

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 11 to 25 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume five of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
February, 2013

The translation has been revised and reformatted, to tidy up some looseness of translation, supply some omissions, and help reduce file size.

January, 2023

NB: the interpolated texts, added (in smaller type) at various points in some of the questions, are of texts inserted in the *Ordinatio* by earlier editors from equivalent passages in other surviving commentaries on the *Sentences* by Scotus. The Vatican editors placed them in footnotes and they are translated here for the convenience of the reader.

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Eleventh Distinction

Question 1: <i>Whether the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son</i>	Page 8	Num. 1
I. To the Question		Num. 9
II. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 19
Question 2: <i>Whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real Distinction between him and the Son could stand.</i>		Num. 24
I. On the Question itself		Num. 27
II. Response to the Question		
A. Opinion of Others		Num. 35
B. Against the Opinion		Num. 39
III. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 49
IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question		Num. 51

Twelfth Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether One or insofar as they are Distinct</i>	Page 18	Num. 1
I. Response to the Question		Num. 7
II. Whether the Father and the Son inspirit more by the Will insofar as it is One or insofar as it is Concordant		Num. 8
A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent		Num. 9
B. Against the Opinion of Henry		Num. 14
C. Scotus' own Opinion		Num. 36
III. Whether the Father and the Son are one Inspiriter or two Inspirites		Num. 42
IV. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 48
Question Two: <i>Whether the Father and the Son uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit</i>		Num. 54
I. To the Question		Num. 60
II. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 63

Thirteenth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the Production of the Holy Spirit is Generation or is Distinct from it</i>	Page 32	Num. 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------	--------

I. The Opinions of Others	Num. 7
A. First Opinion	Num. 8
B. Second Opinion	Num. 12
C. Third Opinion	Num. 16
D. Fourth Opinion	Num. 24
E. Fifth Opinion	Num. 27
F. Sixth Opinion	
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 30
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 31
G. Seventh Opinion	Num. 43
II. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 77
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 82

Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Distinctions

Single Question: <i>Whether any Person at all may send any Person at all</i>	Page 52	Num. 1
I. Opinion of Peter Lombard		Num. 5
II. To the Question		Num. 11
III. To the Reasons of Peter Lombard		Num. 13
IV. How the Opinion of Lombard might be Held		Num. 15
V. To the Arguments against the Opinion of Lombard		Num. 17
IV. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 20

Seventeenth Distinction

First Part

On the Habit of Charity

Question One: <i>Whether it is necessary to posit a created Charity that formally inheres in a Nature capable of Beatification</i>	Page 56	Num. 1
Question Two: <i>Whether it is necessary to posit in a Habit the idea of Active Principle with respect to Act</i>		Num. 6
I. To the Second Question		
A. Five Ways of Giving a Solution are Expounded and Examined		
1. First Way		Num. 21
2. Second Way		Num. 27
3. Third Way		Num. 32
4. Fourth Way		Num. 46
5. What is to be Thought about the Four Ways		Num. 53
6. Fifth Way		Num. 55
B. Solution of the Question by Holding the Third Way		Num. 69
C. To the Arguments by Holding the Third Way		Num. 71
D. To the Principal Positive Arguments when Maintaining		

the Fourth Way	Num. 87
E. To the Arguments for the Fifth Way	Num. 92
II. To the First Question	
A. The Opinion which is Attributed to Peter Lombard	Num. 101
1. Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard	Num. 102
2. Arguments against the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard	Num. 113
B. Scotus' own Response	Num. 125
1. Whether some Supernatural Habit needs to be Posited that gives Grace to a Nature Capable of being Beatified	Num. 126
2. Whether a Supernatural Habit giving Grace should be posited for this, that a Nature Capable of Beatification be Beatified	Num. 160
3. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard	Num. 165
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 171
D. To the Arguments for the Opinion which is attributed to Peter Lombard	Num. 178

Appendix: From the Additiones Magnae
Seventeenth Distinction
First Part

Question One-Two: <i>Whether he who Possesses Created Charity is Accepted by it Formally as Worthy of Eternal Life</i>	Page 92
I. To the Question	Num. i
II. To the Arguments	Num. vii
	Num. xviii

Seventeenth Distinction
Second Part
On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question One: <i>Whether the whole of pre-existing Charity is corrupted so that no Reality the same in Number remains in a greater and a lesser Charity</i>	Page 95
I. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines	Num. 195
A. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 198
B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 202
II. To the Question	Num. 225
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 226
Question Two: <i>Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole</i>	

<i>Essence of the Intensified Charity</i>	Num. 235
I. Opinion of Others	Num. 241
II. Scotus' own Response to the Question	Num. 249
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 250

Appendix: From the Wadding Edition Eighteenth Distinction On Gift and the Holy Spirit as Gift

Single Question: <i>Whether Gift state a Personal Property of the Holy Spirit</i>	Page 113
I. To the Question	Num. i
A. Opinion of Others	Num. xi
A. Scotus' Opinion	Num. xv
B. The Intention of Augustine	Num. xvii
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. xx

Nineteenth Distinction

Question One: <i>Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude</i>	Page 119
I. To the Question	Num. 1
A. About Equality Taken Properly	Num. 5
B. About Equality Taken Generally	Num. 6
C. How there is Equality in the Proposed Case	Num. 8
D. About Equality in the Divine Persons	Num. 10
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 11
Question Two: <i>Whether Every Person is in the Other</i>	Num. 18
I. To the Question	Num. 29
A. About the Mode in which a Person is in a Person	Num. 37
1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 38
2. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 50
3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Henry	Num. 55
B. What the Idea is of the Indwelling of the Divine Persons	Num. 58
C. The Indwelling of the Divine Persons does not have a Like Example in Creatures	Num. 63
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 68

Twentieth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Three Persons are Equal in</i>	Page 134
----------------------------------------------------------------	----------

<i>Power</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	
A. Determination of the Question	Num. 11
B. Opinion of Others	Num. 16
C. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 24
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 35

Twenty First Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether this Proposition is true, 'Only the Father is God'</i>	Page 142
I. To the Question	Num. 1
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 7
	Num. 14

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God is Nameable by us with some Name signifying the Divine Essence in itself, as it is a 'This'</i>	Page 152
I. The Opinion of Others	Num. 1
II. Scotus' own Response	Num. 2
	Num. 4

Appendix

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God is Nameable by Some Proper Name</i>	Page 156
I. Division of Lombard's Text	Num. i
II. Opening Arguments	Num. iii
III. Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. xii
IV. Scotus' own Response	Num. xx

Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether Person, according as it says Something Common to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, says precisely Something of Second Intention</i>	Page 163
I. Opinion of Others	Num. 1
II. Scotus' own Response	Num. 4
	Num. 15

Twenty Fourth Distinction

Single Question: *Whether Number properly exists in Divine Reality*

Page 169

Num. 1

Twenty Fifth Distinction

Single Question: *Whether Person in Divine Reality states Substance or Relation*

Page 171

Num. 1

I. Response to the Question

Num. 3

II. The Objections of Others

Num. 8

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Eleventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son

1. About the eleventh distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

That he does not:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.7: “the one proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son we call the Holy Spirit.”

2. Again, *ibid.* ch.8: “We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, we do not say from the Son.”

3. Again, the same in his letter *On the Thrice Holy* to the Archimandrite [Jordan] n.38, at the end: “Father and Word and Holy Spirit;” and he adds: “From the Father indeed; and of the Son, and not from the Son, but the Spirit of the mouth of God.”

4. Again, by the reasoning of the Greeks: nothing is to be held as an article of the faith save what is contained in the Gospel (which confusedly contains the faith), or at any rate in the Scripture of the *New Testament*; but it is not seem express in the New Testament that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; therefore etc.

5. Again, love in us does not proceed from the word, because knowledge does not have causality with respect to volition; therefore neither likewise in the prototype.

6. Again, the will is posited as the third part of the image, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50; therefore it is not a principle of producing but a produced. – Response: love is called ‘will’; but will ‘in potency’ pertains to a parent, although it not constitute a parent, but quasi-arrives as a second fecundity in a father [or: the Father].

7. Again, passive spiration is proper to one person in divine reality, therefore active spiration is too. – Proof of the consequence: for each seems equally perfect and equally incommunicable.

8. On the contrary:

In the *Nicene Creed*: “who proceeds from the Father and the Son;” and Athanasius in his *Creed* [Ps-Athanasius, *Creed* ‘Quicumque vult’]: “the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.”

I. To the Question

9. On this question the Greeks are said to disagree with the Latins, as the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] seem to sound. But about this disagreement Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] says (in a certain note on the end of the letter *On the hymn the Thrice Holy* [ms. in Magdalen College, Oxford, 192, f. 215rb]) that “the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, but not proceeding from the Son but

from the Father alone, although through the Son; and this opinion seems contrary to ours whereby we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But perhaps, if two wise men – one Greek and the other Latin – each a true lover of truth and not of his own mode of speaking whence it is his own, were to investigate this contrariety, it would be plain to each eventually that the contrariety is not truly real as it is verbal; otherwise either the Greeks or we Latins are truly heretics. But who dares accuse this author, namely John Damascene, and blessed Basil, Cyril, and other like Greek fathers, of being heretics? Who indeed accuses again blessed Jerome, Augustine, and Hilary and like Latins of being heretics? It is likely then that there is not under the said contrary words an opinion of contrary saints: for the thing is said in many ways (just as here ‘of this’, so here ‘out of this’ or ‘that’, or ‘from that’), by which multiplicity, perhaps more subtly understood and distinguished, there would of contrary words be no discordant opinion evident.”

10. Whatever may be about them, from when the Catholic Church declared this to be held as of the substance of the faith (as is plain [in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.1], ‘About the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’: “We firmly believe”), firmly must it be held that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from both”.

11. For this the reason is of this sort: what has a perfect productive principle first before it be understood to have a product can produce by that principle, namely when the principle is so perfect that it does not depend on something passive nor can be impeded by anything; the Son has will, which is a productive principle of adequate love, and he has it as it is pre-understood to ‘produced act of the will’; therefore he can produce it, therefore also he does produce it.

12. I prove the minor [n.11]: generation and spiration have some order, so that in some way generation is prior to spiration; in that prior stage there is communicated to the one generated all the divine perfection that is not repugnant to him, and so will is communicated; therefore he has then will as prior to that produced by act of will, because still is not understood any production made by way or by act of will.

13. The assumption too about the order of these productions [n.12], although it seem to be manifest from the order of powers, is proved however by this, that when first acts have an order in something – if both be perfectly active – they will also have a like order in eliciting their acts. But I have added ‘perfectly active’ to exclude substantial form and quality in corruptible things where, although substantial form be active, and quality likewise, and substantial form be prior to quality, yet quality has its act first: but this is from imperfection of activity of the substantial form. Now in the Father intellect and will are principles perfectly active, and have a certain order, because the fecundity of intellect constitutes the Father but not fecundity of the will. Therefore the fecundity of intellect will in some way have its act before the fecundity of the will its act.

14. Others prove this order of production to production by this, that as understanding is to willing so saying is to spirating.

15. But this proof [n.14] seems to be defective: for willing presupposes understanding, because through the ‘to understand’ the object about which there ought to be love is sufficiently present, and without the intellection it would not be sufficiently present to the will so that it could will; but through the act of saying there is not present to the will precisely the object the love of which is spirated, because, although the Father spirates by will as it is in him, yet he does not have the object formally present by

generated knowledge (because he knows nothing by generated knowledge, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n2), but by the for him ungenerated intellection he has the object present to him, and this is the knowledge that is presupposed to the act of spirating; therefore there is not the like necessity that generation be presupposed to spiration as there is that intellection be presupposed to volition.

16. I concede that this instance [n.15] does well prove that there is not altogether a like necessity, but between intellection and will there is an order for two reasons: one is because of the presence [of the object] already stated [n.15], the other is because of the order of these powers in working, because these powers are such that one is naturally ordered to work posterior to the other. The first reason is not the reason for the priority of generation to spirating, but the second is: for just as insofar as they are operative powers there is some order between their workings, so insofar as they are productive powers there is some order in their productions, although it not be an order of necessity because of the having of such presence of the object.

17. An example of this is: if in fire heat and dryness be active causes, yet of a nature to elicit their acts in ordered fashion such that dryness cannot dry unless heat first heats, the necessity of order is not because by the heating the dryable object becomes present to the dry so as to be dried, but because of the nature of these active powers; and if in the prior stage in which the hot heats by heat it were to communicate to the heated, or produce in the heated, not only heat but also the dryness which it had, the heated would be dried by the same dryness as the heater, because in the instant of nature in which there is drying, there is one dryness in the heater and in the heated.

18. Thus must it be understood here that, in the moment of origin in which the Father produces by act of will, the same productive principle is in the Father and in the Son, and therefore the Son produces the Holy Spirit with the same production as the Father.

II. To the Principal Arguments

19. To the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] it seems reply can be made through the note of Lord Lincoln, which was spoken of [n.9]. However Damascene's first authority [n.1] could be explained, if he be speaking of the will and not of the Holy Spirit: because then it could be said that the will, which is the principle of spirating, is itself 'from the Father into the Son' because the Father communicates it to the Son; and 'it rests in the Son', that is, it is not further communicated under the idea of fecund principle, although the same will is communicated to the Holy Spirit, in himself. But the literal word of Damascene in the same place [n.1] seem to be speaking of the person of the Holy Spirit, and not of the will by which he is spirated.

20. To the reason about the Gospel [n.4] I say that the doctrine 'Christ descended into hell' is not taught in the Gospel, and yet it is to be held as an article of faith, because it is put in the *Apostle's Creed*. Thus many other things about the sacraments of the Church are not expressed in the Gospel and yet the Church holds them handed down with certitude from the Apostles, and it would be dangerous to err about things that have come down not only from the Apostles through writings but also that are to be held through the custom of the universal Church. Nor did Christ in the Gospel teach all things pertaining to the dispensation of the sacraments; for he said to his disciples (*John* 16.12-13): "I have

yet many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now; however when he, the Spirit of truth, has come, he will teach you all truth.” Therefore the Holy Spirit taught them many things which are not written in the Gospel: and those many things, some through writing, some through custom of the Church, have been handed on.

21. Similarly, diverse creeds at diverse times have been set forth against diverse heresies freshly arising, because when a new heresy was rising up it was necessary to declare the truth against which was the heresy: which truth, although it was before of the faith, was yet not before as much made clear as now against the error of those who were denying it.

22. To the other, about our word [n.5], I say that it is a mark of imperfection in the created image, because to a word is not communicated the same nature as in the mind, and therefore neither liberty formally and simply. But to the divine Word is communicated the nature of the Father and the same will as the Father, and therefore the Word has it [the will] as fecund in respect of the production of the Holy Spirit, because he is understood to have it first in order of origin before the Holy Spirit be spirated.

23. To the final one [n.7], I say that it does not follow, because the divine nature cannot be had by several productions in one person, as will be plain in the following question [n.47], because by each production it would have the nature and by neither would it have it; however one person can by several productions communicate the nature, and several persons can by one production produce a person: and therefore if passive [production] be only in one, it does not follow that also active production be only in one.

Question 2

Whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real Distinction between him and the Son could stand.

24. Second I ask whether, if the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand.

I argue that it could not:

Because, according to Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.6: “essence contains unity, relation multiplies trinity”; therefore no person is distinguished from another unless he is referred relatively to the other; therefore if the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son no real distinction as to him could stand, because he would not be referred to him, – therefore, etc.

25. Further, Augustine *The City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “For this reason is God simple, because he is what he has, that being excepted which is said relatively; as the Father has a Son and is not the Son.” Therefore, if the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son, he would be the Son, because then he would not be said relatively to him.

26. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “It is apparent that the Holy Spirit is not son, although he come forth from the Father, because he comes forth not as somehow born but as somehow given.”

I. On the Question itself

27. [Opinion of others] – Here it is said¹ that the question is null, because a position that includes impossibles cannot be posited nor sustained, because refutation is immediately included in it, which is the ultimate unacceptability to which a respondent can be reduced; for when such a position is posited, no rule of disputation can be preserved (namely conceding what follows and denying what is repugnant), because immediately must one concede the repugnancies that are included in the thing posited. And the proof that the thing posited is of this sort is because the supremely impossible is repugnant to the supremely necessary; whatever is in God inwardly is supremely necessary; therefore the repugnant to it is supremely impossible. Therefore a position supposing that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son is ‘supremely impossible’ because its opposite is supremely necessary inwardly (namely that he proceeds from the Son), and an impossible including impossibles seems to be more impossible than an impossible not including such; therefore etc.

28. [Against the opinion] – Against this position [n.27] is the fact this position seems to be an avoiding of the question. For the question is being moved in order to inquire what the first distinctive real thing is of the Son from the Holy Spirit, whether filiation or only active spiration, – because if filiation, then, however much active spiration is *per impossibile* removed, there still remains a reason for the distinguishing.

29. Further, although a position that immediately from its being understood includes contradictories cannot be admitted, yet that which from its being understood includes only one of the contradictories, and the other only through accidental consequence or extrinsic topics, does well seem it can be admitted, because when such a position is posited the rules of disputation can be sustained: for what follows by essential consequence can be conceded and what is repugnant denied; but if there be inferred something repugnant that follows through an extrinsic topic or by accidental consequence, it must be denied that it follows, because the proposition through which such a consequence would hold would be destroyed from the position. But now active spiration is not of the *per se* understanding of the Son as he is a person, but a quasi-property common to the Father and the Son; therefore by positing, with this removed, the Son in being of the Son, contradictories are not posited from the first understanding of what was set down [n.24], but only one of the two, namely that the Son is Son, and the remaining one only as it were by accidental consequence and through an extrinsic place [of argument], by removal of the quasi-predicate in removing the quasi-subject: therefore what was set down [n.24] does not so include opposites but that it could be admitted.

30. Again, if something included essentially in something be posited to be removed from it which yet was not the reason for the inherence of some predicate, – it can well be asked whether, with this or that removed, such a predicate would be in it or not; and however much the posit include contradictories, it is yet not repugnant to this posit without one part of this requisite having to be determinately given: for example, if animality is removed from man – which however includes impossibles – and the question be asked whether, with this removed, man could be distinguished from ass, it seems that it can be determinately replied that he can, because not through animality was it proper for man to be thus distinguished but through rationality. Therefore, although

¹ Vatican editors: this opinion, which is referred to by Richard of Middleton and William of Ware, is found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences*, though they also note that the opinion is attributed by William of Nottingham to John of Berwick and William of Macclesfield.

active spirating were of the idea of the Son, yet still – with it removed – it can be asked whether the Son be distinguished from the Holy Spirit or not, because the question is only whether the removed predicate was the precise cause of the distinction, or another non-removed predicate was.

31. Further, it is one thing to posit something and, with that posited, to ask about something proposed, – and it is another to ask about the truth of some conditional, because to ask about some conditional obliges to nothing. Although therefore the opinion [that the question cannot be posed, n.27] have some probability on the posit that the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son etc. yet it has none when the question is proposed thus (as I have proposed it [n.24]): ‘whether, if the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son, a real distinction of him from the Son could stand’. For there I am asking about a certain conditional, whether on ‘the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son’ it essentially follows that ‘he is not distinguished from him’, so that the opposite of the consequent could not stand with the antecedent, speaking of their formal meaning.

32. Against this position [the opinion stated in n.27] there are also many authorities.

One is from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “If the Father were not unable to be born, nothing would prevent him having generated the Son,” – and yet this position concomitantly includes impossibles, namely that the Father is unable to be born.

33. And Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* ch.16: “If there were one person, nothing would prevent him having the fullness of wisdom,” – although, however, there follow concomitantly on the fullness of wisdom or intellect a plurality of persons.

34. So too the Philosopher *Physics* 4.7.214a9-11 argues: on the posit that there were some space and it had not body but sound or color, he asks whether it would be a vacuum; and he responds that if it was of a nature to receive body, it would be a vacuum; if not, not. Therefore, with such position posited, which however by itself posits impossibles (because an accident – as sound or color – to be without a subject), it can be asked of something whether it follow, namely by understanding it of natural consequence, – because although the posit include impossibles, yet not all impossibles by natural consequence, but on it can some contradictory follow by natural consequence and some in no way, save as on the impossible anything at all [follows].

II. Response to the Question

A. Opinion of Others

35. Therefore, admitting the question, there is one opinion which says that if he [the Holy Spirit] were not to proceed from him [the Son] in no way would he be distinguished from him, – and it has for itself two reasons:

36. One reason is this: relation in divine reality distinguishes either according to its quiddity or according to its being; not according to being because thus does it pass over into the essence; therefore according to quiddity. But according to quiddity it only has respect to the opposite, therefore it only distinguishes from the opposite; but, with that hypothesis posited [n.35], there would not in Son and Holy Spirit be opposite relations; therefore etc.

37. The second reason is of this sort: if disparate relations could sufficiently distinguish persons, since there are two such in the Father – as active generation and active spiration –, the Father would be two persons. There is a confirmation of the reason, because these relations – active spiration and active generation – seem to have as great a distinction as their relatives or correlatives; therefore the latter can distinguish just as the former.

38. The authority of Anselm is adduced, in his book *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.2, but since each side adduces him for themselves and there is much disagreement made about his intention, what it was, therefore here I do not wish much to delay over his intention.^a

a. *Interpolated note*: “For this conclusion ‘that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son even though he would not proceed from him’ note the express authorities of Blessed Anselm, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.1, where he says as follows: “Now the Son, so that I may in the meantime state another cause (since it is not yet clear that the Holy Spirit be and proceed from him), is therefore not the Holy Spirit nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son by being born has being from the Father, but the Spirit not by being born but by proceeding.”

Again in chapter 20 [27] he draws, from intention, this consequence (about the middle of the chapter): “If the Holy Spirit,” he says, “were not from the Son, it will follow that the Son is from the Holy Spirit.” – I ask therefore about the truth of this antecedent, because either therefore the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Son because they would be the same person – and if it is thus understood, Anselm’s consequence does not follow, because if so the Son would no more be from the Holy Spirit than conversely; but if Anselm understand that they be distinct persons, then a distinction is had between them before procession, which is the conclusion proposed [at the beginning of this note]. – These authorities ponder.

B. Against the Opinion

39. Against this opinion [n.35] there are reasons which are taken from two middle terms: the first middle is from the idea of the formally constitutive, the second from the distinction of emanations.

40. [From the idea of the formally constitutive] – From the first of these the argument is as follows: by whatever formally something is constituted in being, by that same thing is it distinguished, because by the same thing is something a being and one (with the oneness fitting such an entity), and if one, then indistinct in itself and from others distinct; but the Son is constituted in ‘personal being’ by filiation, therefore also by it is he formally distinguished from every other person; therefore *per impossibile* or *per incompossibile*, when everything else is removed and especially ‘later’ filiation, the Son will by filiation remain distinct personally from any other person. – The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in ‘personal being’ by active spiration, because that is common to the Father and the Son; and there are not in him other positive properties besides passive generation and active spiration; therefore etc.²

² The Vatican editors give a helpful quotation from Henry of Ghent as they do elsewhere. Here it is perhaps worth translating. *Quodl.* V q.9 (f. 167V): “Only through that does a thing have to be essentially distinguished from anything

41. Response is made that something is not distinguished by the formal constitutive from anything at all but only from things with which it most agrees and from which it is not distinguished in any way save by that formal [constitutive]. An example: man is not distinguished by rationality from a stone but from species of animal, with which he most agrees and from which he seems in the fewest things to be distinguished; but from a stone he is distinguished by animality, because a stone is inanimate, which animality is not his formal constitutive. – So is it said in the matter at hand that the Son agrees with the Father in active spiration, and is in this respect distinguished from the Holy Spirit; but by his own proper formal (namely filiation) he is distinguished from the Father, with whom he most agrees; wherefore etc.

42. Against that [n.41], and first, because anything having some being is, with a distinction fitting that being, distinguished from anything else by something that is of its idea insofar as it has such being. The Son therefore is personally distinguished by something which is of his idea insofar as he is a person, and active spiration is not of his idea, but, once the Son is already posited, is as it were an adventitious property. From this is it plain that the example adduced is not to the purpose, because, although man be distinguished from stone not through rational first, yet he is distinguished by something that is of his essence, so that it would be unacceptable that he is by nothing that is of his essence distinguished from a stone but only by capacity for laughter. So therefore is it in the matter at hand.^a

a. *Interpolated text*: “From this is it plain that the example shows the matter at hand. For man would not be distinguished essentially from stone, insofar as he is an animal, if ‘animal’ were not of his essence (which however it is), though not as the ultimate constitutive of him. And so is it argued in the matter at hand: whatever is distinguished from something else, insofar as it is such, is distinguished by something that is of its per se idea, insofar as it such; the Son is distinguished per se from non-Son, therefore by something that is of his essence; but this is not the spirative force (for it is consequent to his constitutive property), therefore etc.”

43. Secondly in this way: what is constituted is distinguished by what is formally constitutive of it from everything else, even if *per impossibile* all things other than it were removed, because by it is it distinguished first – that is adequately – from everything not such; but anything that does not have that constitutive form is not such; therefore by it is it distinguished from everything else that does not have it.

44. This reason [n.43] is made clear because, although man be distinguished from a stone not only by rationality but also by animality, he is also not first distinguished by rationality, that is not adequately (because then anything distinct from a stone would be rational), but adequately in the genus of body is he first distinguished from stone by ‘animality’; however, after removing by intellect from man anything other than

else, and personally, through which essentially and personally it is constituted in being, as is plain through singular cases in creatures; but the Father has to be constituted in being of his personality by the property of paternity and not another one, since common active spiration is constitutive of no person, because it as it were follows persons already constituted in personal being; therefore the Father by paternity alone has personally to be distinguished from any other, therefore also the Father would be distinguished by paternity from the Holy Spirit even if he [the Holy Spirit] did not proceed from the Father, provided however he proceeded from the Son. Although therefore the Holy Spirit were not to proceed from the Son, nevertheless from him in his property of filiation he would be distinguished, because although he proceed, yet not by common spiration is he personally distinguished from the former, because it is not constitutive of a person.”

rationality, by that alone would he be distinguished essentially from anything not rational, and so from a stone, which is not rational. Not only that, then, distinguishes really which distinguishes adequately, but also that which, merely if it were posited, would be impossible with that from which it is distinguished.

45. There is confirmation of this principal reason taken from the properly constitutive [n.40], because if the Father *per impossibile* were not to spirate but the Son were, yet still the Father by paternity would be distinguished from the Son and from the Holy Spirit, just as he is by paternity constituted in personal being [cf. n.40 fn.].

46. [From the distinction of emanations] – From the second middle, namely from distinction of emanations [n.39], argument is made as follows: generation is distinguished from spiration, and this when *per impossibile* everything is removed other than the idea of generation and spiration, or at any rate when what would be spiration-action from the Son is removed, provided however that the distinction between the principles of generating and spirating stand; therefore even with all such removed would the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit stand.

47. Proof of the consequence, because it is impossible that one person receive being by two total productions: for by no production or distinction does he receive being when, with it *per impossibile* removed, he would no less receive being; but if by this production and by that he were to receive being – and by either completely, because either would be perfect – then, with either removed, he would have being completely through the other, and so he would receive being by neither and by either.^a

a. *Interpolated text*: “There is also argument as follows: if the Holy Spirit were from the Father alone, the productions would be essentially distinct; therefore also the terms. – Proof of the antecedent: the principles of the emanations have opposite modes of being principle; and such principles are not principle according to the same mode of principiation or emanation.”

48. To this reasoning some responses are posited as to the antecedent, and because there will be treatment of this in distinction 13 [I d.13 n.7], I do not now pursue it. The conclusions of these reasonings [nn.40, 46] I do concede, and the matter in question will be plainer when the distinction of emanations has been clarified [d.13].

III. To the Principal Arguments

49. To the authority of Boethius [n.24] To the authority of Boethius [n.24] I concede that ‘relation multiplies trinity’, and yet it distinguishes not only from the opposite relation but also from any disparate relation with which formally it is not the same; because, just as in the genus of quality whiteness is distinguished not only from the other opposite quality [sc. blackness] but also from every other disparate one, because whiteness is not formally sweetness nor smell (and if any disparate quality were impossible with another disparate one in the same supposit, not only would nature be distinguished from nature but also would a distinction of supposit be required), so any disparate relation is distinguished from another disparate relation [sc. active generation and active spiration in the Father], without any other impossibility. There is a confirmation: active generation is distinguished from spiration as it is in the Father, because the Son does not have a spiration more distinct from active generation than the

spiration of the Father is, because the spiration of the Father and the Son is the same. Some [relations], however, have not only distinction but also impossible idea (or impossibility) in the same supposit, of which sort are the disparate relations of receiving the nature, because a person that were to receive the nature in disparate ways would not have it in a single way.

50. To Augustine on *The City of God* [n.25] I say that any person is what he has, except that the relative has a correlative and is not it. But, with the hypothesis posited [n.24], the Holy Spirit would not have the Son as correlative and as spirating, and so it does not follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son, because he would, originating, not have the Son either intrinsically or as correlative. Now Augustine makes an exception, that what is had is not a haver when it is had as correlative; so Augustine only accepts that it is had either in the way in which the Son is said to have deity, or in the way in which he is said to have the Father: one way is to have it formally or essentially, another way is to have it correlatively or originally.

IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question

51. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.35].

To the first [n.36] I say that relation remains there both according to quiddity and according to being. For in whatever mode it remains according to quiddity, it remains according to the being of that which is ‘being to another’, because the quiddity of relation cannot be without ‘being to another’ because, in understanding relation without ‘being to another’, a relation is not understood but an absolute, because – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – if it is to another it is not substance, and so if it is substance or to itself, it is now not a relation; for in whatever way it passes over [sc. relation into essence], being and quiddity pass over, because just as ‘being to another’ – which is the being of relation – is truly the same as the essence, so too the quiddity of relation is the same as the essence; for nothing is there which is not the same. There remain therefore both being and quiddity, because relation is not formally the divine essence, because, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* V ch.2 n.1: “not by that is he Word by which he is wisdom;” but each passes over, because with what it is not formally the same it is truly same, as has often been said [I d.2 n.410, d.4 n.10, d.5 nn.43-45, 117-118, 138].

52. When therefore you say ‘it is distinguished either according to being or according to quiddity’ [n.36], – I say according to quiddity and according to ‘being to another’. And when you say ‘thus does it pass over, therefore not thus does it distinguish’ [*ibid.*], the consequence is not valid, because it passes according to identity,^a because true identity does not have to be formal, because the formal idea of this which passes over is not formally the idea of the essence to which it passes over; and therefore to this formal idea belongs what is proper to it: but it is proper to it to be distinguished really from every relation, both opposite and disparate impossible with it, and therefore, along with the fact it truly passes over, it truly remains, as much as suffices for real distinction both from the opposite relatively and also from a disparate relation impossible with it.

a. *Interpolated text*: “and remains according to formality.”

53. To the second, when statement is made about two properties in the Father [n.37], the response is in distinction 2 question 3 [I d.2 nn.221-237³]. For it is not necessary that there is as much distinction or impossibility of active productions as there is of passive productions, because it is impossible that the same thing by two opposite productions is produced and receives being, [*ibid.* n.357]; but it is not impossible that the same thing by two active productions communicates being to distinct persons.

Twelfth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether One or insofar as they are Distinct

1. About the twelfth distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one or insofar as they are in some way distinct. Proof that insofar as they are distinct:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7: “The Holy Spirit is the common union (or communion) of the Father and the Son.” From this is commonly taken that he is the nexus of both, – but a nexus is not of any things save insofar as they are distinct; and he is the nexus of them insofar as he proceeds from them; therefore he proceeds from them insofar as they are distinct.

2. Again, action is of a supposit, therefore of two supposits there is not one action; the Holy Spirit is produced by the action of the Father and the Son as agents; therefore insofar as they are distinct.

3. Again, if they produce insofar as they are altogether one thing, – either insofar as they are one in essence, or insofar as they are one in person, or insofar as they are one in spirative force; not insofar as they are one in essence, because then the Holy Spirit would produce himself, because he is one in essence with the Father and the Son; nor in the second way, as is plain; nor in the third way, insofar as they are one in spirative force, because then it would follow that the Father was two principles in respect of the Son and the Holy Spirit, because of two productive forces in him with respect to them.

4. Again, the love of generated knowledge is the third part of the image, therefore ‘love that proceeds’ is the love of the Word. – The proof of the antecedent is in distinction 6, from Augustine [I d.6 n.23]; look for the response there [*ibid.* n.27].

5. There are three acts of the will: with respect to the object, with respect to the act of being well pleased, with respect to command. The third is in no way in God, since neither is it in us with respect to first intellection; the first is more principal, the second is more universal [I d.6 n.26], – each is essential in God. But ‘the love that proceeds’ is principally love of the object, not of the Word unless it be of the Father (perhaps of neither from first production), as neither [is there] a Word save of the essence; now in us all love is proceeding love, there not, but only love of the first known lovable object.

³ “The Father by two productive active principles, memory and will, can perfectly produce generated knowledge and love, or perfectly communicate being to distinct persons.”

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “Father and Son are one principle as to the Holy Spirit, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one principle as to the creature;” but the creature is from the three insofar as they are one, not insofar as they are distinct; therefore etc.

I. Response to the Question

7. In this question it is plain that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. This was made clear in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X, as is plain in *Extra*, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith’, and it is today in book 6 of the *Sixth Book of the Decretals* [*Boniface VIII* lib.1 tit.1 ch. un].

The reason for this truth is as follows, because as was said in distinction 11 the Father has first in origin an act of fecundity of the intellect before of the the will [I d.11 n.13]; in that prior stage there is communicated to the Son the same fecundity that is in the Father, because in that moment of origin – in which the Son is produced through fecundity of intellect – there is communicated to him by the Father whatever is not repugnant to him, and thus fecundity of will [*ibid.* n.12]; therefore, in the other moment of origin, when a person is produced by an act of the second fecundity (namely of the will), he is produced by the Father and Son altogether as by one principle, because of the one fecundity of the productive principle in them [*ibid.* n.18].

II. Whether the Father and the Son inspire more by the Will insofar as it is One or insofar as it is Concordant.

8. But there is another difficulty: for since the will is single in two suppositis, which suppositis do concordantly will with this will, and since concord connotes some distinction of concordant suppositis, [the difficulty is] whether the Father and the Son *per se* inspire more by this will insofar as they are one or insofar as they are concordant.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. Here the following is said [by Henry, *Summa* a.54 q.6 ad 8], that the producing suppositis are distinct, and because of that distinction they would not in any way be conceded to inspire insofar as they are mores, – for they have one inspirative force; but further, this inspirative force is not altogether under the idea of its unity the proximate fecund principle [*ibid.* a.60 q.8] for inspiring, but under the idea of concordant will, where some distinction is connoted; because of that distinction, connoted on the part of the principle ‘by which’, it can be conceded that they inspire insofar as they are distinct. – This opinion is given confirmation by Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* III ch.16:

10. “Since⁴ the intellect can have perfect fecundity for production of the Word as it exists in one person alone, but the will cannot have perfect fecundity for the production of the Holy Spirit unless it exist in twin persons, and this because the fecundity of the intellect consists in fullness of perfect wisdom, which can be in a singular, as Richard

⁴ Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry, though according to the Vatican editors his quotations are not without errors and lacunae, either because of the exemplar used or of Scotus himself or the first amanuensis of the *Ordinatio*.

says [*ibid.*]: ‘Nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom be said to be able to subsist in singularity of person, for if there were only one person in the deity, nevertheless he could have the fullness of wisdom’; but fecundity of will consists in fullness of true love, which cannot be save in two at a minimum, on the saying of the same Richard [*ibid.* ch.3]: ‘Love cannot be joyful unless it were mutual’, because since in essential love fecundity of will cannot be unless love be supremely perfect and joyful, it must be that if the will be fecund, that the love be mutual, ‘so that there be’ – according to him ch.3 – ‘he who pays love out, and that there be he who pays love back’, because, as he says in ch.7, ‘there is no satisfaction for one who loves supremely if the one who is supremely loved does not pay supreme love back’.

11. And according to this, for the purpose – as was said above [n.10] – that the common will of the Father and Son may be fecund for spirating the Holy Spirit, it is not enough that there be one will for both and an essential love therein common, by which both together love and will, but it is necessary that there be a will mutual and concordant of the two, so that one pay out supreme love to the other and he in turn always pays supreme love back to the first; when this love exists, the will is fecund so that it produces love from itself, which love is the Holy Spirit, as Richard says (*ibid.* [n.10] ch.11): ‘in love mutual and most fervent there is nothing more admirable than that by him whom you supremely love and by whom you are supremely loved you should wish another to be equally loved’; ‘therefore in him, as he is mutually loved, the love of both, in order to be consummate, requires a sharer in already possessed love’, and this by producing through spirative force (which is concordant will in mutual love) the Holy Spirit, – not only as they are one in that will or love, but as they are plural, distinct between themselves, which distinction is connoted by this, that the will is said to be concordant and the love mutual; this cannot be unless it be of a plural according as the plural are inseparable, for this preposition ‘con/with’ imports association, which is only of a distinct plural (and, for this reason is it well said that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three co-eternal’, although however this be denied, that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three eternal’).

12. By this too, that this will is concordant, and the mutual love of the two, though it be one and the same, is yet not the same idea of it as it is paid out by the Father on the Son, and as, conversely, it is paid back by the Son on the Father, – since (according to Richard, *ibid.* ch.19) ‘when the two love themselves mutually and pay each other back the affection of supreme desire, and the affection of this one to that and of that one to this runs to and fro, it tends as it were to things diverse’, because it is in some way diverse in idea; but this diversity is in love or essential will, of which, notwithstanding, the fecundity is wholly one and the same in that concordant will and mutual love, in which fecundity the Father and Son are one and uniformly spirate the Holy Spirit, who ‘by two is concordantly loved, of two the affection is by a third love’s fire melted into one’, as the same Richard says.

13. And according to this, in the spirating of the Holy Spirit is the distinction of Father and Son to be doubly considered; in one way as they are expressed as eliciting an act, – in another way as they are understood to be concordant in mutual love and in will concerning the act to be elicited. And from the distinction of it [spiration] considered in the first way, are they in no way to be said to spirate as plural; for although they be plural who spirate, yet not because of the plurality that is prior in them do they spirate, but only from their distinction considered in the second way; and thus do the Father and Son not

spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are plural in eliciting the action (although they concur in the one idea according to which the action is elicited), but as they are plural in one will, which is the idea of eliciting an act by agreement to their love in that exchange.”

B. Against the Opinion of Henry

14. Against this position.

[First reason] – If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by will as loving themselves in concord thereby, then there is another Holy Spirit produced beforehand, – which is unacceptable.

15. Proof of the consequence [n.14]. First because in whatever moment of nature or origin the productive principle is perfect in itself and is in a supposit suitable for action, in that moment there can be for such supposit an idea of producing; but infinite will, as it is infinite will, understood before all willing, having an infinite object present to it, is a sufficient productive principle of infinite love, and the Father and Son are persons suited for production; therefore the will as in the Father and Son, not understood as that whereby they formally will but as will is infinite having the divine essence present to it by act of intelligence, will be for the Father and the Son the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, – and so, if the Holy Spirit be produced by will insofar as it is willing, or insofar as by it the Father and Son love themselves in act, it follows that, prior to the Holy Spirit having been produced by will willing, the Holy Spirit has been produced by will as it is first act, which is unacceptable.

16. This reasoning about the will, that it be a principle of spirating as it is will, but not as it is willing in act [n.15], is confirmed in two ways: first by the formal idea of the will in being a principle, which is liberty, which does not thus belong to the very willing; second by a likeness from the intellect.

17. About the first [n.16] the argument is as follows: the will, as in us it is first act, is free for having an act of willing, but the act itself of willing is not free or principle of producing anything freely, because an act of willing is a certain natural quality, – and if it is a principle of some act, it seems to be a natural principle of it, not a free one (just as if from such act a habit of appetite were generated, it would be naturally generated, so that the generation of such habit is not in the power of the act, as it seems). Therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit’s being freely produced is more saved if he is produced by will as it is first act than if he is produced by will as it is willing in act, namely as it is understood under second act.

18. Secondly the argument [n.16] is as follows, because the Son is not produced by the paternal intellect as it is understanding in act, so that actual intellection be the formal idea by which the Father generates the Son, as was shown above in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.291-296]; therefore, by similarity, the will as it is willing in act will not be the principle of producing the Holy Spirit, but will as first act.

19. Secondly I prove the principal consequence [n.14] as follows, by taking the same major as before [n.15], ‘in whatever moment of nature or of origin etc.’; then I add this minor, that the divine will – having the first object present to it – is the idea of producing love adequate to that object more perfectly than when having a secondary object present to it, or at least not less perfectly; therefore, since the divine essence is the first object of the divine will – not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then

the Father would be formally blessed in several distinct objects – then the will having the divine essence present to it (whether as lovable or as loved, I care not in this second proof [sc. as opposed to the first proof, n.15]) will be more a principle of producing love adequate to that object [sc. divine essence] than as it has the Father as Father or the Son as Son for object, at any rate not less so, and thus since the will has the essence for object before the Father as he is Father, the Holy Spirit will be first spirated by the will as it is of the divine essence as first object before by the will as it is of the Father as of object, or of the Son as object.

20. This reason [n.19] is confirmed because the divine essence is formally infinite, paternity as paternity is not formally infinite; therefore the Holy Spirit, who is infinite love, and this not only by reason of infinite will but by reason too of infinite object, as was said in distinction 10 [I d.10 nn.9, 30-31, 47-49], will be spirated more by the will as it is of the divine essence (which is the infinite object) than as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son as object.

21. If it be said that the essence is not the first object of the will but the formal idea in the first object is, which is the person, – this is false, because the first object of the will is one, and because the idea of the formal loved thing is loved first; it also concedes the matter at hand, because there will be a formal idea of spirating in the way the object contributes to the spirating.

22. From these two proofs [sc. nn.15, 19, proofs of the principal consequence, n.14] the conclusion is that the Father does not spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as he loves the Son first, nor does the Son insofar as he loves the Father, but the Father and Son insofar as they have the divine essence present as first object of their will, and this because of the second proof of the principal consequence [n.19]; likewise that they spirate insofar as they have the essence present to them, not as actually loved, but as a lovable presented in an act of their intelligence, because of the first proof of the consequence [n.15].

23. And if you object against the first proof [n.15], ‘surely the Father and Son are first lovers of the essence in itself before they spirate the Holy Spirit?’ – it can be replied as was said before in distinction 6 [I d.6 n.15] about the production of the Son, how the Father in some way first in origin understands before the Son is generated [cf. *Ord.* I d.6 n.15], and yet not in such way that the actual understanding of the Father is the idea of begetting the Son, but memory in the Father [I d.2 nn.290-296]; thus can it be said of the love by which the Father and Son love concordantly and formally, and of the act of spirating.

24. [Second reason] – Again, second [n.14]: a principle equally perfect in one supposit as in two is equally a principle of acting in one as in two, because for action there seems not to be required save a perfect principle ‘by which’ and a perfect acting supposit; but the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, and one supposit is as equally perfect – with the perfection requisite for an acting supposit – as two; therefore the will can as equally be a principle of producing in one as in two, such that the exchange is not any reason for producing on the part of the productive principle.

25. The major [n.24] is proved because the principle ‘by which’ does not receive the perfection belonging to it from the supposit but gives it to the supposit – because by it the supposit is perfect – so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several than in one when there is the same principle in several and in one.

26. And if you say [against the argument of n.24] that the principle is not in one as it is a productive principle but only thus is it in two, and only residually in the Father after the Son has been generated, – this seems absurd, because all the reality, both relative and absolute, that the Father can have, he has in himself in the first moment of origin; therefore he has none after the Son has been generated which he is not pre-understood to have in origin before the Son be generated, – wherefore that fecundity [for spirating] too, whether the fecundity be posited as a relation or something absolute [I d.3. n.584].

27. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” and from him – in the authority cited before [n.6] – is it plain that they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, altogether one, just as the three persons are one principle of the creature; but not altogether ‘uniformly’ would they spirate if the Son at once, in the first moment of origin, had the fecundity of spirating and the Father did not have all fecundity in his first moment, but only had it in the second moment, after the Son has been generated.

28. And if an objection be made [against the response to the objection, n.26] about the power of creating, that it not be in the Father before the production of the Son and Holy Spirit, – the response will be clear partly here in expounding Richard’s intention [nn.38-39], and more fully about ‘the order of the intrinsic productions to the extrinsic ones’ [II d.1 q.1].

29. [Third reason] – Again, if there is in the Father perfect will, it is plain first in origin before in the Son; however it is not a perfect principle of spirating, for you [sc. Henry]. – I ask what is understood to be added to the principle so that it be a perfect principle of spirating? Not some supposit, because that adds nothing to the principle ‘by which’, but only by it does it have that it could act [cf. *Ord.* I d.7 n.75]. If mutual love of this one for that, and conversely, then the double relation of reason will be the ultimate reason or actuality of the principle of spirating; this is impossible because of two things: first, because no relation of reason is a prerequisite for divine production (it is proved in distinction 13, against the opinion positing that intellect and will are only distinguished by reason [I d.13 nn.31-40]), – second, because then there would be two proximate formal principles of spirating, and so two supposit would not spirate altogether as they are one, which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* as was cited in opposing argument [n.6, cf. n.27].

30. [Fourth reason] – Again, if they had two wills, they could, be concordant in such exchange [n.24]; therefore to spirate insofar as they are concordant is not ‘as one principle’ to spirate, because neither as one supposit nor as one ‘by which’ insofar as they are concordant.

31. [Fifth reason] – Again, either the Father by will and volition, as they are in him with the relation to the beloved Son, is the total principle of spirating, or not. If he is, it follows that the Son does not spirate insofar as he has relation because [as such] he does not have the idea ‘by which’; for he does not spirate insofar as he is loving, with this loving removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be spirated; but, when relation is removed, no less would the Holy Spirit be spirated by the Father as total principle by his act of will as it tends to the Son. If it be granted in the first division [earlier in this paragraph] that he is not, it follows that each, insofar as loving the other, is only a diminished principle, and both together are one principle as it were by aggregation (as two people hauling a ship), but not one principle by identity of perfect principle.

32. [Against the reasons from Richard] – Further, against the reasons that Richard intimates on his behalf [sc. Henry's], namely that mutual love is most delightful [n.10]; from this it follows that the Father would be formally blessed by such love, because the love by which he is blessed is most delightful, and then the Father would not be formally blessed in himself but in the Son, objectively, which is heretical.

33. Again, secondly, against that reason [n.32], I argue as follows: in us mutual love is more delightful because by such mutuality is had in the beloved a fuller idea of lovability. For any beloved able to love, if he love back, makes himself more lovable, because not only is whatever goodness is in him an idea of lovability, but loving back is another idea of lovability, and because of this he who has the goodness which is the first idea of lovability, and likewise has loving back, is more lovable. Therefore it will be opposite in divine reality, where this idea of lovability can in no way be found or posited: for the Son is not more lovable than the Father and more loving back the divine essence (because of which he is first loved back), nor is this loving back another idea of lovability in the Son.

34. Further, mutual love in us is not more delightful if it not be known. For just as goodness is not loved unless known, so neither is he loved who loves back unless his loving back is known. But if in this way loving back or mutual love should be posited as more delightful in divine reality, and that for this reason the Holy Spirit is spirated by such love, – then would the Father and the Son, not insofar as they love each other back but insofar as they love and know they love each other back, spirate the Holy Spirit, so that knowledge of being loved back would seem then to be more formally and more immediately principle of spirating the Holy Spirit than love, and thus the Holy Spirit will more formally and more immediately be produced by the intellect than by the will.

35. [Against him who holds the opinion] – Further, against him who holds this opinion [sc. Henry], because he holds that the Holy Spirit could be distinguished from the Son, although he were not to proceed from the Son, because of his distinct mode of proceeding from the Father. But if fecundity of will for spirating the Holy Spirit is only as will is formally in the two, there could not belong to the Holy Spirit his own mode of proceeding – other than the mode of proceeding of the Son – unless he were from the Son. Therefore he [Henry] seems to be contradicting himself.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

36. As to this article [n.8] I concede that the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by will insofar as they are altogether one, because for the idea of principle, precisely as principle, there is only required the perfection of it in itself and that it be had in the person before it be understood to have an adequate term; now the will is 'altogether one' in the Father and Son, and prior in origin in them before it be understood to have an adequate term (because both are also spirative), and therefore the will, as in them, is the same principle productive in respect of the Holy Spirit.

37. But, for understanding the words of Richard [nn.11-12], I distinguish that 'concordant will' can be understood in many ways; either concordant in some elicited second act, namely in loving the same thing, and then either the creature or the Holy Spirit; or in loving themselves and loving back, as that the Father by it loves the Son and conversely; or concord can be understood habitually, insofar as first act is of a nature to

have a second quasi-act. In the first two ways it does not seem that the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by concordant will, because (as was proved in the first reason by two proofs [nn.14, 15, 19]) neither by love of essence (as was proved in the first proof [n.15]) nor of themselves reciprocally (as was touched on in the second proof [n.19]) do they formally spirate. Therefore it is necessary that it be understood in the third way: ‘by concordant will’, that is ‘by will insofar as it is first act, in which they are of a nature to be in concord in their act [sc. of spirating], by concordantly producing love’; by such a will – I say – do they spirate, and more by one than by concordant will, because, as first act is being understood, one will in them is being understood and that it only has concord in this way of speaking ‘because the persons are understood to be capable of being in concord in quasi-second act, by concordantly spirating’.

38. Then, by saving the words of Richard in some way I say that, when in some same thing there are two active principles active ‘in ordered way’, that thing is not in proximate power for acting by the second principle unless it be pre-understood in the act of the first principle, – an example about intellect and will in the soul; therefore the Father is not altogether fecund with power proximate for spirating (which is an act of the will as principle ‘by which’) unless he be pre-understood in act of the prior principle (which is the intellect), and consequently the will is not the proximate principle save as it is in the two: this follows because, by that prior production – without which this power is not proximate – the will is in the two because, by the act of the first fecundity, there is communicated to the produced person the second fecundity, namely the fecundity of the will with respect to the spirating of the Holy Spirit; there is not however another fecundity – namely fecundity of the will – in the two than in the one, but the same in both producer and produced.

39. There is an example of this in some way in us. The soul is not fecund ‘with proximate power’ for having an act of willing unless it be in actual intellection, although by that intellection it not formally produce an act of loving but by the will as it is first act, which preexists in the soul before intellection though not in a power altogether proximate to acting. If then the soul in producing intellection were to communicate to it fecundity of will, it would not be will in proximate power for producing love unless it were first a produced word, and so with fecund will communicated to it; and thus never would the will be proximately fecund save in two, – not however such that this fecundity require of its idea to be in two because it could not be in one (rather it the same already would preexist in the mind), but because of the order of fecundities in producing, there would have to be a second fecundity – when it is in proximate power – necessarily in the two.

40. It can therefore be conceded that the Father and Son spirate by the one will which is in them, and which is perfectly fecund existing in the two suppositis, because it is understood to be communicated to the generated supposit – and so to be in the two – before the Holy Spirit be produced by it.

41. But how is the Holy Spirit spirated by mutual love [n.11]?

I reply: by love, that is by the will by which the Father and Son as in first act are of a nature to love themselves mutually; by this will – I say – as existing in them, and of a nature to be the sort by which they love themselves mutually, is the Holy Spirit spirated, but not by any second act as if of love actually bestowed and requited. But if this does not suffice for the intention of Richard, let him expound him who will be able to, because his determination does not seem to stand well with the statements of Augustine – who

attributes to the Father and Son the perfect idea of one principle with respect to the Holy Spirit just as to the Trinity in respect of the creature [n.6] – if it contradict the aforesaid; but as to how Augustine says that the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as if he be the very mutual love of the Father and Son (as Augustine seems to say in *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7), it will be expounded in distinction 32 [I d.32 qq.1-2 nn.1, 11], where the Master [Lombard] treats of this question ‘Whether the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’.

III. Whether the Father and Son are one Spirator or two Spirators

42. Along with this question [n.1] is a quasi-grammatical difficulty: whether the Father and Son might be called one spirator or two spirators.

When a thing is said in many ways, but because the force is about the significate of a name, I do not much delay over it. For it seems that such a verbal name [sc. ‘spirator’] signifies such a principle of acting as it is of a nature to denominate an active supposit; for just as ‘reading’ signifies an act quidditatively by way of habit and rest, so ‘reader’ signifies a principle of this sort of act by way of habit and quiet, as it is denominative of an active supposit; ‘spiration’ therefore signifies the force of spirating as it concerns a supposit – and because there is one force in the Father and Son, and a numerical term attached to something determinable puts its own significate on it, therefore it does not seem it should be conceded, from the force of the word, that there be two spirators, because the spirative force would seem to be numbered in them.

43. And if you object, it follows ‘there are two spirating, therefore two spirators’ (the proof of the consequence is because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural), – I reply: I say that the consequence is not valid, because a participle signifies an act as in its being done, for it co-signifies time as does a verb, – and thus, just as it is conceded that the Father and Son create, so is it conceded that they are beings creating; and it is not conceded that they are two creators but one creator, because a verbal name does not signify an act by way of act and in becoming, but by way of habit and rest.

44. But what reason [is there] why a numerical term is conceded to be capable of being apposite to adjectival terms and not substantive ones?

There is set down this reason, because adjectives lie next to suppositis and signify a form lying next to suppositis, and therefore they can be numbered by the numbering of suppositis; but substantives do not thus signify a form lying next to suppositis, but they signify as it were in some way abstracted from suppositis; therefore they cannot be so numbered, because thus would be signified there the numbering of form, and so ‘two Gods’ is not conceded as ‘two possessing deity’ is.

45. But this reason does not seem to suffice, because a numerical term places its significate on the significate of the determinable; but the significate of an adjective and a substantive is the same, – and they do not differ save in mode of signifying; therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily places its significate on the same thing, and so if the numeration of a determinable form be signified on one part and not on the other, because of adjacency to the supposit that belongs to one and not to the other – not by reason of the significate but by reason of the mode of signifying will truth be able to be in one and falsehood in the other.

46. I assign another reason, of this sort: everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when two things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but each would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive. When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, there is at least found an independent thing on which its dependence is terminated, – but when two adjectives are mutually added to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore, when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as if it be said ‘two spirators’, at once the numerical adjectival term has a terminating substantive, because the adjective determines what terminates its dependence; therefore the significate of its substantive is denoted to be numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when is said ‘two spirating’, both are dependent, and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third which terminates their dependence and is determined by them. And this it is in the matter at hand [n.43], ‘some’ or ‘persons’, as if it say ‘three somethings’ or ‘three persons’ creating, because although usually the masculine not be a substantive but only the neuter form is a substantive⁵ [I d.5 nn.36, 42], yet in divine reality, when a masculine adjective is posited per se, then it is understood there to be a substantive, like ‘someone’ or ‘person’: as when it is said ‘the Father and Son are not one’ – as the authorities say [n.47] – , although they be one God, because ‘one’ posited absolutely is signified adjectively and is understood to have its own substantive, that is ‘someone’; hence is signified that the Father and the Son are one-someone or one-somebody or one-person.

47. Then to the consequence ‘there are two spirating, therefore there are two spirators’, – I deny it.

And when you prove it ‘because as singular infers singular, so plural plural’ [n.43], I say that it is not necessary – if on some antecedent some consequent follow – that on a distinction of the antecedent a distinction of the consequent follow, save when the consequent is distinguished in antecedents as a genus is distinguished its species. But in the matter at hand the spirating suppositis are distinguished, and on ‘spirating supposit’ follows ‘spirator’, but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing ‘spirating, so spirator, – therefore if two spirating, two spirators’ there is a fallacy of the consequent, by arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent. And if sometimes it is found by authors that the Father and Son are two spirators, their authorities must be given exposition and soundly understood; for many authorities of the saints, which are not true by virtue of speech sometimes, are to be expounded according to the Master [Lombard] in distinction 12 [*Sentences* I d.12 ch.2 nn.109-111].

IV. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the arguments.

⁵ In Latin the neuter ‘album’ (‘the white [thing]’) can readily be treated as a substantive, but the masculine ‘albus’ (‘the white [man]’) less so.

To the first, when argument is about the bond [n.1], – I say that the Father and Son are bonded in the Holy Spirit as in a common product; for although they are distinct (otherwise the two would not be connected), yet they do not have a common product insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one; hence the product is single from them insofar as they are a one producing, and so that authority [sc. from Augustine, n.1] is to the opposite.

49. To the second [n.2] I say that action is ‘of a *per se* existent singular’ – but it need not be of some incommunicable *per se* existent singular, as was said in distinction 4 [I d.4 nn.11-13].

In the way that this is true ‘God creates’ or ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is it posited that there is a ‘this spirator’ to whom it first belongs – that is adequately – to spirate, who is pre-understood in some way in the Father and in the Son, to whom the act of spirating belongs, because each is ‘this spirator’; and then it would be said of this ‘*per se* existent’, which is as it were something common in reality to the Father and the Son, that there is one action, although it not be one supposit (that is, an incommunicable), just as neither is the Trinity one supposit, yet it creates with one creation.

50. This does not seem probable here as does ‘God creates’ there, because it does not seem any one here is *per se* existent, common to the Father and Son and not to the Holy Spirit, because then that singular *per se* existent would, though not incommunicably yet really, be referred to the Holy Spirit and would be something really related inwardly in some way before it would be understood to be the first person, and so not every real relation inwardly would be of a person, which would not seem probable.

51. In another way it can be said that action denominates with ultimate denomination only the supposit, or what has the mode of a supposit. I say ‘mode of a supposit’ on behalf of a separated soul and of accidents separated by a miracle, which are denominates by an action with ultimate denomination, because they *per se* exist, – although not incommunicably, because they are of a nature to communicate being to supposit; but while they communicate nothing, nothing is denominates by their action save with ultimate denomination. But every form, existing in another as a form, just as it gives it being so does it give it in some way to be denominates by its action, not however with ultimate denomination, but the supposit would be further denominates by the same action; but if some *per se* existing form were of a nature to have some proper action, if it were to give the same being to several supposit – from the fact the supposit are not denominates by the action of the form save because they have being through the form, they would be denominates by the same action, just as they would have the same being of that active form (an example: if one whiteness were in two surfaces, they would cause a change [sc. in the eye] with one change): so therefore, since ‘fecund will’ is one principle of spirating, whatever is denominates by this action is, by the fact that it has being by this form, denominates by the same action. When therefore he [sc. Henry] says [n.2] that ‘action is of a supposit, therefore of several supposit there are several actions’, I deny the consequence, except when what is multiplied in them is the idea of acting, by which, as giving them being, they are said denominatively to act.

52. And if you object, from man’s one soul there are many distinct operations (as to understand and to will), and also many operations of the sensitive parts (as to see, to hear, and many such), and, if those parts were supposit, the actings of them would have

many actions, I reply: I say that not always is one thing one idea of acting; rather, one thing can include in itself several ideas of acting, as will be said of the soul in respect of its powers, if there be question about this [*Ord. II Suppl.* d.16 q. un nn.15-19; IV d.49 p.1 qq.1-2 n.18]. And it was stated, in the response already made [n.51] about one idea simply of acting, what sort of idea there is in the Father and Son in respect of the production or producing of the Holy Spirit.

53. To the third [n.3] I say that the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one: and not insofar as they are one in essence, nor insofar as they are one in person, but insofar as they are one in spirative force. And when you infer ‘therefore the Father would be two productive principles, because of the double fecundity in him’ [n.3], I deny the consequence, because for this purpose, that ‘several producings’ be spoken of, there is required an enumeration of suppositis: for someone is not said to be ‘several knowers’ although he have several sciences, but there would have to be several suppositis for this in order for it to follow^a (about this elsewhere, in book III, where it is asked ‘whether, if several natures were assumed by the Word, he would be one or several men’ [III d.1 q.3 n.3]).

a. *Interpolated text*: “because an adjective is in essential adjacency to the supposit that terminates dependence, and therefore never is it multiplied unless the supposit that stops its dependence is multiplied; but in the matter at hand the supposit that stops dependence of the adjective cannot be multiplied, and therefore adjectives adjacent to it cannot be multiplied unless the proposition be false” [i.e. unless it is false that the adjectives belong to one supposit].

Question Two

Whether the Father and the Son uniformly spirate the Holy Spirit

54. Second I ask whether the Father and Son altogether uniformly spirate the Holy Spirit.

That they do not: Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.17 n.29: “The Holy Spirit principally proceeds from the Father.” Therefore not principally from the Son; therefore not altogether uniformly.

55. Again, Jerome *Epistle* 88 [=Ps.-Jerome *Epistle* 17 to Cyril]: “The Holy Spirit properly from the Father,” through the Son. Therefore not properly from the Son.

56. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* XII n.57: “May I merit the Holy Spirit, who is from you through your only Begotten.” Therefore he is from the Father through the Son; therefore not uniformly from both.

57. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* V ch.9: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father mediately and immediately, but from the Son immediately only.” Therefore etc.

58. Again, every first cause acts more than a second, from the first proposition in *On Causes*; and it is plain from the statement of the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30, and in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30: “Of necessary things must the principles always be most true, because they are cause of truth for other things.” Therefore every prior producer produces more than a second producer; the Father seems to produce first, because he gives producing to the Son, therefore etc.

59. On the contrary:

By one principle, insofar as it is altogether one in them, do they spirate the Holy Spirit, – from the preceding question [n.36 above]; therefore altogether uniformly.

I. To the Question

60. I reply. An act can be considered in three ways: either in itself, or insofar as it is of a term, or insofar as it is compared to acting suppositis. In the first two ways there is altogether uniformity, or rather unity, because there is most truly one act and one produced term. Speaking in the third way, as the spirating force is communicated to the Son by the Father, so too, that the Son spirate, this he has from the Father, – and so the Father spirates from himself, the Son not from himself.

61. On the contrary: therefore the Father spirates the Holy Spirit before the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, because in the first moment of origin in which the Father has being from himself, he has spirating from himself, – and then the Son would not spirate, because if the Holy Spirit be pre-understood to have being first from the Father before from the Son, then the Son will not produce an already existing Holy Spirit.^a

a. *Interpolated text*: “There is a confirmation: whatever principle productive in a prior supposit is understood to have an adequate term cannot be a principle of producing in a later supposit; but so it is in the matter at hand; therefore etc.”

62. I reply. About these orders or origins, or about many orders of priority and posteriority, there will be discussion elsewhere [II d.1 q.1 nn.13-18]. But as to what concerns the matter at hand,^a it should not be understood that the Father spirate before the Son spirate, in the way the Father generates first in origin before he spirates,^b because then the Son would not spirate (as the argument [n.61] deduces), just as neither can the Holy Spirit generate the Son already understood to be generated. But this is the order, that there is in the Father: first, both fecundities from himself; second, in the Father there is an act of first fecundity, and then in the Son is a second fecundity; third, an act of second fecundity at once from the Father and Son possessing then that fecundity, – still however with a certain order, because the act is of the Father from himself but of the Son not from himself but from the Father, just as neither in the second moment is the fecundity of the Son from himself but of the Father from himself. There is not then an order of origin between the spiration of the Father and Son as if the Father were to spirate in some moment of origin in which the Son does not spirate, but in the same moment of origin they spirate together; there is however there an order of spirators in spirating, because the Father in that moment of origin spirates from himself, but the Son not from himself.^c

a. *Interpolated text*: “I say that there is not a like order between the Father generating and spirating as there is between the Father spirating and the Son spirating; hence...”

b. *Interpolated text*: “because of the order of principles in producing.”

c. *Interpolated text*: “To the confirmation [footnote to n.61] it must be said that the major is not true if the principle have an adequate term after the other suppositum be produced, to which that principle is communicated according to its total fecundity; and so it is in the matter at hand about the spirative force, which the Father communicates to the Son before he have the adequate term Holy Spirit.”

II. To the Principal Arguments

63. Hereby is it plain to all the authorities adduced [nn.54-58], – because for this reason does Augustine say the Father spirates principally [n.54]; for he gives exposition of himself: “Therefore did I say ‘principally’, because what the Son spirates this he has from the Father.”

64. However, a certain doctor [Bonaventure] says that the Father spirates principally and more principally, but the Son only principally, because with respect to the Holy Spirit does the Son have authority though the Father have authority both with respect to the Son and with respect to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he spirates. – But another doctor [Henry] contradicts him, that there is not there any comparison properly speaking in any one form, but there is only there comparison in speech; just as [the Archangel] Michael is said to be holier than the demon, where there is only comparison in speech and not in any form common to each extreme (but the form is only in one extreme and not in the other), so principality is in the Father, so that it is the same thing for the Father to spirate more principally and for him to spirate principally.

65. To the other, from Jerome [n.55], I say that only he is said to be proprietor who in having a thing does not depend on another, and he a borrower who in using a thing does depend on another and is not properly proprietor. The Father, therefore, who has spirative force from himself, is rightly said properly to spirate, but the Son does not in this way properly – that is from himself – spirate, although properly, that is not improperly or imperfectly, he does spirate.

66. Through the same point [n.62] is it plain to Hilary, when he says that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son [n.56]. – However a distinction is made that something determined by this preposition ‘through’ with in its causal [form] is compared to a transitive verb or an intransitive one;^a if to a transitive verb, then indicated in the causal [form] of this preposition is sub-authority, as ‘the Father creates through the Son’; if to an absolute or intransitive verb, then indicated in the causal [form] of this preposition is authority, and this either of efficient causality, as ‘man lives through God’, or of formal cause, as ‘man is wise through wisdom’.

a. Interpolated note: “for example, when it is said ‘a man divides with a saw’ or ‘cuts with a knife’; and then no principality is understood in the causal [preposition]; but when it is construed with an intransitive, then principality is noted in the causal preposition, and formality in the verb, etc.”

67. And through the same point [n.62] is plain to Richard [n.57]. For the Father with the same fecundity immediately spirates the Holy Spirit, but, insofar as he gives to the Son the virtue of spirating by which the Son spirates, the Father can be said to spirate mediately: nor is there here any difformity of perfection and imperfection or anything that may posit diversity in act, but only a different way of having the same virtue, – because the Father from himself and the Son not from himself but from the Father.

68. To the final one [n.58] I say that the proposition is true about cause and caused for this reason, that in ordered causes there is a different and more principal virtue of causing in a prior [cause], but not in a principle which is not a cause, because there is not there another virtue of being principle. So it is in the matter at hand, and therefore a

first principle is not more of a principle than a second, just as neither would a superior cause, were it to cause by the same causative virtue as a second cause, more cause than the second cause would cause.

Thirteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is Generated, or whether the Production of the Holy Spirit is Generation or Distinct from it

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the production of the Holy Spirit is generation or distinguished from it.

Proof that it is generation:

Because generation in creatures is distinguished by the fact it is generation to substance, or by the fact something is produced by it in being of substance; by spiration is the Holy Spirit produced in divine being, just as by filiation or generation is the Son produced; therefore the production of the Holy Spirit is generation. – This reason is confirmed, because changes and movements are distinguished by their formal terms, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b7-10; but the formal term of the spiration of the Holy Spirit is the same as the formal term of generation, because essence is communicated to both; therefore spiration is generation.

2. Further, whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other, therefore things that are univocal with one and the same thing are univocal with each other; generation and spirating are univocal productions when comparing them to the same third thing, as to the Father, because it was said above in distinction 7 that each production is univocal in itself [I d.7 n.42]; therefore they will be univocal productions between themselves, and so of one idea.

3. Further, a real difference does not depend on a difference of reason, because it is more perfect; but the difference of the principles of these productions – which are nature and will – is only a difference of reason, because a real difference of absolutes does not seem it can stand with divine simplicity; therefore the distinction of these productions, which pre-requires that one, will only be one of reason.

4. The minor is also proved in another way, doubly:

First, because otherwise between intellect and act of understanding in God there will be a real relation, and so a real distinction. The first consequence is proved because wherever the intellect by the nature of the thing is distinguished from act of understanding, the intellect receives the act of understanding (or is the idea of receiving it), and so there will be there a relation of recipient to received; and it is confirmed because, if intellect in God is not the idea of receiving the act of understanding, God will no more properly be said to understand with intellect than with will. So too can it be argued about the relation of ‘prior’, because the principle is prior to that with respect to which it is principle.

5. Secondly the minor is proved because absolutely the intellect is the principle ‘by which’ with respect to intellection, both in eliciting and in receiving, and so they will be unequals because the one exceeds the other; therefore when the same thing is added on

both sides, an infinite intellect will be thus principle in respect of an infinite act of understanding, and so there will be a real relation there.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son “not as somehow born but as somehow given.”

I. The Opinions of Others

7. Here there are many ways and many modes of positing whereby these productions may be distinguished.

A. First Opinion

8. It is posited in one way that these productions are distinguished by the formal terms which are the produced persons.

9. And this position is confirmed by that [remark] of *Physics* 5.5.229a25-27, where motions are distinguished by terms, as it seems, because another term is of another motion [sc. as of motion in a circle and in a straight line, n.87]; and although these productions not be motions or changes, they yet are as it were certain ways to the persons; therefore they are distinguished by them.

10. On the contrary: they [the productions] do not have ‘being’ through the terms, therefore not distinction either. – The antecedent is plain because the terms have being from them [sc. the productions] formally; the consequence I prove because from the same thing are had being and distinction.

11. Again, that [remark] of the *Physics* [*ibid.*] is to the opposite: for motions are not distinguished by the terms save because forms in flow are of the same idea as terminating forms; but here the flow is not of the same idea as the term, – nor too is the way, which is as it were a flow, of the same idea as the formal terms, because the formal term is the essence, the way or the production – which is a sort of way – is the relation.

B. Second Opinion

12. In another way it is posted that these productions are distinguished by the fact one production is from one person, and another from two persons [Thomas of Sutton, *Quodl.* IV q.2; Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* I d.13 q.1 a.2, also *ST* Ia q.36 a.2 ad 7, *SG* IV ch.24].

13. Against this, because if the same thing be the formal principle of producing something, the principle of production will not be of a different idea because of its being in this supposit or in that, because whiteness in a stone and in a horse is a principle for affecting sight of the same idea; so too, if the same whiteness were in two things and in one, it would be a principle for affecting [sight] of one idea. But these productions are thus distinguished, that they are not of the same idea, therefore it is necessary to assign for this distinction another idea than the unity or duality of the acting supposit.

14. Again, according to this way, an infinite number of persons could be posited in divine reality: for a fourth person from the three could be posited, and a fifth from the four persons, nor would there be any idea of trinity in the divine persons if there was only

a distinction through the unity, or plurality, of the acting supposit and there was no distinction through ideas of producing.

15. Again, every distinction is reduced to some things first diverse, which would be distinct if *per impossibile* they were separated from all other things, – therefore this distinction is through things of the sort that would be distinct when everything else *per impossibile* is left out, that are also in themselves primarily diverse; such things are not a unity or plurality of acting suppositis, if there is not any other distinction in principles of acting; therefore etc. For when everything other than the unity or duality of suppositis has been removed, it does not seem that this unity or plurality should be the first idea of distinguishing the productions.

C. Third Opinion

16. In another way it is posited that these productions are distinguished because one is with another one and with its opposite, such that the idea of a distinction of disparate relations is a distinction of opposite relations, namely insofar as one disparate relation admits of two other opposite relations along with it – just as the spirative force stands with active and passive generation, and is therefore distinguished from each of them.^a

a. Note by Scotus: “Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VII q.4: ‘On the contrary [to the opinion of n.16]: essence stands with opposites, therefore it is distinguished from both. – Response: essence is not opposed to anything by which the one generating and the one generated are really distinguished; the one spirating is thus opposed.’”

17. Against this [n.16] it can be argued as against the preceding opinion [n.12]: for this position [sc. of Godfrey] does not assign why there cannot be infinite persons, because a later relation could always stand with opposite prior relations; further, there would not be a diversity first between this production and that by the fact this production [sc. active spiration] would be with one and its own opposite (and the other does not stand with its opposite [sc. active with passive generation]), and so this would not be the first idea of distinction, because the first idea of distinction is some idea of things first distinct.

18. Against this way and the other preceding one [nn.16-17] together I argue as follows:

I ask why active spiration can stand with active and with passive generation, and active generation cannot stand with passive generation? – There is no reason save because of the distinction of active spiration from active generation. For something is for this reason compossible or impossible with something, because it is such in itself and not conversely, because the truth of a negative is confirmed and founded on the truth of the affirmative; for man is for this reason not an ass, because man is man, – *On Interpretation* 2.14.24b3 and *Metaphysics* 4.41008a16-18. First then there is some distinction between active generation and active spiration, because of which the former is impossible with passive generation and the latter not, before there be this compossibility or impossibility. Therefore that compossibility and non-compossibility is not the first idea of distinction of productions.

19. Further, these productions are distinguished because one of them is by way of nature and the other by way of will; but this distinction of productions is not precisely from producing suppositis [cf. n.12], nor because one stands with one and the other with another [cf. n.16], but is taken from the distinction of productive principles, which have opposites modes of being principle; therefore etc.

20. He [Godfrey⁶] who holds this opinion [n.16] replies that one of the productions exists by way of nature and the other by way of will “not that one person be naturally produced and the other not,” but because one is like natural production and the other is like voluntary production. For a natural agent produces without presupposing another production, and this speaking generally, although *per accidens* one natural agent may presuppose another producing before it; for thus is the production of the Son by way of nature, because it does not presuppose another production. For the will’s production does presuppose another production, namely the one that is by way of nature and intellect: and thus is the production of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, because the Holy Spirit is produced in a way similar to the production that is properly called production of the will, namely ‘by presupposing another production’.

21. This exposition [n.20] does not seem valid against the intention of the saints attributing these productions properly to intellect and the will; because if they should only be understood to be distinguished by this, that one presupposes the other production and the other production presupposes none, there seems no reason why from the productions the Son would be more Son or Word (by force of his production) than the Holy Spirit, nor that the Holy Spirit by force of his production would be more love than the Son, which seems absurd.

22. Again, many other productions can be posited, whether presupposing or not presupposing another production – just as production by way of art seems to presuppose another production, namely the production of an inner word in the mind of the artist; therefore the Holy Spirit could be said to be produced by way of art, which is false.

23. And there is proof, as was argued in distinction 2 and 10 [I d.2 nn.75-88, 221-226, 300-303, d.10 nn.6-9]: from the fact that in God there is properly intellect and will, and each is a sufficient productive principle with the object present to it, truly will one person be produced by act of intellect as of productive principle, and another person by act of will as productive principle – and not only metaphorically because of such extrinsic likeness, namely ‘being produced when another [production] is presupposed or not presupposed’.

D. Fourth Opinion

24. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by opposite relations, namely of prior and posterior, because one production is naturally prior to another.

25. On the contrary. This distinction is not primary. For one must give some cause why one production is prior to the other; nor is there any reason other than that this production is of one sort and the other of another, whether on the part of the productive principles or on the part of the acting suppositis.

⁶ The Vatican editors: a similar response is found in St. Thomas Aquinas as well as Thomas of Sutton.

26. Besides, a relation is not primarily and precisely distinguished from a relation by a relation, because a relation does not refer first; therefore, since these emanations are relations, they are not distinguished from each other first by other relations, namely relations of prior and posterior; and it is plain that these relations [sc. of prior and posterior] are other than relations of origin, because they are between other extremes, for relation of origin is between producer and produced, relation of prior and posterior is between origin and origin.

E. Fifth Opinion

27. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished in the presence of the elicitive formal principles that are posited to be ideas of acting persons, namely the generative and spirative force.

28. But this was rejected in distinction 7 whether it be understood of the elicitive principle or of the terminative principle [I d.7 nn.23, 35-42].

29. And besides this, how are these relations [sc. generative and spirative force/agents] distinguished so that through them may opposite relations be distinguished [sc. passive generation and spiration]? For these seem less distinct than opposite relations, because these can concur in the same person (to wit in the Father), those cannot, because no same person is produced in two ways; therefore it is more manifest that those emanations are distinct than are opposite relations on the part of the productive principle. Therefore to assign a distinction to these [sc. passive generation and spiration] through those [sc. active generation and spiration] is to assign a more manifest difference or distinction through a less manifest distinction – and also not through intrinsic features, because relatives are not intrinsic to their correlatives.

F. Sixth Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

30. In another way it is posited that these emanations are distinguished in presence of principles distinct in idea, namely in presence of nature and will, which have to be principles of distinct emanations, – and yet they are not distinguished in essence save by reason alone [sc. according to Henry], as was proved in the question ‘On Attributes’ in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.174-176].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

31. Against this [n.30]: a real distinction does not necessarily require a distinction of reason; but the distinction of these emanations for you necessarily requires a distinction of elicitive principles; therefore if this is real, it is not through a distinction of reason alone [cf. I d.8 n.177].

32. The major of this reason [n.31] is denied by some, and an instance is posited about ideas, which only differ in reason and creatures differ really, – and yet a real distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of reason in ideas.⁷

33. There is argument against this – and first is the major proved [n.34], and second the instance excluded [n.41].

34. The major is proved according to this understanding, that a difference of idea in the cause will not be the proper idea of a real distinction in the effect.

[First proof of the major] – Because if it is, let the cause be *a*, and let the diverse ideas under which it causes be *b* and *c*; but let the caused be *d* and *e*. Then as follows: if *b* and *c* be the proper ideas of the *a* insofar as it causes *d* and *e*, then *a*, insofar as it is under *b*, is the proper cause of the *d*, – for if not, ‘this difference’ is no more a distinct idea of causing than if the difference did not exist, because neither idea [sc. neither *b* nor *c*] is the proper idea appropriating the cause to this effect; anyone then who concedes that the cause, insofar as it is under *b* and *c*, causes *d* and *e*, has to concede that each idea is the proper idea of the cause in respect of its proper effect. But this consequent is false, because ‘*a* insofar as it is under *b* is the proper cause of the *d*’, because a being, insofar as it is under *b* – which is only a being of reason –, has only being in the intellect, because a being of reason is only insofar as known caused by the object, and as such has being only in the intellect, because it is a diminished being, from *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25-1028a2. But nothing according as it is a diminished being is a proper idea of a true being and a proper cause of a perfect being; and the proof of this is because it is necessary that everything which causes a true being have some being of existence insofar as it is cause; but diminished being, which namely a known being is, does not have being of real existence; therefore neither can it, insofar as it is such, be a proper cause of any real being.

35. And if you say that although it not have the being of its own existence, yet it does have the being of existence of the intellect in which it is, because it participates in the ‘being of the intellect’ insofar as it has being in the intellect, – on the contrary: from this it follows that to known being insofar as it is such no causation belongs save in virtue of the actual existence of the intellect, in which it has the being of actual existence in a certain respect; and then the will further will not be the principle of spirating save insofar as it participates the idea of the intellect, and then the divine intellect will be more the idea of spirating than the will; and thus it follows further that the intellect with respect to the generation of the Word will be a double principle, namely immediate, insofar as it is productive principle, – and mediate insofar as it is the operative principle through whose operation it has being insofar as it is productive, just as a known thing insofar as it is known has the participated being of the knower. But if you do not attribute such real action to the existent intellect itself but to the object that has diminished being in the intellect, – it follows that real action would be of ‘what is none the less such were it altogether not to exist’, for it is not repugnant to anything that it be a known being, although it have in itself no true and real being.

36. If it be said here that the divine intellect knows nothing here save intuitively, and thus that which has known being in this intellect – insofar as it is such – has being of

⁷ Note on translation: the word ‘idea’ here in this paragraph translates ‘*idea*’ in the Latin. For the most part, however, the English word ‘idea’ is being used to translate the Latin ‘*ratio*’, which itself is also sometimes (depending on context) translated as ‘reason’. The English ‘idea’ seems, in most contexts, better to capture in English the meaning of ‘*ratio*’. Scotus also uses ‘*ratio*’ more often and in more ways than ‘*idea*’.

true existence, but it does not have the sort of being that is known by abstractive intellection or cognition (of which sort is my intellection of a rose not existing now, which is not intuitive), – on the contrary: the reason that is posited as proper to a principle, insofar as it is a principle, is posited to be caused by an act of intellect in a known object; but the divine intellect causes nothing in the divine essence as it is existent (just as they concede about the opposite opinion [sc. Scotus’ own opinion, cf. *Ord.* I d.8 n.187], that there is no difference there of ideas in the essence as it is existent but only as it is known), and it is plain *per se*, because whatever is in the essence as it is existent would be in it if *per impossibile* there were no intellect busying itself about it.

37. [Second proof of the major] – Further, second: the divine essence, as in the Son and Holy Spirit, has naturally some priority to simple intellection of the essence; for just as it ‘as in the Father’ is of a nature to move the intellect of the Father to simple intellection of itself, so ‘as is in the Son’ it is of a nature to move any intellect to simple intellection of itself, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.23 “the Father sees everything in the Son as in himself.” But if the essence ‘as in the Son’ has such priority as regard such simple intellection of itself, then it ‘as in the Son’ naturally precedes every idea that the intellect can, by busying itself, construct about it; therefore no idea constructible about it naturally precedes it ‘as in the Son’, – otherwise there would be a circle in natural priority, because that reason too ‘caused by the intellect’ would naturally precede the being of it [sc. the essence] in the Son, and conversely.

38. And if you say that the essence in the Father naturally precedes every idea producible about it, but that ‘as in the Son’ it follows some idea already produced in him [sc. the Father] by act of the paternal intellect, – and then there is no circle of the same thing to the same thing according to the same extremes, or according to the same existence or according to existence in the same thing, because essence according to existence in one supposit follows, in another precedes.

39 [Third proof of the major] – Against this response [n.38], I argue as follows: of one cause in one order of causing there is one *per se* idea of causing, – therefore much more in divine reality, where there is a primacy of being principle, is it necessary to posit one *per se* idea of being principle; therefore the idea of being principle of the generation of the Word will be some single real idea *per se*. But thing and idea do not make a one *per se*, because neither can any property consequent to a thing from the nature of the thing make a one *per se* with the subject of which it is the effect; therefore much more not an idea that does not follow the thing from the nature of the thing but only follows it through an act of intellect. Therefore one of these two [sc. the idea and the thing] will be precisely the principle ‘by which’ (by the Father) of the producing, and not the idea alone, because it is not formally infinite; proof, because neither is a real relation formally infinite perfection, because then some person in divine reality would not have every infinite perfection formally; therefore much more too can a being of reason not be formally infinite, and consequently it is not a principle of producing ‘by which’ an infinite supposit; therefore only a thing to which this idea is attributed will be a principle of producing an infinite supposit. But in whatever there is a principle ‘by which’ of some production, for it there is a principle of producing, if the supposit is suitable for such production; and a suitable supposit in divine reality for producing such a person in divine reality is what does not have such a nature by this production, nor by any production

prior to this: such is the Father; therefore only a thing will be for him the principle by which he produces, and in no way the idea.

40. [Fourth proof of the major] – Further, fourth: in divine reality that which is not formally the same as something is not truly the same as it unless either both are formally infinite, or one is, or at least both are truly the same as something formally infinite. But these ideas that are posited as appropriating the productive principle of the two persons [nn.34, 30] are not formally the same, because then they would not be distinct ideas; nor are they truly the same as anything formally infinite, because then they would be in that ‘formally infinite’ from the nature of the thing, as wisdom is in the deity formally from the nature of the thing; nor is one or other of them formally infinite, as was proved in the preceding reasoning [n.39]. Therefore none of them is truly the same as the other in any way. Therefore in the way that both are there, they are thus truly distinct that they seem to stand in the way of supreme simplicity, whatever sort of entity of them be posited, because nothing can be posited to be there – according to any entity – that is not simply the same as the other, because of the simplicity of the essence.

41. [To the instance] – This instance [n.32] I exclude, – first because it seems to be to the opposite; for if the distinction of creatures were necessarily to presuppose a distinction of idea-patterns, and thereby God under the notion of one idea-pattern would be the proper cause of one idea-patternable, this would be for this reason, because the diminished being of God, namely known being, is simply more perfect and prior naturally to the perfect being of the patterned thing, because patterned things are artificial in respect of God, and the known being of an artificial or exemplar thing – in which the exemplar or artifactual thing has being – is simply prior to the being of existence of the patterned thing. But this reason is altogether lacking in the divine persons, because the known being of essence cannot be naturally prior to the perfect being of the essence in itself; and therefore, although the first major [n.31] were false in an artificial agent (for the proof of which four reasons are apposite [nn.34, 37, 39, 40]), yet it would not be false in a natural production where there was communication of the same nature (as in the matter at hand), because there it does not seem that any known being could naturally precede the natural being of the nature.

42. Further, the instance assumes something false about the patterns, because the distinction of reason in God is not necessarily presupposed to the distinct patterned things, and God under the ideas of patterns is not the proper cause of diverse patterned things, as will be clear later in distinction 35 ‘On Ideas’ and in distinction 45 ‘On the Will’ [cf. *Ord.* I d.35 q. un nn.5-10, d.45 q. un nn.2-3].

G. Seventh Opinion

43. There is another opinion [Thomas of Sutton] as to the question which posits that the essence under one idea, altogether indistinct, is the principle of these productions; because just as two limited things can be the principles of two acts, so the same unlimited thing, containing those several virtually in itself, can be the proper principle of the same acts, and under no idea of distinction in it but from the sole lack of limitation of itself as it is indistinct, – just as is plain about the sun in respect of many generable things in what is down here [sc. on the earth].

44. And this position is confirmed because it is necessary to posit that the divine essence immediately has wisdom and goodness, and to be in some way the root as it were and principle of these attributal perfections, and without all distinction in the essence itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity. Therefore does it thus seem able to be posited as the immediate principle of the two personal productions.

45. Against this [n.44]:

The action of willing in us is not formally free but the will itself is, because action itself is a certain quality and a certain natural form in itself, and is not something intellectual having an inclination to opposites; therefore it is not free. So therefore in divine reality the production of the Holy Spirit – as already posited in being – does not seem to be formally free, but liberty precisely seems to be in the principle of this production, insofar as it is such. But if no distinction precede the production of the Son and Holy Spirit, the first distinction that is of this production and that is as they are posited in being by that principle; therefore there is not one production in divine reality by way of intellect or nature and another by way of freedom, because no principle precedes what would of itself be disposed to this production differently than to that, – and these productions, in which there is a first distinction, are altogether in themselves uniform in naturalness as they are now posited in being.

46. The assumption ‘about volition’ [n.45], although it could be proved in many modes or ways, can yet be clear from this, that whatever the volition generates, it generates naturally: hence appetitive habits by virtue of acts of appetite are as naturally generated from them as intellectual habits are generated from intellections. It is also apparent from something else, because then [sc. if the assumption were not true] someone could formally rejoice and be sad freely, namely insofar as joy and sadness are passions consequent to willing and not willing, because the things that are immediate causes of these passions would be posited as formally free.

The consequent, however, ‘about passions’ seems to be sufficiently unacceptable, because it does not seem to be in the power of the will to be glad save because in its power is the ‘willing’ of that on which being glad is consequent – and so neither being sad save because in its power is the ‘not willing’ that on which being sad is consequent; and therefore someone sad about the event of some harmful or disagreeable thing, if he wants to remove the sadness, must desist from not wanting what he did not want; but it does not help to deliberate for this, that while the not wanting and the happening of the not wanted are in place, sadness should not follow.

47. This reason [n.45], if it were to conclude, would conclude necessarily to a distinction of intellect from will in the creature, and this a distinction in absolutes on the part of the thing, which does not seem necessary: hence I reply that the same principle can have different relations to two products and to two productions; and now freedom and naturalness do not essentially state an active principle but an aptitudinal relation of principle to product, and an aptitudinal non-relation – to wit, naturalness [states] a determination from itself of first act to second and third act, but freedom a non-determination of this sort.

48. To the form [sc. of the argument, n.45]: I concede that neither posited act is free. Therefore, freedom is in something preceding the act, I agree, but not absolutely in it, but it states a respect of it to the act, – and naturalness likewise states another respect of the same preceding absolute to another act. Likewise, in the matter at hand a response is

easier, because to both production and product the principle ‘by which’ seems to be disposed naturally (distinction 10, nn.20-21).

49. On the contrary: therefore in the ‘by which’ there is no distinction, as it is the ‘by which’ as to the production or the product, save one of reason only, because it has no relation to the production or the product save only one of reason; again, freedom is an absolute condition, because it is a perfection simply (response: it gives to understand perfection simply, but it states only a respect). – Corollary: therefore the whole deduction in distinction 2 about the first duality of active principles [I d.2 nn.300-303] is not valid save about relations that state a disposition of active principle to product; and it seems probable that there be a stand at a one simply, both in the productive principle ‘by which’ (although not ‘which’) and in the cause, because to be ‘by which’ belongs, for you [sc. Scotus], to perfection simply, just as [to be] cause.

50. Response: I concede that ‘freely’ and ‘naturally’ state a disposition to acting or to a term, a determinate and a non-determinate disposition, but they prove a distinction in their foundations [sc. in will and in intellect]. Because it is a mark of ‘perfection simply’ to be an absolute by respect to a posterior, therefore the principle to which belongs a greater absoluteness with respect to being a principle is simply more perfect than that to which belongs a greater determination with respect to being principle, and this if the things to be principled are equally perfect or if what is to be principled of something absolute is [e.g. the will] more perfect than what is to be principled of something natural [e.g. the intellect], because as to an equally perfect posterior the more absolute ‘to be’ is more perfect: therefore, if our willing is not less perfect than our understanding, [then] from the respect of liberty in the will to willing, and of naturalness in the intellect to understanding, it follows that the will, ‘the foundation of the respect’, is simply more perfect; this is in accord with the distinction of powers, on which see IV d.49 p.1 q.4 n.10.

51. But what [is the case] in God?

The same seems to follow, because the Holy Spirit is equally noble as the Son. Therefore a productive principle which is more absolute will be more perfect.

52. Response: each is infinite, both insofar as it is productive and insofar as it is operative.^a Therefore there is no excellence in the formalities, but only perhaps one of reason comparing infinite formalities to the finite ones with which they agree, and thus what agrees with the more perfect is conceived to have a certain idea of nobility – an idea, that is a relation of reason to what is nobler.

a. *Note by Scotus*: “Another way – in distinction 10 nn.18-19 – that infinite will is not more indeterminate for operation or production than intellect.”

53. To the argument [n.51]: the Holy Spirit and Son are not things posterior to the principles, nor things more imperfect, but the same as them, – therefore absoluteness there does not argue perfection and determination not imperfection, but only another way of producing.

54. On the contrary: at any rate in respect of creatures the intellect [sc. divine] naturally understands, but the will [sc. divine] freely wills; therefore with respect to them the will is nobler.

55. Response. This disposition and that [sc. natural and free] to first operations and products would, if [the latter] were posterior, prove the excellence of the foundation,

but when first operations and first products are not posterior but the same or equal simply, dispositions stand of a different idea and in other formalities, but without excellence of one to the other. In whatever way the foundations may be compared afterwards – under these respects – to later operations and products which are simply posterior, no excellence follows of this foundation to that.

56. Note. A free power is a sufficiently active power, not determined from itself to working about any object which is not finally perfective of it.

‘Active’ by action in the genus of action and from consequent operation; nor does ‘active operative’ suffice, because thus the intellect might be active though passive.

‘Sufficiently’ in its own order of acting; therefore it receives no act from another by which it may act in its own order, because then it would be insufficiently active.

‘Not determined from itself’, that is from its own first act – and this in its own order of causing (it follows from the corollary ‘sufficiently’) – and from the fact it determines itself to acting: not indeed from any determination preceding action of the genus of action, but it determines itself, that is, it is indeterminate from its own first act; yet it acts determinately, nothing else determining it to act.

57. This conclusion – thus expounded – is proved because whatever is in its own order sufficient for acting, if it is determined to acting by another, it was already first determined to this in its own order or insofar as it was in it: for that it has not acted was not because of defect of form or of determination on its part (but the superior’s, on which it depends) for acting, for operating; therefore it is operative and active. But freedom has more *per se* a respect to action, at least more immediately; nor is it therefore determined to acting, to some work which is not about an object essentially perfective; but it is consistent with liberty that it be determined to operating about it, and to acting – as a result – with respect to that work; it is proved about the divine will with respect to God in distinction 10 [nn.41, 48], – here indeed infinite liberty is necessarily determined.

58. But is not finite liberty determined to operating about that [sc. an essentially perfective object]?

Response: liberty does not stand in its way, as is plain about infinite liberty, nor does imperfection; my proof is because it is a mark of perfection to be determined to a perfective object, – it is plain about the will of God with respect to himself.

59. Therefore to a more perfect thing it belongs more to be determined in respect of a perfective object; the created will is more perfect than the created intellect, and the created intellect is necessarily determined to its perfective object; therefore the will more so (the opposite is held in distinction 1 question 4 [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140]).

60. Response: to determine oneself to anything whatever naturally is a mark of greater imperfection than freely not to determine oneself to a non-perfective object, because determination to what is non-perfective is a mark of imperfection; the intellect is to whatever you will necessarily determined, because naturally. And then to the proposition ‘it is a mark of perfection to be determined to a perfective object’: it is true in this way, that to that alone, and consequently not naturally [sc. but freely]; ‘therefore it belongs more to the more perfect’ is true in uniform way, because it belongs to the divine will and to no intellect.

61. But if from the greater perfection of created will than of created intellect [n.59] you at once infer that it be necessarily determined to its perfective object, this does not follow, because determination to the natural necessity that belongs to the intellect is

repugnant to the will; but the other determination [sc. to the perfective object, as in the case of God nn.57-58] cannot belong to the will from the perfection of will in general but only to an infinite will. In another way: the intellect is necessarily determined by another; it is a mark of perfection not to be so determined and, in what determines itself, that it necessarily determine itself to what is perfective, – and this belongs only to an infinite will.

62. Whence this indetermination of will?

Response. Not from the intellect, which is necessarily determined to anything whatever, although it can be impeded by a sophism (thus can a heavy object be impeded from falling); nay here, when it is determined by a sophism, it is necessarily determined, – in another way by an opposite agent. The indetermination, therefore, is radically from the essence, but formally from the proper idea of the will. For because its nature is as it were unlimited, namely to which many things can be agreeable – therefore is given to it an appetite unlimited as to agreeable objects and an apprehensive intellect, but determinately, according to determinate evidence, so that it may direct something: therefore further, so that what is indeterminate to either may be determined.

63. Further, second [nn.44, 45], if essence as altogether indistinct were principle of a double production, therefore since the intellect under the idea of the infinite is a sufficient idea of producing an infinite word, and the will under the idea of the infinite is a principle productive of infinite love – and, before the infinite intellect and the divine will distinctly formally infinite are understood, the essence as essence is pre-understood – therefore through it as it is pre-understood there is a double intrinsic production; and when later are understood there the formally infinite intellect and the formally infinite will, there will be two infinite persons produced by virtue of these two principles; so there will be five produced persons.⁸

64. But if you say that never is infinite intellect and infinite will there by the nature of the thing, but only is the one nature there altogether indistinct by the nature of the thing, and from its idea is it that there are three persons there, and that intellect and will are there precisely through consideration of the intellect, and that thus not there are the principles, distinct from the nature of the thing, productive of real persons, – on the contrary:

If there are some things there distinct by act of intellect, let them be *a* and *b*. Then I ask: either these are distinct from the nature of the thing, – and if so, you are contradicting yourself; if not but [distinct] by intellect, then intellect under the idea of intellect distinguishes and not under the idea of nature. Either then before distinction of these things the intellect is there under the idea of intellect – and the proposed conclusion is had, that it is there from the nature of the thing; or it is not, but the intellect itself under the idea of intellect is produced there by act of intellect busying itself and doing the distinguishing, and then there would be a question about this intellect, by what act it is produced – either from the nature of the thing or from the intellect as intellect – and there will be an infinite process, or wherever a stand will be made there the intellect will be

⁸ Namely (perhaps): a double intrinsic production is understood in the essence (the Father and the intrinsic production of Son and Holy Spirit), which is three persons; and then formally infinite intellect and formally infinite will are understood, which are two persons, making five in all. The Vatican editors say instead: “namely two persons before intellect and will, and three afterwards, because intellect and will are in the Father; cf. n.70 and *Rep.* IA d.13 n.33.” *Eligat qui vult.*

insofar as it is intellect and from the nature of the thing, or the first distinction that will be put there will be from the nature of the thing, the opposite of which you posit.

65. Further, God from the nature of the thing is formally blessed and not formally in relations of reason; and his beatitude formally consists in intellection and volition; therefore intellect and will – which are of these the principles – are there from the nature of the thing.

66. This reason is confirmed through the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074b17-21, who proves that ‘if God not be actually thinking, there will be nothing honorable in him, – for he will be disposed as one sleeping’; therefore, according to Aristotle, he is not formally perfect in the nature of the thing unless intellect were there formally from the nature of the thing, because actual intellection formally cannot be understood without intellect formally.

67. Further, if the intellect is not formally there from the nature of the thing but foundationally, then the intellect formally is not a perfection simply, because it is not better to have it formally than not to have it; rather for you, in that essence, which is best, it is not formally had but only in the opposite way of having; therefore it cannot be concluded that intellect is there ‘because it is a perfection simply’, but rather the opposite seems to follow. Why then does Anselm say in *Monologion* ch.15, that whatever is in God “is better it than not it”? – as is true of ‘being wise’. And Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: “In the volumes of the divine books authority preaches only that God is, but all nature that surrounds us proclaims that the Creator is best disposed and most outstanding, who has given us mind, by which we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living, things endowed with sense to non-sensing things, and intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, and incorruptible things to corruptible; and by this, since without doubt we prefer the Creator to the created, we must confess that he both supremely lives, and understands all things, is most just, best, and most blessed” etc.; look for Augustine there. – What would this consequence be if natural reason says that the blessed is better than the wretched, therefore God is blessed (if what it is in creatures is better than its opposite, this is because of the reality of it), and in God from the nature of the thing this reality is in some way not but only foundationally, with the opposite mode of this sort of formality?

68. But that this intellect (which is proved there to be from the nature of the thing [nn.64-67]) is infinite, the proof:

For as intellect formally, it understands the divine essence as object; nothing comprehends an object formally infinite unless what comprehends it is formally infinite; therefore etc.

69. Further, the divine intellect as intellect understands at the same time infinite intelligibles – according to Augustine *City of God* XII ch.18: “So does God not know numbers because of their infinity? Who, even the most demented, has said this?” and he adds: “The infinity then of number, although there be no number of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible to that intellect *of which there is no number* [Psalm 146.5].”

70. And if you say, the intellect is not formally infinite insofar as it is intellect but insofar as it is the same as the infinite divine essence, and therefore it does not have, insofar as it is intellect, that it be the productive principle of some infinite person, and so there will not be five divine persons [n.63], – I argue against this, because it could in this way be said that paternity is formally infinite, because it is the same as the infinite divine

essence, and then it would not be more unacceptable for the Son not to be simply intelligent than for him not to be formally Father, which is manifestly absurd.

71. There is proof also from something else, because things that are not formally infinite in divine reality, if they be taken in the abstract, are not predicated of each other, not even by identity just as not formally either; hence this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is inability to be born’. The reason for this was stated in distinction 8 in the question ‘About the attributes’ [I d.8 nn.219, 221], because ‘abstraction takes away that which was the cause of truth’, namely identity of the extremes, – because, as they are precisely taken, ‘neither is formally infinite, and therefore neither as taken precisely abstractly includes its being the same as the other’. But this is true ‘intellect is paternity’ and ‘intellect is filiation’, although it not be formal predication; therefore the intellect has formal infinity, of the sort that filiation and paternity and the property of inability to be born do not have.

72. And if you ask, is the intellect altogether infinite formally of itself as is the essence? – I reply:

It can be said that, just as by distinguishing things from each other, one thing is infinite of itself and in itself (as the first person in divine reality), another thing is in itself infinite but not of itself (as the Son and Holy Spirit), and another thing is finite of itself and in itself likewise finite (as the creature), – so, by considering things that are not formally the same, something can be taken as infinite in itself and altogether by itself, as the divine essence, which is the root and foundation, which has its infinity from nothing: hence according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.9, the being of God is like “a certain infinite sea of the infinite substance of God”^a [I d.8 nn.199-202]; and something is infinite through itself and in itself, but not altogether from itself as first root and foundation of all infinity, as the divine attributes, which according to John Damascene *ibid.* ch.4 state something as it were about the essence – and well can such things be formally infinite both in themselves and through themselves, but radically in the essence as in the foundation with which they are the same; further, there is something which is neither in itself formally infinite nor the same formally as the infinite, as the personal properties.

a. Note by Scotus: “About this is had [discussion] in d.8 in the question ‘About attributes’, *extra*, in the solution”

73. But what is the reason why these do not have formal infinity from the essence, as the intellect has?⁹

74. To the arguments for this last rejected opinion [nn.45-46, 63-72].

When it is said ‘the infinite of itself, altogether indistinct, can be principle of distinct things’ [n.43], it is true where the distinct things do not of their idea require a prior distinction in principles: but such do free and natural production require, because for these [distinct things] distinction cannot be first, but some distinction is first required in the principles, which in some way have to be principle naturally and freely for the divine persons.

75. Again, if *per impossibile* the essence – as it is understood – be posited as foundation of the perfections [n.72], and not be understood as intellective or volitional,

⁹ An empty space is left here by Scotus.

nor consequently dictive or spirative – could it really be a principle of communicating itself?

76. And by this [n.74] is plain the response to the confirmation that is adduced there [n.44]. That the essence has wisdom and goodness and all other attributal perfections before all consideration of the intellect, and this without any distinction presupposed in the essence, is true, because those attributal perfections do not require an opposite mode of being principle, nor a distinction in principles: for the essence is as naturally will as it is intellect; likewise these attributes do not properly have the divine essence as principle, although the essence be in some way conceded to have the idea of radical and foundational perfection with respect to them [nn.72, 44].

II. Scotus' own Opinion

77. To the question [n.1] I respond that productions are distinguished by themselves formally. For generation is itself formally generation, and spiration is itself formally spiration, and from the formal ideas of them it is impossible for generation to be spiration (everything else being *per impossibile* removed), so that one should not ask by what they are distinguished [n.7], because the whole formal idea of one is not the same as the whole formal idea of the other.

78. This is clear from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.5, where he says that “thus you will see how or as to what the nativity of the Word is distant from the procession of the Gift;” and a little later that: “will proceeds from cognition, but is not the image of cognition; and therefore to understand in this matter a certain intelligible distance between procession and nativity (since to descry by knowledge is not this which is to desire or also enjoy by will) he sees and discerns who can,” – when from the distinction of processions he wants to deduce a distinction of persons proceeding.

79. Likewise in *ibid.* V ch.14 n.5: “Where too it shines forth why the Holy Spirit also is not son, although he too comes forth from the Father; and therefore is he not called son, because neither is he born; for he comes forth from the Father not as somehow born but as somehow given.” Therefore he solved there the question about the distinction of persons through their distinct emanations.

80. And if it be objected because ‘emanations are not from themselves, therefore they are not distinguished by themselves’ (the consequence is proved because what something has entity from, that it has unity also from, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a30-31), – because being and one are said relative to conversion), I reply:

Specific differences are not by themselves effectively and yet are by themselves distinct formally, but by that are they effectively distinct by which they effectively are. But to be distinguished ‘first formally’ is not to be distinguished by something included in one and to agree in another,¹⁰ but to be formally distinct by itself wholly, even if *per impossibile* everything other than its idea be removed; thus I say that if ultimate differences were composite, they would be distinguished in themselves totally, and in themselves totally would be first distinct formally.

So I say in the matter at hand that if *per impossibile* these distinct persons could exist without a principle, they would in themselves totally be distinct formally, so that

¹⁰ Vatican editors: as Socrates is distinguished from Plato in socrateity and agrees with him in humanity.

nothing formally included in one would be formally included in the other; and yet, just as they do have principles, so are they, in having principles or origin, distinct from their principles (namely intellect and will), which are not only distinct by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion [nn.31-40]. But the intellect is not, from the nature of the thing, formally will, and since infinity added to something does not destroy the formal idea of it, infinite intellect is not formally infinite will: and so, although it would not be necessary for this formal distinction [sc. of emanations] to reduce to the other distinction [sc. of principles] insofar as it is formal, yet because it is formal and in things from a principle, it is reduced to this distinction of principles.

81. If it be said that although two be distinct from three, yet not two infinities from three infinities, – on the contrary.¹¹

III. To the Principal Arguments

82. To the principal arguments [nn.1-5].

To the first [n.1] I say that it seems to conclude against those who posit that the quasi-subject of generation is the divine essence [cf. *Ord.* I d.5 nn.59-63], for since in creatures generation is natural from inclination of a passive principle, but not from the idea of an active principle (because if my will were to generate fire from the matter,¹² passive generation would be natural because of the inclination of a passive power to form, although the active principle would be free), so it seems that, if the divine essence were the quasi-subject in divine reality with respect to the personal properties – since the essence as naturally inclines to the property of the Holy Spirit as also of the Son –, the passive production of the Holy Spirit would be as equally natural as also that of the Son, although this production and that would be from a different productive principle; but it does not conclude against me, because I deny generation there under the idea of change, and altogether anything passive with respect to act (as is clear in distinction 5 nn.97, 113, 118, 131-132, 137-138), but precisely I posit there generation under the idea of production, whose terms are producer and produced [*ibid.* n.97]: precisely then will generation there be called natural, because this relation between producer and produced is natural, and the naturalness of this sort of relation is on the part of the naturalness of the very producer, because it produces by a principle naturally inclining to act, – and in this way does the Father not spirate. In another way it is said that generation is taken in one way for the generation of substance, or in another way specifically for the production of the living from the living (and in this way is an animal said to be generated and fire not), and there [sc. this latter way] does commonly concur on the part of the agent a natural inclination or a natural form, which is the principle of generating: and in this last way does there seem to be generation in divine reality. – The first response [earlier in his paragraph] is better, perhaps.

83. To the second [n.2] I say that, when two things are compared to an unlimited or indeterminate third thing, the union of them between themselves does not follow from the union of them in the third thing. An example: ‘if I am with God here and the Pope is with God in Rome, therefore I am together with the Pope’ does not follow, because God

¹¹ A blank space is left here by Scotus.

¹² The Vatican editors: the matter here is any that is naturally adapted to generating fire. But it may perhaps be metaphorical and refer to the fire of passion.

is unlimited according to the presence by which he is present at places; so too does not follow ‘I am with eternity, and Abraham was with eternity, therefore I am together with Abraham’, because God is eternal and his eternity is unlimited. So do I say in the matter at hand, because the Father has in himself a double fecundity perfectly, but each production corresponds precisely to one fecundity; and therefore the Father with respect to the two productions is as it were something unlimited or as it were indeterminate compared to determinate things, – and therefore it does not follow, if both productions be univocal with such third, that these productions be univocal between themselves.

84. Against this it is argued as follows:

If the productions are not univocal, but let them be of different idea, then the terms too of the productions will be of different idea, – from the *Physics* [n.1]; but if the produced terms require such formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal with some third thing; therefore, from the opposite side, if the terms are univocal to some third thing, the productions too will be univocal between themselves.

85. Further, intellect and will, according as they are operative powers, require a formal distinction in the objects, and if in respect of the objects they were productive powers, they would produce that sort of distinction in the objects; therefore, since the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal.

86. Further, what is produced by the intellect is, by force of its production, generated knowledge, and what is produced by the mode of will is love proceeding; but knowledge as knowledge and love as love seem of formally different idea; therefore etc.

87. To the first [n.84] I say that that proposition about motions and terms – which is adduced for the matter at hand – is not true save when two others are true, namely that ‘a form in flux, according to which it is motion, is of the same idea as the terminating form’ [n.11], and ‘motion is of the same idea as the form in flux’ [I d.2 n.339]. Now applying this to the matter at hand, there is not any flux nor a form in flux, but this production is not of the same idea as the form which is the formal term of production, because the formal term of production is something essential, and production is a relation formally; and therefore it is not necessary to conclude from a distinction of productions to a formal distinction of objects or terms. An example of that which has been said about motions is plain from *Physics* 5.4.227b14-18, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by straight and circular motion, which are altogether of a different species, as is proved in *Physics* 7.4.248a10-13, 248b4-6 “because they are not comparable.” But here, a form according to which there is flux in the form of motion, if it is of the same idea as the term, is not thereby distinctive of the idea of motions. – This response was touched on above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [I d.2 n.339], for the argument of the Commentator [*ibid.*, n.212].

88. And if you object, at least the first terms, namely the formal terms, will not be univocal from the fact the productions are not univocal, and so the persons – which are the first terms – will not be univocal between themselves, and so they will not be univocal in a third, – I respond:

Production does not formally include the divine essence, but the person does include it formally, because the person is not only a property or relation but is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, – just as Socrates does not only include an individual property but also human nature. Although, therefore, the first terms be of the same idea as the productions as to the fact that the first terms include the relations

(because productions are relations), yet they are not of the same idea quasi-adequately, because the first terms not only include relations but also an absolute; and then it is not necessary that they [the persons] only be distinguished as productions are distinguished, because what includes certain distinguishing things must not be distinguished only as they are (as was said above in distinction 8 in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ n.106), because the differences are first diverse, yet the things that first include them are not first diverse.

89. To the other, about powers [n.85], I say that as they are operative powers they do not require a distinct formal object. Rather, that same thing which is the first object of the divine intellect is also the first and formal object of the divine will, such that each power is beatified in the same first object, according to the same formal idea of the first object. For no perfection quasi-founded in the divine essence is first beatific of the divine intellect or will, but the essence is under every sort of first idea (namely as it is the foundation of every perfection in divine reality), such that the argument is to the opposite, because just as there is not also required a formal distinction in the objects as they are operative powers, so neither in them produced as they are productive.

90. To the third argument [n.86] I say that it is not to the purpose, because those who hold that generation in divine reality is equivocal in itself say that it is in itself equivocal because of the equivocation of the term produced to producer,¹³ – and likewise, they have to say that spiration is in itself equivocal because of the difference of the spirated from the spirating. It would not therefore be sufficient for them as to this conclusion [n.86] that generated and spirated were equivocal. – Now the argument in itself, if it prove anything, proves only a distinction of generated and spirated or of the formal terms of generation and spiration, – and so not their proposal [sc. in n.86].

91. But to the contrary I argue as follows: not only are knowledge as knowledge and love as love of different idea, but also knowledge as actual knowledge is of a different idea from memory, and love as love is of a different idea from will as it first act; therefore if a formal distinction be conceded in the terms of productions, namely of knowledge and love, and that these terms – namely knowledge and love – be produced by virtue of memory and will, it is necessary to concede a formal distinction of the productive principle from the produced formal term, and so an equivocation in one production.

92. I reply. It can be said that the assumption, namely that ‘the generated by force of its production’ – namely of its generation – ‘is actual knowledge’ [n.86] can be distinguished as to primacy of origin and primacy of adequation. If it be understood of primacy of origin, it can be denied, because then the three persons would not be uniformly God: for in the Father deity is understood to be in him a quasi-principle and foundation of any perfection, and then, if in the Son knowledge is pre-understood before essence, the Son would not have essence before anything else in him but knowledge, and so he would not be uniformly God with the Father.

93. As to this primacy then, although it not be one of origin, it does however correspond to the primacy of origin of several perfections in one creature; and it can be said that first in any person is the essence, because when something contains in itself many communicable perfections, when communicating that one, it communicates all

¹³ Vatican editors: the term ‘produced/product’ is equivocal as between ‘Son’ and ‘filiation’, and the term ‘producer’ as between ‘Father’ and ‘paternity’.

perfections in the order in which they are of a nature to be in that one. An example, both in the distinction of things and of non-things (however on the part of the thing): first indeed – if fire were to generate the total fire and were to produce both matter and form, it would first in origin communicate matter than form (in the order namely in which they are in the generator); an example of the second is – fire is a corporeal and inanimate substance and an element. Just as these then exist in order in a fire generating, so are they communicated in like order in fire generated, and yet the first term in adequacy is fire as fire, because this is what fire generating principally intends and in which most perfectly assimilated to it is fire generated (namely fire as fire). So can it be said in the matter at hand, that though the divine essence in any person be altogether first quasi-foundation of any essential perfection, – yet the first person appropriately has memory, and by virtue of that productive principle produces by a first production adequately the second person, and the second person quasi-adequately by his own productive principle is produced as actual knowledge, and the Holy Spirit quasi-adequate to this own productive principle, is produced as actual love.

94. But then the argument [n.91] still seems to stand, because equivocation or non-univocity seem more to be proved from primacy of adequacy than from primacy of origin: for although the sun is a substance and a worm a substance, yet not for this reason is generation of a worm by the sun said to be univocal, because it does not assimilate to itself the term in specific form; so therefore here there seems to be equivocation, from the fact the first adequate produced term is not altogether univocally of the same idea as the productive principle.

95. I say that there is not equivocal production if the productive principle is not of the same idea as the produced formal term – speaking of the first productive principle and the first produced formal term – but it is required that that which is the productive principle not be of the same idea in the thing generated, and not that that which is the formal term in the product be of the same idea in the producer; but the opposites of these are in the matter at hand, because both is memory formally in actual generated knowledge and is actual knowledge formally in the generating person, although neither of these be the first idea of acting and the first idea of terminating the production. An example of this is: if an ass generates an ass, although the specific form not be the first principle of producing, not for this reason is generation equivocal or non-univocal, because that which is *per se* formal term of generation is also of the same idea in the generator, although it not be for it the idea of generating; but that something of the same idea be first in this (as in the producer) or first in that (as in the term produced) is not required for univocal generation. Thus can an example be posited about animate flesh generating animate flesh naturally by virtue of heat, where however the soul itself – or whatever other form be given – is not necessarily the first principle of producing and the first formal term in the product; therefore this is not required for univocity of generation.

96. To the second principal argument¹⁴ I say that active generation and active spiration are not the same formally, nor are the first formal terms of them (namely actual knowledge and actual love) the same formally; yet the first terms, produced by these productions, are both univocal between themselves and with the producer, because the

¹⁴ The Vatican editors: the second principal argument [n.2] was in fact responded to already [n.83], and that the argument responded to here is not found above, but is the fourth argument brought forward in the *Lectura* I d.13 n.4.

produced persons have every same absolute perfection both with themselves and the same with the producer.

97. To the other I say that the antecedent ‘about the distinction of principles by reason alone’¹⁵ is false [nn.64-67].

98. To the first proof, when it is argued that ‘the opposite would not stand with the divine simplicity’ [n.3], the response was given often before in distinctions 2 and 8 [d.8 nn.191-127, d.2 388-410], where mention was made of formal non-identity without real distinction [n.4].

99. To the second proof, when it is argued that ‘otherwise there would be a real relation between intellect and understanding’ [n.4], I reply that the intellect is both an operative power and a productive power: but insofar as it is an operative power, neither the intellect, nor the supposit of which it is the operation, has a real relation to real operation, but this happens in us, because there is there a real difference between it [the intellect] and the operation for which it is; but as it is a productive principle, although it not have a real relation to the product (because it is the same as the product), nor to the production (for the same reason), yet the producer [the Father] has a real relation to the product [the Son], and this is enough for the production to be real. But such relation is not required between intellect and to understand, because there is no real distinction between this and that; nor does this, that it is said the intellect is for the Father the principle for understanding, indicate a real relation of the intellect itself to the intellection that is in the Father himself according to this principle, because this is seen more about begetting than about intellection (because begetting requires greater distinction), nor yet when it is said that ‘the intellect is for the Father the principle of saying’ is a real relation indicated of intellect to saying [cf. *Ord.*I d.6 nn.9-15].

100. And when it is argued that ‘he would not more understand with the intellect than with the will’ [n.4], the consequence is not valid. And ‘to understand with the intellect’ is not that there is a real relation of the intellect, or of the Father according to the intellect, to [act of] understanding, but only that this is some operative perfection, according to which such operation is of a nature to belong to the Father, – nor does it follow that ‘he does not more understand with the intellect than with the will’, because this operation which is to understand is of a nature first to belong to the intellect and is not thus of a nature to belong to the will, nor is there any other reason save because intellect is intellect and will is will: for to any operative principle whatever – from the fact that it is such, whether it be a *per se* thing or be unitively contained in something – is its proper operation of a nature to belong.

101. On the contrary: it is conceded that in the Father the intellect is for him the principle of understanding; to be principle imports some relation, and if it is principle from the nature of the thing, it will be a relation from the nature of the thing, and consequently real.

Response: whatever would belong – if it were a real thing – to something really, this same thing ought to belong to it (and not to another) when it is a reason or in accord with reason; in this way is there intellect in the Father in respect of [act of] understanding, because the principle is altogether the same as [act of] understanding really.

¹⁵ The Vatican editors: rather than the third argument [n.3] of the *Ordinatio* here, Scotus has more in mind the form of the equivalent fifth argument in the *Lectura*, I d.13 n.5

102. To the other proof – about unequals and the same thing added – that the first consequence ought still to hold in the matter at hand [n.5], I reply:

Just as in consequences it is said that, with the same thing added, if the consequence hold, it will still hold (this is true, when the same thing added does not destroy the idea of the consequence, as when it is said ‘man therefore animal, every man therefore every animal’) with respect to any predicate, or conversely negatively, – so in the matter at hand I say that the inequality of intellection and intellect is because of the limitation of the extremes, because of which (or not without which) the one exceeds the other; but when an infinite is added to each of the extremes, it takes away from each extreme limitation and so inequality – and then it does not follow that they are unequal, nay infinite intellect and infinite [act of] understanding are of equal perfection.

103. And if it is objected against this that infinity does not take away all inequality, because infinite whiteness would exceed infinite blackness, – I say that infinity added to something limited of itself is infinity in a certain respect (the sort that can belong to the idea of such a limited thing), because it does not state infinity or illimitation save in the idea of that to which it is added, which here cannot be simply infinite; but infinity added to some perfection simply (namely to which infinity simply is not repugnant) is infinity in that idea [sc. of perfection simply], and so simply infinity. But [act of] understanding and intellect are formally ‘perfections simply’, and do not include limitation, – and therefore infinity added to both says infinity simply: not only in these ideas but also concomitantly in being and truth and goodness, and in every perfection simply, because all ‘perfections simply’ mutually and unitively include each other; and therefore ‘infinite [act of] understanding’ would be simply equated to infinite intellect.

Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Distinctions

Single Question

Whether any Person at all may send any Person at all

1. About the fourteenth and fifteenth and sixteenth distinctions I ask whether any divine person may send, and be sent by, any divine person.

And it seems so:

Because whatever is essential in divine reality belongs to the three; sending [mission] – both active and passive – is essential, because it states a relation to the creature; but such respect to the creature is common to the three. Now, that both sending and being sent state a respect to the creature is because each is said of God from time; but nothing is said of God from time save what states a respect to the creature; therefore etc.

2. Again in *John* 14.23 the Savior says of the Father (and of himself): “We will come to him;” therefore the Father comes in time to someone. This ‘coming’ states some effect of the Trinity, therefore it seems that the Father could be sent by the three persons, just as the Son and Holy Spirit.

3. Again, according to Augustine *To Dardanus* [*De Praesentia Dei*, ch.5], any person gives and is given; therefore, by parity of reasoning, any person sends and is sent.

4. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “The Father, when he is perceived in time by anyone, is not called sent; for he does not have one from whom he is or from whom he proceeds.”

For this conclusion too does the Master [Lombard] adduce the authorities from Augustine in the text [*Sentences* I d.15 ch.9-10, nn.136-137].

I. Opinion of Peter Lombard

5. [Exposition of the Opinion] – In this question it seems to be the opinion of the Master that ‘to be sent’ does not belong to the three but only to the two persons who proceed.

For according to Augustine no person is sent save who has another from whom he is, and according to this, ‘to be sent’ states a respect to the creature, yet by connoting the respect of eternal procession.

6. But ‘to send’ is common to the three, according to the Master.

This is proved by the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* II ch.5 n.8, where Augustine says of the Son that “the Son cannot be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit,” and he proves it: “because the Father is understood to have sent him according as he made him from a woman, which the Father did not do without the Holy Spirit;” therefore the Holy Spirit sends the Son, – and it is certain that the Son himself sends himself, as is had from the same Augustine and in the same *On the Trinity* II ch.8; therefore ‘to send’ belongs to each person.

7. And this does the Master prove by reason, because otherwise one person of the Trinity would do something that another does not do, since to send is to cause an effect outwardly.

8. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion it can be argued:

If ‘to be sent’ imports a double respect in some way, eternal and temporal, since it only states a respect either to him for whom he is sent or to him who sends, it is plain that the first is common to the three, because it is a respect of reason outwardly; but the second is a real respect or a respect of reason; if of reason, then it can be in the Father with respect to himself, just as the Father can give and be given, for it is not repugnant to the Father to be sent because of a respect of reason only; if ‘to be sent’ state a real respect to the sender, namely procession from the sender, then ‘to send’ is not an essential property, because then the Holy Spirit would not send the Son since he does not produce him.^a

a. Interpolated text: “Or in another way as follows: if ‘to be sent’ includes an eternal relation, then either in respect of him for whom the person is sent (which does not happen, because this is temporal), or to the sender, and then everyone sent by a sender would proceed from him, and thus since the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, he would proceed from him.” *Rep.* IA d.14-15 n.9.

9. Besides, ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’ seem to signify the same, although in diverse ways as to grammatical modes: if then one of them connote some respect inwardly, the other too will connote it, – if therefore ‘to be sent’ connote ‘to be produced’, then ‘to send’ connotes ‘to produce’, and so neither is merely essential; or if one does not connote

a respect inwardly, neither will the other, but only a respect outwardly, – and so both [sc. ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’] will be common to the three.

10. And this is what can thus be argued briefly: if ‘to be sent’ includes ‘to be produced’, then ‘to send’ includes ‘to produce’; therefore the Holy Spirit does not send the Son because he does not produce him. – Besides, ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’ seem to state opposite relations; therefore if ‘to send’ does not include ‘to produce’, then neither does correlative [‘to be sent’] include correlative [‘to be produced’].^a

a. Interpolated text: “The consequence is plain from this, because when two correlations and four extremes are taken, as the first is to the third so is the second to the fourth; but to send and to be sent are said correlatively, and to produce and to be produced similarly; therefore if the person that is sent is produced, to send will be to produce.”

II. To the Question

11. It seems then that it can be said to the question in another way, for it is manifest, according to the intention of Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20, that the Father is not called sent, but it is necessary that ‘to be sent’ – along with the fact it states a respect outwardly – connote a procession inwardly [n.5], and then it seems reasonable to say similarly of ‘to send’ that, although it principally state a respect of action outwardly, yet it connotes a respect of active production inwardly: and thus neither will be merely essential, but ‘to be sent’ will only belong to the produced person and ‘to send’ only to the producing person; and thus there are only two sending persons (the Father and Son) and only two sent (the Son and Holy Spirit), nor does any person send himself, nor does the proceeding send the producing.

12. An example of this can be had in something else; for the Father is said to create through the Word, and thus it could be conceded that the Son creates through the Holy Spirit; but not thus conversely, for ‘to create through the Son’ does not state absolutely an action outwardly but action along with authority, and in this it connotes active production in the worker¹⁶ with respect to the person through whom, with as it were sub-authority, he works. Thus could it be said that ‘to send a person’ is to work through him, and thus to work the effect along with that person by way of an authority that gives action to that person, which only belongs to the producing person with respect to the person produced, – and ‘to be sent’ would state the same as to work with sub-authority, by virtue of the person sending, which is only when the person working receives from another the power of acting.¹⁷

III. To the Reasons of Peter Lombard

¹⁶ The literal translation of the Latin noun, which noun is indeed followed in the next line by the verb ‘operate’. ‘Operator’, used here and elsewhere, is not as happy, of course, in English as ‘actor’ or ‘doer’, but it preserves the connection in Latin with the companion verb. Besides older uses of English words are sometimes worth preserving despite their obsolescence.

¹⁷ Vatican editors cite from the *Lectura* I d.14-16 n.12: “That person is said to be sent who causes an act by sub-authority, and that person sends who has authority in causing, and therefore both ‘to send’ and ‘to be sent’ state an act that belongs to a person having authority or sub-authority... Hence just as ‘to be sent’ states to cause an effect with sub-authority, so ‘to send’ states to cause an effect with authority.”

13. Then to that which the Master adduces for himself, from Augustine, that the Holy Spirit sends the Son and that the Son sends himself [n.6].

It could be expounded first of the Son incarnate, not of the Son as incarnating, in the way Ambrose says in *On the Holy Spirit* III ch.1 nn.1, 2, 6, that the Spirit of God sent the Son, – as we read in *Isaiah* 61.1 “the Spirit of the Lord is upon me” etc.; “well did he say,” says Ambrose, “the Spirit of the Lord has sent me to preach’, because as a son of man was he sent and anointed, for according to divinity the Holy Spirit is not upon Christ but in Christ.” That authority, then, of *Isaiah*, which says that Christ was sent by the Holy Spirit, is understood of Christ the man, but not of the sending of the to-be-incarnated eternal Word – In like manner could that authority [here *supra*] be expounded which says that the Son sent himself.

14. To the argument too [n.7] of the Master it could be said that the consequence is not valid [sc. “that if ‘to send’ did not belong to the three, one person would effect something that another would not,” n.7], because ‘in what way’ is altered into ‘what’. For it does not follow ‘the Son does not work through the Son as the Father works through the Son, therefore the Father does something that the Son does not’, but it follows: ‘therefore in some way does the Son not work’, because [he does not work] through authority, – and this is true; or also ‘if the Father send the Son and not send the Son himself’, it should be inferred ‘because the authority of bringing about an effect in the creature is in the Father, not in the Son’, – and this also is true.

IV. How the Opinion of Lombard Could be Held

15. Although this way [nn.11-12] may seem probable, yet because the authorities of Augustine seem to speak not only of Christ the man sent but of the Word of God sent ‘because to be incarnated’ (as Augustine himself says, the very incarnation is understood to be the sending), therefore can the opinion of the Master be held in this way, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “when he is conceived in time by anyone’s perfect understanding, he is said to be sent;” and more clearly n.29: “To be sent, for the Son, is that it is known he is from the Father, – so to be sent, for the Holy Spirit, is that it is known he proceeds from the Father.”

16. ‘To be sent’ then is that a person is shown to proceed, and ‘to send’ is to show that a person proceeds. This ‘to show’ is genuinely common,^a because the whole Trinity manifests that the person proceeding proceeds; but ‘a person is shown to proceed’ connotes that a person proceeds. And, if these are the significates of these terms (because significates are to be taken according to the usage of authors), it follows that ‘to send’ is genuinely essential and does not connote a real eternal respect in the sender; but ‘to be sent’ connotes a respect in the person sent, insofar as his eternal procession is manifested. And indeed another word could be imposed that would signify ‘to show a person produces’, and its passive form would signify ‘a person is shown to be produced’, – and the active form would be common to the three, but the passive form would belong only to the two persons who are produced.

a. Interpolated text [instead of “...and ‘to send’ is to show...a person proceeds”]: “and connotes that a person proceeds, nor does it belong to all persons, because neither do all proceed; and to send is to manifest that a person proceeds, and it belongs to all. An example about ‘memory’, – which sign, according to Augustine, memory, intelligence, and will

manifest, in which sign however only memory is manifested. Hence this which is ‘to show’ is genuinely common etc...”.

V. To the Arguments against the Opinion of Lombard

17. A reply in accord with this [n.16] must be made to the arguments that are against the opinion of the Master [nn.8-10].

To the first [n.8] I say that ‘to be sent’ states a respect of reason to the sender formally; but it connotes an eternal respect, not indeed to the sender because sending, but to anyone indistinctly. Hence this proposition is to be denied that “‘to be sent’ states only a respect to him to whom he is sent, or to the sender’,” if it be understood insofar as he is sender, and this both of the principal signified and of the connoted; for [the proposition] states by connoting a respect to the one proceeding, and this to the one producing – not insofar as sending, because also a person sending can be non-producing, though a [person] producing always be a [person] sending.

18. To the second [nn.9-10] I concede that active and passive signify the same under opposite grammatical mode, although something the same that is not diversified in presence of those modes could be connoted in both; ‘to show’ indeed and ‘to be shown’ – which are principally imported – are diversified in presence of those modes, but not so this, which is ‘a person proceeds’: for that is what is connoted uniformly, both by the active and by the passive. An example of this in other things: for I know fire heats, and it is known that fire heats. Although here there be grammatical variation as regard ‘to know’ and ‘to be known’, yet not as to that which is noted to be the term for ‘to know’ and ‘to be known’, because that is disposed uniformly on both sides; and if a single active were imposed to signify the whole of ‘to know fire heats’, its passive would not connote ‘it is known that fire is heated’ but only the ‘to be known’ in the mode of the passive and something connoted in the mode of the active, namely ‘that fire heats’.

19. Hereby is plain [the answer] to the confirmation ‘to send and to be sent are correlatives’. This is true as to the formal significates, and both state *per se* a respect of reason; however one of them can include, as connoted, that some extreme of the relation and the other do not include the correlative of it [n.10] as is clear in the example proposed, because the verb thus imposed would include ‘to heat’ and yet the passive verb corresponding to it would not include this, which is ‘to be heated’ [n.18 end]

IV. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the principal arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1] I say that not everything said of God in time is common to the three when it imports not only a respect to the creature but also connotes with it an intrinsic respect, as it is of ‘to be sent’.

21. To the second [n.2] I concede that the Father comes invisibly and indwells, but yet he is not said to be sent, because he does not have from whom he is [n.4]; for he is not shown to proceed unless he proceed. However, he can well be shown absolutely or be shown to produce, but being thus shown is not noted by ‘to be sent’ [n.16].

22. To the third [n.3] I concede that any person gives any person, because to give is to communicate freely: but any person communicates himself freely by the will as it is

his; nor does it follow from this, that any person send any person, because it is already plain that ‘to give’ does not include such an intrinsic respect as ‘to be sent’ includes.

Seventeenth Distinction

First Part On the Habit of Charity

Question One

Whether it is necessary to posit a created Charity that formally inheres in a Nature capable of Beatification

1. About the seventeenth distinction I ask whether it is necessary to posit a created charity that formally inheres in a nature capable of beatification.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.7 n.10: “He who loves his neighbor loves as a consequence love itself; but ‘God is love’; therefore the consequence is that he loves God.” 1. About the seventeenth distinction I ask whether it be necessary to posit a created charity formally inherent in a nature capable of beatification.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.7 n.10: “He who loves his neighbor as a consequence loves love itself; but ‘God is love’; therefore the consequence is that he loves God.”

I ask how he is taking ‘love’ in the minor? If formally, I have the conclusion; if effectively, then there will be four terms, because the major is not true save of the formal love by which the neighbor is loved. If too you say that ‘besides the love which is the Holy Spirit, there is another formal love’, then there is a fallacy of the consequent in Augustine’s argument, arguing ‘he loves love formally, therefore this love’, – because the antecedent can be true for the other love. If the argument then have to hold, it must be that God is formally love and every love that is formally in someone who loves in respect of his neighbor.

2. Again, *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37: “There is no gift more excellent than this gift, which is love; and there is no gift of God more excellent than the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit is love.” This argument would not be valid unless it were about formal love and that the Holy Spirit precisely would be it.

3. If also it be said to these authorities that the Holy Spirit is called ‘love’ causally, the Master in the text stands in the way, who adduces Augustine, that Augustine himself understands it formally. For Augustine says *On the Trinity* XV ch.17, n.27: “We will not say that ‘charity’ is said to be God by the fact that it is the gift of God, just as is said ‘you are my patience’ (*Psalm* 70.5); for this sense does the locution itself of Scripture easily refute; for ‘you are my patience’ is such as ‘you are my hope’ is (*Psalm* 90,9), etc.” “And not in this way is ‘Lord, my love’ said, or ‘you are my love’, but ‘God is love’ (*I John* 4.16) is said as ‘God is spirit’ (*John* 4.24) is said.”

4. Again, by reason: every creature can be understood to be non-good, because it is good by participation; but charity cannot be understood to be non-good; therefore it seems that it is good by essence, – therefore, etc.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Morals of the Church*, treating of that verse in *Romans* 8.35 ‘Who will separate us from the love of Christ’, says: “Love of God of this sort is called virtue, which is our spirit’s most correct affection.”

Question Two

Whether it is necessary to posit in a Habit the idea of Active Principle with respect to Act

6. Along with this question I propose another in general about habit: whether it be necessary to posit in a habit an idea of active principle with respect to act.

Argument is made that it is:

A habit is what a haver uses when he wants, from the Commentator on *De Anima* 3 comm. 18:^a ‘to use’ belongs to an agent, for a patient does not use a passive principle.

a. Interpolated text: “about the remark ‘It is necessary then that intellect be in it’ (Arabic-Latin translation of Aristotle *De Anima* 3.5.430a14): ‘This,’ he says, ‘is the definition of intellect, that by habit it understand that which is proper to it from itself, and when it wants, without its needing in this anything extrinsic’. But...”

7. Further, we attribute four conditions to a habit and the haver of a habit: that it operate delightfully, easily, expeditiously, and promptly.

8. From each an argument can be given for the matter at hand:

From the first, because an act which was before disagreeable to an agent does not become agreeable to it unless the agent, insofar as it is agent, be differently disposed; therefore when by this habit, through which operating belongs to it, [such operating] is acceptable to it and so pleasant – the agent itself is differently disposed insofar as it is agent.

9. From the second condition the argument is because what is of itself supremely disposed to undergoing does not need to be helped to undergo; but a habitual potency, of which sort is intellect and will, is of itself supremely disposed to receiving act (because they do not have a contrary and, for this reason, do not need motion so as to act); therefore the habit whereby [the potency] is facilitated disposes it to acting and not to undergoing.

10. From the third condition the argument is because expediting belongs to what there is a being impeded of; but being impeded belongs to an agent when its active power fails and it is overcome by another; therefore the habit whereby working without impediment belongs to something, belongs to it as it is active.

11. From the fourth the argument is as follows, because working sluggishly or non-promptly belongs to what there is promptitude of; but ‘not to act promptly’ belongs to an agent insofar as it is active, not insofar as it is passive; therefore promptitude too, which a habit bestows, belongs to an agent insofar as it is agent.

12. Further, to the principal point:

A habit inclines a power to act. But there is a double inclination, namely of a passive power to form and of an active power to act; habit does not incline in the first

way, for act is received in the power immediately, otherwise perfect and imperfect act would not have the same susceptible subject; therefore it inclines in the second way, as an active principle for acting, – which is the proposed conclusion.

13. Again, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.4.255a30-255b5 and *De Anima* 2.5.417a21-28, the soul before knowledge is in essential potency, but when it has knowledge it is in accidental potency. But what reduces from essential potency to accidental potency in respect of operation seems to be the active principle in respect of it, because it is that whereby the haver operates; hence the Philosopher means, in *De Anima* 2.2.414a4-7, 12-13, that just as science is “that whereby we know” so the soul is “that whereby we live and sense” etc., and consequently, just as the soul is that whereby we perform vital acts, so science is that whereby we actively speculate.

14. Again some habit is practical, and of such some is active, as prudence – some factive, as art; the idea of a practical habit in general, and of a factive one in particular, seems to conclude to the idea of an active principle in such habit.

15. On the contrary:

Relation is not an active principle, nor is anything which essentially includes relation; but habit is ‘in relation to something’, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 7.3.246a30-b21; therefore etc.

16. The reason is confirmed because no less is an absolute real entity required in a principle of motion than in its term; if therefore a habit lack the absolute entity that suffices for terminating motion (according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13), much more does it lack the one that is required in an active principle.

17. Further, second, in respect of one action there is one active potency (the Commentator on *Physics* 5 com.38); but the habit alone is not the active power with respect to operation, because then the habit itself would be a power (because power is that by which we are simply able), and ‘that which is perfected by it’ would not be power simply; therefore only that which is perfected by a habit is an active principle of operation.

18. This reason is confirmed, because one action requires a formal principle by which a ‘*per se* one’ may be elicited; an aggregate of power and habit is ‘one *per accidens*’, not ‘*per se*’; therefore this whole cannot be the ‘by which’ in respect of an operation ‘*per se* one’.

19. Further, an accident is not a principle of acting on its proper subject; but an operation, for which a habit is posited, is received frequently in the power of which it is the habit; therefore with respect to it [= operation] the habit is not the active principle.

20. Further, some habits are in the appetitive sensitive powers; this appetite is not active, because according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.36, “sense does not lead but is led;” therefore neither can its form be an active principle, because if it were it ought to concur with the power in acting.

I. To the Second Question

A. Five Ways of Giving a Solution are Expounded and Examined

1. First Way

21. [Exposition of the opinion] – To this question it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that things are one way as to acquired habit and another as to infused habit. For from the

one is man's natural act and [from the other] expedition of the act, because of the indetermination that nature has with respect to the act, – and therefore acquired virtue is a perfection of nature presupposed in idea of principle of act; but if supernatural virtue were [a perfection] of nature presupposed in the being to which such act corresponds, then it would only facilitate nature, as acquired virtue [does]; but this is false, rather by the same thing is 'being' gratuitous and is a gratuitous act simply elicited according to that [supernatural] degree, – so that acquired virtue is a virtue according to the idea of virtue that is posited in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, but theological virtue is not so, but according to the idea of virtue by which is posited that virtue is 'the ultimate of power' (*De Caelo* 1.11.281a10-12).

22. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion [n.21], if he [Henry of Ghent] thus understand that a supernatural habit is simply a principle with respect to act, I argue as follows:

That by which someone can simply work is a power; therefore a supernatural habit will be a power. The antecedent is plain, because a power is that whereby we are simply and first able to act.^a

a. Note by Scotus: "This is true of the genus of action, it is false of operation-action."

23. Further, from this [sc. that a supernatural habit is a principle of act] it follows further that no more will the will be good if it work through the habit of charity than a piece of wood is perfected in acting if it acts by heat inhering in it accidentally;^a an example: for just as from this fact [sc. the wood acting through heat] no action belongs to the wood through the form of wood but only to the agent [sc. the heat] that is received in the wood, so also it seems that the action that would belong to charity as to principal principle would in no way belong to the will as will. And it also follows further that just as heat, if it were separated, would heat equally, so charity, if it were separated, would act equally, for every form that is the total principle of acting as it is in a subject can, if it is *per se*, operate *per se* – and thus the matter at hand evidently follows, namely that the habit will be a power.^b

a. Note by Scotus: "By that action is a subject not *per se* perfected, the formal principle of which is 'an accident *per accidens*' of that subject."

b. Note by Scotus: "If heat were an active principle in respect of something that was a perfection of wood, there would be nothing similar to 'heat is active' (each unacceptable result rightly follows when positing habit as reason for receiving operation); nothing the like about operation, – for a material cause of operation is lacking; nothing either about acting, about genus of action, because thus is it only a principle of something immanent, not of something transient (but why is it not?)."

24. Further, an operation is not freely elicited whose active principle is merely natural; but a habit, since it is not formally the will, nor as a consequence formally free, will if it is an active principle be merely natural; therefore its operation will not be merely free, and thus no 'willing' will be free if it is elicited by a habit as by active total principle.

25. Further, then a man who once has charity could never sin mortally, which is unacceptable. – Proof of the consequence, because he who has some active form predominating in him can never be moved against the inclination of that predominating

form, just as never can a heavy mixed body ascend against the inclination of the earth dominating [in it]; but charity – if it is total active principle – is predominant over the will, which has no power on that act; therefore the will always follows the inclination of charity in acting, and so it will never sin.

26. Further, that act is not mine which is not in my power; but the action of the habit is not in my power, because a habit itself – if it is active – is not free but is a natural principle; therefore the ‘loving’ will not be mine, such as to be in my power, and so I will not merit by that act.^a

a. Text canceled by Scotus: “nor will I be able to be said to do that operation, and so meritorious actions are not of the will nor of the supposit of the will, which seems unacceptable.”

2. Second Way

27. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way it can be said that acquired and infused virtues do not differ in the aforesaid way [n.21], but both are compared in the same way as to the substance of the act; and then one way of speaking is that the act has its substance from the power but has such or such intensity from the habit, so that as if to the two things in the act – namely substance and intensity – there correspond two things in idea of principle or cause.

28. [Rejection of the opinion] – I argue against this, because the intensity of an act is not something extrinsic, accident of the act, but a degree intrinsic to the act, – so that an intense act is something ‘*per se* one’, as an individual of this sort in a species. There cannot, therefore, be a different principle of the substance of this sort of act and of its intensity, because by what it is this individual, by the same is an intrinsic degree proper to this individual: for it cannot receive nature from something else, and a nature designated ‘this nature’, without receiving it in a certain degree. – Following on from this, as if from the same middle term, it could be argued the way it was argued before to the principal point [n.18], that since an intense act is ‘*per se* one’, and what is combined from potency and habit is as it were ‘*per accidens* one’, this whole cannot be the principle of that. But this form of arguing is not cogent (hence too it will be solved later [nn.73-74]), but the first form is cogent, that whereby it is ‘this one thing’ thereby does it have a definite degree intrinsic to it.

29. Further, second, whenever a principle naturally active concurs with a free agent cause, always does that natural principle co-act as much as it can (an example about the will and an inferior power acting naturally as much as is from itself); for although such be impeded from acting when the free [principle] does not act, yet – when the free principle is acting – it acts necessarily, because by way of nature, as much as is of itself, it co-acts with that free principle as much as it can; therefore if a determinate habit in the will give a determinate intensity to the act, then, with the will operating for the substance of the act, necessarily will the habit give the intensity corresponding to itself, and thus however much the will operated with a modicum of effort, always would its act be equally intense because, while it is causing the substance of the act, the habit – because it acts by way of nature – necessarily would cause what is its own.

30. Further, if the habit give intensity to the act, this would be in some designated degree (let that degree be marked *a*); therefore, the will with this habit can have an act

intense to this degree. Let there be another will, more perfect than this will according to the proportion of ‘degree *a*’ relative to an act in the lowest degree (to wit, if *a* is the fourth degree in the act, let there be another will exceeding the first will by four degrees), then this will – without a habit – could have an act as equally intense as that will with a habit. Therefore the substance of the act is not precisely from the power such that the intensity is not.

31. Further, only an infinite will – excluding all idea of habit – has power for an infinite act; therefore too a will, in whatever degree of nature, has power for an act of determinate degree. – The antecedent is plain, because a will, from being infinite, is not receptive of any habit, because there is not lacking to it any perfection that is possible for the will. The proof of the consequence is because ‘as the highest is to the highest, so is the simply to the simply’ [cf. Aristotle, *Topics* 5.8.137b20-27] and any degree to the degree corresponding to it.

3. Third Way

32. [Exposition of the Opinion] – In a third way, by attributing to the habit in some way the idea of active principle with respect to the act, it can be said that a habit is a partial active cause, along with the power (which is also a partial cause), in respect of a perfect act proceeding from the power and the habit, although the power could be a total cause in respect of an imperfect act preceding generation of the habit. And then about the distinction of these two partial causes, and how they *per se* make one total cause, it would have to be said as was said above in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Cause of Generated Knowledge’ [I d.3 nn.495-498].

33. [A doubt] – But then there is a doubt. Since these two [sc. power and habit] are not causes of the same order like two people hauling a boat, – which of them has the idea of prior cause?

34. It seems that the habit does, because it belongs to the prior cause to determine the second and not conversely; but the habit determines the power for acting and inclines it, and not conversely; now to incline belongs to the superior in respect of the inferior, and not conversely

35. But the opposite of this seems to be the case:

First, because the power uses the habit, not conversely, – because what uses another in acting is more principal than it, and that which it uses is as it were the instrument or the second cause with respect to it [I d.3. n.562]

36. Likewise, a power is more unlimited in acting than a habit, because it extends to more things; but a superior cause seems to be more unlimited in extent; therefore etc. [ibid. n.559].

37. Further, third, a habit is a natural cause. Therefore if it be the principal cause, moving the power, it would move it by way of nature and consequently the power, since it acts in the way in which it is moved, would act by way of nature: for an agent that acts insofar as it is moved – if it be moved by way of nature – acts also further by way of nature, and so every action of an habituated power would be natural and none free (at any rate not in the power of the will), which is unacceptable.

38. Again, fourth, a habit would be a power, because it would be that by which the haver can first operate.

39. Again, fifth, when there are two ordered causes one of which is cause of the other, that which is cause of the other is the superior cause; but a power is cause of the habit – at any rate when acts mediate – and in no way conversely; therefore etc.

40. [Declaration of the opinion] – I concede, for these reasons [nn.35-39], that by holding a habit to be partial cause with respect to the act [n.32], it would be second cause and not first, but the power would be first cause and absolutely would not need a habit for operating; yet it operates less perfectly without the habit than with a habit (and this when equal effort on the part of the power is posited), just as, when two causes concur for one effect, one alone does not have power *per se* for an as perfect effect as both together. And in this way is saved why an act is more intense from the power and habit than from the power alone: not indeed that the power be the cause of the substance of the act and the habit the cause of the intensity of the act (as if to the two caused things there correspond two causes [n.27]), but that both causes concurring can produce a more perfect effect than either alone [I d.3 n.296], – which effect, however, according to its whole self and as ‘*per se* one’, is from the two causes, but causing in diverse order [nn.32-33].

41. [Against the opinion] – Against this opinion there is argument as follows:

No things distinct in species are for each other equivocal agent causes; habit and act are distinct in species; therefore they are not for each other equivocal agent causes; but an act is necessarily an equivocal cause in the generation of a habit, at least an acquired one, – not therefore conversely.

42. Proof of the major, because an equivocal cause eminently contains in itself the perfection of the effect; but two things distinct in species cannot eminently contain each other. – Further, by comparing to the same first cause two effects, it seems that each of them has a determinate order, immediate or mediate, prior or posterior – and this in speaking of the whole species of each of the effects. This is apparent by induction in passions following the same subject, wherein there is necessarily a determinate order, that one more immediately follows the subject than the other, and this according to the whole species, so that this order does not vary in any individuals at all of the species. Therefore in respect of the power – which is a common cause of the act and habit – these two effects will have a determinate order, so that either necessarily the act according to its whole species would precede the habit, or conversely; and since some act of necessity precedes the habit as cause of it, the habit would not precede any act.

43. Further, if a habit is a partial cause with respect to an act and equivocal, then the cause of this cause will be a more perfect equivocal cause of the same act (the consequence is plain, because in equivocal causes the cause of a cause is a more perfect cause than a cause closer to the caused); but the act is cause of the generation of the habit; therefore if the power with the habit has power for a perfect act [nn.32, 40], much more if it were under the generative act of the habit would it have power for the same perfect act – which seems unacceptable, because two perfect acts cannot be in the same power, or at any rate if they could, it does not seem that one of them could be in any way the active principle in respect of the other.

44. Further, if the habit is as it were the second cause [n.40], supplying some degree of causality that is lacking to the power, then the habit could come to be so perfect that it would supply the place of the whole power, – and so some habit alone, without the power, could be sufficiently cause both in idea of habit and in idea of power: for

universally, in agents of the same idea, it seems that the virtue of one could be so intensified that it would become equal with two [I d.3 n.497].

45. Further, if it were held that in the movement of intension and remission the preexisting individual is corrupted, it would be necessary to posit that the habit is not the cause of the act, because it is corrupted in the act by which it is intensified; but a cause is not a cause when it is corrupted, because what is not is cause of nothing.

4. Fourth Way

46. [Exposition of the opinion] – He who would hold the conclusion of these reasons [nn.41-45] could deny of a habit all idea of active principle, and say that a habit only inclines to operation, as a sort of prior act agreeing with a second act and determining to that act – just as heaviness is a prior act, determining and inclining to a determinate ‘where’, although, according to some,¹⁸ heaviness is not a principle with respect to being in that ‘where’.

47. [Approval of the opinion] – And this [opinion] seems probable, because to nothing should causality with respect to anything be attributed unless such causality be evident from the nature of things (whether of cause or caused); also to no cause should perfect causality be denied unless manifestly appear in it imperfection of causality, because no nature should be denied to have a perfection that it is not evident it lacks. And there seems no necessity for positing some active causality in a habit with respect to act, because without this will all the conditions be saved that are commonly attributed to a habit [n.48]; there is also no necessity of taking from the potency the perfect idea of causality so that a partial causality may be attributed to the potency. Therefore there is not any causality to be attributed to the habit.

48. The assumption is plain, because the four conditions that are attributed to a habit, namely that it is ‘what the haver operates by easily, delightfully, expeditiously, and promptly’ [n.7], are saved by the inclination alone of the habit, which it bestows on the power as it is receptive of operation.

49. Delight indeed is because of the condition of the receiver, to whom belongs the operation received and the object about which the operation is. For never is delight in a making that is precisely a making, but because action is in the agent action can be delightful because of agreement of agent with object; but this agreement a habit can provide from this, that it inclines to the action and object. Therefore delightfulness does not argue idea of active principle but only agreement of passive principle with power and object, and this as to an action that is of the genus of quality, not that which is of the genus of action, – about which difference of actions there was statement above in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.600-604]. Work indeed is an action which is a quality, and it belongs to an habituated power that is by habit inclined to such act and to an object terminating such work; but it does not thus belong to a non-habituated power, nor does such form or such object.

50. Likewise as to the second condition [n.7, 48]. Difficulty in working arises from this, that what is receptive of the working is not disposed to the receiving, and not

¹⁸ Siger of Brabant, as reported by Godfrey of Fontaines whom Scotus here follows. The Latin word for ‘heaviness’ is ‘gravitas’ which of course gives us our word ‘gravity’.

only from defect of active virtue; therefore if what is receptive is disposed, there will be facility in acting, insofar as the agent acts about such passive thing.

51. Likewise about expedition and promptitude. For the hindrance and slowness of an agent in acting can be because of the indisposition of the passive thing, especially when the same thing is agent and recipient, so that it itself will not operate promptly because it is indisposed to operating. This indisposition, then, is not as to performing an action of the genus of action, but to having an action of the genus of quality; for nothing is said formally to operate insofar as it elicits operation, but insofar as it receives it in itself.

52. In what way too other things commonly attributed to habit are preserved, by attributing the whole action to the power and no activity to the habit, will be plain by solving the arguments to the main point [nn.6-7, 12-14, 87-91].

5. What is to be Thought about the Four Ways

53. Thus then is it plain how, once the two first ways ‘about habit’ are abandoned as unacceptable, the two last probable ways can be sustained, namely the third and fourth: by attributing according to the third way some activity to the habit and not only ‘idea of active principle’ to the power [n.32], – and according to the fourth way by denying to the habit the idea of active principle and [by asserting] that it be as it were a form inclining to reception of some further form, although it not be the idea of receiving with respect to it (as heaviness inclines downwards, although it not be the idea of receiving that which is downwards, but ‘a body quantum’ insofar as it is receptive of a ‘where’ [n.46]).

54. To the arguments that are against these two last ways, each of which could probably be sustained, a response will be given later [nn.71-86], according to one or other of these ways, by holding it of the act as to substance of the act or as to its intrinsic degree.

6. Fifth Way

55. It remains now to inquire further about accidental goodness of an act (of which sort is moral goodness), and about moral habit, whether moral habit insofar as virtue be in any way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in an act.

56. [Arguments for the fifth way] – It seems that it is

Because, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, virtue is “what perfects the haver and renders his work good;” but it does not render it good in idea of passive principle, because it is not an idea of receiving; therefore in idea of active principle.

57. Further, virtue is “the disposition of the perfect to the best”, from *Physics* 7.3.246b23; but it is not a passive disposition because – as before [n.56] – it is not an idea of receiving; therefore it is in idea of active principle. – And the reason is confirmed, because ‘as good to good so best to best’ [*Topics* 3.2.117b22-26]; but since the best idea is of an active principle, therefore according to this idea does virtue perfect the power, and thus for acting.

58. Further, virtue is moderator of the passions; but it does not moderate the passions through idea of passive principle, because the object, from the fact it is a natural

cause, causes action according to the utmost of its power, – therefore as much as it can, if it not be impeded by some contrary agent; therefore a habit, by preventing the object from acting thus completely, moderates it in repressing passion by idea of active principle.

59. Further, *Ethics* 2.3.1105b7-9, the Philosopher says that ‘he who does not have justice, though he could work just things, yet not justly’, – and so of other acts; but moral goodness requires operating justly or formally, – and so of others; therefore virtue is such a principle of an act insofar as it is good that without it an act could not be good.^a

a. Interpolated text: “Again, virtue is more perfect with respect to its act than art is with respect to its by as much as virtue is better than art; but every art is cause whence is the beginning of motion with respect to its own operation, according to the Commentator [Eustratius] *Ethics* 1 com.60 at the end; therefore virtue too with respect to its act. Again, *Ethics* 4.1.1120a8-23, the Philosopher proves that the habit of liberality consists more in good action and giving than in good passion and receiving.”

60. [Arguments against the fifth way] – But the contrary of this is argued through this, that moral goodness in an act states only a relation, because that an act is circumstanced with due circumstances is not anything absolute in the act, but only a due comparison of it to the things it ought to agree with; therefore this does not have any proper active principle, just as neither does any respect.

61. Further, if a habit, insofar as it is a ‘virtue’ were the active principle of moral goodness in an act, since a habit is not a virtue save from a respect, namely from the conformity of it to prudence (for it is “an elective habit of the mean, as determined by right reason” *Ethics* 2.5.1106b36-07a2), therefore some relative idea in a virtue would be the idea of active principle, which is impossible.

62. [Response to the fifth way] – As to this article [n.55], it can be said that as beauty is not some absolute quality in a beautiful body but is the aggregation of all the things that are becoming to such a body (to wit, of size, figure, and color), and an aggregation too of all respects (which are the things becoming to the body and to each other), so the moral goodness of an act is as it were a certain decor of the act, including the aggregation of due proportion to all the things to which it has to be proportioned (to wit, to the power, object, end, time, place, manner), and this especially as these are by right reason declared to have to agree with the act: so that for all of them we can say that the agreement of the act with right reason is that by which, once posited, the act is good, and that by which, when not posited – whatever other things it agree with – the act is not good, because however much an act be about an object of whatever kind, if it not be according to right reason in the worker (to wit if he do not have right reason in his working), the act is not good. Principally, therefore, is the moral goodness of an act the conformity of the act to a right reason making full determination about all the due circumstances of this act.

63. But this goodness has no proper active principle, just as neither does any respect, – especially since this respect follows the posited extremes from the nature of the extremes: for it is impossible for any act to be posited in being and for right reason to be posited in being without there following in the act, from the nature of the extremes, such conformity to right reason; and a relation following the extremes necessarily does not have any proper cause other than the extremes.

64. Therefore, as to this accidental condition of the act, which is moral goodness, it is not necessary that any habit have any idea of proper active principle save insofar as it has the idea of active principle with respect to the substance of the act – which act is of a nature to agree with the complete dictate of prudence;^a and to that act in itself does some habit incline from the nature of the habit, and from this – as a consequence – does it incline to the act which is conform to right reason, if right reason be present in the one working.

a. Note by Scotus: “This respect – aptitudinal respect – follows from the nature of the extremes, but actual does not; for this habit is, of its species, subordinable to prudence in acting, but it is not subordinate – in acting – by the nature of them, even when they exist together in the same [subject]; for when he desires in accord with this habit and not by dictate of reason (if this is possible), then he is not subordinate, nor is the act morally good.

On the contrary: he always uses this as it is a virtue, because as subordinable; for it is not a virtue precisely as actually subordinate in acting, because then he who does nothing would not have any virtue. – Again, every respect that is not from the nature of the extremes has a proper cause. What is it here?

To the first: he uses it but not as being virtuous. In another way: although he uses that which is a virtue, not however as it is a virtue, because although for virtue’s existence subordinability suffice, nevertheless for using it ‘as it is a virtue’ requires it to be subordinated, because this is to use, to be subordinated.

To the second: the respect in an effect is from the two causes, conjoined in acting; and not from the form of one to itself, nor of the other, nor of both and conjoined in the subject, but only conjoined in actually acting, and so conjoined that from the dictate of prudence does habit move to desiring. Such conjoining, therefore, of these in actually acting is whence there is relation in effect; not that whence it is morally (because this would be had from prudence alone, without the other habit moving), but that whence it is morally and easily and delightfully, – as in *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-21.

But whence is this conjunction of these in acting, because it is an extrinsic respect? – Response: from their absolute natures is this conjunction first, and second the relation in effect.

But what is ‘absolute’ from these, so that this respect be caused second? – Response: from prudence there is an absolute act in the intellect, – and from that act as prior cause and rule, and from the appetite as ruled, there is an absolute act of desiring. If the conjunction of the causes precedes in nature the common effect, nothing ‘absolute’ is from the two causes before their conjunction (consequent difficulty: whence the action first, not whence is the second conjunction in the action). If the first – in order of nature – is a caused ‘absolute’, hence a relation of it to each cause, and hence conversely of each to it, – hence conjunction of one with the other.

65. What has been said of the moral goodness of an act [n.62] must be said of the habit proportionally, that moral virtue does not add over and above the substance of the habit – as it is a form in the genus of quality – save an habitual conformity to right reason. For the same habit in nature, which would be generated from acts of abstinence elicited with erroneous reason in the elicitor, when remaining afterwards with right reason would afterwards be the virtue of abstinence and before not be a habit of virtue, as long as there was not a right reason for abstaining; nor yet has anything changed about the habit in itself but only now is it conjoined with prudence and before not.

66. To be conjoined, therefore, with prudence^a attributes to the habit (as it is a form of the genus of quality) the being of virtue when the habit is of its nature naturally

conform to prudence, – and so nothing other in absolute entity does a habit state which is a moral virtue than that which is such in nature and not a virtue, if it be without prudence; and consequently no other causality can it have as it is a virtue than as it is this sort of natural quality, save because ‘as it is conjoined with prudence’ it is of a nature to be a second cause – directed as it were by prudence – in respect of the common effect of both; but as it is without prudence it cannot be a second cause with respect to the same effect (just as sight in a phrenetic cannot be a free power by participation, because he is unable to have use of will, which is a free power by essence – but in someone healthy sight does have use of free power by participation, and it is as it were a second cause with respect to will). But still, when it is a second cause in respect of prudence, it has proper causality – agreeing with it in its order of causing – precisely from this, that it is such a form or a certain quality in nature, but not through a respect of conformity or conjunction with prudence, because although a second cause joined to a first acts otherwise than when without it, yet it does not have its own proper active virtue from such conjunction, but from its absolute nature.

a. Note by Scotus: “I do not say ‘conjoined in the same subject’ but along with this ‘conjoined to it as to a rule and prior cause’, to which this habit is subordinated insofar as it is mover, – and this subordination or conformity is the essential idea of virtue; and the absolute form, as it is precisely mover under such respect, is precisely active for an act having a like respect (because what belongs to the ruled belongs also to the rule), and thus the habit ‘as virtue’ is precisely motive for an act morally right, which – as absolutely such a form – is absolutely active for such act ‘in substance’, nor does it there have the idea of subordinate cause with respect to prudence.”

67. [Conclusion to the fifth way] – Neither, therefore, on the part of the act insofar as it is good morally, nor on the part of the habit insofar as it is moral virtue, can there be found a special idea according to which a virtue ‘as virtue’ is principle of an act as morally good save that which is on the part of the habit and act as far as concerns the nature of them.^a

a. Text canceled by Scotus: “But neither as second cause can it have any causality with respect to the act save by reason of the absolute nature in it, and not from such conjunction with prudence.”

68. [What one should think of the fifth way] – This fifth way, then, about the action of a moral virtue with respect to an act as it is morally good, there is no need to treat as if other than the ways that touch on the substance of the habit and the substance of the act [n.67], – and so in brief, as to the whole of the fifth way, it is necessary to hold either the third or the fourth way [nn.32, 46] about every habit.

B. Solution of the Question by Holding the Third Way

69. By holding the third way (which seems to attribute more to the habit), it can be thus said that, just as if there were some heaviness in a stone that would not be a sufficient active principle in respect of descent downwards, yet it would be a partial active principle (as will be said in II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.2-11 about sufficient heaviness, which is total active principle in respect of descent), that diminished heaviness – I say –, with

another moving power moving it to descent, could act in a diminished way so that, with the other moving power acting by equal effort, a descent would be quicker that would be caused by that other extrinsic moving power and by the diminished heaviness moving intrinsically than a descent that would be caused by the extrinsic moving power alone moving with equal effort, yet the extrinsic moving power could with as much effort move a neutral body (of which, namely, there would be no heaviness nor lightness), just as this body would be moved by intrinsic heaviness and by an extrinsic moving power acting weakly; – so, in the matter at hand, the habit moves the power as a sort of weight, which, however, of itself is not sufficient for actively eliciting the work, but sufficient is the virtue alone of the active power without such weight; but when both concur, yet such that there not be a greater effort on the part of the power now than before, a more perfect work is elicited now than could be elicited before by the power itself alone.

70. And in favor of this way seems to be common experience, because anyone can experience that, when he has been habituated, he can with equal effort have a more perfect work than he could have when not habituated (which perfection of act could not be attributed to the habit if it were only an inclining passive principle), because at any rate, as it seems, in the prior instant of nature in which [work] is elicited – before it be received in the power – there would be an equal idea of active principle in the eliciting, and so an equally perfect work would be elicited with equal effort by an habituated and by a non-habituated power.

C. To the Arguments by Holding the Third Way

71. [To the principal negative arguments] – To the principal arguments. By holding this way [sc. the third], I reply to the first argument [n.15]. Although it be said that a habit is not an absolute form, because of the words of the Philosopher in *Physics* 7 [n.15], yet by holding every quality to be an absolute form (and a quality of the first species is no less a quality than one of another species [*Categories* 8.8b25-11a38]), it can be said that something which the relation is the same as can be an active principle, although relation not be an active principle; nor too is that which it is the same as an active principle by reason of the relation, but by reason of the absolute which the relation itself is the same as. The distinction of these things, namely relation and the absolute essence which the relation is the same as, can be plain from many other things said above, where posited with perfect real identity is formal non-identity [I d.2 nn.388-410, d.8 n.191-217]; and this will be plain more in II d.1 q.4 nn.21-25, where it will be said that the relation of creature to God is the same as the absolute essence of the created thing and yet is not formally the same. To this extent, then, can the Philosopher be expounded, ‘habit is in relation to something’, because by identity it includes the respect;^a and yet it is not a respect only, but a certain absolute, – and therefore action can belong to it as to a principle of acting.

a. Note by Scotus: “There is a doubt about the respect to the per se object, whether it is identical with the habit. It is certain that the respect whereby it is said to be a virtue – which is to a rule – is an extrinsic addition; hence it is not necessary on account of Aristotle’s intention to proceed to a respect identical with the habit, but it suffices that every habit be to something not according to divisible degrees. On the contrary: whence is the topic ‘accidental accident’

not divided, nor that to which it is accident? – Perhaps one idea in *Physics* 7, about identical respect, another about [respect] ‘per accidens’.”

72. For confirmation of the reason [n.16] it can be said that a greater absoluteness is required in a term of motion than in a principle of acting, because nothing can be the term of a motion that has the same relation to it. It is not so of an active principle.^{a b}

a. *Interpolated text*: “Or what is more to the purpose, it can be said that the reason does not prove the proposition save in diminished way, – and to get its conclusion, which it intends, it is necessary to handle it in a way other than the words first mean (on which matter I do not now wish to dwell), or it would be necessary to make clear other reasons for it so as to prove principally the said conclusion (this conclusion ‘whether a habit is something absolute’ will be spoken of elsewhere [n.72 or n.15]).”

b. *Note by Scotus*: “An addition to the Philosopher’s minor [n.15] must be made as follows: ‘every habit is identically in relation to something not according to divisible degrees.’ And in this way the major is true: ‘whatever is identically in relation to something not according to divisible degrees cannot terminate motion’ [n.72]. – But it can well terminate change. Hence a habit is not continually generated (so that thus its generation be motion), but if it has degrees, any is indivisible and in any it has regard indivisibly to the object; and any is generated by simple change, which does not terminate motion in that form (but perhaps motion in passions or certain other things), for more and less in a form do not suffice for motion in that form unless any stage be divisible, so that process could be continuously made from one to the other. For motion is not composed of changes.

Therefore the Philosopher’s middle is not ‘habit is in relation to something’, – but it is this ‘in relation to something not according to divisible stages’, if in any degree it indivisibly regards that to which it is identically relative. And from this perhaps, as from something more manifest, it follows that the absolute itself – which it thus regards – does not have divisible degrees; but this does not follow as from the cause; rather that the absolute does not have divisible degrees is the cause of the fact that ‘the respect is not divisible’ (because a relation takes the more and less from the foundation), not conversely, although sometimes the converse could be the cause of becoming known.

But this indivisibility of respect identical with the absolute does not prove that it is not the principle of acting, as is plain about any active form – if in any way it is indivisible, it has ‘an identical respect’ to God. Therefore it does not follow ‘it does not terminate motion because of an indivisible identical relation, therefore it is not a principle of acting because of it’, because an identical indivisible relation is repugnant to a form acquired by motion, not however to an active form.”

73. To the second argument [n.17] I say that of one action there is one principle *per se*, and this in one order of being principle; however, there can be many principles in diverse order of being principle, of which there is not a unity insofar as they are principle save unity of order, although sometimes with unity of order it concur that there is a unity of subject and accident, but this is accidental.

So in the matter at hand. Habit and power are two active powers of different order, and each in its order is ‘one *per se*’. And with this unity of order concurs a unity of accident and subject among these ordered things, but this is accidental, because if thus the first cause could be conjoined with the second without such informing of one with another, the way they are conjoined when one is informed by the other, they could in the same way have sufficient unity for causing one effect. When therefore it is said that ‘of one action there is a *per se* one active cause’, I concede that it is, namely in one order, –

but in another order of being principle there can well be different causes, and this whether this and that [cause] constitute ‘a one *per accidens*’ or not, but only ‘a one in unity of order’; and although there be there ‘a unity *per accidens*’, yet still is always preserved a unity of order of principle to principled.

74. By this the response is plain to the confirmation about the unity of formal principle [n.18]; for I concede such unity in what is the principle ‘by which’ in one order of being a principle.

75. To the other [n.19] I say that an accident can well be the principle of some effect that can be received in its subject, just as the intelligible species is the principle of understanding received in the possible intellect; and thus can a form be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to the change of its subject.

76. To the other [n.20], about sensitive appetite, I say that it has the idea of active principle in some way, although not of being active freely; and this is what Damascene means, that ‘sense does not lead but is led’; that is, it is not master of its own action, which is ‘to lead’, – but in respect of its action it is determined by the agent to a definite work, and this is ‘to be led’. Also, that the sensitive appetite is not free, although it be in some way active, and the sense similarly – this will be spoken of elsewhere [II d.29 q. un nn.3-4, Suppl. d.25 q. un nn.8, 24].

77. [To the arguments against the second way] – To the arguments that are made against the second way which posits that a habit is an active principle of intensity in the act, because they seem to be against this way [the third] (to this extent, because it posits an act ‘elicited by the habit and power acting with equal effort’ to be more intense than an act elicited by the power alone [n.40]), I show, by running through them, how they are not repugnant to this way.

78. About the first [n.28], it is plain that this way [the third] does not posit two distinct things in act possessing two principles, but the same act ‘*per se* one’ has two principles in diverse order of being principle [n.40].

79. To the second [n.29] I concede what is inferred, namely that when the power is working with equal effort ‘the act is always more intense with the habit co-acting than not co-acting’ [n.40], but from this does not follow the unacceptable result which follows against that way [sc. the second] – namely that when the power is acting with any effort whatever ‘the act is always equally intense’; this does follow there [sc. against the second way], because all of the intensity is attributed to the habit, – but not here [sc. the third way], because the intensity is attributed to the two causes: and to the power, indeed, from greater or lesser effort, – but to the habit always equally, as far as concerns itself [n.32].

80. To the third [n.30] I concede that there could come to be a will in pure nature that would elicit a more intense act than another will with the habit; and this is not unacceptable in positing these two to be ordered principles, as it would be unacceptable in positing all the intensity from the habit or attributing all the intensity to the habit and not to the power.

81. Through the same to the fourth [n.31].

82. [To the arguments against the third way specifically] – To the arguments that are made against the third opinion [nn.41-45].

To the first [n.41] it is necessary to deny the major, because it is necessary to say that of two distinct species there can be of them mutually equivocal, partial, though not total, causes.

83. To its proof, which is ‘through eminence of equivocal cause’ [n.42] I reply: that proof holds of total cause, and I do not posit a circle in total equivocal causes. – To the other proof [n.42] I say that two effects, compared to the one common cause of them, can have a mutual order to themselves mutually in idea of partial cause, – as intelligible species and understanding, comparing them to agent and possible intellect, because with respect to intellection the partial cause is the species, and ‘intellection’ can be posited as some sort of cause of the species, to the extent it includes it.

84. To the other [n.43] it can be said that it is not necessary that the generative act of the habit is the idea of acting ‘by which’, as the generated habit can be the idea ‘by which’, – in the way the virtue of the sun cannot be the principle ‘by which’ in respect of every act in respect of which the form of what is generated by the sun is the principle ‘by which’. And when it is said that ‘whatever is the cause of a cause etc.’ [n.43] – this is true as a remote ‘by which’ (where there is a remote ‘by which’), but not as an immediate ‘by which’.

85. To the third [n.44] I say that a habit – in however great a degree – cannot supply the whole place of a power, because although its causality be diminished, and the causality too of the power be diminished, yet the causality of a habit is of a different idea from the causality of a power; because, although the causality of a power be diminished, yet a habit ‘of its idea’ is a second cause, which namely a power is able to use, – and so, if it were increased to infinity, never could it become a using principle (as the generative virtue of the father, however much it were increased, could not become the virtue of the sun). Not therefore of the same idea is the causality of a power with the causality of a habit, nor could the latter, made intense, ascend to it, but they are always of different idea; and yet this [the habit], causing along with that [the power], causes a more perfect act than if it were only caused by one of them.

86. To the last [n.45]: the supposition [sc. ‘in the movement of intension and remission the pre-existing individual is corrupted’] will be denied in the following material ‘On the Increase of Charity’ [nn. 225, 249].

D. To the Positive Principal Arguments when Holding the Fourth Way

87. He who wishes to maintain the fourth way [n.46] can reply to the principal reasons adduced for the first part [nn.6-14]:

To the first [n.6]: the power (or the one with it) uses the habit, because [the habit] is itself a certain inclination to work; not indeed as a power active for acting, but as a prior form inclines to a posterior form, as heaviness to downwards.

88. To the four conditions [n.7]. It might be said that pleasure [nn.7-8] is from the agreement of the work with the power and the object which the work is about; which agreement is of the object with the power insofar as it receives the action, not insofar as it elicits it, because making alone as making never is pleasure, and therefore because of pleasure never would it be necessary to posit the idea of active principle [n.49]. – Likewise, ease, expedition, and promptitude [nn.7, 9-11] are posited by reason of the passive thing, because a passive thing can with difficulty receive when it is not disposed, and with impediment and slowly or not promptly, and by reason of the indisposition of the passive thing difficulty is there and slowness. Therefore, the agent can act expeditiously and promptly and easily because of the disposition of the passive thing, and

habit is such a disposition in the passive thing [nn.50-51]. When therefore it is said that ‘there is no facility for undergoing because the passive thing is supremely disposed’ [n.9], I reply: by abnegation of the contrary is it supremely disposed, but not by the positing of a fitting disposition. An example about dry and neutral wood: neutral wood indeed is supremely disposed to heat privatively, through lack of any opposed disposition whatever, – not however supremely disposed positively, by the positing of a fitting disposition of the sort dryness is; and if this fittingness were with sense, the dry wood would be heated with pleasure, not so the neutral wood, because the received form does not similarly agree with it.

89. To the other, about inclination [n.12], it could be said that it inclines as a prior form to receiving a posterior form, as heaviness inclines to being downwards (also according to those who say that heaviness with respect to descent downwards is not an active principle [n.69]); nor need what thus passively inclines be the idea of receiving the form to which it inclines, just as neither is heaviness a receptive principle ‘where’ [nn.53, 46].

90. To the other, about science [n.13], I say that science, by which the soul is reduced from essential potency to accidental, is the intelligible species of the object, and about that I concede that it is the active principle with respect to consideration [nn.83, 75]. But the species is not the habit we are speaking of, which is a certain quality left behind from acts frequently elicited; for the species itself naturally precedes the first act elicited about the object about which it is, and although this species could be rooted in the intellect and – when it has been rooted – could be called a habit, it is not however the habit which is generated from acts frequently elicited, as was said [n.90]. Therefore all the words that are spoken about the species as about a habit do not advance to understanding of this question, nor also do those words that take science for this species (the distinction of these habits, namely the habit which is the intelligible species and the habit of the intellective part properly speaking, will be plain in II d.3 p.2 q.3 n.15). Through the same point is clear the response to what is added about being ‘by which’ [n.13]: I say that science, taking it strictly for the habit acquired from speculations, is not properly that by which we speculate but a certain inclination to easily and pleasantly speculating; but that by which as by active principle – on the part of the object – we speculate is the intelligible species.

91. To the other [n.14] it can be said that the intellective habit – or the practical – can be called active or factive because it inclines to action; not that that action be of it as of active principle, but as if terminating the inclination of it, – such that it is either of the habituated power or of another power as active principle: just as choice ‘practically right’ is actively elicited by the will and not by prudence, which however is the practical habit with respect to that choice (because it inclines to it), although it not be the active principle of it.

E. To the Arguments for the Fifth Way

92. [To all of them together] – To the arguments adduced for the fifth way, which seem to show that moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is the active principle of an act insofar as it is moral [nn.56-59], I reply that moral goodness (as was said before [n.62]) in an act is the totality of all the conditions and circumstances, and this especially as

those conditions are dictated by right reason to have to be in the act. Simply necessary, therefore, is it for the moral goodness of a moral act that there precede it the complete dictate of right reason, to which dictate it be conform as measured to measure.

93. But it is not necessary that the dictate be from some intellectual habit, to wit from prudence, nor that the act conform to the dictate be elicited by some moral appetitive habit; for right dictate simply precedes prudence, because by it is generated the first degree of prudence, and thus right choice simply precedes moral habit, because by the choice is moral virtue generated in first degree: then, therefore, in first act and correctly does one dictate without generated prudence and rightly morally chooses without generated moral virtue. However prudence, generated from the first act or from several other right dictates, inclines more to eliciting the like dictates, that is, to rightly concluding conclusions of practical syllogisms about all the circumstances that ought to be present in eliciting the act; likewise moral virtue, generated after the first act, inclines more to eliciting acts similar to those from which it is generated.

94. However, one must understand that what is generated of moral virtue is a certain quality, of whose idea – as it is absolutely such quality – is not its conformity to prudence: for the same quality could be generated from similar acts in the same species, elicited without prudence (nay with erroneous reason if it existed [n.65]), but that quality – which is generated from these acts according to species of nature – is not a virtue from the fact it is this quality, but there is still necessarily required its conformity to prudence or, which is more express, its coexistence with prudence in the same worker [n.66]. For always indeed, whether prudence be present or not, the habit is of a nature to be conform to prudence if it existed (just as the habit of abstaining, generated from acts done from an erroneous reason, is always – as far as is of itself – of a nature to be conform to prudence, although prudence not be in it), in the way that another habit, generated from excessive acts, is not of a nature to be conform. When therefore the quality, which is of a nature to be conform to prudence, coexists with it, then not only does it have an aptitudinal conformity but an actual one with prudence, because each habit inclines to like things [n.93], – and the act elicited according to the inclination of these two habits is morally good; which if it were elicited according to the inclination of that quality alone which is materially moral virtue, with prudence not coexisting in the same worker nor inclining to the act, that act would not be morally good.

95. So therefore it is plain that the quality which is materially moral virtue (which by this has completely the idea of moral virtue, because it coexists with prudence) is related to prudence – when prudence is present – as second cause to first, and this in respect of the same common effect to be elicited by them; for then prudence is as it were prior cause, and moral habit as it were posterior cause. But these two causes, concurring together to elicit the act, can bestow on it the moral goodness which the habit alone could not second bestow if it were without prudence or right reason: to bestow indeed moral goodness is to bestow conformity to right reason – and this does that quality bestow,^a not from this, that it is quality only, but from this, because in causing it is coexistent with prudence inclining it at the same time.

a. *Note by Scotus*: “Nothing: the extreme [prudence] to which the other is referred does not effectively give anything to its correlative but only terminatively.” That is, as it seems: prudence does not make moral virtue to be the good habit or the habit of right desire it is, but rather directs that habit of right desire to the action that here and now is right.

96. It is plain, therefore, that the quality which is virtue [sc. materially so], from the fact it is virtue, does not have a special causality in respect of moral goodness in the act, but it only has – from the fact it is virtue – coexistence with a certain other cause [sc. prudence] of the same act, which cause, concurring at the same time for eliciting the act, bestows on the act moral goodness, because conformity to itself. Yet still then does that habit [sc. moral virtue materially] have no causality in respect of the act from this idea which is its coexistence with prudence, but only from idea of its own nature whereby it is this quality; and therefore in no way is any special causality to be conceded to the habit whence it is moral, beyond that which is conceded to it whence it is this habit [nn.66-67].

97. And it is to be noted that this goodness, as it is attributed to prudence thus inclining, does not, as was said at the beginning [nn.92-93], necessarily belong to the habit of prudence, nor to it solely, but to the act which would be of a nature to be an act of prudence which is right dictate: for if that be present, and according to it – as according to the measure – the appetite desires, the act is morally right; and if that right dictate were not present, yet prudence were present (according to which the intellect could dictate rightly), still the act – elicited without right dictate – would not be perfectly good. Therefore, when prudence is not present, there suffices for dictating the right act the act which is right dictate; but when prudence is present, it does not suffice without its elicited act, and so the rectitude, which prudence bestows on the moral act, it bestows by mediation of a proper act of prudence.

98. [To the individual arguments] – To the authorities, then, adduced for the fifth way, which seem to say that virtue, whence it is virtue, effectively causes the moral goodness of the act:

First to the remark from *Ethics* 2 that virtue “makes his work good” [n.56], I say that either it does so by giving inclination, and this belongs to it from this, that it is this quality in species of nature, – or, because this is not sufficient (for it would thus incline without prudence), it does so whereby it is virtue, that is, whereby coexistent with prudence; it does so indeed in its own genus of cause, because as second cause, – and this by virtue of a superior cause, which is prudence. If therefore the third way be held, to wit about the activity of the habit [n.32], then it does so actively, but as partial and second cause; but if the fourth way be held [n.46], then it does so by way of inclination, and this not from this alone that it inclines, but from this, that the virtue along with prudence-virtue inclines.

99. To the other, about ‘moderating’ [n.58], I say that moral virtue does not actively moderate passion as if it make it less when it is already made by the object: for a delightful object present naturally moves according to the ultimate of itself. But a habit can make an object less agreeable to an habituated power than it would be to a non-habituated power: for just as for the heavy it is more unfitting to be upwards than for a neutral body (although heaviness were not the active principle of descent), thus would to a power according to itself some pleasant excessive thing be agreeable, but to itself habituated by a habit inclining to moderate acts is that pleasant excessive thing disagreeable – or is not as pleasant and agreeable. And to this extent, as if by formal or virtual repugnance to the habit, the habit moderates the disagreeable or excessive object, lest the pleasant thing immoderately please; and from this does not follow any activity of

the habit, as neither of humidity in a piece of wood, although it do moderate lest the fire as immoderately or strongly heat as it does a dry body.

In another way can it be said that virtue moderates a passion not already generated or inherent but coming to be, to the extent it inclines the power – and this with coexisting prudence – to flee immoderate pleasant things that are of a nature to introduce immoderate pleasures, and to admit save pleasant things that are of a nature to give moderate pleasure. And in this indeed it does moderate, not by diminishing an existing pleasure within, but by warding off an immoderate pleasure in advance that would be present.

100. To the other, about this, that ‘without justice no one can operate justly’ [n.59], I reply: I say that in the first act, when there is a right dictate generative of prudence, and conformed to it is the choice of someone just [n.93], there the chooser not only does what is just but does it justly. But it must be understood that he operates non-justly – without justice – according to the whole perfection according to which someone could operate justly, one of which perfections is delectability and facility in operating, which does not belong to a non-habituated power as to an habituated power.

II. To the First Question

A. The Opinion which is Attributed to Peter Lombard

101. To the first question it is said to be the opinion of the Master [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.17 ch. 6 n.159] that only the Holy Spirit indwelling, without any mediate habit informing the will, moves it to meritorious act in a way other than he move it to belief and hope (because to belief and hope he moves it through the mediating habits of faith and hope), and thus is it said that [the Master] denied all created charity.

1. Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

102. For this conclusion it can be argued in two ways.

103. [First way] – The first way is taken from the imperfection of form or habit, or non-necessity for moving.

104. Where it is argued first as follows: as a natural act to a natural or acquired habit so seems an act of an infused habit to be to an infused habit; but an acquired habit bestows only pleasurable acting and facilitates the power for act (but it does not give the substance of the act), as is plain from the preceding question [nn.47-51, 88]; therefore in like manner an infused habit only bestows pleasurable working, or at any rate would bestow it if it were within. But a previous sinner now justified does not elicit with pleasure an act of loving God: for resistance by vices and continuation of good works seem as difficult to him as when he was in his sins, or not much easier, until by battle and victory over passions he has acquired some contrary habit, and then he may work with pleasure. So there is not any infused habit in the justified [sinner], because then he would use it with pleasure were it present within.

105. Further, if a supernatural good be shown to a will in purely natural state, it will sufficiently love the will because it sufficiently has the object close to it; therefore is not required any infused habit for loving supernatural good. The assumption is proved, because if a lesser good shown to the will has whence it can be loved, then also does a

greater good; therefore if the will in its purely natural state can love something, it can love the supreme good if it be shown to it.

106. Further, the act of loving that would be of that supernatural habit would also be supernatural, and so it would be created immediately (for supernatural things are not produced in being by any change from something, but only by creation), and if the act were created then it does not presuppose anything for its production.

107. Further, it is possible to use a habit when the possessor wants (Averroes above, *On the Soul* com.18); but no one experiences himself able to use this habit when he wants; for he cannot, when he wants, pleasurably and easily elicit fervent acts of loving God, – as is plain of contemplatives, who sometimes with some effort experience themselves having great devotion, and sometimes with equal effort lesser devotion or none.

108. [Second way] – The second way is taken from the fact the Holy Spirit suffices to cause motion without a habit.

109. Whereby it is argued first as follows: the first cause has power of itself for what it has power for with a second cause, which second cause is only an agent cause (or the major is taken thus: ‘the first cause has power of itself for whatever it has power for with a second cause that is not of the essence of the thing’; I add this because of form and matter in a composite thing, – for God cannot make a composite thing without the intrinsic parts composing it); but a habit, if it is present, does not have necessary causality with respect to acts save in some mode of agent cause (at least it is plain that not of formal cause nor of material cause ‘of which’ [*Prologue* n.188]); therefore its causality is extrinsic. Therefore whatever the Holy Spirit can cause with the habit in the act, this he can cause without the habit: plurality without necessity does not seem it should be posited,¹⁹ because it is superfluous, – therefore, etc.

110. Further, with a will having a habit must the Holy Spirit cooperate so that it act according to it, otherwise he would not be the first cause in every action of a creature; but he does not cooperate because the will has the habit, because then a created will would be using the Holy Spirit as second cause, and the Holy Spirit would not be the first cause but a quasi second cause with respect to the will having the habit, because he would be determined by the habit of the will to co-acting with the will; therefore on the contrary, because he cooperates with the will, therefore does the will operate according to the habit. But the Holy Spirit can equally cooperate with a will – in the first instant of nature – not having charity as with a will having it; therefore etc.

111. Besides, the Son of God is so united to our nature that he did the works of that nature in such way that those acts were truly said to be of the Son of God as of acting supposit; and yet by this was there no derogation from the assumed nature so as it not also be principle of its own operations. Therefore, by similarity, the Holy Spirit can in some way be united to the will so that he himself do the works of the will and there not be thereby derogation from the nature of the will in idea of operative principle, so that it cannot be principle of its own operations.

112. Further, the intellect is more passive than the will, and less active; therefore it more needs something actuating it so that it have power for its act. But the intellect is posited as being capable of the beatific vision, without any form informing it, from this

¹⁹ An anticipation of Ockham’s razor, so called, namely that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

alone that the essence of God is present to it as it were by way of form [n.193]; therefore much more does the will have power for all its acts, without any form informing it, by the fact the Holy Spirit is for it as it were the form for act of loving.

2. Arguments against the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

113. Against this conclusion [n.101], whether it be according to the intention of the Master or not, argument is made in two ways assumed from the faith: the first is taken from the justification of the sinner or from divine acceptance, and this without any elicited act, – the second from the idea of a meritorious act [cf. nn.116-117, 120].

114. [First way] – From the first way it is argued thus: a sinner before repentance is unjust, after repentance just, as Scripture commonly calls a sinner ‘unjust’ and him freed from sin ‘just’. – From this it is argued: injustice, since it is formally a privation, cannot be taken away from anyone unless be given to him the opposite habit, because ‘to deprive of a privation’ is to posit a habit, because they are opposites immediately about what is naturally apt (*Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a33, 55b3-6); the soul is naturally apt for receiving justice; therefore he justified, made from unjust just, receives a habit opposite to the privation: for if nothing were formally in him more now than before, no more would he lack privation now than he lacked it before.

115. Besides, a sinner before penitence is unworthy of eternal life and after penitence he is worthy of eternal life; but he is not worthy save by something formally inhering in him, to which, according to the rules of divine justice, eternal life is judged should be rendered, and nothing such did he have before; therefore, something positive is in the just formally, by which he is worthy of eternal life.

116. Further, God does not accept a sinner for eternal life; he does accept the justified. I ask then what is ‘to accept for eternal life’? It is not ‘to will – with the will of being well pleased – to beatify him then’, because then he would at once beatify; therefore this is ‘to will the just – in accord with the disposition that he now has – to be worthy of such reward’, whom before he did not will to be worthy of such reward. This diversity, as it seems, cannot be posited in the divine will, because nothing is there new, because it is immutable; therefore because of diversity on the part of him, because for him, disposed in all the same way, the divine will wills that he be disposed in the same way.

117. This reason is confirmed [n.116], because divine volition, which is one act in itself, does not have the idea of opposite or distinct acts – as to will and to non-will – without any distinction of connoted objects; for this ‘divine willing’ is not some willing of being well-pleased – and likewise non-willing – unless the objects be distinguished, otherwise contradictories will be true in the absence of any distinction causing the truth; therefore, since God wills him justified for some existence for which he does not will a sinner, because of which difference he is said ‘to love the just’ and ‘to hate sinners’ in Scripture [*Proverbs* 15.9; *Ecclesiastes* 12.3, 7; *Psalms* 5.7], it follows that this distinction – according to idea on the part of divine volition – necessarily require an actual distinction on the part of the objects themselves. In one way, then, is he disposed in himself when he is said to be ‘beloved of God’ or ‘accepted for eternal life’, in another way when ‘hated’.

118. Lastly is it argued thus according to this way [n.113, the first], because if nothing else is in his soul after penitence than before, it does not seem that he is in any other way disposed to God, nor God to him, because this otherness does not seem to be because of any change made on the part of God. Therefore, if it be conceded, as seems necessary, that in some way he is differently disposed to God, and conversely, this is because of a change in him, – and so something will come to be in him formally *de novo*; but faith and hope do not come to be in him *de novo*, because they have remained in a sinner, – therefore charity.

119. It could also be argued according to this [first] way, that God, offended at the sinner before, remits the offence to him afterwards penitent; this is not because of any change of the divine will (as can be in me when I remit an offense); therefore it is by this, that he to whom the offense is remitted is differently disposed in himself.

120. But this argument is not conclusive, as will be plain in d.16,²⁰ where it will be said that God remits the offense to the sinner first in nature before he give him grace [cf. IV d.16 q.2 n.19]. Whence the arguments – if any according to this first way [n.113] are valid – are to be accepted out of passive acceptance and out of order or dignity for eternal life, which belong to the justified and not the sinner, as was argued before [n.119]; but not out of mere remission of offense [n.113], which in itself is less than to be just.

121. [Second way] – From the second way, from the idea, that is, of meritorious act [n.113], it is argued as follows:

Nothing is said to act formally in any action unless the principle of the action be the form of the agent; this is taken from *On the Soul* 2.2.414a12-14 where, from the fact the soul is ‘that whereby we live and sense’ etc. [n.13], the soul is concluded to be act and form of what thus acts; therefore, since meritorious action is of the will, or of man operating through will, it follows that that by which he meritoriously acts is his form. But this by which he meritoriously acts cannot be pure nature, because then he could from natural powers alone meritoriously act, which seems to be the error of Pelagius; therefore something supernatural is required: not faith or hope, it is plain, because these remain in a sinner, – therefore charity.²¹

122. Further, no action is in the power of an agent unless it have the form by which it could act: for if by something co-assisting it (extrinsic only) that is not in its power, such action is not in its power, just as neither is the co-assistance of that extrinsic thing in its power. But that the Holy Spirit co-assists the will is not in the power of the will, just as neither is universally the action of a superior cause in the power of an inferior cause. Therefore, if from that co-assistance alone it could act, and if it not have in itself the form by which it could sufficiently proceed into meritorious act, it follows that the meritorious act would not be in its power, – which seems unacceptable.

123. Further, if the Holy Spirit move the will specifically in meritorious action, it follows that the motion is cause of something in the will itself and that the will with respect to it does not have any causality but only passive reception; either then that is the act of loving, and so it follows that the act of loving in no way be from the will; or it is something else which naturally precedes the act of loving, – and that I call ‘habit’, because a perfection prior to act in a power (habituated or habituable) seems to be a habit.

²⁰ Vatican editors: an empty space was left by Scotus in place of ‘16’.

²¹ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Sent.* I q.1 corp., who makes the same argument.

124. Further, fourth, greater is the identity of the Father with the Son than could any union whatever be of the Holy Spirit to the will; but because of this identity it is not said the Father works anything for the Son, as is plain according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2,²² because ‘the Father is not wise by generated wisdom’; therefore much more neither will the will be said to work anything because of the union of ‘the Holy Spirit working’ with regard to it.

B. Scotus’ own Response

125. For the solution of this question three things need to be looked at: first whether some supernatural habit needs to be posited that gives grace to a nature capable of being beatified; second whether it is simply necessary to posit such a habit so that such a nature may be beatified; and third what the Master thought on this question, because of the many things imputed to him.

1. Whether some Supernatural Habit needs to be Posited that gives Grace to a Nature Capable of being Beatified

126. [A supernatural habit bestowing grace is present within] – As to the first article [n.125] it can be said that from no act which we experience, neither from the substance of the act, nor from the intensity of the act, nor from the pleasure or from the ease in doing, nor from the goodness or from the moral rectitude of the act, can we conclude some such supernatural habit is present within – because in any given one of these could someone having charity know that he is with certitude in charity, namely from the fact he would experience the act to be in him, or from the fact he would experience an act so intense to be in him, or so delightfully and easily to be present, or to be consonant with right reason.

127. Now the reason why it cannot be concluded from the act, or from any condition of the act that such a habit exists within, is because either an act can of its own power alone have all the aforesaid when right reason concurs (as by holding the fourth way set down in the preceding solution [n.46]), or if some habit were to concur because of some condition of the aforesaid [n.126] it could be some acquired habit: for acquired friendship could give as much intensity to the act (as second cause, with the power as first cause [n.40]), could also bestow as much pleasure and ease, could also be a habit so consonant with right reason that an elicited act would have no evidently apparent condition from which it would necessarily be concluded that it is elicited according to supernatural habit.

128. But if you say ‘the will is suddenly moved so as to operate intensely, easily and pleurably, and this in a way consonant with supernatural reason (that is, with dictate of faith), but it cannot itself suddenly acquire a habit of ordered friendship consonant with faith, therefore it has some habit non-acquired whereby it is inclined suddenly to acting’, – I reply: the will can be suddenly enough moved as to natural acts, which are totally subject to its power, because – as Augustine says *Retractions* I ch.22 n.4

²² Vatican editors: a blank space was left here by Scotus.

– “nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself”; therefore from such suddenness can the thing proposed not be concluded.

129. I say, therefore, that beyond all the aforesaid conditions, namely beyond the intensity of the act, the delightfulness and ease in acting, rectitude or goodness and the conformity with right reason (right either according to the dictate of prudence or according to the dictate of faith), beyond – I say – all these, that one condition is in the act that is matter of belief, namely that it is acceptable to God; not indeed only with the common acceptance by which God accepts every creature (by which way too he wills the act substrate to sin, otherwise it would not be from him), but with a special acceptance, which is in the divine will the ordination of this sort of act to eternal life, as of condign merit for reward. And in this way do we believe our beatificable, just nature to be habitually accepted, – that is that, when it is not actually operating, still however does the divine will order it to eternal life as worthy of so great a good, according to the disposition that it has habitually in itself. And because of this habitual acceptance of beatificable nature even when not operating, and because of actual acceptance of the act elicited by such a nature, it is necessary to posit one supernatural habit whereby he who has it be formally accepted by God and whereby his elicited act be accepted as meritorious. Thus does not seem to be accepted a nature or act without any informing habit, because – according to what has been argued [nn.116-117, 122] – God does not seem to have a volition other in idea about an object in no way diversified [nn.116-117]; nor even would an act ‘as acceptable to God’ seem to be in the power of an agent unless that by which he were formally to act were the form of it [n.122].

130. [Doubt 1] – But there is a doubt how this habit be a reason for accepting nature and act.

131. The reason indeed for accepting nature seems to be as a certain comeliness of nature pleasing to the divine will, so that, whether this habit be posited as active or non-active, from this alone, that it is such a form beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be reason for acceptance and accepting nature.

132. But for the acceptance of an act more is required than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness, otherwise he who has such a habit could not have any act that was indifferent, nor sin venially, which is unacceptable [II d.41 q. un nn.3-4]. – The consequence is proved because neither of these [indifferent acts and venial sin] takes away the comeliness of the actor, and so each would be accepted if the act were accepted from the sole comeliness the actor.

133. It is necessary, then, to say that this habit, besides the fact it is a spiritual comeliness, also inclines to determinate acts, and this either non-actively, according to the fourth way posited in the preceding solution [n.46] – or (which more appears) actively, according to the third way [n.32].

134. Which is proved:

First, because otherwise it would seem that without it could be had a very intense act of loving God, and this both as wayfarer and in the fatherland, and thus have beatitude; for in the instant of nature in which an act is elicited by an active principle, if the will alone were there the active principle, it would be a principle ‘insofar as active’ equally perfect without the habit as with it, and the power itself could, with equal effort, do the act (as is plain [n.70]); therefore a most perfect act of loving God without such a habit could be had.

135. The same is proved secondly, because otherwise it would not seem to be true what Augustine says [Pseudo-Augustine *Hypognosticon* III ch.1 n.20] about free choice, that ‘grace is related to free choice as a rider to a horse’, because a rider actively directs and moves the horse, in some way or other. – Nor even that which he says in a letter to Boniface [Augustine, *Epist.* 186 *ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10]: “With the will,” he says, “accompanying, not going ahead. a foot follower, not a mistress.” Now the will would not be a foot follower of grace if grace itself had no causality.^a

a. *Note by Scotus*: “It is posited [St. Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines] that for a meritorious act the will with charity does not suffice but a special influence is required, – not of permanent form but of motion, just as does an instrument have from the principal agent beyond its own form.

The first reason: a natural form is given to something so that it might act, because such action is proportioned to it; grace is not given to us so that we might act but so that we might be acted on (*Romans* 8.14: “as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God”), and this because such action is not proportioned. – A confirmation comes from *John* 4.14: “the water that I shall give him shall be in him a fount of water springing up” etc. An example: grace is like weight, not like art; weight is not an operative principle, grace is like the spherical shape given to a mass of lead. Another example: grace is compared to the active generative force of a mother; a mother has this (because she has a human soul), but in diminished way and not able to act unless she be moved by the active force of the father.

Second reason: grace now does not perfectly heal nature. The point is taken from Augustine *On Nature and Grace* I ch.26 n.29, where he says in general: ‘as the healthy eye cannot see without light, so neither can even the just soul live rightly without the spiritual light’. – A confirmation comes from *Romans* 7.25 about ‘the law of the flesh’; similarly 8.26 ‘we know not what we should pray for as we ought’ and ‘the Spirit makes intercession’. Third reason: an act is considered as from free choice, as by it informed by grace, as third – beyond this – moved by the Holy Spirit. In the first way it is not even worthy of a reward; in the second way it is worthy (just as is also a baptized child) but not condign (*John* 4.14: ‘a well springing up’ whose water does not rise above its beginning); in the third way therefore condign.”

136. [Doubt 2] – But then there is a further doubt about this habit compared to the operating power – namely which of these should be called first cause and which second.

137. For it seems from what has been said [n.135] that grace is first cause.

138. But the opposite seems:

First, because power uses habit and not conversely.

139. Second, because action would not be free if grace were first cause; for the will would be moved naturally, because grace would move it naturally, – and just as the will would not be freely moved, so neither would it freely act, since it would not act save because moved.

140. Third, because the will would not seem – once having grace – ever able to sin, because a second cause always follows the inclination of the first cause, nor can it be moved to the opposite of that to which the first cause inclines it.

141. Similarly, fourth, the will is more unlimited for acts than is this habit; unlimitedness to several effects seems to belong to the superior cause [cf. nn.33-39].

142. Here it can be said that in a meritorious act (about which the discussion now is [nn.129-135]) I consider two things, namely: that which precedes the idea of the meritorious, and in this grade are included both the substance of the act and its moral

intensity and rectitude; beyond this I consider also the very idea of the meritorious, which is to be accepted by the divine will in order to a reward, or to be acceptable or worthy to be accepted.

143. This second member would be truer if the act were completely a merit through something that is in the one meriting; to accept is not in him but is a divine action; but divine action does not seem *per se* required for merit. – Which is also proved because in respect of this sort of being accepted there seems to be merit [sc. in him who merits], for some act is worthy to be accepted, another not; therefore before ‘accepted’ be understood, there is something in the act whereby it is worthy to be accepted; therefore then is there in it the idea of merit, at least with respect to acceptation.

144. On the contrary: the idea of merit is not completely had unless the idea is had of ‘worthy’ or ‘worthily ordainable’ for reward (which is beatitude), and this ‘worthily’ according to commutative or retributive justice; but no act at all, from intrinsic agents alone, has this order (for then God could not fail to reward him who has so acted with beatitude unless he unjustly subtract it from him, – this is false); therefore such order according to justice is from the divine will alone gratuitously ordering it, and thus the idea of merit will be complete from the divine will ordering this act to reward.

145. And as to what is said about the second member, that ‘divine action is not of the idea of merit’ [n.143], – I reply: the relation in the action of him who merits to divine action is of the idea of merit, which relation is not of someone meriting without divine action.

146. If you say that ‘then it is not in the power of him who merits to merit, just as neither in his power is divine action’, similarly ‘more principally will the meriting belong to God than to me, because what is more principal in merit is from divine action’, – to the first: the act which is merit is in my power, general influence being supposed, if I have the use of free choice and grace; but completeness in idea of merit is not in my power save dispositively, although dispositively such that from divine disposition there always follows that which is complete for my acting, just as animation always follows on the organization done by a natural cause. By the same is it plain to the second, that although what is more principal – that is, ultimate and complete – in merit be from God, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore God merits’, because merit is an act of a free power and, elicited according to the gift of grace, accepted by God as rewardable with beatitude – and therefore to merit is thus to act; God does not thus act.

147. On the contrary: at least what is more principal in merit is from God. – I reply: if ‘more principal’ be called ultimate complete, let it be conceded; if it be called first reality or more perfect reality, let it be denied, because an act is something absolute and prior in nature to ‘that passive acceptation’, and is more a being than it.

148. To that which was adduced second for the second member, that ‘the act merits to be accepted’ [n.143] – I reply: in this there is an idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, because the ordination of an act to beatitude is not as to a reward justly rendered for such act, – and let it be conceded that that passive divine acceptation is not included in the idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, just as it is not required in the idea of merit by congruity, in the way the contrite merits to be justified.

149. And what has been just said [nn.144-148] must be understood of divine eternal acceptance by which God, foreseeing from eternity this act needs to be elicited from such principles, willed it to be ordered to a reward and, by act of his will ordering it

to reward, willed that it will be merited; which however considered in itself, without such divine acceptance, would not according to strict justice have been worthy of such reward from the intrinsic goodness that it would have from its own principles: which is plain because always is a reward a greater good than merit, and strict justice does not render a greater for a lesser one. Therefore it is well said that God always rewards beyond condign worth, indeed universally beyond the worth of the act which is merit, – because that it be condign merit, this is beyond its intrinsic nature and goodness from gratuitous divine acceptance; and perhaps further, beyond that other which of common law would be an act to be accepted, whenever God reward it out of pure liberality.

150. Further, just as in a meritorious act are the two aforesaid things (namely the substance of the act with rectitude, and the idea of merit [n.142]), likewise the habit of grace is a certain quality, – and the proof is because besides the relation which it has to right reason insofar as it is a habit morally good, it has a special relation to the divine will accepting it or the subject having it.

151. This habit according to its substance inclines actively to act, and this actively as partial cause (holding the third way in the preceding solution [n.32]), and in this causality the habit is second cause and the power first cause, as was said in the preceding solution about habit in general and power, positing the habit ‘active’ [n.40]; and this do the reasons already adduced prove [nn.138-141].

152. But taking act according to idea of [being] meritorious, it can be said that this condition principally belongs to the act from the habit and less principally from the will; for an act is more accepted as worthy of reward because it is elicited by charity than because it is freely elicited by the will, although both be necessarily required. An example of this can be posited of division of some body by means of a knife: the cutting, to be sure, is absolutely more from the moving power of the divider than from the knife, and therefore a stronger moving power divides more quickly; but yet insofar as this division is compared to sight under the idea of being acceptable (as ‘whom it pleases’) it is more attributed to the knife, because the smoothness of the divided parts, which pleases sight, is more from the sharpness of the instrument than from the efficacy of the strength principally dividing. Likewise, a sound is more from the percussing of the sounding body than from the order of the percussing, and yet, as acceptable to hearing, it is more from the order of the percussing than from the efficacy of the percussing power; nay a percussing virtue could be more efficacious and less acceptable, indeed altogether not acceptable, to hearing because it is not a harmonious sound. Another example: if the father is the principal cause in respect of the son and the mother less principal, yet she can be a more principal cause of the son insofar as he is loved or lovable by someone, so that the son is more loved because he is of the mother as bearer than because he is of the father begetting.

153. So it is possible that God has ordained to accept some act as worthy of reward – or as acceptable or to be accepted – because some habit inclines to that act as partial active principle of it, and which because of this is more principally accepted or is acceptable than because it is from the remaining partial cause.

154. According to this then [nn.152-153] can the remark of Augustine be suitably expounded, ‘charity is like rider to horse’ [cf. n.135], and the remark too that ‘the will in respect of grace follows on foot behind and not ahead’; this indeed is true in respect of the act insofar as it is meritorious, but not insofar as it is the act ‘in substance’.

155. And the first example [i.e. rider to horse] would be altogether similar if the horse were free and the rider were by way of nature directing the horse to a certain end. The horse's course could please more, and this to some ordained will, by the fact it was according to the natural inclination of the rider to a certain end than from the fact the horse by its own motive force was running quickly. Then too could the horse of its own liberty throw off the rider, or move itself to something else beside the rider's direction to the end; and in the first case indeed the horse would become altogether non-acceptable, because it would not have the rider because of whom it would be accepted by such will, – in the second case, although such a horse would be acceptable, yet its course would not be accepted, because it would not be according to the direction of the rider. – In this way is it in the matter at hand. The will is as it were the free horse, and grace as it were the rider by way of nature, inclining it to an object in determinate way: in accord with this sort of inclination would the course of the will be pleasing, – another course would not be pleasing, as when there is venial sin or an indifferent act; but when the rider is thrown off, which happens through mortal sin, the will is altogether made displeasing.

156. In this way too the will is a foot follower, because it does not of itself as determinately incline to the term (on account of which inclination the act is accepted) as grace inclines, and the will can participate that by grace because that belongs to grace more by essence than to the will; and in this is the will a second cause, not that in causing 'something intrinsic to the act' it is second cause but in being that because of which the act is accepted, which states a respect of it to what is extrinsic: certainly it is possible enough that because of the more principal cause of the effect there belongs to the effect some relation *ad extra* less principally than because of its less principal cause, as is plain in the examples set down above [n.152].²³

157. Now this habit, just like any other moral habit too, has to incline itself determinately to the object – or to the end – by virtue of the object which it in some way participates; for just as an intellectual habit has in some way in itself the object as present to it under the idea of intelligible object, so a moral habit has in some way in itself the object under the idea of lovable good, – and so, just as the former has by virtue of the object to act in some way in the presence of the object, so the latter by virtue of the object in some way contained has to incline to the object; from this appears how the habit more determinately inclines to the object than the power does, because it more determinately includes the object.

158. And according to this [n.157] it could also be said that the partial causality which is attributed to the habit [nn151, 40, 32] belongs to it from the part by which the object is said to be active in respect of the action and not from the part by which the power is said to be active, because a habit more has its force from the object which it determinately includes than from the power.

159. And if it be then argued, as was argued in the aforesaid solution, that 'the habit determines and inclines the power, therefore it is a prior cause' [n.34], – look for the response there [n.85].

²³ As that the directing of the horse to an end by the rider, which is a relation to something extrinsic to the horse caused by a more principal cause (for the rider is such a more principal cause), is less principally a property of the horse than the running of the horse (for the running belongs more to the horse than the direction of the running), which running is caused by the less principal cause that is the horse itself.

2. Whether a Supernatural Habit giving Grace should be posited for this, that a Nature Capable of Beatification be Beatified

160. About the second article [n.125] I say that God of his absolute power could well have accepted a nature capable of beatification – with the special acceptance stated before [n.129] – existing in its pure natural state; and similarly its act, for which there was a purely natural inclination, he could have accepted as meritorious. But he is not believed so to have made disposition that pure nature or its act he would thus accept, because that ‘an act from purely natural resources is meritorious’ comes close to the error of Pelagius [n.121]. Therefore it is more likely believed that he accepts nature and its act as meritorious through a supernatural habit.

161. But here is a double doubt.

One, how something in created nature could be a reason why it may be accepted by the divine will (either absolutely or in such way [sc. of special acceptance]), since nothing in a creature is a reason for a divine act, neither in itself nor as it tends above such object.

162. Another doubt, because, when every supernatural gift of God has been excluded, it is possible to distinguish between friend and enemy, – so that he be called enemy in whom is sin not destroyed (and so offense remains), and he be called a non-enemy in whom is not offense; but before conferring of any supernatural gift could offense be dismissed for someone an enemy before, as will be said in IV d.16.

163. I reply.²⁴ A non-enemy is not a ‘friend’; because someone who pardons another an offense – by the fact he no longer seeks punishment for the offense – becomes no longer his enemy; but not because of this does it follow that he at once recover him as a friend, nor that he reject him as an enemy contrarily, but negatively, that he neither will him evil as an enemy nor good as a friend.

164. As then to this article [n.162], it is not necessary to posit a supernatural habit conferring grace speaking of necessity regarding God’s absolute power (especially since he could give beatitude without any preceding merit), although however this be necessary speaking of the necessity that regards God’s ordained power, which ordaining we collect in Scripture and from the sayings of the Saints, where we have it that a sinner is not worthy of eternal life and a just man worthy.

3. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard

165. As to the third article [n.125], it could be said that the Master does not deny all supernatural habit. He himself indeed, in d.37 of the first book, in the chapter ‘That also is marvelous’ [ch.2 n.338], adduces Augustine to Dardanus [*On the Foreknowledge of God* ch.6 n.21] saying that “to the temple of God belong sanctified children, who are not able to know God”; therefore God dwells in a child who, however, cannot have an elicited act about God. This indwelling, which belongs to a regenerated child and not to another, cannot be without a supernatural habit in the child: for neither can it be posited because of an act, because such does [a child] not have (nor can have), nor because of

²⁴ Vatican editors: this response is to n.162, the response to the doubt in n.161 being omitted.

nature alone, because [God] does not indwell another non-regenerated child, although however in him be the same nature.

166. Likewise, in d.26 of book II, ch.1 nn.228-229, he seems to posit created grace in the soul.

167. Therefore it can be said that the Master has posited one habit whereby, when it informs the soul, the Holy Spirit indwells and as indwelling, perfects as it were the soul's powers with supernatural habits: two [powers] indeed – namely intellect and will – with faith and hope, for believing and hoping; but the will with no other habit – for act of love – other than with that by which he is said to indwell, because the act of loving is so perfect that it can be attributed immediately to the habit where, when it formally inheres, the Holy Spirit indwells, as by the most perfect habit. Not thus can acts of believing and hoping be attributed immediately to the habit through which the Holy Spirit indwells, on account of the imperfection of those acts and the perfection of the habit whereby the Holy Spirit indwells the mind; for that ought to be so perfect that not even in the fatherland will it be removed, when the soul will be the temple of the Lord; for then will believing and hoping not remain [n.101].

168. And in this way do the authorities from Augustine [nn.1-3] make for the Master, not that no supernatural habit be formally gracing the soul but that no other than that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, in the way in which the habit of believing and hoping is other than the habit by which he indwells; and this will be plain by solving the reasons that are adduced for the first part of the question [nn.171-177].

169. According to this, then, does [the Master] not seem to disagree with others save because either they posit grace to be a habit other than charity, or at least say that this habit – which really is grace – is formally in the will and not in the essence of the soul, because then would the Holy Spirit not indwell by one as it were radical habit with respect to faith and hope as they first come to be, but would indwell by a habit formally inherent, informing the will, which would in some order of nature be posterior to faith and hope.

170. But by holding that the same habit really is charity and grace [II d.27 q. un nn.3-4], it seems that this habit informs the essence of the soul first, and thus from the Holy Spirit, indwelling the essence of the soul, would the virtues informing the powers first flow, – or let it be in the will formally, faith and hope being already presupposed in the powers (about this in II *Suppl.* d.26 q. un); at any rate charity does not seem to be a different habit really from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, and so the Holy Spirit does not thus through a 'middle' habit [n.101] – supply 'habit other than that by which he indwells' – move to loving as he moves to believing and hoping.

C. To the Principal Arguments

171. To the principal arguments [nn.1-6].

To the first [n.1] I say that the argument of Augustine holds thus: 'everyone loving his neighbor loves his love formally, if he turn himself toward it; but everyone loving his love formally loves the Holy Spirit who is love by essence; therefore everyone loving his brother loves the Holy Spirit who is love by essence'. – The second proposition in order (which however would be the major, by disposing it in a syllogism) is proved as follows, because everyone in ordered way loving the less good ought more to

love something more good, above all when in the lesser good there is no idea of lovability save from the greater good; but my love is formally a lesser good than the love by essence which is the Holy Spirit, and above all from that love does it have the idea of lovability. The reason, then, of Augustine has to be reduced to two syllogisms thus: ‘he who loves his love-act loves love by essence; but he who loves his neighbor loves his love-act; therefore he who loves his neighbor loves love by essence. But God is this sort of love; therefore etc.’^a

a. Text cancelled by Scotus: “This argument of Augustine, then, proves that God is to be loved and yet not that he be my love formally, nor that there not be in me another love formally. There must, to be sure, be two syllogisms understood in Augustine’s argument, one of which is: ‘he who loves his brother loves the love by which he formally loves; but that is participated love; therefore he loves participated love’. Further, there is another syllogism: ‘he who loves participated love must love love by essence; God is love by essence; therefore etc.’” The Vatican editors note that this text must be considered as cancelled by virtue of what is added at the end of n.171, “The reason, then, of Augustine has to be reduced to...”

172. About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift [n.2], it could be said that the argument holds thus: ‘no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply and not, from the idea of itself, including imperfection or limitations’. – This consequence is proved, because more eminent than any gift that is not perfection simply is another gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit by the fact he himself is the simply most excellent gift, and thereby God (because God can give himself), and so the most excellent gift is God; therefore the Holy Spirit, from the fact he is the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But with this stands that this ‘perfection simply’ is in us participated and essentially other than that divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.

173. Absolutely, then, the arguments of Augustine [nn.1-2] presuppose [i.e. according to nn.171-172] that God is formally charity and love, – not only effectively, as he is effectively ‘hope’ or ‘my patience’ [n.3], because he effects patience as a non-perfection simply, and so not agreeing with himself formally; but charity he effects in the soul – and love – as a perfection simply, and therefore agreeing with himself formally. In which way does he in one way make humanity in a man and in another way goodness: from this, to be sure, that he makes humanity, it does not follow that he be formally man, but only the effective cause of man; but from the fact he effects goodness it does follow that he be formally goodness, – and the reason is because every perfection simply that is in the caused is reduced to the cause formally having that perfection. Not so of limited perfection.²⁵

174. But what do these authorities [nn.1-3], so understood [n.173], do for the proposal of the Master [nn.165-170]?

I reply that the habit by which the soul is inclined to loving meritoriously is a perfection simply, insofar as that ‘perfection simply’ belongs to the Holy Spirit; it follows therefore that this habit could be an immediate habit with respect to the love that is

²⁵ In this way would Scotus, like other scholastics, seem to show and preserve the idea from Platonism that good things are good by participation in the perfect form of goodness, while setting aside the more expansive Platonism that men are men by participation in the perfect form of man.

perfection simply, and hereby does the Holy Spirit – as indwelling through this habit – more immediately cause that act than acts of belief or hope, with respect to which there cannot be any proximate cause that is a perfection simply.

175. But against this response it is argued:

First, that the proposition is false on which it relies, namely that ‘more eminent or more perfect than any perfection non-simply in creatures is some perfection simply’ [n.172]; for it seems to have an instance about the essence of the supreme angel, which is not a perfection simply and yet no nobler thing than it seems to exist in the whole of creation.

176. Besides, the intention and reason of Augustine seem badly adduced for the intention of the Master [n.174], because from the first reason [n.1] is had that the Holy Spirit is formally love by essence [n.171], and from the second [n.2] is had – if it has any validity – that the Holy Spirit is formally charity by essence [n.172]. How then from this would it be inferred that there is not in us any habitual love, or charity, other than the habit by which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell? The habit indeed by which the Holy Spirit indwells either is not a perfection simply but some limited perfection, – or if it is, it does not follow but that another habit than it could be posited as proximate principle of eliciting my act of loving meritoriously, for that act is limited and a limited ‘perfection’; otherwise Augustine’s reason cannot be spoken of as to what the Master proposed.²⁶

177. To the other argument [n.9] it is plain how charity is good by participation from I d.8 q.4 n.213, where is expounded how a simple form participates its cause.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion that is Attributed to Peter Lombard.

178. To the arguments for the opinion that is imposed on the Master, that namely it denies a supernatural habit giving grace [nn.101-112].

179. [To the arguments for the first way] – To the first [n.104] I say that this habit gives acting acceptably [nn.150, 129], and also gives some activity with respect to the act, as a second cause in respect of it [n.151]; but it does not give acting pleurably or easily, which belong to an acquired habit insofar as it is distinguished from an infused habit, on account of this, that it is acquired from acting frequently.

180. To the second [n.105], although some say that the will in its purely natural state can have no act about a supernatural object seen bare, yet this was rejected in I d.1 nn.88-89, 141-142. Therefore I concede that [the will] could have an act about such object shown whether bare or through act of faith, – but an act about an object shown by faith would not be meritorious, because it would not be according to the inclination of that habit according to which alone God disposes to accept the act; nor too in the fatherland would there be beatitude, because [the act] would not be as perfect as could be had by such power if the power were perfect proportionately to a supernatural habit.

181. And if you object that the act about the seen divine essence could be so perfect that it would totally quieten the will, because it would be elicited according to the total effort of it and consequently would be beatific, – which seems also because such a will would have ‘whatever it wanted and would want nothing badly’ (and this is ‘to be blessed’ according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.5 n.8), – I reply that not only

²⁶ Vatican editors: no response was given by Scotus to these two objections [nn.175-176].

would that will not be blessed because it would not have whatever it would want in the way it ought to want it (for it ought want ‘to love acceptably’ and this it would not have), but also it would not be blessed because it would not have an act as perfect as would belong to it in the grade of its nature. For no power capable of being habituated can have an act as perfect without that habit as with the habit [nn.40, 70, following the third way, n.32]; rather, the more perfect the power, the less can it have an act proportional to its perfection, if it lack all habit, because from the fact that the geometrical proportion of two unequal powers is similar to proportionally perfective habits, there will therefore be another proportion, arithmetical proportion – and thus simply will a more perfect power fail more, if it not be habituated, than an inferior and more imperfect power [III *Suppl.* d.27 q. un. n.19].

182. As to what is also added, that ‘it has whatever it wants’, – I reply: not with as much volition as it can in ordered way desire the object with. For it can in ordered way desire to have it with an act as great as would belong to it from the nature of the power and the habit proportional to it, and not merely with an act as perfect as belongs to it from its purely natural state; now it would not have [sc. whatever it wants] in the first way but only in the second.

183. Against this [nn.181-182]:

It seems then that no will would be blessed that did not have the greatest charity it was capable of.

184. Further, as was argued in the preceding solution [n.30], from the reason by which a power in the supreme grade of the power is perfect, it is capable of the supreme act such that nothing is lacking to it from lack of the habit; therefore for a will in any grade nothing is lacking to it in that grade because of lack of habit.

185. To the first [183] I say that it cannot in ordered way will to have the beatific object with a greater act than corresponds to its merits; such is not the greatest ‘of which it is capable’, though always greater than what it could have existing in its purely natural state.

186. To the second [184] I say that an infinite will contains eminently in itself by identity every perfection or the total perfection of the habit, and so it gives no lesser perfection to the act because it is not understood to be informed with the habit; but a finite power does not include by identity a habit proportional to itself, and so it can fail of the proportion that agrees with it in acting, if it not be perfected by the habit.

187. To the third [n.106] I say that this act is not created, speaking properly of creation: both because with respect to it there concurs some second active cause, but creation belongs to the first agent alone without a second cause, – and because there is presupposed here something that is receptive of the act (namely the will), but in creation nothing susceptible is presupposed. When therefore it is said that ‘everything supernatural is created’ [n.106], if it be conceded of every supernatural first act, it is not necessary to concede it of the supernatural that is second act, because with this concurs created power, both in idea of what is active in some way [nn.152-153] and in idea of what is receptive; and yet it can be called supernatural by reason of the form or habit concurring for its production, although it not be immediately created.

188. In another way it can be said [to the third, n.106] that the act is not properly supernatural as the habit is, because although ‘the presupposed habit’ be from the supernatural cause immediately, yet when posited in being it is a natural cause with

respect to its act; and so the act which is produced by such habit is not supernatural: for as naturally can a form that is supernaturally produced be disposed to its act as a form that is merely natural is disposed to its act, so that a difference in the production of the forms does not cause nor prove a distinction between them in comparison to their acts.

189. To the fourth [n.107] it can be said that it is in the power of a will thus habituated to use a habit of this sort; and when the will operates with equal effort, the habit cooperates equally with it, because a habit on its own part acts by way of nature. However, there will not always be an equal delight consequent to the elicited act; delight, to be sure, is from the object that is attained by the act, and not only from the power acting about the object; but now [sc. in this present life], when the object is not present in itself but in a figure, it [pleasure] can be caused by a limited object in diverse ways, now more now less, although an act about it equally intense may with equal effort be elicited. – What then is said of contemplatives [n.107] is true of devotion, that is of the delight consequent to the act; but not of the elicited act itself of loving, which is sometimes more intense and sometimes more meritorious, although a lesser pleasure or almost none follow it, – and sometimes with a lesser act, in itself and in divine acceptance, is concomitant a greater pleasure, for attracting little ones so that they may more avidly pursue that of whose sweetness they have had a foretaste.

190. [To the arguments for the second way] – To the first about the second way [nn.108-109] I concede that the Holy Spirit could cause an act immediately in the will, and accept that act – as caused by himself – as worthy of eternal life; but then this act would neither be of the will nor in its power; nor do we believe that he accepts such act, but he makes disposition to accept an act of free choice – which act is in its [the will's] power.

191. To the second [n.110] I say that the fact the Holy Spirit cooperates with fire for heating is not a miracle; but that he cooperates with water for heating (if however it could without contradiction be said that to it [sc. water] belongs some causality with respect to heating), this would be miraculous. So I say in the matter at hand that the fact the Holy Spirit cooperates with an habituated human will for eliciting an act according to that habit, this is of the common law by which God assists a second cause for doing its act; but that he cooperates with a non-habituated will would be miraculous, if however the will itself could operate. I say, therefore, that the Holy Spirit cooperates with a will having charity; not indeed because it has it such that its charity be prior cause, namely moving the Holy Spirit to cooperating, – but because the Holy Spirit generally cooperates with a second cause for the act to which according to its form it [the second cause] is ordered, the way it is about loving in an habituated will. – When therefore you say that ‘he [the Holy Spirit] cooperates before the will has charity’ [n.110], it is false unless it be understood of priority of nature as superior cause. At the same time, to be sure, the Holy Spirit cooperates with a will having charity, and it [the will] operates, – or if it be conceded that the Holy Spirit cooperates with the will before it have charity, it does not therefore follow that ‘he could equally cooperate with a will not having charity’ [n.110], because he does not thus cooperate with [a will] not having a form for acting as with one that does.

192. To the third [n.111] I say that although by the communication of properties [sc. in the two natures of the incarnate Christ] human operations be truly said of the Word, yet the proper acts of the Word in his divine nature were not in the power of ‘this man’

[sc. Christ], so that he insofar as man could merit by those acts: for Christ did not merit for us in this, if the Son of God – who was in the flesh – created souls with the Father and the Holy Spirit; and so to the matter at hand, not will the will merit if the Holy Spirit, in whatever way joined to it, were to cause in it an act of loving.

193. To the last [argument, n.112] I say that although it make a difficulty for those holding the species to be first act with respect to the intellect, by which the intellect has power for second act (as hot wood heats by heat), because if this were true it would be difficult to save the fact that the intellect ‘not informed by any form’ would be capable of operation [cf. *Ord.I* d.3 nn.456-459]; yet according to the way that I stated in distinction 3 of this first book [d.3 nn.494-498], that ‘the object – whether in itself or in the species – is a sort of partial cause, concurring with the intellect for causing intellection’, it does not cause any difficulty, because the object present in itself (the way it will be in the fatherland) suffices without any informing to cause vision, or suffices of itself alone along with the intellect.

194. And if it be argued ‘if without an informing habit vision can be perfect, then also fruition can be most perfect [sc. without a habit]’, – I reply: no one commonly denies in glory ‘a habit of the light of glory in the intellect’ [cf. *Ord.I* d.3 n.114; III d.14 qq.102 nn.2-4, 8; IV Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.3 nn.9-10], – and it can on the part of the intellect be posited as corresponding to charity on the part of the will.

Appendix²⁷ Seventeenth Distinction First Part

Question One-Two

*Whether he who Possesses Created Charity is Accepted by it Formally as Worthy of
Eternal Life*

i. Next to this I ask whether he who possesses created charity is by it formally accepted as worthy of eternal life.

That he is not:

ii. Because ‘to be an accepted person to God’ is nothing other than for him to be accepted by God, or for God to accept him; but nothing on the part of the creature can be the formal idea of a divine act (the proof is because nothing in a creature, or nothing extrinsic, can be the formal idea of anything intrinsic in God; but the act of accepting is intrinsic to God); therefore etc.

²⁷ Selections taken from Scotus’ *Additiones Magnae* d.17 p.1 q.2 to help fill gaps in the *Ordinatio* left by Scotus on his untimely death. These selections are relegated to Appendix A by the Vatican Editors whose aim, for scholarly accuracy, was to present the *Ordinatio* in the form Scotus left it. The translation of the *Additiones* is placed here for the convenience of the reader. Also for the convenience of the reader paragraph numbers (in Roman numerals) have been inserted. The Vatican Editors did not add any paragraph numbers.

iii. Further, a person is accepted before charity is given him (which is plain, because, in the case of two existing sinners, God accepts this one for grace and that one not); but the posterior cannot be the cause of the prior; therefore etc.

iv. Further, charity is not the form of an act because it is prior to the act; but an act ought to be accepted through something intrinsic to it; therefore not through charity. Further, if it were accepted, and not from some formal intrinsic thing but an extrinsic one, then ‘what has that extrinsic thing’ could not have a non-meritorious act, – which is false, because that retributive justice accepts an act as worthy of eternal life, and then an indifferent act or a venial sin would be accepted as worthy of eternal life. Therefore it is necessary to give something else because of which the act is accepted that is intrinsic to it, beside charity.

v. On the contrary:

By this is a person formally such by which he is distinguished from others not such; but charity “divides and distinguishes between the sons of God and the sons of perdition” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.18 n.32; therefore through charity is each individual accepted to God.

vi. Further, in the same way does the argument proceed about act, because by that act is each one formally such by which, when posited, he is such, everything else not being posited, and by which, when removed, he is not such, everything else being posited; but when charity is posited, an act is worthy of eternal life, and when charity is removed – whatever else being posited – it is not, as is plain in the state of innocence, where there would have been acts most right and virtuous and yet not worthy of eternal life without charity. – For this are the authorities of Augustine that the Master alleges in dd.27 and 28 of book II.²⁸

To the Question

vii. Response:

First I put as preliminary that the will has a first object, like intellect, but this object in respect of the divine will can only be his essence. Which is plain from this, because every operative power co-demands its own first object necessarily; but no created thing whether extrinsic or finite is required necessarily for an act of the divine will or intellect; therefore the divine essence alone is its first object (look for a better treatment of this argument below, in the question ‘Whether God have some object other than himself’, [*Additiones Magnae* I d.36 q.2 n.5, 7; d.35 q.2 n.7]). His will then is its own reason for willing all other secondary objects.

viii. Second: then it follows that the first object is willed necessarily and nothing else. Proof, for that power cannot be in act sometimes and sometimes not, but it is necessary that it always be in right act, and consequently it necessarily always wills its first object (otherwise it could not be right).

ix. Again, from this follows that the first object is object from the nature of the thing – but others are not, for other objects get that they are objects by act of the divine intellect.

²⁸ *On the Spirit and the Letter* ch. 9 n.15; *Epist.* 194 to the priest Sixtus ch.5 n.19; *On Grace and Free Choice* ch.5 n.12; *Retractions* I ch.23 n.3; Peter Lombard *Sentences* II d.27 ch.5 n.243, ch.8 n.246, ch.11 n.249, d.28 ch.3 n.257.

x. Then to the matter at hand. Acceptation of the will can be understood as ‘simple well pleasing’, and this is necessarily of whatever is possible, just as is also simple intellection; another is ‘efficacious acceptation’, and this is when it wills things to be in fact and wills the means necessary for that. This very thing is plain in us, because sometimes we will good for someone, but we do not work for it, nor do we seek means necessary for this, that he attain the good – and then it is will of simple well pleasing; but when we will and seek the means necessary for the good to be attained by him, then it is efficacious will. And in this last way did God want the creature to be in fact, and devils to be punished, and the act substrate of sin to be.

xi. But there is a certain other special acceptation, which is ‘volition that ordains to good’ so that someone attain a greater good, – because [God] wants him not only to be but orders him to a greater good or to completion of this good. And in this way does he accept only the rational creature.

xii. I say then to the question that created charity is not a reason elicitive on the part of the one accepting, because that is intrinsic to God. It will then in another way be an objective reason: not first reason, as has been proved [about simple well wishing]; nor is it reason – as of intelligibles – only in real fact [n.10] (namely which acceptation does not follow), but it is reason as making the subject apt for acceptation. However, from this making apt is not had that it be accepted out of justice.

xiii. In two ways then can we consider the divine will:

In one way as practical principles are offered that are not necessary from the terms, as is the one ‘the just will finally be justified’. Therefore, before the will accept, there is aptness only, but after the will accept, then the proposition is necessary and is a principle, nor can God do the contrary by ordained power.

xiv. In a second way, there is distinguished in God justice and judgment, because justice is according to law in general, but judgment is according to execution in particular. Before the will accept, there is no justice, – but after it accepts there is justice.

xv. I prove this by one reason and two examples.

By reason as follows: just as an intellectual habit includes in some way the object in its idea of intelligibility, so the appetitive habit in some way includes the object in idea of lovability.

xvi. An example is this: what the center does in heavy things, this God does in spiritual things (for God is the center and term of spiritual things);²⁹ for if the center of heavy things loved itself, it would love anything whatever insofar as it tended to the center, and because everything heavy tends to the center it would love all heavy things, and not only heavy things but also the motion and center. – So in the matter at hand. God loves himself because of himself, therefore he loves anything whatever insofar as it tends to him; likewise, charity is the weight by which there is tending to God. Therefore God loves love toward himself and the weight by which such movement of love comes to be.

xvii. Second example: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9 “justice rather is beauty” (and he takes justice for charity, because in Scripture all these things are taken for the same: justice, wisdom, charity, and grace); but beauty is the reason for lovability in corporeal things, and justice is beauty making similar to God; so there can be an idea of lovability in the mind which God loves. Likewise, it is plain that

²⁹ Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus, *Liber Philosophorum* XXIV prop.2: “God is an infinite sphere whose center is everywhere, circumference nowhere.”

the center is the reason for accepting the heave and is more the reason for accepting the motion by which there is tending to the center. – Thus in the matter at hand about charity. For if charity is the reason for accepting a person, it will be more a reason for accepting an act; and so the first example about act is valid, not the second ‘about beauty’, because on account of beauty many acts are pleasing, to which in no way is beauty ordered, – just as sometimes someone beautiful seeks something and is heard because of beauty, and yet to this is beauty in no way ordered; but not so about an act in respect of charity, because charity is not a the reason for accepting any act save that alone to which it inclines insofar as it is charity.

To the Principal Arguments

xviii. To the first argument (ii), when it is said ‘nothing other than etc.’, it is not taken absolutely but as it is compared to the act. And then, when it is said that ‘nothing created is the idea of anything intrinsic to God’, I say that it is true, not as first object nor as new, but as apprehended in eternity, whereby God accepts it aptitudinally before the will’s acceptation of that principle not known from its terms, and after acceptation he accepts it from justice.

xix. To the second (iii): acceptation is double, namely ‘in a certain respect’, and this is first and on the way to acceptation simply, the other [is so] simply. The first is in respect of some gift, namely grace, the second in respect of glory; the first does well precede, but the second follows or is concomitant.

xx. To the third (iv) I say that charity is the formal reason, not intrinsic but inclining; and because of this, not every act is meritorious, but that alone to which charity inclines as it is charity. And so it is plain that the same form is principle for accepting act and person.

Seventeenth Distinction

Second Part

On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question One

Whether the whole of pre-existing Charity is corrupted so that no Reality the same in Number remains in a greater and a lesser Charity

195. About increase of charity, on the supposition that charity could be increased – according to that of Augustine in his letter to Boniface [*Epist. ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10], and it is put in Lombard II d.26 ch.2 n.231, “charity merits increase so that increased it may merit to be perfected,” and according to him *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things it is the same to be better as to be greater”^a (for some charity is better than another because a greater essential reward corresponds to it, therefore some charity is greater than another) – I ask about the manner of increase of charity, and first: whether

the whole of pre-existing charity be corrupted so that no reality the same in number remain in a greater and lesser charity.

a. *Interpolated text*: “in the things that are not great in mass, that is greater which is better.”

196. And that so it is, I argue:

Because otherwise the form itself would increase subjectively, because, remaining the same, it would be transmuted from imperfection to perfection; but form is invariable, according to the author of *Six Principles* ch.1 n.1; therefore charity cannot thus be increased.^a

a. *Interpolation*, replacing ‘because...increased’: “Because if it were not corrupted, then the form of charity would be changed from lesser to greater; this is false, because a simple form cannot be subject of transmutation.”

197. On the contrary:

De Generatione et Corruptione 1.5.321b10-13, “the thing increased has to remain”; therefore in any increase there is no corruption of what pre-exists.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, replacing ‘therefore...pre-existed’: “therefore also pre-existing charity, increased by a new degree of subsequent charity, should remain and not be corrupted.”

I. Opinion of Godfrey [of Fontaines] A. Exposition of the Opinion

198. Here it is said that nothing of preexistent charity remains the same in number in increased charity, but the whole that existed before is corrupted and another individual, more perfect than it, is generated.

199. For this is set down a reason,^a because the terms of motion are impossible (*Physics* 5.3.227a7-10), therefore the terms of this motion or change – whereby charity is increased – will be impossible; therefore that which is the term ‘to which’ is simply impossible with the term ‘from which’; therefore it does not include the same thing in number.^b

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of ‘nothing...reason’ [nn.198-199]: “in every intensification of any form whatever, the degree of the preceding form is corrupted upon the advent of the other, following form.”

b. *Interpolated text*, in place of ‘therefore...number’: “this degree preceding and that newly arriving in this change of increase of form are the terms of the change, therefore they are not at the same time; therefore one is corrupted on the arrival of the other.”

200. This reason is confirmed, because just as in species there is posited the more and less on account of the essential order of species, so it seems it should be posited in its own way in individuals of the same species; but a more perfect species (which is called greater) is simply another nature from a more imperfect one, so that nothing the same in number – namely of the inferior nature – remains in the superior, rather the superior is in

itself simpler than the inferior, because in forms the superior is more perfect and more actual and simpler (it is plain in the forms of separate substances, hence God is most simple); therefore in individuals of the same species nothing of the more imperfect remains the same in number in the more perfect, because then ‘the more perfect’ would be more composite than the more imperfect.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of n.200: “For this opinion [n.198] I add two reasons. Let the first be this: the more and less in the same species are disposed in the same way as the more and less in diverse species are proportionally disposed; but in diverse species the more one species is more perfect than another the more perfectly it contains it and in simpler way, so that the species contained by it does not make addition to it; therefore since simplicity is perfection in all forms, it seems too that in the same species the simpler form is more perfect, not having a preceding degree or form added to it.”

201. It is confirmed secondly, because in like manner must the more and less be posited in a substance (if they be there) in the same species, and in an accident in the same species, especially in that accident according to which there is not motion; but because of defect of motion in substance, the ‘more’ posited there is altogether another individual, not having in itself the ‘less’ as something of itself but being equally simple or more simple than the less; therefore the like will be posited in charity, according to which there is no motion – it is plain.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of n.201: “Again, in like way are more and less disposed in accidental forms as they are disposed in substantial forms, if there were more and less in substances; but according to everyone who posits more and less in substantial form, the more perfect substance, even in the same species, is simpler than another, not making addition with the less perfect but containing the other in a simple way – as is posited of the soul of Christ, which was not more composite than the soul of Peter but simpler, and yet more perfect in essence of soul; therefore in the same way of accidental form.”

B. Rejection of the Opinion

202. Against this position [n.198] it is argued in six ways, one of which is taken from the presupposition of form in increase of that form – and in accord with this way I argue first as follows:

[First way] – Although it is not necessary that God increase charity in the instant in which a meritorious act is elicited (whereby ‘charity merits to be increased’ [n.195]), yet he can then increase it, so that the increase which someone merits is given at the same time as when the act is elicited.

203. From this I argue: this act, which merits increase of charity, is meritorious, – therefore it presupposes charity in the instant in which it is elicited. I ask which charity? Not the new part which is acquired, because that follows the act as the reward the merit; therefore it presupposes that which was pre-existing, and consequently it is not corrupted in that instant, – because if so, then in that instant a meritorious act could not be elicited, in however someone merits increase of charity.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of nn.202-203: “Against this opinion [n.198] it is argued as follows: on the supposition that it be possible that God can increase charity in the instant in

which the meritorious act is elicited, – let it then be posited in being that he then increase it. I ask then by which charity this meritorious act is elicited (because it is necessarily elicited by some charity, as was shown before; not by the charity infused *de novo* which was increasing charity in the instant in which it was in act, because it is the reward of such act and follows in some order that meritorious act; nor is it elicited by preceding charity, because according to you [Godfrey] it is corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is corrupted; therefore in the instant in which charity is increased there is a meritorious act and yet not from any charity, which is impossible.”

204. But if someone impudently say that God never increases charity in the instant of time in which is had the act meritorious in respect of increase but always later in duration, for the reason that he does not increase [charity] because of the act insofar as it is elicited but insofar as it is in divine acceptance, and in this way does it remain after the instant in which it is elicited, and then thereafter is increase conferred:

205. Although this response be altogether improbable if it deny that God can then do the increasing (because if it is possible, let it be posited in being, and the argument proceeds), nevertheless it does not in other respects escape difficulty.

First indeed because in the virtues, moral and intellectual, virtue is increased by the elicited act, and not when the act is not, because when it is not it causes nothing; therefore then, when the act is present, is there reason for increasing the habit. Therefore if then a new individual is generated and what was before is corrupted, it follows that the act augmentative of the habit will not be elicited by the habit but by the power alone, which seems unacceptable, because then – according to what was said in the preceding question [nn.69-70] – the act augmentative of the habit would be more imperfect than another [act] non-augmentative of the habit, elicited by the habit.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of nn.204-205: “You will say that God does not increase charity in the instant in which he elicits the meritorious act, but the act of charity passes and stands in divine acceptance as something rewardable, and then God – accepting the meritorious act – afterward gives increase to the pre-existing charity as a sort of reward of the act, and he does not at once in the same instant give the reward with the merit, just as he did not give it to the good angels in the first instant in which they merited beatitude but in some later instant of nature. – On the contrary: although this could be said in the matter at hand about the infused virtues, yet it cannot be said about the increase of natural virtues, moral and intellectual, and especially the moral; for moral virtue is increased by moral acts, just as it is generated from them (*Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-22); therefore the act which augments and increases moral virtue only increases it when it exists. When therefore it increases, I ask whether it is by some virtue or not. If it is, by which virtue? Not by the preceding one, because that is corrupted – nor by the degree that it makes, because that is posterior as effect to its cause; therefore when it increases virtue it is not from some virtue; but this is impossible, because then it would not be virtuous and yet it would generate virtue, which is against the Philosopher and against all understanding, because “from like acts like habits are generated” [*Ethics ibid.*]. – In the same way could it be argued about an intellectual act: while there is act of speculating the intellectual or speculative habit is increased, because when there is not it does nothing; but that act is not from the preceding habit, because then there is no such habit but it is corrupted, because in the instant in which it is produced it is increased, not by the preceding degree; nor by the following degree, because that follows; therefore it cannot be said that such in any way increases [it], because there is no term at which the increase may come to be.”

206. And if it also concede the conclusion that ‘the act augmentative of the acquired habit is elicited by the power alone’ (although this seems unacceptable [n.205]), yet it does not escape this special difficulty, if the intelligible species be posited to be increased by the act of understanding. For that act cannot be elicited by the power alone, with the species removed, because – as was made plain in I d.3 nn.486-498 – the intellect is not enough, without the species, to elicit an act of understanding; therefore no intellection can increase the species which may be elicited by the power alone; it then, augmentative of the species, presupposes the species, and not the individual that is generated – therefore the preexisting individual and consequently what preexists is not corrupted.

207. But if it be denied that intellection increases the intelligible species, the final instance – against what is proposed – is this:

The will by its own act can dismiss an act of understanding, – which is proved, because it can totally corrupt and remove the intellect from this act; and yet the volition dismissive of intellection necessarily presupposes intellection: not some new one which follows the volition, it is plain; therefore one that precedes volition and consequently the preexisting intellection is not corrupted by it.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of n.207: “Again, the will can dismiss an act of understanding, because it can altogether by its own willing corrupt the act of it, by turning it away from consideration of any secondary object so that it not determinately consider it. But every act of will does an act of intellect naturally precede. In that instant, then, in which the will dismisses the act of intellect by its own imperative, it is necessary that the intellect be in its own act: not in the preceding intense act, because that act does not remain intense when the will thus dismisses it, as the position holds; nor in the dismissed act, because that naturally follows the act of will; therefore if the dismissed act is not something of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in the instant in which the will is in its own act with respect to some object, that in respect of that object the intellect not be naturally first in act, and then the will wills something unknown, – which is impossible.”

208. [Second way] – The second way is from the perfection of that which is induced through increase.

Where it is argued first as follows: in acts augmentative of a habit, the tenth can be more imperfect than the first, and yet by that tenth act the habit is increased to some degree to which it could not before be increased by the first or second act; this could not be if the preexisting whole be corrupted, because the perfection of the first or second act in itself was greater than the perfection of the tenth in itself, and consequently the individual in whose generation the first act had power, could be more perfect than the individual on which the tenth act had power; therefore that that which follows the tenth be more perfect than the first will not be because a new individual be generated by virtue of the tenth, but because to the preexisting individual – generated by preceding acts – something is added and thus the preexisting individual will remain.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of n.208: “Secondly I argue as follows, by supposing that the second or third act could intensify the habit, though it not be more perfect nor more intense than the first act, – then I argue: if the later act intensifies the habit and yet is not necessarily more intense nor more perfect than any preceding act whatever, then it does not generate a new individual of charity more perfect, which is against you [sc. Godfrey]. Proof of the

consequence, because an act generating a habit cannot generate it save according to the proportion of its own virtue; if therefore this act, which is more imperfect than the first act, generates an individual of charity, and more perfectly, this will be either in virtue of the preceding acts, and then they remain and are not corrupted as the opinion posits [of Godfrey], – or by its own virtue, and then the effect will be more perfect than its total cause in virtue, which is false.”

209. If it be said that the preceding acts elicited by charity remain in divine acceptation (although not in themselves, nor in another impressed by them), then the argument [n.208] is not solved in the acquisition of intellectual and moral habits.^a

a. *Text cancelled* by Scotus: “The reason [n.208] is also not solved in natural agents: for posit that to something hot in nine degrees there come something hot in lesser degree, it can in some way intensify the thing hot in nine degrees, and consequently that which will be at the term of the action will be more perfect in heat than is the agent coming to it and increasing it; this would be impossible if it were ‘a new individual’ generated by the act of the hot thing already present. The proof of the major, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6, “a greater extensive virtue exists in a greater magnitude,” – therefore if from the beginning the virtue in the greater magnitude come close to the thing acted on, it will act more; but this is just the same as far as the action is concerned as if it is one continuous greater magnitude, or many [magnitudes] contiguous together equal to that one magnitude; therefore a thing less extensively hot, if from the beginning it be contiguous with a greater hot thing extensively, makes for inducing a more perfect form, – therefore, if from the beginning a large hot thing act *per se*, it will not introduce as great a form as would be introduced if another small one were contiguous with it; therefore the thing acted on is left in potential for a degree inducible by the lesser hot thing if it be contiguous, – therefore the lesser one arriving will reduce it to that act. – Response: let everything be conceded up to the final consequence; but let that be denied, because the lesser one arriving does not find the thing acted on in a contrary disposition that it could conquer, but is conquered by it – therefore it will simply be acted on, and if it do anything little to the contrary, this will be by more intensely decreasing, but eventually it will be conquered.

Nor can this be evaded by order of degrees, to wit, that an agent can reduce the thing acted on, which was before in another degree, to a more perfect degree than it could have reduced it to at the beginning, just as an agent can animate the thing acted on that before was organized and yet cannot produce a non-organized thing toward as much perfection first (and this because of the order of forms in coming to be or of degrees in a form, because of which order something existing in a more imperfect degree can at once be reduced to what is more perfect, – not so if it were not under that degree): this response – I say – is not valid, because if a thing hot in eight degrees intensify a thing hot in nine degrees and this intensification be done by the heat of a weaker agent and by generation of a new individual, then in the instant in which a thing hot in ten degrees is generated, the thing generated will exceed in perfection the heat of the generator – which is impossible; therefore increase does not thus happen.”

[*Note by Scotus to this text*]: “Against Godfrey [in the previous footnote] are two reasons, one that in alteration there is no continuing change (because of what as subject?), the other that a changeable thing will be hot with many heats, because in motion a part more remote from the mover is not as equally intense in form as a close one. [**] But as to what is placed here above under [the above interpolation], what is there supposed is not certain, that namely ‘what more weakly arrives intensifies more intensely, even as to any degree at all’, is rather the other way round, and then ‘the thing that is acted on is contrary, and then ‘what is passive is contrary, insofar as it is imperfect and not able to conquer the more perfect but is conquered by it, – therefore it does not act, or if it does anything back, it will be rather too intensely weak to make it like itself’: it does not seem an instance, save about lights; perhaps

there something less virtuous than the first agent intends the effect of it, and yet it would not have power in itself save in what is more weakly a form than it finds in the thing acted on. What is the cause there, if the hot thing does not thus act [sc. like light]?”

210. If no agent can intend³⁰ a form, which it finds in the passive thing, more perfect than the form that it could of itself cause in the passive thing, this whole second reason fails, because then never does an act intend a habit save to a degree as great as it could of itself induce, and then would not appear why it could not induce it if it were a new individual, so that nothing would remain of what is preexistent. But because it is manifest that a tenth act, equally intense as the first, intends the habit beyond the degree induced by the first or second, then the first proposition [sc. at the beginning here, n.210] seems it needs to be denied.

211. But then there is a doubt whether thus it be in heat, that an arriving weaker thing intend a more intense heat in the passive thing (it seems that not, as here below, in the second line there³¹). It can be said that a univocal agent does not intend its own more intense form found in the passive thing, but rather on the contrary; but an equivocal agent does intend, because it is of a nature to act on this and not to be acted on by it, and its form is nobler than any degree of an equivocal effect that it finds, although it not have power at once from itself for so great a degree of equivocal effect. Therefore light is intensified infinitely if infinite lights of the same species are put around a medium, each one of which intensifies the light in that medium.

212. [Third way] – The third way is taken from natural things and the action of contrary on contrary.

For a hot thing acting on a cold thing, before it corrupt it totally, lessens the cold thing. If in this lessening of the cold thing a new individual of cold is generated, I ask by what generator? If recourse not be had to a universal agent (which recourse is here irrational), it is not possible for any particular generator of this individual to be assigned, because a hot weakening a cold cannot of itself generate an individual of cold; therefore neither is it when weakened a new individual habits.^a

a. *Interpolated text*, in place of 212: “Third thus: the hot corrupting the cold first weakens the cold; for two motions run together, intensification and augmentation in heat and weakening in coldness (namely the motion of intensifying of heat and of weakening of coldness); therefore according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] a new individual of cold is generated. I question then the term ‘from which’ of this motion to coldness; it cannot be said that [it is] the preceding greater coldness, because that coldness is corrupted; nor the following weaker degree of coldness, because then the effect would be exceeding its cause in entity and perfection, which is not intelligible, according to Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 12 ch.16 n.33 and 83 *Diverse Questions* q.2. – Again, everything that is moved, while it is moved, is partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’ (*Physics* 6.1.231b28-232a6). If therefore the hot act on the cold, in the whole motion the cold has something of the term ‘to which’ (namely of the hot); if then in the whole motion the cold is not weakened before it be corrupted, it follows that the contrary at the extreme and not weakened is with some degree of its contrary, and since these forms do not have latitude, it

³⁰ The Latin verb is ‘intendo’ which typically means, and is translated as, ‘intend’, but in the context here ‘intend’ carries rather the sense of ‘intensify’.

³¹ A peculiar symbol appears after ‘there’ which does not appear elsewhere in the text, but it could be a reference to a passage near the end of the footnote to n.209, at **.

follows that contraries at the extreme could be at the same time true. The cold thing then is weakened. Therefore, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] another supposit of the cold is generated; but it is not generated from the preceding cold, because that has been corrupted; therefore it is generated from the hot, and thus the hot would generate the cold, which is impossible. – Again, fourth thus: if the preceding form is always corrupted, it follows that there could not be a motion according to degree of form of quality, because as soon as there is departure from the term ‘from which’, another form is generated; therefore there will only be motion in quality according to the degree of the movable thing. But this is false, because then there would be continuous motion, whose parts however would not be joined to any common term, because the change joining [them] – I ask in what it is? Either it is in some divisible or in some indivisible; not in a divisible part, because no whole part is changed at once, but part before part, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey]; therefore motion would be in an indivisible, and so a point would become hot. – Again, it follows too that every heatable, while it is becoming hot, becomes hot with infinite heats; because if motion come to be precisely according to degrees of the movable successively, since there are infinite parts in the movable (as in the heatable), at least potentially, and no part of the movable in the same degree of heat would become hot with another part, but with another heat and in another degree, – it follows that the whole will become hot by infinite degrees of heat, which is impossible.”

213. [Fourth way] – The fourth way is taken from the fact the Philosopher concedes motion in the same way in accidents as he denies in substances [*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11], and consequently the more and less in accidents, just as they are required for motion, so are they are not required in substances; but if there were no increase in accidents save by corruption of what preexists and generation of what is new – and in such way can the more and less be found in substances – then motion would no more be saved here than there.

214. [Fifth way] – Fifth it is argued hereby, that a nature under a determinate degree more or less will be a species for individuals, and this inferior species contained under a species of nature; and thus no species – which now is posited – of a nature that can be intensified or weakened will be most specific.³²

The first consequence is proved, because whatever is said *per se* and in the ‘what’ of individuals, and is ‘*per se* one’, is a species of them; nature in a determinate degree – such or such – is said in the ‘what’ of individuals and is ‘*per se* one’, because a nature according to this degree is essentially of things that have the nature in such degree, and a degree adds nothing accident to nature; it is plain then that a nature in such degree is a species, and plain that it is less common than a species of nature in itself; therefore it would be a species inferior in order to the species of nature.^a

a. *Note of Duns Scotus*: “The fifth argument needs to be solved in [the case of] substance, against which it concludes. The minor then is false by reason of the part in the ‘what’, because the ‘what’ abstracts from every individual condition, from ‘more’ just as from ‘thisness’ (*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11). ‘More’ is a condition of an individual, not designate as ‘this’, but vague, because there can be the same degree though not the same ‘this’; but not conversely: for there cannot be this individual unless it be of this degree. – On the contrary: therefore a degree is understood to determine nature before ‘this’, and *per se* in

³² Vatican editors (referencing Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales* tr.2 n.8 p.17): since whiteness is a most specific species, if it had under it an inferior species, it would be a genus, which is contrary to the definition of a most specific species.

that prior stage; otherwise it is an accident and a common difference [sc. as Socrates sitting differs from himself or another not sitting – Peter of Spain, *Summulae Logicales* tr.2 n.11]; therefore etc. Response: common, but not universal, because individual. – On the contrary: at least predicable *per se*, a mean between the most specific species and the individual; likewise, some species are posited as being distinguished by degrees of form, as animals in degrees of sensitive and angels in degrees of intellective [form]. Response: a species states the ‘what’, a species under a degree states the ‘what-how much in virtue’; ‘how much’ is not a difference (d.8 n.108 of this book [“if ‘how much’ were a specific difference, white would be a genus”]).”

215. [Sixth way] – Sixth and lastly is it argued, because if the reason adduced for the position [nn.198-199] be valid, it ought to conclude in the same way about the ‘how much’ of bulk as about the ‘how much’ of virtue, and so when the ‘how much’ of bulk is increased nothing would remain the same; therefore in an increase properly speaking of bulk, what is increased would not remain according to the pre-existing quantity, which seems unacceptable.

a. *Interpolated text* in place of n.215. Further, the reason [n.199] is not valid, because then it would conclude universally about every increase, and so in bodily increase the preceding term and the increasing degree would be impossible, which is to destroy increase.

216. Response is made in accord with this position by conceding the conclusion – that there is thus a new individual in the how much of bulk when something is bigger, just as something more intense is another individual of the intensifiable form.

217. But against this there seem to follow two unacceptable results.

First, because if the species of wine be diluted in the Eucharist,³³ there will be a quantity of bulk greater than before, because a greater quantity follows dilution; if then the quantity that there was of wine does not remain after dilution, then neither does blood remain there, because blood is not held commonly to remain there save as long as the accidents remain that affected the converted wine.

218. Something else unacceptable, because then it would seem that such dilution could not be by virtue of a natural agent, or that a natural agent would act with no matter or substance presupposed: for it is plain that substantial matter is not presupposed there, because an alterable substance is not there, nor is even presupposed there a quantity remaining the same in number (for you [sc. Godfrey]), and yet a natural agent is able – as it seems – thus to dilute or condense these species; therefore a natural agent is able to act without presupposing anything in its action, and so to create.

219. To these unacceptable results it is replied:

To the first [n.217], that as long as accidents remain similar to those that affected the wine, the blood remains; and although they not remain the same, they do nevertheless remain similar after dilution.

220. To the other [n.218] it is conceded that natural virtue can act with nothing remaining common under the terms; it does now however create, because this later – in natural order – follows the earlier; so it is not in creation.

221. Against these responses it is argued:

³³ In preparing the wine for consecration a small amount of water is added, and this small amount of water must, to that extent, dilute the wine.

Because although this new quantity in number differ from the preexisting quantity, and in no other way does the quantity of water differ from the quantity of wine save in number alone (because not in species, it is plain), it follows that, because of such permanence of accidents the same in species not in number, the blood no more remains under this new quantity than it would remain under the quantity of water if it were principally there, since this new quantity is not more inclined to affect the wine – the quantity of which was before – than to affect the water.

222. Against the other response [n.220] it seems to be unacceptable that active natural virtue not presuppose in its action a subject.

223. Further, I ask how one of these follows on the other? Either without the action of the agent – and this is manifestly unacceptable, because then a natural agent would act in vain, because without it this [the later] would be consequent to that [the prior]. Therefore it does not follow save by action of a natural agent. But such an agent cannot posit the effect in being without a material cause presupposed: otherwise creation or such action as is repugnant to a natural agent, would not – by such consequence – be prevented.

224. Further, according to this [n.220], it could be said that a natural agent effectively induces the intellective soul, because it follows in natural order on the organization of the body: the consequence is commonly held to be unacceptable.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] They reply – see elsewhere, and for the arguments that are contrary to it; see this in IV d.12 p.2 a.1 q.1 n.6-7, 14-17.

II. To the Question

225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215], and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249].^a

a. [*Interpolated text*, in place of n.225] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that this positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [*Followed by this second Interpolated text*] Nor is it corrupted *per se*, save as to the being that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example about matter *per se* or form *per se*, which are not corrupted as they are in the whole, but remain more perfectly in the whole than when they had *per se* being; this is plain in the quantity of bulk when it is increased. – As to the reason for that opinion [nn.198-199] I say that the terms of motion *per se*, of which sort are privation and form, are impossible; but a weakened form and it increased are not *per se* of this sort of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positing. Therefore are weak and intense forms terms of motion not *per se* but *per accidens*, insofar namely as a weakened form is conjoined with the *per se* term that is privation; hence although the *per se* term ‘from which’ of motion be corrupted in the coming of the term to which as privation, yet it is not necessary that the form which *per accidens* accompanies such term ‘from which’ be corrupted. Therefore it makes the fallacy of the consequent because the weakened form is the term ‘from which’ as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being *per se*, and this does not remain; but as in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term ‘to which’, and thus it remains the same in number as before, but

more intense and more perfect. – To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and therefore one does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can be together, and by how much the form is under such several degrees of form, by so much is it the more intense and perfect. It is the opposite way here and there. – To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less according to parts of bulk (rather he thus concedes it there), therefore in this way he denies the more and less in accidents in this way, namely by parts of bulk; but he denies in substances the more and less according to degrees of form, so in this way he concedes them in accidents. Hence, because he posits that in-itself-indivisible substantial form, therefore does he posit no degree of form with another; it is the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible according to degrees, – therefore any degree is compatible with another and is perfected by it.

III. To the Arguments

226. To the argument on behalf of the opinion of Godfrey [n.199] I reply: the *per se* term ‘from which’ is the privation of the degree to be induced.

227. But what is the positive term ‘from which’ necessarily required [sc. for inducing a further degree]? I reply: an imperfect degree.

228. On the contrary: it [the imperfect degree] remains in the term ‘to which’ [n.225]. – I reply: it does not remain in a distinct act, as was the term ‘from which’ was, but it remains in the whole potentially, as a part.

229. On the contrary: it remains the same in every absolute idea; a respect is not the idea of the term ‘from which’ or ‘to which’. The same difficulty is seen about water divided and united, what the term is ‘from which’ and ‘to which’: for if all the water is the term ‘from which’ of division, and if ‘this separated part and that’ is the term ‘to which’, each term was before the same in number according to everything absolute; there is here another force, because two divided waters are being counted together, – therefore when the same numerical unity of each remains, they are always counted together; but in the whole remains the same numerical unity of each, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply corruption, and generation of a third from them. He who would say the parts in the absolute whole have the absolute being of the whole, with respect to which the proper being of them is material (*Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21), could say that the prior degree remains in the whole according to some absolute being which before was not; likewise about water united to another water.

230. But always is asked what is the term ‘from which’ impossible according to something absolute? – It is not assigned, so I briefly reply:

Per se the term ‘from which’ is impossible with the term ‘to which’, – it is the privation; but the positive term ‘from which’ is not impossible with the term ‘to which’ save as is conjoined ‘the *per se* term from which’ [note to n.225]:³⁴ unless by stating the impossibility, that ‘this is not this’ – or that ‘this and this do not together perfect the same as act, in a distinct act. So indeed in two ways is the prior degree impossible with the term ‘to which’: because it is never it, even when it is in it; never is too the act distinct of that of which the term ‘to which’ is a distinct act.

³⁴ A sign was put here for this clause by Scotus [significance unclear].

231. But of these two ways of ‘unless by stating’ etc. [n.230] the first is not sufficient for terms of motion, because whiteness is not sweetness; the second cannot posit the opposition of the term ‘from which’ on account of anything absolute in it, because being a distinct act states nothing beyond absolute degree – as it remains – save excision, which is ‘to be in another’ (as a part in the whole), and so thus to posit a term is to posit it formally under the negation of relation: therefore hold that ‘(—)’ [see footnote in n.230].

232. To that other point about waters [n.229], I reply: as a part is in a whole indeed and in the act terminating generation (because division is not generation), it is not however in a distinct act, which is an act with excision of part-ness; thus corresponds to it unity according to first idea of act [sc. act of terminating generation], and that remains in division and in union, – but according to idea of distinct act [sc. act along with excision of part-ness] there corresponds properly the unity that is the principle of number.

233. To the form. The first consequence [n.229] holds, speaking of unity in the second way [sc. unity as principle of number], because number is of discrete things; any parts whatever of a continuous thing are one in number, speaking strictly of number. – Further: the minor [sc. ‘but in the whole remains the same numerical unity of each, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply corruption and generation of a third from them’] is false of numerical unity in the second way [‘that which is the principle of number’]; it is true of it in the first way [n.232 ‘unity according to first idea of act’]. Nor yet does it follow that the same thing has two numerical unities; but the same according to its absolute being has a unique, perpetual unity while it remains; but according to its precise being co-numbered unity corresponds to it. And just as it happens to it to be precise, so it happens to it that its unity is co-numerable; for when its being is precise, its proper unity is co-numerable, – when not but it is in another precise being as something of it, then its proper unity is not co-numerable but is something of a co-numerable unity, such that, in brief, ‘to be a co-numerable unity’ properly requires it to be precise, because number is of discrete things.

234. To the argument for the opposite [n.196] I say that ‘the same form remains in the imperfect and perfect individual, therefore it is changed in subject’ does not follow, because it does not remain as subject of change but it remains as a nature in individuals, to which any individual whatever adds something. And the reason for failure of the consequence is because that which is the subject of one individual of the nature is also the subject of another individual, and that also is possible and changeable from individual to individual; but the form, just as it is not the subject of one individual, so neither of another, and consequently it is not changeable from one to the other.^a

a. [Interpolated text, in place of n.234. To the principal reason [see Interpolated text to n.196] I say that the form is not the subject of change but is related in respect of its diverse degrees as a species to two individuals that have *de novo* the being of the species; and it is not the subject for them, because when individuals are multiplied *de novo*, the species now begins to be in one individual, now in another; hence there is no movement of form according to these degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature of form but they are intrinsic modes, stating a certain degree of virtual quantity of that form. [cf. *Rep.* IA d.17 n.102]

Question Two

Whether of Preexisting Charity the Positive that remains in Increase be the whole Essence of Intense Charity

235. Secondly I ask^a whether of preexisting charity the positive that remains in increase be the whole essence of intense charity so that, if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have no positive reality in itself essentially other than that which preexisted in mild charity.

And that in this way the reality of preexisting charity is the whole essence and reality of increased charity I prove:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: “forms are as numbers,” – as to this, that “as any added number varies the number, so any added degree in form varies the species;” therefore in the essence of this sort of form nothing can be added while the species remains the same. But it is supposed that the intense is of the same species as the mild, therefore no degree is added there beyond the reality of the form.

a. [Interpolated text] On the supposition that prior charity is not corrupted when charity is increased, there is a question because of another opinion about increase of charity [Rep IA d.17 n.103].

236. Further, in *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that “formal differences change the species:” a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.

237. Further, Porphyry says [*Book of Predicables* 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: “The being,” he says, “of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease.”

238. Further, the author of the *Six Principles* [ch.1 n.1] says: “Form consists of a simple and invariable essence.”

239. Further, if any reality comes to a preexisting [charity],^a then the charity increased will not be in a species, because it will include something accidental to the specific nature; or if it be *per se* in a species,^b it includes nothing save something pertaining to the nature of the species – and so^c the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in a species.

a. [Interpolated text] [if any reality] is in a charity which arrives *de novo*, different from what was in preexisting charity...

b. [Interpolated text] it has whatever is required for the nature of a species, and consequently...

c. [Interpolated text] since it has one [degree] beyond a lesser charity, pertaining *per se* and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that...

240. On the contrary:

Then [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity is the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235]^a the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI

ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater,” the charity of any of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.^b

a. [*Interpolated text*] If a greater charity were to have no more of reality than a lesser charity, then...

b. [*Interpolated text*] [as equally blessed] as Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of charity, which is impossible.

I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] – An opinion resting on the arguments made for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, removing the form from the subject, there is not a more and a less in the form in itself through the added reality; and because, according to the authorities [cited by Gregory], it is necessary to save there in some way a more and less, it is necessary to posit them there according to the being of the accident in the subject (which indeed is to be in the [subject’s] being), and so a more-ness as to being-in is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the indisposing opposite.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this position I argue first thus: contraries at the extreme are impossible in the same thing, but not in weak degrees.^a But this is only because something is in the contrary intense degree that is not the weak one: for if the whole reality which is in the weak degree is in the intense degree, there is no repugnance of the weak to the intense. – But this impossibility is not a relation to the subject nor from any relation to the subject: for the impossibility of forms in themselves is before it is of forms in a third as in a receiving subject (for because they are in themselves impossible, therefore can they not be received in the same subject, – not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the idea of impossibility in intense degrees is something positive in them in themselves, not only in order to a subject.

a. [*Interpolated text*] namely hot and cold at the extreme, and not under weaker degrees (it is plain, because while the hot and the movement of hot or heat is weakened, the movement of cold is intensified, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be twice produced, and consequently it is not possible that any reality is acquired by any change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same positively as that which was before, because then that which is before would be really acquired.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]: again I make supposition that it is impossible that a real motion or change is without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity a lesser charity is the term ‘from which’ and a greater charity is the term ‘to which’, and this is real production; therefore necessarily it is toward some real term according to the second supposition. Not to the reality which altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be twice produced; the preceding reality was the term of another production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives to the subject indivisible being and indivisibly: for the subject is not such according to the form save because the form is such; therefore if the form is such in itself there is not any more-ness of perfection, nor will the subject according to it be said to be more such according to it.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] for because the form is such, therefore what has it is said to be such according to it. Therefore if the form be indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more and less according to it: for it is contradictory that a ‘form in itself’ be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible according to it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition – that is according to idea of one thing – to more and less, and if the disposition is the form, it follows that in some form there is more and less.^a If then in some form there is a disposition not according to the idea of one disposition to more and less, as some want to say that^b in air humidity is a disposition to lesser heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,^c – against this I argue: one species, according to its whole self, seems to have, in what is susceptible of it, the idea of one disposition.^d Further,^e then there will not be one motion from intense to weak, not conversely; for nothing will be moved to the weak save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception it; but the intense does not have a disposition agreeing with the weak; therefore for this, that it could be moved to a mild degree, it is necessary that it be moved to a disposition agreeing with a weak degree – and so for this, that from intense it become weak, it is necessary that there first come to be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense to a disposition that is to the weak degree, and so^f never will one motion be immediately from the intense to the weak, because they do not have the same immediate susceptible subject agreeing with both dispositions.

a. [*Interpolated text*] Again, against their mode [Godfrey’s] of positing more and less in a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, because of which the form will be said to take up the more and less: that disposition either is some form not. If it be a form, and according to it the subject is said to be more and less disposed, the thing proposed follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b. [*Interpolated text*] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but another form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, – and then must be asked about that disposition either it is some form or not, and so either there will be a process to infinity in dispositions or it is necessary to grant a more and less in some form in itself. Again, it is necessary first to have a disposed subject before it be moved to the term of motion, because nothing is moved to anything unless it be disposed to reception of it; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, it follows that something other is acquired in the term of the motion than the sole idea of disposition. – He says [sc. Godfrey] that greater and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not of the same but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c. [*Interpolated text*] and therefore there is not this more-ness is in any one disposition.

d. [*Interpolated text*] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as also a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not a disposition proper, there can be a greater and less in individuals of the same species and so intensity and remission according to the form of that species without this, that such contrary and opposite dispositions would precede them in subjects. Then it is asked, as before, why there is something more disposed now than before, as was before argued [sc. in *Interpolated texts a. and b. above*].

e. [*Interpolated text*] if such opposite dispositions precede, to greater and to less.

f. [*Interpolated text*] and so, for the intense to become weak, it is necessary that first there be a movement from the disposition that is in intense degree to a disposition agreeing with a weak degree before from the intense would come to be the weak, and conversely, – which is impossible, because then...

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be rejected by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not any greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not held.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence it does not follow that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel equally has grace’.

247. Also a third way – which is held by some people – of ‘the rooting of form in the subject’ seems to be refuted because this root is either some absolute form (and the thing proposed is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems that they cannot have more and less save by more and less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too is a more intense form not properly saved,^a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can be in itself more intense: just as redness from shame can be more intense than redness that is a quality receivable in another.

a. [*Interpolated text*] Again, this mode does not save one form being more intense than another.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede – especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] – that the positive reality which preexists in a lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in a greater charity. Rather, if there were a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser and some added: if *per impossibile* all relation to a subject were taken away (as a quantity of bulk, were it posited to be separate from a subject), even if *per impossibile* it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than another and would have in itself the whole positive reality of the lesser and something added.

III. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239].

To the first – about numbers [n.235] – I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. Indeed the Philosopher there is comparing quiddities to numbers, insofar as they are definable, in the way that Plato was speaking of quiddities, by positing separate quiddities [Scotus, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way indeed, that is the quiddities of things, are compared to numbers according to the four properties [*ibid.* nn.22-25] – one of which is this, that ‘anything added varies the species’: and I understand it thus, that from a species it makes another species, or that from a non-species it makes a species. For any difference, added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the idea of a genus, it determines it to the idea of a species, which was not had before the addition of the difference.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] An example about the intellective [soul], when added as a difference to the sensitive soul.

251. I say then that what is added to a quiddity, when quiddity is taken according to idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species, n.250]. But what is added not to quiddity as it is quiddity does not change it; now any individual degree, as also an individual difference contracting a thing to being a ‘this’, whether unity or individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is added: for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is the idea of a species, – and such is not any individual condition.

252. As to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity, it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of a number were added to a preexisting number, the species of the number would change; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were understood to be made more intense than before), then the species would not in itself be changed.^a So in the matter at hand: whatever individual difference (or degree) is added to a quiddity, it is not of the nature to be part of the quiddity.

a. [*Interpolated text*] but in some individual degree.

253. By the same [n.252] is plain [the answer] to Porphyry [n.237], who in a like manner is speaking of a difference insofar as it is a *per se* part of a definition. In this way does it consist in an indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which whole indifference is a degree of it as it is a specific difference; thus does it not receive the more and less, because ‘whatever is more and less’ can belong to individuals in this way [sc. according to the said indifference] and they are all within this indifference of difference and do not add to difference according to this indifference.

254. To the passage from the *Metaphysics* 10 [n.236] it can be replied by the same point, calling formal difference ‘quidditative difference’.

255. It can also be said – as to the form – that not every difference of forms is formal, speaking properly of formal, insofar namely as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference of men is a difference in humanity. For this a reason is assigned both really and logically. Really as follows: men can have humanity and differ, though not by humanity – and so in humanity they do not differ; thus can pure forms differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not formally either, because to differ formally is the same – properly speaking – as to differ in form or according to form.^a Logically as follows: because a term of difference is understood by a negation included in the difference, it can in respect of that negation be taken confusedly and distributively; so also can that which is denominated to be the idea of the difference (of which sort is that which is construed with ‘to differ’ as that in which, or according to which, it is denominated), which could be confused by the negation. But now on the negation of the inferior does not follow the negation of the superior, but there is destruction of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.³⁵

a. [Interpolated text] To the matter I also say that things can differ in species between themselves yet not cause such difference in a third thing, – just as white and black differ in species and yet white Socrates and black Plato do not; so although the individual differences are first diverse, yet they do not vary the essence, because they are accidents of the essence and are material with respect to it, – and so of masculine and feminine, and so too of degrees in respect of a form in itself, which [things]³⁶ according to their being do not determine for themselves a determinate degree.

256. To the other, from the *Six Principles* [n.238]: in the way it proves simplicity of form, so is the conclusion to be conceded to it. But it proves simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when it is added it does not make more in bulk (for a form placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded – but this is nothing against intensity as to more, which belongs to the thing proposed.

257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to this, that ‘something accidental to the nature of the species’ is said, it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus – and thus is an accident taken, in the fallacy of an accident, for something extraneous that is outside the idea of the other; in another way an accident is called that which does not make ‘*per se* one’ with that to which it is accident, as whiteness with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which

³⁵ Vatican editors: by saying, ‘there is a difference or a non-identity between men, therefore there is a difference or a non-identity between them in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’; or, in other words, ‘this man differs from that man or is not that man, therefore they are different or not the same in the form of or according to humanity’. Translator: the denial of a logically inferior difference (e.g. an individual difference that distinguishes this man from that) is not followed by the denial of a logically superior difference (e.g. a specific difference, as that which distinguishes this species, man, from that species, horse). Or, to put it in logical form: while the conditional statement ‘if they are the same individual then they are the same species’ is true, a fallacy of the consequent is committed if one argues from the denial of the antecedent (the denial of the inferior difference) to a denial of the consequent (the denial of a superior difference), as in ‘but they are not the same individual, therefore they are not the same species’.

³⁶ The word ‘things’ is added to keep to the plural form of the verb in the codices. The Vatican editors note that some other codices have the singular which they prefer. Nothing much seems to hang on the difference.

is accident to the nature of the species (so also does a less intense whiteness, indeed every individual has something that is accident to the nature of the species – otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted [sc. to individuals]); in the second way I say that an intense [whiteness] does not have something that is accident to the nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in itself makes ‘*per se* one’ with the nature, just as also any individual difference added to the nature makes ‘*per se* one’ with the nature. When therefore you say ‘if the intense includes something which is accident to the nature of the species, then the weak, which does not include it, is not in the species’ [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, in which way and not in the other the antecedent is true.^{a 37}

a. [Interpolated text] So it is not valid to infer ‘therefore such a degree is not in the species’, but it should be inferred should ‘therefore such a degree is not a species’; so it is in the species as contained under it. Nor does it follow, ‘therefore the other will not be in the species’; for it does not follow, ‘it does not have whatever pertains to the species, therefore it is not in the species’, Or it can be said that ‘something pertains to the species’ is [said] in two ways, either quidditatively or subjectively. Quidditative parts are *per se* of the understanding of the species, but not subjective parts but they are as remote parts; so it is in the matter at hand: no formal degree belongs to the species as a *per se* and essential part of the species (because the species can be understood without any degree), but it does well pertain to the species as contained under the species.

Appendix³⁸

Eighteenth Distinction

About Gift and the Holy Spirit as Gift

Single Question

Whether Gift states a Personal Property of the Holy Spirit

i. About this eighteenth distinction I ask one thing, whether gift state a personal property of the Holy Spirit.

ii. It seems that it does not, because according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* 15 ch.19, “the Holy Spirit is the gift of God insofar as he is given to those to whom he is given,” but not because he is given to those to whom he is given does he have his personal property, because thus is he given in time; therefore of his personal property he does not have that he be gift, because according to the same [Augustine] *ibid.*, “And with him,” he says, “God is, even if to no one he be given, because he was God coeternal with the Father and Son before to anyone he was given,” – let this be as to the question by

³⁷ Vatican editors: a large blank space was left here by Scotus, both for a further question within distinction 17 and for distinction 18, but neither the further question nor the further distinction are contained in the text of the *Ordinatio*. [They were historically supplied from the *Reportationes*.]

³⁸ The Vatican editors do not include a text for this question, which is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. The Wadding edition does have such a text (from the *Reportatio* or the *Additiones Magnae*) and it is translated here for the convenience of the reader. For the convenience of the reader too have paragraph numbers been added (in lower case Roman numerals). The Wadding edition leaves them unnumbered.

which the Master asks, “Whether the Holy Spirit be by the same idea called gift and given.”

iii. Again secondly thus: If the Holy Spirit of his personal property be called gift, since through the Holy Spirit are gifts given, by gift would gifts be given, but this seems impossible, because ‘gift’ includes the idea of givable; therefore, if it were to include the idea of giver, it would include opposite ideas, namely of giver and gift. Let this be for the first question of the Master, whether through the Holy Gift Spirit gifts are given.

iv. Third as follows: if the Holy Spirit by his property be gift, therefore by his property he is givable, because every gift is givable; I ask to whom is he givable? Not to the Father and Son, it is certain, therefore to the creature; but this is false, namely that he be called gift from eternity from his personal property because givable to a creature, because then for the same reason the Son would be called gift, because from eternity he proceeded from the Father as givable to the creature; hence it is said in *Isaiah*, “A son is given to us etc.” This as to the third question of the Master, whether the Holy Spirit be givable to the Father and Son or only to us.

v. Again fourth as follows: the property of a person proceeding states the procession by which he has received essence; therefore if gift be the personal property of the Holy Spirit, gift will state his procession, by which the Holy Spirit proceeded and received essence. But gift only states donation, which does not belong to the Holy Spirit from eternity, since he would not be given before there was to whom he would be given; therefore his procession would not be from eternity, which is false.

vi. Again fifth as follows: a person receives essence by that by which he has essence; but the Holy Spirit by procession receives essence; therefore by procession he has essence. Therefore, with the same thing added on both sides, by that by which he has essence he is essence; but by procession he has essence; therefore by procession he is essence, because if he has essence he is essence; so then it follows that the Holy Spirit by gift is essence, which is false, because the Holy Spirit is not gift by that by which he is God (nor is the Son by that Son by which he is God, but by that by which he is God he is essence; therefore [sc. the Holy Spirit is] not essence by that by which he proceeds, nor gift by that by which he is God. This is what Augustine says, *On the Trinity* 7 ch.1, *On things great*.

vii. Again sixth as follows: A gift has a relation toward that to which it is given; therefore if the Holy Spirit has from procession that he is gift of the creature, by consequence he would have [sc. from procession] that he is Spirit of the creature. This is false, because for the same reason would the Son be Son of the creature, since he is given to us. And this reason is intimated in the fourth question of the Master: whether the Son could be called ours, since he is given to us, just as the Holy Spirit is called ours.

viii. Again seventh thus: between giver and gift there is a relation; but the Holy Spirit gives gift; therefore, if from his personal property he be gift, then the Spirit would be referred to himself according to the relation of donor and donated, or of giver and given; but no real or personal relation is of the same thing to³⁹ itself; therefore etc. Let this be as to the fifth question of the Master, whether the Holy Spirit be referred to himself.

³⁹ The Wadding edition has the Latin *a* or ‘by’, which seems a misprint for *ad* or ‘to’.

ix. Against is Augustine, *On the Trinity* 4 ch.20, “For just as,” he says, “to be born is to be Son from the Father, so to be sent is to be known to the Son that he be from him, and just as for the Holy Spirit to be gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to be known that he proceeds from him.” And there follows, “Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit not proceed also from the Son;” therefore the Holy Spirit is gift by that by which he proceeds from the Father and the Son, and consequently gift is the personal property of the Holy Spirit.

x. Again Augustine, *On the Trinity* 5 ch.2, “But yet,” he says, “the Holy Spirit who is not the Trinity, but is understood in the Trinity in that which is properly called the Holy Spirit, is said relatively when he is referred to the Father and Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and Son. But the relation does not appear in this name, but appears when he is called gift of God; for he is gift of the Father and Son because he proceeds from the Father and Son.” These things he [says]. Therefore, gift is his personal property according to which he proceeds from the Father and Son.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

xi. Here it is said that ‘gift’ can be taken in three ways, or equivocally, as we can get from Augustine in the aforesaid authorities. In one way aptitudinally. In a second way habitually. In a third way actually. In the third way Augustine speaks in the first authority adduced, about gift. In the second way Augustine speaks, *On The Trinity* 5 ch.45, where he says: “ Was he then (supply ‘gift’) before he was given but was not yet gift, or was he, by the very fact by which God was going to give him, already gift even before he was given?” etc., a little later he replies saying, “But because he proceeded so as to be givable, he was already gift even before there was to whom he might be given.”

xii. In the first way, namely aptitudinally, he is called gift as he is naturally apt to be given, so that it not be repugnant to him to be given, even if in the future he were not given, as Augustine speaks in the authorities to the opposite; and in this way gift has the idea of a personal property, or he is gift from his procession, namely insofar as he is givable.

xiii. But this I do not concede, although we approve the distinction; and that it is false the argument is: because a personal property is inward and not outward, but the donability is not inward but outward to the creature, because not to the Father nor to the Son; therefore etc. I prove the major because any divine person had perfect being divine and personal before there was any creature, because he is of himself necessary being; but a creature in no being, neither inward nor outward, is necessary being, neither in being of existence nor in being of essence, namely in diminished or understood being. The reason for this is because necessity is a condition of existence, and such [sc. created] being abstracts from existence; also this would be more unacceptable than if it were necessary being in real being. But what is of itself necessary existence is prior to that which is possible or not necessary being; therefore in that prior stage is the third person or his procession, and not a respect of the same to a creature, because it is not to understand that any relation is to a creature unless the creature were or be understood to be, because relation requires a term simultaneous with the being. Secondly the major is proved thus:

because a relation of reason is not *per se* included in a divine person, which is a real being, and if he were to include a relation of reason he would be a being of reason, even if with this he were to include several reals, because a constituted thing follows the weaker part; but the relation of God to the creature, whether actual, or habitual, or aptitudinal is a being of reason; therefore etc.

xiv. Again to the principal point as follows: one person is not constituted formally by two distinct relationships; but the Holy Spirit is by passive spiration (which states a respect to the spirators) constituted in personal being, but if aptitudinal relation were necessary for this, it would be a different relation from that. I prove it first because they are to diverse terms, then because one is real, the other of reason.

B. Scotus' Opinion

xv. I reply first to the thing in itself, second to the intention of Augustine. As to the thing I say that no [sc. divine] person is constituted in personal being by any respect to the creature, nor does any personal property state a respect to the creature, rather whatever is intrinsic in divine reality, whether absolute or respective, in whatever being real or intelligible, abstracts from every respect to the creature, and is prior to any being at all of the creature; so that if, *per impossibile* or *incompossibile*, nothing other than God could be in any being, nevertheless there would be in God whatever belongs to him *ad intra* according to any being essential or personal, because the whole Trinity is first understood in personal being according to any being whatever before the creature is understood according to any being, because whatever being is attributed to the creature, whether real or diminished, it is from the whole Trinity. And therefore the creature, according to whatsoever being of it, is necessarily posterior to all being *ad intra*, and therefore nothing intrinsic in divine reality includes necessarily a respect to the creature, which is posterior; therefore since the respect by which the Holy Spirit is called gift is to the creature, because he would not be gift save to the creature to whom he were given, because he is not so given to the Father nor to the Son, it follows that gift is not a property constitutive of the Holy Spirit but only passive spiration is, which receives being from the Father and Son, which is properly designated by this name *Holy Spirit* in the sense of composition, whatever Augustine say in *On the Trinity* 5 ch.2, that namely his relation appears more in this name 'gift' than in this name 'Holy Spirit'.

xvi. I say therefore that most appears the constitutive property of the third person in this name *Holy Spirit*, not understanding by *Spirit* only intellectual or spiritual nature, because thus is this name *Spirit* common to the three persons; but taking *Holy Spirit* for the one spirated by the single and holy will of the Father and Son, because such a will, having an infinite object infinitely lovable present to it, is a sufficient principle of producing a love infinite and consequently standing *per se*, who is called the *Spirit*.

C. The Intention of Augustine

xvii. Yet because of the authority of Augustine, it needs to be known that 'gift' can be taken in many ways. In one way can gift be called anything whatever freely produced, and thus 'to give' is nothing other than to produce freely, and 'to be given' to be produced freely. And in this way can it be conceded that the Holy Spirit is from

eternity given and gift, because from eternity he is spirated, and thus 'gift' does not state save a personal property, because from eternity is the Holy Spirit spirated. Hence thus 'to give' and 'to be given' is nothing other than to spirate and to be spirated, and in this way do the Saints not speak of 'gift'. For they concede that the Spirit is gift from eternity but not given from eternity, because that he is given from eternity includes that the creature to whom he is given will be from eternity, for something cannot be given unless there be that to which it is given.

xviii. In another way can by 'gift' be understood the concordant love of the Father and Son by which the Father returns love to the Son and the Son returns the same love, in the way Richard speaks, *On the Trinity* 3, of love. And thus does Augustine here not intend to speak of 'gift', because gift in this way, which is the same thing as love, is purely essential, according to one opinion, or purely personal, according to another opinion. And therefore I say that 'gift' *per se* principally designates something one and by consequence connotes it, and so is univocal. For it designates *per se* a respect of reason to the creature, and then it designates something essential and not *per se*; or principally it designates a notional property of some person, but connotes the notional, as was said above about 'to be given', or if it be said that it designates both *per se*, then it will be equivocal and not designate *per se* one.

xix. Supposing however that it designates something *per se*, I say that first and *per se* it designates the respect of donability to the creature or of donative or donating, because 'gift' can be taken in three ways in respect of the creature, as the first opinion said, and in this well. But yet it connotes the property of the third person proceeding from the Father and Son, because he is true love by force of his procession, and thus truly freely gift. For, among all the gifts of a giver, the first gift that he, and whoever is able to give, gives is love of him[self], whom first he gives to the beloved, who is the idea of whatever other gift. For nothing has the idea of gift save insofar as it falls under act of love, for not a knife or a rose nor anything exterior has the idea of gift or merits the name of gift, save because communicated lovingly by loving act of the will; therefore all gifts are called such by reason of the love giving, although not of the [love] receiving. Now the Holy Spirit by force of his procession is first love, and infinite, and proceeding by act of love from the Father and Son freely producing him; and so 'gift', if it be an essential *per se* designating respect to the creature, will yet connote necessarily the property of the Holy Spirit, who is the first love of the essence that proceeds from the Father and Son by act of love. And thus are to be understood the authorities of Augustine above adduced for the opposite side, that gift states the personal property of the Holy Spirit by connotation, and not according to his principal signification. This is made clear by an example: this name 'giver' does not first designate the respect of the spirative virtue of the Father and Son, but first designates a respect of reason of it to the creature, connoting the passive procession or personal property of the Holy Spirit, by respect however to the spirative virtue by which is produced first spirated infinite love; in the same way 'gift' does not in the first way designate the personal property of the Holy Spirit.

II. To the Principal Arguments

xx. To the first principal reason, the response is plain through what has been said, because 'gift' does not first signify the personal property of the Holy Spirit. For there is

gift insofar as it is given to those to whom it is given, and so *per se* it signifies a respect to the creature, but it connotes the property of the Holy Spirit.

xxi. As to the second, I concede that by gift are gifts given, because by love which is the first gift are all gifts given, as was said.

xxii. To the proof I say that there is not opposition in relatives unless they be taken in respect of the same thing; for paternity and filiation are not opposed in the same thing, so that the same thing in respect of diverse things may be father and son, because he can be son of his father and yet father of the son whom he generates; yet he cannot be son of his father and father of himself, because then the same thing would produce itself, which is unacceptable, *On the Trinity* 1 ch.1. Now the Holy Spirit is gift insofar as it connotes his personal procession, and he is together with the Father and Son giver or donator of any gift that is given to a creature, nor is this unacceptable, that he be giver and gift or given in respect of diverse things.

xxiii. To the third it must be said that ‘givable’ is said in one way that it is ‘naturally apt to be given’. In another way it says the same as ‘possible to be given’; nor are these the same, because something is able to be such which however is not naturally apt to be such; for a stone is able to be borne upwards and yet it is not naturally apt to be upwards, nor does it have aptitude for this. A neutral body too, which of itself is of a nature neither to be borne upwards nor downwards, as the circular body [sc. of the heavens] is able to be borne downwards and upwards. Now according to the first way, the person of the Holy Spirit has an aptitude from his procession and from his personal property, because the Holy Spirit proceeds as givable love; not so the Son, but as Word declarative of the essence of the Father, and therefore the Son does not proceed by his personal property, as having an aptitude to be given; yet he does proceed as to a second way, as able to be given by the Father and by the Son and by the Holy Spirit; and so they are not the same, as is plain in the example before alleged.

xxiv. As to the fourth it must be conceded that, for the Holy Spirit, procession from the Father and Son furnishes essence without any beginning of time (as Augustine says, *On the Trinity* 15), and that this procession is included in this name ‘gift’, not as principal signified but as connoted.

xxv. To the fifth it must be said that it is false: “the Holy Spirit is God by that by which he has essence”; because by procession he has essence, yet not by it is he God, “for he is not Father by that by which he is God, nor Holy Spirit by that by which he is God,” as was made plain above by Augustine. The Son also has essence by nativity, but not by nascibility is he God but by Deity; and when it is proved that for a person to have essence is for him to be God, therefore, with the same thing added on each side, a person is God by that by which he has essence, I deny the consequence. But there is a fallacy of figure of speech in the first mode, for when an ablative is construed with a verb-adjective, it is construed with it either in idea of active principle or in idea of action and coming to be, as “wood has being hot by heat or fire,” there this ablative “by heat” signifies that the heat had in wood is the principle of heating in wood. But when it is said “wood has to be hot by heating,” the ablative is construed in idea of making and coming to be, but when the ablative is construed with a verb-substantive it is construed with it in idea of formal principle of being, as when it is said “wood is hot by heat;” and thus in the matter at hand, “the Holy Spirit has essence by procession,” the ablative is construed with the verb in idea of action as if in ‘to be’ or ‘to become’: but when it is said, “by procession he is

essence and God,” it signifies there that procession is the formal idea by which he is God, which he is not; and so there is a fallacy there of figure of speech from like ending.

xxvi. To the sixth it must be said that the Holy Spirit is said to be gift for the creature and to be our spirit according to the respect which he connotes from his procession, because as ‘gift’ first signifies a respect to the creature, connoting however eternal procession, so also conversely ‘Holy Spirit’ first signifies eternal procession or the person constituted, connoting aptitudinal respect to the creature. But the Son, from his procession, does not signify a respect to the creature, nor connotes it, because he proceeds naturally and not by way of gift, for he comes forth not “somehow given, but somehow born,” Augustine, *On the Trinity* 5.

xxvii. To the seventh I say that the Holy Spirit is a giving of himself as to what is extrinsic, but this respect is not his property.

Nineteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude

1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude.

That they are not:

Because in the *Categories* 6.6a26-27 is said that “to quantity is proper that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;” quantity is not in God, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2, “God is great without quantity, good without quality;” therefore etc.

2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which states imperfection. Equality is of this sort, – the proof, because it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; which is plain from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.41: “If all things,” he says, “were equal, they would now not be ‘all things’;” therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand with equality; equality therefore is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as essential or as common to the three persons.

3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with that of which it is the image, not the latter with its image.”

4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: “The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal,” – and the Master in the text specially proves this, through Augustine [Fulgentius, rather] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

I. To the Question

5. Here it is necessary first to see about equality properly taken, second about it generally taken, and third how there is equality in the matter at hand [sc. in the divine persons], and fourth it must be shown that in this way in the divine persons there is perfect equality.

A. About Equality Taken Properly

6. About the first, the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-12 ‘On Relation’, distinguishes three relations founded on ‘one’, namely the same, the like, and the equal – and, speaking of these strictly and properly, they are appropriated to three genera [sc. the categories], as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps can other relations be founded on the ideas of other genera, as proportionality on relation, – and this Avicenna seems to say [*Metaphysics* III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.

7. I say, however, that the remote foundation of these relations is a thing of that genus, as that of equality the foundation is a thing of the genus of quantity, and of likeness a thing of the genus of quality, and of identity a thing of the genus of substance; however the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of a foundation is the unity of such thing, because on a thing of such genus, as [the thing] is diverse, are founded disparate relations and not common ones.

B. About Equality Taken Generally

8. About the second [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a ‘what’, and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or possessing a form; and in accord with this, just as in three ways can any being be considered, so also can a triple relation commonly taken be founded on it – because identity [and diversity] on any being insofar as it is a ‘what’, equality and inequality on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called ‘quantity of virtue’, about which Augustine says, *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9, that “in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater”), and likeness or unlikeness can be founded on any being insofar as it is a ‘what sort’ and a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher speaks in *Metaphysics* 5.14.1020a33 ‘On Quality’, that “one mode of quality is difference of substance,” that is, substantial, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were an essential quality of them).

9. In this way, namely taking commonly these common relations and not strictly, the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b25, that “every being compared with every being is the same or diverse;” so too every being compared with every being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness – taken commonly in this way – is being in common compared to any being in common, so too the relations are transcendent, though not convertible yet disjunct, dividing being as it is divided into necessary and possible.

C. In What Way there is Equality in the Matter at Hand

10. About the third [n.5], I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither a property of any genus and consequently not any of the common relations either according as they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera [n.6]; but because said formally of God is being and any property convertible with being and, of non-convertible – but disjunct – properties,

always the nobler extreme, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God which either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, but the remainder is repugnant.

D. About Equality in the Divine Persons

11. About the fourth [n.5] (setting aside now identity and likeness, about which there is not now question [see I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it is perfectly in the divine persons.

12. And although equality of some created beings could be taken according to continuous or discrete quantity, and according to continuous [quantity] permanent and successive, and thereby could it be queried ‘whether in the divine persons there was equality in number’ (if there was perfect number there) and ‘whether there would be perfect equality there as to duration or as to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) – the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to this Distinction 19 but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything of this here in the present Distinction [d.19], because he does not posit number there [sc. d.19] positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in that Distinction 24); but the second [sc. duration] the Master does in a way touch on (and the Master adduces Augustine [rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* [n.4], and it was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). About the third [sc. continuous quantity] there is question, namely about equality in magnitude.

13. And that it is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, – and from the proximate idea of foundation, namely unity [n.7].

The first is plain from this, that the magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it, and nothing is perfect ‘to which infinity is not repugnant’ unless it be infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, only this [the perfect] is infinite, as was plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.

14. About the second, [n.13], the thing proposed is proved, because in all other natural equals there is a diminished unity of magnitude according to which they are called equal – because the magnitude is numbered in the equals; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet with this a sufficient distinction of the things related, which is required for real relation.

15. But here there is a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, it does not seem that a relation founded on magnitude is other than a relation founded on the essence as it is a ‘what’, and so equality does not seem to differ from identity, – or if equality could be noted in things that seem to be quasi-properties of essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness etc.], it is not noted in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute other than the sort of perfection that states a mode intrinsic to it [sc.the attribute] (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore if likeness ‘according to such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] be equality according to the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness according to this property – and so it seems that equality according as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because neither as distinct from identity, speaking of equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.

16. There is also another doubt, because infinite equalities of divine persons seem should be posited if there could be infinite attributal perfections; for any of them has its magnitude as an intrinsic mode of itself, according to its proper idea; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as attributal perfections.^a

a. [*Interpolated text*] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, it follows that something of one idea in divine reality is not of itself a this, and then the reason above is not valid, in distinction 2, why there cannot be in divine reality several suppositis of the same idea, because any of them is of itself a this and any production is of itself a this; but of this the contrary is seen about magnitude and equality in divine reality.

17. To these [doubts]. To the first I reply^a – see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].

a. [*Interpolated text*] ...that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from others (as was said above about infinity [n.15, refs.]) but a degree intrinsic to any, because there is not a thus simple attribute in divine reality about which one may not seek its quantity of virtue; for if there were in divine reality only one attribute, as wisdom, it would still be possible to ask about its degree of virtue, how great it was; hence if any [sc. perfection simply] were without another, still each would have a certain degree in its virtual quantity, and any would be infinite and have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not a single foundation of equality in divine reality but is an indifferent single foundation which is saved in every perfection simply and included in it, each of which can be a foundation of equality, because each has a proper magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’, also infinite magnitudes likewise and equalities corresponding. But on the essence as it is quiddity there is founded identity, – and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, on it is founded an equality between the persons having the essence. – But is equality in divine reality distinguished from relation of likeness and identity? I reply that it is in a way so and is in a way not. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished among themselves, because not the foundation of it either (as magnitude) is distinguished as much from the foundations of those as much as the foundations of these are distinguished from each other, because magnitude – on which equality is founded – states only a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished from each other. Hence equality does not seem to state in divine reality another relation simply from likeness and identity, but it states only a perfect mode of each relation, which can be made clear: for if there are two whites one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed similar, though not equal – but they are not perfectly similar unless they be equal in whiteness, so that equality does not state quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is similarity in each. Thus, if in the Father – according to the error of Arius – there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser, the Son would indeed be like the Father but not equal, because he would not have as perfectly the form of deity as the Father. Positing however – as we posit from faith – that nothing is there less than anything else in the deity, the Son is perfectly alike, because in foundation of likeness they are altogether and perfectly equal. Hence, just as magnitude states only a perfect intrinsic mode of any essential perfection, as of the foundations of identity and likeness, in divine reality, so equality states a perfect mode of this and of that, and thus does not state simply a relation other than them.

To the second doubt [interpolation to n.16] it can be said in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality are determined the things of one idea to their plurality;

but this does not happen about the divine persons, as is plain in the same place of distinction 2 [*Rep.* IA d.19 n.29]; but in the matter at hand equality requires a distinction of persons, and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and they are distinct formally and in idea (it is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of different idea). It can be said in another way, and equally well, that although unity concurs with a foundation of equality, yet it is not a foundation as remote of equality but that from its diversity the equality be multiplied, – which is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as science is distinguished from charity, so the likeness which is founded on unity in science [sc. is distinguished from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless to the matter at hand it must be said that the equalities founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections are not of the same idea formally, just as neither are those on which they are founded of the same idea formally, but of different ideas: and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and unity from unity, so equality is of a different idea in one and in the other – and then it need not be conceded that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is appropriated to magnitude of bulk (but magnitude is not appropriated to magnitude of bulk), then it could be properly conceded that magnitude is there without quantity; and that magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because in this way every being is great or small, and equal or unequal, although that magnitude is not foundation of equality as it is a property of the quantity which is a genus.

19. But against this it is argued, because it does not seem that anything could be said of God unless what is of the understanding of it be said of him; therefore, since quantity is of the understanding of magnitude, magnitude cannot be conceded in God and quantity there denied.

20. Again, when asking how great God is, it is well replied that he is immense; but if there were not there quantity, the question would be null.

21. Again, a property common to every genus does not belong to anything by specific difference; equality is a property common to every genus of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference of the genus of quantity, – and so there cannot be posited in God any difference of the genus of quantity by denying there the genus of quantity and that by such difference there be there an idea of equality.

22. To the first [n.19] I reply: magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (*Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-10), and according as it is opposed to smallness, and its concrete – which is ‘great’ – is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.6.1056b3-14, in the simile ‘of long and short, great and small, many and one’). In the first way magnitude is not transferred to God, nor its difference as something of him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then would be transferred to him the genus that is included in it; nor too in the second way, as ‘great’ is properly taken and states a property of quantity, because too a proper property is not without its proper subject. But in another way magnitude is a property of being, distinct from small, and thus is it in every being the other extreme; this is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.13 1020a23-26, in the

chapter ‘On Quantity’: “Now great and small, greater and lesser, are said according to themselves and relative to another; according to themselves indeed properties of quantity; they are also transferred to these other names [great, small etc.]” (as if he were to say: ‘properly taken’ they state properties of quantity, ‘commonly taken’ they state common properties of being).

23. As to the other [n.20] – how great God is – it must be denied that it is a reasonable question if in God quantity be denied; but if it be conceded that it is a reasonable question, then it is to be conceded that in God there is quantity of virtue, not of bulk.

24. The third reason [n.21] only concludes that equality, as it is a property in the genus of quantity, does not belong to God by any difference of the genus of quantity, and is not transferred to divine reality; and I concede that no difference of the genus of quantity belongs to God, nor any property of that genus; but the transcendent property belongs to God.

25. To the other [n.2], I say that perfection simply, that is which formally could be infinite, states only something that can be essential in divine reality and to itself (and such in some way is pre-understood to relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness etc. But equality is not pre-understood to relations of origin, nor can it be to itself; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not state perfection simply; it does however state a perfection which, in every nature – comparing it to something of the same nature – is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for there is no inequality in the same nature unless the other individual imperfectly have the nature. From the fact, then, relation can be between suppositis in this nature, inequality in them would be a mark of imperfection, because in one of the two it would posit a diminished perfection; but equality is not there a mark of imperfection, rather it more pre-demands perfection simply, because it pre-demands a nature that is perfect and perfectly in each thing related. And this is what Augustine says in his book *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15, when speaking to the disciple: “Equality,” he says, “you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon anyone to be endowed with human sense for whom that would not be apparent.” This indeed is true when comparing to things in the same nature; and simply, for things for which equality is compossible, they are more able to be perfect than those for which equality is not compossible, because necessarily something of the latter is imperfect.

26. Then, when you give proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], – I reply that some things are necessary for the perfection of creatures that however do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures – of themselves imperfect – without those things cannot have perfect perfection (as much as and of the sort possible for them), and therefore they in some way supply the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything is a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several ordered natures; and so there an order of nature, that is of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection possible for them, – but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can be in the most perfect unlimited nature, without order of imperfection.

27. And if you argue that order is mark of perfection, and order seems to require inequality, – I reply: I say that an order of origin stands with perfection, but an order of

inequality does not stand with perfection. Not every order, then, is mark of perfection, but some stands with perfection in the same nature, and some does not.

28. To the third [n.3] I say that sometimes on some common relation are founded equivalent opposite relations, just as if it be said ‘assimilating and assimilated’. These state a relation of active to passive [sc. and of passive to active] founded on this common relation that is ‘likeness’; for the assimilating is causing likeness as the whitewasher is causing whiteness, and the assimilated is caused according to likeness as the whitewashed is caused as to whiteness. There is then here a relation of active and passive in the assimilator and the assimilated, just as in what whitewasher and the whitewashed; but, in the whitewasher that on which the relation of the active is founded is absolute, but here – namely in the assimilator – that on which the relation of active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And this sort of name imports two relations, of this sort: one common and the other of non-equivalence. As to the common relation, it has mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not have mutuality with the correlative according to relation of non-equivalence. – So also here [sc. in the divine persons], to be co-equalled imports the relation of co-equalled to co-equalizer, and thus the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is co-equalized with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely ‘to receive equality from another’, is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence – namely to co-equalize – belongs to the Father, that is, ‘to give equality to the Son’. There is then an equal image and conversely, but only the image is co-equalized when understanding the two aforesaid relations.

Question Two

Whether Every Person is in the Other

29. Second I ask about the circumincession of the divine persons, whether every person is in the other.

And it is argued that not:

Because if anything whatever were in anything whatever (according to the position of Anaxagoras) there would be the greatest confusion; therefore if the divine persons were in themselves mutually they would be confused – against the remark of Athanasius [*Athanasian Creed*] “not confusing the persons.”

30. And the argument is confirmed, because the indivisible is not distinguished from the indivisible unless it be outside it, – which is proved by the Philosopher, *Physics* 6.1.231b3-4, because two indivisibles put together do not make a greater, because they would be one indivisible; therefore since the divine persons are indivisible, if they are together, they are not distinct.

31. Besides, if with ‘person is in person’ there stand any distinction, then also composition. Proof of the consequence: if something were in deity that were not it, then deity would be composite or compositional, – which is plain from Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1 (and it is put in Lombard, *Sent.* I d.8 ch.8 n.89): “Therefore God is simple because he is that which he has, that excepted that person is said relatively to another and is not another;” therefore if a person has something in himself which is not himself, he is composite or compositional, which is false and was refuted before [I d.2 nn.376-410, d.8 n.209].

32. Again, in the same thing that the Son is in, filiation also is in; in the Father is the Son (by the positing of circumincession); therefore in the Father is filiation. And further, that in which is filiation, that is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son.

33. Further, if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, then the Father is in himself. The consequence is proved through the Philosopher *Physics* 4.2.209a33-35: “If air is in fire and fire is in the heaven, therefore air is in the heaven;” therefore by similarity here. And it is confirmed by the remark of the Philosopher in *Categories* 3.1b10-12: “whatever follows on the predicate follows on the subject,” and by the maxims [from Walter Burleigh and Nicholas of Amiens] “whatever follows on the consequent follows on the antecedent” and “whatever antecedes the antecedent antecedes the consequent” and “what is prior to the prior is prior to the posterior” and “what is cause of the cause is cause of the caused” and the like.

34. Again, if the Father is in the Son, then God is in God; and further: then God is distinct from God.

35. Again, what goes out from something is not in it; but the Son goes out from the Father (as is said in *John* 16.28: “I have come from the Father”); therefore etc.

36. To the opposite:

John 14.10-11: “I am in the Father and the Father is in me,” – and the Master adduces authorities in the text [*Sent.* I d.19 ch.4 nn.172-73], namely of Augustine and Ambrose and Hilary.

I. To the Question

37. The truth of this question is plain and certain from the authority of the Savior in *John* and elsewhere in many places, and also of the saints expounding them [n.36]. But so that in some way it can be understood, three things need to be seen: first about the mode in which person is in person, second what is the reason for this indwelling,⁴⁰ and third if this mode of being ‘in’ can be reduced to some mode of being ‘in’ found in creatures, speaking of the modes that the Philosopher posits, *Physics* 4.3.210a14-24, or whether it can be made clear through some mode that can be found in creatures.

A. About the Mode in which Person is in Person

1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

38. [Exposition of the Opinion] – About the first [n.37] it is said as follows [sc. by Henry], that in two ways can something be understood to be in another: ‘first’, that is, according to the whole – as wine is in an amphora; or according to a part, and this in two ways: either such that a part is in another and is not anything of it, as the foot of the bird is in a trap and is not anything of it (and by this the whole bird is said to be in the trap), or that a part of it is in another and is something of it (and by this, that of which it is a part is said to be in it^a).

a. [Interpolated text] just as if some monster, having two bodies and two heads, had only two feet, then one would be said to be in the other by its foot, which is part of the other.

⁴⁰ Scotus says literally ‘in-existence’. ‘Indwelling’ seems the more proper term in English for the doctrine.

39. To the matter at hand [n.37], it is said that the Father is not in the Son in the first way.

40. Which is proved in two ways:

First, because that which is in another in the first way, anything of it at all is in it equally first – just as if earth is first in the center, any part at all of earth is equally first in the center, as far as concerns itself; therefore if the Father is first in the Son, everything whatever of the Father will be first in the Son, and so paternity equally first as deity. And from this further: just as by deity the Son is God, so by paternity he will be Father, which is false.

41. Second, because that in which something is first seems as it were to go round it and penetrate and contain it; but that the same thing with respect to the same thing contains and is contained, goes round and is gone round, is not intelligible; therefore etc.

42. Therefore it is necessary that just as in creatures something is called according to a part in another and not first, so one person is said to be in another according to something of itself: but not according to something of itself that is nothing of that in which it is, because that would be a personal relation of the indwelling person, and that is not the reason whereby a person is in a person (as will be plain in the second article [nn.58-62], wherein I agree with him [Henry]); therefore that is the essence, which thus is something of what indwells which is something of that in which it dwells.

43. And that because of this essence of the Son indwelling the Father is the Son in the Father, the proof is because wherever the foundation of any relation is, there the relation founded on it is; therefore wherever the essence is on which filiation is founded, there filiation is.

44. A distinction, however, is drawn about the person ‘who is in another’ and the person ‘whom another is in’, because although the person ‘who is in another’ be posited in it not first but by something of itself, that is, by the essence [n.42], yet the person where it is, is where first there is another, that is itself totally, because it itself totally has in some way as it were the idea of what surrounds and contains deity, which, although it not be part of the indwelling person, is yet something of the person.

45. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this.

First: to be ‘in’, according to every opinion, does not state something relative to itself, because thus would the Father be in himself; therefore a relation of person to person. Not relation of origin, because that is not of the same idea in the extreme terms (and the persons are uniformly in each other, according to them [n.60]); therefore it states a common relation [n.6]. But a common relation in accord with the same idea of foundation is in the supposit that is referred and in the supposit that it is referred to, just as likeness requires the same idea of whiteness in the like that is referred and in the like that it is referred to; therefore if that to which the indwelling person is referred be of the sort first that that person is in itself, it follows that the indwelling person will first be *per se* related by this relation and not through something of itself precisely.^a

a. [Interpolated text] this is plain in the example about an encounter of *a* and *b*.

46. Secondly as follows: when something is said to be in another according to a part, in the same way is it in it according to a part in the way the part is in it ‘first’. An example: if a man is on the earth by his foot, as the foot is on the earth locally so is the man on the earth locally by a part – but not if the foot is there as in a place will the man

be there as form in matter; so too if whiteness is in a man according to a part, because in his face, in the same way of being ‘in’ in the genus by which it is in the face first – to wit, as an accident in a subject – in that same way, I say, is it in the man by a part, because in him as in a subject. Therefore if the Son is in the Father because of the essence which formally is in the Father, it follows that the Son is in the Father as it were formally (although according to something of himself), which is not to be ‘in’ by way of circumincession.

47. The reply is that the major is true when speaking of that which is the proximate reason of something’s being ‘in’, but not of the remote reason; and the essence, as it is formally in the Father, is not the proximate reason of the Son’s being in the Father but the remote one – and the proximate reason is as he is under the property of the indwelling person.

48. On the contrary. This proves the matter at hand, because that is said to belong to the whole ‘first’ which does not belong to it according to some part of itself, but according to what is from all its parts, in creatures; therefore so here, since there is not in a person – according to them [sc. Henry and his followers] – save relation and essence, whatever belongs to a person not precisely by reason of one of these but by reason of the essence together with the relation (and conversely), this belongs to it first, because this states the person according to its whole self.

49. Further, the property of person, as it is incommunicable, does not belong formally to the essence (as: essence does not generate, nor is generated, nor is distinct, nor is referred), and not conversely either (the property that belongs to the essence as it is communicable does not belong to the person, because it is proper to the essence according as it is distinguished from the person [I d.2 nn.389-390]), because essence is one in three, but person is in no way – neither first nor according to something of itself – one in three; therefore since this mode of being ‘in’, by which the essence is in the Father as a quasi form (to wit, as by what the Father is God), in no way belongs to person, because this is proper to essence according as it is distinguished from person, in no way from this will the Father be said to be in the Son, just as neither from this, that ‘the Father is essence’, will the Father be the same as the Son.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

50. As to this article [n.37] I say as follows, that a predicate belongs to the whole ‘first’, as ‘first’ is distinguished from that which is according to a part (as is said in *Physics* 5.1.224a21-34), that it does not belong to it precisely because it belongs to a part of it.⁴¹ And contrariwise, nothing is said to belong to any whole according to a part, save what belongs to a part and through that part is said of the whole – as is plain from the Philosopher in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] in his example: “The man is healthy because his thorax [is healthy];” the ‘to be healthy’ is said of the thorax formally and first, and by this of the whole, of which whole the thorax is part.

51. A predicate inhering first in some whole is sometimes in no part of the whole, and sometimes is in in any part of it.

⁴¹ Vatican editors: ‘capable of laughter’ belongs first to man, not because it belongs to a part of him but because it does not belong first either to his soul or his body but to both together [n.52].

52. An example of the first: a triangle first has three angles etc. [and three sides and three vertices], and yet no part of a triangle (speaking of integral parts) has this predicate, namely ‘to have three sides etc.’; likewise man first is capable of laughter, and yet in no part of him is this property first; and the composite is generated first, although no part of it [sc. form or matter] is generated first, speaking of this way ‘of that which it is to be generated’; and so universally in all heterogeneous substances and their properties. And the reason is this, because the nature of such subject is adequate to such predicate, which adequacy does such primacy indicate (as is plain from the definition of ‘universal’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b32-33), and the nature of that adequate whole is saved in no part, and so its property belongs to no part of it.

53. An example of the second [n.51] is: if fire is first hot, any part at all of fire is hot. Thus too does the Philosopher argue, *Physics* 7.1.241b32-242a15, that no body can be moved by itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part; for it would not first be moved unless motion were in any part of it: for if motion were not in some part of it, it would not be in the whole ‘first’. And so is it universally in homogeneous substances and their properties, because the nature, to which first – that is, adequately – such property belongs, is of the same idea in the part and in the whole; therefore a predicate adequate to such nature is in anything at all in which the nature is, and thus does it belong to a part.

Not therefore because of the idea of primacy must a predicate – which belongs to the whole – belong to the part, rather never because of this must it be that it belong to the part, but precisely when the nature of the whole is the same in such whole and in its part.

54. To the matter at hand [n.37] I say that this way of being ‘in’ [sc. circumincession] is not in the way in which nature is in a supposit or form in matter, but as a subsistent is in a subsistent, according to Hilary *On the Trinity* ch.7 n.41 when he says as follows: “The being-in is not as one thing in another, as body in body, but so to be-in that it be-in the subsistent, so indeed to be-in that it too subsist.” Now to subsist, that is, ‘to be *per se* incommunicably’, belongs first to the person (for it is not said of the person because it be said of the essence or of the relation), just as also ‘to act’ in creatures, or ‘to be produced’, belongs first to the whole supposit (that is, not to it because to a part). Therefore also ‘to be-in subsistently’ first belongs to the person: for although the nature be-in the Father first, as nature in a supposit, this however is not the subsistence or the existence-in of a subsistent in a subsistent, but precisely the existence-in by which the whole Son exists-in by presence and intimately in the whole Father; and to this alludes the remark of Ambrose in the hymn [*Splendor of the Father’s Glory*]: “In the Father the whole Son, and the whole Father in the Word.”

3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Henry of Ghent

55. And then to the arguments of the aforesaid opinion against this member [nn.40-41].

To the first [n.40] I say that the major premise is doubly false:

First, because it is not necessary for the predicate that belongs ‘first’ to the whole to belong to any part (as is plain enough from what has been made clear [nn.52, 54]), because it is ‘firstness’ of adequacy.

Second, because if it belong to any part, or to the whole by reason of any part [n.50], it is not necessary for it to belong to a second part by reason of any part,^a especially when the parts are not of the same idea in integrating the whole [n.52]. Just as, if man is first rational, because his specific difference (as ‘rational’) is said first of the species, first too does man have the act which belongs to rational animal insofar as it is rational, namely to understand or reason; and yet that predicate [sc. to understand, reason] does not belong equally to each part of man, namely to soul and body, for perhaps it can formally be said of the soul and in no way of the body; but it is not said of man because said of the soul, because then it would belong to man according to a part, just as ‘to be tall’ belongs to man according to a part, because according to the body. If also ‘to understand’ were to belong to each part so as to be able to be said of it, yet not equally is each part disposed to the predicate as concerns inherence of the whole predicate; for the body is not so the reason for the inherence of this sort of predicate as the soul is, and this because these parts – namely body and soul – are not parts of the same idea in integrating the whole, but one is matter and the other form; for matter is not the idea of operating, as the form is, for the whole first operating.

a. [*Interpolated text*] and so it is not necessary that what is first in a whole belong equally to the parts, because the parts in a whole are not equally cause of a property as it is.

56. So then in the matter at hand [n.54, 37]: it would not be necessary on account of ‘the Father being first in the Son’ to concede that deity or paternity is in the Son by that way of being ‘in’; if however it be conceded, it is still not necessary to concede it equally, because they [sc. deity and paternity] are not of the same idea in the person that includes them. And further, when it is argued ‘if they were equally in the Father, then if one formally the other too’ [n.40], – it is not valid, but it is a fallacy of equivocation, because when taking in the antecedent the ‘to be’ in the Father, it is taken as in a subsistent by presence, and in the consequent is inferred another mode of being ‘in’, which is not this mode formally, although it be presupposed to this mode of being ‘in’; hence from a mode of being ‘in’ by way of presence is concluded a mode of being ‘in’ by informing.

57. To the second [n.41] I say that it is not only against this part about being ‘in’ first, but also against the principal conclusion [sc. about being ‘in’ simply and not first]; for it seems as impossible in creatures that the same thing in respect of the same thing should contain and be contained, or by reason of the whole contain and by reason of a part be contained, as that the same thing first contain and be contained. And so I reply to the argument and say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc. circumincession] does not state containing, but the presence of a subsistent in a subsistent, and it is of one idea in both, because just as this subsistent is present to that, so that to this.

B. What the Idea is of the Indwelling of the Divine Persons

58. As to the second article [n.37] I say that neither is the essence reason for this indwelling nor relation alone [cf. n.42].

59. I prove the first [n.58], because then the Father would be in himself, which is false, in the way in which the Savior understands the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father [n.36], because thus to be ‘in’ requires real distinction.

60. I prove the second [n.58]: First because relations of origin are not of the same idea in the related persons, and so if they were the formal ideas of being ‘in’ of the persons in themselves mutually, the persons would not be mutually in themselves uniformly, – which is against what was said before [nn.54, 57].

Second because if *per impossibile* this God were to produce another God, this God would not be in that, because – according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.5 – if there were two Gods, they could not be together, and so neither would be immense, and so neither God; and yet there would truly be a relation of producer to produced.

Next, third, because if *per impossibile* two persons were without origin, if yet they had the same essence with real distinction, they would be mutually in themselves, because the essence of one person could not be in another unless the relation itself (which is altogether the same as the essence) were in it, although in another way of being ‘in’, because what the foundation is in the relation is also, though one would not be from the other in origin; therefore the relative property is not ‘in’ the cause.

Then, fourth, because in creatures there are truly relations of origin, of the principle and what it is principle of, and yet there – because of diversity of nature in the things related – neither is in the other.

61. And from these it follows that, since there are in the persons only essence and relation, according to the common opinion [e.g. of Henry of Ghent, Thomas Aquinas], that both these will be the total reason of the indwelling [cf. n.42].

62. And for understanding how this may be, an example can be taken in creatures about likeness: for nothing is like itself, according to Hilary ([*On the Trinity* III n.23] and it is put in Lombard, *Sent.* d.31 ch.1 n.266), but like another; yet likeness is founded on unity in quality, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a11-12, (chapter ‘On Relation’); neither the diversity alone, then, of the related things, nor the unity alone of the foundation, suffices for likeness, but both are required *per se* as one total cause. – So here: neither the distinction of the person indwelling and [the person] in whom the other is, nor the unity of essence by which they are mutually in each other, is the total idea of indwelling, but both together are. Yet just as in a likeness the more principal idea– and likewise the more immediate – is the unity of the foundation than the distinction of the things related, so here can the unity of the essence be posited the more immediate and more principal idea of this indwelling than the distinction of persons.

C. The Indwelling of the Divine Persons does not have a Like Example in Creatures

63. As to the third article [n.37] I say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc. circumincession] is not any of the modes that the Philosopher posits in the *Physics*, – formally, I say, because all those modes exist by this, that the thing contained is something of the thing containing and not conversely, or by this, that something of the thing contained is something of the thing containing and not conversely; neither of these ideas holds in the matter at hand [sc. of circumincession], because diversity is there a greater reason for being ‘in’ than unity is. Therefore well did Hilary say in *On the Trinity* III n.1, at the beginning (and it is set down in the text, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.4 n.172): “The nature of human intelligence does not grasp the idea of this statement [sc. “I am in the

Father and the Father is in me”], nor will human comparison provide any example for divine things.”

64. By collecting, however, what is of perfection in creatures and by taking away what is of imperfection, some examples can be posited of this mode of being ‘in’, at least imperfect ones and imperfectly representing this mode:

First indeed about the infalling of the divine essence in respect of creatures, as to which infalling there concur at the same time the immensity of the divine nature and its maintaining. Let be removed, then, from the infalling the idea of maintaining, so that the idea of presence be kept because of the immensity, without the idea of conservation or of active power that pertains to maintaining: with this removed, just as God – because immense – is present to every creature, so is he then understood present to something without the fact of his maintaining it; and then, if one nature is posited in that which is present and in that to which it is present, because of which one nature it is necessary that it be present, there will be an example for the matter at hand about this way of being ‘in’.

65. Another example is of the soul not informing the body but present to the body (as in the instant of death); or of an angel present to a body but not informing it; or of a glorious body present to a non-glorious body, – or a better example, if a glorious body could exist in another glorious body equally subtle. In all these the being ‘in’ is of a thing subsistent and present, not by informing nor by way of a part; and if in these be added unity of nature, which by necessity of nature requires such presence, it will be more perfectly alike.

66. Another example too is from the powers of the soul, which if they be posited to differ on the part of the thing and yet, along with this, to be really the same as the essence of the soul, of necessity will one be in the other, because in the other is the essence of the soul, which the power is the same as; therefore things in some way distinct will be really indistinct. If each of these were *per se* existent, a subsistent distinct will be in a subsistent by presence, and will be an example of being ‘in’.

67. On behalf of all these examples [nn.64-66] – and to make clear the two articles preceding [nn.61-63] – it can be added that, in this way of being ‘in’, each extreme is according to the same idea in the other, because here mutual presence is indicated, not the containing of extreme by extreme. Just as if a body be understood to be in a place, this is as contained in containing; but if two bodies be understood to be in the same place in themselves mutually, this is according to the same idea, because they are together and togetherness states the common relation of one idea in the extremes; and if *per impossibile* place be removed and the presence of bodies together be posited, there will be a relation of one idea in the extremes, and each will be in the other without the containing of one by the other or of both by a third.

II. To the Principal Arguments

68. To the principal arguments [nn.29-35].

To the first [n.29] I say that there would be confusion if anything whatever were in another according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, because thus anything whatever would be in another as a part of it, as the Philosopher seems to impute to him; but a person is not in a person as something of it; and so it does not follow.

69. When the reason is confirmed by that comment in the *Physics* 1.4.187b4-7 ‘about indivisibles’ [n.30], I reply that either it is false that ‘indivisibles of quantity are not distinct unless they differ by position’ (about which elsewhere, II d.2 p.2 q.5 nn.9-13), or, if it is true, it is not to the purpose, because the idea which would be there is not in the divine persons, to whom position does not belong.

70. To the second [n.31] I say that deity is common to every subsistent in divine nature and is something of the subsistent in that nature, and therefore it could not really be distinct from any unless it were in some way compoundable with it, because it is not intelligible that in some subsistent there be several things unless one be compoundable with another; but a person is not something of every subsistent in that nature, and therefore, although a person be in a person, yet it is not necessary that it be it or compoundable with it, the way it is necessary to speak about the deity.

71. To the third [n.32] I say that when an abstract is said to be in something, either by virtue of the words it is noted to be ‘in’ the way a form in the informed (as when it is said, ‘color is in the stone’) is not signified to be ‘in’ as a part is in a whole, but as a form in the informed, and then the proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ is to be denied, – and then the first consequence is not valid; or this is not had by virtue of the words but from use (as we say ‘heat is in light’ not as in a subject), and then can this ‘filiation is in the Father’ be conceded, taking to be ‘in’ for intimate indwelling, as has already been said [n.54]. And it does not follow further that ‘therefore the Father is the Son’ [n.32], but there is a fallacy of equivocation, drawing an inference in the antecedent as if ‘in’ were taken there by way of form.

72. To the fourth [n.33] I say that that way of arguing holds when this sort of proposition is true (through which such mode of arguing holds): ‘whatever has some relation to something has a similar relation to that which that something has such relation to’. This proposition is frequently true in relatives of superposition and supposition,⁴² but it is not universally true. But I am not speaking of this mode now, because the argument here [sc. the fourth] proceeds of being ‘in’, which – as is assumed in the matter at hand – indicates a common relation [n.45].

As concerns, then, the common relations I say that the proposition is universally false, to wit ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything like Socrates’: for this includes that something be like itself, because this falls under this distribution⁴³ ‘everything like’. But for this to be true it is necessary to add this specification ‘everything other than himself [sc. Socrates]’; and then, by virtue of such specifying proposition, such mode of arguing holds by proceeding not by converting, – to wit, it does not follow ‘Socrates is like Plato and Plato is like Socrates, therefore Socrates is like Socrates’; for this proposition is false ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything like Socrates’, unless be added ‘everything like Socrates other than himself’, and then Socrates is not included under the distribution, nor can argument be made by converting to Socrates⁴⁴ but by proceeding. But still such an addition does not suffice for the truth of such proposition, nor for the efficacy of such argument, but it is necessary to add that the middle term – to

⁴² As in the case of prior and posterior, where the prior will be prior to, or ‘placed above’, (‘super-position’) whatever the posterior, or ‘placed below’ (‘sub-position’), is prior to [n.33 above].

⁴³ The distribution of a term in a proposition, when a term is taken universally, as ‘man’ in ‘all men are...’

⁴⁴ That is, one can argue proceeding forward, as in ‘a is like b, b is like c, therefore a is like c’, but not by converting backward and arguing ‘therefore a is like a’, for the phrase ‘everything like a other than a’ blocks this conversion.

which the extremes are compared – is limited according to such idea, because it is not necessary that whatever is together with *a* be together with all that *a* is together with (everything – I say – other than itself) if the *a* be unlimited, – because then someone who is at Paris would be together with someone who is at Rome, because they are together with the deity, immense and unlimited as to them. Nor even does all this suffice unless it be added that the middle not vary as it is compared to the extremes.

73. As to the matter at hand, then, I say that the argument [n.33] is not valid because it argues by converting and not by proceeding; and the proposition confirming such way of argument [sc. ‘whatever has some relation to something has such relation to that to which that something has such relation’] is false. The argument however of the Philosopher in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] holds, because he argues only by proceeding and taking a limited middle and not a diversified one; but the argument is in relatives of supposition and superposition, hence it is not much to the purpose about being ‘in’ in the matter at hand, as it is stating a common relation. In order, however, for something brief to be said about relatives of disparity [sc. superposition and supposition], I say that such a way of arguing generally does not hold save by reason of prior and posterior, which is almost common to all such relatives; for whatever is prior to the prior is prior to the posterior [n.33], – and, to speak more generally, ‘whatever has an order to something has a like order to anything else which that has a like order to’; this proposition is true in an essential order, not understanding a special condition of order (to wit, mediate or immediate, near or remote). Because, therefore, to be ‘in’ of the air in fire states an essential order, and to be ‘in’ of fire in heaven states the like, therefore does the consequence hold [n.33] by proceeding, and this because process is made according to the general idea of order, not specifying mediate or immediate order. Hence it does not follow ‘*a* is father of *b*, *b* is father of *c*, therefore *a* is father of *c*’, as ‘father’ denotes an immediate order to *c* as to a son; but it does well follow as it marks paternity in general, insofar as ‘father’ is extended to include grandfather and great-grandfather.

74. To the other [n.34] I concede that ‘God is in God’ and Hilary concedes this, *On the Trinity* VII n.32. But when it is inferred ‘therefore God is distinct from God’, I deny the inference because of the fallacy of the consequent: for this preposition ‘in’ does not indicate a power of confusing its declined term⁴⁵ (nor does it have this), and so its declined term can stand for some determinate supposit indeterminately; but ‘to be distinct’ distributes the term of this relation confusedly and distributively, because of the negation included; and therefore the declined complement of this preposition ‘in’ does not infer the term of this relation, – just as it does not follow ‘God generates God, therefore God is distinct from God’, for like reason.

75. To the last [n.35] I say that the going out of the Son from the Father is the procession of produced from producer, and is not diversity in nature; such a going out in

⁴⁵ More literally ‘its cased [term]’, for the Latin word ‘in’ takes here the ablative case in the declension of the term it governs. As to the sentence as a whole, it is affirmative and the complement (‘in God’) is not distributed or taken in its entirety (or ‘confusedly’ as Scotus says). So saying ‘God is in God’ leaves open whether ‘in God’ refers to God simply, or to one or other of the Three Persons. In the latter case it can admit of a legitimate sense (for God the Son is in God the Father, etc.). As to the rest of the paragraph, to say that ‘God is distinct from God’, since it is implicitly negative and so universalizes the predicate, is effectively to say that ‘God is not God’ in the sense of his not being God at all, which is false. And if, to avoid this, one says that God is distinct from God in the sense of God the Father being distinct from God the Son, the problem dissolves.

no way prevents him who goes out from remaining in him from whom he goes out, because he receives the same nature with him from whom he proceeds.

Twentieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Three Persons are Equal in Power

1. About the twentieth distinction I ask whether the three persons are equal in power.

I argue that they are not:

Because then just as the Father can generate, so could the Son generate.

Proof of this consequence:

First because Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.7: “If the Father cannot generate a Son equal to himself he is powerless;” therefore from the opposite, if he is not powerless but all powerful, he can generate a Son, and consequently ‘being able to generate’ pertains to omnipotence, – and thus if the Son cannot generate he is not equally powerful or of equal power with the Father.

Second because the Son would not be omniscient if he did not know the generation of the Father; not then omnipotent either if he had no power for that generation.

2. Further, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.25 proves that there cannot be several omnipotents, because then one could make the other nullipotent; therefore similarly does it seem it can be argued in the matter at hand, if several divine persons equally potent were posited.

3. And just as this inference of Richard’s was made clear [in I d.2 n.179] in two ways, in like ways do I make it clear too in the matter at hand:

First, because one person could by his act of will produce everything possible and, with them produced in being, another person could not produce them; for the same things cannot be twice totally produced [I d.2 n.181]. And this proof is confirmed, because the Father has first, in order of origin, the willing of creatures before the Son does, because the Son, according to Hilary [*On the Trinity* IX n.48], is potent “through himself but not from himself”; therefore first in origin before the Son produces is the Father understood to have produced, and so in the moment in which the Son is understood to need to produce, nothing is possible for him.

4. Second, because an omnipotent being can by his will prevent everything possible to another omnipotent being, if it existed, because it is not necessary for their wills to agree in things other than themselves, because all those things do they will contingently [I d.2 n.180]; so here, it does not seem to be necessary that the will of one person agree in the act of willing of another person.

5. But if you say that they have the same will and so they agree in willing the same things, – on the contrary:

The form that is the principle of acting, if it is in several, in the same way is that principle the principle of acting for each of them as if it were in one alone (just as if whiteness were in two surfaces, there would be for them a principle of diffusing [sight] in

the same way as there would be if it were only in one); but if the will were in the Son alone, it would be for him a principle of contingently willing a stone to be such that by that will could the Son then equally will the stone not to be; therefore, having posited that he is in the Father, still there will be for the Son a principle of contingently willing the stone to be, and so, whatever be posited in the Father, the Son can equally will the stone to be or not be, – and so if the Father will the stone to be and the Son not, one omnipotent is making another nullipotent, by preventing all the possibles willed by him.

6. Again, a first cause causes more than a second cause, according to the author of *On Causes* in prop.1, and of *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30 and *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30; but the Father gives the Son the virtue of causing and not conversely; therefore the Father has more power.

7. To the opposite is the Master, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.1 n.168 in the text, and he adduces Augustine [rather: Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

8. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus II* ch.14 nn.7 & 9, ch.18 n.3 proves this conclusion in three ways:

First by the authority of the Savior in *John* 16.15: “Everything that the Father has is mine;” therefore also his power.

9. Second by reason, because “if he was not able to give equal power, he was not omnipotent, – if he was able to give it and did not want to, he was envious.”

10. Third by a likeness, because “a carnal father would generate an equal son for himself if he could, or a greater son; therefore much more strongly in the matter at hand.”

I. To the Question

A. Determination of the Question

11. I reply, omitting logical power (which refers to the mode of combination made by the intellect) and power said metaphorically (of the sort that is in geometry, according as geometers themselves imagine a point to be in potency to a line and a line to a surface) [cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.17.1019b30-32, Scotus *Ord.* I d.7 n.27]:

12. Power properly is taken in one way (as was said in I d.7 nn.28-29) insofar as it is a difference of being opposed to act, in another way according as it signifies the same thing as principle does (as the Philosopher speaks of it, *Metaphysics* 5.17.1019a19-20). And power taken in this second way is divided into power active and passive, and in each way – however it be taken – it can be understood either for the relation of the power that it signifies, or for the proximate foundation of that relation.

13. To the matter at hand: It is plain that in God it is necessary to posit active power, since he is efficient principle (from I d.2 nn.43-58), and about this power does the Master speak in this distinction.

14. And this sort of equality [sc. in active power] can be understood in two ways: either according to the extension of possible objects to which the power extends itself, or according to the intensity of the power in itself. An example: the heating power is called equal according to extension if it extend itself to equal heatables (and thus is all charity equal, and extends itself to all things lovable from charity); according to extension if the power be equally perfect and have power for an equally perfect act; although not as many possibles be subject to it as to another power, as is plain with the case posited which is posited in I d.7 n.41, that heat by a heating adequate to it would produce another heat.

15. And these two equalities frequently accompany each other in turn; each can however be understood without the other. And speaking of equality of extension, there is no difficulty save about notional actions [sc. actions within the divine persons] and about the terms of those actions, because the two terms are not producible by all the persons, but the Son by the Father alone, and the Holy Spirit by the Father and Son.

B. Opinion of Others

16. [Exposition of the opinion] – Hence as concerns this [n.15], it is said as follows that the power of generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father and not in the Son.

17. This is made clear in two ways:

First, because omnipotence is for everything that does not include a contradiction; but that the Father generates does not include a contradiction, but that the Son generates does include a contradiction; therefore etc.

18. Further, second, because it is one way about transitive actions *ad extra* and another way about immanent actions: the possibility of transitive action is judged from the idea of action in itself and its term, the possibility of immanent action is not judged from these precisely but along with this from comparison to the agent in which such action remains; since therefore generation is an immanent action, its possibility is to be judged not only from itself in itself and its term, but because it is compossible with the agent supposit in which it must remain: and generation is compossible with the Father and not the Son, therefore the same as before [n.17].

19. A third clarification is added, because that is called ‘potent’ which has power for all that for which it has the form, and it is not called ‘impotent’ if it does not have power for the action to which its form does not extend itself (as fire is called ‘impotent’ because it cannot make cool, for it does not have the form for making cool); now the Father has a form agreeable for generation and the Son not; therefore the Father is impotent if he cannot generate and the Son is not impotent if he not be able to generate, – and so ‘being able to generate’ pertains to the omnipotence of the Father and not to the omnipotence of the Son.

20. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this:

Without comparing ‘to generate’ to any supposit, I ask: either this (as it is of the generated as term) is something that some active power is of a nature to be for, or it is not. If so, whatever there is not a power in for it, there is not omnipotence in (that is, not power for everything that power is of a nature to be for); if not, then in nothing is there power for that, and so it does not pertain to the omnipotence of the Father.

21. The confirmations too [nn.18-19] are not valid. Not the first⁴⁶ [n.18] because the omnipotent has power for everything that is the term of power simply, and this by producing it in that which it is of a nature to be produced in, if it is of a nature to be produced in something, or by producing it in itself subsistent, if it is not of a nature to be produced in anything. Now it is not necessary that it [omnipotence] produce all such

⁴⁶ Vatican editors: the text says ‘the first’ because it is first in the *Lectura* though it is second here (after the first in n.17), just as the text says ‘the second’ in n.22 because it is second in the *Lectura* but third here. The one that is first here [n.17] lacks an argument against it. [All such inconcinnities would seem to reflect the incompleteness the *Ordinatio* was left in by Scotus on his untimely death.]

things formally in itself: just as it can produce running in an animal (as in a man or an ass), in which running is of a nature to be, but cannot produce this in itself (just as neither can it formally run), because by this neuter word would be signified that such a form was in it formally. Although therefore the Son not be formally able to generate so that generation be in himself, nor able to be a principle of generation in himself, yet, if this [sc. principle of generation] be term of omnipotence, it is necessary to say that the Son could be principle of generation in that in which generation is of a nature to be, because otherwise he would not be omnipotent, just as neither would he be omnipotent if he could not cause intellection in an intellect able to receive it. Now ‘to generate’ cannot in any way be by the Son nor as in the Son – therefore if ‘to generate’ is a term of power simply, the Son will not be omnipotent.

22. The second confirmation [n.19] is not valid, because what has a limited form for acting is not omnipotent for acting: for although fire be able to ignite and heat, if yet it not be able to cool it will not be simply omnipotent, because its form – limited to one act – proves that it is not simply omnipotent; therefore that the Son does not have a form agreeing with all actions, which actions power is simply of a nature to regard, proves that the Son is not simply powerful.

23. Again, this way [n.16] does not save how the Father and Son are equally powerful, because the Father has power over act of generation (which, for you [sc. the holder of the opinion in nn.16-18] is term of power simply), over which act the Son does not have power, and so they will not be equally powerful in extent.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

24. As to this article [nn.15], I say in another way that to active power the first correlative is the ‘possible’, – not commonly taken, as it is opposed to the impossible, because in this way it is possible that God is; therefore it is necessary that the possible, as it is correlative to active power, be taken more determinately. Now this only seems to be according to what Avicenna takes possible, *Metaphysics* VI chs.1, 3 (91va, 93rb) and frequently elsewhere VIII chs.4, 5 (99rb, 99vb), I ch.7 (73rab), insofar as it is opposed to that which is necessary of itself. And then, since anything intrinsic to God is in itself formally necessary (or by identity with essence, which is formally necessary), nothing intrinsic to God will be the term of active power properly stated; and if so, since to everything other than the divine essence the three persons have the same idea of principle, because first the principle of producing creatures communicated to the three is understood before it can have the act of producing those others, – it follows that equal is the power of the three persons as to number of possibles.

25. Now the assumption [sc. ‘first the principle of producing creatures communicated to the three is understood...’] is made clearer in the question ‘On the Order of Extrinsic Productions to those Intrinsic’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.8-11, 22].

26. And in brief it is plain from this, that a principle necessary in respect of one production and contingent in respect of another production is first a necessary principle of producing before it is a contingent one; now whatever be the principle of producing the persons it is necessarily disposed to the production of them, but contingently is the principle of producing creatures disposed to the very creatures; therefore it is

communicated to the three persons first before it can have an act with respect to outside possibles.

27. From this is apparent that the power is equal in the divine persons not only as to extension but also as to intension; for if the power be taken for an absolute (which is the foundation of the relation of principle), it is plain that it is according to the same magnitude in the three, not only according to the same magnitude ‘in a certain respect’ but ‘simply’, as was said in the preceding question ‘About Equality of Magnitude’ [I d.19 nn.13-14]; or if it be taken for a relation (founded on the absolute), there is the same relation of the three, and if it has any magnitude, there is the same magnitude of the relation in the three, and so in every way there is equality of power both according to extension and according to intension.

28. And as to what is said about the first correlative of active power, that it be the possible [n.24], it must be understood of the possible objectively (namely which is the term of the power), not of the possible subjectively, because that is not the correlative convertible in respect of active power: for not every active power has something thus possible corresponding to it, but only the active power does which is transmutative.⁴⁷ The objectively possible then is equated, as correlative, to the active power, but the subjectively possible is not – and such [sc. the objectively possible] is the possible that Avicenna has been adduced for [n.24], namely the one that is opposed to the ‘necessary of itself formally’.

29. But that it [the objectively possible] differs from the ‘necessarily of itself formally’, or from the producer, could be confirmed from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.1.1013a17, where he means that principle and cause convert really; but everything caused is other than the cause, therefore the possible too (that is, what has a principle) is other – according to him – than the principle.

30. It is confirmed too by the idea of active power posited in *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16, 19-20, that it is “a principle of transmuting another, or insofar as it is other;” therefore much more is a principle of producing other, because the caused cannot as be the same as the cause as the active can be the same as the passive in creatures.

31. But then the doubt remains how the power of generating is called a ‘power’, since it is not in respect of anything possible according to the aforesaid [nn.24-30].

I reply. The possible can be taken by extending it still more than as it is opposed to the necessary of itself, by saying that that is possible which is opposed to the necessary by itself – and in this way everything originated would be possible, but neither thus do the saints seem commonly to speak, nor the philosophers. And in this way could it be conceded that the Son is possible because originated, and thus that the corresponding active power to this term is ‘power’. More truly, however, is it conceded that the Son is ‘principled’ [sc. from a principle] and not ‘possible’; in the Father, however, is the active power of generating conceded, because active power in creatures states a certain perfection – but the possibility corresponding to it, because it is repugnant to necessity of itself, states imperfection; therefore is the name of that which states perfection transferred [sc. to God], and the name of the other correlative – which states imperfection – is not transferred in itself but in something more common than it, so that thus on the part of the

⁴⁷ Transmutative power is that which works on something extrinsic so as to ‘transmute’ or change it (as heat makes cold water hot), unlike the power of the Father to beget the Son, which is not a change in something extrinsic but an eternal producing intrinsic to the being of the Deity.

one producing there be said to be power way power is said to exist on the part of the producer and yet on the part of the produced there not be said to be possibility but only the idea of the 'principled'.

32. From this appears the irrationality of the statement that 'under omnipotence is contained, by virtue of the words, the power of generating, but not according to the usage of the saints', because although sometimes the saints or the doctors say 'the power of generating is a power' and 'to generate is the term of a power', yet by virtue of the words neither is true simply when speaking of power to the extent it respects a possible term, but only when applying the idea of power to the idea of principle to the extent it has in common a respect to what can be principled.

33. Speaking in this way, I reply to the question about equality of power in the divine persons [n.1], – and I say that even thus are they equal, because according to the Master in distinction 7 of this book [I d.7 ch.2 n.77] 'by the same power by which the Father can generate, the Son too can be generated'; but then this equality of power is not to the same thing: just as, if an equality of power were posited in color for affecting sight and in savor for affecting taste, these two would indeed be of equal power, yet they would not have the same power, nor for the same thing. So is it in the matter at hand: speaking of power in this way – extending it to notional act – the Father and Son are equal in power both extensively and intensively, because the power that is in the Father for act of generating is equally perfect in the Son and for equal objects; not however is it in this way altogether the same power, as a power is the same that is in respect of the possible – and according to this must it be conceded that in the Son there is not every power, or that there is not in him power for every possible, taking power thus extensively [sc. as it includes the notional act *ad intra*], although there be in him the omnipotence that states power for all possibles.

34. And if you ask 'if the same absolute is in the Father and the Son on which is founded a power equal according to extension and intensity, even that which is *ad intra*, why is not every power the same in both?' – I reply: I say that although the same absolute, which is the power, be in the Father and in the Son, yet not under the idea of power as to the notional act is it in both, because not under the idea of what is prior to that act, and power or principle requires an order of priority to a term.

II. To the Principal Arguments

35. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.1] I speak by denying the first consequence, to the extent it is from the form of the consequence.

When it is proved from Augustine *Against Maximinus*, I reply that the argument does not hold through an intrinsic place [= topic of argument] (as through the place from a whole in quantity to a part of a whole in quantity, as if being able to generate be some being able), but it holds because of many implicitly understood propositions. And the argument has to be reduced to many syllogisms in this way: Maximinus conceded that the Father generates a Son, but not an equal [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.20 ch.3 n.189], – Augustine argued 'if he generated and could not generate an equal Son, then he was impotent'. Proof of this consequence: from the fact he gave the Son deity (even according to Maximinus, because otherwise there would not be generation properly), but lesser deity

(according to him [Maximinus]) than the deity of the Father, then deity is not infinite of itself, because something cannot be greater than the infinite, nor can the infinite be lessened; and if deity is not infinite then he who has it is not omnipotent: for nothing is omnipotent (since omnipotence requires infinite power) unless it have infinite essence. Therefore the consequence does not hold as if under this universal [sc. being omnipotent] be contained that singular [sc. being able to generate], but because accompanying the universal – which is ‘being omnipotent’ – is infinity of essence and so communicability in equality. And similarly it follows, ‘if the Father cannot understand, the Father is not omnipotent’; but it does not follow through an intrinsic place [of argument] (as if the understanding of the Father be a term of omnipotence) but through these implicitly understood propositions: ‘what cannot understand does not have every perfection simply, and then it is not of infinite essence, and thereby not omnipotent either’.

36. When it is afterwards argued about the omniscient [n.1], I say that science does not require a determinate order to knowables, nor an order of prior or posterior,^a – and therefore science of necessity extends itself to all being, because all being is knowable; but power does not extend itself – as to an object – to all being, but only to possible being which, whatever way of taking ‘possible’, is of a nature to be posterior: and therefore not [extended] to that which is not of a nature to be posterior, and therefore not to that which is not of a nature to be in an infinite person the same thing as that person.

a. [Interpolated text] because science can be either in respect of the prior as object or of the posterior, even in respect of itself; but power requires a determinate order to a term, as of prior to posterior.

37. When afterwards argument is made from Richard [n.2], I say that the argument is valid if two Gods were *per impossibile* posited (as was made clear in I d.2 n.180), but not about two persons equal in power.

38. When it is proved first by this, that ‘one person could make another nullipotent by willing all possibles and positing them in being’ [n.5], I say that he cannot will them save with the other person willing them, and so they are not put into being by one person, the other person not putting them into being, but as in the same instant of nature the three [persons] are understood to have a sufficient principle of putting them into being, so in the same moment they are also understood to have the act by which those [possibles] are put into being. But if two Gods were posited, one could by his own action put everything into being or produce them in being and the other could not produce them, by the same action; therefore either by no action could he produce them, and thus he would not be omnipotent, – or he could produce them by another action, and thus the same thing could receive being twice, which is impossible.

39. To the second proof, that ‘one omnipotent could impede everything willed by another’ [n.4], I say that the proof is good about two wills, because – *per impossibile* – what has its own will could use it contingently as to any object other than itself; but it is not so about two having the same will, because there is one use of will by the same necessity by which there is one will, and so one person cannot will by this will and another not will, just as neither can one person have that will and another not have it.

40. When it is objected – against this response – about the form that is in the two, that there would be a principle of acting in the same way for each of them as if it were in

one alone [n.5] I concede that the Son does not as it were naturally or by coercion will with this will, as if the Father willing has predetermined the Son to willing the same, and the willing is not in the Son's power as it was in the Father's power, but in the same instant of nature are the Father and Son understood to have the same will, and equally freely to have any act at all of willing – as it is of this object – just as if the other did not have that will. This form, then, for whoever has it, is a principle of uniformly operating just as it would be if he alone had it; but it is not for anyone who has it a principle of operating and for another a principle of not operating, with an operation that is the same for this will, just as this is not the same will and not will. Hence the necessity of this consequence 'if the Father wills this, the Son wills this' is not against the freedom of the Son's volition, just as neither against the freedom of my volition is this consequence 'if I will, I will'; so not there either, 'if the Father wills *a*, the Son wills *a*', because there is the same 'to will' of the Father and Son.

41. To the other argument, about first and second cause [n.6], the response is in distinction 12 n.68, that the proposition has truth because of a different virtue or force of causing in the prior and posterior cause – and that which is of the prior is more principal; but this fails in the principle of a prior in origin, and of a posterior, in which there is the same force or virtue of causing in respect of a third – of which sort is the force in the matter at hand, and therefore in the matter at hand it is not valid.

Twenty First Distinction Single Question

Whether this be true, 'Only the Father is God'

1. That it is true:

About the twenty first distinction I ask whether this be true, 'only the Father is God'. That it is:

Only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The antecedent is plain because only God who is Father is the Trinity. The consequence is proved by a simile, because it follows 'only the animal that is man runs, therefore only man runs'.⁴⁸

2. Again, only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God. The antecedent is plain from the expositors. The consequence is proved by conversion of an exclusive.⁴⁹

3. Again, only God is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The consequence is proved, both because 'God' in the antecedent stands personally (because it is indefinite), and because the antecedent implies each exponent of the consequent.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ The premise and conclusion here are of course false, but what matters is that the *consequence* is true, namely that if the premise is true the conclusion is true.

⁴⁹ That is (here), the conversion of the exclusive 'only God is the Father' to the converse exclusive 'only the Father is God'.

⁵⁰ Vatican editors (from note to n.27 below): If the term 'God' in the first proposition, the antecedent, stands indefinitely for a person, then it is equivalent to 'only the person who is God is God', which is equivalent to 'only the Father or only the Son or only the Holy Spirit who are God is God', and so entails each exponent of the consequent, namely 'only the Father is God' and 'only the Son is God' and 'only the Holy Spirit is God'.

4. That it entails the affirmative exponent, the proof because it follows, ‘only God is God, therefore all God is God’, and so the Father is God; therefore the consequent affirmative exponent follows [sc. ‘therefore only the Father is God’].

5. There follows also ‘only God is God, therefore no other than God is God’, and further, ‘therefore no other than the Father is God’. – Proof of the inference: here there seems a fallacy of the consequent: ‘other than God, therefore other than the Father’; therefore, by arguing negatively in the same order, there will be a good argument [sc. ‘other than God, therefore no other than the Father’]. Proof of the assumption, because if ‘other than God’ entailed ‘other than the Father’ this would be because of the distribution of the term of the relation of diversity [sc. the term ‘God’ in ‘other than God’⁵¹] but it is not distributed, – proof, because then every proposition would be false where a relative of diversity were predicated of something, to wit, any such proposition ‘man is diverse or other’; for given here to be understood is the first correlative of this relative [sc. ‘man’ as the first correlative of the relation ‘other’], and consequently it is signified that man is ‘other than another’, and if the term of the relation be distributed [sc. ‘another’], it follows that he be ‘other than any other at all’, therefore ‘other than himself’.^a

a. [Note by Scotus] Again, a negative exceptive and an affirmative exclusive of the part excepted convert; *Matthew* 11.27: “No one knows the Father but the Son,” [sc. which as converted to an affirmative will read: ‘only the Son knows the Father’] – therefore only the Son knows, therefore only he is God. Again [Augustine], *On the Trinity* VI ch.7: “The Father is as great only as the Father and Son together are;” therefore only the Father is thus great, therefore only the Father is God. – To the first: ‘No one’ – no man; God is called ‘man’ (“he gave a marriage feast for his Son”, *Matthew* 22.2). Therefore let be taken ‘common to God’, ‘no God’, or ‘no intellectual being’ so that it be a substantive; let ‘but the Father knows’ be conceded, – and thus no intellectual being other than the Father [knows], because ‘other’ indicates an otherness in the significate of its substantive [sc. ‘the Father’]; thus universally, wherever it has a substantive common to the three, the proposition is true with ‘only’ and with ‘none’.⁵² To the second the response is plain through the second: ‘only’ is taken syncategorematically.⁵³

6. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.9 n.10

I. To the Question

7. As to the question,^a a distinction can be made (as it is commonly distinguished, and well), that ‘only’ can be taken categorematically or syncategorematically. For ‘only’ signifies the same as ‘not along with another’, as is plain from the Philosopher *Sophistical Refutations* 2.22.178a39-b1. But this negation of association can be understood to determine something in itself or from the nature of the thing, or to determine something as it is an extreme of composition in relation to the other extreme,

⁵¹ Only if ‘God’ in ‘other than God’ is distributed or taken wholly, that is, as equivalent to ‘other than God altogether’, would the conclusion ‘other than the Father’ follow. For the Father is other than God in some sense, because he is other than God the Son, but he is not other than God the Father.

⁵² That is, the proposition ‘none knows... but...’ can be repeated as to all three persons of the Trinity: none knows the Son but the Father, none knows the Holy Spirit but the Son, none knows the Father but the Holy Spirit, etc.

⁵³ That is, the term ‘only’ is taken like a quantifier, such as ‘all’ or ‘no’, not like a term. So it is not taken as excluding the Son and Holy Spirit but as making ‘Father’ precise.

to wit by denying the association of the other by this in receiving the predication of such predicate. In the first way is this name ‘alone’ not admitted in divine reality, because nothing is solitary there. It is in a second way conceded whenever not associated with the subject is someone of whom the same predicate is said; thus it is not by predicating an essential of a personal, because an essential belongs to another included by it – and therefore such a proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] is denied.⁵⁴

a. [*Note by Scotus*]⁵⁵ To the question three opinions: The first: the correlative is not excluded because it is of the understanding of what is included (response: not what this is, but to what or of what this is); again, it follows: ‘only the Father is, therefore the Father is’, and further ‘therefore the Son is’ – therefore ‘that the Son is’ is included, and consequently that he is God is included (the consequence is denied, because it is opposite in the subject.⁵⁶ On the contrary: the syncategorematic term [‘only’] disposes the categorematic [sc. ‘the Father’];⁵⁷ again, with respect to any predicate it would distract ‘only the Father is Father’. Therefore in another way: it is formally excluded; thanks to the matter, the predicate does not follow about the excluded correlative, because correlatives are simultaneous, and therefore opposites in the antecedent⁵⁸); again, when an accident is included the subject is not excluded (response: true about a concrete, because it is predicated of a subject; false about an abstract – hence ‘only whiteness’ is contradictory).⁵⁹ – To the contrary, in three ways: *Physics* 1, “only the principle is” [n.13 below];⁶⁰ again, opposites are such that it is impossible that this is this (any ‘not-this’ is excluded);⁶¹ again, it is not fitting to express the whole concept: because nothing can be attributed precisely to a relation, not even a proper difference, but it can be understood.⁶²

⁵⁴ The proposition ‘only the Father is God’ is false because it excludes the Son and the Holy Spirit from being God. But ‘God’, being an essential and not a personal name, belongs to all three persons.

⁵⁵ Vatican editors: this note assumes that passages from the *Reportatio* are to be added. The note makes frequent reference to these passages and has to be understood in relation to them.

⁵⁶ ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposed relatives in the subject term ‘God’.

⁵⁷ ‘Only’ determines the concept ‘Father’, but the concept ‘Father’ includes the concept ‘Son’ (for they are relatives), so ‘only’ does not exclude ‘Son’ from the subject term.

⁵⁸ ‘Only the Father is God’ is excluded, not because ‘Father’ does not include ‘Son’ (on the contrary it does), but because ‘only’ as applied to ‘Father’ excludes, not ‘Son’ from ‘Father’, but the application to ‘Son’ of the predicate ‘God’.

⁵⁹ A suggestion about this puzzling remark: The claim being made is that to speak of an accident or property (e.g. wisdom) is to include and not exclude the subject whose property it is (e.g. a wise man). Thus to say ‘only the Father is God’ is to include ‘Son’ because ‘Son’ is also subject of ‘God’. Scotus’ response is that the subject is included when a property in the concrete is in question (e.g. ‘wise’), but not when a property in the abstract is (e.g. ‘wisdom’). Hence it is contradictory to say ‘whiteness’ includes a subject, because, as abstract, it is taken precisely as excluding a subject. In relation to ‘only the Father is God’, then, the point perhaps is that ‘God’ taken concretely or along with a subject always means one or other of the persons. But when it means the essence without reference to the personal subjects it is not taken concretely but, as it were, abstractly (as ‘God-ness’). So if ‘God’ is taken concretely in ‘only the Father is God’ then it includes the subject, that is, the person in question, and is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God the Father’, which is true and uncontroversial. But if ‘God’ is taken abstractly then ‘only the Father is God’ is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God-ness’, which is false if not indeed contradictory.

⁶⁰ Aristotle is arguing at this point in the *Physics* against Parmenides and Melissus, that if they say that only the principle is, then they are saying that what is from the principle is not. So the Philosopher thinks that to assert ‘only’ of one of a correlative pair (here the pair of ‘principle’ and ‘from a principle’) is to exclude, and not implicitly to include, the other correlative.

⁶¹ ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposite relatives, and opposites exclude one opposite from being the other, so to say ‘only the Father...’ cannot be to include the Son implicitly.

⁶² Relational terms, as ‘father-son’, do not have a strict conceptual definition, because neither relative can be defined in isolation from the other (as that one cannot define ‘father’ without mentioning the son relative to whom a father is father). But one can nevertheless understand relations and relatives. Hence it is not to the point to say that ‘only the Father...’, with ‘Father’ taken in its whole conceptual idea, implicitly includes the Son, because there is no whole

In another way: other and other (sc. the substantive is one thing, the adjective attaching to it is another). – To the contrary: the adjective conforms to the substantive in modes of signifying, therefore also whatever is included in the adjective, and it converts ‘non-Father...’; the substantive states whom, not what.⁶³

In another way third: composition and division. – To the contrary, as argued above.⁶⁴

Solution: ‘only’ – not along with another (*Sophistical Refutations* [n.7 above]).

Categorematically it is predicated per se ‘solitary’. Syncategorematically it disposes the extreme [term] of the intellect composing [the terms], and it states the mode under which it is taken in the composition [sc. the proposition] – but this in two ways: as to the extent (as it is reduplicative) it states the disposition in order to the predicate, because *per se* the idea of inherence of the predicate, – or it states the formal idea, according to which the subject is taken in itself, not that it be the idea of the inherence of the predicate. Thus the subject can be taken in itself precisely, and of it so taken can something be said, – in another way it can be taken precisely in order to a predicate as it is said of it; in the first way ‘only’ indicates that the subject is in itself precise, whatever concur with it in respect of the predicate, – in another way it indicates it is subjected precisely, whether it is precise in itself or not: in the first way Augustine’s “so great is the Father only”, that precisely taken he truly has this predicate “so great [is he]” (we speak like this in other cases: “You only will count for 10,000” is true; although there were many other lords who would count for so many servants, but ‘You’ precisely taken, and yet not solitary, rather existing in the middle of others; hence it is not there categorical, because neither a predicable but a co-predicable⁶⁵); in the second way the proposition is false, as is proved above and by its consequences.⁶⁶

But against that remark from *On Interpretation* [see n.11 below] it is objected, taking distinct ‘whereby it is dependent’: this is true, ‘only man or non-man is non-man, therefore nothing non-the same with man or with non-man is non-man,’ – therefore no non-man is non-the same with man or non-man, therefore no being is not the same, therefore every being is the same’; ‘nothing non-the same with man or non-man is non-man, therefore it is not man’ does not follow, because all such is man – I concede, the consequence is not valid from a negative to an affirmative about a subject including contradictories; such is this ‘non-the same with man or non-man’. This about the constancy of the subject, that is that that which is taken here by reason of the subject, let it be subject-able, that is, not including contradictories which make no single term: *Metaphysics* 5 “in itself false, of everything is false,” therefore everything predicated of it, because it is repugnant to itself and to each part. – On the contrary:

conceptual idea of ‘Father’ in the first place and the ‘only’ attached to it has to be interpreted according to this feature of relative terms, that is, as excluding from the predicate the opposing relative (‘Son’) which its understanding nevertheless implicitly includes.

⁶³ The other way of saving ‘only the Father is God’ is to say that ‘only’, taken as an adjective (as categorematic), signifies the Father as to deity, while the substantive ‘Father’ signifies the Father as to person. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means something like ‘the Father only as to deity is God’, which does not exclude the Son from also being God. Scotus’ response is that if the substantive is taken personally, as signifying a ‘whom’ and not a ‘what’, the adjective attaching to it must be taken personally too. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means ‘the person alone who is Father is God’, which does exclude the Son from being God. The response is confirmed by appealing to the converse of ‘only the Father’, namely ‘no non-Father’, because to say ‘no non-Father is God’ also clearly excludes the Son from being God.

⁶⁴ A reference to *Reportatio* IA d.21 nn.27-30. And see n.14 below. Perhaps the point about composition and division is that if ‘only’ is taken as dividing Father from Son, the proposition is false; if it is taken as combining them (because they are said relatively to each other), it is true. Scotus’ response is doubtless that ‘only’ as used here excludes taking the proposition in a combined sense.

⁶⁵ ‘Only’ in this case means ‘you by yourself count as so many, even if others also by themselves count as so many’; it does not mean ‘you alone and no one else count as so many’.

⁶⁶ In the second way ‘so great is the Father only’ means ‘only the Father is so great and not also the Son and Holy Spirit’, which is false.

to which affirmative is this negative reduced (to which enthymematically) from such antecedent? Response: to affirmatives about the parts.⁶⁷

8. Declaration of these, namely how a syncategoreme [sc. a syncategorematic term] disposes an extreme of the intellect combining and dividing in respect of another extreme,⁶⁸ and how a syncategoreme differs from a second intention [sc. a term referring to a term in the intellect], and how diverse syncategorematic determinations differ among themselves, would require a long treatise – but it is not necessary to delay [over this] because of some more useful and more necessary things.

9. The falsity is also proved of the proposed proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] through that rule in the ‘Sophisms’: ‘an exclusive affirmative entails a universal affirmative about transposed terms’ [Walter Burleigh, *Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic* tr.2 p.3 subpart.1 ch.1]; therefore this ‘only the Father is God’ entails this ‘every God, or every divine person, is Father’.

10. That rule is proved also by reason of exclusion, which namely indicates precision in that to which it is added in respect of the other extreme – or [indicates] precise commensuration, namely that the other extreme does not exceed it; and this the universal affirmative indicates ‘about transposed terms’, and especially in common terms, where each extreme can be taken universally.

11. It is also proved logically [n.9] by one proposition that expresses the whole understanding of the exclusive; for this, ‘only man is capable of laughter’, although it be commonly posited to have two exponents, is nevertheless sufficiently expounded by this, ‘no non-man is capable of laughter’; from which follows ‘nothing capable of laughter is a non-man’ (by conversion), and further ‘therefore nothing capable of laughter is not a man’ (through that in *On Interpretation* 2.10.95b-20b10,⁶⁹ ‘from a negative of an infinite predicate follows an affirmative of a finite predicate and a negative of a negated predicate’, – which is proved by the first principle ‘an affirmation about anything whatever etc.’ [Ord. prol. n.89], and this in simple predicates, because by denying the consequence both opposites would be denied by the same thing), and further ‘therefore everything capable of laughter [sc. is a man]’ by equivalence – therefore from the first etc.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ The negative statement ‘nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man’ should, like any negative, be reducible or convertible to an equivalent affirmative (according to the rules for obversion, as that ‘no a is b’ is equivalent to ‘all a is non-b’). Scotus’ answer is that it is reducible to two affirmatives, according to its two-fold and contradictory subject: ‘everything non-identical with man is non-man’ and ‘everything non-identical with non-man is man’.

⁶⁸ The intellect in forming a proposition joins one term, one ‘extreme’, to another term, and does so either by combining the terms, ‘the dog growls’, or by dividing them, ‘the dog does not growl’. Scotus is adverting, by the by, to such propositions with syncategoremes, as in ‘the dog only growls’, and how to negate them.

⁶⁹ Vatican editors remark that this rule is not as such found in Aristotle but arises from two of the things he does say. For he says first as follows: “But there follows on the proposition ‘no man is just’ the proposition which is ‘every man is non-just’;” second, “‘he is a non-just man’, of this the negation is ‘he is not a non-just man’.” From the first statement of Aristotle this rule follows: ‘from a negative about a finite predicate there follows an affirmative about an infinite predicate’, and conversely ‘from an affirmative about an infinite predicate there follows a negative about a finite predicate’, from which at length there follows ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’. But according to the second of Aristotle’s statements, by adding ‘not’ to his first example, this follows: ‘no man is non-just, therefore every man is not non-just’; there also follows ‘therefore every man is just’ and ‘no man is not just’, because it follows ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’, as has been said.

⁷⁰ Vatican editors: that is, therefore by running through from the first (‘only man is capable of laughter’) to the last (‘therefore everything capable of laughter is a man’), the rule [n.9] follows.

12. Here some object that when one relative is included the other is not excluded, because one is of the understanding of the other [see note n.7], because ‘things posited are posited etc. [sc. and things taken away are taken away; Peter of Spain, *Logical Summaries* tr.3 n.21]’ and they are also ‘together by nature’ [cf. *Categories* 7.7b15].

13. But this is against the Philosopher’s intention, *Physics* 1.2.185a3-5, arguing there: “If only the principle is, then what is from the principle is not.” Therefore the correlative is not of the understanding of the relative as something of it (to wit as an essential or integral part), but as something to which the understanding of it is determined, and such is sufficiently diverse from the included – [sc. sufficiently diverse as to] how much diversity is required for this, that it be excluded.

II. To the Principal Arguments

14. To the first argument [n.1]. The antecedent [sc. ‘Only God who is Father is God’] is distinguished according to composition and division, as with ‘every man who is white runs’.⁷¹ The sense of composition is false, because there ‘God’ is determinate to standing for the Father through the implication ‘who is Father’, just as ‘man’ is determinate to standing for white man in the sense of composition there, ‘man who is white’ – and then the consequence holds [sc. ‘only God who is the Father is God, therefore only the Father is God’]. The sense of division is true because then two predicates are enunciated of the same subject, of which subject both are true, namely of God that ‘he is Father’ and that ‘he is God’ (as if the two were enunciated in two categorical propositions joined to each other, neither of which would specify the other), and then the consequence from the inferior to the superior [sc. from ‘Father’ to ‘God’], with exclusion is not valid.^a

a. *Note by Scotus*: It can absolutely be conceded true in each sense [division and composition], because ‘God’ is not contracted [sc. as a universal to a singular]; it is a ‘this’ [‘this God’ or ‘this deity’, v. n.31 below].⁷²

15. And if you object that a like consequence⁷³ holds in creatures in the sense of division, I reply: If a common same thing – numbered – can belong to several inferiors, that consequence⁷⁴ does not hold in the sense of division: for it holds precisely that the animal that is rational in the sense of division is not other than the animal that is rational in the sense of composition; but in the matter at hand this reason does not hold, because the same God who is Father in the sense of composition, is the Son who is distinct from the Father, and thus the God who is Father in the sense of division, can be said truly of anything of which he is not said in the sense of composition; but it is not so of the animal

⁷¹ The divided sense of ‘every man who is white runs’ would be ‘every man is white and every man runs’; the composite sense would be ‘every man who is white (as opposed, say, to black or brown) runs’.

⁷² The inference ‘therefore only the Father is God’ can be allowed to be true whether the antecedent ‘only God who is Father is God’ is taken in the sense of division or of composition. For in the sense of division the antecedent means ‘only God who is God and is Father is God’, for this allows also for ‘only God who is God and is Son and Holy Spirit is God’; and in the sense of composition it means ‘only God who is Father (and as a matter of fact also Son and Holy Spirit) is God’.

⁷³ Vatican editors: namely ‘only the animal that is man is rational, therefore only man is rational’.

⁷⁴ See previous note.

that is man, because that in the sense of division is predicated truly of nothing of which the same is not truly predicated in the sense of composition (and not conversely), and for that reason it is there predicated indifferently – not so here [sc. in divine reality].

16. However, just like antecedent according to composition and division, some also distinguish the principal proposition [‘only the Father is God’], as if this ‘only the Father is God’ could have a false sense of composition and a true sense of division – adducing that of Priscian *Constructions 2* (or *Grammatical Instruction 18*) ch.1 nn.6-7, that between the demanding and the demanded [e.g. between a nominative and a genitive] a ‘who is’ falls in the middle.⁷⁵

16. However, just as the antecedent according to composition and division, some also distinguish the principal proposition [‘only the Father is God’] in like manner, as if this ‘only the Father is God’ could have a false sense of composition and a true sense of division – adducing that of Priscian *Constructions 2* (or *Grammatical Instruction 18*) ch.1 nn.6-7, that ‘...who is’ falls in the middle between the demanding and demanded term qualified and a qualifying term.⁷⁶

17. But this is neither logically said nor grammatically.

Not logically, because then nothing could be contracted or determined by any contraction or determination: for however immediately a categorematic or syncategorematic determination were added to something (as ‘a white man runs’ or ‘every white man runs’), it would still remain to distinguish, as here [sc. ‘only he who is Father is God’], between the sense of composition and the sense of division, and in both senses it would remain to distinguish further,⁷⁷ and so on *ad infinitum* – nor could any sense be determinately conceived or expressed.⁷⁸ Nor did the Philosopher [*Sophistical*

⁷⁵ Vatican editors: Others say [e.g. Richard of Middleton] that, according to Priscian, in every conclusion where there is a demanding and a demanded there is always understood a copula ‘who is’, through which the construction is expressed, as ‘a white man runs’, that is, ‘a man who is white runs’. So in the matter at hand [‘only the Father is God’], if it be thus divided, ‘only the Father, who is God, is God’, it is true, but in the composite sense [‘only the Father who is God is God’] it is false.” So Priscian *Inst. Gram.*, ch.1 nn.6-7: “But there are occasions when, by ellipsis of a verb or substantive participle, a construction of cases of this sort (that is of a nominative with oblique cases) is wont to be proffered as: ‘Achilles son of Peleus killed many Trojans in battle’; for a participle of a substantive verb ‘being’ is implicitly heard [sc. ‘Achilles being son of Peleus’], which among us is not now in use, in place of which we can say or implicitly hear ‘who is’ or ‘who was’ son of Peleus. Likewise, for other cases following a nominative or the aforesaid participle or which are taken for it, one must implicitly hear for the nominative: ‘a friend agreeable to me is advancing’, that is, ‘who is an agreeable friend to me...’;” also ch.2 n.27: “And in all these must a ‘who is’ be implicitly heard, even if they are in oblique cases: as ‘of a horse white in color’ (that is ‘of his horse which is of white color’), ‘for a horse white in color’ ‘toward a horse white as to color’.

⁷⁶ Vatican editors: “Others say [as Richard of Middleton] that, according to Priscian, in every conclusion where there is a noun and a qualifying adjective a ‘who is’ is always understood as the copula by which the construction is expressed, as in ‘a white man runs’, that is, ‘a man who is white runs’. So in the proposition here [‘only the Father is God’], if it be thus divided, ‘only the Father who is God, is God’, it is true; but in the composite sense [sc. ‘only the Father who is Father and God’] it is false.” Priscian ch.1 nn.6-7: “But there are occasions when, by an ellipsis of a verb or participial substantive, a construction of the following sort is wont to be made in these sorts of grammatical cases (that is, the nominative case along with the oblique cases): ‘Achilles the son of Peleus killed many Trojans in battle’; for the participle of a verb for the substantive is implicitly understood, namely ‘being’ [sc. ‘Achilles being the son of Peleus’], but we do not now use it, and in its place we can say or understand [‘Achilles’] who is’ or ‘who was’ the son of Peleus. Likewise, with other cases following a nominative, the aforesaid participle or things taken for it must be understood with the nominative: ‘an agreeable friend is going with me’, that is, ‘a friend who is agreeable to me...’.” Also ch.2 n.27: “And in all these cases, even oblique ones, a ‘who is’ is understood: as ‘of a horse white in color’ (that is ‘of the horse which is of white color’), ‘for a horse white in color’ ‘to a horse white as to color’.”

⁷⁷ The Vatican editors give as example: ‘everyone who is he who is a white man runs’.

⁷⁸ The argument seems to be that if a qualification or adjective added to a noun is an implicit relative clause (as that ‘white man’ is implicitly ‘a man who is a white man’), so that all such admit of a divided and a composite sense, then,

Refutations 1.4.162a6-38] teach in such cases a multiplicity according to composition and division, but only in those where the same composite and divided materials make a diverse sense; but these materials ‘every man runs’ – composed and divided – make no other sense, nor can they be divided, because the syncategorematic term [sc. ‘every’] only co-signifies with the categorematic term [sc. ‘man’]; differently is this, ‘he sees now I am running’, combining the adverb ‘now’ with the preceding or following verb [sc. ‘he now sees I am running’ or ‘he sees I am now running’].

Nor even is it said grammatically, because ‘demanding’ and ‘demanded’ are called the sort of construables of which one is said by Priscian to govern the other by some [grammatical] force;⁷⁹ but a syncategorematic term is not construable in respect of a categorematic term as if the one govern the other by some force, and therefore although here there fall a mediate implication, ‘the cloak of Socrates’ (that is, ‘the cloak which is of Socrates’), not however here, ‘white man’ and ‘every man’.⁸⁰

18. To the second [n.2] I say that that is not a conversion [sc. ‘only God is the Father’ to ‘only the Father is God’], nor does that consequence [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’] hold, but is a fallacy of the consequent, because – as was proved in the solution of the question [n.9] – an exclusive [proposition, sc. ‘only...’] is convertible with a universal affirmative ‘about transposed terms’ [sc. ‘only man runs’ is equivalent to ‘everything that runs is a man’];^a therefore to infer an exclusive from an exclusive ‘about transposed terms’ [sc. to infer ‘only the Father is God’ from ‘only God is the Father’] is equivalent to the inferring of a universal affirmative from a universal affirmative ‘about transposed terms’ [sc. inferring ‘all B is A’ from ‘all A is B’]; but in such an inference of universal from universal there is a fallacy of the consequent, as here ‘every man is an animal, therefore every animal is a man’, by affirming from higher to lower [sc. from affirming ‘animal’ of ‘man’ to affirming ‘man’ of ‘animal’].

a. *Interpolated note:* It is said that an exclusive does not convert; but the Philosopher does not show this, because he is making determination about the conversions of simple propositions, which belong to the categorical and simple syllogism. But that it does convert is plain through what is here proved [nn.18, 21-22].

19. So it is in the matter at hand [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’]. And the proof is because always – by force of language – there is a process from inferior [subject] to superior [predicate] with distribution [‘all’]: for the predicate of a universal affirmative is not indicated to be convertible, but stands as if it were superior to the subject; therefore from the distribution of such universal subject there does not follow the distribution of the predicate with respect to the same, nor can

however closely one tied an adjective to a noun so as to express the composite sense (as replacing ‘man, who is white, runs’ with ‘a white-man man runs’) and exclude the divided sense (as ‘man who is white and who runs’), the result would itself admit of a composite and divided sense, and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, one would never be able to disambiguate any statement as composite instead of divided, and so one would never be able to express or conceive anything determinately.

⁷⁹ An adjective is said to demand a noun to go with, and a noun is said to demand case and number of the adjective that goes with it.

⁸⁰ In ‘white man’ the noun ‘man’ governs, and governs immediately, the adjective ‘white’ as to case and number, but in ‘the cloak of Socrates’ the case and number of ‘cloak’ do not govern, nor are governed by, the case and number of ‘Socrates’; rather these are governed, if at all, by the syncategorematic ‘of’ relation.

the distribution of the predicate follow with respect to an inferior to anything if the distribution of the predicate not follow with respect to what is superior to it. Therefore, arguing thus, ‘all *b* is *a*, therefore all *a* is *b*’ is the fallacy of the consequent; because from the distribution of that which is indicated to be inferior there does not follow the distribution of the superior (and this in respect of a predicate that was indicated to be inferior to a higher predicate marked), but it is the fallacy of the consequent, just as if it were argued, ‘every man is an animal, therefore every animal is Socrates’.

20. But when the consequence is proved by conversion of an exclusive proposition [n.2, ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’], I reply:

Not every inference ‘in transposed terms’ is a conversion, namely which indicates as great a converse union of extremes as can be had by virtue of the first [sc. the antecedent proposition]; hence a universal negative is not converted to a particular negative ‘in transposed terms’, although it imply it.⁸¹

21. To the matter at hand I say that the [proposition] ‘about transposed terms’, which captures as much of the understanding of an exclusive affirmative as any proposition can capture of ‘transposed terms’, is a universal affirmative, as was proved in the second reason for the principal solution [n.9]; therefore such an affirmative exclusive is converted into a universal affirmative, and by parity of reasoning contrariwise, a universal affirmative into an exclusive affirmative.⁸²

22. And if you object ‘therefore Aristotle taught conversions badly and insufficiently by not teaching that the universal affirmative is to be converted into an exclusive affirmative’,⁸³ I reply: he taught conversions for perfecting the imperfection of imperfect syllogisms;⁸⁴ but an exclusive [proposition] would not hold a different place in perfecting an imperfect syllogism than would some non-exclusive indefinite, because it would entail no other conclusion than was being entailed before in an imperfect syllogism; and therefore well and sufficiently did he teach conversions as far as was necessary there for his purpose.⁸⁵

23. To the third [n.3, ‘only God is God, therefore only the Father is God’] I say that from a negative expounding the antecedent [sc. ‘none other than God is God’] there does not follow a negative expounding the consequent [sc. ‘none other than the Father is God’].

24. When it is proved because [n.5] “‘other than God therefore other than the Father’ does not follow’, I deny it, because that consequence is good.

25. And when further it is proved that [n.5] ‘the term of this otherness is not distributed, because then there would be an impossibility in asserting such relative of anything’, I reply that in all relatives of equivalence the common, taken by itself – as it is

⁸¹ The universal negative ‘no *A* is *B*’ converts simply to ‘no *B* is *A*’, but it implies the particular, ‘some *B* is not *A*’.

⁸² That is, ‘only man runs’ (an exclusive affirmative) converts to ‘all that runs is a man’ (a universal affirmative with transposed terms), and contrariwise, ‘every man runs’ converts to ‘only what runs is a man’.

⁸³ Vatican editors: Aristotle only taught that the universal affirmative, ‘all *A* is *B*’, was to be converted to the particular affirmative, ‘some *B* is *A*’, *Prior Analytics* 1.2.25a28-29.

⁸⁴ Imperfect syllogisms are those in the second figure (*A* is *B*, *C* is *B*, therefore *A* is *C*) or third figure (*B* is *A*, *B* is *C*, therefore *A* is *C*). They are made perfect by being reduced, through conversion of propositions, to forms of the first figure (*A* is *B*, *B* is *C*, therefore *A* is *C*).

⁸⁵ Converting a universal affirmative, all *A* is *B*, to its exclusionary affirmative, only *B* is *A*, is to do the same as converting it to a particular affirmative, some *B* is *A*, so it does no more to reduce imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones than that particular affirmative is already doing. Therefore Aristotle had no need to introduce it in this context.

common –, is not related, because, from the fact it is as common, it is abstracted from all related terms or terms of relations, and a real relation is only of distinct to distinct; if it were related as such, it would be necessary to grant there a distinct ‘thus related’ term, and so it would not be related to anything of the same idea as the related, but it would be related to something of another idea. Such a relative then is only in relation for its inferior, just as the like is not related ‘for the like in common’ to the like but for some inferior that can be distinguished from the like to which it is related; so is it also about the different: for it is not related to the different in common as to its first correlative (as if there were two first extremes of a relation and each most common to everything different), but the different is different from this different.

26. And if you object that a relative gives first to understand its common correlative, I reply:

The correlative of it ‘as common’ is only it as taken for some inferior for which it can be distinguished from the related. There is an example of this in real thing, because if the whole nature of fire were in one individual, that individual would not be able to generate fire (because if so, then it would generate another fire in which would be the whole nature of fire, and there would be as it were two species of fire, which is impossible); and yet now nature in one individual [fire] is the idea of generating, because it has unity sufficient for active principle and sufficient distinction. So here: likeness is well for something the idea of referring or terminating a relation, but it is not referred nor does it terminate unless it be accepted for the distinct thing in which it is, so that neither unity nor distinctness is *per accidens* but each *per se* in respect of such relation, as was said in the question ‘About Circumincession’ [d.19 n.62]; for it does not follow ‘not other than God, therefore not other than the Father’ (but affirmatively is the consequence good [n.24], by reason of the distribution of the term of this relation), because of the negation included in the idea of otherness.⁸⁶

27. To the other proof, when it is said ‘only God, therefore only the Father or only the Son’ [n.3, and footnote], the response is that the subject of an exclusive [e.g. ‘only God’] can be compared to the exclusion or to the predicate: in the first way it has simple supposition, because exclusion is made by it by reason of the significate; in the second way it has personal supposition, because the predicate is attributed to it for supposit.⁸⁷

28. Against this: one extreme in one act of compounding and dividing has one idea according to which it is taken in respect of the other extreme, because diverse ideas of taking the same extreme in respect of the same do not seem to cohere with unity of act of compounding.

29. And if it be said that, in respect of exclusion, it supposits under one idea and, as it is taken under exclusion in respect of the predicate, it supposits under another idea, – on the contrary: the subject does not supposit in respect of its own disposition but in

⁸⁶ ‘Not other than God therefore not other than the Father’, because it is negative, has a universal force and is false here because false of the Son and Holy Spirit, who are not other than God but are other than the Father. By contrast, the affirmative of ‘not other than God, therefore not other than the Father’ would be ‘same as God, therefore same as the Father’, which, being affirmative, does not exclude ‘same as the Son and Holy Spirit’, and so the consequence is good.

⁸⁷ Simple supposition is when a term is taken as to its meaning (as: dog is a species), and personal supposition is when the term is taken as to the thing it signifies (as: dogs run). So in the case of ‘only God is God’, if the subject term is taken in simple supposition the proposition is about the meaning of the term ‘God’ and not about the persons, so nothing follows about the persons. If the subject is taken in personal supposition, then it means ‘only the Father is God’ or ‘only the Son is God’ or ‘only the Holy Spirit is God’, and this way of speaking was rejected above in n.7.

respect of the predicate, and so it has precisely the supposition that it is understood to have in respect of the predicate as [the predicate] is taken under its disposition.

30. Therefore I say in another way that the subject of an exclusive affirmative supposits confusedly only, as does the predicate of a universal affirmative (which is proved from their convertibility and because, in respect of the same extreme standing in the same way, to argue distributively on the part of the other [extreme] from confused to distributive [supposition] is the fallacy [of figure] of speech), and under a term that so stands – namely confusedly – it is not licit to descend.⁸⁸

31. However in the matter at hand it could be said otherwise than it is in creatures, namely because ‘God’ under exclusion [sc. ‘only God’] stands for ‘this God’, who is common to the three persons (which response was touched on in d.4 nn.11-13), for which the subject there stands, ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’; and it could also be valid by d.30 qq.1-2, that he [sc. God as this God] is the subject to which first it belongs to act in respect of creatures (because [he is] ‘this God’ as he is ‘by this deity’ God, not understanding any personal property), although every predicate that is true of this predicate [sc. the predicate ‘to act’ in respect of creatures’] be true of the Father *per se*, yet not of the Father alone but of the Son and Holy Spirit.⁸⁹

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether God is Nameable by us with some Name signifying the Divine Essence in itself, as it is a ‘This’

1. About⁹⁰ the twenty second distinction I ask whether God is nameable by us wayfarers with some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a ‘this’.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] That he is not.⁹¹ – Augustine on the Lord’s words in *Sermon 34*: “Whatever can be said is not unsayable/ineffable;” but God is ineffable (the proof is from St. Paul). Again, Augustine *On John* sermon 19, and *John 5*: “The Son cannot do anything save what he sees the Father doing;” what the ‘seeing’ of the Word be cannot be demonstrated by

⁸⁸ The point of these paragraphs can perhaps best be illustrated by the following: The subject of an exclusive affirmative, as ‘only animals are horses’, supposits confusedly (i.e. it is undistributed), as does the predicate of the equivalent universal affirmative, ‘all horses are animals’. The two affirmatives are of course equivalent, and to argue from ‘only animals are horses’ to ‘all animals are horses’ is as illicit as to argue from ‘all horses are animals’ to ‘all animals are horses’. This fallacy is explained here in terms of descending from confused to distributed supposition (or as one might also say, from an undistributed term to the same term distributed). So ‘horses’ is taken distributively because taken as to all horses, and ‘animals’ is taken confusedly (or undistributively) because not taken as to all animals. It is a fallacy, a fallacy of ‘figure of speech’, to proceed from a proposition where ‘animals’ supposits confusedly to one where it supposits distributively. There is a like fallacy in arguing from ‘only God is the Father’ to ‘only the Father is God’. The first is equivalent to ‘all the Father is God [sc. and he is not also something else other than God]’, which is true, and the second to ‘all God is the Father [sc. and he is not also the Son and Holy Spirit]’, which is false.

⁸⁹ In other words ‘only God is the Father’ could be maintained if it is understood to mean ‘only this God (who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) is the Father’.

⁹⁰ See also the Appendix at the end of this question.

⁹¹ Vatican editors: this note is a contraction of what is found in the *Reportatio* on the same question. The references are found in full there and are not repeated here. See the Appendix.

word. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* III.9: “Do not fail to know, because, as to speech about this nature, virtue does not exceed it.” Again Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but angels’.” Again, by reason: he is not understood in this way, therefore neither is he named. The consequence is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4: “More truly is he thought than said;” and *Enchiridion* 13: “Instructions are whereby someone conveys his thoughts for the knowledge of another;” and Plato: “so that [sc. thoughts] may be present to hand.”

On the contrary. – Augustine *Against Adimantus* 13: “That sublimity must be signified by human sounds.” Again, thus is he [God] understood, therefore etc.; proof of the antecedent: he is understood to be of himself a ‘this’, therefore he is understood as a ‘this’. Again Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] in *Guide* I ch.60/61: “There is no name among us that is not taken from his work, save the ‘Tetragrammaton’ [sc. JHVH], therefore it is called ‘the separated Name’, because it signifies the substance of the Creator with a pure signification;” “it is written down, it is not spoken,” “save in the sanctuary, by the holy priests, only in priestly blessing, and by the greater priest on the day of fasting.” “This name ‘Adonai’ (*Exodus* 6) is acknowledgement of another name that is more abstract than other names that are known of God,” besides the first imposition (these four letters [of the tetragrammaton] were imposed by God to signify some articulated word that would be signified by other letters according to the first imposition of letters; God imposed that word for signifying purely his essence). He [Maimonides] is treating the same things, which is of “four letters [tetragrammaton]” (jod-heth-vau-he, which these Latin letters are the same as, j-e-v-h), from which – joined in one syllable – nothing significative is collected, but from teaching, about which he adds ch.61/2: “Man knew not how he was to speak therein; the wise received, one from another, how he was to speak.”

A spoken name must be a symbol between speaker and whom he speaks to, so that the thing signified (in the way it is signified) might be known to both, and the name as sign of the thing; the truth of the divine nature, as to the idea of its immensity, is known to him alone, – to no creature can it be known as to the idea of its immensity; therefore God could appropriate for himself this ‘nameable name’, could make it his own –, no name of a creature can be a name proper to the divine nature like this, because no mark either, leading through some withdrawing to a knowledge of divine immensity. However, for signifying the divine nature as it is known by the intellectual creature, a proper name can be had (made by divine or created intellect), by which sign the saints speak of the truth of the divine nature in the way it is known by them; that name for wayfarers would not be a name-sign because, according to the way in which the blessed know the divine nature, in no way is it known to the former; therefore neither is a mark, just as neither whiteness to one born blind. For us a proper name can be made, at God’s pleasure, in accord with the way he is known by us; but that is not transferred from creatures, because common to creatures and imposed on them first; therefore it is on him first and principally imposed. ‘God’ signifies what is of perfection simply, as if supreme among Latin words; it is more proper in respect of others, which express as if particularly some idea of dignity.

Against the minor [sc. the first statement in the preceding paragraph] (against the major later): any blessed knows the object as infinite, because an object supremely seen (*Ord.* I d.1 nn.42-50); again, comprehension is not required for it to be signified; again, the mental word is a natural sign; again, a name given to God would not be an essential sign in being; again, the saints could use that name. – I concede the second [sc. ‘However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature...’], but it would be of the same significate. On the contrary: to conceive the significate under the same idea on the part of the object, thus does the wayfarer know; proof: [the wayfarer] has some quidditative concept, otherwise none; it is a concept of the quiddity under its proper idea as object, because in no way common, nor capable of contraction, but first diverse.

Solution. ‘Nameable by me’ is understood in two ways: by me as imposer, or by me imposing it, by using it, on myself or by proffering it to another. In the first way it is denied,

because it is not thus known, according to Aristotle and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 8 (the contrary here within, about names of substances, – the way is posited here within, in the solution of the question [end of n.2 below]; to Aristotle: he is understanding it confusedly; an example: letters). In the second way it is true, not only as with a magpie [sc. when a magpie imitates and repeats a word of human language], but attending to the letters; an example: when someone who does not have a distinct image of Rome speaks about it, – and proper names universally, whether it be imposed by us (as in the first case) or by God (Maimonides, *Guide* I, above). In a third way I conceive it as I can, because something that is under a confused concept that I have.

But surely can I not have a proper and quidditative concept? No, because the creature is deficient, and also we could distinguish through a simply simple concept (because the proper and not contractible, simply simple, primarily diverse), and also we could naturally know necessary truths.

To the arguments: ‘ineffable’ to him to whom it is expressed; by using the verb ‘he sees’, as it is expressed.

I. The Opinion of Others

2. It is said that as God is understood by us so can he also be named by us. Therefore, according to the diverse ways some think about the knowledge of God had by the intellect of the wayfarer, so consequently do they speak in diverse ways about the possibility also of naming God, – and he who denies a common concept univocal to God and creatures and posits two analogous concepts (of which namely one, which is of the creature, is attributed to the other, namely to that which is of God), will say according to this in consequence that God is nameable by the wayfarer with a name expressing that analogous concept [e.g. Henry of Ghent, above I d.3 nn.20-21].

3. But against this opinion I argue specifically, because every real concept able to be had of the divine essence is of a nature to come to be in the intellect by virtue of that essence (the proof is, because even any least intelligible object is of a nature to cause every real concept able to be had of it); but according to them only one concept is of a nature to be had of the divine essence by virtue of it, although the intellect, in busying itself, could cause and fashion several concepts about the object; therefore whatever object can make a real concept in the intellect about God can make that single concept which the essence would be of a nature to make of itself; but that single concept is of ‘this essence’ as it is ‘this’, therefore whatever object makes some knowledge of God in our intellect will – according to this opinion – make a concept of him as he is ‘this essence’, and so he will be nameable by the wayfarer with a name signifying ‘this essence’ as it is ‘this’ [I d.8 n.188].

II. Scotus’ own Response

4. It can be said to the question [n.1] in brief that this proposition, common to many opinions – namely that ‘as it is understood so is it also named’ [n.2] –, is false if it be understood precisely, because more distinctly can something be signified than understood.

5. The point seems to be made persuasive from this, that since substance is not intelligible by the wayfarer save in the common concept of being (as was proved in I d.3 nn.128-129), if it could not be more distinctly signified than understood, no name

imposed by the wayfarer would signify any thing of the genus of substance, but just as is precisely conceived by the intellect of the wayfarer some property by which the name is imposed (which property is commonly expressed by the etymology of the name), so precisely would such property be signified by the name; for example, by the name of ‘stone’ (‘lapis’) there would not be signified anything of the genus of substance but only something of the genus of action, to wit ‘striking the foot’ (‘laedens pedem’), which the etymology expresses and was what the name was imposed from.

6. And so can it be argued about all other names imposed on things of the genus of substance, that none of them signifies anything save some accidental property that was understood by the imposer [of the name] – or it is necessary to say that the name more distinctly signifies than the imposer understood.

7. But how this may be possible can be understood thus, according to the way of Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, whereby he proves composition in every creature. For by anyone are many accidents conceived, running together in the same thing, to wit such and such quantity and quality – and it is proved that neither of these is the other because each of them remains without the other; it is proved too for each of them is that something else is the common subject, because each of them can be destroyed with the other not destroyed: therefore something is concluded to be the subject for each, as for quality and quantity, – but that which is the subject is not conceived in a quidditative concept save of being, or of ‘this being’. And since it frequently happens that such and such quantity and quality are conjoined in something and are elsewhere are not conjoined, and this is not from the nature of quality and quantity, as was shown above [here n.7], – the conclusion is that this is from the nature of that third thing in which both these are founded; but the sort [of quality and quantity] conjoined in this whole are not the sort in that: for from their being conjoined in diverse ways in diverse things, it is concluded that the substrate for these is diverse from the substrate for those, and from this is concluded that this third [sc. the substrate in the first case] is other than the other third [sc. the substrate in the other case].^a But on this other, thus distinct (whatever be that which is with these things conjoined, which are understood) some name is imposed; it seems to be the proper sign of ‘this’, under the idea by which it ‘this’, such that he who imposes the name intends to signify the essence of the genus of substance; and just as he intends to signify, so the name that he imposes is a sign, and yet he does not understand that distinctly which he distinctly intends to signify by this name or this sign.^b

a. *Interpolated text*: therefore some third thing is known to be substrate, and likewise that it be other than the subject for others; nor yet do I know distinctly what it is in itself, save that it is a being or a thing, qualified by such accidents; hence the further conception that I can have of it, as to what it is, is a thing having such accidents and relations. To the matter at hand, then, not with such accidents.

b. *Interpolated text*: and thus perhaps, after the fall, have names been imposed.

8. An example also would be: if someone were to impose Hebrew characters not knowing Hebrew words in particular – yet knowing that some word is first and some second and some third, he were to impose them thus, ‘some word is first, and whichever it be, I will that it be signified by such name and such character’, those characters would be signs of those Hebrew words, which someone Hebrew would distinctly know with

such signs put in front of him, but a non-Hebrew, although he would understand what was signified by these shapes, would yet not know distinctly what is signified but only under the idea of first word or second.

9. Briefly then it can be said that at least many names are imposed that signify God in general, because thus can he be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, as is clear in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.58, 61]; or if it is true that ‘more distinctly can he be signified than conceived’ [n.4], God can be named by the wayfarer with a name signifying ‘this essence’.⁹²

10. But however it be about these, it is likely that God is named by such name, and this whether the name be imposed by God himself, or by an angel who knows him, or by a wayfarer. For it is likely that there are many names in sacred Scripture distinctly signifying that essence, – as the Jews say of the name of God by which they call him ‘Tetragrammaton’ [JHVH], and God seems to say, *Exodus* 3.14: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name;” and in another place, 3.15: “I am the God of Abraham etc., this is my name;” and 6.3: “my great name Adonai I have not made known to them.”

11. God, then, is nameable by the wayfarer with a name signifying properly the divine essence as it is ‘this essence’, because the wayfarer can use that sign and intend to express the significate of that sign, whether he himself has imposed that sign or anyone else who knew the significate; and also such sign or name can the wayfarer use as a name although he could not impose it as a sign. And if the proposition were true that ‘no name can be imposed on anything more distinctly than it be understood’ [n.5], yet this is false that ‘no one can use a name more distinctly signifying a thing than he himself could understand’; and therefore must it simply be conceded that the wayfarer can use many names expressing the divine essence under the idea of the divine essence.

Appendix A⁹³ Twenty Second Distinction Single Question

Division of Lombard’s Text

i. “After what has been said it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names, etc.” [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.22 ch.1 n.198]. According to what the Apostle says, *Romans* 10.10: “With the heart faith is held unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” in accord with this the Master [Lombard] – proceeding in this first [part] –, after he has taught what is to be believed about God and divine reality [I dd.1-21], in this second part [sc. from here onwards] teaches how one should speak about

⁹² Vatican editors: which essence, however, cannot be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, I d.3 nn.56-57.

⁹³ This interpolated text is considered genuine by the Vatican editors but relegated to an appendix because written in the margin and marked ‘Scotus extra’.

things believed. And that this division is according to his intention is plain to one who considers his text at the beginning of this distinction 22.⁹⁴

ii. Now this part [sc. second part of Lombard] is divided into two: the preface and the treatise (which begins at ‘That then chiefly’). And the latter is divided into two: in the first of which he determines about the divine names in general, positing six differences of names said of God, in the second he pursues these differences separately and singly (and that part begins there, ‘One must know therefore’ [ch.4 n.201]). And the second part is divided into two: in the first of which he determines about the names about which a briefer treatise suffices, in the second he determines about certain things that require a special and distinct treatise (the second part begins at the beginning of distinction 35: ‘Since we have discussed above’). The first part is again divided into two: for first he determines about absolute names [dd.22-25], second about relative names (at the beginning of distinction 26: ‘Now about the properties of the persons’). The first part into two: for first he posits a rule about absolute names, from which appears their distinction from relative names – second he excepts from the common rule the name ‘person’ (and this at the beginning of distinction 23: ‘To the aforesaid however must be added’). The first is divided into two, because first he posits the rule and proves it from Augustine, second he adduces a proof from Augustine by which he proves the conclusion asserted (the second part there ‘But God is not great etc.’).

Whether God is Nameable by Some Proper Name

iii. About this distinction I ask whether God is nameable by a human wayfarer with some proper name.

iv. That he is not:

Augustine in sermon 34 ‘On the Lord’s Words’ [*Sermon* 117 ch.5 n.7]: “Whatever can be said is not ineffable; but God is ineffable.” This minor Augustine proves by what he immediately subjoins saying: “For if the Apostle Paul says that he was snatched up ‘to the third heaven and heard ineffable words’, how much more is he too ineffable who shows him such things?”

v. Further, Augustine in homily 19 on *John* [*On the Gospel of John*, tract.19 n.1], expounding the verse, *John* 5.19: “The Son can do nothing that he has not seen the Father doing,” says that “the seeing of the Son is his being the Word of the Father, which cannot be shown by a word.”

vi. Further, Hilary *On the Trinity* III ch.9 [n.20]: “The virtue of the generation [sc. of the Son] exceeds the speech of human nature.”

vii. Further, Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5 [*On the Faith* I ch.10 n.64]: “Voice is silent, not mine only, but that of angels” (he is speaking of the generation of the Son).

viii. Further, by reason: nothing can be signified by anyone save what can be understood by the same; but God cannot be understood by the human wayfarer with a proper concept; therefore etc. – The major is proved through Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a22-24) and the Commentator (Averroes, *Metaphysics* IV com.10), and to the matter at hand by the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7 (“God is more

⁹⁴ The Vatican editors give the text from Lombard thus: “After what has been said, it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity. Next we must show in what ways something is said about that Unity and Trinity.”

truly thought than said, and more truly is than thought”), and by the Philosopher *On Interpretation* 1.16a3-4 (“Words are marks of affections” that is of concepts): therefore there cannot be [a mark] any remote signified thing save under the idea under which the concept is a proximate sign of it. The minor is proved by the saying of *Exodus* 33.20: “No man will see me and live;” and by reason, because the proper concept, if it were had, would include virtually a proper knowledge of all the things that are necessarily in God: this consequence is proved, because universally even in creatures the proper concept of a subject virtually includes a proper knowledge of the things that are in the subject; and then it would follow further that, just as he who has the proper concept of a subject can naturally know simply all the knowables about the subject, so the wayfarer having such a concept could naturally know all the necessary truths about God, and consequently all those things we have faith about, as to the unity and trinity in divine reality and as to creative and incarnative power, and so about other things necessarily belonging to God.

ix. To the contrary:

In *Psalms* 75.2: “Great is my name in Israel;” and *Exodus* 3.14-15: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name etc.”

x. Further, Augustine *Against Adimantus* ch.13 n.2: “That inestimable sublimity, so that it may accord with the ears, must be signified by human signs.”

xi. Further, by reason: the wayfarer can have a proper concept of God, therefore can also name him with a proper name. – The antecedent is proved, because by natural reason can he know that some being is first and infinite, and that it is unique and is a ‘this’; therefore he can have a concept of that essence as it is a ‘this’ (but such concept seems most proper of any object, namely to conceive it as it is a ‘this’, in itself).

III. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

xii. Here there is one opinion [of Henry of Ghent] of this sort:

A name or vocal word must be a symbol between the speaker and him to whom he speaks, so that the thing signified may be in itself known to each, and also that it may be known to each that the name is imposed for signifying that thing; but the truth of the divine nature is known only to God as to the idea of immensity; therefore only he could appropriate a vocal name to himself. Now [the opinion] subjoins for the second minor (to be assumed under the first major) that the blessed do know that essence in itself; therefore by some word (as by a sign of that essence) can they under that idea name God, whether that word be instituted by God or by some blessed. The third minor, that the wayfarer cannot conceive the divine essence, neither according to the idea of its immensity (this is proper to God) nor in the same way that the blessed see it; and therefore a sign imposed on that essence in the first or second way cannot lead them to any knowledge of the divine essence, just as neither can someone born blind be led to a knowledge of colors through the words by which seers and knowers of colors through recollection conduct themselves to a knowledge of colors. Fourth minor: the intellect of the wayfarer can in some way conceive God; therefore also proportionally name him. – The opinion adds there that no name proper to God, imposed at the pleasure of the wayfarer, can be transferred from creatures (because any such name at all is also common to creatures and imposed on them first), but that name must first and principally be imposed on him for that very little amount that can be known of God from creatures. It

infers further that this name ‘God’, from its imposition, signifies what is simply more perfect as if in sum and in general in respect of other names, which as it were particularly express something that has the idea of dignity in God, as are ‘wise’, ‘good’ etc. Also this name ‘God’ is first imposed on him, so that it does not belong to creatures save by transference (as Moses is called the ‘god of Pharaoh’, *Exodus* 7.1); therefore among all Latin names the name proper to him is this name ‘Deus’, and thus proper in the Greek tongue is this name ‘Theos’.

xiii. About the reason for this opinion, how the major possess truth, it will be stated in the solution of the question. But the minors, or the diverse parts of the same minor, seem doubtful. The first indeed, namely that ‘God alone knows himself under the idea of his immensity’, is as to the affirmative part, that ‘he thus knows himself’, most certain. But as to the negative part, namely that ‘no intellect knows God under that idea’, it is refuted thus:

xiv. No operative power can be most perfectly quietened save in the object that includes the highest perfection possible for its adequate object; but infinity or immensity is the perfection possible for being or truth, or for any transcendent idea, and something of them is the adequate object of any intellect at all; therefore a created intellect is not perfectly quietened save in God under the idea of his immensity. – The major is proved by an example from sight and from fitting visible object, and by reason, because whenever anything else is had, there is still an inclination of the power to something not had and more principally than to this, which is had. The first part of the minor was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.147], the second part in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.137].

xv. The second [refutation] is as follows: only an intellection ‘comprehensive of God’ is repugnant to a created intellect; but some intellection of God ‘according to the idea of his immensity’ can be non-comprehensive of it; therefore etc. – The minor is proved, because an act comprehensive of an infinite object is infinite intensively, because it is as perfect in idea of act as the object in idea of object, and therefore simply adequate; but of the object as it is immense the can be a non-infinite act, because as the object can be simply more perfect than the act, and this under the idea under which it is the object of the act, so also [can it be] infinite without infinity of act. It is confirmed, because there does not appear a reason why, about an object ‘under the idea of infinity’, there could not be an act more perfect in one and less perfect in another.

xvi. From the refutation of this part of the minor, the corresponding conclusion is refuted, – and first as follows:

He who names an object under some idea does not have to comprehend it under that idea, but it is enough that he distinctly apprehends it; a created intellect can thus apprehend God under the idea of immensity (it is plain from the reasons already set down); therefore, etc. – The major is proved, because Adam imposed names proper to the diverse species of animals, and yet he did not comprehend them, because then he would equally perfectly have known them as does the soul of Christ, which is not held.

xvi. Second, because a natural sign more truly signifies than a sign imposed at pleasure; a created intellection can be a natural sign of God according to the idea of his immensity; therefore [an intellection] so understanding can impose a sign on him at pleasure. – The minor is proved, because an intellection, as it is of an object, is a natural sign of it (Aristotle *On Interpretation* I.1.16a3-4): “properties are marks of things,” and this naturally), which is for this reason, because intellection is a proper idea of the object;

and it was proved before that some created intellection can be of God under the idea of immensity.

xvii. Third, because any name is a finite sign, even if it be imposed by God himself according to the idea of his immensity; therefore, for this to be a sign for someone understanding, it is not necessary that he has an infinite intellection. God therefore can be named with some name or other by a finite intelligence, nay more, God cannot name himself with any name that exceeds the name by which he is nameable by the blessed as much as the comprehension of God exceeds the apprehension of the blessed; and no wonder, because neither is there necessarily in us a proportion of name to name in signifying as of intellection to intellection of imposer or user, – and therefore a name imposed by each can be a sign for both. So therefore this name imposed by God who comprehends can be a common sign for himself and the blessed, because it signifies as much finitely, nor consequently does it require in the user an infinite intellection.

xviii. The fourth part of the minor, although it be in itself true when holding that the wayfarer could not have a proper quidditative concept of God, and the blessed imposes a name for signifying a proper concept of the sort he has of God, yet there is argument that it is repugnant to his statements [sc. Henry of Ghent's] elsewhere:

First as follows: for he concedes that the wayfarer has some quidditative concept of God, and it is plain, because otherwise he could have no qualitative or relative concept of him, for a qualitative concept always requires some quidditative one in which it is; but according to him a quidditative concept cannot be had of God common to him [God] and creatures; therefore it will be proper [sc. to God], and so simply first diverse from the concept of a creature. Therefore a name imposed by the blessed on God under his proper idea would not thus be a name for the wayfarer, just as the name of a color for one born blind. – If it be said that the wayfarer cannot intuitively understand God like the blessed, this is not an obstacle, because never by a name does intuitive knowledge come to be of the thing signified by the name, but only a certain remembering for considering the thing known before; it is plain in an example, for a blind man not born so, because at some time he saw colors, does well use the name of color as a sign common to himself and one who sees, because each could by remembering understand colors, although the blind man now could not intuit colors.

xix. Secondly it is argued as follows: a perfect object can make in a proportioned intellect any concept able to be had of it (this is proved, because a less perfect object is capable of this); but the divine essence – according to him [Henry] – can only make in a proportioned intellect a single real concept (others, if they are had, are had by the busying of its intellect); therefore only a single real concept is possible of that essence. Therefore, if it has some concept of God (he does have it!), it will be a proper one. Nor is concept in this argument taken for the idea of conceiving, but for the formal object terminating the act. – Although the major of this argument seem probable, it would yet be denied of a proportioned intellect (that is an infinite one), because that is comprehensive in a single concept, and so not capable of many about the object as a non-comprehensive intellect is; it would be denied too of any intellect, when understanding of an object immediate in self-moving, because it, on account of its perfection, would not move to the imperfect concepts able to be had of it by the motion of other objects imperfectly leading to knowledge of it.

Scotus' own Response

xx. To the question I premise certain things:

First, that any name, signifying anything that can be present in this alone, can be called the proper name for this, but simply the proper name of this is only what first signifies this under its proper idea, because only that is the vocal proper sign of this.

xxi. Second, I premise that 'to be named by someone' can be understood in two ways: either as by his imposing the name or as by using the name; and both in two ways, namely perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly to use a name is not only to use the name as some natural vocalization, namely by forming the sound (the way a trained bird can form it), but is to use the name 'as a sign' not only of a concept able to be had by another through that name (so could a Latin pronounce some Hebrew word to a Hebrew, not knowing what he was saying), but as a sign of a concept had by the user, so that thus 'to use a name perfectly' is to use it as a sign expressive of a proper concept; but to use it as in some way cause of the having of a like concept by the hearer through recollection is not necessary for simply perfectly using it but for perfectly using it as a sign common between two, and therefore it is required for this which is perfectly using the name morally, because it is required for using the name for the due end. And each of these perfections does Augustine touch on, *Enchiridion* ch.22, when he says: "Words are instituted by which each may proffer his thoughts for another's knowledge;" 'his thoughts', behold the first perfection – 'for another's knowledge', behold the second. Understand 'another's' (or 'as it were another's'), because sometimes someone by speaking leads himself more effectively to knowledge by recollection than without speaking (to a knowledge, I say, not then new), as when we speak to God by praying; again, about the first perfection I sub-distinguish 'his thoughts', because either he has as proper a concept as the name signifies (and then he signifies 'his thoughts' perfectly), or he has a less proper or confused concept, as namely when having only the concept of animal he proffers this vocal sound 'man', intending to express by this name to the hearer that which others conceive by the name and for which it was imposed, knowing that it was imposed on some species under animal, which however he does not understand in particular as it is signified by this name. There is therefore this order: to use a name as it is such thing; further as a conventional sign of something, of which however the user has no concept (save in this most universal sense which is 'something signified by this name'); third, as a sign of something of which the user has only a universal concept (he intends however to express that which is signified by the name, although he does not conceive it so in particular); fourth, as a sign expressive of a proper concept in particular. And here always is a prior stage imperfect with respect to a posterior; the first then is most imperfect, the last simply perfect.

xxii. With these as premises, let the first conclusion to the question be this: it is possible for God with a name simply proper to be named imperfectly by the wayfarer, according to the first three aforesaid grades; the second conclusion is this: it is not possible for God to be named perfectly by the wayfarer, namely according to the fourth grade; third conclusion: in what way God is in fact named by us.

xxiii. The first is proved, because, if not, this would only be because it is not possible to have a proper concept of God, – and it is necessary for a thing to be conceived as it is named. But this second is false: I prove it, because of no substance do we have a

concept *per se* and proper; if therefore it is not possible to name more distinctly than to conceive, it follows that the wayfarer signifies a substance by no name distinctly, as using the name, nor will any name imposed by the wayfarer signify any substance distinctly. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The first proposition, namely that ‘we do not understand substance distinctly’ was proved above in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.140].

xxiv. But as to how the opposite of the consequent be true (because this is a preamble to the matter at hand), it is made clear first by the denomination of substance, using the name imposed, – second, by the denomination of it when imposing a name on it.

xxv. The first as follows:

By this name ‘man’ we do not intend to signify animal merely (it is plain), but something under animal, distinct from horse and other animals; hence this for us is true, ‘man is *per se* distinct from horse’ etc. Nor do we intend to signify by this name ‘man’ some accident or some accidents, rather a species in the genus of substance only; hence this is for us true ‘man is *per se* distinct from any accident whatever’, even with the greatest distinction, because according to the most general genus. Nor do we intend to signify some description of animal and accident (or accidents), rather something *per se* one and in itself of a nature to have a definitive concept *per se* one; but that which we intend to signify under its proper idea, and yet we do not so understand it – this we name imperfectly according to the third grade, as was said before; therefore etc.

xxvi. It is similarly plain about the second, namely about imposition as about use:

For just as if Adam, when understanding man under its proper idea, had imposed on it a name proper to it, using which I intend to signify it as it is the name imposed on it (of which, however, I do not have a concept save an imperfect one universally, or *per accidens*, or in a certain description), so if I were similarly to understand the same thing not yet named, I could impose on it a name, intending by that name to signify it just as now I intend to signify it by a name imposed by another. And he who imposes [a name] in this way, although sometimes he will not have had a concept of the thing save under some description which the etymology of the name signifies, yet the name is not imposed to signify that etymology or description, but the substance of which it is the description; just as this name ‘stone’ has not been imposed to signify this action ‘striking the foot’ (because then stone would be of the genus of action *per se*), but it is imposed on that substance under its proper idea, of which this is a certain description ‘striking the foot’. This is also plain, because sometimes many names are imposed on the same thing, not from the same property but from different ones, as stone-rock;⁹⁵ nor are they imposed on the properties, because then they would not be of the same thing *per se*, nay one would be a name of something of the genus of action and another of something of the genus of passion (as ‘worn down by the foot’).

xxvii. It is plain, then, that one is the idea by which a name is imposed (and the etymology signifies it) and another for which it is imposed; and so although the one imposing it did not have a distinct concept save of the idea by which he imposed the name, yet he did not impose the name for that idea but for the substance of which this is a

⁹⁵ Scotus is using somewhat fanciful if traditional Latin etymologies, as deriving ‘lapis’ or stone from ‘laedens pedem’ (hurting the foot), which is in the genus or category of action, and ‘petra’ or rock from ‘pede trita’ (worn down by the foot), which is in the genus of passion. The stone or rock thereby named is, of course, in the genus of substance and not of action or passion.

description, and this under its proper idea, which however he does not thus understand, – and consequently he gives a name as imposing it imperfectly according to the third grade.

Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether Person, according as it says Something Common to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, says precisely Something of Second Intention

1. About the twenty third distinction I ask whether person, according as it says something common to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, says precisely something of second intention.

That it does not:

Proof, because person is the term of a real production and is adored; a second intention does not terminate a real production nor is adored; therefore, etc.

2. Further, the Trinity in divine reality is not only of concepts but of things, – against the error of Sabellius; therefore, etc.

3. On the contrary:

Everything common to many things, univocal, distinct, and multiplied in them, is said of them according to some idea of a universal; person is a common univocal to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7; therefore person is said of them according to some idea of a universal: and if it state some second intention, there would truly be in divine reality some idea of a universal, which does not seem unacceptable; but if it state a first intention, there will be in divine reality a real common universal, and so some potential reality, – this is unacceptable.

I. Opinion of Others

4. [Exposition of the opinion] – Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that person only states a second intention:

5. Because as is an individual in any nature, so is a supposit in substantial nature and a person in intellectual nature; but individual and supposit state only a thing of second intention; therefore person too only states a thing of second intention.

6. The reason is confirmed, because the nature in which these are [sc. individual, supposit, person] does not belong to their *per se* idea; for it is posited in the definition of them as something added, therefore it does not vary the formal ideas of these.

7. Again, everything common said of many things is said of them according to the idea of something universal; therefore if person signify a thing of first intention, common to the three, it will be said of them under the idea of a most general genus, or of some intermediate genus, or according to the idea of most specific species, – whose opposites are manifest: not of most specific species, because then it would follow that there will be two as it were most specific species with respect to the same persons; for deity – according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48 – indicates as it were the species embracing the hypostases [I d.8 n.41], and person too will indicate the most specific species with respect to them. Therefore, etc.

8. Added to this opinion [n.4] is that, although person state something of second intention, yet it does not state it in the abstract but in the concrete, – and therefore it can be predicated of a thing of first intention and can supposit for it. There is an exemplification: ‘species is a second intention’, there species is taken for the intention in itself – and ‘species is predicated of many things differing in number’ etc., there species is taken for the thing which it denominates; for this intention ‘species’ is not predicated of many, as it seems, but man or ass [is], of which this intention is said.

9. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this, and first against him who opines it [Henry]:

Whenever from the formal constitutives of certain things can a common thing of first intention be abstracted, with equal reason or greater reason can something be abstracted from the constituted things; now the divine persons – according to them [Henry and followers] – are constituted formally by relations. But from those constitutive relations can something real of first intention be abstracted: for paternity is a relation and filiation is a relation,^a and this when taking relation univocally, because there can be certitude about a concept of inward relation while doubting about any special concept – and such a one, thus certain, not only has certitude about the word but about some concept; therefore the concept of relation in general is other than the concept of it in particular. Therefore much more from the things constituted by these relations will something of first intention be able to be abstracted. – Now the assumption about the univocity of relation will more appear below, in this question.⁹⁶

a. [Interpolation] and is a predication in the ‘what’; but no second intention is predicated in the ‘what’ of a thing of first intention.

10. Against the opinion [n.4] in itself:

Because every second intention is a relation of reason, not just any relation but pertaining to the extreme of an act of the intellect combining and dividing, or at any rate comparing one to the other (this is plain, because a second intention – according to everyone – is caused by an act of the intellect busying itself about a thing of first intention, which act can cause about an object only a relation or relations of reason); but person does not state a relation of reason, and especially not one pertaining to an act of the intellect combining [terms into a proposition]. But that it not state any relation of reason appears because it would then at least necessarily co-require a correlative to which it would be referred, because it is impossible to understand relation and it not be to some term and correlative, just as every second intention requires its correlative (as a species requires a genus for its correlative, and a particular a universal, and so of others); it is plain about an idea which is a relation of reason, and cannot be understood save in respect of another. But person is not said to be person of someone, or at least it does not state an extreme of the comparing intellect.

⁹⁶ Vatican editors: the assumption (namely that relation in common is said univocally of the particular relations constitutive of the divine persons) is not dealt with below; but since a relation is a positive concept, the matter has regard to the second way [nn.24-25], which Scotus did not finish. The assumption is dealt with extensively in *Reportatio* IA d.25 nn.24-29, but there is doubt whether Scotus would have treated of it here as well, because below, n.20, he did not concede a univocal common concept in the ‘what’ abstracted from the constitutives of the persons, as neither had he conceded it in the *Lectura* I d.23 n.20.

11. Again, I take their reasoning [of Henry and his followers] to the opposite by taking the same major and the opposite of the minor, that an individual that imports individual unity states a thing of first intention, because unity is a property of being (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b22-25), and consequently unity follows a thing from the nature of the thing – and this is above all true of the unity that is true unity, of which sort is the unity of the individual; therefore such unity does not state a second intention; and just as unity does not in any nature, thus neither does unity in intellectual nature; if therefore person state unity in intellectual nature as individual does in every nature, the opposite of their conclusion [n.5] follows.

12. Further, against the second reason [n.7]:

Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.5 n.5 (and it is put in [Lombard's] text in I d.25 ch.2 nn.220, 222) says that “things that are to be enjoyed are the Father and Son and Holy Spirit:” hence, according to him, the three persons are three things; but ‘thing’ does not seem to state a second intention, and yet it is common to the three persons and numbered among them; therefore it is not necessary to say that person signifies a second intention because it is common and numbered among many.

13. The Master too, in d.25 ch.2 n.220, expounds three persons through ‘three subsistences or three subsistents’; but by subsistence he does not seem to signify a thing of second intention, and yet it is common to the three and numbered among them (‘for they are called three subsistences or three subsistents, three beings⁹⁷ or three things’).^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the aforesaid opinion [n.4] asks ‘how person can be univocally predicated of several in divine reality, unless it be a universal’, but it suffers the same difficulty about relation and it follows in the same way; for it more seems that from the constituted could the common be abstracted than from the constituting. But how something common of first intention can be abstracted and yet not a real universal will be stated in distinction 25 [*Reportatio* IA d.25 nn.27-29].

14. Further, against the other thing added [n.8] I argue as follows: an adjective does not determine anything save that at which its dependence is terminated; but an adjective cannot terminate the dependence of another adjective because they are equally dependent; therefore neither determines the other, – and so if this name ‘person’ be such a concrete [n.8], it will not be well said that there are ‘three persons’ save by understanding another substantive, which would be determined by each adjective: but it is not possible to give any such sub-understood substantive, therefore etc.^a

a. *Note by Duns Scotus*: Response: there are many concretes which are not adjectives (for example cause, genus, species), and the argument [n.14] is against an adjective, not against a concrete.

II. Scotus’ own Response

15. I respond to the question [n.1] that by taking the definition of person which Richard [of St. Victor] posits, *On the Trinity* IV ch.21, that it is “the incommunicable existence of intellectual nature,” by which definition is expounded or corrected the

⁹⁷ Scotus interestingly invents here the masculine form of the word ‘being’ (*entes*) rather than the standard neuter (*entia*).

definition of Boethius saying that a person is “an individual substance of rational nature” (because thus it would follow that the soul is a person, which is unacceptable, and that deity is a person^a), I say that there is nothing in this definition of Richard’s that signifies a second intention, because from the nature of the thing – without work of the intellect – there is in the Father intellectual nature and incommunicable entity.

a. [*Interpolation*] and also would not belong properly to God, because there is not an individual save where there is something divisible, which does not belong to God; likewise only properly would the name of person belong to man, who alone is properly called rational.

16. Now this incommunicability is double (which can be understood from what was said in distinction 2 [nn. 379-380]), because ‘communicable to many’ is said in two ways: in one way is ‘communicable to many’ called what is the same as each of them, such that, whatever it be, it is said as a universal is said to be communicated to its inferiors; in another way something is communicated as a form, by which something is but is not it, as the soul is communicated to the body. And in each way is deity communicable, and in neither way is person communicable, and so there is a double incommunicability which pertains to the idea of person; because of which the separated soul, although it have the first incommunicability, is yet not a person because it does not have the second, – and each incommunicability is required for the *per se* idea of person, and it is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and so nothing of the idea of person states a second intention.

III. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

17. Against this can objection be made because according to this it would seem that person only signifies a double negation of a double communicability,^a – and if this be true then there seems a doubt how negation could be common to the three unless some affirmation be common to them because of which such negation be in them;^b but ‘deity’ is not that affirmation, because it is not numbered up in the three [sc. one does not say ‘three deities’ or ‘three Gods’]; therefore it is necessary to give first some common positive – as person – abstracted from them before there be such negation, and then the intended proposition is got [sc. that nothing of the idea of person states a second intention, n.16].

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, I argue as follows: if person formally state incommunicability, then it formally states negation; but negation is a second intention, since it is a being of reason; therefore person states a thing of second intention, which is the intended proposition. – I reply that person does not only state incommunicability, but gives to understand the intellectual nature in which it is, as individual [gives to understand] nature in common. I doubt, however, I doubt if it state existence formally with double incommunicability, or only state formally incommunicability-negation and existence in the concrete as mode of having nature, so that the sense is ‘person is incommunicability having existence in intellectual nature’; and, posited that it were so, I still say that person does not state a second intention (because a second intention, since it is a being of reason, is only caused by the busying intellect), for that to the knowledge of which a thing moves before any busying of the intellect is not a second intention, but a thing moving the intellect moves to negation of the opposite before busying of the intellect, because such negation follows the thing from the nature of the thing before any busying of the intellect (and hence it is that one of the opposites moves to knowledge of its

opposite before busying of the intellect, because of which the Philosopher says that ‘the same science is of opposites’ [*Posterior Analytics* 2.26.69b8-32]). Therefore although it be posited that person only formally states negation, yet not a second intention, because a negation that follows from the nature of a thing is not a second intention, and especially negation in general, of which sort is incommunicability. When therefore it is said that ‘negation is a being of reason’, I say that it is a negative entity from the nature of the thing: for just as Socrates is a man from the nature of the thing, so he is a non-ass from the nature of the thing; also negations – in the intellect – are entities, because the first motion of the intellect (not before affirmation, but before negation) is to apprehension of negation. – Thus therefore do I hold that person is not a name of second intention, but of first, and that it formally signifies a double negation of communicability and connotes intellectual nature. And perhaps formally too it imports existence, and then not only does it import a common negation, but something positive; or perhaps it does not formally state existence, and then of its formal significate there is only double negation, giving to understand a double positive, namely nature and mode of having nature. And thereby, whichever way is given, answer to the arguments [nn.1-2] is plain: because if person state existence in the abstract and way of having nature in the concrete, it is formally positive, and then person is formally incommunicable existence having intellectual nature; but if it only formally import negation, then it connotes an existent in nature, and thus it stands for that which is incommunicable, – and is thus adored and is a term of real production. But to the other argument [n.2] it will be plain in distinction 25 [*Reportatio* IA d.25 n.24; also above nn.12-13, and below n.24].

b. [*Interpolation*] because negation does not seem common to the three unless it follow a common affirmation.

18. If it also states such negation precisely, it does not seem to state the whole idea of person, because person states a thing pertaining to dignity, but negation posits no dignity or perfection.

19. It seems too that it states a relation of reason by this, that its opposite – namely the communicable – only states a relation of reason in the divine essence: for essence is communicable to the Son and yet essence is not referred really to the Son; therefore ‘communicable’ too states a relation of reason.

20. To the first of these [n.17] I say that from ultimate distinctives and constitutives of persons nothing common said in the ‘what’ of them can be abstracted, because they are first diverse, that is including nothing the same really (for then it would [remain] to ask of them what they were distinguished by [I d.3 n.132]); and therefore everything common abstracted from them is either a concept altogether negative or at any rate is not a quidditative concept of reason. And it is certain that some common negation can be abstracted from those ultimates, and this of one idea, because negation is of one idea by this, which is repugnant to affirmation of one idea. To whatever things, therefore, is affirmation of one idea repugnant, to them belongs negation of one idea, – and so to the three persons, and also to the ultimates distinctive of them, there can belong some common negation. But if that be said to be incommunicability, and if it be posited that incommunicability alone is of the *per se* idea constitutive of a person (so that personality be ‘incommunicability of a subsistent in intellectual nature’, and everything beside the first [sc. incommunicability] be added in the idea of person), then person properly does not state some concept of second intention: for every concept is of first intention that is of a nature to come to be immediately from the thing, without work or act of the busying intellect, of which sort is a concept not only positive but also negative.

21. And if this were posited, when it is doubted ‘how there can be a common negation without a common positive in which it is’ [n.17], I reply: however diverse they are, if they also have nothing common, there can be a common negation, – just as not-Socrates is a common univocal to everything other than Socrates, beings and not beings. And although the things to which negation is common have something positive common, yet it is not necessary that by that common something there be in them a common negation: for non-rationality belongs to the ultimate difference of horse and ass, and not through something common in them to which this negation belongs, because either there is nothing common to ultimate differences, or if entity is common to them, not because of entity does such negation belong to them, just as neither because of entity is such affirmation repugnant to them.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] And thus must it be said that the major [interpolation b, n.17] is false, because negation is of one idea, because it is opposed to affirmation of one idea and not because it follows affirmation of one idea: for not-man is of one idea because man to which it is opposed is of one idea and not because it follows an affirmation of one idea; for not-man is common to being and not-being, to which nothing affirmative or positive is common.

22. And when, second, it is objected that ‘negation does not state anything of dignity’ [n.18] (and for this too could the reasons for the principal conclusion be adduced, because ‘negation is not adored’, ‘nor even is it a term of real action’ [n.1]), – it could be said that negation in a genus differs both from negation outside a genus and from privation. Privation indeed requires a fit subject, either in itself if it is a privation in itself, – or in a genus, if it is a privation in genus (as a mole is called blind, *Metaphysics*, ch. ‘On privation’, 5.22.1022b24-27). Negation outside genus requires absolutely nothing, because it is equally said of being and not-being. And negation in a genus is as it were in the middle, because it requires a subject of which it is said, though it does not indicate aptitude for form; such negation perhaps does diversity import (about which elsewhere [I d.18 qq.1-2]), because it indicates such non-identity in being – therefore such can incommunicability name as it is imported in ‘person’, because it indicates the negation of a double communicability in intellectual nature; nor yet does it state any aptitude for communicability but that negation in positive intellectual nature, – and so it states dignity, not by reason of what is signified, but by reason of what is connoted and made subject, and thus could person be conceded to be generated and adored (just as ‘a blind man walks or is loved’, not that blindness be the idea of walking, but that that in which is such privation is the subject in respect of such predicate).

23. When it is argued about the communicable and incommunicable [n.19], I say that one opposite can be a relation of reason and the other a real relation (or at any rate a real negation or privation of some relation), just as ‘same’ with perfect identity states a relation of reason (*Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4, ‘On the same’), and yet ‘diverse’ – which denies this identity – belongs to a thing without an act of reason or intellect; and the reason is because, although something not belong to a thing save from work or act of intellect, yet it can be repugnant to the thing of itself, without act of intellect, just as to Socrates universality is repugnant, which however does not belong to man save through an act of intellect working and busying itself about man. Although therefore communicability state only a relation of reason in the essence, yet it can be repugnant to

person from something that is in reality, and because of the same can incommunicability belong to it.

24. With this way therefore supposed as certain (that from person can be abstracted some negative concept of negation in a genus, and this not only from persons as wholes but also from their formal constitutives [nn.20-23]), there is a further doubt whether only such a common [negative] be abstractable from them or some common positive.

And it seems it is necessary to posit something positive, able to be abstracted from them, because of the word of Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* and the word of the Master in the text of distinction 25, which have been adduced against the first opinion [nn.12-13].

25. It can be said that from individuals can be abstracted not only the species, which states the quiddity of individuals, but something quasi-proper.⁹⁸

Twenty Fourth Distinction Single Question

Whether Number properly exists in Divine Reality

1. About the twenty fourth distinction I ask whether in divine reality there is properly number.^a

a. *Note by Scotus*, (Opening references to Henry, Gospel of John, Damascene, Avicenna as found in the *Reportatio*).

On the contrary. – Boethius: “This is truly one in which there is no number.” Again, one is prior in nature to two. Again, part than whole. Again, either according to substance or to relation.

Solution. – ‘One’ double (synonymous): what follows form and principle of number and adds above ‘one’ the idea of measure (and therefore it is of the genus of quantity), – what follows form because of matter; thus double number, Averroes, *Metaphysics* 5 com.12 (or triple: formal, mathematical, sensible). The first is there [in divine reality], by ‘one’ which preserves unity; the second is not there; or in another way: for number not there simply but with determination of forms.

Response. – ‘Numbered things’ are several things divided, hence in a whole they are not numbered save in potency; they are of a nature to be contained in the unity of one continuous thing. All are of a nature to be one, therefore of one species and in different matters.

In God none are divided from each other, because of unity of essence; by opposition, in immaterial species there is formal number.

Again, anything there [in divine reality] is a quasi-species, and they are not several under the same species; therefore only number ‘in a certain respect’ (namely with addition of persons and attributes), so that if of one species, absence of division prevents [numbering] – if division of essence, another species prevents [numbering]; with mathematical number it agrees, because it arises from unity of essence as from the root, – it differs because here [in divine reality] unity is not divided but distinguished as it were by species (in this it agrees with formal number, but it is never rooted in one singular form, and the difference there [in divine reality] is through absolute forms, here [in formal number] not).

⁹⁸ Vatican editors: much blank space is left here by Duns Scotus, nor is the question resolved.

To the first [argument – see opening paragraph of this note]: it is not one in number, because it does not constitute number. To the second: he is speaking of number with a determination, namely of persons. To the third: multitude is more known to us and is signified by a positive – but it is a division of units, which is negation of union, therefore they are not ‘many’ save with a determination; conversely in God: although, according to mode of name, ‘one’ signifies negation, the negation is only of negation [sc. ‘one’ negates ‘division’] and, as to the thing, a true positive.

2. I respond:

Either it is posited that number has formal unity, with respect to which formality unities are material and as it were matter of the form, – or it is posited that number is one only by aggregation of units,^a as a heap of stones is said to be one by aggregation of stones.

a. [Note by Scotus] Number is of distinct things not only by aggregation but by distinction of beings.

3. Which of these is true will be said elsewhere when number will be dealt with.⁹⁹

4. In the first way [n.2] I say that number is not in divine reality, because any divine person is infinite and any personal property is the same as the infinite. But nothing that is formally of itself infinite, or the same as the infinite, is potential or part of anything, because then there would be something greater than the infinite (because the whole would be greater than the infinite, if only a part of it were infinite), and therefore, by holding this position, there will not be number in divine reality.

5. If the second position is true, namely that number is only one by aggregation of units [n.2], since aggregated things are simply diverse so that they do not make nor are they anything *per se* one (rather they are less one than those that are one *per accidens*), and what are in divine reality are something the same as something truly one, which is the essence, – it follows that there is no aggregation there of thing with thing, and so there is no number there according to the second position.

6. If however number has being in the intellect only, conceiving at the same time many ‘ones’ or many unities, since some intellect can conceive three persons together or one alone (not conceiving the three persons), and since there is no concept as perfect and complete in conceiving one person as in conceiving three persons (hence several distinct articles of faith respect distinct persons), there could be posited a quasi-single total concept of the Trinity in the intellect.

7. But passing over whether there be number in the intellect, and speaking of number in reality – I say that number simply is not in divine reality, holding either one or other of the first two opinions [nn.4-5]. Number however is conceded there ‘in a certain respect’ (namely with this determination of persons), because there abstraction is made of that – in number – which does not state imperfection (namely of distinction) from that which does note imperfection (either in each of the numbered things or at any rate in one of them), namely from potentiality if number is one according to form, or from diversity if number is one by aggregation of several units. Yet well conceded there is distinction without diversity or potentiality or even aggregation, which state some imperfection in unity.^a

⁹⁹ Vatican editors: Scotus however does not later expressly treat of numbers.

a. [Note by Scotus] Concerning the remark in *Metaphysics* 106.1057a3-4, about ‘one’ which constitutes number etc. [“For number is a multitude, measurable by one.”] add: ‘one’ in the intellect, by unity of order, can have the idea of measure according to idea; number is such a ‘one’, through a certain distance of the last unit from the first; therefore number is a measure according to reason (it is thus perhaps that Augustine was speaking about time). – On the contrary: ‘a measured thing’ according to what of it is measured; if according to quantity, then it in itself is a discrete ‘how much’.

Response, holding the common way:

Units which are parts of number are of one idea and not only one concept but the singulars of it on this side and that are of one idea. Second: ‘ones’ are distinct, so that a one this way does not include a one that way; therefore a unit of nature does not make a number along with a unit of supposit, nor with a unit of formality, because nature is included in one and includes the other. Thirdly, in each unit and each ‘one’ there is required potentiality of part to whole.

Because of the first, God is not numbered along with creatures, because that singular unity – which is in God existently – is not of the same idea with another (because then it would be contracted by ‘infinite’ and so God would be composite).

Because of the second, white and sweet are not two, but whiteness and sweetness are two. Grammatical reason, because a numeral adjective term determines a substantive: that [substantive] is the subject in the first [sc. the thing that is white and sweet], and to it are two distinct unities indicated to belong – in the second [sc. ‘whiteness’ and ‘sweetness’] there is form and form; for the same reason whiteness and colored-ness are two, but not whiteness and color, because one this way includes one that way [sc. ‘whiteness’ includes ‘color’ in its definition], just as de-whitening includes each nature [sc. whiteness and color are both included in the definition of ‘de-whitening’]. A cause could also be assigned for these through the first: because namely the unity of a supposit, of nature and of formality, are not unities of the same nature; therefore none is co-numbered with the other.

Because of the third, neither within nor without is anything intrinsic to God co-numberable, because not potential either; yet by extending number to distinction of entities, number is conceded in divine reality. And this ‘two’ – namely entity and distinction of numbered things – is required for number but is not sufficient; therefore when because of these alone number is posited, it is imperfectly posited (thus ‘three persons’).

Corollary: a triple of stones is *per se* one (according to common opinion), such that it is not only this-this-this; a trinity of persons is only this-this-this, and not more a one. It would be stated in another way if number were posited in the intellect, because then concordantly on both sides.¹⁰⁰

Twenty Fifth Distinction Single Question

Whether Person in Divine Reality states Substance or Relation

1. About the twenty fifth distinction I ask whether person in divine reality state substance or relation.
2. Without arguments.

¹⁰⁰ Vatican editors: namely both of a triple of stones and of a trinity of persons. Translator: perhaps Scotus’ point is that number properly belongs to distinct things, as three stones and three human persons. The deity is a trinity of persons but the persons are understood by analogy with acts of mind (by ‘knowing’ the Father produces the Word or Son, and by ‘loving’ do the Father and Son produce Love or the Holy Spirit), and the mind is one mind though it have two acts or two producings.

I. Response to the Question

3. I reply:

Person does not state a proper relation, because this name ‘person’ is common to the three (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: “If there are three persons, common to them is this which is ‘person’”), and not by community of equivocation, as ‘this man’ is common to Socrates and Plato. This indeed is [said] equivocally because the pronoun ‘this’ signifies this which it designates. Not so here [sc. with ‘person’] because an equivocal is not numbered among equivocates: for fish and star are not called two dogs [sc. ‘dogfish’ and ‘dogstar’], because the numbering of something in somethings requires the unity of it among them. Person thus is common, which is numbered (Augustine, *ibid.*).

4. Nor does it state a common relation, – which is proved by Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, because “the Father is not the person of the Son,” nor conversely. And this idea can be deduced as follows: to whatever an inferior relative is said, to that same is a higher relative said, although not first. An example: if the double is double of the half, and this first, then the double is a multiple of the half, although not first; and not only so, but also, right up to the most general [genus], it is relative of the half, although not first, that is, adequately. Therefore if person stated a common relation, then Father, just as he is Father of the Son first, so Father would be person of the Son *per se*, although not first – which is false.

5. Nor does person state second substance, that is, quiddity, because that is not enumerated among the three [sc. ‘three deities’ is not said]; but person is enumerated [sc. ‘three persons’ is said].

6. Therefore [reply must be made] according to the two opinions touched on in ‘On Person’ in distinction 23 [d.23 n.24], because according to one opinion ‘person’ states a negation in genus, common to the three, and thereofre thus it does not signify either substance or relation. It does however connote something positive: and first it connotes that of which it is first predicated (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), not as if from its first understanding but as a common connotes an inferior for which it supposits; secondly it connotes relation, whereby such common negation belongs to the Father and to the Son similarly; third and lastly it connotes the essence, which although it be in the first connoted, is not however in it the idea of this negation.

7. But if another opinion in that question be held, that person states something positive, abstracted from the three as quasi-proper, not as a species – then it can be said that it signifies something positive: but not substance nor relation (and this extending ‘substance’ both to first substance and to second), but first something positive indifferent to both; for the idea of subsistent is indifferent to absolute and relative, holding the divine persons to be relatives. Yet by consequence it does give to understand – as a superior its inferior – that for which it is taken, namely the relative of which person is said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second the relations themselves, and third the essence – so that each opinion (set down in distinction 23, *ibid.*) agrees here that person, of its first idea, states neither relation nor substance, and this neither first nor second [substance]. But according to one opinion it states the concept of negation (in general) common to the three, and so it states a concept of negation common to the three which is

distinct in them; according to another opinion it states a concept of something common positive and distinct in them. And, according to each opinion, such a something common, whether positive or privative, connotes – as its inferior – that of which it is formally said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and as if secondly it connotes the formals distinctive in them, and third the essence common to them.

II. The Objections of Others

8. But it is objected that person signifies second substance (that is, quiddity) by this which Augustine says, *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, that by this, which is ‘three persons’, response is made to the question whereby is asked in divine reality ‘three what?’; now ‘what’ is asking for the essence.

9. Besides, Augustine says [*ibid.*] that “it is not a different thing to be God and to be person;” therefore person is merely essential, and consequently it signifies second substance, that is, quiddity.

10. To the first of these [n.8] I say that ‘what’ is sometimes asking for the definition and sometimes asking for that about which something is said. The first is plain from *Topics* 5.101b39: “Definition is a sentence indicating the ‘what is’ of something.” The second is plain from the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 10.2.1053b27-28: “the whole question to be asked is what ‘one’, as how and what being is not sufficient, because this itself is nature of this” (he means to say that it is not enough to say the ‘one’ is principle, as the ancient philosophers said the ‘one’ is principle, like the Platonists, but something of which ‘one’ is said). And according to this, the question ‘what is element’ has a double response: one by assigning the definition of element, and the other by assigning what element is said of, as ‘fire is an element’. And now, when Catholics are confessing ‘three’ (according to the canonical epistle of *John* ch.5), the heretics asked ‘three what?’, not questioning the definition of this name, but seeking what the substantive was that was determined by the adjective ‘three’ (or of what it was said) – and to this it is well responded by this, which is ‘person’. When therefore it is taken that ‘what’ is asking about the essence, it is not true generally nor specifically in the matter at hand [n.9].

11. To the second, from Augustine [n.9], the answer will be plain in the following distinction, because person is for itself (both in itself and in its inferiors), although it is not for itself as essence is for itself, and this if it is posited that the divine persons are constituted in personal being by some absolutes [cf. *Ord.* I d.26 q.un. n.31]; but if this not be posited, it seems difficult to expound the authority of Blessed Augustine, but about this there will be statement there [*Ord.* I. d.26 n.52].^a

a. *Note of Duns Scotus*: Henry of Ghent [a.43 q.2]: “A relation under its genus is not distinguished save by the things on which it, and so there is not in it truly a universal idea save because it is founded on a universal” (an example about likeness and whiteness); “now every divine relation is founded on the essence, which can in no way have the idea of a universal,” because a universal nature is “that alone which from the idea of its quiddity is nature only” (Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V), “not by concerning the idea of universal or particular, but of a nature to receive in itself the idea of each: singular by determinate being in a supposit, – universal by this, which is of a nature to fall in the consideration of the intellect, as one in idea, applicable by predication to the many in which it is multiplied,” that is, “of itself a certain singularity;” “although therefore relation is predicated univocally of paternity and filiation, yet it is not a universal.”

