to another), there follows that one person cannot be seen without another.

20. Hereby then to this second article [nn.9, 15]: the will is not more abstractive than the intellect, but since the intellect, as was proved [nn.16-19], cannot intuitively see the essence without the person nor one person without another, therefore neither is the will able to will the essence without the person or one person without another. And again, as to this last point: the mind is the image of the Trinity and so cannot be at rest save in the Trinity; but to enjoy is to rest; therefore etc.

21. Notwithstanding all these arguments, however, I say that by the absolute power of God [n.9] the blessed can enjoy the essence without the person and enjoy one person without enjoying another.

22. The arguments given above about the wayfarer [nn.11-14] are able to prove this point, but I prove it about possibility in a particular way as follows: the Father precedes the Son in divine reality by order of origin, but in that prior moment he is most perfectly blessed; yet he is not expecting any perfection from the produced person from whom he is really distinct, and blessedness is an intrinsic perfection; however in that prior moment he does not have for beatific object the essence as communicated to the persons, as is plain; therefore the essence absolutely and of itself is the most perfect beatific object. There is then no contradiction in being able to enjoy, with the most perfect enjoyment, the essence without the person and similarly one person without another; for in that prior moment the first person, since the essence is included in him, is the most perfect beatific object.

23. Again, beatitude in God is a perfection simply; but in God the perfections simply precede the notions in some way; therefore in God, before the production of the persons, there is perfect beatitude, whose object cannot be the essence as communicated to the three persons. The manner of positing this fact is as follows: an act has a first object on which it essentially depends, and it has a secondary object on which it does not essentially depend; but it is not impossible for the same act to remain with the first object while the second object has been removed. An example: the divine essence is the first object of beatitude, and the things seen in the divine essence are the secondary object; and therefore an angel can be simply blessed by enjoying the divine essence while vision of the things contained in the essence are taken from him, and while the act of enjoyment remains the same as it was before. So in the issue at hand the divine essence as not communicated to the three persons is as it were the supreme object of enjoyment.

24. To the first argument to the contrary [n.16] I say that the divine essence, because of its perfection, is not divided up into the persons, and therefore it so exists in the three of them that it is nevertheless a this, and thus knowledge of it without the persons is not confused the way universal knowledge without the particulars is confused.

25. To the second [n.17] I say that intuitive vision always focuses on existence but not incommunicable subsistence. An example: whiteness only exists in a supposit, and yet if it were separate it would truly be seen intuitively because it would have a true essence; so in the issue at hand, the essence in itself truly exists but it only has incommunicable subsistence in the person.

26. To the third [n.18] I say that the major is false save where a whole is divided into the parts; but the divine essence is not divided into the persons.

27. And from this is plain the solution to its other consequents [nn.19-20], and thereby is the antecedent denied. Nevertheless I say that the consequence about willing is false, for the intellect can show the will one total object where there are many things, of which one includes the rest, and yet the will, because of its liberty, will have its own act of willing about the including first thing without have an act about the included last thing. An example: someone can want to have the episcopacy without wanting to have the priesthood, especially if his act of willing is a negative one; and yet the intellect shows that the priesthood is included in the episcopacy.

28. As to the last argument about the image [n.20], it is plain that the argument is not one of necessity but of a certain congruity. For *per impossibile* God were not three he would, if he were the supreme good, still beatify.

The Third and Fourth Articles

29. About the third article [n.9] I say that a blessed created intellect itself acts with its natural power as much as it can when its beatific object acts; and because its object is the essence as communicated to the three persons, therefore it cannot of its own power see the essence save in the three persons; thus too it cannot intuitively see the essence without the persons, nor one person without another, nor can it thus enjoy the essence with ordered fruition as far as the will is concerned, because, just as being able to enjoy and not enjoying is a sin, so being able to enjoy a person and not enjoying him, although he is enjoyable, is a sin.

30. But whether God could do this by his absolute power is a matter of much doubt. However I believe that he would not do so insofar as he is good; for since he is confirmed in good and cannot sin, then as a result he cannot fail to enjoy what is enjoyable. But when one speaks precisely of his absolute natural power, one should perhaps say the same as about the wayfarer [n.10].

31. About the fourth article [n.9] I say that *de facto* all the blessed enjoy with a single enjoyment the one essence and the three persons, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.8.n.17.

To the Arguments

32. To the first argument at the beginning [n.2] I say that the good that is convertible with being and is found in every category is not a simply perfect good of the sort the end and the term of enjoyment ought to be.

33. To the second [n.3] the answer is also plain, because the personal good, if the good that is convertible with being could be called that, is not the simply perfect quidditative good that is the term of the act of enjoyment.

34. To the third [n.4] I say that the wayfarer does not see the Trinity as it is but conceives it with three conceptions, by a sort of likeness with three created things; but in beatitude the first object is the essence, which is one in the three persons, and, because it is intuited as it is, so the vision of the essence and of the three persons is single.

35. As to the statement that we see God insofar as he is Three, I say that the 'insofar as' does not indicate formal cause, for the Trinity is not the formal cause of vision but the essence is, which is single or a oneness of essence; and the like is not true of faith for, because of the imperfection of our intellect, the essence does not cause in us the act of believing or knowing the way it causes the act of vision. For we believe or know the distinct persons from creatures.

36. To the argument for the opposite [n.5] I say that, with respect to what is extrinsic, effecting in God is one thing and determining is another. For the human nature in Christ is caused by the whole Trinity and yet it has its supposit only in the person of the Word, so that only the person of the Son is the term of the nature's dependence on the supposit. Thus in the matter at issue I say that the essence without the person and one person without another can, by the absolute power of God, be the term of the act of enjoyment.

37. To the next argument [n.6] I say that one ultimate end, having in itself one formal idea as it is the ultimate end, can yet have ideas different from that idea that are not ideas of ultimate end; and [n.7] it can be enjoyed according to the idea of ultimate end without being enjoyed under other ideas.

38. To the next [n.8] I say that there is a double adoration, one habitual and one actual. It is sufficient now that someone who adores one person actually adore another habitually. And one of the persons can in this way be adored without another being adored, as is plain in the hymn 'Come, Creator Spirit.'

Question Three

Whether enjoyment is a feeling received in the will, to wit some delight

Bonaventure, *Sent.*1 d.1 q.1 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.3

Thomas, *ST Ia IIae* q.11 a.1

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.*1 d.1 q.1

Durandus, *Sent.*1 d.1 q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.*1 d.1 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.1

1. I ask third whether enjoyment (on the supposition that it per se belongs to the will) is an act elicited by the will or a feeling and a delight consequent to an act.
2. That it is a feeling and a delight can be taken from the Apostle in *Galatians* 5.22 where he says that the fruits of the Spirit are joy and peace; now these are not acts but things consequent to act, whence the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10.4.1174b31-33 says delight follows act; therefore enjoyment is not an elicited act.
3. On the contrary: the will when willing God in an elicited act either wills God for the sake of something else, and then it uses God and is perverse, or wills him for his own sake, and then enjoys him – and the intended conclusion is obtained.

To the Question

4. Response. One must here first look into the acts of the powers and then into the principal matter at issue.
5. About the first I say that, just as the intellect assents to some truth because of itself, namely a principle, and to another truth because of something else, namely a conclusion (to which it assents in virtue of the principle), so the will wills something for its own sake, namely the end, and another thing for the sake of something else, namely things for the end (which it wills for the sake of the end). However in fact there is in this likeness a twofold difference. One is that the two assents of the intellect are distinguished precisely by their objects, one of which objects is self evident and the other evident through something else; and therefore the intellect, which is a natural power, can only assent to the first because of itself and to the second because of another. But it is not so on the part of the will, for since the will is of itself a free power it can will the same object for its own sake or for the sake of something else, because that is contained in its liberty of manner of willing (just as is the act itself is so contained), and thus the mentioned acts are distinct precisely because of the liberty of the will. The second difference is that the intellect's two assents sufficiently divide them, for since the intellect is a natural power it can only assent according to the nature of truth itself, and every propositional truth is either a principle or a conclusion. On the part of the will, however, there is a middle position, because the intellect can show the will some good absolutely without showing it whether the good is to be willed for itself or for something else; and then the will can, of its liberty, will it absolutely, without willing it for itself or for something else; but the will can next command the intellect to consider how it is to be willed; and the will has one act of willing it for another, which is called using, and another act of willing it for itself, which is called enjoying, and another act that is neither.
6. About the second [n.4], which is the principal thing asked, some authorities from Augustine attempt to say that enjoying is precisely a perfect act elicited by the will, which act is willing something for its own sake. Hence he says, *83 Question* q.30, that all perversity, which has the name of vice, is to use what should be enjoyed and to enjoy what should be used; and such perversity exists formally in an elicited act of will and not in delight, for delight is only perverse because the act is. Augustine also seems to say the same in *Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.4 n.4, that to enjoy is to cling with love to something for its own sake. Other authorities of Augustine attempt to say that delight is consequent to act, as *On the Trinity* 1.10, that joy is formally a delight in properly intending the act. Some authorities say that enjoying states both things, the act of willing something for its

own sake and the delight consequent to the act. And, in that case, enjoying is not some being per se one, but a being per accidens one put together from the two; and Augustine seems to mean this expressly in the definition he sets down in *On the Trinity* 10 ch.10 n.13, that we enjoy known things in which the will, delighted in them for their own sake, rests. So when Augustine says ‘we enjoy known things’ he indicates the elicited act (which is about a known object); when he says ‘delighted in them for their own sake’ he indicates the feeling itself that is consequent to the act, or the very delight. And so, accordingly, his other authorities are incomplete with respect to this one.

To the Arguments

7. The response to the argument [n.2] is plain. But whether the act or the delight is more properly signified by the word ‘enjoy’ [the authority from the *Ethics*] is difficult to establish, though it can be said that it signifies the act, because the word ‘enjoy’ takes a direct object and signifies an act. To the argument itself one can say that the authority [from *Galatians*] is rather in our favor than against us. For the fruit that is enjoyment is the act of joy; but if enjoying were not an act, enjoying would not be delighting.

Question Four

Whether the will must necessarily enjoy the end when the intellect has apprehended it

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.4

Thomas, *ST Ia IIae* q.10 aa.1, 2

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.*1 d.1 q.7

1. The fourth question asked is whether the will must necessarily will the end when the intellect has apprehended. The fourth question asked is whether the will must necessarily will the end when the intellect apprehends it.

2. That it must. Just as the efficient cause moves something properly, so the end moves it mediately through the efficient cause; but when the efficient cause is proximate to a well disposed passive thing and neither is impeded, action necessarily follows; therefore it will be the same on the part of the end. But there is a sufficient proximity when the end is apprehended by the intellect; therefore etc.

3. On the contrary. Natural necessity and liberty do not go together; but the will is a free power; therefore it cannot be necessitated. The proof of the major is that ‘necessarily’ and ‘freely’ are opposite modes of predicating and are impossible. The proof of the minor is that the will is free even about the end; for it freely wills what is for the end, and so it freely wills the end; otherwise it would not be the same power; but it is plain that there is one intellect for all intelligibles; so there is one will for all willables.

To the Question Opinion of Others

4. Response. This question can be understood either about an end obscurely apprehended in general, or about an end obscurely apprehended in particular, or about an

end seen clearly in particular.

5. About the first it is said that the will necessarily enjoys when an end is apprehended in general. The proof is as follows, from *Physics* 2.9.200a15-16, that as the principle is in speculative things so the end is in doable things; but the intellect assents necessarily to a first principle in speculative things; therefore the will necessarily wills the end in doable things.

6. Again, the will cannot fail to will a thing unless it finds in it some malice or some defect of goodness; but the intellect shows it neither of these in an end apprehended in general; therefore etc.

7. About the second article [n.4] it is said that the will is able to enjoy an end apprehended confusedly and in particular, and the reason is that it is able then to enjoy some other particular good impossible with the first.

8. About the third article [n.4] it is said that the will necessarily enjoys an end clearly seen, which is proved by the second argument to the first article [n.6]. Another argument is also added here, that the will without charity can in no way enjoy the end even when clearly seen; the reason is that action presupposes existence, and therefore a supernatural action of the sort that the enjoyment of the ultimate end is when the end is clearly seen presupposes supernatural existence, which is charity.

Against this Opinion

9. Against the first article [n.5] Augustine says *Retractions I* that nothing is in the power of the will more than willing itself; but the act of the other power, namely whether the intellect considers or does not consider the end, is in the power simply of the will as to its being or not; therefore much more will the will's own proper act, namely whether it wills or does not will the end, be in its own power.

10. Again if the will necessarily wills the end shown to it by the intellect, the will would necessarily command the intellect to consider the end all the time, which is plainly false.

11. Again, a heavy thing rests in a lower place with the same necessity as it tends to a lower place and conversely, and it also removes every impediment less than itself; therefore if the will necessarily wills the end shown it by the intellect, it necessarily commands the intellect to show it the end, and necessarily holds the intellect to consideration of the end, which however is false.

12. I concede the second article as to the conclusion [n.7] but it does not seem to stand with the other articles. First because if the second reason for the first article [n.6] is good, it would be more conclusive about an end apprehended in particular than about one apprehended in general, and so it seems to posit impossibles.

13. And as against the third article, when there is the same principle of acting and the same idea of acting, there is uniformity in the mode of acting. But a wayfarer who sees the end obscurely does not will the end necessarily but contingently and freely; therefore since a comprehender in the fatherland, who sees the end clearly, has the numerically same will as before (the principle of his acting), and the numerically same charity though a more perfect charity (the reason of his acting), he does not will the end necessarily but contingently and freely.

14. A confirmation is that clear seeing and obscure seeing seem only to be a greater

and lesser closeness in respect of the object of the power; but greater and lesser closeness do not take away the manner of acting, but just make the act more or less intense. An example: fire by necessity of nature heats a distant and close heatable thing but the latter more intensely and the former less.

15. Again, the will, as will, is formally free will, just as the intellect, as intellect, is formally a natural power; but the will to which the intellect presents an object clearly seen is formally will; therefore it is formally free; therefore it does not necessarily but contingently will whatever it wills, because if it is not lord of its act it is not formally free.

Author's Opinion

16. I say therefore about the first, second, and third articles, that the will contingently and not necessarily wills the end, in whatever way the end is shown to it; and the same as to what is for the end.

17. I say this as to what belongs to the will of itself. I also say in addition that the intellect, by the absolute power of God, can clearly see the end without the will enjoying it, although they say the opposite; and I prove this as follows: whenever there are two absolute entities one of which naturally precedes the other, God can make the first without the second; therefore God can make it that there is clear vision in the intellect without volition in the will, because the former is an absolute entity and is naturally prior.

18. To this the response is made that this is true when the first thing does not depend on the second and when both do not depend on a third; but here both proceed from the clearly seen object.

19. On the contrary. What causes voluntarily can without contradiction cause the first effect without causing the second when the first does not depend on the second; but God causes voluntarily whatever he causes extrinsically; therefore he can cause the vision that happens in the intellect without the volition that he causes in the will.

20. Against what they say also in the third article about charity [n.8] I argue as follows: that by which an agent formally and precisely acts is the power; therefore if the will with charity can enjoy and without charity cannot enjoy, then the result is that charity is a power and not a habit.

21. Again, the will without charity can, by its own natural power, love a created good for itself and so enjoy it, and much more strongly if the good is clearly seen, since more of the idea of enjoyability would be found in it.

Response to the Arguments

22. In response to the arguments, I say to the first argument adduced for the other position in the first article [n.5] that if the likeness held in everything it would entail many falsehoods. For just as the intellect necessarily assents to a conclusion because of the principles, so the will would because of the end necessarily will what is for the end, which is plainly false. Overall, however, I say that the likeness holds to this extent, that just as the intellect elicits the conclusion from the principles, so the will pursues from desire of the end those things that are for the end which the intellect shows the will that the end cannot be attained without; but in manner of acting there is no likeness, since the intellect is a natural power and the will a free power.

23. As to the second article [n.6], it is said that if the will cannot fail to will the end shown it, namely by denying it with a positive act (for in such an end there is no malice nor nay lack of what should be in an object of volition), but the will can fail to will it by denying it with a refusal to act (because the former is a contradiction in willing but there is no contradiction in the refusal to act, for the act is positive but the will remains free as to the contradictories, as is plain) – then it thus seems to follow that even a blessed will, although, as far as concerns itself, it would not be able not to will the beatific object as if that object were non-willable, can yet fail to will it, that is, can suspend the act of willing it.

24. But against this result [n.23]: the will can only fail to will the object by a refusal to act if it wills with a positive act the act because of which it refuses the object; but the end is not thus non-willable, since there is no malice or defect in it. Further, if the act could be refused, the respect based on it could also be refused, and consequently God, who is the term of the respect, could be refused.

25. Again, the will of God is free and yet it cannot suspend its act; therefore suspending the act does not belong to the idea of freedom.

26. Again, if the reason whereby the will could remove the act for one moment is a reason it could remove it for another moment, then the will could continue the suspending of the act (because whenever it was time to re-elicite the act, it would elicit otherwise); but to hold onto a suspended act by refusing God is to sin, since the commandment says ‘thou shalt love the Lord thy God’; therefore a blessed will could sin, which is false.

27. To the first of these [n.24] one could, in one way, say that even if the act is not bad in itself, yet it is imperfect by way of negation, because it does not state total perfection, and so the will can, because of this imperfection, refuse it. And likewise, the respect in question [n.24] is the term of the act; or it is not, because it states total perfection. Nor yet is there need that the intellect not understand the respect without understanding the term, but the will, which does not follow the manner of the intellect (for it is free), can will the respect without the end or the end without the respect, and so non will in just the same way as it non wills the Father without non willing the Son, and conversely; or one could say that non willing the object does not have to be by non willing of the act but by removal of every act.

28. To the second [n.25] I say that every will, as it is will, is free, and as such can remove the act. But that the will of God could not do this comes from the fact that his act is infinite and is a necessary existence; and consequently it is also immutable.

29. To the third [n.25] I say, on the supposition that the will removes the act by non willing of the act (as was said in the first solution to the objection made against the solution to the argument of the first article n.22)), that, because the blessed will is confirmed in goodness by God, God does not act along with the blessed will in its act of volition such that by it the blessed will could of itself not will the act, and so its liberty is not impeded. For if God were not to act along with my will, I could not will anything, and yet my will is free.

30. To the argument adduced for proof of the second part of the third article [n.8, n.20], I say that although the presentation of the clearly seen object is supernatural, yet, once presented, the will is naturally able to will it freely for its own sake and consequently to enjoy it.

31. To the argument at the beginning [n.2] I say that if the efficient cause is a natural agent it necessarily acts when the passive thing is proximate to it and is unimpeded; but if it is a voluntary agent it does not act necessarily when the passive thing is proximate to it but contingently; and so if the end is shown to a voluntary agent the agent does not necessarily but contingently will it.

Question Five *Whether God properly enjoys*

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.1 a.3

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.5

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2 a.2

1. The fifth question is whether God enjoys.
2. That he does not. Because enjoyment is with respect to an end; but God does not have an end; therefore etc.
3. On the contrary. God does not will himself for the sake of something else, because then he would be using himself; therefore he loves himself for his own sake, and consequently he enjoys himself.

Question Six *Whether the wayfarer enjoys*

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.5

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2 a.2

1. The question is asked sixth whether the wayfarer enjoys.
2. That he does not. Because the willing that is enjoying is the most perfect act; therefore it does not belong to the wayfarer.
3. On the contrary. The wayfarer can will something for its own sake, since he has free will, and so he can enjoy it; therefore he can enjoy.

Question Seven *Whether the sinner enjoys*

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.5

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2 a.2

1. The question is asked seventh whether the sinner can enjoy.
2. That he cannot, because he clings to a changeable good, but enjoyment must be of the unchangeable good.
3. On the contrary. The same as was said about the wayfarer [Question six n.3].

Question Eight

Whether the brute animals enjoy

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.5
 Thomas, *ST Ia IIae* q.11 a.2
 Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.2 a.2

1. The next question is whether the brutes enjoy.
2. That they do. Augustine *83 Questions* q.30 says that even the beasts are not absurdly supposed to enjoy some pleasure.
3. On the contrary. To enjoy is to cling to something with love, and the beasts do not love.

Question Nine

Whether all things enjoy

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.1 q.5

1. The question is further asked whether all things enjoy.
2. That they do. In *Ethics* 1.1 it is said that all things desire the good with natural love; therefore all things can naturally love the good, and can love some good for its own sake.
3. On the contrary. We enjoy what we know, but not all things know; therefore etc.

Response to Questions Five to Nine

1. In answer to these questions I preface the following example: the center naturally stands immovable in the middle of things. The earth, which is heavy body, per se primarily and immediately and properly and immovably adheres to the center. But stones and heavy bodies like metals, which are in the bowels of the earth, properly and immovably adhere to the center, but not immediately or per se but through the intermediary of the earth. Heavy bodies on the surface of the earth adhere to the center properly but not immediately or per se but through the intermediary of the earth, and not immovably either, for they can be moved. A body in the hand would be naturally fit, because of its gravity, to adhere to the center, but does not adhere to it but to the hand that is now holding it.

2. Next to the issue at hand. I take the immovable center for the ultimate end, which is immovable and moves all things, and I take gravity for the will. Then I take for the earth, which immovably and immediately adheres per se to the center, the will of God, which adheres to itself in this way. The heavier bodies resting in the marrow of the earth I take for the blessed, who adhere to the ultimate end immovably and for its own sake, but not immediately or per se but by the intermediary of the divine will in which they are confirmed and that is signified by the earth. The heavy bodies resting on the surface of the earth, which adhere to the center by the intermediary of the earth, I take for the will of just wayfarers, who adhere to God by means of the divine will in which they are

confirmed, but not immovably as long as they are on the surface of the earth, that is, are in this present state. A body in the hand I take for the will of a sinner which, though apt to adhere to God, adheres however to something changeable.

3. From these comparisons a solution to the first three of the preceding questions (five, six, and seven), is plain.

4. To the next two (questions eight and nine) I say that nothing can enjoy which does not properly have will, since enjoyment consists in an act of will, or in the delight following the act, or in both.

5. To the argument against question five [n.2], I say that, as was said above, the respect of end is not the term of enjoyment but the absolute thing is which is under that respect; therefore the divine will enjoys the very divinity that founds the respect of end to all caused things but not to itself, because the causality of the final cause metaphysically acts to cause the effect of which it is said to be the final cause; the thing is plain, for inhabiting a house, which is the end, moves the house builder, who is the efficient cause of making the house; therefore, the sort of un-makeable thing God is can yet be an end. The common saying, then, whereby it is said that God acts for an end, must be understood as that God does sometimes act for an end, though not for his own end but for the end of what he makes.

6. To the argument of question six [n.2] I say that to enjoy God is a more perfect act, and this act can be had by the wayfarer.

7. To the argument of question seven [n.2] I say that the sinner, because he enjoys a changeable good, enjoys imperfectly and is perverse, because he enjoys what should be used.

8. As to the arguments of question eight [n.2] and question nine [n.2], it is plain that enjoyment is only taken there improperly for any sense appetite or natural inclination.

Second Distinction

Question One

Whether there is any existing infinite thing among real beings

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.3 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Sent.* 1 q.6 p.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.1, *Quodlibet* q.5

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.7 a.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.7

1. 1. As to the second distinction I first ask whether there is anything existent that is actually infinite.

2. That there is not. Because if heat were an infinite act it would not allow anything cold to exist along with it; so an infinite good would not allow any bad to exist along with it; but there are many bads in the universe; therefore etc.

3. Again. An infinite body would allow no other body to exist along with it; so neither would an infinite being allow another being along with it; but there are many

beings besides God.

4. Again. What is here in such a way that it is not there is finite in place; and what exists now in such a way that is not at another time, is finite in time; and what is this in such a way that it is not anything else is finite in power; so what is this in such a way that it is not that is finite in entity. But God is a substance in such a way that he is not an accident, and he is this singular substance in such a way that he is not that substance; therefore he is finite.

5. On the contrary. Aristotle proves in *Physics* 8 that the first mover is infinite.

Question Two

Whether the proposition God exists is self-evident

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.2

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.2 a.1

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.1

1. The second question on this point is whether the existence of such an infinite being is self-evident.

2. That it is. Because what is innate in everyone is self-evident; but God, according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 1 chs.1, 3, is innate in everyone; therefore that there is a God is self-evident.

3. On the contrary. What is self-evident cannot be denied; but the fool has said in his heart that there is no God, *Psalms* 13, 52; therefore etc.

To Question Two, about self-evidence

4. I reply that, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2, it is unacceptable to seek the science and the manner of the science at the same time; and the Commentator, Averroes, expounds this by saying that we seek first the manner of the science. Therefore I speak first about the second question, which inquires about the manner of knowing this proposition 'God exists', and about it I state first that it is a self-evident perfection, and second I state what the terms of the proposition are. Third I infer two corollaries. Fourth I speak to the matter at issue.

5. About the first article I say that in a self-evident proposition, the expression 'self-evident' does not exclude the proposition's terms, because we know first principles by knowing the terms (*Posterior Analytics* 1). But it does exclude the proposition's being known through some other cause or through some other proposition or through something else that is outside the per se concept of the terms. But the proposition is known from the terms that are intrinsic to the proposition, and these terms of themselves and in themselves contain the force of the proposition's evidence.

6. About the second article [n.4] I say that the terms of a self-evident proposition are the definition and the thing defined, which I prove from the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1, where he says that the definition or the 'what it is' of one extreme is the middle term in a demonstration; so one of the premises in a demonstration is self-evident,

and is formed from a definition, and is a definition, as is plain.

7. About the third article [n.4] I say that it follows from what has been said that there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition and a knowable self-evident proposition. For a proposition is not called self-evident because it is actually known by some intellect; because if there were no intellect the propositions would still be self-evident. But a proposition is called self-evident because its terms, as far as the proposition is concerned, always give evident knowledge of it.

8. A second thing that follows is that there is no distinction between a proposition self-evident in itself and a proposition self-evident to us or to the wise; for any proposition self-evident in itself is not self-evident to everyone or knowably self-evident, for no one can know it save through its terms, which contain the evident knowledge of it.

9. About the fourth article [n.4] I say that this proposition 'God exists' is most of all self-evident. For since existence is so proper to God that it is not said of him in the second mode of per se statement [sc. where the subject is of the definition of the predicate] but in the first [sc. where the predicate is of the definition of the subject]. Thus, because God's essence is his existence, it thereby follows that the terms of the proposition 'God exists' most of all contain the evident knowledge of the proposition, so that whoever knows the terms would at once know the union of the terms, and not know their union through anything else. For existence is so evidently and immediately related to God that it can be demonstrated or proved of him by no middle term.

10. But one needs to know that there is self-evidence about no other concept of God's being save about his essence, as was said. The reason for this is that, whenever something is predicated most immediately of some subject, that subject is a sufficient middle term for demonstrating, by a demonstration giving the reason, the predicate 'has existence' about everything found in the subject and about everything the subject is found in. An example: if having three angles were most immediate in a triangle, a triangle would be a sufficient middle term for demonstrating 'has three angles' both of what is found in triangle, as figure, and of whatever triangle is found in, as isosceles. Therefore since the essence of God is most immediate in him, it is a sufficient middle term for demonstrating God's existence about necessary being, about supreme good, and about all concepts found in God; and so, as a result, all these conclusions, as that he is an infinite being, that he is the supreme good, must be demonstrable and so not self-evident. But only this proposition will be self-evident, which is the most immediate one, namely that this essence is. Likewise neither would any proposition be self-evident in which is predicated of God any of these concepts, as that God is infinite, God is necessary existence, and the like. The reason is that such things are predicated of him as quasi properties. But as it is, things are such that every property, whether primary or not primary, is demonstrable of the subject by a middle term that will be either the definition of the subject or the definition of the property predicated; and although there are no properties in God in the strict sense and although too what is in God is not defined in the strict sense, yet the predicates have the quasi manner of properties and can be quasi defined. And so the proposition 'God is infinite' can be demonstrated as follows: everything that has power over everything makeable is infinite; God is such; therefore etc. And so infinity is demonstrated of God by a middle term, which is as it were the definition of the subject; or if a middle term must be taken that is the definition of the property (according to another opinion), the quasi definition of infinity will be taken as the middle term.

11. One must note, however, as to explaining the second article above [n.6], that wherever the definition is predicated of the thing defined the proposition is self-evident, as the argument there proves; but the converse is not true, because there can be a self-evident proposition without this, as in the case of a principle and even in the present case of 'God exists'. For what is sufficient for a self-evident proposition is that its terms contain of themselves the evident knowledge of their combination, because the combination is in the definition and the thing defined. Therefore such a proposition is self-evident, and since it is the same in other cases, therefore etc.

12. One must further note more carefully that every proposition that is in itself self-evident is self-evident to all who can know its terms according to their proper ideas, since it was said that the terms of such self-evident proposition contain the evidence of the composition of the terms. And because the term 'God' is not known to the wayfarer according to its proper idea, therefore the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to the wayfarer; but it is self-evident to God and the blessed, for they apprehend the terms according to their proper ideas. It was said above, however, that there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition in itself and a self-evident proposition in us, because what is self-evident in itself is self-evident to us if we apprehend the terms, and otherwise not. For a proposition is for this reason said to be self-evident that it is known through the terms; and because the fool did not apprehend the term 'God' in its proper idea, therefore he could say that there was no God.

13. To the first argument [n.2] therefore I say that Damascene's remark is taken to mean that we naturally come to a knowledge of the creator from creatures, and so a way of knowing God, namely through creatures, is naturally innate in us.

14. To the second [n.4] I say that if there is no truth then it is true that there is no truth, and this will be a truth in concept, and God is not of this sort. So a logical argument serves for proof of the matter at issue.

To Question One, about infinite existence

15. Then I say to the question [Question One of this distinction above] that existence is demonstrable of an infinite thing by a demonstration giving the reason, that is, by a demonstration from the nature of the terms through the divine essence itself (which is the immediate subject of the predicate 'exists'), as was said in the preceding question [nn.9-10]. Now the predicate of having three angles (where triangle is the immediate subject) can be demonstrated of everything that is triangle. However, because the divine essence is not known to us in its most proper idea, therefore we cannot demonstrate or show existence of an infinite thing by a demonstration giving the reason; however we can demonstrate it by a demonstration as to the fact. Now such a demonstration is more perfectly obtained through properties of relation than through absolute properties. The reason is that when one correlative is known the other is immediately known too.

A. Properties of the Infinite Being

16. I will speak, first, therefore about the relative properties of the infinite being, and then I will make clear the existence of the infinite being. On the first point there are six conclusions: the first is that there is among real beings something simply first in idea of

efficient causality; the second is that this thing is altogether incapable of being an effect; the third is that there is among real beings something simply first in idea of final cause; the fourth is that this thing is altogether incapable of being directed to an end; the fifth is that there is among real beings something simply first in eminence; the sixth is that one and the same thing is, according to these three properties, simply first.

17. The first conclusion is proved as follows. There is among beings something that can be brought about or is effectible, and so by something able to effect it. Either then it is effected by itself, and this is impossible because nothing generates itself, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 1.1. Or it is effected by nothing, which is also impossible because nothing can be brought about by nothing. Or it is effected by something else – and then either that something else is simply first (and so the conclusion is gained), or it is not simply first and thus will have something prior to it. I will ask then the same of it (by what it is brought about), and since an infinite regress is impossible, an effective power will be reached that is simply first.

18. A first response to this argument is that the philosophers do not regard an infinite regress in efficient causes as unacceptable, because, in the case of generation according to them, a thing is generated by something else but by something so generating it that there is no first generator; therefore etc.

19. A second response is as follows, that the above argument [n.17] is not a demonstrative proof, for the fact that the first efficient cause causes is contingent.

20. To the first [n.18] I say that the philosophers do not deny an infinite regress in the case of accidentally ordered causes, as is plain from Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 6.5 where he is speaking of the generation of individuals under one species; but the philosophers do deny an infinite regress in the case of essentially ordered causes.

21. To make this point [n.20] clear, know that to talk about a per se and an accidental cause is not the same as to talk about causes essentially or per se ordered and causes accidentally ordered.

22. For in the first case there is a putting together only of cause with effect, so that a cause is said to be per se when it causes the effect by itself or through its own nature, and a cause is said to be per accidens when it causes the effect through something attaching to it. An example: man generates man by his own nature, but disperses sight by the whiteness attaching to him.

23. In the second case, however, the causes are compared with each other in relation to the effect, so that causes are called essentially ordered with respect to the same effect when one cause depends on the other in causing, and causes are called per accidens when one cause does not depend on the other in causing. For there is a double difference between essentially ordered causes and accidentally ordered causes. The first difference is that in essentially ordered causes the second cause depends in its causing on the first, but not so with the other causes. The second difference is that in essentially ordered causes the first cause is necessarily causing when a second cause is causing, and this difference depends on the first, as is plain. But it is not the same way with the other causes as it is with essentially ordered causes, according as the totality is plain to anyone who looks.

24. From these two differences [nn.22-23] the result as to the issue at hand is that an infinite regress in essentially ordered causes is impossible, because, as is plain, an infinity

of accidentally causing causes would have to come together for the same effect;¹ therefore etc.

25. To the second argument [n.19] I say that, although the first efficient cause's causing and the causable thing's being caused are contingent facts, yet it is necessary that there be a first thing that is effective of the effect and that what can effect be effecting; this way is the way the argument takes it, and therefore it demonstrates with a demonstration only as to the fact.

26. The first conclusion [n.16] has been proved, namely that there is some efficient cause among beings that is simply first.

27. The second conclusion [n.16], that this first efficient cause cannot be brought about or be effectible, is immediately apparent.

28. For if something that is effectible itself causes, then it is effectible by some first efficient cause; because an efficient cause precedes what can be brought about; for no one can cause himself to come about, as was proved in the first conclusion; therefore it follows that a thing that can be brought about or is effectible will not be the first effecting cause. It is a contradiction, then, for the first effecting cause to be brought about or be effectible.

29. The third conclusion [n.16], namely that there is something among beings that is first in idea of end, is proved as follows in more or less the same way as the first conclusion [n.17]: for something is enjoyable, therefore it is so because of some end; but not because of itself as end, therefore because of something other than itself; and either this is an ultimate end, and then the conclusion as reached; or, if it is not ultimate, I will take another, and, since there is a stand (and no infinite regress), therefore etc. And if objection is made against this argument as against the first, it is solved in the same way [nn.18-25].

30. The fourth conclusion [n.16], that such ultimate end is altogether incapable of being directed to an end, is proved the way the second conclusion was proved [n.28], as is wholly clear.

31. The fifth conclusion, that there is among beings something first in eminence, is proved as follows: the first efficient cause is outside the whole ordered structure of all effectible things, otherwise it would not be the first efficient cause, as is plain; therefore it is outside the idea of makeable things; therefore the first efficient cause is not a univocal but an equivocal cause; and consequently it is more eminent than them all, for an equivocal cause contains its effect eminently; therefore the consequence is that in the whole ordered structure of makeable things there is a thing first in eminence that is outside that ordered structure; and thus the fifth conclusion is plain. It is also proved that such a thing first in eminence is the first efficient cause, and so one part of the sixth conclusion is plain.

32. Next I prove another part of the sixth conclusion, namely that this thing is first in idea of end, and I do so as follows: that which per se and first acts does not act because of something other than itself, for then it would not per se first act since it would in its

¹ In essentially ordered causes the second cause causes in virtue of the first (n.22), and so the second cause causes accidentally or in virtue of something else (n.21). If then there were an infinite regress in essentially ordered causes, there would be no first and an infinite number of causes would be causing accidentally, or in virtue of something else. So they would not cause at all, since they would not have the needed first cause whereby, or in virtue of which, they themselves cause.

acting depend on something other than itself because of which it would act in a way similar to it; therefore it acts per se and first and not because of something else; therefore this same thing, which is simply first efficient cause, is the ultimate in idea of final cause and is the same in its own way of being taken.

33. It has been proved, therefore, that one and the same thing is first in idea of efficient causality, and in idea of end, and in eminence; and this will be the sixth conclusion.

34. However, about the first article, wherein relative properties have been proved of the infinite being, I say that firstness states a relation to that with respect to which it is first, and also that existence states a privation of relation.

B. Existence of the Infinite Being

35. As to the second principal article [n.16], wherein existence is to be proved of the infinite being, I state five conclusions: The first is that the thing of which the triple property was proved above is a necessary existence. The second is that it is intelligent and has will. The third that its understanding and its willing are really its essence. The fourth that it naturally knows and wills things distinctly before they exist in themselves. The fifth that such a thing is actually infinite, which is the chief conclusion intended.

36. The first conclusion is proved as follows: everything altogether uncreatable exists of itself; but that which exists of itself necessarily exists. The being in question here is altogether uncreatable because it cannot be brought about or be effected, as is plain from the second conclusion of the first article [nn.27-28], and because it lacks an end, as is plain from the fourth conclusion of the first article [n.30]; therefore it is altogether uncreatable.

37. The second conclusion is proved as follows: There is something among beings that is contingently caused, so the first efficient cause causes contingently; the antecedent is plain from the theologians and philosophers; the proof of the consequence is that in the case of essentially ordered things, a second cause depends in its causing on the first, as is plain from the first article [n.23]; therefore if the first cause causes necessarily then the second does too, though not conversely; therefore if something is caused contingently, then necessarily the first cause causes contingently. Next, beyond everything that acts contingently there is a voluntary agent, because no other agent besides the will acts voluntarily; so it follows that the first agent is a voluntary agent and, as a result, an intellectual one. This reasoning is made clear by the fact that a second cause depends, in its causing, on the first, because it only causes by virtue of the first and as moved by the first; therefore if the first were to move necessarily the second would cause necessarily; the result is that the first causes contingently and so voluntarily.

38. The third conclusion is proved in the following way, as is plain from what has been aforesaid: The agent in question here is the simply first efficient cause and, being thus effective of itself, it depends on nothing else; therefore it can of itself cause all the effects that, in the absence of anything other than itself, it could cause; but it cannot cause a volition that belongs to it in the absence of intellection, because nothing is willed save via intellect; therefore intellect is not other than its essence and, by parity of reasoning, volition is not other than it either; and this last argument is conclusive as to every volition and intellection of it, whether it understands so as to will itself or to will something other

than itself.

39. The fourth conclusion is proved in the following way, as is plain from what has been aforesaid: The being that is here being dealt with is a necessary existence and is simply first efficient cause, and so whatever is the same as it is necessary of itself and simply first; but its intellection and volition are really the same as it, as is plain from the preceding conclusion [n.38]; therefore it knows things naturally and distinctly before they exist in themselves, because there is no imperfection in it, as is plain from the fifth conclusion of the first article [n.31]; but indistinct knowledge argues imperfection in the knower; therefore etc.

40. The fifth conclusion, which is principally intended in this article and in the whole question, namely that such a being is actually infinite, is proved in many ways.

41. The first way is on the part of the efficient cause, which Aristotle sets down in *Physics* 8 and *Metaphysics* 12, and it goes as follows: The first mover moves with an infinite motion; therefore it has infinite power; but infinite power can only exist in an infinite essence. The reasoning is made clear as follows, first as to the antecedent: for if it does not move with an infinite motion (as was perhaps the philosopher's understanding), yet it can, as concerns itself, move with an infinite motion, that is for an infinite duration; and so this is as valid for proving the conclusion as if it did so move. The first consequence is proved as follows: From the fact that it moves of itself and not in virtue of another and does not depend on another in moving, it must contain virtually in itself the whole motion that it can cause of itself through an infinite duration and for all the effects that it can cause through that motion; but if the motion were infinite, the effects too would be infinite; therefore what actually contains that motion in itself virtually and contains likewise such effects is actually infinite.

42. The second way is taken from the fact that it is an acting intellect, as is plain from the fourth conclusion of the second article [n.39]: The being here being dealt with distinctly knows things first in nature before the things exist in themselves; therefore the knowledge of things that it has is not caused by the known things, because they are not pre-required for its knowledge; therefore this knowledge is caused by something else, which is the first object of its intellect; and this can only be its essence, because nothing else is pre-required for its intellection; therefore its own essence can of itself sufficiently cause the knowledge of knowable things and therefore of all intelligibles (the reason for its causing knowledge of one is a like reason for its causing knowledge of another – because the thing is not pre-required for knowledge); but the totality of intelligibles is infinite; therefore the power whereby its essence can cause knowledge of the totality of intelligibles is infinite, because a power able to cause knowledge of two things rather than of one thing is greater, and a power able to cause knowledge of infinite things is infinite; and so its essence is infinite.

43. The third way is taken from the fact that there is an ultimate end, and it proceeds as follows: Our will is naturally inclined to loving the supreme good, according to Augustine (*On Free Will* ch.2); but the supreme good is infinite; therefore there is something actually infinite, otherwise the natural inclination of the will would be toward nothing.

44. Further, by the same way, the will naturally desires to be blessed; but it is not blessed unless it is perfectly at rest; now it cannot perfectly rest in anything finite, because it can always desire more; therefore the ultimate end, wherein it is blessed, is

something actually infinite, otherwise its natural appetite would be in vain.

45. The fourth way is taken from the fact that it is first in eminence, as is plain from the fifth conclusion of the first article [n.31], and it goes as follows: it is repugnant to the most eminent thing for there to be anything greater, as is plain, because then it would not be the most eminent; but it is not repugnant to anything finite for something to be greater; therefore the most eminent thing is not finite; therefore it is infinite.

Response to the Arguments of Question One

46. In response to the arguments of this question [d.2 q.1] – proposed first but determined second – I say [n.2] that if some active thing formally or even virtually infinite were to act only by necessity of nature and not contingently, it would destroy everything contrary to itself and not permit it to exist along with itself; but God does not act extrinsically by necessity of nature but voluntarily and contingently.

47. To the second [*ibid.* n.3] I say that the consequence is not valid; for the dimension of one body is repugnant to the dimension of a second body in respect of the same place, but one entity is not repugnant to another entity; for one entity does not fill an entity's whole nature as to the dimension of its essence, as it were, in the way that the dimension of one body fills a whole single place as to local dimension. One can also say that the dimensions of the glorified body can exist along with the dimensions of another body, and that because of the glorified body's subtlety; therefore much more can the divine essence do so because of its simplicity.

48. To the third [*ibid.* n.4] I say that the consequences are not valid, but only what is proved in the antecedent, that that from which other things are separated off is finite. An example: supposing, per impossibile, that there existed an infinite place and that some body filled it, then it would not be valid to say that it exists here in such a way that it is not elsewhere infinite in place. So, just because, according to the philosopher, an infinite motion exists in an infinite time, it is not valid to say against him that the motion, because it is in this time in such a way as not to be in another time, is finite; but in the argument at hand, what is demonstrated in the antecedent is not infinite; therefore etc.

Question Three

Whether there is only one God

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* Ia q.14, p.2

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.3

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.11 a.3

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.1

1. The third question asked is whether there is only one God.

2. That there is not. Many finite goods are, *ceteris paribus*, better than fewer finite goods; therefore many infinite goods are better than one infinite good; but what is better should be posited in the universe; therefore there are several things supremely good, or several Gods.

3. On the contrary: *Deuteronomy* 6, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one.”

To the Question

4. Reply. Among the faithful it is certain there is one God alone. Some of them say that this is not demonstrable but is purely a matter of belief, and the proof is as follows: if it could be proved naturally that there is one God, his singularity could be known, and therefrom his unity would be naturally known; and so God could be known in his singular idea, the contrary of which was stated above.

5. I say that it can be shown naturally that there is one God, and this in many ways. The first of these is taken from the side of the infinite intellect of God himself. I argue as follows:

6. If there are several Gods, then: Either, first, one of them does not understand the other and then neither of them is God because neither understands what is maximally intelligible. Or, second, one God does understand the other, and then the God labeled *a* understands the God labeled *b* either through the essence of himself, *a*, or through the essence of *b* or through some likeness. Not through the essence of himself for, since God is intelligible through his essence, then God *a* either understands God *b* imperfectly, and thus God *a* would not be God, or God *a* contains God *b* eminently and thus the contained God *b* would be God. Not through the essence of *b* for, since an intellection that is not the same as its object is posterior to the object, it would follow that the intellection of God *a* would be posterior in nature to God *b* and consequently God *a* would not be God. Not through a likeness either, for what is intelligible through its essence is understood imperfectly through a likeness, and so God *a* would not be God. The result then is that there is only one God.

7. In the same way again as follows: the same act cannot have several sufficient objects; but if God *a* were thus perfectly to understand both himself and God *b* in the same way and in the same act at the same time, his act would have two sufficient objects; but if God *a* were to understand God *b* in another way and another act, then God *a* will not be God because he has diverse acts; and if God *a* were not thus perfectly to understand both himself and God *b*, God *a* would likewise not be God.

8. The second way is taken from infinite will and it goes as follows: God *b*, since he is the supreme good, is infinite and should be infinitely loved by a correct infinite will able so to love him. Therefore if God *a* does not love God *b* in this way he is not God, for either he does not have an infinite will or does not have a correct infinite will. But if God *a* does love God *b* in this way the result is that he naturally does not love himself more than he loves God *b*, of whom he is neither part nor effect, which is impossible.

9. Again in the same way as follows: Either God *a* enjoys God *b* and then the same act of enjoyment has two sufficient objects of enjoyment, which is impossible, for then one object will be sufficient when the other is removed, and yet the object removed was the total object since it was the supreme good. Or God *a* uses God *b* and then God *a* is perverse and thus not God.

10. The third way is taken from infinite power and it goes as follows: There cannot be two total causes of the same effect, and the reason is that, when one cause is removed, the other is sufficient, and thus the effect would remain in its totality when its total cause was

removed, which is unintelligible.² But any cause of infinite power is a sufficient cause in respect of any producible effect. Therefore there cannot be several causes together having infinite power.

11. The fourth way is taken from the fact of necessary existence and it is as follows: A necessary existence exists of itself, as was plain above in the previous question; therefore if it can be, it is; therefore if there can be several Gods, necessarily they are. The consequent is false, therefore so is the proposition it follows from.

12. The fifth way is taken from omnipotence and it is as follows: Something omnipotent has power for everything; therefore God *a* can destroy everything other than himself; therefore he can destroy God *b*, and consequently God *b* is not God. But this reasoning is of no validity, because omnipotence, as theologians take it, is only with respect to possibles. Just as therefore the ability to destroy itself does not fall under omnipotence (for the omnipotent thing is a necessary existence), so neither does being able to destroy God *b* fall under omnipotence, since God *b* is posited as being a necessary existence.

13. Therefore I argue in this fifth way as follows: Just as the ability to produce everything producible falls under omnipotence, so also does the ability to prevent anything from being produced; so either God *b* can prevent the effect that God *a* wants to produce, and God *a* is not God [or God *b* cannot prevent such effect, and so God *b* is not God].³

14. As to the arguments, then, for the opposite position [n.4], I say that everyone allows that God's existence can be demonstrated by a demonstration as to the fact, and the Philosopher so demonstrates it in *Physics* 8. I then ask whether, at the end of the demonstration, one God is conceived or several. Certainly one God is conceived, and then he is not, on this account, conceived in his properly distinct singularity. So it is in the issue at hand: at the end of this demonstration that God is one, God is not conceived under his proper singularity, which he shares with nothing, but he is conceived confusedly and indistinctly. Hence note that all the knowledge had of God by the wayfarer is confused and indistinct knowledge, because of the accumulation of transcendental concepts, as that in 'God is an infinite being' 'being' is a transcendental concept, and so the negation [sc. 'non-finite'] is transcendent and infinite in itself. Hence any of the transcendental concepts is by itself found in creatures, but all of them together are found in God alone. Hence, when I know that God is one, I do not, on this account, know distinctly his own proper singularity.

To the Argument

² This argument, which is found also in Scotus, is peculiar. It turns on what is now called over-determination or the existence of two or more sufficient causes of the same effect. An example would be redundancy in constructing buildings where more supports are put in place to hold the building up than the building needs. Such redundancy is intended to improve safety, so that if one support fails or is destroyed the building will stay standing. In this case there is more than one sufficient cause of the building's staying up. One could perhaps say that a total sufficient cause is whatever has to be taken away for the effect not to occur, so 'sufficient cause' would include all the redundancies. But if so the idea of 'sufficient cause' has been changed from 'what is sufficient to cause the effect' to 'what, if removed, is sufficient for the effect not to be', and these two meanings are not the same. The second meaning also no longer seems to give the conclusion Andreas needs.

³ The words in square brackets are not in the printed text but are clearly implied.

15. To the principal argument [n.2] I say that if several infinite goods were possible they would be better than one but, since they are not possible, therefore one infinite and supreme good is better because it contains every good. Hence the good that is possible is better than a good that is impossible.

16. If the further statement is made that it is an article of faith, since the Church says ‘I believe in one God’, and so it is purely a matter of belief and consequently not demonstrated – I say that, because not all intellects have a capacity for demonstration and because error in demonstrations can occur among the ignorant and because the people are generally uneducated, therefore that can be a matter of belief which yet of itself can, even in a natural way, be demonstrated.

17. And if it be said that every wayfarer is bound to believe the articles of faith, but that he who demonstrates would now have knowledge and consequently not faith – I say that science is of itself a more certain habit than faith is, and so it would suffice, as is plain in the blessed who do not have faith but clear vision. For the habit of faith, unlike the habit of charity, is not, by reason of itself, necessary for salvation but by reason of what is believed; therefore if it is known, it suffices. But because the habit of faith is of itself imperfect, therefore does vision succeed to it in the fatherland. So if knowledge, which is a more perfect habit, succeeds to faith in the wayfarer, then knowledge suffices, as is plain.

Question Four

Whether a plurality of persons is consistent with the unity of the divine essence

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.2 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* 1a q.14, p.5

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.4

Thomas, *ST* 1a q.39 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.4

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.1

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.14

1. The fourth question asked is whether a plurality of persons is consistent with the unity of the essence.

2. That it is not. Because either the divine persons would be distinguished in their totality from each other and then the unity would be taken away, as is plain; or they would be distinguished by ideas of certain different sorts, and then either the ideas are necessary existences and so there will be several necessary existences, the contrary of which was shown above [in the previous question], or they are possible existences and then they will not exist in God.

3. Again, whatever there is of perfection in one person is also in another; therefore positing a plurality of persons is superfluous, for no perfection is added thereby; but nothing superfluous is to be posited in God; therefore etc.

4. If a plurality of persons does not take away simplicity of essence, then the persons would have to be existence simply; but things that are simply the same as one and the

same thing are simply the same among themselves; therefore they are not several.

5. Again, essential and accidental divide the whole of being; therefore that whereby there is a per se distinction in the persons, since it cannot be accidental, will be essential to them; but when certain things are essentially the same, then if one is multiplied the rest are multiplied too; therefore a plurality of persons does not stand with unity of essence.

6. On the contrary. Everything that does not include a contradiction can exist; but there is no contradiction involved in there being one essence and a plurality of relative persons since the plurality and the unity are not referred to the same thing; for plurality is referred to relation and unity to essence; therefore etc.

Question Five

Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.4 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* 1a q.14, p.5

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.5

Thomas, *ST* 1a q.39 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.4

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.2 a.2

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.2

1. Following on, the question is asked whether there are only three persons in divine reality.

2. That there are not. Because all relations in divine reality are of the same dignity; therefore the reason whereby one relation constitutes a person will be a reason whereby another relation constitutes a person; so, since there are four relations in divine reality, namely paternity, filiation, active spiration, passive spiration, there will be four persons in divine reality.

3. On the contrary, *1 John 5* says ‘There are three who give witness in heaven, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’; so there are three persons, not four.

Question Six

Whether the divine essence can exist in something if that something is produced

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.6

1. The question is further asked whether produced existence is consistent with the necessity, unity, and supreme perfection of the divine essence.

2. That it is not consistent with necessity is proved as follows: No produced thing is of itself necessary; but whatever is in God is of itself necessary; therefore. The proof of the major is multiple.

3. First as follows: What is produced was capable of being produced and was not incapable of being produced; but ‘possible’ is contradistinguished from ‘necessary’; therefore etc.

4. Second thus: just as that which is produced is not produced by itself but by another, so it does not have being from itself but from another and, if that other is removed, it would not have existence; therefore it is not necessary by itself but by the other thing from which it gets existence.

5. Next, that it is not consistent with immutability; for the thing that produces precedes in some way the thing produced; therefore in that prior moment the produced is not understood to have been produced, and in some other later moment it is understood to have been produced; so there is change in divine reality.

6. Again, generation essentially includes change, as it seems; therefore generation cannot exist without change.

7. Next, that it is not consistent with supreme perfection: what is produced depends on the producer, otherwise it could exist without the producer; but dependence of itself states imperfection.

8. Again, other changes are more perfect than generation, a sign of which is that the heavens possess, by reason of their perfection, the fact of not being generated, and yet they can change with local motion and with other alterations; therefore generation argues imperfection in the generated; therefore it is not in God, and especially because the more perfect changes are not in God.

9. Against this is Augustine, *On the Trinity* 12.48.

Question Six *bis*

Whether there are Several Productions in God

10. Another question asked here is whether there are several productions in God.

11. That there are not: because the productions would necessarily be distinct in species, and consequently the things per se produced would be distinct in species; but this is impossible, because then necessarily one would be more perfect than another.

12. Against this is the Master in the text *ad loc.*, as is plain.

Question Seven

Whether there are in God only two productions intrinsically

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.2 q.7

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.27 a.5

1. The final question asked about this point and about this distinction is whether there are only two productions.

2. That there are not: the Philosopher in *Physics* 2 distinguishes nature and intellect as two active principles; so there are three productive principles, namely nature, intellect, and will; and consequently there are three productions.

3. To the contrary is the Master in the text, that the number of the divine persons is a plurality, and it is made clear from the fact of production.

Response to the above Questions To Question Six

4. I respond therefore to the first question about production, which is third in order [sc. q.6 n.1], and I say that there is production in divine reality. I make this plain as follows:

5. That which is in its formal idea a principle of some production will be a principle of such production wherever it is posited to be; but perfect memory and intellect, with a sufficient object present to it in idea of object, is a principle of production of generated knowledge about the object and about it adequately; therefore it will be thus wherever it is posited. But in God there is a most perfect, because formally infinite, intellect, which possesses a most perfect object most present to it in idea of object, because present to it in the divine essence in God. This intellect is therefore a most perfect principle of production, and consequently there is production in God. The major of this argument is self-evident. The minor is plain in Augustine's *On the Trinity* in several places.

6. An objection against this argument, so as to give it greater clarity: I concede the major, then, but I say against the minor that the minor is true when the intellect is perfected formally by the produced knowledge, without which it would be formally imperfect, and this happens in a created intellect; but an infinite intellect, to wit the intellect of the Father, is not formally perfected by generated knowledge but by ungenerated knowledge, which is the same really as itself, and by it does it formally understand.

7. Further, in the prior stage, in which the intellect of the Father precedes generated knowledge by way of origin, it has a sufficient ungenerated knowledge by which it understands formally; for it is not that it understands afterwards. Therefore the intellect of the Father, along with the object, cannot be a productive principle of any other knowledge.

8. These objections notwithstanding, I support the stated argument.

9. Reply to the objection; to the first point [n.6] I say that a created intellect has a receptive potency, which is a passive potency, and therefore it is perfected formally by generated knowledge; but that it has a passive potency is a mark of imperfection, while that it is a productive principle is a mark of perfection; and so it is not by reason of passive potency (which indicates imperfection) that intellect is a productive principle. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the intellect of the Father does not have a passive receptive potency, and although, consequently, it is not perfected by generated knowledge, yet, along with an object in the way stated, it is a productive principle, and so a productive principle not of impressed knowledge but of subsistent knowledge.

10. To the second point [n.7] I say that since the ungenerated knowledge, by which the intellect of the Father is formally perfected, is not produced knowledge, so it is not adequate to the Father's intellect in idea of productive principle, and so does not take away from the Father the idea of productive principle.

11. Again secondly, against the principal conclusion [n.7], I argue as follows: opposite relations of the second mode are compossible in the same nature, as is plain of the relations of motive to moved in the will when the will moves itself. But the relations of producer and produced are of the second mode, as is plain in *Metaphysics 5*; therefore they are compossible in the divine nature. And there is a confirmation, that just as the will is in a way without limit as to universally containing the act that it can formally receive in itself, so much more is the divine essence without limit as to the extremes of this relation.

To the Arguments of Question Six

12. Next to the arguments for the opposite:

13. I say to the first [q.6 n.2] that the major is false; and to the first proof of it [n.3] I say that 'possible' is double. In one way it is distinguished from the necessary and is the same as the contingent; and production in God was not possible in this sense of possible, because this sort of possible is able not to be. The possible in another way is what comes from the possible in general and is consistent with the necessary, and such possibility is contradistinguished from the impossible; and the production of the Word was possible in this sense, and God's being God is possible in this sense.

14. To the second proof [q.6 n.4] I say that the other from which the produced thing has being is essentially the same as itself and the produced thing does not have being from some other that is essentially distinct; and it has necessary existence from itself, because not from some other that is essentially distinct from it, but it does not have it precisely from itself, as is plain. Further, Augustine says that the Father is the principle of the whole Trinity.

15. To the second argument [n.5] I say that if the producing person could be understood in some prior moment without the produced person being understood, nevertheless in that prior moment the produced person is not understood *not* to have been produced and *not* to have being in the person produced; and so there is only a change there in understanding, because first the produced is not understood and afterwards it is understood.

16. And if you say that the person producing does truly, by the nature of the thing, precede the person produced, I say that the preceding is not that of creation but of origin (and what this means will be stated below).

17. To the third [n.6] I say generation in the case of creatures signifies change and production, and these two ideas do not include each other; but change states imperfection, and is the form of what has been changed, while production states perfection, and is the way to the term; and generation is then applied to divine reality only by reason of production, and change, which states imperfection, is set aside.

18. To the fourth [n.7] I say that, since the product is not essentially distinct from the producer, there is in that case no dependence, which states imperfection.

19. To the fifth [n.8] I say that, when the idea of change is removed from generation, generation no longer states imperfection but perfection, which it says is the communicating, without change, of numerically the same nature.

20. However, other arguments against the questions about production are set down here; and first proof is given that there is no production in divine reality [q.6] second that there are three productions [q.7]; third that there is only one; fourth that there are six.

21. The first is proved as follows: True production is truly elicited, but is not truly said to generate or spirate; therefore none of these is a true intrinsic production. The major seems manifest; the proof of the minor is that, just as nothing can elicit itself, so it cannot elicit that by which it is an eliciting supposit; but the Father is formally Father by paternity, and as Father he is able to elicit; and paternity is really and formally the same as to generate; therefore etc.

22. The second [or rather third; the argument for the second is perhaps q.7, unless a

further argument for it it is implicit here; see n.30 infra] is proved thus: In divine reality there are no other productions than to spirate and to generate, and these are intrinsic productions; but they are the same thing; therefore etc. The proof of the minor is that they are in the same wholly simple supposit.

23. The third [or rather fourth] is proved thus: Where there is a sufficient productive principle, there production is possible; but in any divine supposit there are two sufficient productive principles; so there can in general be six productions; and if there can be, there are, because to be possible and to be are not different in divine reality. The proof of the minor is that in any supposit there exist both intellect with an object present in idea of object and will with its object present in idea of object.

24. To the first of these [n.21] I say that God truly produces creatures per se, and produces creation in addition by stipulation; and then in no way does he by eliciting produce passive creation, since it is the same as himself. So it is in its own way in the issue at hand, because the Father truly produces the Word per se and filiation in the Word per accidens, as it were; and so there is no need for him to produce by eliciting but only to generate actively. For there is one mode in God and another in creatures, where their action is not their substance nor is their action that by which they are constituted in being of supposit.

25. To the second [or rather third, n.22] I say that, just as the intellect with its object in creatures, or with the species of its object, forms complete memory (which is the productive principle of their word), so in its own way the divine intellect in God along with the divine nature, which is its own proper object, forms complete memory, which is the productive principle of the Word.

26. To the third [or rather fourth, n.23] I say that to generate and to spirate are not the same formally, nor the same really with reality of relation.

27. I prove this [n.26] in three ways. First because to spirate is the same thing in the Father and the Son, but it is repugnant for generating to be in the Son.

28. Second because then the Father would be said to be related to the Son by the same relation as to the Holy Spirit.

29. Third because things that are not the same in any moment are the same in no moment – unless perhaps one of them is in passive potency to the other, which I say because of remission or intensity in the same form, and these, in the view of many, are the same thing, which then cannot be so in the issue at hand. But now the case is that, in the first moment of origin when there is paternity or generation, spiration does not exist; for since the Father and Son are one spirator, spiration cannot be prior to filiation; but paternity precedes filiation in origin, etc. Hence too you can see when it is that the order of origin is not merely the being from another.

30. To the fourth [the proof of the minor in n.23] I say that if the intellect and the object present in idea of object exist in the Holy Spirit, yet they are not, as they are in the Holy Spirit, a productive principle of the Word, but they have a production and an adequate and persisting term prior in origin to their being in the Holy Spirit, namely when they are in the Father; and so it is also in like cases [sc. the will and spiration].

To Questions Six *bis* and Seven

31. Now I reply to the questions fourth and fifth questions together [qq.6 *bis* and7],

about the number of the productions. And I say that there are only two productions, namely generation and spiration. Now this is explained by some people as follows: the notional acts are founded on essential acts, there are only two intrinsic essential acts, namely understanding and willing; therefore there are only two extrinsic notional acts, namely speaking and spirating, and these are the productions.

32. The way the opinion of Henry of Ghent goes is said to be as follows: The object that is present, in idea of adequate object, to the intellect is expressive in the intellect, and then, as being its own pure active principle, it produces in the intellect, as in the pure natural passive principle, the simple knowledge of itself; but the intellect, now informed with the simple knowledge (with respect to which it was purely passive), becomes fecund and receives an active power for producing declarative knowledge; but, as bare of a proper and natural power of its own, it converts itself back onto itself in its understanding, and onto its simple act of understanding, and onto the object that it actually understands, and so, by this converting of itself, it is purely act (although it was not able so to convert itself without first being informed with simple knowledge, so that it might thus have something to turn itself back onto). The intellect, therefore, having been informed with simple knowledge, actively produces, by means of this simple knowledge as by a principle of acting, the declarative knowledge, which is the word, producing it in the bare converted intellect and from the intellect as from matter.

33. Will follows: having first been informed with a volition about the simple object and then, as bare, converting itself back onto itself as performing an act willing with this simple volition, and converting itself back onto its own act of simple volition and onto the object of this volition, it produces an equal love; then the bare converted will is, in this way, an active and elicitive principle of equaled love, and that from which the principle is produced as from matter is the will itself informed with simple volition. And so there is a double difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will.

34. One difference is that, with respect to simple knowledge, the intellect is purely passive and the object purely active; while, on the part of the will with respect to simple volition, the will is purely passive and the object is as it were the material of which it is said and from which it is produced.

35. The second difference is that, on the part of the intellect with respect to declarative knowledge, the intellect itself, when informed with simple knowledge, is active, and therefore the bare, converted intellect is passive; but on the part of the will it is otherwise, as has just been said, and the reason for the diversity is that the intellect is of itself a passive power while the will is of itself an active power. One thing is to be noted, that the intellect of itself is not said to be a nature but is a nature when informed with simple knowledge. And therefore the principle of production of the word is a nature, but the bare intellect is not called a nature because, as such, it is a passive power, as was said.

36. This way is, according to this doctor, the one found in creatures and in divine reality, except that simple knowledge and simple volition are not accidents in God, and except that in God, because of his perfection, declarative knowledge and equaled love are produced as subsistent.

37. To the contrary: This way of thinking sets down three articles. The first is that the bare intellect converts back onto itself. The next is that the conversion of bare intellect is necessary for it then to be an adequate receptive principle of the word. The next is that the intellect, when informed with simple knowledge, is an active principle of the word.

38. Against the first article the argument is as follows: Conversion is an action; actions belong to suppositis; therefore the intellect, when it converts, belongs to some supposit. But not to the second supposit [sc. the person of the Son], because since conversion, according to you [sc. Henry], is the production of the word it will not belong to the second supposit before the production of that supposit (which is false); therefore it belongs to the first supposit. Thus, in that case, the bare intellect is a sufficient receptive principle of the word, and the intellect informed with simple knowledge is a sufficient productive principle of it; therefore a word will be produced and no second supposit will be had in divine reality, which is absurd.

39. Against the second as follows from Augustine [*On the Trinity* 9 last chapter]: the word is produced from the memory, but memory, according to Augustine *ibid.*, is wholly composed of grace and presented object; for he says that knowledge, which is the word, is born of knower and known; therefore it does not proceed only from intellect formed with simple knowledge.

40. Against the third as follows: I do not see the necessity why I should posit a bare intellect that converts back so that a word may be produced from it; but I believe that as soon as there is complete memory, it generates a word without any other conversion. Next to the proof, I say that in divine reality there are two intrinsic productions, namely generation and spiration, for which the reason is that, since the intrinsic productions are adequate to their principles and are coeternal, there cannot be more or fewer productions save as their principles are more or fewer; but their principles are only two. I prove this through Augustine above [n.39], for, from the fact that memory is the productive principle and memory is wholly composed from an object present in idea of object and from the power, therefore there will be as many principles as there are powers; but the powers are two, namely intellect and will; etc.

41. This sort of way, then, is that both in divine reality and in creatures the principles are wholly composed from the power and the object, with nothing else added; but in divine reality things are such that essential understanding is the same as existence and is a pure perfection of the essence itself, and is therefore in no way produced but is communicated the way the essence itself is and the other attributes. And for this reason it is called essential knowledge and is that by which the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit formally understand and are formally blessed; and therefore all this is presupposed to the production of the word just as are also the other pure perfections; and the same holds simply of essential volition. But then, as I said, memory is wholly composed from object and power, and it is the formal principle of the production of the word, but what actively produces is the first supposit.

42. But if you ask by what then is the indwelling of the supposit composed, I say that it is composed by the act of saying itself, of which memory is the formal principle; and so the first supposit is memory as memory includes the act of saying; and I say that, although in creatures the act of saying is an act in the category of action, yet in divine reality it is in the category of relation and is paternity or active generation; and, because it is not intellection, therefore it does not have an object, but because it is relation, therefore it does have a term. But its term is the produced word which, indeed, because of its supreme perfection, is not an inherent property but something subsistent, and it is not properly the knowing that is intellection, as it is in the case of creatures, but is a supposit and a person constituted in being of supposit; by this it corresponds to the act of saying,

and the saying, indeed, is not in the category of passion but of relation and is filiation itself; and thus in the production of the word the numerically same nature as is in the producer is communicated to the produced word.

43. So it is too on the part of the will, and the will itself, along with the object, is the formal principle of spiration; and this spiration is the corresponding relation, and to the term produced is communicated the numerically same nature as is in the first and second supposit. But herein there is a difference, that the act of spirating does not constitute a person as the act of saying does, for which the reason is that the two supposits, in which is the object and the will (which are the formal principle of spirating), were not then constituted [sc. but had been constituted before]; and so the act of spirating is elicited by two distinct supposits and spiration is therefore called a common notion, because it belongs to the two of them.

44. And if you ask about the order of these two productions, I say that all things that are in God are essentials and notionals absolutely and relatively simultaneously, not only in duration but also in nature. Yet the Father precedes the Son in origin, and the Father and Son precede the Holy Spirit in origin. And likewise paternity precedes filiation, and active spiration precedes passive spiration. And if you ask what is meant by order of origin, I say that it is taken from the nature of the thing and is the being from another.

45. And thus it is apparent that between paternity and filiation in respect of active and passive spiration there is no order of origin, because the one does not have being from the other. And if you say that neither does filiation properly have being from paternity, I say that the Son, who is formally constituted in his indwelling as Son through paternity, has being from the Father. And if you say that, just as paternity is simultaneous with the Father in origin, so being spirated is simultaneous with the Holy Spirit, and therefore, just as the Father precedes the Holy Spirit in origin, so does paternity precede being spirated; I say that the Father and Son precede the Holy Spirit in origin, not as Father and as Son, but as spirating, and so they are, as spirating, simultaneous in origin; and yet the Father as Father precedes the Son in origin. And in this way can all similar doubts be made clear.

46. But if you ask how the Father produces the Word by the same act of saying by which he is constituted in being of supposit, I say that, because in the case of creatures a supposit is absolute, therefore the acts of saying or acting, because these are in the category of action, do not constitute a supposit but suppose what is already constituted; in God, or where the supposit is relative, they for the same reason constitute and produce a supposit.

47. But if you ask why in God the act of saying is not in the category of action, I say that it is because there is no motion or change in God; so a respect there is pure, not founded in motion, and so it is in the category of relation.

48. And if you ask why God is said to produce a word by way of nature, I say that the reason is that the intellect is a natural power and so, when its object is present to it, action follows by necessity of nature; and therefore memory is said not to be intellectual contingently but by necessity of nature; the will however, even if it is inclined by the object, is yet not compelled by it, and therefore it acts contingently and freely.

49. But if you ask about the production of a word in the case of creatures, I say that, just like in divine reality, so in creatures too memory is precisely constituted in totality from the object and the power, with nothing added.

50. But if you ask what the act of saying by elicitation is from, I say that it is from a

supposit, from a man or an angel.

51. And if you ask what the formal principle of the act of saying is, I say that it is memory.

52. And if you ask what the act of saying is, I say that it is in the category of action.

53. And if you ask what is its most immediate term, I say that it is the being said itself, which is in the category of passion; for action exists of itself in passion.

54. And if you ask what is the consequent term as it were, I say that it is the word produced, which is declarative knowledge and is an absolute act, though not subsistent but inherent, in the category of quality. And so now I say that, in the case of creatures, all intellection is from memory as from its formal principle, and is produced by an act of saying, which is in the category of action and is an absolute in the category of quality.

55. And note too that every intellection is a word, and a word is sometimes more perfect and sometimes less perfect. In God however there is no produced intellection but an ungenerated and essential intellection, as was said before; and his word is not intellection but a relative supposit. Note further that, in the case of creatures, there follows, after the production of a word, the relation of producer to produced, which is in the category of relation, and there follows, in the same order of nature, an act of saying in the category of action and an act of being said in the category of passion, and this is the produced word. For the produced word itself is the foundation of the other extreme of the relation, which extreme indeed is simultaneous in nature with the first extreme. And therefore I say that the whole relation of producer to produced follows, in order of nature, the produced word; and the acts of saying and of being said and this sort of relation lack names save in the case of eminent things, when they are called paternity and filiation; but in divine reality the relation of producer to produced is the very saying and being said, which constitute supposit; and therefore a produced word does not follow, as is completely clear.

To the Arguments

56. On the basis of these statements, which avail for the questions proposed and for many other things that must be said in the same way, I reply to the arguments for the opposite.

57. To that belonging to the question posed fourth in order [q.6 *bis* n.11] I say that changes different in species only argue ideas different in species when the changes are the same formally as the term. An example is when the de-whitening of something is the same as the whiteness removed, differing only as to perfect and imperfect; and for this reason de-whitening and de-blackening do argue terms differing in species. An example about other cases: motion is not the same as 'where', and the same straight and circular motion, which are distinct in species according to the Philosopher, have their term at the same 'where'. And so it is in the issue at hand, because, if the productions themselves are distinct from each other in species, still the terms are not, for since they are the same as relations, as was said, they are not the same formally as the nature (which is the same formally as the term); for, just as motions distinct in species can have numerically the same 'where' as term, so the productions have diverse terms in which numerically the same personal idea, namely the nature, is found; and for this reason they are said not to differ in species, although the things constituting the terms in being of supposit are of

diverse ideas; for the specific idea is not taken from the indivisible idea proper to the supposit but from the nature.

58. To the next argument, belonging to the last question in order [q.7 n.2], I say that the Philosopher spoke little about the will as it is distinguished from the intellect, and therefore he means by intellect commonly the whole intellectual part as it includes will and intellect, and thus does he take it in *Physics 2* when he distinguishes intellect from nature.

To Question Five

59. Now I respond to the second question [q.5] about the number of the persons, and I say that in divine reality there are only three persons, which I prove as follows:

60. Wherever there are only two persons produced and one person unproduced, there are there only three persons; but so it is in divine reality; therefore etc. The major is manifest. The proof of the minor is, first, that there are there only two produced persons; second, that there are not more produced persons; third, that there is only one non-produced person there; fourth that there are not more non-produced persons.

61. I prove first as follows: Wherever there are two adequate, unimpeded, productive principles, there are there two productions and, consequently, two terms of the productions; but in divine reality there are two such principles and also two productions, as is altogether plain from the preceding question; therefore etc.

62. I prove second as follows: Whenever there is a term that, while it abides standing as term, is adequate to the productive principle, such a principle cannot produce another term; but the persons produced in divine reality, since they are formally infinite by reason of the essence (which they include), adequately and also still abide, since they are there coeternal; therefore etc.

63. I prove third as follows: In divine reality there is a produced person, as is plain from what has been said; so there is a producing person. The consequence is plain, because whatever is produced is not produced by itself but by another, and there cannot be a circle in the act of producing.

64. Now fourth as follows: There is only one God; therefore there is only one non-produced person. The antecedent is plain from the question about the unity of God [d.2 q.3]. The consequence is proved by Hilary in his sermon on the synod, where he says that he who says there are two unborns is confessing that there are two Gods.

65. By reason again [i.e. again to n.64] as follows: There are no absolute persons in divine reality because there would be composition there, but the persons are constituted by respect there and so by relations; therefore, if there are several non-produced persons, they are constituted either by relations of origin and then one of them will be from another, or by disparate relations and then they have a respect either to what comes before, and so both will be produced, or to what comes after, and then they will not be several, as is plain of paternity and active spiration which, because they are in respect of what comes after, do not constitute diverse persons; therefore etc.

66. These arguments do not seem efficacious. For the first [n.64] is not necessarily convincing because being unborn does not state an absolute perfection or a pure perfection, and being multiplied is not repugnant to such things the way being multiplied is repugnant to divinity, which is infinite perfection. Hilary does not say that thus it is in

fact, that he who says there are several unborns says there are several Gods (because there are not several unborns just as there are not several Gods); yet, if another unborn were not repugnant, there could perhaps, while the unity of God persists, be several unborns; therefore etc.

67. And the third reason [the second dilemma, n.65] does not seem sufficient, first because it supposes that a first person can only be constituted by relation, and second because it does not adequately prove that disparate and diverse relations possessing a disposition toward something first cannot constitute diverse persons. Therefore I prove the proposed conclusion as follows:

68. That which of itself is unlimited as to several things and is not determined to a definite number by something other than itself, has, as far as depends on itself, no repugnance to existing in an infinite number of things; if therefore being unborn is unlimited as to several supposit, then, since it is not determined to one supposit by another supposit (being unborn is not something got from another), the result is that it can, of itself, be in an infinite number of supposit; and if it can be it is, because in eternal things, and especially in one that exists necessarily, there is no difference between existence and possibility.

To the Argument

69. To the principal argument of this second question [q.5 n.2] I say that active spiration does not constitute a person – not indeed because it is less noble than the other relations, but because it exists in supposit already constituted by relations that are in some way prior.

70. Note here a good difficulty [sc. a difficulty that arises if one does not adopt the solution given in n.69] – for either one must say that order of origin is not just being from another and being from itself, or one must say that filiation is superior in nature to spiration, which is false; or one must find some other way of escape.

To Question Four

71. To the question posed first [q.4] I say that a plurality of persons is consistent with the unity and simplicity of essence that the essence requires.

72. To make this clear, note that common sharing is twofold: one is by identity, in the way that the universal is narrowed down to the singular; the other is in idea of ‘by which’, in the way that a form is communicated to matter. I say then that the idea of a supposit consists in a double incommunicability that is opposite to the stated double communicability. By contrast, the idea of nature includes this double communicability. A nature, therefore, as far as concerns itself, is communicable to several supposit, any one of which is it, as man for Peter and John; and the nature is communicable in idea of ‘by which’, in the way that the supposit, through the nature, comes to be quidditatively of that sort. But the fact that the nature in such communicating should itself be divided, this occurs because of the imperfection of the nature. So since all imperfection is excluded from the divine nature, and since the exclusion does not take the idea of nature from it, both incommunicabilities are thus plain, namely that the divine nature can be communicated to several supposit really distinct while its own unity remains, and can be

communicated in such a way that each of the suppositis will be the nature and will be quidditatively of that sort – just as any particular man is a man and is so quidditatively. And since indivisibility and simplicity and necessity do not take the idea of nature from the nature, and since communicability is of the idea of nature, as was said – just as incommunicability is of the idea of supposit –, the consequence is that the divine nature, according to its indivisibility and singularity and necessity, can be communicated to several suppositis really distinct.

73. The same is proved again as follows: Communicability in nature states a perfection, and from this perfection results the fact that the divine nature is its own singularity and is indivisible and necessarily exists. But a second perfection does not take away a first perfection unless the second contains the first eminently; therefore, since the divine nature is one nature, it will be communicable, while its singularity and indivisibility and necessity remain, to several suppositis really distinct.

74. The proof of the first proposition here [n.73] is that privation in a nature, or its lack of communicability, would state an imperfection, because then the whole coordination of beings would be taken away. But lack of communicability in a supposit does not state an imperfection, because a supposit is not a subject apt to be communicated. And so incommunicability in a supposit does not state a privation but rather a negation. Therefore, just as the fact that blindness states imperfection in the eye – it is a privation in the eye, and privation states an imperfection and an imperfection in a naturally fit subject, namely here the eye – so does incommunicability state imperfection in a nature, while communicability states a perfection in it. And it is plain that such fitting communicability of nature is really in the supposit and really distinct in it; and the communicability as such states a perfection, because incommunicability in it would, as such, state an imperfection; etc.

75. However, because it does not seem intelligible for numerically the same nature to be in diverse suppositis really distinct without the nature having several distinctions in relation to the ideas by which the suppositis are really distinct, therefore I say – without prejudice to a better opinion – that the being of the nature does have some distinctness in respect of the relations, and has it prior to any act of a created or uncreated intellect, so that the distinction is on the part of the thing. I prove this as follows: The formal idea of the [divine] essence is its being for itself and its being something absolute and communicable, and this from the nature of the thing. The formal idea of paternity is its being to a son and not for itself, and its being in relation, and this too from the nature of the thing. But to be for itself and not to be for itself, to be to another and not to be to another, to be absolute and to be relational, to be incommunicable and to be communicable – these are, by the nature of the thing, opposites; etc.

76. Again, in the case of things that, from the nature of the thing, are totally the same, when one is multiplied the others are too; but relation is really multiplied in divine reality while the unity of the essence remains; therefore they are, from the nature of the thing, not totally the same; etc.

77. Again, things that, from the nature of the thing, are totally the same as some one and the same thing are, from the nature of the thing, totally the same as each other; but paternity and filiation are really distinct from each other; therefore they are not totally the same as the essence, which, from the nature of the thing, is itself the same.

78. Nevertheless I still say that, although paternity and filiation have, as I said, some

distinctness on the part of the thing (which you can formally call a formal distinction), yet they do have a supreme real identity. I prove this in several ways.

79. First because, according to Master Lombard in the text *ad loc.*, one of them is predicated of the other in the abstract by a statement saying ‘This is this’ – as that paternity is the essence, and conversely. And a unity less than real unity is in no way sufficient for this predication.

80. Second, because otherwise there would be composition in the persons, because there would be composition of diverse things.

81. Third, because something formally infinite (of which sort the essence is) necessarily draws into its own identity of essence what is compossible with it, etc.

82. Again I say – so as to preserve a greater simplicity – that the distinction in question is not a relation, or anything posited the way things are in creatures; on the contrary, in order for it to be distinct by nature, it is a pure negation, that is, it does not take some same thing away from the nature of the thing.

83. And for this reason I say that this inference is not good: ‘They are not the same formally, therefore they are distinct formally’ – taking ‘distinctness’ for the something positive that is an ultimate division of being when being is said to be divided into ‘same’ and ‘distinct’; for distinctness does not then say something positive, because what divides a thing partakes of the thing it divides, otherwise the division would be empty. For we do not say that a something ‘other’ is a nothing [sc. ‘same’ and ‘other’ are distinctions of being, and so both are part of being and state being].

84. And that this inference is not a good one I prove as follows: When some one or other of certain things does not consist in something indivisible but has degrees and divides some other third thing, negation of the supreme degree in one of the joint dividers can stand with the non-positing of any degree in the other joint divider, etc. An example: if whiteness and blackness divide the whole of color, then, although any degree of them can be denied of a subject of whiteness (so that it will not be whitest) without positing any degree of blackness in it, yet in no way would it be black.

85. And if you say here that a subject approaches one opposite by as much as it departs from the other, and so, if it departs from supreme whiteness by a degree, it approaches blackness by a degree, I say that it is not so. Rather I say that the proposition is true in this way: a subject approaches an opposite as much as it departs from the other opposite in the sense that passage over to the other will, as is plain, become easier. I then form the minor premise but only in the way that ‘same’ and ‘distinct’ in Aristotle’s sense divide the whole of being; and each of these has degrees, for ‘same’ is both formal and real and so too with ‘distinct’. Also, formal sameness, taken on the part of the nature of things, is the supreme degree of sameness, because things that are formally the same are, from the nature of the thing, maximally the same. And if there be perhaps a more supreme degree, which may be called modal degree (which will perhaps be spoken of below), then formal sameness is at least not the lowest degree; therefore this formal degree of sameness can be denied of certain things by the fact that some degree of distinctness is posited in them; but the initial degree could not be denied, namely real sameness, unless some distinctness were posited; because, once the initial degree has been denied, nothing would remain and distinctness would follow, just as would be the case if blackness were posited when the whole of whiteness was denied of a subject (supposing there to be no other intermediate color). Therefore things that are not really

the same are really distinct, but things that are not formally the same and yet are really the same are of necessity formally distinct, etc.

86. But against these assertions many difficulties arise. And first, against the first assertion [n.75], an argument namely that essence and relation are the same formally in God is made as follows: Just as the really infinite draws to its reality everything compossible with it, so the formally infinite draws to its formality everything compossible with it; therefore the essence, which is formally infinite, formally includes paternity, which is something compossible with it.

87. Again, as to predicating one thing of another in the abstract [n.79], real identity is not sufficient for this without formal identity; for the following proposition is not true: humanity is not animality and yet they are really the same, since the intellective soul contains the sensitive unity; therefore etc.

88. Again, a relation when added to the essence constitutes a real and not just a formal supposit; therefore it remains really and not only formally; therefore etc.

89. Against the second assertion [n.78], namely that they are really the same, I argue as follows: the Father is really distinct from the Son by paternity, and he is really the same as the Son by essence; therefore essence and paternity are not one reality, etc.

90. Again, according to you this essence is really this paternity; and this filiation is really this paternity; therefore this is false; therefore some premise is false; and any reason by which one premise is false is a reason by which the other is false; etc.

91. Again, the three arguments posited above for proving a formal distinction between them [nn.79-82], can in equal manner be made here to prove a real distinction between them; so that if they are valid in the first case, they will be valid also in the second, as is plain to anyone who looks at them.

92. Against the second assertion, namely that an inference in this way is not a good one [nn.83-84]: ‘they are not the same formally, therefore they are distinct formally’ – I argue as follows: What things are constituted by, and what they are distinguished from anything not of the same sort by, is the same. An example: Man is formally man by intellective soul, and by the same soul he is distinguished from anything not man; and therefore by the diverse formalities by which they are constituted in something diverse or something other, they are also distinct formally in a different formal being. Etc.

93. To the final one [n.85?] I say that ‘one’ is something distinguished negatively, because by ‘one’ is meant ‘not other’, just as what does not have an intellective soul is not a man; but it does not follow that between them there is some positive distinction that is something other than those formalities, etc.

94. However, solutions to the objections to the other two previous assertions are, for brevity’s sake, not set down here; also because I did not find them in the text [sc. of Scotus].

To the Arguments

95. But to the first principal argument brought forward in the other first question [q.4 n.2] I say as to the relations by which the persons are distinguished that, just as they do not pass over formally into the essence, so they are not formally necessary existence; but just as they are one reality with the essence, so they are one necessary existence, and therefore it does not follow that they are possibles; also just as paternity is not formally

infinite nor finite, for the idea of finitude or infinity does not formally belong to it, yet it is really infinite by reason of the essence. Thus, being possible and being necessary do not belong to paternity formally, but necessary existence does really, by reason of the essence, belong to it, just as also paternity is neither perfect nor imperfect formally but it is really one perfection with the essence. For if it were formally perfect, some perfection would be lacking to the other supposit; but if it were formally imperfect, the Father would be imperfect.

96. To the second [n.3] I say that what is a perfection in one supposit is so also in another. But paternity does not state a pure perfection but only a perfection in that in which it is, and therefore there is no pure perfection that ought to exist in the other supposit; however paternity is not superfluous in the Father, etc.

97. On the contrary: Either paternity states a perfection of itself, and then wherever it is posited it states a perfection, and so it will have to be posited in any supposit; or it receives perfection from that in which it is posited, and then, since any supposit is equally perfect, it receives that perfection in whatever it is posited; and so the reason for positing it as being in one is a reason for positing it as being in another, etc.

98. I reply therefore differently to the argument, and I say that a result from the supreme perfection of the divine essence is that, while its unity remains, it is communicated to three supposit really distinct; but the supposit cannot be really distinct unless there is some part of them that is not in another; therefore it is not superfluous but necessary that there are three persons and that paternity is in the Father and not in the other supposit.

99. To the third [n.4] I say that the persons are, as to real being, simply and totally the same being, but they have some formal distinction (spoken of above) by reason of the relations that the persons include; and this distinction suffices for the supposit being distinct among themselves by a relative reality; but they are really the same in absolute being by reason of the same essence that they include

100. To the fourth [n.5] I say that what the persons are distinguished by is not an inhering accidental thing though it can, in a larger sense and yet improperly, be said to be accidental to the essence insofar as it is outside the formal idea of the essence, etc.

Third Distinction

Question One

Whether God can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.1 q.2 sect.1 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.12 a.12

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. About the third distinction I ask first whether God can be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer.

2. That he is not. From Aristotle as follows. *On the Soul* 3: We understand nothing without phantasms, for just as sensibles are to the senses so intelligibles are to the intellect; but God is not a phantasm because he is not sensible; therefore etc.

3. Again, *Metaphysics* 2: Our intellect is related to what is most manifest in nature as the eye of the owl to the sun; but there is impossibility here; therefore etc.

4. Again, *Physics* 1: The infinite qua infinite is unknowable; but God qua God is infinite; therefore etc.

5. Again, Gregory on *Ezekiel*: However much my mind has advanced in contemplation of God, I have reached not to what he is but to what is beneath him, etc.

6. On the contrary. *Metaphysics* 6: Science or theology is about God; but the science of metaphysics is naturally attainable; therefore.

Question Two

Whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The question next asked along with the first is whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer.

2. That he is, from *Metaphysics* 2: As things are to existence so are they to being known; but God is the first being; therefore he is the first known.

3. On the contrary: All natural knowledge arises from the senses, *Metaphysics* 1, *Posterior Analytics* 2; but God is furthest removed from the senses; therefore he is not naturally first known.

Response to Questions One and Two To Question One

1. The first question is not asking about whether God exists, because this question was discussed above [d.2 qq.1-2]. Rather it is asking whether the intellect of the wayfarer can have some simple concept in which God is in some way known as to what he is.

2. To this question some say (Thomas, *Summa* Ia q.12 a.12) that God is known by the wayfarer only negatively. But this does not hold, because negations are known only through affirmations, *Metaphysics* 4, *De Interpretatione* 2. For the reason that something is removed from something is because something else, with which the thing removed was impossible, is affirmatively attributed to it. So we remove composition from God because we attribute simplicity to him.

3. An alternative answer is that God is not known in himself by the wayfarer but in creatures, wherein he shines forth. But this too does not hold. For let purely a creature be known: and then God is not known, or God himself, who is in the creature, is known, and then he is known in himself through creatures.

4. Or in this way: God is known by discursive reason; if there is this discursive reasoning, then, either it is discursive to God, and so the conclusion is obtained; or it is discursive to the creature, and so the beginning and end of the reasoning is the same and consequently nothing is known – or God is at least thus known in the creature.

5. Another way is to say that God is known by creatures not per se but as it were per accidens, because he is not conceived in the proper idea of deity but in some attributal idea, which is a quasi accidental according to Damascene bk.1, where he says that attributes do not state the nature of God but something about the nature; and in knowing that God is wise and the like, creatures know him as it were per accidens, because through some quasi accidental idea.

6. On the contrary. When creatures know that God is wise, they know that wisdom is in him, in a quasi second mode of statement per se [sc. a statement when the subject enters into the definition of the predicate]; and so they know the underlying quiddity to which they adequately attribute in the second mode the quasi accidental perfection.

7. Accordingly I state five articles in solution of this first question [q.1]. First I say that the wayfarer can naturally have of God some quidditative concept in which God himself will be known in some way, albeit imperfectly. For the wayfarer can naturally know that God is wise; therefore he attributes wisdom to the divine nature; therefore he in some way knows the divine nature quidditatively.

8. I say second that the wayfarer cannot naturally have a concept of this divine essence as it is this essence, the reason for which is that the essence is in this way not a natural object of our intellect, only of the divine intellect; but of other intellects the essence is in this way the moving and beatific object.

9. I say third that the wayfarer can attain knowledge of many concepts proper to God, of which sort are all concepts in their supreme degree, as when he conceives God to be supremely wise, supremely good, and other things of this sort. However, the more perfect among these concepts is the concept of infinity, for infinity is not as it were an attribute but a degree intrinsic to the divine essence, just as intense whiteness is not something quasi accidentally added to whiteness but is an intrinsic degree of it, etc. Note that 'supreme' taken in relation to another states a respect but taken absolutely it states, for me, something purely simple; and in this way is the infinite made more explicit.

10. I say fourth that all the naturally possible knowledge that can be had by a wayfarer is because of the hopes creatures have and is as it were by way of argument; and it proceeds in this way: I possess the species of wisdom and the species of act and the species of a supreme stone; I then put these three species together and form one concept, which is supreme actual wisdom; and I then argue that such is the wisdom of God and so on as to other attributes; and this can be done by an argument *a minori*. For the imaginative faculty does this when it imagines a golden mountain, by putting together at the same time the species of gold and the species of mountain. Hereby is it plain that the natural knowledge that can be had of God is not knowledge of this essence under its proper idea of essence; etc.

11. I say fifth that, because the knowledge that can naturally be had of God comes through species of creatures, it must necessarily be the case that a concept common to God and creatures is univocal. And I mean by a univocal concept a concept that is single with as much oneness as suffices for the extremes of contradiction and for a middle term, without fallacy of equivocation, in a syllogism.

12. Now I prove this in three ways. First as follows: Knowledge is not natural unless it is naturally caused; knowledge is not naturally caused unless it is caused by what naturally moves the possible intellect; the possible intellect is not naturally moved save by an object that is translucent in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; but every such object is something sensible; therefore God cannot be naturally known save through species of sensible things; but a sensible species cannot lead to knowledge of God and of spiritual things save in the way stated; but a sensible species, as of a stone, causes knowledge of the stone and of all its higher genera, as body, substance, and being; and it causes the concept of being, which is got through the species of the stone, by attributing concepts to being, or by putting being together with other concepts, as was said in the fourth article [n.10]. For I say that God is like this, and so I have of God a concept of being; but this could not be done unless, as is plain, the concept of being were univocal to God and stone, for otherwise I could not attribute to God the concept of being that the species of stone causes in me; etc.

13. Secondly thus: The intellect, when conceiving created wisdom, conceives it as it states imperfection; and then, by removing the imperfection (namely limitation and the like) and preserving the formal idea of wisdom, the intellect attributes it to God; but this could not be done unless the concept of wisdom were univocal to created and uncreated wisdom; instead the whole of it would have to be taken away, and so nothing we received from creatures could we attribute to God.

14. Thirdly thus: The concept that the philosophers had of God, or of the first principle, which concept was being, was a created concept; but such a concept did not give certainty as to whether being was created or uncreated; therefore the concept of being was neutral as to both such concepts; and consequently it was univocal to them.

To the Arguments

15. To the arguments. To the first [q.1 n.2] the answer is plain from what was said in the fourth and fifth articles [nn.10, 11 supra].

16. To the second [q.1 n.3] I say that, according to the Commentator [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 2 com.1], there is no impossibility but a difficulty, the reason for which is that nature would have uselessly made separate substances if they could not be understood by any intellect. But this does not hold, because being understood by us is not the goal of separate substances. Hence, if they are not understood by us, they would not for this reason have been made uselessly; etc.

17. Further, that they cannot be understood by us does not entail that they cannot be understood by themselves.

18. One must therefore say that the eye of an owl only has intuitive vision, as is plain, and I then say that, just as it is impossible for the eye of an owl to see the sun, so it is impossible for God to be intuitively seen by the wayfarer naturally.

19. It can also be said in another way that the eye of an owl does see the sun at twilight, and just as its eye then sees the sun imperfectly so do we understand separate substances imperfectly.

20. To the third [n.4] I say that Aristotle is speaking there of an infinite in possibility, and such a thing, as far as it is infinite, is unknown; but God is an infinite in act; therefore etc.

21. To Gregory [n.5] I say that however much the mind of the wayfarer may advance in contemplation of God, yet it will not be able to reach distinct knowledge, but it can well reach some natural knowledge of God – not however of his essence as it is this essence, but to a knowledge of God, or of his essence, under the idea of being. This sort of knowledge is called inferior, however, because it is not a perfect and distinct knowledge as of the essence as it is this essence; wherefore etc.

To Question Two

22. Now in answer to the second question I say that there is a triple order to intelligible things: the first order is that of origin or generation; the next is the order of perfection; the third is the order of adequacy or of causality in the precise sense.

23. Of the first two priorities the Philosopher speaks in *Metaphysics* 9.15; of the third he speaks in *Posterior Analytics* 1.11, about the definition of the universal, because it states precision and adequacy first.

24. To being with, then, we must look at habitual cognition. As concerns this I say that concepts are twofold: one is simply simple, namely that which is not resolvable into other prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of being and its ultimate differences; the other is a simple concept but not simply simple, namely that which is resolvable into other prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of a thing defined (which is resolvable into the concepts of the parts of the definition), and so of other like terms.

25. Secondly I say that the second concept here [n.24] is knowledge, one being actual knowledge and another habitual knowledge; etc.

26. Third I say that actual knowledge is double: one is distinct, whereby a whole thing is actually known and actually in its totality; the other is confused, whereby a thing is not known actually in its totality because not all the things that are knowable about it are actually known. An example: it would be a contradiction to understand man actually without understanding all the things that are included in him essentially; yet it is not necessary for all these things to be understood actually, but only habitually. Accordingly, when all of them were understood actually, the thing would then be said to be known distinctly, because the whole of it would be known actually and totally; but when the things included in it are understood not actually but habitually, then the thing is said to be known confusedly.

27. Fourth I say that to know confusedly and distinctly are one thing and that to know a confused thing and a distinct thing are another; for in the former the confusion and distinctness are on the part of the knowledge and in the latter on the part of the thing, as is plain.

28. On the basis of these premises I say that when speaking of actual knowledge, which is here at issue, the first naturally known thing, naturally confused with confused knowledge, is the most specific species; but the first thing naturally known with distinct knowledge is being. But there is clarification of this as follows:

29. The first thing by which the possible intellect is naturally moved is the representative object in a phantasm together with the agent intellect, and, according to the common opinion, it does not immediately and directly represent the particular but the universal, namely the specific nature; therefore the specific nature is naturally first known; and because many things are included in it, of which included things the first is being,

which is supreme, therefore, if the nature is to be distinctly known, there is need to start from being, and from the fact that being has a concept simply simple so that it includes nothing else. Therefore being can be only known distinctly, and thus it is plain that the first distinctly known thing is being, and the first confusedly known thing is the most specific species. But because the more universal things are the more confused things, therefore is it said in *Physics* 1 that the more confused things are known first by us. But this ‘known first’ must be understood of distinct knowledge, because we are now beginning from it, as was said [just above]; and what in such knowledge is more distinct is what is last known, as is plain; etc.

30. One must note here, however, that, as Scotus seems to think, no particular is, in our present state, known in its proper idea either by the intellect or by the senses. The reason is that, if the particular could be known in its proper idea, it could be distinguished from everything that is not it, and yet it cannot be. For suppose that there is here a single whiteness and it is present as an object to your senses, and suppose that God by his own power were to annihilate it and immediately replace it with a whiteness that was not numerically the same but very similar to it, you will think it is the same and yet it will not be the same; but if you knew the first whiteness in its own proper and singular nature, you would immediately notice that it was not the same. This would also be clear of many other cases that, whether by the senses or in any other way, you cannot distinguish between, and yet they are really distinct. The particular and singular, therefore, are, in our present state, not known by the intellect or the senses in their proper idea of singularity, but they are known by aggregation of many accidents, namely size, shape, color, and many such things.

To the Arguments

31. To the first argument for the opposite [q.2 n.2] I say that the proposition is in all cases true only in respect of the divine intellect, which knows things according to the degrees of their entity; and so what is first and most being is first and most known by it. But because our knowledge begins from the senses, therefore are sensible things first known to us, yet they do not have existence first. So it is true that the first being is of itself the first knowable, but it is the first known only to the most perfect intellect, which also knows things in all their degrees, etc.

Question Three

Whether God is the sufficient object of our intellect

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.85 a.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The second question⁴ is whether God is the first sufficient object of a wayfarer's intellect.
2. That he is. Just as there is no participated being unless there is being by essence, so participated being is not known unless unparticipated being is first known; therefore God, who is being by essence, is the first sufficient object of any intellect whatever, etc.
3. Also, the first thing in any genus is the cause of everything in that genus, from *Metaphysics* 2 text.4; but God is the first and most perfect of all knowables; therefore etc.
4. Further, things are related to being known as they are related to being; but God is the first being; therefore etc.
5. On the contrary. The first object of a power, by the primacy of its sufficiency, is predicated of everything that can be known by that power, as visible is said of everything that the eye can see; but God is not predicated of everything that the wayfarer's intellect understands; therefore etc.
6. Further, no power can apprehend or understand any object under an idea more common than the idea of its first object; but the intellect understands things under an idea more common than God; therefore God is not the first object of the intellect.

To the Question

7. I reply by saying that Thomas [*ST* Ia q.12 a.4, q.85 a.1] posits that – just as powers are threefold: one altogether separate from matter in its being and in its operating, another altogether material in its being and in its operating, a third separate from matter in its operating but not in its being (the first is a separate intellect, the second is a material organic power, the third is a conjoined intellect which perfects matter in existing but does not use a material organ in operating) – so there are three objects proportionally corresponding to them. For immaterial quiddity corresponds to the first power as its first object; the material particular corresponds thus to the second power; the quiddity of a material thing corresponds thus to the third power, which quiddity, despite being in matter, is yet not known in the material singular, for it is purified by the irradiating of the agent intellect.
8. On the contrary. While a power remains the same power it cannot, by any habit added to it, exercise its act about an object that is not conceived under the formal idea of the first sufficient object of that power; but an intellect when blessed and when not blessed is numerically the same intellect; therefore, however much the habit of glory is added to the intellect when blessed yet, since such habit does not make the intellect not to be the same power as it was before, the intellect will when blessed not exercise its act about separate substances, which is absurd. The proof of the minor is that the first object of a habit either is contained under the first object of the power or at least does not go beyond it; otherwise it would not be a habit of the power.
9. Now Henry of Ghent says [*Quodlibet* 15 q.9 and 13 q.9] that the naturally first object of the intellect and of the will is God, the reason for which is that, just as the first object is naturally first simply, so it naturally first moves the intellect and the will, and whatever else moves them moves them by virtue of it, etc.

⁴ 'Second' because questions one and two above were really parts of one question, or because this question begins the second part of distinction 3 (see footnote 10, to q.5 n.1 below).

10. Against this is the argument brought against the first argument at the beginning [n.5]. On the supposition, therefore, of the univocity of being (which was proved supra, d.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), I say that the first sufficient natural object of the intellect and of the will is being. However I will first state what the univocity of being extends to and what it does not extend to. Second I will demonstrate the proposed conclusion.

11. About the first point I say that being is not said univocally and quidditatively of the ultimate differences or properties of being. I first give a twofold proof. The first proof is that if being is thus univocally said, then two ultimate differences, labeled *a* and *b*, will not be in their totality primarily *diverse* but will be *different*,⁵ because they will be ‘some other being’, that is, they will be one in being by the fact that they include ‘some other being’, namely the concept of being. And then I will take precisely the reasons by which they [*a* and *b*] differ, and so either there will be an infinite regress or some ultimate differences will be found that will then be so diverse in their totality that they include nothing common; and consequently, since being states a single concept (as was proved, q.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), these ultimate differences do not quidditatively include it.

12. The second proof is as follows: Just as a composite thing is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept is composed of an actual and formal concept; and just as act does not include potency, so an actual concept does not include a potential one; and just as the concept of being, which is potential, is simply simple, so an ultimate simple complex (at which ultimate resolution stops) is simply simple; and thus being, which states something potential, will not be predicated of difference, which states something actual.

13. Second [second of the twofold proof, n.11] I prove it following the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4 text 5 as follows: Being qua being has properties, and (following the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 9) properties are predicated of the subject in the second and not the first mode of statement per se. Therefore, just as a property does not include the subject quidditatively, so the properties of being do not include being quidditatively.

14. I say that although being is not contained quidditatively in everything intelligible (for it is not thus contained in the properties and ultimate differences of being, as was said), and although, as a result, being is not common, with the commonness of quidditative predication, to all intelligibles, yet it is in some way common to everything as to virtual containment. And this virtual containment suffices for being to be called the natural first and adequate object of the intellect and of the will, and common to all intelligibles. And although it follows from this that the reason adduced against the first argument at the beginning [n.5] and against Henry’s opinion [n.10] is not in itself a good argument, yet it is valid against Henry, because God is not predicated quidditatively of everything intelligible, nor is he contained in everything the way intelligible is so contained, as is plain.

15. But against what was said in the first article [n.11], and against the univocity of being that it posited, argument is made in another way from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3 text 10, where he says that being is not a genus, for then its difference would not be a per se being. And if you say that it would be, the result is that being is a genus, because it is, according to you, univocally predicated of its logical inferiors, and,

⁵ Things are said to be ‘diverse’ if they are in another genus but ‘different’ if they are other in the same genus. So white and red are different but white and square are diverse.

according to you, something can be outside the idea [of being], and then this something will be able to be a true difference.

16. Again against the univocity of being: The Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4 that being is said of all beings the way health is said of all healthy things, and so not logically [sc. but analogically].

17. Again in the same place he says that everything metaphysics is about is not a one but related to a one; therefore being, which is the subject there, is not univocal but analogical, etc.

18. Again in *Metaphysics* 7 text 14 & 15, accidents are not beings but *of* beings, etc.

19. Again Porphyry says [*Predicables*, on species] that if anyone speaks of all beings he will call them beings equivocally and non-univocally, etc.

20. These arguments notwithstanding, I bring forward yet another sort of reason in favor of univocity:

21. Whatever things are properly matched together in respect of some third thing are named with one name univocally in respect to it; but substance and accident, created being and uncreated being, are properly matched in respect of being; therefore etc. The major is plain from *Physics* 7 text 26. It is also plain in an example, for this proposition is not true: whiteness is more a color than sound is; the reason for this is that color has no unity in respect of whiteness and sound, but only in respect of whiteness. The minor is plain because substance is properly more a being than accident is, and uncreated being than created being; and the point is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 text 5, where he says that substance excels more than accident; but his meaning cannot be that substance is more substance than accident is, because then accident will be a substance; nor can his meaning be that accident is less accident; etc.

22. In reply to the objections that were brought forward [nn.15-19], I say to the first part of the first objection [n.15] that, in the case of many differences, being is said quidditatively; but only in the case of the ultimate differences and properties of being is it not predicated quidditatively; the point has been explained [nn.11-13]. However, the idea of genus requires that all differences, both immediate and remote, be outside the idea of the genus, etc.

23. And for this reason does Aristotle say there [n.15] that if being were a genus all the differences would be per se non-being, which is unacceptable; but it is not unacceptable, rather it is necessary, as to the ultimate differences and properties, as has been shown.

24. Hereby is plain the solution to the second part of the first objection [n.15], that, because not all differences exclude being quidditatively, being cannot be a genus.

25. To the second, third, and fourth objections, and to all the authorities taken from the Philosopher that could be adduced for the purpose [nn.16-18], I say that, speaking naturally and metaphysically, it is true that being is analogical insofar it does not state any real unity outside the intellect and as to the same things it is said of. But nevertheless, logically speaking, it is univocal, because the concept of being is truly abstracted from them and is truly one concept, as has been said and made clear.

26. I confirm the fact, for the Philosopher says, *Physics* 7, that equivocations are latent in a genus; and he means it to the extent that not every genus has a real unity in respect of its species; indeed sometimes the idea of a genus is taken, in reality, from some other form, a form from which the difference is taken, as is plain according to those who

posit a plurality of forms; and yet, despite this fact, the genus is a true logical genus, because one concept can be naturally abstracted from things really diverse; therefore it is plain that, notwithstanding the fact an accident is a being by way of attribution to substance, that also a concept of being abstracted from other things is logically a univocal concept, and it has a certain unity, as was made clear above. For it was not to be imagined that being as said of God and creatures would have a real unity outside the intellect, because then such being would naturally precede God himself, and so God will not be the first principle.

27. To Porphyry [n.19] I say that Aristotle, whom he cites there, does not say in his *Logic* that being is equivocal; but if he says it in his *Physics* or *Metaphysics*, the thing has just been expounded, etc.

28. I come now to the second article [n.10], which is about the principal matter at issue; and I say that the adequate natural first object of the intellect and the will is being.

29. I prove this about the intellect in two ways, and first as follows: The object of a habit does not exceed the object of the power of the habit, because then it would not be the object of the power; but the object of the habit that is metaphysics is being, as is plain in *Metaphysics* 6 text 1; and that habit is an intellectual one; therefore nothing inferior to being can be set down as the adequate object of the intellect; and nothing is superior to being; therefore being is the object.

30. Second as follows: The adequate first object of a power ought to contain under it quidditatively or virtually everything to which the power extends, otherwise it would not be the adequate object; but there is nothing that may contain everything intelligible save being, for being (as explained above) contains everything by quidditative or virtual containment (according to what was expounded above). I prove that truth, or the true, is not the object in question, because although the true is transcendent as being is, it cannot be posited as the adequate first object because it does not contain all intelligibles. For the true, as a property of being, does not contain being, nor the things that are per se being, whether quidditatively or virtually; but on the other hand the subject does contain the property virtually, albeit not quidditatively, etc.

31. Now, that being is the adequate first object of the will is plain from this, that whatever the intellect can understand the will, since it is free, can will, provided however the thing understood has the idea of being; for the intellect is of itself proportioned to the will. Many however do not concede that the will can will whatever the intellect can understand, etc.

32. Against this article [n.28] there is argument as follows: distinct powers have formally distinct objects, from *On the Soul* 2 text 33; but will and intellect are formally distinct powers, and sense and intellect are formally distinct powers, and yet the sensible is not formally distinct from being; on the contrary it formally includes being as its superior.

33. Again: Because then the intellect will naturally be able to understand separate substances per se, since they are contained per se under being.

34. To the first of these [n.32] I say that disparate powers of the sort that sight and hearing have also formally distinct objects, just as they are formally distinct powers; but subordinate powers in the same genus, of which sort are the sensitive cognitive power and the intellective power that is also cognitive, need to have subordinate objects, just as they themselves are subordinate; and just as is plain about the particular sense and the

common sense, so the sensible does not have to be distinct from the intellect but may be contained under it. Powers, however, that have an order between them but are not of the same genus, of which sort the intellect and will are, do not need to possess formally distinct objects because of the fact they have an order, for everything willed is known first, etc.

35. To the second [n.33] I say that, just as was said above, the intellect in this present state only naturally understands what it is naturally moved by; but it is only naturally moved by the object that shines forth in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; and everything such is sensible. And therefore the quiddity of sensible things is the first natural mover of the intellect in this present state; but nevertheless, that which the intellect is capable of should be assigned to it as its adequate first object. Hence the intellect, and the like, is the whole of being. For the conjoined and non-conjoined intellect are numerically the same intellect; indeed every blessed conjoined intellect has power for every intelligible and every being. But the fact that in this present state the intellect cannot be moved naturally save by sensible things is a result either of the natural connection of the powers of inferiors, or of superiors, or because of the sin of our first Parent, as Augustine seems to mean in *On the Trinity* 15 last chapter; and Augustine's view is perhaps more likely, because the blessed intellect would be conjoined with the same body after glorification, and consequently the connection would be the same; and yet the blessed intellect would understand sensible substances.

To the Arguments

36. As to the first argument, then, at the beginning [n.2], namely that there is no participated being unless there is being by essence and so participated being is not known unless it is a being through being by essence. However, the following inference does not hold, namely that just as being is from unparticipated being, so being is not known unless unparticipated being is known and unless being is known through the idea of being by essence. An example: A stone is not a being unless there is being by essence. Let there be being by essence. Yet the inference does not hold: the stone is not formally white or hard unless being by essence is white or hard.

32. Hereby is plain the solution to Henry's argument [n.9]. For although God is simply the first being and is of himself the first knowable, yet he is not naturally for us the first known or the first knowable. Such he is for his own true intellect, which is a purely simple intellect.⁶

Question Four

Whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4
Thomas, *ST* Ia q.44 a.3

⁶ This response to Henry will serve also as a response to the remaining two arguments at the beginning, nn.3, 4 (which are not expressly addressed); for they both turn on the same idea, namely that since God is first therefore he is first known.

1. The fourth question is whether the wayfarer can possess some sound and certain truth without special illumination from the uncreated light.

2. And it seems that he cannot. For Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.8 says that we gaze on inviolable truth, and by state by means of it what sort of mind should belong with reasons to eternal man.

3. And in the same place, in the truth by which all temporal things are made we behold the form; therefrom do we get, as a word within ourselves, the conception of true knowledge.

4. And in *Confessions* 12 chs.2 & 3 Augustine says that if both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me or I in you, but we both see it with a changeless truth as far as possible above the intellect.

5. On the contrary, in *Romans* 1 it is said that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are understood by the mind through the things that are made. These, the invisible things of God, are eternal ideas. Therefore they are known from creatures, and so, before they are seen, a sure knowledge of creatures is attained.

To the Question Henry of Ghent's Answer

6. The question here is about the knowledge of truth, which is known by the intellect as it combines and divides; the question is not about the first truth or being, but about the idea, etc.

7. The opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about this question is in the negative. Here one must note that, just as there is a twofold exemplar, namely created and uncreated (the uncreated the idea, and the created the impressed intelligible species), so there is a twofold conformity corresponding to them. But Henry says that through the created exemplar, or the acquired one within us, there cannot be had an altogether sound and certain truth; in fact it is fallible, which he proves as follows:

8. The object from which the created exemplar (that is the true species posited above) is abstracted is changeable; therefore it cannot be the cause of anything unchangeable, but the sound and certain knowledge of any truth about anything is had about it under the idea of changeability; therefore it is not had from such an eternal exemplar. Hence Augustine in *83 Questions* q.9 says that sound truth is not to be expected from sensible things, because they are changeable, etc.

9. Further, the soul is not ruled or perfected by anything more changeable than itself; but the sort of created exemplar posited above is more changeable than the soul; therefore etc. The major is from Augustine *On True Religion*, etc.

10. Further, he who has such eternal truth should have wherewith to discern the true from the untrue or from the seeming true, which the wayfarer does not have (for the created exemplar or species cannot do it). And the proof is that this species either represents itself as it is, and then it is a true understanding, or represents itself as the object, and then it is a false understanding; therefore it can err, as is plain in dreams. From these premises the conclusion is drawn that sure knowledge cannot be had by looking at the created exemplar.

11. His way of putting this is as follows: for he says that God does not have the idea of exemplar as a known thing by which, when looked at, sound truth is known; so God is known in some general attribute. But he is the reason for knowing as naked exemplar and as proper idea of uncreated essence. Hence Henry says that the uncreated light illumines the intellect of an angel by direct vision, as it were, and this light, as seen, is the reason for an angel's seeing in himself other things. But the uncreated light illumines our intellect as by reflected vision in this present state, and therefore it is the reason of seeing for our intellect and is not seen.

12. I argue against this opinion, and first by turning Henry's reasons in the opposite direction. For if the object too in the containing mind changes [n.8], no certitude can be had about it under an unchangeable idea; indeed in no light at all can certitude about it be had, because there is no certitude when the object can be known in a way other than how the subject is. There is no certitude then in knowing the changeable as unchangeable. It is plain too that the antecedent of this reasoning is false, for it imposes the view of Heraclitus, that sensibles are continually changing, *Metaphysics* 4 text 23. It also follows that if, because of the changeability of the exemplar in our soul, there can be no certitude (since anything posited subjectively in the soul is changeable, including the act of understanding itself), then it follows that by nothing in the soul will the soul be set right so as not to err.

13. Likewise, according to this opinion [n.9], the created species is inherent with this species alone⁷ apart from the being; but when something is known that is repugnant to certitude, no certitude can be had; for, just as from one contingent premise joined to another contingent premise a contingent conclusion follows [*Prior Analytics* ch.21], so from an uncertain thing and a certain thing (when they come together for some piece of knowledge) no certain conclusion follows, etc.

14. Again, the same is plain about the third reason [n.10], for if the species abstracted from the thing is concurrent with all knowledge and if it is not possible to judge when the species represents itself as itself and when it represents itself as the object, then, however much something else is concurrent with it, no certitude can be had whereby to discriminate the true from the seeming true etc.

15. Now, that this opinion is not, as some mean to say, the opinion of Augustine, is plain from Augustine when he says [*Soliloquies* 2] that for no reason does anyone concede that the speculations of the sciences to be the truest. And Boethius says [*De Hebdomadibus*] that the common conceptions of the soul are those that, when heard, everyone approves. The Philosopher too in *Metaphysics* 2 com.1 says that the first principles are certain and known to everyone, like the doors in a house.

16. From these three authorities the argument goes as follows: Whatever agrees with everything of some species is consequent to the specific nature; therefore since everyone has sure knowledge of the first principles, and since knowledge of the conclusions depends on knowledge of the principles, it follows that sure knowledge of the conclusion can be known by anyone. And elsewhere Augustine says *On the Trinity* 15.13, "Far be it that we should doubt to be true and certain the things we have learnt through the senses of the body."

17. I now solve Henry's arguments etc. As to the first [n.8], about the changeability of the object, I say that the antecedent is false. Nor is it the opinion of Augustine but of

⁷ The text prints 'absente' but, to make sense, it should be 'abs ente'.

Heraclitus [rather Cratylus], who did not want to speak but to move his finger, as is said in *Metaphysics* 4. And given that the antecedent were true, sure knowledge could still, according to Aristotle, be had about the fact that everything is moved contingently; and from the fact that everything is moveable contingently, sure and sound and unchangeable knowledge is had that everything changeable was changeable. For the following consequence does not hold: the object is changeable; therefore whatever is generated by it does not represent anything under the idea of being unchangeable. For the changeability of the object is not the reason for knowledge, but rather the nature of the changeable object is; what is generated by it, then, represents the nature per se; therefore if the nature has some unchangeable relation to something else, this something else is represented by its exemplar as being unchangeably united to it and thus through two exemplars.

18. To the second [n.9] I say that a double changeability can be understood in the soul: one is from affirmation to negation and conversely, namely from non-intellection to intellection and conversely; the other is as it were from contraries to contrary, namely from correctness to error and conversely. The soul is changeable in the first way as to any object whatever, and such changeableness is not removed from it by anything existing formally in the soul. But the soul is not changeable in the second way until it reaches propositions that are not evident from the terms. But about propositions that are evident from the terms the soul cannot change in this second way of being changeable, because the apprehended terms are a necessary cause of the conformity of the composition with the terms. Therefore if the soul is capable of absolute changeability from rightness to error, then there is nothing by which it can set itself right; at least it cannot set itself right as to the objects that the intellect, once the terms are grasped, cannot be in error about.

19. To the third [n.10] I say that, when the intelligible species or the exemplar is said not to represent itself as the object in dreams, then it is a phantasm and not an intelligible species; therefore if the intellect is using only a phantasm in which the object is present to it and is not using another intelligible species, then it does not seem able to discern the true from the seeming true by anything that the object is manifest in; but positing an impressed species in the intellect is not valid reasoning, because the intellect cannot use that species itself for the object, because in fact it does not use it in sleep.

20. And if answer be made that because a phantasm can represent an object the intellect can at least err and can even be impeded from operating correctly, as is plain of the mad and people asleep – I say that the intellect does not then err because it does not then act.

21. And so the response to Henry's arguments is plain, etc.

22. What remains now is to argue against the conclusion of Henry's opinion. Hence I ask what he means by sound truth. For either he means certain and infallible truth, without any doubt or deception, and this can be had by purely natural power. Or he means by truth a property of being; but since being can be naturally known, so too can its property, namely the true; consequently, by abstraction, truth can be known, for any form that can be understood in something can also be understood in itself by abstraction. Or he means by sound truth conformity with the exemplar, and then I ask whether the conformity is with the created exemplar (and then the proposed conclusion is gained) or with the uncreated exemplar; and if with the uncreated exemplar then, since conformity cannot be known unless what the conformity is with is known, it follows that the

uncreated exemplar is known in the created exemplar, which is contrary to how he posits things.

23. Further, when the intellect understands something confusedly it can grasp it definitively by investigating its definition through a process of division. This knowledge is the most perfect kind and belongs to simple understanding, and from this most perfect kind of knowledge of terms the intellect can understand principles, and from principles conclusions, and in this way its knowledge becomes complete, etc.

Andreas' own Answer

24. To the question I say that, because of Augustine's words [nn.2-4],⁸ one must concede the fact that infallible truths are seen in eternal patterns. But here the 'in' can be taken as meaning the object and in four ways: as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that by virtue of which the proximate object moves, or as in the remote object.

25. To understand the first of these I say that all intelligibles have intelligible being by act of the divine intellect, and all truths about these intelligibles are visible in them; and the intellect, understanding them as intellect and the necessary truths about them by virtue of them, sees the necessary truths in them as in its objects. Now these are truths insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, because they are conformed to their exemplar, namely to the divine intellect; they are also light because they make things manifest and are unchangeable and necessary; they are also eternal, but in a certain respect, because eternity is a condition of what exists in a certain respect, and these things only have existence in a certain respect. Thus we can in a first way say that the intellect sees things in the eternal light, that is, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which, in the way just expounded, is the truth or the eternal light.

26. The second way is plain from the fact that the divine intellect contains the truths as a sort of book, after the manner stated by Augustine [*On the Trinity* chs.14-15], that the eternal patterns are written in the book of eternal light, that is, in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. And although the book is not something seen, yet the things written in it are seen to be the quiddities of things; and the intellect could be said to see truths in the light, that is, in the book as it contains the object (and this is the second way), or to see them also in the truths that are in a certain respect eternal light, as we see truths in objects (and this according to the first way). The latter of these ways seems to be of Augustine's mind, because the idea of square body remains incorruptible and unchangeable but the body itself does not remain so, save as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect, etc.

27. But there is a doubt here; for if we do not see the truths as they are in the divine intellect (for we do not see that intellect), then we will be said to see them in the uncreated light, and that because what we see in such eternal light (eternal in a certain respect) are things that have being in the uncreated light as in the intellect that knows them. Here the second way replies that things as they are the secondary object of the divine intellect have being only in a certain respect. But real operation does not belong to any being by that being's power as it precisely is a being in a certain respect; but if

⁸ Note that because Andreas accepts the arguments at the beginning he has no need to give an answer to them; so no section responding to such arguments is found in this question.

operation does in any way belong to it then it must do so by the power of another thing that has being simply. These objects, then are, according to Aristotle, only able strictly speaking to move the intellect by virtue of the being of the divine intellect, which is being simply and through which the objects have being in a certain respect. Thus it is, then, that we see things in the eternal light (eternal in a certain respect eternal) as in the proximate object; but we see them in the uncreated light as in the proximate cause, by virtue of which the proximate object moves the intellect, etc.

28. Alongside this can be said that, as to the third way [n.24], we see things in the eternal light as in the proximate cause of the object in itself. For the divine intellect produces things by its own indwelling intelligible act, and by this act it gives to each object, to this object and to that, this or that sort of being; consequently to each is given the idea of the kind of thing it is, and through these ideas do things first move the intellect to sure knowledge. But the fact that one can indeed say the understanding of the matter is to see things in the eternal light (because the light is the cause of the object) is apparent from a likeness: for we are properly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect – although however this light is but the active cause, either as being what makes the object actual, or as that by virtue of which the object moves, or as both. So this double causality of the divine intellect (namely that it is the true uncreated light which produces secondary objects in intelligible being and is that by virtue of which produced secondary objects also actually move the intellect) can as it were integrally include the third member (the one about the cause [n.24], because of which we are said to see truly in the eternal light).

29. But if you object against these two ways (which integrally include the third one about the cause) that then it seems rather to be the case that we are said to see in God's will, or in God as will, than in God as he is light, because the divine will is the immediate principle of any extrinsic act of God etc. – I reply that the divine intellect produces objects in intelligible being insofar as it is in some way prior to the divine will, and so it seems to be a merely natural power with respect to them, because God is only a free cause with respect to something if the supposition is first made that some willing or act of will in some way precedes it; and so the intellect, as prior to the act of will, produces intelligible objects such that a prior cause seems to cooperate naturally with the intelligibles for their effect, namely in the way terms, when apprehended and joined together, cause apprehension of the conformity [of the proposition] to themselves. There seems, then, to be a contradiction in the intellect forming some such composition of terms and the composition not being in conformity in the terms – though it is possible that the terms not be conceived; for although God voluntarily acts along with the intellect in putting or not putting terms together, nevertheless, when the intellect has put them together, the conformity of the composition with the terms seems to follow necessarily the intelligible nature of the terms, which nature they have from the intellect of God as this intellect naturally brings the terms about in intelligible being.

30. Thus it is apparent how no special illumination is necessary for seeing things in the eternal patterns. For Augustine posits those truths alone to be seen in them that are, by the force of the terms, necessary extremes, and in such cases there is the maximum of necessity, that is, in both the proximate and the remote causes with respect to the effect, namely, in both the divine intellect with respect to the objects that move the intellect, and in the objects in relation to the truth of the proposition about them. But if it is posited that God cooperates as to the effect with a general influence but not with natural necessity, I

say that, whether there is a general influence here or a natural necessity, plainly no special illumination is necessarily required.

31. The assumption from Augustine [n.30] is plain from *On the Trinity* 4.15 when he speaks about these matters: “Some are able to raise the sharpness of their mind above every creature to attain in some way or other to the light of incommunicable truth, which they mockingly say Christians who live by faith alone are not yet able to do.” Therefore he maintains that Christians do not see the things of faith in the eternal patterns. But philosophers see many necessary things in those patterns according to Augustine when he says [*On the Trinity* 9.6] “the mind must not be of the sort it is in just any man,” as if he were to say, “contingent things are not seen there but necessary ones;” therefore he means the necessary ones are seen through eternal patterns, because contingent things, which are only known through the senses are or believed from histories, are not known; and yet a special illumination is more required in the case of believing contingent things than in knowing necessary ones, where a special illumination is furthest removed and the general illumination is alone sufficient.

32. On the contrary: Why then does Augustine say [*On the Trinity* 12.14] that few are able by sharpness of mind to attain to the intelligible ideas, and that only pure souls reach them?

33. I reply that the purity in question here should not be understood as purity from vices, because Augustine maintains [83 *Questions* q.46, *On the Trinity* 14.15] that an unjust man may see in the eternal patterns what in them one should think. But the purity must be understood as an elevating of the intellect to understanding truths as they are manifest in themselves, and not only as they are manifest in phantasms. Here one needs to note that a sensible thing causes a single confused phantasm representing in the imaginative power something per accidens one, namely the thing in its size, shape, color, and other sensible accidents. And just as the phantasm represents the thing only confusedly and per accidens, so many people perceive only a per accidens thing. But pure truths are precisely what they are through the proper nature of the terms, to the extent the terms are abstracted from everything joined per accidens with them. For the proposition, ‘every whole is greater than its part’, is true not only as it is a whole of stone or wood, but as it is a whole abstracted from everything to which it is per accidens conjoined. Therefore when the intellect understands a whole as it is in wood or stone, it does not have sound truth about it; and in this way Augustine says that few are able thus to understand, for few have so subtle a sort of mind; and he who understands with a confused and per accidens sort of concept is in the valley and surrounded by fog. But he who understands truths purely, and understands them as, from the idea of their terms, they precisely are, is on a broad mountain, having the valley and fog below.⁹

33. One can, then, in this way concede that sound truths are known in uncreated light as in a remote known object [n.24]; for the uncreated light is the first principle of theoretical matters and the ultimate end of practical ones, and the principles of theory and practice are taken up in this way. Therefore knowledge of beings through such principles is nobler, and such knowledge belongs to theologians. Yet, notwithstanding, Augustine says that sound truth can be had without special illumination, etc.

⁹ The printed text has ‘sincerum’ or ‘sound’ which makes no sense in the context. It may be a misprint for ‘inferius’ or ‘sub pedem’ or the like, which is what is translated here.

Question Five

Whether a trace or footprint of the Trinity is found in all creatures

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.5

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.45 a.7

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The question asked in the third place¹⁰ is whether there is a trace or footprint of the Trinity in creatures.
2. That there is not, because a footprint leads to knowledge of what imprinted it, and so we could know the Trinity, which is false.
3. Again, in intellectual nature there is an image of the Trinity, so there is no footprint; for image and footprint have opposite ways of representing something.
4. Again, intellectual nature, because it is nobler, has a higher way of representing than lower substances do, namely by way of image; but there are many natures in intellectual nature that have a less perfect rank, just as animate things rank above inanimate things and, after that, above simple things; so these natures will have different ways of representing, because the idea of trace or footprint will not be common to them all, etc.
5. To the contrary is Augustine, *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter, who says that we should be able, by looking at the creator through the things that are made, to understand the Trinity, whose footprint, as has been said, is posited to exist in creatures.

To the Question

6. I reply that, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 6.2, all transferred senses are transferred according to some likeness.
7. First, then, one must note what in creatures a trace or footprint is, and second in what consists that whereby the footprint is transferred to divine realities, and third whether the footprint is found in any creature whatever.
8. As to the first point, a trace or footprint is said to be an impression left by the foot of an animal as it passes by, if there is something that yields to the foot. Footprints do not represent what they belong to perfectly but by way of inference, and not as to the proper form of the individual (the way an image does) but rather as to the form of the nature. An example: If I see the footprint of a horse in the ground, I argue that a horse has been there; not however that this or that particular horse has but absolutely that some horse has; and

¹⁰ 'Third' because it looks to be the third part of the distinction, although the fifth question overall. The first two or three questions are the first part (about the knowability of God), the fourth question (or the third and fourth question together) is the second part (about creaturely knowledge in general in its dependence on God), the fifth question is the third part (about the trace or footprint of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the second part), the sixth to ninth questions are the fourth part (about the image of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the third part).

even this could be wrong, because the foot could have been cut off from the whole horse, etc.

9. As to the second point [n.7], any creature at all is said to be referred back to God in three respects: as an example back to its exemplar cause, as a product back to the producing cause, and as a thing ordered back to its final cause; and all three respects are parts of a footprint. However, it seems one should speak in another way in accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter [n.5] last chapter; for he maintains that the parts of the footprint are units, species, and order, the first two of which are absolutes, as is plain.

10. On the third point [n.7], any creature at all is said to have its proper unity whereby it is distinguished from everything that is not of the same sort; and it has its own species, whereby it imitates its own proper idea; and it has its proper order, whereby it has a certain rank among beings; and so there is a divine footprint in every creature whatever.

To the Arguments

11. To the first argument for the contrary [n.2] I say that from the fact a footprint leads by way of argument and imperfectly to a knowledge of that of which it is the footprint, it does not follow that a Trinity of distinct persons can be known by such created footprint, etc.

12. To the second argument [n.3] I say that, although a created essence, insofar as it is such an exemplar, is created according to some determinate exemplar (so any creature represents God under the idea of footprint), yet, insofar as intellectual nature has in it one essence and several operations possessing an order of origin between them, it represents the Trinity by reason of all the operations found in such nature; to this extent an intellectual nature is not a footprint and an image in the same way, as will be plain below, etc.

13. To the last argument [n.4] I say that there are different ways of representing in creaturely essences, that is, different ways of being a footprint; but because there is a material subject in which many things representing unity and trinity come together, therefore such a nature has the idea of image, as intellectual nature does. But such coming together is not found in any nature lower than intellectual nature; and for this reason all other natures have precisely just the idea of footprint, etc.

Question Six

Whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding

1. The question asked in fourth place¹¹ is whether some species impressed on the possible intellect necessarily precedes all intellection by nature.

2. That it does not. A species is only posited because of the presence of the object; but the object present to the intellect is prior in nature to the impressed species; therefore positing a species is otiose. The proof of the major is that a species is only caused or impressed when the object is present; and here is confirmation, because the object that is in the phantasm, together with the agent intellect, can cause and impress a species on the possible intellect (according to you); thus the natural phantasm can cause simple intellection,¹² so the species would be impressed to no purpose.

3. Again, because it would then follow that the possible intellect would not be moved immediately to understanding by the intelligible object but would first suffer from it some real effect, namely by receiving in impression the real species; so the impression would be impressed to no purpose.

4. On the contrary. The possible intellect is sometimes in essential potency for understanding and sometimes in actual potency etc. But it only moves from essential potency to accidental potency by some real change in it, as is plain of all like cases. Now such real change is nothing but the impression of the species; therefore etc.

To the Question

5. Reply. Henry of Ghent denies, for the reasons just given, there is any impressed species in the possible intellect, and he posits only an impressed species such that the object evident in the phantasm when illumined by the agent intellect is by impression in the imaginative power, and such that in the possible intellect there is by expression only act and habit of understanding.

6. On the contrary. The same thing cannot represent diverse things in diverse ways; but the phantasm, qua phantasm, represents the singular; therefore it does not represent the universal; therefore the universal cannot be understood unless one posits an intelligible species that is impressed on the possible intellect; etc.

7. I reply. The same thing can represent diverse things under different lights. So the phantasm represents the particular in the light of imagination and the universal in the light of the agent intellect. There is a confirmation, because, according to you, the separated soul understands the universal and the singular and everything else through the same species and in the same and not different light. So this objection does not seem cogent against Henry.

8. I therefore argue against Henry in a different way, and first as follows: The agent intellect is active and not receptive; but its action is real; therefore the term of its action is real; but such term cannot be intellection, because the object, as object, precedes intellection by natural order; now the object, as object, is a universal and it is only made a universal by the agent intellect; therefore the first and immediate term of the action of the agent intellect is the universal or universality; and universality is not intellection but a condition of the object on the part of the object; but this real term of the action of the

¹¹ 'Fourth' because the fourth part of distinction 3, but the particular question is number 6 overall (see footnote 10 to q.5 n.1 above).

¹² The printed text has no nouns qualified by the adjectives 'natural' and 'simple', so what look to be the appropriate nouns are added in the translation (rightly or wrongly) from the context.

agent intellect is not in the agent intellect itself (because the agent intellect is not receptive, as was said), nor is it in the imagination, because, first, it is not posited as being there, second because the agent intellect impresses nothing positive on the phantasm, and third because an agent does not extend to more things actively than the passive or possible thing extends to passively, and every active action received from an agent is received passively. Therefore it is impossible for the universal, which is the first term of the action of the agent intellect, to be received by impression in the possible intellect in advance of all intellection [sc. in advance of the agent intellect making the universal]; and this is nothing other than that the intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect representatively is first and per se the universal, etc.

9. There is a confirmation because, in everyone's view, the first operation of the agent intellect is to make actually intelligible what is potentially intelligible – and this is everyone's view as was said; the term of this action is only in the possible intellect, for as the agent intellect is that which makes everything so the possible intellect is that which becomes everything; but being actually intelligible is on the part the object and not on that of the act; therefore etc.

10. Again, the possible intellect, qua distinct from the sensitive part of the soul, is said to possess the object present to it under its idea as object; but the possible intellect will not have this if there be impressed on it no intelligible species that is representative of the object; therefore etc.

11. I say, therefore, that because of these reasons (one on the part of the agent intellect [nn.8-9] and the other on the part of the possible intellect [n.10]) there is an intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect prior in order of nature to all intellection; and indeed the object, as present in the species of the object, is made manifest in this species and receives in it its being known, etc.

To the Arguments

12. To the first argument at the beginning [n.2] I say that, as is plain from what has been said, the natural order requires that the first and immediate term of the action of the agent intellect is not intellection but the species that is naturally representative and that does represent the object as actually intelligible etc.

14. And hereby is plain the answer to the second argument [n.3]. For the natural order requires that the possible intellect be moved to an impression of the intelligible species before it is moved to intellection; it is of course, however, moved to understanding immediately by the intellect representing the species, but it is moved first to an impression of the species, as was said.

Question Seven

Whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge

1. The question asked fifth¹³ is whether the possible intellect is purely passive with respect to generated knowledge.
2. That it is, from Aristotle *On the Soul* 3 text 18, who says that the agent intellect is what makes everything and the possible intellect what becomes everything; therefore, just as the agent intellect is purely active with respect to intellection, so the possible intellect is purely passive, etc.
3. On the contrary: Sometimes the possible intellect is in essential potency to understanding, and sometimes in accidental potency; but this distinction cannot be taken properly in something purely passive; therefore etc.

To the Question

4. Some say that, because the possible intellect is purely active, therefore understanding is an act merely of life; so it comes from a principle of life, and consequently it is not from an object but from the power, etc.
5. Again, the more perfect a form is the more actual it is; since therefore the intellect is a perfect form among other lower forms it is purely active.
6. Again, from *On the Soul* 3, intellection is an immanent action, so it is not the effect of an object, because then there would be an influence from outside the agent, for the act of understanding is in the possible intellect as in its subject.
7. Again, intellection is an action, and action is distinguished from passion; but action of this sort is in an agent and is its perfection (*Physics* 3, *Ethics* 2, *Metaphysics* 9); therefore, since the possible intellect is perfected by itself, the perfection comes actively from itself; this is said to be Augustine's meaning *On the Trinity* 4.5, *On Genesis* 28 etc.
8. On the contrary, from *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, where Augustine says that knowledge is from both, that is, both knower and known; and *ibid.* 2.2 & 5 where he says that vision is generated by seeing; and *ibid.* 15.10 & 24 where he says that the word comes from the thing we know; therefore the object contributes some activity, etc.
9. Again by argument thus: the efficient and material causes are sufficient for the effect when they are disposed and proximate to each other and not impeded – necessarily so if the efficient cause is a natural one, or, if it is a voluntary one, the effect can follow; for the effect essentially depends on the efficient and material causes; but the possible intellect is a sufficient continuing matter for intellection; therefore, if it is sufficient matter in respect of some same intellection and is purely active, then intellection follows even when everything else is removed; and so there will be intellection without an object, which is impossible, etc.
10. Others assert the opposite extreme [Averroes *On the Soul* com.17 & 18, Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* 7 q.7], namely that the possible intellect is purely passive. The reason is that it is susceptible of intellection as being the matter of it; so, if it were able to effect intellection, then material and efficient cause would coincide in numerically the same thing, which is contrary to Aristotle *Physics* 2 text 70 where he says they do not coincide.

¹³ 'Fifth' perhaps because, although this question belongs to the general discussion of image (the fourth part of d.3), it here takes a diversion through the details of how the created mind knows, and then the question of image proper is returned to in question nine below.

11. Again, it would then follow that the same thing was active and passive with respect to the same thing, which is against the first principle [sc. the principle: ‘the same thing cannot both be and not be’], etc.

12. Again, it would follow that the extreme terms of a real completion, namely of producer and produced, would be in the same foundation, which seems impossible.

13. Hence these others say [n.10] that, since the agent intellect is the same really as the possible intellect, it does not do or cause anything in the possible intellect but only makes the object that is manifest in the phantasm to be actually intelligible and actually able to move the possible intellect to understand. But intellection and volition are, they say, caused precisely by the intellectual object; namely intellection by the object manifest in the phantasm (when this is actually imagined and illumined by the agent intellect), and volition by the object made actually intellectual, etc.

14. On the contrary: The sensitive soul is the same really as the intellectual soul, so the reason they give for the agent intellect’s being unable to cause or do anything in the possible intellect is a reason for its being unable to be in the sensitive soul. Therefore either the agent intellect causes something positively in the phantasm (which is contrary to what they say); or it removes something from it, namely the material conditions and that sort of thing, and then the same problem arises, that by acting it removes something or it does nothing, and then the phantasm alone will cause intellection – which is false, however, because the effect would be nobler than its cause, and because a less noble thing would act on what is more noble, etc.

15. Again, acts of discursion and composing and denying could not be in the sensitive soul, as is plain, and likewise neither reflexive acts or relations of reason or logical intentions, and yet all these are intellections.

16. Again mental acts could not be in the sensitive soul etc.

17. Henry of Ghent [*Quodlibet* 5 q.14] holds a different view, that the possible intellect is not active or passive with respect to the impression of the species because, as he says, there is no impressed species. But with respect to simple knowledge the possible intellect, because there is no impressed species, is purely passive, for it is instead caused by the object manifest in the phantasm, and the same is expressive in the intellect. But with respect to the further knowledge, which is the word, the possible intellect is active by means of the simple knowledge that it is informed by first.

18. On the contrary: Although this opinion, which does not posit an impressed species, was argued against in another question above [d.3 q.4], yet to the extent it has regard to the present matter it is argued against here again as follows:

19. The first knowledge, which is called simple, is confused and imperfect with respect to second knowledge, according to Henry, and can be of the same species as the first, because it can be about the same object; but the formal principle of causing an effective object cannot be more imperfect than the effect that it causes of the same species; therefore an intellect informed by simple knowledge cannot be made active by it for causing a second effect if, in the person, it was purely passive, etc.

20. The Thomists and Giles of Rome say in a different way that the object in the memory (if it is per se there primarily), or the species of the object in the memory, causes another intellectual species, and this second species is generated knowledge while the first is not (and here they differ from the second power that Henry posits), because nothing is impressed on the intellect absolutely before knowledge is; and here they agree

with Henry. But he posits that, in respect of all knowledge, both first and second knowledge, the intellect is purely passive, and all knowledge is caused by the object; and here they differ from Henry. They posit instead that the intellect is indeed purely passive in respect of all knowledge but, when the object is not present per se, the first impression of the species in the memory is not intellect but second intelligence.

21. To the contrary: I say about discursive, vital, reflex acts, and the like what I said against the second opinion [nn.14-16], that intellection does not come precisely from the object or the species of the object, both because of the arguments made against this sort of opinion, and also because then the idea of image is not preserved in the mind when it is mind, for nothing of the mind would have the idea of parent by way of intellection.

22. I also say that intellection is not entirely from the power, both for the reasons made against the first opinion [nn.8-12] and for two other reasons:

23. First that intellection would not be a likeness of the object but of the power, because it would not be caused by the object save by the power; but this is unacceptable because understanding is about the object not about the power, for the object is what is understood.

24. Second because the power would have to have non-successively an active and infinite power – it can understand an infinity of intelligible things differing in species; but the intellect does not gain for itself any power from the fact it actually understands, but must have the power first so that it can understand; therefore it must pre-possess as much power as can understand infinities, though it understands this specifically diverse intelligible species through one power and that specifically diverse intelligible species through another power, but it can understand several things of the same species through the same power; therefore since two powers are more than one, powers infinite extensively would be infinite intensively. And if you say that fire can successively burn an infinity of combustible things and yet does not have infinite power, I say that the case is not the same, because all the combustibles are of the same species in idea of combusting, and therefore the fire burns all of them by the same power. But intelligibles are not so, because the intellect understands one intelligible as it is specifically distinct from another.

25. I say therefore that both the power and the object, or the species, are each per se partial causes, and both together integrally constitute one total cause. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, as cited above [n.8].

26. But note that when several causes in the genus of efficient cause come together for causing the same effect, sometimes they come together as several men for dragging a weight, sometimes as subordinate but such that a lower receives power from a higher (as the cause in a creature receives power from the uncreated cause), sometimes as essentially ordered but such that one does not receive power from the other (though one is more excellent than the other, as in the case of father and mother in generating offspring, according to those who posit that a mother has active power in generating). The causes above listed [n.25] do not come together in the first way, because just as a stronger person could come along there who would by himself drag as much as two persons were dragging, so there could be a single more powerful intellect here which would cause intellection by itself without the object, which however is impossible. Nor do the causes above listed [n.25] come together in the second way [as is evident].

27. I raise the question about the comparison of the two partial causes [n.25] that cause generated knowledge.

Question Eight

Whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species or the intellective part of the soul

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.8

1. But then the question arises as to which of these two causes [q.7 n.25] is more principal.

2. It seems, to begin with, that the object itself moves without being moved (*On the Soul* 3 text 54); while the intellect does not move to intellection unless moved, first because it is moved by the species impressed by the object, and second because its effect, namely intellection, is more like the object than like the power.

3. On the contrary. The cause that is more actual with respect to the same effect is more principal than the cause that is less actual; but the intellective power is more of this sort, especially when the object has a diminished being.

4. Again the object works along with the power and not conversely, because we can understand when we wish (from Aristotle), which would not be the case if the object was the principal cause.

5. Again, the object is determined to this intellection alone, that is, only to an intellection about itself; but the power is determined to intellection as such and so is a cause more universal and more indeterminate with a universality and indetermination that state perfection (as is plain); and so it follows that the power is more principal.

6. So for these three reasons, especially the last, I concede this conclusion, etc.

To the Arguments

7. As to the solutions of the arguments: To the first argument of the first opinion [q.7 n.4] I say that although a non-living thing cannot be the total cause of a living effect, it can yet be a partial cause, as is plain of the sun in the generation of man, etc.

8. As to the second [q.7 n.5] I say that, because the infinite is perfect, its not being totally active is not repugnant to it, but that it have some activity is sufficient for it, etc.

9. To the third [q.7 n.6] I say that, for an action to be immanent, it is enough that it not pass beyond the supposit of the agent, or beyond its own total cause, and that, even if it pass beyond a less principal partial cause, it yet remain within its principal partial cause – which is sufficient for action properly speaking. And hereby is plain the answer to the fourth argument [q.7 n.7].

10. As for the quote from Augustine [q.7 n.8] I say that his intention was not this [sc. that the object contributes some activity] but what has been said [sc. that the intellect is the principal cause], as is plain from the places there cited.

11. As to the first argument of the second question [rather second opinion, q.7 n.10] I say that it is true about matter properly speaking that it is pure potency, but this is not true of the subject of an accidental form, which is matter in a certain respect; for such a

subject states in itself an act, and so there is no repugnance to its being an efficient cause, etc.

12. To the second argument [q.7 n.11] I say that the same thing cannot be active and passive with respect to the same thing in the same way, namely that it be formally such both in act and in potency; but it can be virtually such in act and formally such in potency, and this when it is an equivocal agent. In fact all change toward a non-active form is from an equivocal agent, because the formal principle of acting is always an active form (otherwise it would not be the principle of acting); therefore change that is to a non-active form is change to a form dissimilar to the principle of acting and so dissimilar to the equivocal active cause. I then say that that this can sometimes fail to hold, though not always, in the case of equivocal agents, just as change can also be from an equivocal agent and yet to an active form; but what is sufficient for the idea of an equivocal cause is that the formal term of the change be of a different idea from the formal principle of the acting. There is an example of this from those who posit that a substance is actively causing in itself its proper accident at the prior moment when the substance precedes its proper accident: the subject in this case is, with respect to the same thing, virtually such in act and formally such in potency.

13. To the third [q.7 n.12] I say that some relations cannot go together in the same nature and the same supposit, as the relations of cause to caused. The reason is that then the same thing would depend essentially on itself, for the caused depends essentially on the cause. Some relations cannot go together in the same supposit but can in the same nature, when the nature is communicable without division to several suppositis, of which sort is the divine nature; and these are relations of motion to moved. The reason is that, as the divine nature is of itself unlimited to the extremes of this relation, so a supposit or nature can in some way be unlimited as to the extremes of the relation; thus it is in the issue at hand, that the intellect and will are of themselves unlimited as to their power and understanding and willing being virtually informed by such acts, etc.

14. To the first principal argument [q.7 n.2] I say that the soul, by reason of the agent intellect, can activate any intellection, and, by reason of the possible intellect, can receive any intellection; and you may understand this of the intellection that is about an object naturally moving the power, otherwise the agent intellect would not be able to activate it; however I say that the activity of the agent intellect is not immediately directed to understanding but to illumining, and this illumination is necessarily prior to natural intellection; and therefore the activity of intellection must be immediately from both the object and the power, as was said above etc.

15. Nevertheless, the soul's intellection of itself might well be totally from itself, because it would be both thing understanding and thing understood; however, according to Scotus, it cannot be had by the wayfarer save only by inference through the species of different sensible things; the reason is that only the species of sensible things are in the phantasm and illumined by the agent intellect.

16. Next, to the first argument of the first question [q.8 n.2] I say that a moved mover is a less principal cause than an unmoved mover, unless the moved becomes mover in such a way that it receives the power of moving from the motion by which it is itself moved; but so it is here, because the intellect receives no power of understanding into itself from the impression of the species, but the species must be impressed in such a way that it and the intellect are simultaneous, as being two partial causes integrally forming

one total cause. Hence I say that the agent intellect with respect to the impression of the species, and the phantasm with which the intellect integrally forms one total cause, and the possible intellect with respect to intellection are all a more principal cause than the object or the species etc.

17. To the second [sc. the second reason given in q.8 n.2 and/or n.3] I say that the cause that makes the effect more like what it should be like is more principal, and not necessarily the cause that the effect itself is more like. An example: a like effect caused by God and by a second cause is more like the second cause, and yet God is the more principal cause. Hence a less principal cause does not actively make the effects more like itself, though it is indeed more like the effects. But such likeness is more brought about actively by the more principal cause. For it is certain that the intelligible species is more like the phantasm than like the agent intellect, and yet the agent intellect is the more principal cause; otherwise a less noble thing would, as if principal agent, act on a more noble thing, etc.

Question Nine

Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Alexander of Hales, *Summa Ia* q.61 p.3 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.9

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.93 aa.5-6

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The final question in this distinction is whether there is in the soul distinctly an image of the Trinity.
2. That there is not: Because then we could naturally come to a distinct knowledge of the Trinity through it. The proof of the consequence is as follows: an image is per se reflective of that of which it is the image, etc.
3. Further, the mind represents one [divine] person in the mind no more than it represents another, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.7, 14 when he says that the Father is intellectual memory – will as also memory – and the Son likewise; therefore the memory represents the Father no more distinctly than it represents the Son, and conversely.
4. Further, in the Trinity there are two produced persons in image, namely Son and the Holy Spirit; but no person is produced in memory, and consequently memory does not represent any production, and so neither is it the Trinity. The proof that no person is produced in the memory is that the acts themselves are the things exemplified in the soul, and not the second acts [see n.8 infra]; for there is no action of action since there would then be an infinite regress in the action, etc.
5. On the contrary: Augustine in *On the Trinity* 14 says that an image of the Trinity must be looked for, and it must be found where our nature possesses nothing better in itself, etc.

To the Question

6. The first thing that needs to be stated is what in creatures the idea of image is taken from. About this I say that an image represents the whole per se (just as I say that a trace or footprint represents a part per se [e.g. a horse's foot] and represents the whole inferentially [e.g. a horse] as to the idea of the species of the whole [e.g. some horse or other and not this particular horse]); and I say that an image is naturally fit to imitate and to express that of which it is the image. Therefore, although a thing may be altogether like another thing, yet, because it does not imitate that other thing, it should not be called an image of it. Hence the impression of a foot in the ground is an image truly of the foot but it is a trace or footprint of the whole animal, etc.

7. The second thing that must be stated is in respect of what in God the idea of image in us is taken. About this I say that it is in respect of the three persons and of the one essence and of the procession of the persons. Here one must note that the concept of one person is a concept that is partial in respect of the whole Trinity. As to creatures, which lead us by way of image to a knowledge of the whole Trinity, they will represent the whole Trinity as to the total concept that our intellect can have of it; so they will represent the distinction of the persons, the unity of the essence, and the order of origin; for the real distinction that exists in divine reality by relations of origin will have an essential imitation in respect of the Trinity that creatures represent.

8. I reply that what needs to be stated is where in us the image is. Here one must note that in the mind there are first acts, namely intellect and will, and second acts, namely intellection and volition;¹⁴ and the principles of these second acts are principles distinct in respect of their formal ideas, which formal ideas are act and will in the presence of their objects. Because of this the acts are of diverse ideas, for the cognitive act and the other volitional act will have distinct principles, etc.

9. Now one must note that the image does not consist only in acts of paternity, first because there are only two such acts (and so the image would be only of a duality and not also of a trinity); and second because between these acts there is no real distinction of thing and thing, nor is there an order of origin either (though there is consubstantiality because a unity, albeit an essential unity, is communicated to the soul); and third because one of these acts is not produced by the other – not even in the case of individual acts, first because the acts are not essentially the same, and second because of the other two reasons just stated, namely that there are only two acts and that one does not originate from the other, etc.

10. I then say that the image consists in first and second acts in the following way, that the soul, qua having in itself the perfection of understanding and willing in idea of second act (namely in respect of knowledge generated along with the object present to it in idea of object), has the idea of memory and of parent (as of a father). However, to the extent that the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive generated knowledge in itself, it has the idea of a word; and to the extent the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive produced love, it thus has the idea of something

¹⁴ First act is the existence in the soul of the powers of intellect and will; second act is the exercising of these powers in acts of understanding and willing.

spirated. And in this way the soul will be a trinity, of which the first part will be the parent, the second the thing generated, and the third the thing spirated, etc.

11. However there are here two doubts. The first is that there seems here to be a quaternity, because knowledge is produced from one memory and love is produced from another memory, etc.

12. On this point note that the first act in respect of volition, as namely the will, does not go together in the image with any of the three [n.10]: not with the third part because the same thing is not the principle of itself; and not with the second part because actual intelligence is not will; and not with the first part because memory is said properly to be the productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore the will is a fourth with them, etc.

13. The second doubt is that generated knowledge does not go together with the production of love the way that, in divine reality, the first person by nature originates the second person, and the first and second person originate the third. It is not like this in the image, because neither is the first the cause of the second nor are the first and second the cause of the third, etc.

14. I reply by saying that Augustine assigns or gives two ideas of image. The first is in *On the Trinity* 9, and it is mind, knowledge, and love. The other he gives in *On the Trinity* 10 as follows: memory, intelligence, and will. When dealing with these two in *On the Trinity* 15 he says that what is said in the case of the fourth in the listing [sc. memory] is more evident to the extent that memory expresses the idea of parent more than mind does.

15. To make clear the first part of the image [sc. mind and memory], note that mind can be taken in two ways: either we can understand by mind a first and perfect act with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity in generating a son and fecundity in spirating a holy spirit). In this way mind possesses the perfect idea of parent, because it includes both fecundities. And between these acts, namely knowledge and love, there are two objects produced in a certain order, and so there will not be a quaternity, because in a parent that has the idea of parent perfectly there occurs a double first act. And this is the way it is in divine reality, because there is in the Father a fecundity for generating and also for spirating, and the Father has this fecundity from himself and not as derived from something else, namely from the production of the Son (as some say). The proof of this is that it would then follow that the Father never had the fecundity in question; for the Father does not in any way have from production of the Son any reality whether absolute or relative, and so he will never have any reality that he does not have in the first moment of origin (namely insofar as he is pre-understood in order of origin to the Son); therefore he does not have this sort of fecundity of generating and spirating from production of the Son.

16. In another way mind can be taken precisely for first act alone, namely as it has only a fecundity for generating or a fecundity in respect of generated knowledge (which is the same thing). And in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned to it, and in this way too mind does not have perfectly the idea of parent.

17. Thus, about the way image is assigned when memory is posited, I say, neither more nor less, that if memory is taken precisely as first act in respect of generated knowledge, or in respect of being generator, then in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned. But if memory is taken as it states first act as first act is perfect with

respect to both second acts (namely fecundity for generating and for spirating), then memory has perfectly the idea of parent. And thus is the idea of image assigned perfectly by Augustine, etc.

18. I then say that mind or memory should be taken as it has the perfect idea of parent; but it is not perfectly parent save as it is taken in respect of knowledge and love – as is plain, because the Father in divine reality has in himself fecundity for both. Therefore, in the case of the mind in the first way of assigning image, or in the case of memory in the second way (or for the first part of the image) [n.14], the soul must be taken as it means the idea of the first act of the intellect, along with its object present to it in idea of object, and the idea of the first act of the will, along with its object present to it in idea of object, etc.

19. In the case of the second part of the image, generated knowledge, or the word, is taken for it; and in the case of the third part produced love is taken for it; and so it is plain that there is no quaternity there, because a double relation of fecundity is combined in the parent, if it is perfectly parent.

20. To the second doubt [n.13] I say that, because generated knowledge is an accident in the case of the soul and because an accident cannot have the idea of a producer, therefore, when memory generates knowledge, it does not communicate to it a fecundity of spirating the way this happens in divine reality (where generated knowledge is subsistent and has the same communicated nature as in the generator); and so, to this extent, and also as to real identity in absolute thingness according to distinction of relation, there is not a total similarity between the image and the Trinity, as is plain; yet the second and third part of the image have, even if not an order of origin, yet some natural order properly, because volition naturally and necessarily presupposes intellection, and an origin can in some way be assigned to them, because intellection goes together with the idea of parent of love. For the object of the will is necessarily actually known, just as the object of the intellect is formally actually in the phantasm; and thereby one can see how the agent intellect belongs to the image, etc.

To the Arguments

21. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that the assigning of an image of the Trinity in the soul only avails for someone who believes the Trinity, to enable him to investigate it in some way; but it does not do so for the sake of the Trinity becoming naturally known, first because the soul is not created by God as he is a Trinity, and second because the things mentioned [sc. in the image] are all primary together, as is plain.

22. To the second [n.3] I say that the major premise would be effective if the Father were posited as generating insofar as he understands (as some say) – and badly posited, as was proved above, because the Father does not generate in this way; rather, as I said, the Father has the divine essence by a second distinction present to himself under the idea of being actually intelligible (which belongs to the Father as he is memory) and in this way does he generate; but, as was made clear above, he does not generate insofar as he understands. And therefore I say that the antecedent is false, because the memory does not represent the Father more than the Son by the fact that memory alone exists in the Father, or that intelligence alone exists in the Son, but by the fact that the Father

generates the Son insofar as he has the idea of memory and not as he has the idea of intelligence or will, etc.

23. To the third [n.4] I say that second acts are produced. The argument is *pro se*. Hence when it is said then there is no action of action, or action is not the term of action, and this [sc. some production] truly terminates action, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter that knowledge is generated, and in *On the Trinity* 15.27 that volition proceeds – then these are not actions in the genus of action but are absolute forms in the genus of quality.

24. When you prove [n.4] that they are properly actions because they are second acts, I say that there are certain forms which have a fixed and permanent being not dependent on their cause (as heat in wood), and that there are certain forms which have a communicated dependence on their cause, as light in the medium depends on the sun; and about this Augustine says, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.9, that the air has not *been made* bright but *is being* made bright; thus the first forms, because they are independent of their cause in existing, are not actions and are not called actions; but the second forms, because of their independence,¹⁵ seem to have their existence rather in becoming than in being, which is why they seem to be actions; and yet in truth they are not actions, because they have their parts together all at once, which is something repugnant to action, and they are not in a passive thing either, because they have existence at once in the whole and part is not acquired after part; and intellection and volition are forms of this sort, for they have a continuing dependence on the presence of their cause, etc.

25. Intellection and volition pass over into something other as to their term. It is unintelligible that volition and intellection exist and are not *of* something (I care not what that something is). It seems that they are called second acts because of this continuing dependence and because they pass over to a term; but in fact they are immanent forms, being whole all at once and not as things acquired part after part, etc.

Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether this proposition is true: 'God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.1 q.65 sect.3 a.1
Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.4 q.2

1. As to the fourth distinction the question is raised whether this proposition is true: 'God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'.

2. That it is not, because its contradictory is true, namely that no one is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The proof is that each of its singular instantiations is true, namely that the Father is not Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and that the Son is not Father and Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is not Father and Son etc.

¹⁵ The printed text says 'independence', but it may be a misprint for 'dependence'.

3. On the contrary, the following proposition is true according to Augustine in many places of *On the Trinity*, that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God; therefore its converse is also true, namely that the one God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit.

To the Question

4. I reply by saying that there is a double predication in divine matters. One is formal and is when the subject, in its formal idea, has by identity the inclusion of the predicate, as the fact that God is infinite by his formal idea of divinity is because he includes infinity by identity as if by intrinsic rank.

5. The second is also by identity and is when the subject does not have in its formal idea the inclusion, by identity, of the predicate, but the fact that subject and predicate are the same comes from elsewhere, namely when the subject passes over to the predicate really but not formally, and this because of the infinity of the predicate, as in this proposition: paternity is divinity. For paternity in its formal idea is not the same being formally as God, because then every case of paternity would be divinity, and so created paternity would be divinity, for it is a true paternity; the identity, therefore, does not come from the formal idea of paternity but from the infinity of the essence, which draws to its real identity everything compossible with it, etc.

6. Then I say to the issue at hand that the proposition is true that God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; but it is not formal predication because paternity is not included in the formal idea of God, nor is any relation so included; and this is because deity is something absolute and for itself while paternity is something relative to another. The predication then is one of identity, because divinity, whereby God is formally God, is the same and not diverse in the three supposit, and it has a real identity with the three supposit because of its infinity, etc.

To the Argument

7. To the principal argument I say that the proposition is true and its contradictory is not true; and for proof I say that the Father as he is God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit but not as he is Father; however Father as he is Father is not properly a singular instantiation of the contradictory proposition.

Fifth Distinction

Question One

Whether the divine essence generates or is generated

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.5 q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.1 q.42 sect.3 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.5 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.39 a.5

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.5 q.1 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.5 q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.5 qq.1, 2

1. As to the fifth distinction the question asked first is whether the divine essence generates or is generated.
2. That it is.

Twenty Sixth Distinction

Whether the Divine Persons are constituted in their personal existence by relations of origin

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.26 q.3

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.26 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.40 a.2

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.26 q.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.26 q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.26 q.1

1. About the twenty sixth distinction the question is asked whether the persons are constituted in their personal existence by relations of origin.

2. That they are not. Because such relations would differ specifically and consequently generation would be an equivocal term, which has been rejected. For paternity and filiation differ more than paternity differs from paternity or than filiation from filiation, and thus the persons differ specifically, and consequently generation would be equivocal, which is something that was rejected in the seventh distinction.

3. On the contrary. Boethius in *On the Trinity* 6 says that the Trinity is found in relation and the divine unity in the essence, because the person is simple as constituted by the essence and is distinct in itself, and there is nothing else besides relation to assign to the person. There is confirmation too in the fact that the same term signifies the concrete and the abstract, and so, as the essence is constituted in its being as essence and is distinct in itself from everything that is not essence, and as paternity is constituted in being paternity and in being distinct from all that is not paternity, so too is the person constituted and made distinct.¹⁶

4. On the contrary. The person includes the essence and the Father and Son have the same essence numerically, and so they are not totally distinct from each other. Therefore it is possible to assign to them something that is constitutive and distinctive.

5. Again the relation of spiration is in the Father and he is not distinct from the Son by spiration, therefore the two are not distinct in everything.

The Common Opinion

6. The common opinion, then, says that the persons are constituted and distinguished by relations, and for this opinion are adduced Augustine *On the Trinity* 5 ch.8 n.9 and Anselm *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* and Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.8 and Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* 4.19, all of whom seem to maintain that everything said absolutely in divine reality belongs to the three persons together, and consequently that what constitutes and distinguishes the persons as persons is something relative.

¹⁶ This first opinion is thus described by Scotus himself d.26 n.6: "The response of some – as of Praepositinus – is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and so there is no need to ask by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive element."

7. This common opinion is confirmed by reason, and first as follows. An absolute added to an absolute causes composition, and therefore a person would be a composite if he were constituted by something absolute and if he is distinct from another person by what constitutes him and not by the divine essence. So he would be something other than the divine essence. The same result does not hold of a relation, because a relation passes over into the essence while remaining opposite as a relation, and so it is distinct from its opposite without composing something additional to the essence. An absolute, however, does not as such have regard to an opposite but is spoken of on its own. Either then it does not pass over into the essence and so will cause composition. Or if it does pass over, it passes over entirely not remaining in any way and so not causing any distinction.

8. Again, an essence cannot exist in diverse absolute supposit without division of itself; therefore etc.

9. Again, the Father is Father from the fact that paternity exists in him. If then paternity does not constitute him it would be adventitious to him and something as it were accidental, which is contrary to the simplicity of his person. This opinion says further that not just any relation, even any real relation, constitutes the persons, but only relations of origin, because those relations are first that first burgeon in the essence.

The Scotistic Opinion

10. However I argue against this opinion as follows. A relation formally relates something to something; but it does not thus relate the relation itself, because, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 7 ch.1 n.2, a related thing is something in addition to the relation. For a being that is said in relation to another being is something in abstraction from the relation; but the essence is not related to anything, because the persons are not distinct from each other in essence; so the supposit are related to each other. Therefore the supposit are something formally in abstraction from the relation.

11. Again, a real relation requires first a real distinction of related terms, and from this fact the Philosopher proves in *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4 that identity is not a real relation because it does not have terms that are really distinct. Therefore the divine supposit are really distinct prior to relation. So their formal and distinguishing principle is not relation.

12. Again, the existence of a supposit is in some way understood first before the same supposit's action is understood in it. So either an absolute supposit is first understood, and then the intended conclusion is gained, or a relative supposit is first understood, and then in that same first understanding the Son is understood, since relatives are understood together in the same understanding. Thus the Son is understood prior to understanding the Father's generating of the Son; therefore either the two supposit are understood as absolute supposit in that prior understanding, or they are constituted by relations other than relations of origin.

13. Again, the primary unity of existence of the first constitution of something is repugnant to the division opposed to the unity in which the thing was first constituted. An example: if rational is what first constitutes man in his specific being, the specific division of rational is first repugnant to him. So, if being spirated is what first constitutes the Holy Spirit in his incommunicable existence, then the sharing of this 'being spirated' among several will be what is first repugnant to the Holy Spirit. But this does not seem to

be the case, because being spirated does not seem to be more incommunicable in its formal idea than its opposites are, but its opposite is communicated to several.

14. Again, no single concept that is asserted of the whatness of things can be abstracted from their ultimate distinguishing or constituting principles, because then these principles would agree in some respect and differ in another and so would not be ultimate; but a single concept is abstracted from paternity and filiation, namely the concept of relation, which is said of the whatness of Father and Son.

15. Again, what is constitutive of a supposit in some nature makes that supposit to be per se one with that nature; but relation does not seem able to make a something that is per se one with an absolute.

16. Again, there are authorities for this point, for Augustine *On the Trinity* 7 ch.4 nn.8-9 seems to hold that things in divine reality subsist absolutely.

17. Again, there are other reasons for the same conclusion. The first is that primary substance in Aristotle's *Categories* 5.2a11-14 is most of all substance. Therefore whatever it adds to secondary substance is substance, otherwise it would not be substance most of all; but what primary substance adds is the idea of subsisting; therefore etc.

18. Again, secondary substance states the whole being of primary substance; therefore the idea of subsistence, which is what primary substance adds over and above secondary substance, cannot be relation.

19. And if it be said against this view that it is not consonant with the faith, since the Savior in the Gospel always expresses the Trinity by relative names, as when he says (*Matthew* 28.19) 'Baptize in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit', and St. John in his epistle (*1 John* 5.7) says 'There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit', one can say in response that this view does not take away relations of origin from the persons. Rather it preserves them more than the other opinion does, as is plain from its foundations and reasons. Secondly it says that although relations do not first constitute or distinguish the persons yet the Savior names the Trinity for us through relative names since these names were more intelligible to us and in order to express the origin of the persons.

20. This opinion can also be made clear in some way from the witness of Scripture. For Solomon in *Proverbs* 30.4, after posing many questions about God, asks what is his name and what the name of his Son if you know; but if the Son were constituted in his existence as a supposit by filiation then his most proper name would be Son, and so Solomon's question would be no question, because it would answer itself in the asking, although however Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16 says that every question asks something that is doubtful.

21. This opinion does not seem contrary to the faith, because it does not deny the origins or the distinction of relation between the divine persons, but says that some other distinction is prior and more principal than the distinction of relation. And the Savior did not say anything contrary to this, nor did the other saints, either in the Apostles' Creed or the Nicene Creed or in any General Council. Our Savior indeed did well express the origins and relations among the persons, and yet what he said will not imply that no distinction is more principal than they.

22. Hence, just as nature is communicated to diverse individuals by generation and just as those individuals are said to be distinct *effectively* by generation but distinct

formally and *principally* by other individuating features, so it is the same in its own way in the issue at hand; therefore etc.

23. Anyone who may want to hold this opinion would be able to answer the opposing objections. In response to the authorities [n.6] one could say that, according to Richard of St. Victor, substance is said absolutely in two ways. For substance as it states quiddity is absolute in a first way, as in the case of ‘man’, but substance as it does not state quiddity but an individual, as in the case of ‘this man’, is absolute in a second way and not in the first.

24. As to the first argument [n.7], one can say that a person would be less composite in this way than in the other, as is plain because relation in creatures is additional to the foundation (as will be said elsewhere), and consequently causes some composition; but the idea of individuality does not add anything to the species and so does not make any composition with it. And when you say that therefore it does not distinguish the person, I say that relation is said to distinguish the persons to the extent that it is not formally the essence, but the idea of individuality, which I posit, is not formally the essence and so it truly first distinguishes the persons, and does so more than relation does because it states a greater degree of entity.

25. As to the second [n.8] one can say that, just as you posit that the same essence can exist individually in several relative and distinct individuals, so I say it can be the same in the case of my account. For the reason why the same essence exists in three persons is its infinity; but it would be as infinite on my view as on yours.

26. As to the third [n.9] one can say that, just as active spiration, on your view, does not constitute an individual but is as it were something adventitious to the persons and yet does not cause composition in the persons, so it would be on my view; therefore etc.

27. Anyone who wants to hold the other opinion, namely the one listed second [n.6; the one listed first is n.3], can hold it by responding to the reasons [nn.10-18] for this third opinion (for these reasons are also against the second opinion) as follows: for the first three arguments [nn.10-12] seem capable of being solved by the fact the divine relation is a singular one, different from relations in creatures, and that this very divine relation constitutes the individual in its individual existence and is related to what it constitutes ??? in being the very action itself, which is not the case with any created relation. So the three arguments in question do not seem to hold save of creatures. As to the other arguments [nn.13-18], Scotus did not solve them here but left them to be solved by anyone who prefers the second opinion, which however is the common opinion. As for the authorities, they can be expounded in their own way. Think out solutions yourself for the opinions and reasons, and expositions for the authorities, if you wish.

28. However, as to the principal point, I say that if relations constitute the individual supposit then no specific differences can be posited between them but they will be diverse primarily, as the idea of individuality is diverse in its own way in creatures. And when you say that these latter differ more, I too say that ‘Peter-eity’ is more diverse from the ‘Brownie-eity’ of this donkey than it is diverse from materiality, and yet Peter and Brownie are not distinct in form on these grounds, but on the grounds of the difference of rational and irrational; therefore etc.