

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 26 to 48 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume six of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi. Volume six is the final volume for the distinctions of Book 1. Volume seven begins the distinctions of Book 2.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson  
April, 2013

The translation has been revised and reformatted, to tidy up some looseness of translation, supply some omissions, and help reduce file size.

April, 2023

*NB:* The interpolated texts, added at various points in some of the questions, are of texts inserted in the *Ordinatio* by earlier editors from equivalent passages in other surviving commentaries on the *Sentences* by Scotus. The Vatican editors placed them in footnotes or the appendix and they are translated here for the convenience of the reader.

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## Twenty Sixth Distinction Single Question

*Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin*

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin.

That they are not:

Relations of origin are of different idea, just as are relations different in species in creatures, which is plain: for paternity and filiation, or paternity from filiation, differ more than filiation from filiation or paternity from paternity; therefore, things constituted from them formally differ in species. Persons therefore differ in species, and so generation is equivocal in divine reality – which things have been rejected in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50].

2. Again, by the same idea by which relations of origin constitute persons do common relations constitute them, and so the same person would be constituted by a double formal constitutive, – which is unacceptable. The consequence is proved by this, that common relations require equal distinction in the extremes, and stand in the same way with unity of essence; therefore, they distinguish equally [sc. as the relations of origin do].

3. Further, opposite relations of the second mode of relatives [sc. relations of active and passive: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-32, Scotus, *Ord.* I d.3 nn.287, 296-97, d.2 n.240] can be founded on the same thing, just as the will moves itself; but the relation of mover and moved pertains to the second mode of relatives; therefore by parity of reason the relations of producer and produced, which pertain to the same mode, can be in the same thing, – and so they will not distinguish suppositis.

4. The reason is confirmed by Boethius, who at the end of his book *On the Trinity* ch.6 says that this relation is ‘as it were of the same thing to itself’. Therefore these relations do not distinguish.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Note. Relations are either distinguished by species or number.

If they are distinct by species, this distinction is taken because of a distinction in the foundation, and this is in two ways: either that there are two foundations in the some related thing, – and then it is plain that the two relations founded on them are distinct in species (as Socrates by his generative power, through the medium of a previous act, is referred to Plato by the relation that is ‘paternity’, – and by another relation that is founded on whiteness, which is called ‘likeness’ he is referred to a white thing; and these differ in species); in another way there can be a distinction of foundations, not in the related thing itself in which are these relations, but in the terms to which are these relations (for example, by the same whiteness fundamentally is Socrates referred by the relation that is ‘likeness’ to a white thing and by the relation that is ‘unlikeness’ to a black thing; and these two relations are distinguished in species by a distinction of foundations in the extremes to which the related thing is referred in which are these two relations are).

If it a question is asked about numeral distinction, I say that for this suffices either one of the two aforesaid distinctions and their foundations (the proof, because whatever suffices for the distinction of some things in species, suffices for a distinction of them in number); and I speak of a distinction of essence, not of supposit or subject. A distinction too

of related things suffices for their numeral relation (proof, because the same relation in number is never in two related things, as neither any other accident). A distinction too of terms in number also suffices for a distinction of these relations in number (proof, because one can remain with the other not remaining). A numeral distinction also of foundation along with unity of subject and term, suffices for a numeral distinction of relations; hence, when unity of related thing and term remain, with variation made in the foundation of the relation, there is not in one or other of them (namely thing related and term) the same relation in number, because by the action of a natural agent no return is made to the same thing in number. An example of this last point: white Socrates is referred to Plato with the relation that is 'likeness'; but if afterwards he become black, then he is not referred to him by any such likeness; but if again become white, then he is referred to him by 'likeness', but not by the same likeness in number as before.

Hence note that a specific distinction of relations is founded on a distinction of the foundations existing in the related thing in which are the two relations, or in the extremes to which the related thing is referred by the aforesaid relations. But for the numerical distinction of the relations there suffices one or other distinction of the aforesaid foundations (either the subject or term) to which is the relation.

The reason for all the aforesaid is because whenever many things are required for something, a distinction of any of them suffices for distinction of it; and for the unity of it there is required a unity of all the other requisites. Hence for the unity of something more things are required than for its distinction.

[*Additional note:*] Note that a white man is like blackness in whiteness [sc. both are qualities of a subject] and unlike the same in color, and yet the relations are distinct in species although they have the same terms. So correct according to these additions.

5. On the contrary:

Boethius, *ibid.*: "Essence contains unity, relation multiplies trinity."

## I. Opinions of Others

### A. First Opinion

6. The response of some – as of Praepositinus – is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and it does not remain to enquire by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive.

7. This reason is confirmed, because a divine person is as equally simple as the essence; but the essence, because of its simplicity, is distinct by itself from whatever else; therefore the person too.

8. Again, abstract and concrete signify the same, – therefore paternity is the Father. Therefore to say the Father is distinct by paternity is to say that he is distinct by himself.

9. Against this it is argued as follows:

Whatever things are not first diverse are distinct by something of themselves, because things that are distinct in their whole selves are first diverse (for if they are not first diverse but 'the same something' beings, then they are not distinct by that by which they are the same but by something of themselves by which they are not the same); now the divine persons are not first diverse, because they are of the same essence; therefore it remains still ask by what they are distinct.

10. Again, there are several properties in the same person, as in the Father unbecomability and generation-action; but they are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, where he means that, if the Father were not unbegotten, he could

yet be Father, and conversely; therefore although – *per impossibile* – one property would not distinguish the Father from anything, the other could distinguish him, and conversely. Therefore it remain to ask by what the Father is distinct from the Son.

11. Again, in the Father is active generation and active spirating; active spirating does not distinguish him from the Son, because that is in the Son; therefore the Father is not by his whole self equally first distinct but by something that is in him.

12. Again, in the *Preface of the Trinity* [Roman Missal] it is said “in the persons property [and in the essence unity]”; but a person is not in himself the way a property is understood to be in a person; therefore a person can be said to be distinct by a property formally in some way in which he is not distinct first in himself.

13. It is also argued against him [Praepositanus, n.6], because if the Father is distinct in his whole self from the Son, by parity of reason also from the Holy Spirit, – and the converse follows; and if he is by the same thing distinct from each, then he has the same disposition to each; therefore also conversely, each has the same relation to him, and a relation of the same idea (just as if Paul is like Peter and Linus, then Peter and Linus have the same likeness, and a relation of the same idea to Paul), and then the Son would seem to be distinguished from the Father by a relation of the same idea as that by which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father.

14. But perhaps this argument is not conclusive, because in whatever way the Father is constituted in personal being, he would in that way be distinguished personally from the Son and the Holy Spirit; nor yet does it follow conversely that the Son and Holy Spirit would be distinguished by anything of the same idea from the Father.

## B. Second Opinion

### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. There is another opinion, a common one, which says that the persons are constituted by relations.

16. For this opinion is alleged the authority of Christ in the Gospel (*Matthew*, 28.19), as will be touched on below against the third<sup>1</sup> opinion.

17. For this opinion is Boethius adduced [n.5], where he seems to touch on many things about it.

18. And Augustine likewise, *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9: “Whatever relative to itself that most outstanding sublimity is said [to be], it is said substantially;” and a little later: “Whatever is said about the individual [persons] relative to themselves, is not taken multiply in a sum but singly.” And *ibid.*: “Whatever is said about the individual persons relative to themselves is said all at once.” And in ch.11 n.12: “But what properly the individuals in the Trinity are called, in no way are they said relatively to themselves but to each other – or to the creature; and therefore that they are said relatively not substantially is manifest.” – In these words it seems most expressly to be held that everything said ‘to itself’ belongs to the three and is common to the three, and everything not common to the three is something relative; but what is constitutive and distinctive of a person is not common to the three; therefore it is relative.

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<sup>1</sup> Vatican editors: Scotus actually wrote ‘fourth’, having the *Lectura* before his eyes which does have four opinions, but only three were carried over into the *Ordinatio*.

19. Again, Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is whatever he has, save that one person is said relatively to another and is not him.”<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] “For the Father has the Son, but is not the Son.” – Again, Boethius *On the Trinity*: “Substance contains unity, relation multiplies Trinity,” and many other words in the same place.

20. And with this agrees Anselm *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.2, that everything is one in divine reality “when opposition of relation does not prevent it.”

21. Again, Damascene ch.8: all things are one in divine reality “besides generation and non-generation and procession; for in these three properties alone do the three holy hypostases differ from each other.”

22. Again, he says in ch.51: “In these three alone, uncausable-paternal, filial, and processional, do we know them.”

23. Richard [of St. Victor] seems to say in *On the Trinity* IV ch.19 that the persons are not distinguished in divine reality save by way of having the same nature; therefore etc.

24. Again, by reason:

Because if a person is constituted by an absolute in divine reality, an absolute added to an absolute will necessarily produce composition; but if in an absolute the divine persons come together, it is clear that they are not distinguished personally in the same absolute in which they agree; therefore in some other absolute. Therefore there is there an absolute added to an absolute, – therefore composition. This does not follow about relation, because relation adds nothing to the foundation, nor does it make composition with it.

25. In a further way is that position and this reasoning [nn.15, 24] confirmed, because relation can in one way pass over to substance and thereby it does not make composition with an absolute; in another way it can remain by comparison with its opposite and thus is it really distinct. These two ideas do not seem to belong to the absolute, because an absolute either passes over in every way or remains in every way: if it passes over in every way, it does not make distinction (as neither does the essence to which it passes over), – if it remains in every way then there is composition.

26. Again, the same nature cannot be in diverse absolute suppositis unless it be distinguished in them. For although it could be in diverse relative suppositis (because the unlimited same thing can be a foundation for several relations in diverse suppositis), yet it does not seem it can be in diverse absolute suppositis unless it be distinguished and numbered in them: for if there be two absolute suppositis, it seems that whatever is in one is other than whatever is in the other; therefore the divine essence would be numbered in God if the divine persons were constituted by absolutes.

27. Again, according to everyone, relations are in the divine persons. Therefore if they do not constitute the persons they will be there as if accidental and adventitious to the persons constituted (which seems to be against the simplicity of the divine persons), and also such relations – which are proper to the persons – will be relations of reason, because the relation of God to creatures is for this reason not real, because it presupposes a divine person in perfect being and not dependent on the creature, nor naturally or necessarily co-requiring the creature for its own personal being. Therefore, by similarity, it seems to be the same in the matter at hand: if the first person be absolute, he will not

depend on the second, because he is pre-understood perfect in his personal disposition before the second person, and consequently he does not necessarily co-require the second person for his personal being; therefore his relation to the second person will be only a relation or disposition of reason.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Further, some absolute property, if it were to be constitutive, would not only be virtually in God, because then he would by such property not be more this person than an ass (for God virtually includes the perfection of an ass in himself); therefore it is necessary that it be there actually: therefore it is there as act. Therefore in divine reality there would be three [absolutes].

Further, the absolute property – if it makes a one with the essence – is one an act, another a potency, and another a perfection of the other; the essence does not perfect the personal, because it does not presuppose it, but rather contrariwise; therefore a personal absolute will be a perfection of the essence. And two unacceptable things follow: first, that the essence in itself is not altogether perfect, the other that one person is not altogether perfect because he does not have the absolute of another person (which is a perfection, from what has been shown [supra]). – And this second [point] is confirmed, because according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15, “besides relations, everything else either is simply better it than not it – or not so, but in something better not it than it;” what is disposed in the second way is not in God, according to him [Anselm]; therefore everything other than relation (which is in God) is simply better it than not it: therefore it will be perfection simply. And from this follows that no person will be simply perfect, because none has the absolute of another; it also follows that two are more perfect than one, which is against Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2.

Further, third, when some absolute is multiplied, co-multiplied with it is every other absolute circumstancing it (example: when quantity is multiplied, whiteness is multiplied, and conversely); therefore if there thus be distinct proper absolutes which circumstance the divine essence, they would also distinguish the divine essence. – And the major is confirmed, because several things of the same species cannot be in the same thing; these [absolutes], if they be posited, will be of the same species, – because if not, therefore they will be of other species, and so it will be necessary to ask whereby another of them is incommunicable: for just as it is posited that paternity (which differs in species from filiation) cannot be of itself incommunicable [n.46], so it will follow of *a* in the Father (if it be an absolute) and of *b* in the Son – if they differ in species – that neither will be of itself incommunicable, and it will be necessary to stand at some properties of the same idea. This reason is confirmed, at least because there are not several things of the same idea in the same perfect thing (as in divine reality there are not several Words nor several Fathers), because this seems to be a mark of imperfection that in some nature there can be several altogether like things; therefore in the simply perfect divine nature there will not be several absolutes of the same idea.

Fourth: if an absolute property *a* be expressed by the essence, and *b* likewise, and the ‘expressed’ is in the same supposit as that by which it is expressed (according to this way of the expressing that is posited), then *a* and *b* will be in one person, and so no person will be originated by another (because what is proper to them will be in the same person), rather it follows that there will be no personal distinction.

Fifth: it follows that there is not origin there, because a person originated receives being through the origin; but a person, if absolute, precedes the very relation of origin; therefore the second person would precede the passive origin in being, and so would not have being through it.

28. Now it is further posited, in particular, that not just any relations – even real ones – constitute the divine persons or distinguish them, but relations of origin, because they first burgeon in the divine essence: because there is first in the divine essence a double fecundity, insofar as the intellect is infinite and the will infinite, and, by mediation

of these, there at once burgeon the relations of origin pertaining to communicability of nature, which nature or divine essence is communicated according to the double fecundity just stated; when these are now pre-understood, the common relations burgeon which presuppose them, and so such common relations, although they be real, yet do not constitute or distinguish the persons.

29. Now how relation can constitute the persons and distinguish them is made clear by this, that a producer is necessarily distinct from his opposite really, because the same thing does not produce itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; so there will be some real distinction between some things that are in the divine essence: but they cannot be there in any way by in-forming, because of the divine simplicity, – therefore it [the real distinction] will be *per se* subsistent in that nature; therefore there will be distinct persons really.

30. And how from this there does not follow a distinction of the essence in which they subsist is made clear, because the same unlimited thing can be a foundation of opposite relations, and then the relation is said in one way to remain and in another to be transitive [to the essence, n.25] – and about this do many disputes arise, according to what idea a relation may distinguish [cf. d.26, nn.56-69].

31. But in brief it can be said – according to this way here [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations] – that relation, from that which relation is, is not formally essence, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “if essence is relative to another, already it is not essence;” and it can be argued conversely: ‘if relation is formally an entity for itself then it is not relation’. It is also – from this, that it is relation – of the opposite as of its term,<sup>a</sup> and from this, that it is of its opposite, it is necessarily distinct really from it; and yet it is not necessary that the essence is distinct formally, because essence is not formally a distinct relation. Nor is it necessary that there is composition there, because although relation remain such that it is not formally the essence, yet relation – because of the infinity of the essence – passes over into it according to perfect identity with it. Relation then remains formally, because the idea of it according to which it is formally is not the idea of essence, – and it passes over because of perfect identity to the essence, though not to formal identity. And the ‘remaining thus’ suffices for formal and real distinction, without any distinction of essence; and from this, that this essence is simple, this distinction will not be of things that inform but of things that subsist – and from this, that this essence is infinite, the ‘remaining formally’ will be without composition.

a. [Interpolation] so that to compare it to essence, not including disposition to the opposite, is not to compare relation to essence.

## 2. Reasons against the Opinion

32. Against this conclusion [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations and not by something absolute] it is argued in four ways: first by comparing relation to related thing, second by comparing relation to origin, third from the proper idea of the constitutive, and fourth by authorities.

33. [First way] – As to the first way it is argued as follows:

By relation is something related formally (as by whiteness someone is made white); relation itself is not related (because according to blessed Augustine *On the*

*Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “every relative is something when relation is removed;” and: “If the Father,” he says, “is not for himself, he will not be something that is related;” for relation is not related, because that which is related by relation is not anything afterwards, nor is it simultaneous in nature, – therefore naturally prior); but essence is not related really, therefore supposit alone is related; therefore supposit is there really and naturally first before relation. Therefore a divine supposit is not constituted or distinguished first by relation.

34. Proof of the assumptions: everything composite of necessity pre-requires parts and union of parts, and this not only in a composite *per se* one but in a composite *per accidens* one; for just as the essence of man pre-requires the essence of body and soul and their union, so the essence of a white man pre-requires the being of man and whiteness and the union of them. Therefore the being of something related, which is said ‘to be related first’ as a quasi-whole, pre-requires relation as form, and what is related by relation as subject, and the union of these. Therefore something is first informed by relation before it is some quasi-composite relative that may be said ‘to be related first’: the prior thing, in-formed by relation, can be said to be related, because everything informed with some form can be said to be such.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Therefore nothing in divine reality can be said to be related unless there be something that is quasi-denominatively said to be related; and it will not be constituted formally by a relation as if *per se* included in it (it is clear from the difference of the thing related first to that which is denominatively said to be related), and that can only be the supposit (this was shown before [n.33]); therefore, etc.

35. This reason is confirmed in a likeness, because just as man would not be animated first unless the body were *per se* animated (as if informed by soul), so – as it seems – will it be in the matter at hand, because nothing will be related first that is not constituted formally in ‘being’ unless something first be related quasi-denominatively, because of denomination by relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Along with this it could be argued – but less effectively – as follows: if relation is not related, neither is the divine essence (it is plain); therefore only person is related. But what is related is first for itself. Proof: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3a, “if the Father is not anything for himself, he will not be anything that may be said in relation to another.” – Next by reason, because what is related is not simultaneous in nature with relation, because nothing is simultaneous in nature with relation save relation; therefore that which is related would be relation, and so relation would be related. Nor is it posterior in nature to relation, because what is ‘of such sort’ by quality is not posterior to quality (likewise of quantity and other forms); therefore similarly of relation. Therefore it is necessary to grant a third member, namely that that which is related is prior to relation, and then it seems to follow that it be absolute, because nothing seems prior to relation but the absolute.

36. Again a real relation pre-requires real distinction of the extremes, therefore no relation causes first a real distinction of extremes; therefore not here either. – Proof of the antecedent: the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4 chapter about ‘the same’, proves that identity is not a real relation, because it does not pre-require a real distinction of extremes.

37. If it be said that that [relation] is not real which neither pre-requires nor makes a real distinction of extremes, – on the contrary: therefore this argument is not valid, ‘the extremes are not really distinct, therefore it is not a real relation’. For either is taken in the antecedent that extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding relation, and then does not follow ‘therefore the relation is not real’, because so could it be taken in the matter at issue; or it is taken in the antecedent that extremes are not distinct by a distinction made by this relation, – if thus you take ‘therefore a distinction of extremes is not made by these, because this is not a real relation’, then to infer from the antecedent so taken that the relation is not real is to infer ‘because it is not real, therefore it is not real’, which is nothing.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] In another way it is said that the major [sc. the above antecedent] is true of an accidental relation that comes to extremes already distinct; such this [relation] is not but constitutes a supposit made formally distinct by it. – Against this: to a relation ‘whereby it is a relation’ belongs that it be to another, because if it is not to another it is not a relation (otherwise it could even be said that paternity could be a real relation without the Son, if it were not in any way necessary for the extremes of a relation to be distinct, as neither of identity). Either then ‘this paternity’ is to something else distinct by filiation alone, or to something else distinct by a distinction prior to that which would be from the Son. If in the second way then the proposed conclusion is had. If in the first way, then by arguing ‘paternity is not to something distinct, therefore it is not real’ is to argue thus: ‘to this relation there is no real opposite relation, therefore it is not a real relation’; but this seems to be a manifest begging of the question, because the antecedent does not seem more manifest than the consequent. No argument therefore may be had in many relations for concluding that they are not real by the fact that they are not between extremes really distinct, but it would be in common a begging of the question.

Again, third, thus: every relation is terminated first at an absolute; but the first term of a relation ‘in a person’ is some person and not the essence, because just as [essence] is not related so it does not terminate a relation (for the term of a relation is distinguished as the related thing is); therefore a person, insofar as he is distinct from another and is the term of his relation to himself, is absolute. The major will be made clear in distinction 30 [nn.35-38], in the question ‘On the Relation of God to Creatures’.

38. [Second way] – From the second way [n.32] argument is as follows:<sup>a</sup>

A relation cannot be originated save by something absolute previously originated, whether in the related thing or in the term;<sup>b</sup> therefore the divine person that is first originated cannot be merely a subsistent relation, but one must posit something absolute that is originated first.

a. [*Interpolation*] first from the order that origination necessarily requires, which seems to be twofold, – for the first originator seems prior to the originated, seems also prior in origin. Argument from the first priority is: the originating is prior to the originated; a relative is in no way prior to a correlative, because they are simply together; therefore etc. – And the reason is confirmed, as if from the opposite of the conclusion, as follows: if the persons are not absolute but are relatives first [*then follows n.40*]

b. [*Interpolation*] just as neither can motion be in ‘to another’ [sc. the category of relation] save only *per accidens*, because it is *per se* to an absolute in a subject or in a term of relation, as is plain from *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13.



39. And this reason is maximally confirmed if it be denied that essence is the formal term of this production; for then neither will the originated be to itself nor will the formal term of origination be, – which seems unacceptable.

40. Again,<sup>a</sup> then it will not be different for the Father to originate the Son than for the Father to have the Son correlative; but the Father of himself – by the fact he is Father – has the Son correlative, because in no instant, neither of origin nor of nature, can the Father be understood without the Son, or unless he is understood to have a Son; therefore the Father of himself, without origination, has the Son; therefore he does not originate him if nothing is originated save a correlative.<sup>b</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] from the priority of the originating to the originated: the originating is prior to the originated; the relative is in no way prior to the correlative, because they are simply together. – And each reason is confirmed, because it follows from the opposite of the conclusion: if the persons not be absolute but firstly relatives.

b. [*Interpolation*] This is more clearly argued as follows: that is not originated which – when the unbegettable is posited and all action is removed – has its whole being; such is the correlative of unbegettable, because from the nature alone of the relation, as it is first act (with every action or second act removed), the correlative of the unbegettable is when the unbegettable exists; therefore etc.

41. Further, third: every relative equally naturally regards its correlative, therefore equally naturally does spirator regard the spirated as the generator the generated. Therefore if what is produced by each production is only relative, each is equally naturally produced, and so there will not be in divine reality a double production (by way of nature and of will), and then equally truly can it be said that the Son is produced by way of will and the Holy Spirit by way of nature, – which is against everyone.

42. Again, then no production in divine reality will be generation, because generation is to first substance [n.60] as to produced term; but here relation or relative is posited as the first product; therefore production will be in the category of relation and generation not.

43. Again,<sup>a</sup> a supposit is in some way pre-understood to action, because first is it understood that each thing *per se* is than that it *per se* act: in that prior stage, if it is a supposit for itself, the proposed conclusion is got [sc. the persons are not constituted merely by relations]; if the supposit is not for itself but to another – as toward the Son – then the Son is understood at the same time, and so the Son is pre-understood to generation, and so the Son will not be the term of generation.

a. [*Interpolation*] from the second priority [note *a* to n.38] the argument is, second, as follows: [*alternative text*] from the priority of originating to origin.

44. And it is confirmed, because by whatever priority one correlative is understood prior to something, by the same priority is the other correlative understood prior to the same, because the of the simultaneity of relatives.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] In like manner with this could it be argued about the third priority, namely of relation to person, which is proved by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a5-7: for form is prior to the composite (according to him there), therefore paternity is prior to the first

person and consequently the opposite relation will be prior to the first person; therefore it is not had by the first person through action of the first person. The consequence about the opposite relation is proved by the simultaneity of relatives.

45. [Third way] – As to the third way [n.32] it is argued as follows: Whatever constitutes being in something, and in the unity corresponding to such being, is in its whole self first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitute man in his entity and specific unity, it is in its whole self first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, by removing *per possibile* or *per impossibile* whatever is other than rational that is not part of the understanding of it, with only the understanding of rational standing, division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And this proposition is proved, because if such a distinction is repugnant to the whole thing constituted, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that be *a*: if to the *a* it is repugnant in its whole self, then the proposition is got, – if not but it is repugnant to the *a* through *b*, there will be a process *ad infinitum* or, wherever a stand will be made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such unity, and to it will be repugnant in its whole self the distinction opposite to such unity. Therefore if paternity constitute the first supposit in personal being under the idea of incommunicable, it must be that communicability be of its own idea first repugnant to paternity.

46. But this seems multiply false:

First because, according to those who hold this opinion [n.15], quiddity is of itself not incommunicable; therefore neither is paternity.

47. Second because paternity is not of itself a ‘this’, with everything removed not of the formal idea of paternity: for with deity removed, which is not of the formal idea of paternity (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, ‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’), paternity is not of itself formally infinite, and consequently neither is it of itself a ‘this’ – and if so,<sup>a</sup> then neither much more will it be of itself incommunicable, because incommunicability presupposes singularity.

a. [Interpolation] This consequence is proved: what contains by identity something that is outside its first idea is in some way unlimited; therefore what formally contains such is simply infinite (for formal containing requires a greater perfection of the container). From this further: if paternity is not of itself a ‘this’...

48. Next, third, because any relation divine of origin is equally the same as the divine essence; therefore if it contracts from it some incommunicability, any [relation] at all would equally contract it; but this is false, because active spiration, although it be a ‘this’, is yet not incommunicable, because it is in two, namely the Father and Son.

49. And from this, fourth, is proved that, since opposite relatives seem to be uniformly related to incommunicability and since active spiration is not of itself thus incommunicable, therefore neither is the passive spiration opposite to it; therefore neither will it thus constitute the Holy Spirit in personal being, which is false.

50. Next, fifth, because even if whatever positions were posited, impossible or impossible, while the understanding of ‘rational’ stands, it would be repugnant for it to be divided into several specific natures; to wit, if it were posited that ‘rational’ were a difference of color and that color could cause substances from nothing, or any suchlike things. But once this impossible position is posited, that the production of the will were

prior to that of the intellect, with the idea preserved of generation and spiration, active spiration would be in one supposit and active generation would then be in two, because then would be communicated to the Holy Spirit – in the instant in which he is spirated – generative force; therefore communicability is not formally repugnant now to active generation in itself.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] To this argument about ‘the first incommunicable’ there is a twofold response:

In one way (i) that paternity, although it not be incommunicable ‘whence it is paternity’, yet divine paternity or ‘whence it is divine’ is incommunicable.

In another way (ii): that subsistent paternity (of which sort is that which is in God) is incommunicable, but not inherent paternity, of which sort is created paternity.

Against the first response, although the three last proofs [nn.48-50] do conclude it, yet I argue otherwise in two ways:

First as follows: when two *per se* constitute some third, neither of them has from the other the condition that is proper to it insofar as it constitutes, but each has such from itself first. For example, about matter and form: matter does not have from form the potentiality that is its in causing the composite, nor does form have from matter the actuality that is its in compounding; so too in the definition: the genus does not have from the difference a determinable concept, nor does difference have from genus a specific act indivisible into things several in species. Therefore if a person be constituted from essence and incommunicable property, neither will have from the other what is proper to it; as follows, just as the essence does not have communicability from a property but is of itself communicable (property being in thought removed), so the property will not have incommunicability from the essence, but will be of itself first such (the essence being *per impossibile* removed).

Further, essence does not give incommunicability to the Father as it is merely essence, because it is communicable; therefore [it gives incommunicability to the Father] as it is understood to have paternity virtually in itself, and so the same thing ‘as virtually in the essence’ will be the idea of itself ‘as formally such’, – which is unacceptable: first because I will ask about it as it is virtually in the essence, either it is communicable or incommunicable; if communicable, it will not be the idea of incommunicability for paternity as formally in itself, – if incommunicable and from the essence (according to the response [point (i)]), again it will be argued that not from the essence as it is merely essence, as before, and so on *ad infinitum* ‘either it is communicable or incommunicable’; second because no unity more truly or intensely belongs to anything as it is virtually only than as it is formally, and this speaking of unity proper to it, and this is plain as about entity proper; third because what is in another is in it by way of it – therefore what is in the essence virtually, as it is precisely in it, is not there as incommunicable.

Against that which is replied afterwards [point (ii)] about subsistent relation, that it is incommunicable, I ask: since it is necessary to understand something to be a ‘this’ first before subsistent, I ask by what paternity is a ‘this’? Not of itself, since it is not formally infinite – therefore much more is it not of itself subsistent either; therefore neither [is it] of itself incommunicable.

51. Again, it is argued second thus principally as to this way [n.32]: from the ultimate constitutives and distinctives of certain things there cannot be abstracted anything common said in the ‘what’ of them; proof: because if there is something common to them, they are not by that common thing distinguished first, but they are distinguished by something contracting [them], and so they are not first distinctives; if therefore they are first distinctives, nothing said in the ‘what’ is common to them. But

from paternity and filiation is abstracted this which is relation, which seems to be common to them and univocal: for the intellect can be certain about relation and doubtful about this relation and that. Therefore these from which it is abstracted are not first distinctives.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] It is responded by denying the minor [sc. relation as common to paternity and filiation and univocal], by saying that divine relations are first diverse [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.56 q.3 ad 2]. – Against this it is frequently argued [n.51], and one middle term can be iterated: because then he who knows one origination in divine reality, and not knowing whether the origination were generation or spiration, would have no concept save about the word. Vain then would be the problems that are made about generation or about production in general, and they are solved by their proper middles before question be asked about productions in particular.

52. Again, third: the first constitutive of a supposit in any nature seems to make a *per se* one with that nature, because it does not seem that it could *per accidens* be ‘first simply’ in any genus, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23;<sup>a</sup> but just as in creatures a relation is of a different kind from an absolute and so does not make a *per se* one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept *per se* of absolute and of relation; therefore if person include these two essentially, namely essence and relation, it does not seem to be a *per se* supposit and first of such nature, but as it were a supposit *per accidens*, and so it seems that some prior constitutive *per se* of the supposit in that nature could be given.<sup>b</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] and first that of which nature is said *per se* is its proper supposit; therefore etc.

b. [*Interpolation*] The reason is confirmed: the first identity seems to be of first nature with the proper supposit, therefore the identity is neither *per accidens* nor quasi *per accidens* but altogether *per se*; therefore the supposit does not include anything of a quasi second genus by nature.

It is confirmed too, because otherwise there would more be a *per se* identity of created substance with its supposit than of the divine nature with its, which seems unacceptable.

It is confirmed third, because second substance [sc. the divine essence] states the whole ‘what it is’ of first substance [sc. divine person, cf. nn.60-61], – therefore in first substance there does not concur another quiddity distinct from the quiddity of second substance; therefore neither does quiddity of relation, which is distinct from quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of first substance: for if first substance includes *per se* a quiddity distinct from the quiddity of second [substance], then it is not more a ‘*per se* supposit’ of second [substance] than of the quiddity of the other [sc. relation], and so of neither or of both.

Nor is here the response valid that this quiddity is that by identity, and therefore the same ‘*per se* one’ can be a *per se* supposit of each quiddity. – For this does not save the ‘*per se* unity’ of the supposit, because supposit is posited the ‘*per se* supposit’ of quiddity by actuality, according to formal idea, but not because of a real and non-formal identity of it with another (for then a *per se* supposit of being would be a *per se* supposit of one, because of the true identity of ‘one’ with being). Therefore a supposit ‘one *per se*’ is only a *per se* supposit of a quiddity formally one, and consequently of none formally distinct from it, – and consequently no formally distinct [quiddity] does it include *per se* in the first mode, because there is no reason why it would not be a *per se* supposit of that distinct quiddity if it included it *per se* in the first mode.

If an objection be made here about [divine] attributes, it is not similar, because no attribute constitutes *per se* a supposit of deity, but it is a property (according to Damascene, *Orthodox Faith* chs. 4, 9), and it is not unacceptable for a quasi-passion to be quasi *per accidens* the same as a quasi-subject (and even as the supposit of the subject), although it is unacceptable for the first supposit of the first subject to be in itself a being *per accidens*.

To the third reason, which proceeds from the *per se* unity of a supposit of divine nature [n.52], the response is that relation constitutes as it passes over into the essence and so not as it is of another genus; nor because of this does it follow that the constituted is an absolute, because relation preserves that which is proper to it, – it is however well conceded that that which is left behind by relation is absolute, because the ‘left behind’ is being.

Against this response. I ask, either relation constitutes as it is the same as essence formally (or quidditatively), – if so, two absurdities follow: one that relation will not be relation, because according to Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII. ch.1 n.2, “if [substance] is [relative] to another, it is now not substance”, and by parity of reasoning, if it is formally substance, it is not now [relative] to another; likewise the other [absurdity]: whatever is constituted by something insofar as it is formally absolute is absolute formally, and so a constituted supposit would be formally absolute. Or it is constituted by relation insofar as [relation] passes over to or is the same as essence, not formally but really, – and with this stands that it is constituted by relation properly, as it is relation, because relation can in no way be considered in divine reality without being really the same as essence. If therefore, in some way considered, it were to constitute a supposit *per accidens*, given that it would thus constitute – and yet, in every way considered, it is the same really as essence though not formally – it follows from this that, as the same really as essence it does constitute, it is not prevented from being a being *per accidens*; but it cannot constitute as more the same as the essence than really, because not as formally the same.

Further, that it is said that ‘relation leaves behind absolute being’, this seems to be repugnant to itself, because form does not leave behind a being other than itself, just as whiteness does not leave behind in a white thing a being by which it is white other than itself; therefore a constituting property, if it conserve that which is proper to itself, leaves behind that which is proper to itself, and nothing else. Similarly, how could an absolute being be left behind by a relative property if it were to precede it in the person?

53. [Fourth way, n.32] – From the fourth way argument is made by authorities: Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: “Every relative is something with the relative taken away etc.” Therefore, as the first reason has brought forward [n.33], he seems to concede that that which is related is something for itself.

54. Again, *ibid.* ch.4 nn.8-9: “Everything subsists for itself, how much more God?” And he speaks of ‘subsist’ which pertains to substance as the Greeks take substance; but they (according to him) take substance as we take person; therefore ‘to subsist’, which belongs to a person insofar as he is a person, which is numbered in the three (namely as they are called ‘three subsistents’), that is for itself, according to him; and it is unacceptable for a divine person to subsist for another, taking ‘to subsist’ in this way.

55. Again, third: everything that is put in the definition of person, whether by Boethius *On Person and Three Natures* ch.3, or by Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* IV ch.22, are absolute, such that none of them includes relation essentially; and a definition ought to express the intrinsic quiddity of the thing defined, – therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] To the authorities of Augustine already adduced (here in the fourth way [n.54]) it is replied that Augustine is speaking of the formal significate of this name ‘person’, not of the [material] significate; now formally this name ‘person’ signifies something (in

itself indistinct and distinct from another) in intellectual nature; but it is accidental to this significate what there is such distinction by, – yet in some nature it is necessary that that distinct is absolute (as in created nature), in some that it is relation (as in the matter at hand).

Against this response. Either Augustine, in that formal significate of person, understands ‘not distinct in itself and distinct from another’ according to essence, and then he no more has to concede that there are three persons than three essences (or three distinct according to essence), which seems manifestly contrary to his intention when he means that we use the name of substance differently from the Greeks [n.54]: therefore they use it for first substance and concede three substances in the way in which we [concede] three persons; therefore we properly concede – according to him – three persons. Or he understands ‘indistinct in itself’ according to incommunicable substance (and so ‘distinct from something else’), and then if that – according to its formal significate – is for itself, the thing proposed is had.

### C. Third Opinion

56. [Exposition of the opinion] – In a third way it is posited differently,<sup>a</sup> that the divine persons are absolute.

a. [Interpolation] There is a third opinion agreeing with the reasons and authorities adduced against the second opinion [nn.15, 32-35], and it posits these.

57. And lest it seem new and extraneous, a statement is adduced of a certain old doctor drawing a distinction that ‘something is said in twofold way according to substance.’ For he speaks thus [Bonaventure, *Sentences* I d.25 a.1 q.1]: “It must be understood that – as Richard of St. Victor says [*On the Trinity* IV chs.6-7]—‘to be said according to substance’ is twofold: in one way indicating substance according to common nature, and thus is ‘man’ said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a certain supposit, as ‘a certain man’. In the first way to say substance (namely for the quiddity) is to say ‘what’; in the second way it is to say ‘whom’.” He says, therefore, further that “the name of essence or substance (or of quiddity) is said according to substance because it indicates the common nature, but person is said according to substance because it indicates a certain and distinct supposit: for the common nature is not multiplied nor referred, – and therefore what states substance according to common nature is so said to itself that it can in no way be said according to relation;<sup>a</sup> but a supposit (or hypostasis) is of a nature to be multiplied and to be compared to something else, and so to be related: and that it is so said according to substance in no way prevents it – by reason of superadded relation – from being said according to relation. And this is what Richard of Saint Victor means.”

a. [Interpolation] “and in this way indeed is it divided from the opposite”

58. The same doctor also<sup>a</sup> says – in the question ‘Whether the properties distinguish the persons’ – that ‘according as they are dispositions they do not distinguish the persons, but according as they are origins’; which statement – even if he himself perhaps not so understand it – can be expounded that the origins do not distinguish the persons formally but as if by way of principle: just as motion in creatures, and especially if it be in the mover and not in the moved, would not distinguish the terms of motion

formally but effectively, which pertains to the genus of efficient cause, – in the way too if human nature were posited in one man and it could not be multiplied save by generation, it could be said that generation multiplies men, not indeed formally (as if men were distinguished formally by generations as they are generations), but as it were effectively, because generation is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. So could it be said in the matter at hand, that the divine nature is not communicated to the suppositis save by origin, and so by origin are the persons distinguished in nature as it were by a principle, by reducing to the principle what distinguishes not formally but in a way corresponding to what distinguishes effectively in creatures.

a. [*Interpolation*] And if it be objected: how will then the common opinion of the saints be saved who say the persons are distinguished by relations – to this can be taken a certain statement of the same doctor; for the same...

59. According to this then it would be posited that the divine persons were constituted in personal being – and distinguished – by some absolute realities, and that as it were by way of principle, not formally, would the ‘produced persons’ be distinguished through origins; not however would the things constituting the persons be absolute in the first way but in the second way, because although they would not formally be relations, yet the things constituted by them would be referable. This could be the way of positing it.

60. [Proofs] – Now the solution of this position [the third, n.56] is not only proved by the four ways touched on against the second opinion [nn.32-55], but also by certain other persuasions.

First indeed because<sup>a</sup> first substance is most of all substance, according to the Philosopher in *Categories* 5.2a11-14, – and this is not mark of imperfection; therefore it seems that in this way it could be posited that first substance in divine reality, namely person, to which to subsist most belongs, that this is ‘to be per se’. But relation does not seem it can formally constitute something subsistent, nor consequently first substance.

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, according to this third way it is argued fourth [cf. nn.45, 51, 52] as follows:

61. And this reason is confirmed, because second substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of first substance, – therefore in first substance does not concur any quiddity distinct from the quiddity of second substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of first substance.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] It is confirmed because, since second substance does not include anything that is not formally substance, therefore neither does first substance – which is maximally substance – include it, because substance is not from non-substance.

62. It is confirmed too, because if it is necessary – in things that are relative to something in divine reality – not only to posit quiddity, to wit not only paternity but this paternity, and this under the idea of incommunicable, and that all these belong to it insofar as it is to another and as it is not formally that which is for itself, –why it cannot

be so in that which is to itself, that not by that formally ‘which is to another’ is this which is incommunicable had?

63. And this is confirmed ultimately efficaciously, as it seems, because in created substance, although it be a mark of imperfection to be limited to one subsistence or to one most perfect being which in no way is determinable or contractible, nor can it be something of something, yet that nature itself can have ultimate being, according as it is not of a nature to be contracted by something else, this is not a mark of any imperfection, because this is conceded to substances, and it is denied to accidents because of their imperfection; therefore it seems that divine nature ‘as it is for itself’ will have of itself ultimate actual being and ultimate unity without limitation to a unique being of subsistence.

64. Then too could an example be posited, that just as if the intellective soul were first to perfect or constitute the heart in being of supposit and second the animated heart were able to produce the hand in being of supposit, there would not be any things distinct in the nature of what is animated save by origins, and yet formally they would be certain absolutes, of which one is produced by the other; yet in them there would truly be relations of producer and produced; for relations are not less preserved – but more, as it seems – by positing certain absolutes that could be related, than if any such absolutes not be posited.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Through these two statements – the first about double absolute, the second about origin distinguishing as it were correspondingly to the effective, not formal, principle in creatures – can many authorities be expounded that seem to the contrary.

65. It is responded to what has here been touched on about first substance [namely that relation cannot constitute it, n.60] that relation<sup>a</sup> has the force of here constituting first substance or a supposit of second substance. Which is confirmed by this, because what is scattered among inferiors is united in superiors, and therefore although by something different do ‘to be relative to’ and ‘to subsist’ belong to something among creatures, yet they can belong by the same thing to God or to the divine persons.

a. [*Interpolation*] Response is made to this fourth reason, which proceeds from the idea of first substance, by saying that relation here has the force of an incommunicable property of first substance, and therefore...

66. Against this it is argued as follows: I ask what force you mean, the force either of an efficient or of a formal cause? If of efficient cause, it will as it were cause there a certain absolute reality, which will formally constitute there a first substance, – and thus is the matter at hand conceded, that first substance is constituted by some absolute reality; and with this is added one other impossible, that relation could cause that absolute person. If in the second way, namely formally, since no form has the force of constituting anything formally save such sort of thing as is of a nature to be something by such form (as whiteness does not have the force of constituting anything save the white and what is included in the white), it follows that relation – which is essentially a disposition ‘to another’ – does not have the force of constituting anything ‘for itself’. The confirmation [n.65] seems to be worth nothing: for such union is for this reason in God, because of the infinity of the divine essence, which includes unitively in itself every perfection simply



and also every reality compossible with itself; but a property is not infinite formally, so there is no need for every reality to be united in it (and especially not that reality which seems to be formally repugnant to it or unable to be included in it), as if it were stating a greater perfection formally than this [sc. the essence], or not a lesser one.

## II. What Should be Thought about the Third Opinion

67. And if it be objected against this way [sc. the third, n.56] that it cannot stand along with the faith, because the Savior, when expressing the whole truth of the faith, named three persons (*Matthew* 28.19) Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and blessed John in his first canonical letter 5.7 says ‘there are three who give testimony in heaven: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit’, – and the saints, when later treating of this matter, basing themselves on these words of the canon [of Scripture] seem always expressly to say that the persons are not distinguished formally save by relations, as was argued for the second opinion [nn.18-22]:

68. Here it could be said that the Savior truly taught three persons and that they are the relatives to these relations, and that person receives essence from person – and this indeed does this opinion [n.56] not deny; yet it does not follow that ‘the Savior did not say that the divine persons are constituted by anything absolute, therefore they are not so constituted’ (for a place from an authority does not hold negatively), just as it does not follow, ‘I speak with bishop and official and archdeacon, therefore these are distinct in their personal being by these relations’. And perhaps the Savior, seeing that we cannot conceive the proper absolute realities, if there be any, by which the divine persons are formally constituted in personal being, wanted to express them to us by names more intelligible to us; for we can in some way conceive these relations of origin from relations of origin in creatures. And perhaps another reason could be assigned, because here [sc. through relations of origin] more of the truth of the faith is at once expressed than in the other way [sc. through absolutes]; for if the persons be absolute and constituted by absolute properties (*a, b, c*) and could be named by names – if the Savior had expressed them [sc. absolute names], he would precisely in this have expressed the distinction of the persons and not the origin of person from person; but by expressing these persons with relative names, by them he expressed both, namely distinction and origin.

69. But that the divine persons could by some absolute names be named and expressed seems it can be shown through Scripture, – as in *Proverbs* 30.4 where (after many questions moved about God) Solomon asks: “What is his name and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – If the first name of ‘his Son’ is ‘Son’ (which it should be, if he is constituted in being by filiation), the question seems to be null, because every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16). The question then would be null, because it would suppose and seek the same thing: for it supposes he is Son and seeks ‘what is his name’, – and likewise by the nature of relation it supposes that ‘that of which he is the relative’ is the Father and seeks that name. It could be replied to Solomon: you are asking for the name of the Father and the name of the Son, and you state their prime names!

70. Therefore it seems it can be said that if the *New Scripture* [*Testament*] expressly intend them to be relative persons, and that this be of the substance of the faith, it is yet not found express that relations be the prime forms, constituting and

distinguishing the persons first, – nor has the Church declared this. Neither in the *Apostles' Creed* nor in the *Nicene Creed* nor in the General Council under Innocent III is this declared (as to this article, 'On the Trinity', an 'Extra' is set down, 'On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith', "Firmly"); nor in the general council of Lyons under Gregory X (which, as to this matter 'On the Trinity', is posited an 'Extra', 'On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith', "To the faithful", and it is today in the sixth book of the *Decretals*), nor in any other Council, which may still be manifestly seen handed down in any authentic Scripture.

71. If therefore Christ did not teach this nor has the Church declared it, namely that the persons are first distinguished by relations, it does not seem they are then asserting that this is of the faith, because if this is not true it does not seem reverently said of the divine persons that they are only 'subsistent relations' [Henry of Ghent]; if however it is true, yet is not handed down as true, certain, it does not seem safe to assert that this is to be held as true, certain. And although it be true that the persons are distinguished by relations (and, standing on this general fact, the saints labored how a distinction of persons can stand with unity of essence), yet it is not necessary to deny but that some distinction can, as if prior, be posited, which will also concede this distinction [sc. through relations], – such that every way holds this affirmative true, that namely the divine persons are distinguished by relations, although some way said that some real distinction as it were preceded this distinction. Nor is it necessary to restrict an article of faith, handed down in general, to one special understanding, as if that general understanding could not be true save in this special understanding: and just as this article, that 'the Word of God was made man' must not be restricted to one determinate mode (which is not expressed in the canon [of Scripture] nor by the Church), such that it could not be true unless that mode were true; for this is to reduce an article of faith to incertitude, if anything is uncertain that is not handed down as an article of faith (for that seems uncertain which, without something uncertain, cannot be held).

72. If this position [n.56] were held, it would be said that this absolute reality – constituting person and distinguishing it – would not be a reality for itself as essentials are for themselves, but a reality personal and for itself in the second mode [n.59], according to the distinction of the master put at the beginning of the opinion [n.57].

### III. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion by Holding the Third Opinion

73. [To the authorities] – He who would hold this opinion [n.56] could respond to all the arguments of Augustine for the afore-positd opinion [nn.15, 18], against this one [n.56], through the distinction of that doctor [n.57, 72] – because<sup>a</sup> he [Augustine] is speaking of things that are for themselves simply, such that they are neither related nor relatable but are opposite to relation, as is plain from his examples there [*On the Trinity* V]. For he himself there seems to say that something is for itself although it is relatable to another, as he expressly intends in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.8-9 where, treating of how the Greeks say that there are three substances, he means that to subsist – according as it belongs to substance in that way [sc. the way the Greeks speak] – is for itself. For he subjoins there: "If it is one thing for God to be and another for him to subsist, as it is one thing to be God and another to be Father, then he subsists relatively, just as he generates relatively;" and from this he infers: "therefore substance will now not be substance,

because relative;” and later: “But it is absurd that substance be said relatively: for every substance subsists for itself, how much more God?” – What more express than that substance, as the Greeks take it (namely for person), be prime substance and not second substance, that it be for itself and that it for itself subsist, with the ‘to subsist’ which belongs to substance thus<sup>2</sup> spoken of?

a. [*Interpolation, for n.67 to n.73*] Against this opinion [n.56] it can be objected that it does not seem to stand with the faith:

First, because the Savior, when expressing in *Matthew* 28.19 the whole truth of the faith that is to be held about the Trinity, named three persons with relative names (“in the name,” he says, “of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”); likewise John in his canonical letter 5 (“There are three that give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit”), – and generally, wherever the canonical Scripture speaks of the divine persons it expresses them with relative names. It seems then that to posit they are absolutes contradicts Scripture and thus the faith.

Second, because the Church (or anyone who expresses the truth that is to be held about the Trinity) expresses the persons with relative names, as is plain in the Apostles’ and Athanasian Creed, and in the Nicene Creed, and any other authentic declarations of the faith by the universal Church. Therefore the opposite is repugnant to the faith, when it has been declared by the Church.

Third, because when the saints – and catholic doctors commonly – treat of this article, they only posit and keep a trinity of relative persons – whose doctrine, at least of many of them, has been authenticated by the universal Church, as is plain in the canon at distinction 15 (*Decretum Gratiani*). Therefore to contradict the sayings of these saints is to contradict the Church authenticating their statements.

If it be said to this objection that the said opinion not only is not repugnant to the faith, but – what is more – agrees with the sacred Scripture; the first point is shown in two ways:

First as follows, that whatever sacred Scripture has handed down about the Trinity or that the Church has declared or that an authentic doctor has so manifestly asserted, this does the said opinion concede, namely that the three persons are appropriately expressed by the names of Father and Son and Holy Spirit; because it truly concedes there relations of origin, because it concedes the true origination of one person from another, which is generation (and so the person generating is the Father and the person generated is the Son), and the procession of the third from the two (and the one thus proceeding is the Holy Spirit, that is, spirated by chaste and holy will). But Scripture does not say – nor does the universal Church by anywhere declaring – that the persons are distinguished by only these relations, just as neither does it say that they are distinguished by absolute properties. But now, although whatever authority hands down must be held as true, whatever it does not hand down is not to be denied to be true; “Many works,” says John the confidant of Jesus, “did Jesus do which are not written in this book” (*John* 20.30); certainly not elsewhere either, because he adds, 21.25: “I reckon that the world cannot contain the books etc.” Even logically speaking it is plain that a place from authority does not hold negatively.

Secondly thus: nothing is to be asserted to be of the truth of the faith save what is handed down in Scripture or is declared by the universal Church, or is necessarily and evidently entailed by something so handed down or declared; that the persons are distinguished by no absolute properties does not appear to be such; therefore etc.

The first part of the minor seems plain, because Scripture nowhere hands this down: for he who affirms relations nowhere denies absolute properties.

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<sup>2</sup> Vatican editors: Namely as it is first substance, referable, according to the second way of that doctor [n.57].

The second part is similarly plain, because all the things that the Church is found to have declared as needing to be held about the article ‘On the Trinity’ are contained in the Apostles’ or Athanasian or Nicene Creeds, or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly” – “We condemn” (both which chapters were promulgated in the General Council celebrated under Innocent III), or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “To the faithful”, and it is today in the sixth book (which chapter was promulgated in the Council of Lyons celebrated under Gregory X). No more chapters, or authentic writings, are found containing a declaration of the Church about the article ‘On the Trinity’! Nor in any of these is it declared that the persons ‘have no properties save relative ones’; it is plain to one who looks.

The third part of the minor is proved, because the reasons that are given for inferring what is proposed [sc. the persons have no properties save relative ones] from what is handed down by Scripture or declared by the Church, seem all to be solvable, as will later be said in reply to them.

The second point – namely that this opinion agrees with Scripture – is shown by the verse of *Proverbs* 30.4 where (after moving many questions moved about God) Solomon asks: “What is his name, and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – From this it is argued: every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16); but here it is supposed that the ‘Son’ is, and the question asked is what his name is, – and by parity of reasoning, by the name of relation is supposed that that of which he is the Son is ‘Father’, and the question asked is what his name is; therefore with this being certain, that he is ‘Son’ and he ‘Father’, the doubt is what the name of the latter is and what the name of the former. But if these persons be constituted first in personal being by paternity and filiation, the first name of the latter is Father and the first name of the former is Son, – and so there would be certitude about ‘Son’ and doubt what his name was; therefore Solomon seems to mean that the he is not first constituted by filiation, just as neither that ‘Son’ is his first name. But, it being known that he is Son, there still remains to ask – according to him [Solomon] – what his name is; this is briefly argued thus *ad impossibile*: given that the first name of the person – which is ‘Son’ – is the name of the Son (which follows, if he be first constituted by filiation), then Solomon is supposing and asking for the same thing; for he is supposing the first name of the person and is asking ‘what is his name’.

If response be made in the stated way to an objection about the faith, made against the third opinion, argument against this response is made:

First as follows: why did the Savior wish to express the persons by relative names if they are absolute and the absolutes (if they exist) were not hidden from him – and it would seem fitting for baptism to be given by invoking the divine persons with their first names?

Second as follows: when the article about Christ is handed on, it is proper to take it according to the understanding that can most be had from Christ; such is about persons first relative and in no way about absolutes; therefore etc.

Third as follows: the inferences of the saints and doctors must be supposed to be necessary ones; but when using these or similar ones, it is concluded from what is manifestly believed that the persons are not absolute, as is plain in many deductions of the masters.

To the first [of these arguments] perhaps someone would say that for two reasons did the Savior congruously thus express things:

First because he taught us as we had capacity: and if they are absolute properties, he saw we could not conceive them, or not as easily as relations, because neither by way of causality and eminence can they be known by us (since they are not perfections simply), nor by anything similar in creatures (the way we can perhaps conceive relations from relations of origin in creatures), because to those incommunicable absolutes – if they exist – nothing is similar in creatures, nay not even to any created incommunicable thing is anything similar, because anything such is first diverse from anything else; and this impossibility or difficulty in knowing the absolute properties, if they exist, could someone grasp from the aforesaid

question of Solomon. An example of this is plain in the common way of speaking, where we more frequently express some persons with relative names than with absolute ones, because the former are more known; yet it is clear that the persons we intend to express with those names are in themselves absolute; for example, we say the pope or the bishop or the king did this; we do not as often say 'Peter' or 'John [did it]': for the duties are more known than the absolute persons. So could it be said here that through the origin of the person we can conceive the absolute property (if he has it), or we cannot, or not as easily.

Second, because if there are absolute properties, and according to this could the persons be named with absolute names, by thus naming them there is not expressed by those names as much of the truth of faith as by these names 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit', because by these names not only is the distinction of the persons expressed but also the origin that is in them, and also in some way – as a result – the unity of essence, because in such origination there is perfect communication of the same essence; three absolute names would not thus express all these things.

To the second [argument] someone might perhaps say – first – that the understanding which Christ expressed (namely that they are relatives) is without doubt to be held, but about that of which he was silent (namely whether they are absolutes) one part is no more against the understanding of the article than another, unless it be shown to be repugnant to the understanding which he expressed.

Second, that to restrict an article of faith to a particular understanding – which however is handed on in general – as if the general understanding could not be true unless the special understanding be true, this seems to reduce the article to uncertainty; for that seems uncertain which cannot be held without uncertainty. At any rate greater reverence seems to be given to an article handed on universally, if it be said that the universal understanding of it can be true whatever special one is posited or denied (which is not handed on as something needing to be held) than that it could not be true unless some determinate special one be true.

An example of this in other articles: 'Creator of heaven and earth'; it is not necessary here to reduce it to this, that if omnipotence in God be in any way distinct from will it could not create, – and so of the opposite side [sc. it could create]. Likewise 'the Word was made man', it is not necessary to reduce it to many special facts, nor to one of those with any of which and its opposite this truth can stand. A more apt example seems to be: if handed on to the Jews as to be believed was that 'God is one' and nothing explicitly about the Trinity, not only would it be a lesser reverence but an irreverence and a falsity to assert that this article cannot be true unless he were one in person as he is in essence; and yet this would seem then to be more consonant with the words of the article handed on to them than the opposite opinion. Therefore just as they [the Jews] were then obligated to assert that neither side was necessarily determinate (but it does seem that that had necessarily to be held which was in general handed on to them), so it seems that we, about the articles handed on to us in universal terms, should not assert – without a declaration of the Church – that necessarily this or that special thing is to be held, with either of which the articles as they have been handed down can stand; for God, who knew the truth in particular, did not without cause hand it on to be held only according to a universal understanding, and did not reduce it to this or that special mode as something to be held by faith.

Third, that in the matter at hand it does not – because of the reverence of these persons – seem it should be said that there are only relations in the essence unless this were most certainly handed down, on account of the little entity of relation in respect of absolute being.

To the third someone might perhaps say that something is not to be held to be of the substance of the faith precisely because of a soluble piece of reasoning – by whomever it be made –, nor perhaps because of a conclusion of such reasoning, insofar as precisely through that reasoning it is concluded: someone arguing like this would expose himself to death, nor should anyone according to right reason expose himself; therefore it is necessary to have greater authority for this, that something be held to be of faith, than that someone is thus

arguing (often does someone argue what he does not altogether assert). And although what a saint, authenticated by the Church as to doctrine, asserts is to be held, be sufficiently certain, yet other authorities – doubtful ones – can be given exposition, and much more those of other less authenticated writers.

In the first way someone might say that nothing is found contrary to the aforesaid opinion [n.56; that the persons are not absolutes].

As to the things that secondly seem to be against it, they reply [sc. those who hold the third opinion, n.56] by running through [the authorities] in order.

To the authorities and reasons that were adduced above against it [sc. the third opinion], or in favor of the second opinion [nn.15, 17-27] (to the first, from the Gospel [n.16], response seems to have been made already above [earlier in this note]): to the authorities from Augustine, *On the Trinity* V [n.18], they respond through the distinction set down at the beginning of the opinion [sc. the third, n.56, cf. n.57], that Augustine...

74. And if it be objected that the words of Augustine ‘about substance and person’ [n.73] should not be taken more of the personal than of the essential, because he says that ‘by the same is he God and person’ [*De Trinitate* VII ch.6 n.11], – response: ‘by the same’, that is, by something said for itself, distinguishing that which is ‘for itself’ from that which is ‘for another’, because the Father is not the person of the Son, just as neither is he God of the Son, – the way that Socrates is not Socrates of anyone, as neither is he man of someone, meaning as of his correlative. But it is not necessary that ‘altogether by the same thing’ he be God and person, so that person be said altogether for itself just as God or deity is said for itself, because then, just as there are not three deities and thereby not three magnitudes either, according to him [Augustine] (because magnitude is altogether said for itself as deity is), so neither would there be three persons, which he himself denies. What then are altogether for themselves are not numbered, – what altogether for another are not common to the three; and what for themselves, but not altogether for themselves but referable (because to be referred is not repugnant to them) are common (but numbered), or can be called proper, from which can be abstracted some common numbered thing.

75. To Augustine *On the City of God* XI [n.19], I concede that he [God] is ‘whatever he has’ save for the relative that he has and he is not it; he does indeed have a correlative, as the Father has the Son as Son. And therefore I concede that the first person is ‘whatever he has’ that he is not referred to: but he is not the second person, whom he has as correlative, although he would not be first constituted by that relation.

76. To Boethius, when he says that ‘relation multiplies the trinity etc.’ [n.17], I say that that doctor takes relation for origin, and, understanding it in this way, ‘to multiply’ is taken not for distinguishing formally, but by way of principle as it were, correspondingly to effective principle [n.58]; and this indeed is not to twist the words; for ‘to multiply’ is to make many, as Christ truly multiplied the Gospel loaves (*Matthew* 14.13-21, 15.29-39), and yet he was not the form by which those loaves were formally multiplied, – and God when creating multiplies souls, yet he is not himself the form by which souls are formally distinguished.

77. To John Damascene [nn.21-22] I say that one authority of his solves the other, because ch.8 precisely posits un-generation and ch.52 posits paternal property; and these two properties are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7; therefore by excluding everything else in Father – in ch.8 – besides un-generation, he understands by un-generation the personal being of the Father. And whenever by some property of some

supposit he excludes everything else, through the property included he includes everything else personal, and so that absolute reality, if there were any, would be thus included; and it would be included most of all, as it seems, because when in creatures an accident is included, the subject is not excluded, and so when relation is included in a divine person that which is referred by it is not excluded, – just as, if it were said that only paternity is, the Father would not thereby be excluded, who is by paternity Father.

78. To Richard [n.23] I say: that the mode of existence is different, this pertains to origin, but from this does not follow that the originated is not something subsistent for itself, distinct by some absolute personal reality from the one originating.

79. To Anselm [n.20] similarly I say that ‘all things are one and the same where the opposition of relation does not prevent it’ either formally (as relation prevents relation) or as of a nature to be related by the opposite relation: in this way would the persons – if they were absolute – be distinguished, because in them are relations the originators.

80. [To the reasons] – To the reasons for the second opinion [nn.24-27].

To the first [n.24] it can be said that if any absolute reality constitute the persons, it will yet not make composition with the divine essence, just as neither would the constituting relation make it: the fact is confirmed by the [argumentative] place ‘from the greater’, because a reality proper to subsistence in a creature does not make composition with the essence, but relation in creatures makes composition with the foundation, as will be explained elsewhere [*Ord.* II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6, nn.9, 11-12,15-16; d.1 q.4 nn.5-6, 26]; therefore if here [sc. in God] relation cannot make composition with essence, much more will neither the reality of a supposit make composition with the reality of nature.

81. And when the reason is confirmed, that the absolute ‘either altogether remains or altogether passes over’ [n.25], I say: as was said in making clear the second position, that ‘relation remains from this, that its idea is not formally the idea of essence, and it is transitive because according to perfect identity it is essence’, so can it be said that absolute reality – if it constitute a person – is indeed, because of perfect identity, transitive to the essence, yet it remains because it is not formally the reality of essence. And this response is confirmed, because attributal perfections seem to be absolute and not relative (as was said in distinction 8, in the question ‘About attributes’ [d.8 nn. 185, 209, 215-217, 220, 222]), and yet they both remain and are transitive, so that they do not make composition nor are they formally the same as the essence; and if any of them would, according to their formal idea, have to be distinguished really from the other, the distinction would be through it formally and not through the essence, and yet there would not be composition.

82. To the second argument [n.26] I say that in positing relative persons it is necessary to posit they are truly subsistent and that in them is the same non-divided nature; this cannot be posited because of any imperfection of the persons in subsisting, because they are posited as being as truly subsistent as if they were absolute; therefore it is necessary that it be posited because of the infinity of the essence that is in them subsistent; but there would be the same infinity of essence if the persons were absolute, – therefore it is not necessary that nature is divided, just as neither now does the property divide it. Let this then be proved, ‘every nature, common to absolute supposits, is distinct in them’! [n.26]. This indeed is true in the case of creatures, but in the matter at hand it begs the principal conclusion.

83. To the third [n.27] it is, by insisting, said that to the Father constituted in personal being, and to the Son too constituted in personal being, active spiration is at it were an adventitious property – according to some – and yet it is not quasi-accidental according to them, nor even a relation of reason. Why then could it not be thus understood in the matter at hand, that person is constituted by an absolute reality and that to it – quasi-constituted in such reality – there comes a relation according to mode of understanding, and yet is neither accidental nor a thing of reason? And when it is proved that there is a relation of reason, by a likeness of the relation to creatures [n.27], I say that it is not alike; for the relation to creatures is not from a necessity of the nature of foundation, as it is here.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] The fourth reason [see interpolation to n.27] rests on this proposition: ‘every absolute is act and consequently gives being’.

This is disproved in many ways:

First because in creatures, where it seems most of all to have probability, it has an instance from the hypostatic property, because that is not an act giving being – because then the human nature in Christ would not have the same being that it had when let go [sc. in death when Christ’s body, although hypostatically united with him, did not receive the same being].

Similarly, an act giving being gives operation, – the hypostatic property in creatures does not give operation. The thing is plain from Damascene in ch.60: “We call wills and operations natural and not hypostatic: for if we grant them hypostatic, we will be compelled to say that the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity will different things and do different things;” here he himself, from the fact that the divine persons do not have three operations, concludes that operation is not hypostatic – that is, not through the hypostatic property, and this in general, whether of absolute or relative property.

Further, third: in everything that in any way has being by something there is, besides that which gives it being, something by reason of which it receives being (the thing is plain about a composite of matter and form, and about all other composites of act and potency); therefore in everything having being through something giving being, there is something which is not an act giving being but the reason for receiving being – and so it seems in a supposit of nature, because since a supposit has being and nature gives being, the hypostatic property will be the reason for receiving being.

To the argument [interpolation to n.27] it then can be said that since there is a double idea of entity, namely quidditative and hypostatic, as it is a mark of the quidditative to give being, because it is of itself communicable, so it is a mark of the hypostatic that it not be an act giving being, because it is of itself incommunicable as a ‘by which’. And although in creatures the individual property gives being, because it is of some degree of positive entity beyond the quidditative entity of nature, yet the property of a supposit states no entity beyond the entity of singularity, nay it adds nothing positive (from the first question of Book III, d.1 nn.31-39, 44); and although it were to add something, that would yet not be a reason for giving being but only the incommunicable, because this existing nature – in which is included nature and the entity of singularity – is the total idea of giving being, and so whatever be understood to come to it, whether positive or privative, whether absolute or relative, will not give being, because through that which is already pre-understood is being totally given. Although therefore in divine reality the ‘personal property’ not be only negation but some positive property, yet because divine nature is of itself a this – per se existent – it will have the whole idea of giving being: just as also in creatures ‘this existing nature’ gives being totally, not through this, that the arriving property is merely negation (nay, if a positive property were to come to it, nothing would be taken away from this existing nature), so neither in divine reality will it be taken from this nature – which is of itself existent – but that it will totally give the being of person, although in person be understood a positive personal property.



To the argument, therefore, when it is proved that it is act, since it is not potency, I say that there is a fallacy of equivocation there: for in one way act is the difference opposite to potency, and in this way it divides every being, – in another way act along with potency constitutes some whole (as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII chs.1-6, 1044a3-45b23, about potency and act), which is not of the potency opposite to act, because it does not remain along with act; this property therefore is not only virtually in the divine essence (as is act, which is in potency before act), and consequently this property is in act there insofar as act is opposed to such potency. But it does not follow ‘therefore it is an act giving being’; for required for this would be that it was formal act: for in this way matter would give being, because it is ‘in the composite’ in act, not in potency before act.

The second reason [interpolation to n.27] seems to fail [sc. that an absolute property would be added to essence as act to potency]:

First because this [an absolute property] is not disposed to essence as perfection to perfectible, as was diffusively made clear also ‘about the relative property of a person’ in distinction 5 of the first book [I, d.5 nn.113, 118, 129-138], where it was said that person is not composed of essence and property as from quasi potential and actual, nay essence has more the idea of act. If therefore this property be understood as if posterior in some way to essence, yet it is not a perfection of it; for there is there the same order of origin and perfection, and therefore the prior in origin is prior in perfection, as was then made diffusively clear [*ibid.* nn.130-138].

Second: given that it [an absolute property] would be in some way disposed to essence as informing it, yet it is not a perfection simply, because according to Anselm the idea of ‘perfection simply’ is that it be in anything ‘better it than not it’, which is impossible of a hypostatic property, because that is of its idea repugnant contradictorily to anything other than that of which it is, and so it cannot be in anything else better ‘than not it’, because it is repugnant to anything else.

So therefore to the reason [n.27, interpolation], it is plain that the false is assumed if it be taken that this absolute perfects the essence; nor is the proof of this valid ‘through this, that in some way it follows and does not precede’, because in divine reality – the way precession can be posited – act and form is first. Second, given that this ‘which informs’ would be had, it does not follow that it is perfection simply, and neither [do] those things [follow] that are further inferred, namely that ‘the divine essence is not simply perfect’ or that ‘one person is not simply perfect in himself’.

Further, this reason [n.27] would better prove to the contrary of relation, because it seems more probable that relation could be a perfection than that a hypostatic property be a perfection, because to no hypostatic property does perfection belong (neither in creatures nor in other things), but to some relation according to its proper idea it does belong to be perfect; for one relation is more perfect than another, and yet none is perfection simply, as is plain of equality with respect to inequality, because according to Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* chs.9-11, nn.15-17; ch.12 n.19: “You rightly put equality before inequality, nor is there anyone endowed with human sense – as I suppose – to whom that does not appear.” But this is not only from the foundation, for inequality can be founded on more perfect foundations than equality; it is also plain that if it were only from the foundation, Augustine would be begging the question; for he intends to conclude to excellence, namely of circle as to rectilinear figures, and this he does from equality and inequality, – because if that excellence were only from the foundations and he were to conclude from it the excellence of the foundations, he would then be arguing in a circle.

If it be said that the statement of Augustine is true by reason of the proximate, not the remote, foundations, but the proximate foundation of equality is parity – this is false and nothing as regard the *b* [a reference to a text in *Ord.* III d.1 n.189]. For I ask, either parity states something for itself, and then it can be understood to be equal without its being equal of anything; and similarly, whence then will the perfection of parity be had in this way in respect of inequality in a triangle? For either parity states quantity: and then either the same as that

which is commonly posited the foundation of equality, and then there will not be a distinction between the remote and proximate foundation – or a different quantity, and then in this equal thing there will be said to be two quantities; or you are inventing some other mode in which parity can be an absolute, more perfect than imparity and other than quantity. But if it state a relation, as seems manifest, then a relation will per se be founded on a relation; nay it seems to state the same relation as equality: as much as is par to how much and equal to how much!

To the remark of Anselm in *Monologion* 13 [earlier here], it is replied that he is speaking only of quiddities and not of hypostatic properties. – This is proved, first, by his examples about wisdom and truth on one side, and gold and lead on the other. Second by reason, because only that is a perfection simply which can in something be infinite, only that in something is better ‘not it than it’ which is of itself finite; these belong to quiddity (namely to be finite or infinite), but not to a hypostatic property, because a divine personal property – whatever it be – is neither formally finite nor infinite. Beside relation therefore a ‘whatever’, that is a ‘whatever quiddity’, – not a ‘whatever hypostatic entity’, because that is not divided into such and not such but falls under not such; likewise a hypostatic property is repugnant to anything besides the one of which it is, – therefore it cannot be for any whatever better it ‘than not it’, but not for any [particular one] either. Therefore, Anselm excludes from the universe of quiddities relation according to quiddity, and then every absolute quiddity is a perfection either simply or limited; but from this does not follow the proposed conclusion about absolute hypostatic property.

The third reason [sc. in the interpolation to n.27, that every absolute circumstance of an absolute is multiplied along with that absolute] has a major false in all things essentially ordered, from its form, although sometimes on account of the matter it may be true; and similarly in everything not equally unlimited. For in no order, essential from its proper idea, of prior and posterior is it necessary that they [the priors and posteriors] be co-multiplied, but multiplication of the posterior can stand without multiplication of the prior, although not conversely; likewise, whenever two things are compared to a third, which is unlimited, it is not necessary that, in the way in which the two things are unlimited, it is co-distinguished with them (an example: the intellective soul is compared to its parts; because it is in some way unlimited, in the way the parts are unlimited, it is not necessary that the soul is distinct in distinct parts). The major then, as to the matter at hand, is false in two ways: both because the essence (in the way in which there is priority in person there) is in some way prior to the properties, not conversely, according to them [sc. those who hold the third opinion], – therefore it is not necessary for the essence to be distinguished on distinction of the properties; and because the essence is formally infinite, and these properties are not formally infinite – and therefore it is not necessary for the ‘infinite formally’ to be distinguished on the distinction of those that are not formally infinite.

Even if the major were taken generally, about any absolutes whatever circumstancing the same thing – it has a manifest objection about the soul and the powers, because the powers are multiplied when the soul is not multiplied.

But if they evade this [objection] by specifying the major of things of the same species (the way the first confirmation of the major takes it), neither then is the proposition true universally in relations, as will be plain in distinction 8 [*Ord.* III d.8 q.un nn.6-9]. That many things of the same idea are in the same thing – even in absolutes – is not a contradiction, if any of them is not an act adequate to that in which it is.

Now when the major is made clear by induction, a fallacy of the consequent is made, because some singulars are taken not similar to the matter at hand, namely in which a distinction of prior things constitutes a distinction of posterior ones, or in which there is a similar limitation on both sides and not unlimitation in one with respect to the other; from these an inference cannot be universally drawn, because it is false when the conditions are lacking, as in the matter at hand.

But to the final [argument], added for confirmation of the major, that the ‘same’ [sc. there cannot be many things of the same idea in the same perfect thing], it could be said that

just as the simply perfect – the same in number – is communicable to several supposit of the same idea (so that it is not repugnant to it from perfection simply, but it belongs to it that it is in several supposit of the same idea), from its perfection it can belong to it that several things of the same idea can be in it as supposit in a nature, and consequently even several hypostatic properties of the same idea; but it cannot be so of the other things of which it is exemplified (as of the Father and the Word), because the perfection of it [what is simply perfect] requires that any production have an adequate term, but does not thus require that some hypostatic property be adequate to the nature in constituting a supposit.

Though this could response be made to the first confirmation of the major, by applying it to the matter at hand, that there is there a fallacy of equivocation. For the major [sc. ‘many things of the same species cannot be in the same thing’], if it were true, ought to be understood of being ‘in’ as act is in that which is informed; but the minor [sc. ‘the absolutes, if they be posited, will be of the same species’] is not true: for a property is not in the essence as informing it, but as constituting a supposit in it.

It could however be said to each confirmation that these properties are not of the same idea formally, just as in creatures the individual properties are primarily diverse and not of the same idea. And if from this be inferred that they are of a different species or that each of them has the idea of a different species, and that by this it is necessary that it be determined by something else to incommunicability – it does not follow, just as neither in individual properties in creatures: although they not be of the same idea in anything, yet none is a quidditive and common entity, but of itself a ‘this’.

The fourth reason [sc. that if two absolute properties are expressed by the essence they will both be in one person and will not distinguish the persons] proceeds from a false imagination, that all these properties are expressed by the essence as if by origin, – which was not said. But just as some concede [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers] that relations burgeon up in the essence (if however this be properly said), so it could against them be conceded that these properties – absolute if they exist – burgeon up in the essence; and although each property be in the same supposit from which it burgeons (because the essence is in all persons), yet none is in the same person as the one from whom it is had through true origination. Nor is repugnant the true origination ‘of the person having one [property]’ from a person having another, though all these [absolute properties] are not originated but in some way burgeon from the essence – just as others have to say [they do so] through relation, that the Son burgeons from the Father by origin and yet the Son in some way burgeons in the divine essence or from the divine essence.

The fifth reason seems to fail [sc. that there is no origin in the persons because an absolute person would precede any relation of origin], because it seems more difficult to sustain origination by positing that the extremes are only relative formally than by positing that they are absolute. For if they only be relative, it will be nothing else for a person to originate a person than for a relative to have a correlative; but a relative, once posited, seems to have a correlative without all other action. But if they be posited as absolutes, there does not seem as much difficulty how one supposit be generated by another, since in creatures – according to them – there are absolute supposit and yet origination of one by another is not there denied.

When it is argued then that absolute precedes relation and so origination, I reply: it was said that origination pertains to the genus of efficient causality, not formal; and just as in creatures the term is not by origination formally but quasi-effectively (and not herefrom, that it is not formally by it, does it follow that it precede it), so could it be said in the matter at hand; nor does there seem greater difficulty about the priority of an absolute than of a relative, in creatures, than here [sc. in the divine persons].

#### IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Maintaining it

84. Whom this opinion does not please (which, however, does not seem to contradict the faith, as was touched on when explaining it [nn.56, 68-71]), if the second opinion please more (which is more common [n.15]), reply can be made to the reasons against the second opinion [nn.33-55]:

To the first [n.33] response is made by denying the proposition ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in a relation constituting a supposit, and is true in others. When it is proved by this, that ‘a relation is not related, but something which is not only relation is related by relation’, and when it is said further that ‘the related is prior to relation’ [n.33], – it is denied.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation: in place of n.84*] Holding to the second opinion, which is more common, response can be made to the reasons against it:

To the first [n.33], it is conceded that relation is not related; but something that is not only relation is related by a relation: not indeed the essence, but the supposit is related, which supposit is not only relation (but yet a relative, not an absolute), – and so the whole deduction up to the final consequence is conceded [sc. therefore the supposit is there really and naturally before the relation], and that consequence is denied.

85. As to the proposition that says ‘for every composite it is necessary first to understand the parts and the union of parts’ [n.34], those who hold that relation is in the essence as act in what is susceptible of it would have to say that in the person – which is a quasi-whole – it would not be necessary for the informing of a quasi-part by a quasi-part to be pre-understood before the whole be understood, but, if a quasi such informing be understood, yet not quasi by way of denominating form. But by holding the second opinion [n.15], it seems better it should be said that relation is not a quasi-form or an act with respect to the essence (as was touched on in distinction 5 [d.5 nn.113,131, 137-138]), but rather the essence seems to be quasi-form and act, whereby subsistent relation is God. And this seems to be proved from this, that whenever a foundation is potential to a relation, the foundation is first naturally informed by the relation before the supposit; conceded too – from this – is that there [sc. when the foundation is potential to relation] the thing related is ‘relative to’ formally by the foundation or according to the foundation, just as it is conceded that Socrates is white by whiteness or according to whiteness. Neither it seems should be granted in the matter at hand: not that paternity exists in the essence before in the Father, – nor that the Father by deity or in accord with deity is Father formally, because this seems in accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: ‘he is Father by one thing, he is God by another’; but he is God by deity formally – he is not therefore Father by deity formally, but by something else, according to Augustine.

86. Therefore it can in another way be said (holding the second opinion) that, although the parts and the union of parts be pre-required for the whole, and the quasi-parts and the union of the quasi-parts be pre-required for the quasi-whole, yet where there is no partialness but perfect identity of the things that would otherwise be parts unless one or other of them were infinite, it is not necessary that the union of such be pre-understood to the whole but that the perfect identity of one thing with another be. And so it seems to be in the matter at hand, that to the Father – who is said first to be related – is in some way pre-understood the perfect identity of relation with essence, but not the union of a quasi-form with some quasi-matter or quasi-potential; nor is such perfect identity a reason that the essence be formally denominating by relation.

87. But if the reason [n.34] be confirmed by this, that ‘nothing is a quantity first and per se unless something be a quantity per se and not first but denominatively’ [cf. n.35], I say that if a quantity could be the same as something which would otherwise be susceptible of it, and so the same [as something] that did not inform it, it could well be some quantity first and yet nothing a quantity by informing (nor does this seem remarkable, because the ‘first’ seems to be separated from that which is ‘per se but not first’); therefore in this way can something be posited as first related although nothing be related ‘not first but per se’, as if informed by relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] As too that which is argued ‘Along with this’ [interpolation to n.35], this proposition is denied, ‘what is related is first something to itself’.

To the first proof, which is taken from Augustine, I reply: ‘what is related is something when the relative is removed’, that is, it includes something absolute which is the foundation of the relation; and therefore if the Father ‘is nothing for himself’ (that is, does not include anything absolute), he will not be Father ‘to another’. But Augustine does not understand that every relative is formally for itself before it be to another by relation.

As to the second proof, the conclusion or the proposition is denied which it rests on for proof, namely that ‘that which is related is prior to the relation’, or – which is the same – that ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in a relation constituting a supposit, and is true in other things.

When it is proved by division [sc. into three members]: if one of these three members of the division should be granted, more to be granted would be that the relation is prior, just as form is prior ‘to what is by form’; nor does it follow that ‘supposit is thus as it were posterior to relation, therefore it is relation’, but that ‘therefore it is relation or a relative constituted by relation’, – and the second is true.

88. To the second [nn36-37] I say that, just as any form by itself is such a form, nor is there any intrinsic reason why it is such a form, so too some relation by itself is formally real and some relation by itself formally is only of reason; however of this or that [relation] sometimes there are extrinsic effective or material causes, sometimes too there are some caused things or some posterior signs from which these can be inferred by a demonstration ‘that’. I say then that identity, because identity, is a relation of reason, nor is there another formal reason ‘because of which’, – paternity, because paternity, is a real relation, nor is there another formal reason ‘because of which’. Yet because a real relation is of a nature to have extrinsic causes causing it, commonly speaking, in creatures, it follows there that a relation which does not have such causes is not real, just as on the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused; likewise, any real relation, if it does not have such prior distinction of causes, does at any rate cause a distinction. And then from the removal of both the cause and the caused (one of which corresponds to a real relation) it can be concluded that some relation is not real, so that there will follow ‘this relation does not pre-require distinct extremes, nor does it make them to be distinct, therefore it is not a real relation’ [cf. n.37], and for why the premises are true must middle terms proving them be looked for; but the consequence is good, just as from the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused, and from the removal of the caused follows the removal of the cause from it, because at least one of these must concur for a real relation, so that wherever either is removed there follows (a consequence through extrinsic facts) the removal of the real relation. When it is said that “therefore to infer ‘the relation is not real because it is not between distinct things’ is to

infer ‘it is not real because it is not real’” [n.37] I say no, because although it does not distinguish the extremes for this reason ‘because it is not real’, because arguing from cause to caused – yet it does follow ‘it does not distinguish, therefore it is not real’, just as from caused to cause (and this with this added ‘that it does not pre-require them distinct’), because then concur there both denial of the cause of a real relation and denial of the sign, from the concurrence of which is perfectly inferred the negation of a real relation.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] but sometimes with a distinction preceding relations, sometimes not, but only formally caused [n.37].

And not only is there a real relation of will to will, but also of will as active to itself as passive, and universally an effect dependent on an active and passive principle necessarily requires a real relation; and yet the will, which is the foundation of these opposite relations ‘of mover and moved’, is denominated by each of them.

I say that for inferring the conclusion it is necessary to prove that neither are the extremes distinct by a distinction preceding relation, by a distinction pertaining to the genus of relation, just as it does not follow ‘they [sc. the extremes] are said of the same thing, therefore they are not real’; not thus from the nature of the thing, without act of intellect.<sup>3</sup> Hence it can well be conceded. If however they are proved, the consequence is good. But it is necessary ultimately to come back to this, that having been omitted which is of the distinction of the extremes; for it does not at once follow ‘if a relation does not follow from the nature of the thing, it is not real’. It would be necessary to expound the antecedent, that ‘the extremes are not distinguished either by a distinction preceding relation.’

To the third [*interpolation* at n.50] it can be said that an absolute can well be the term of a relation, and it always is the term in relations of something measured – and this is principally preserved in distinction 30 [nn.35-40], that the relations of creatures terminate in God insofar as he is absolute; and universally speaking, it is not necessary to concede that the term of a relation is absolute save in unlike relations (about which it is argued there [nn.35-38]), namely those that are in a genus (of which sort divine relations are not), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term: for as the foundation in a related thing is an absolute, but not always that which is related (according to this opinion [sc. the third, nn.57, 59, 72]), so too that which is the reason of terminating a relation is always an absolute, and it is pre-required on the part of the relative term just as the foundation is on the part of the thing related.

89. To the first about the second way [n.38] I say that the proposition is false that ‘relation cannot be the formal term of origin’, as will be appear in the material ‘On the Incarnation’ [III d.1 nn.57-61]; and whatever may be about the formal cause, at least a relative can be the first produced term, so that essence ‘for itself’ – in a relative – be a formal term, and in this way was it posited in distinction 5, in the production of a person [d.5 nn.27-30, 64-71, 97]. When therefore it says ‘a relation is not originated unless an absolute is originated’ [n.58], if you understand ‘to be originated’ as the first term of production, it can be conceded about a relation but not about a relative – but if you understand ‘to be originated’ as the first formal term, it could be simply conceded; and in neither way is it against the matter at hand, because neither is relation posited to be first originated but the supposit – nor is it posited that relation is the formal term of production, but the essence simply absolute is.

<sup>3</sup> The Vatican editors note that several words are omitted here from the text in *Ord.* III d.1 nn.241-242, whence this interpolation is taken.

90. To the second [n.40] I say that ‘the Father originates the Son’ is that the Father has the Son for correlative (not any correlative, but this sort of correlative, because this sort of co-relation is a relation of origin), and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about the supposit as if pre-understood to origin [nn.43-44]), and it will be made clear in distinction 28 nn.93-99, 108-110.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, in place of ‘and this is the response...in distinction 28’] therefore one extreme can be prior in origin to another, although it be simultaneous in nature – and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about a supposit as if pre-understood to origin or about the priority of supposit to action), and it will be made clear in distinction 28;

[*another text*]: therefore one extreme can be prior in origin to another, although it be simultaneous in nature. This response, and similarly to the second (about the priority of supposit to action), will be made clear in distinction 28 [*then follows n.89*].

91. As to the third [n.41], it seems difficult to respond to those who say that the persons are relative and that relations are the principles of acting [e.g. Henry of Ghent], because then neither on the part of the agent nor on the part of the principle can there be liberty; but although the second opinion may be held as far as concerns the first, yet I have denied the second in distinction 7 [nn.20-26, 35-42].

92 To the fourth [n.42] is said that ‘there is generation’, because that relation has the force of constituting first substance in divine nature [n.65]; and it is necessary to say – when holding this way – that relation can thus be the personal property of a subsistent in divine nature just as if it were some absolute property.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] and thus the production of it will be the production of a subsistent in the nature of substance; and therefore ‘generation’, because generation is generation from a formal term (which is the nature communicated to the one produced), and not from the individual or incommunicable property of the one produced – just as universally every motion receives its species from the formal term of the motion.

93. The arguments about the third way [nn.45, 51-52] seem difficult, and yet they are soluble if the second opinion [n.15] be true. Let him solve them who knows [cf. *Lectura I d.26 n.75*].

94. The authorities about the fourth way can be in some way expounded [sc. in favor of the second opinion], just as commonly authorities are drawn to one sense or another.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] To the other [the first about the third way, n.45] I say that paternity is of itself formally incommunicable; not however this concept, which – according to what was said elsewhere [d.8] – can be abstracted from divine and created paternity, but this reality which is in divine reality, which is not formally the very essence, is formally incommunicable and not as it were through an extrinsic determination, namely ‘because divine’. The reason for its incommunicability is this, because just as essence is ultimate act, and therefore it cannot be determined by anything with respect to which it is quasi potential, so whatever is in it is ultimate, in the ultimate act possible for it, such that in the instant of nature in which wisdom burgeons in the essence, it burgeons according to the ultimate determination that it is able to have; hence too the reality that is wisdom formally is not determinable. Likewise, whatever can be incommunicable in the first instance of nature in which it burgeons in nature, burgeons

as incommunicable, and not first as communicable, because then it would be determinable through something by which it would become incommunicable.

And if you say that then paternity is not incommunicable save because it is in the divine essence, for this reality does not have whereby it may of itself be ultimately determinate save because it is in the essence, – I say that quasi originally or fundamentally whatever is intrinsic in divine reality is from the essence, because according to Damascene [*De Fide Orthodoxa* ch.9) it is a ‘certain sea of infinite substance’; but yet the others have formally their own ideas and are in themselves first such formally, so that wisdom, although it have from the essence quasi fundamentally and originally that it is a perfection simply, is yet formally a perfection simply and in itself formally infinite – such that in the same instant of nature in which wisdom is already in act in the essence, let the essence be *per impossibile* removed and there will remain an intellect of wisdom simply and infinite. So in the ‘now’ of nature in which paternity is understood in the essence, it is in itself formally incommunicable, the essence then being *per impossibile* removed.

Nor is it here a contradiction that something quasi originally or causally has from another this which belongs to it formally, just as the hot is formally contrary to the cold, although causally it be from fire to which it is not contrary formally. So it is in other things, that the entity, by which something is constituted in specific being, is of itself formally indivisible into several species, even given *per impossibile* that it were uncaused, though it now have this in-division causally whence it is causally.

And if you object ‘why does some other entity arise communicable in the essence, and this incommunicable?’ – I say that of this there is no formal reason save because this entity is this and that entity is that; and this entity ‘because this’ is communicable and that entity ‘because that’ is incommunicable, such that the latter could not arise unless it arose incommunicable formally, nor the former unless it arose communicable formally. Now the extrinsic reason for this – quasi fundamental or original – is because the essence is radically infinite, from which can intrinsically arise not only perfections simply and communicable, but also incommunicable properties; any of which however, when it arises, arises determinate, with the highest determination possible for it.

By this it is plain as to all the proofs that show that paternity of itself is not incommunicable [nn.46-50]:

For when you say that ‘it is not of itself a this’ [n.47], I say that it is false, understanding it formally about the reality which is paternity, not about the concept common to this paternity and to that, because (as was expounded in distinction 8 nn.136-150 and will be stated in III *Suppl.* d.22 q. un. nn.7-8) there can be some concept without an order of realities inwardly, one of which is contractive or determinative of another. Paternity, however – that is that reality – is not of itself a ‘this’, that is fundamentally, but from the essence, and from the same is paternity incommunicable, because it is not first a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable and afterwards as it were made incommunicable by something else determining it but, without all order of singularity for incommunicability in this reality, there arises a reality supremely determinate in the first instant of nature in which it arises.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘every quiddity is communicable’ [n.26], but only a quiddity which is perfection simply or divisible (for the first is communicated in unity of nature, the second is communicated with its division): this quiddity is neither a perfection simply nor divisible, because it is in a nature perfect simply.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘opposite relations are equally communicable of themselves’ [nn.48-49], nay active spiration arises communicable to two [persons], nor ever can it be made incommunicable by anything determining it; but passive spiration of itself formally, in the same instant in which it is in divine reality, is incommunicable.

Also as to what you say ‘whatever position is set down – possible or impossible – it will, while its idea stands, remain incommunicable’ [n.50], I concede ‘while its idea stands’ and not ‘with something posited repugnant to its idea’. But if it be posited that its idea remains and that something is repugnant to it, from opposites in an antecedent opposites



follow, namely that it be incommunicable of itself formally and can be communicated; so in the matter at hand: if it be posited that spiration precedes active generation, something is posited impossible with the paternity of the Father and yet the idea of paternity remains, and so it follows that paternity is communicable from the first and yet incommunicable from the second; hence it is formally a contradiction that generation is the second production in divine reality.

Paternity therefore, because divine, is incommunicable, so that the 'because' is a circumstance of the original or fundamental principle, but not a contracting or determining principle, in the way in which white is contracted when 'white man' is said or 'human whiteness'; for this whiteness is pre-understood as existing in itself, and as such it would be indeterminate and determinable so as to be of man (and to this it is determined when 'human whiteness' is said), but not that whiteness arise from the nature of man and that in that instant it be of itself indeterminate. So – by the opposite – in the matter at hand, because just as a cause would not give being to the effect unless it gave itself 'being agreeable to the effect', nor would it produce the effect unless it produced something that was of a nature to have such an effect (for example, no cause would cause a triangle formally unless it were to produce something that necessarily had three angles etc. [sc. equal to two right angles], and if it could produce something that did not necessarily have three [such angles], it would not produce this [sc. a triangle] but something else, – nor is there another reason for this save because the formal idea of a triangle is that it be a triangle), so I say that deity would not be the fundamental reason for any intrinsic reality unless it were to arise such that – in the first instant in which it is – it be determinate with ultimate determination; if therefore it were to produce something determinable by some reality that as it were comes to it already produced, it would not produce anything intrinsic in divine reality, – even if it were to produce something communicable, it would not produce a personal property, but something in some way different from it.

To the other [n.51] I say that although some common concept could be had that is said in the 'what' of divine generation and divine spiration (indeed, perhaps that is said in the 'what' of divine and created paternity), yet no reality can be in divine reality in any way distinct on the part of the thing – from which this concept said in the 'what' is taken – which reality is determinable by another reality, as a common concept is determinable in the intellect by another concept; and the possibility of this and the reason has sufficiently been touched on [d.8 nn.135-150].

I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not first diverse as to understanding without the intellect being able to abstract from them some common reality, but they are first diverse as to reality and reality, so that they include no one grade of reality which is quasi potential and determinable by proper differences (or quasi by proper [differences]), the way that whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same idea determinable by proper differences specific to them, from which are taken their specific differences. And then the major proposition, that 'the first distinguishing things are first diverse' [n.51], should only be understood of the realities themselves that first constitute them as to non-agreement in some one formal reality which they formally include.

To the other, about a supposit per accidens [n.52], I say that in one way does the metaphysician speak of the 'per accidens' and in another way the logician; for the metaphysician says there is a being 'per accidens' that includes in itself things of two genera, as is plain in the *Metaphysics*, the chapter 'about being' and 'about one' [V.7 and 6.1017a7-22, 1015b16-36]; the logician says a proposition is 'per accidens' whose subject does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate; and if from two such things one concept is made – neither of which is per se determinative of the other – he says that that concept is 'one per accidens'. There is not an example in creatures of a logical concept 'one per accidens' save a concept to which corresponds a 'one per accidens' metaphysically, because although this be per accidens 'the rational is animal', yet by joining one concept to the other, one is per se determinative of the other; therefore the whole concept is not one per accidens,

but only is some aggregating concept of two genera one per accidens, and to it there always corresponds a 'one per accidens' with the metaphysician.

To the matter at hand. This can be conceded per accidens 'paternity is deity', because the subject as it is subject does not include the idea of the inherence of the predicate as predicate, because the subject is not formally the predicate. Also by joining the concept of the subject to the concept of the predicate (thus: 'God is Father'), one concept does not per se determine the other, because according to Damascene [*On the Orthodox Faith*, ch.50] properties determine hypostases not nature; therefore this concept is not in itself 'per se one', and so it does not state the concept 'of a per se supposit' with respect to something: for what is not in itself 'per se one' is not the 'per se supposit' of anything, and as neither in things so neither in concepts. Thus therefore, logically speaking, it could be conceded that the Father is not a 'per se supposit' of God.

But against this I argue, because first identity cannot be per accidens, and as not in things so not in concepts either; and first identity in predication seems to be of the first nature with its supposit; therefore it is not per accidens but per se.

I reply: the first identity of predication is of anything whatever to itself, as 'man is man', 'God is God'. But comparing here God to supposit and seeking identity there, I say that speaking really according to the metaphysician – since here there are no genera nor anything of any genus (from distinction 8 nn.95-115) – nothing will here be a being per accidens; nor does it follow 'it is a supposit per accidens logically, therefore it is a supposit per accidens metaphysically', because 'to be a supposit' states the relation of something as subject to something as to a predicate, and thus can a supposit be said to be 'per accidens' because of accidentality on the part of inherence, not of the extremes.

And if it be objected 'here it is conceded that there are things as it were of two genera, namely of substance and accident', I reply: the proper idea of things, as to genera or quasi-genera, does not make a 'whole' to be a being per accidens, but the disposition of thing to thing does, to wit non-identity simply; but now although the proper idea of relation – which remains there – does not include formally the idea of essence, yet one thing in reality is most truly the same as the other, because of which identity there is no disposition of reality to reality of the sort required of things that constitute a 'being per accidens'.

If it be objected against the first member [sc. accidentality on the part of inherence], 'since in creatures there can be per se a supposit of nature, why not so here?', it could be said that an imperfect absolute can be incommunicable, and universally something 'that contracts per se in some genus' can be incommunicable, just as something communicable, – and so in any created thing that pertains to some genus there can be something of that genus constituting an incommunicable; but a simply perfect thing cannot be incommunicable, nor anything of the same idea (of which sort according to this way [sc. the third] is everything absolute in divine reality), and therefore nothing 'quasi of the same genus as the essence' can constitute a supposit there, but only something that is as if of another genus. An example: if anything whatever of the genus of substance, up to the ultimate thing by which it is constituted 'this substance', were a perfection simply and consequently communicable, 'this substance' could not by anything be further contracted in itself (because what is a 'this' is not further determinable in itself), but only could something of the genus of quantity or quality constitute 'in this substance' something incommunicable, because quantity or quality would not be a perfection simply; then the thing constituted of substance and quantity would be a supposit per accidens (and also would be a being per accidens), if one of these realities were not perfectly the same as the other. – So is it posited in the matter at hand that essence is a perfection simply, and whatever is of the same genus as essence is 'for itself'; and therefore anything whatever such is communicable, and yet of itself a 'this'. And further: that which is of itself a 'this', it cannot be contracted, but only in that which is a 'this' can something incommunicable be constituted by something which is not a perfection simply, and therefore not of the same genus as the essence, but quasi of another.

By this can statement be made to the other confirmation, by which is inferred that ‘truer would be the identity of created substance with its supposit than of the divine nature with its’; this does not follow, if it be understood on the part of the thing, because although an individual entity in a creature per se determine nature and make it ‘per se one’ with it, yet that ‘one’ is composite with some composition also real, – but relation, although it not per se determine the divine nature, yet is so truly the same as it that no composition may there come to be; and therefore, really or metaphysically speaking, much truer is the identity of the divine supposit, both in itself and with the nature, than of a created supposit in itself or with its nature, – and logically speaking, it can well be conceded that created substance is formally predicated of its supposit (because ‘per se in the first mode’), not so ‘God’ of Father, because ‘Father’ does not have as per se one a concept in the intellect as ‘Socrates’.

If you infer ‘therefore this predication is truer than that’, the consequence can be denied, because some predication not formal, or not per se, can be truer than another formal and per se, if however there is a greater identity of extremes in the thing, in whose concept however there is a less formal inclination or inherence.

As to the final confirmation [sc. the third in the second interpolation to n.52], it can be logically conceded that of neither quiddity is there a ‘per se supposit’; but really there is a supposit of nature, not of relation, because relation is an incommunicable property there, nature not. Likewise, relation passes over to essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of essence.

To the fourth [n.60 with interpolation]. First substance in creatures has something of perfection, namely ultimate unity (therefore it is indivisible), and this is consequent to ultimate actuality, because of which there belongs to it ‘per se being’; two opposites come together in second substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘being’ save in first substance. These conditions of first substance does the divine essence have of itself, and not by relation formally: for it is of itself a ‘this’ and it subsists of itself (that is it is per se), or at any rate it is the whole idea of subsisting (therefore, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, the Father is not by that by which he is Father but by which he is God). Beyond this, created first substance – because limited – does not have communicability, because the same limited thing in number is not communicable: this property of first substance does not belong to the divine essence.

Hereby is it made plain as to the first point there touched on [n.60], because I concede that first substance in divine reality, as to this, that ‘it most of all is to be substance and to subsist per se’, is not constituted formally by relation but by deity.

Likewise to the second [interpolation to n.61]: that ‘first substance does not include non-substance’ is true, because of the conditions of perfection belonging to first substance, and so, wherever those conditions are kept, it will not be through non-substance; but in a nature in which there cannot through substance be that condition which is of imperfection in created first substance, namely incommunicability (as is posited in God, where anything whatever ‘for itself’ is posited simply perfect and so communicable), there must first substance – as to having that condition – include non-substance.

To the third there touched on [n.62] I reply: paternity and this incommunicable paternity – whatever may hold of them in concept – are altogether the same in the thing, so that there is no distinction there formal or real; for the thing, in the first instant in which it is or burgeons in the essence, is there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it, otherwise in that instant it would be potential for determination. Because therefore determination to incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, therefore it is not only a quiddity and a ‘this’ but incommunicable, and altogether it is not first a ‘this’ in reality before it is incommunicable; but ‘this’ deity is communicable, such that it is repugnant to it by something as it were *sui generis* – according to this opinion [sc. the second] – to be incommunicable. I deny therefore the consequence ‘in relation there is quiddity, and this is incommunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these can be found in that which is to itself’,

because the last [incommunicability] is repugnant to anything 'to itself'; in God, according to this opinion, it is not repugnant to relation, and therefore at once does relation have it.

To the fourth there touched on [n.63]: 'to be per se' is conceded to 'this essence', or to God 'whence he is God', – but not being able to be by what formally something per se is, this belongs to created nature from limitation, because of which it is incommunicable both as 'what' and as 'by which' (of this double incommunicability there was discussion in distinction 23 n.16). It is true, therefore, that created substance has 'per se being', accident not, and this belongs to substance from its perfection, – but that it cannot communicate the 'per se being' to something in which it is, this is a mark of limitation. Here therefore I concede that essence is determined of itself to 'per se being' (whether as 'what' or as 'by which'), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as that by which the relative person has the same 'per se being'.

To those about the fourth way [nn.53-55].

To the first, from Augustine [n.54], response was made after the response to the first argument against the second opinion [interpolation to n.87].

I reply to his other authority [n.54]. Augustine there, *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7, says how 'one essence' is said, and by the Greeks 'three substances', but by the Latins 'three persons'; and in the text that is adduced [n.54] (which is taken from ch.4 n.9), that 'substance is for itself', because 'not properly are three substances spoken of, because substance (as it is conceded in divine reality) is for itself, and therefore essence and substance are the same' [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; he also says: "they are not to be called three substances, so that they may not be called three essences" [*ibid.* ch.4 n.9]. He does not therefore himself intend that substance as the Greeks take it (namely for person) be for itself [n.73], but that they do not properly concede three substances but only because of necessity of speaking; hence he seems to prefer the way of speaking of the Latins, that there are 'three persons' [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; but even that he proves consequently not to be proper, showing that person is simply said 'for itself', as essence is [*ibid.* ch.6 n.11]. Therefore take his final conclusion about this matter from ch.6 n.11: "We want indeed some one word to serve for this signification whereby the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent before someone who asks 'three what?'"

In saying then either three persons from the Latins or from the Greeks three substances, Augustine would say that it is asserted improperly and only because of necessity of speaking. Not then from his intention is it got that something signifying an incommunicable subsistent in divine reality is for itself, but only that those names – which are accommodated by some people for expressing such an incommunicable – are in themselves absolute names, nay purely absolute, such that they are essentials. It would be necessary then to have the first point [sc. "something signifying an incommunicable subsistent in divine reality is for itself"] from him for this, that what is proposed in this question be had for the third opinion [n.56], which posits in reality that 'this subsistent incommunicable' is for itself, and is not only able to be expressed by some essential name, adapted from use or the necessity of speaking.

For the second opinion, by this, for everything that is adduced from Augustine [n.73].

To the third, from Richard and Boethius [n.55], the response is that just as from an absolute and a relative – speaking quidditatively – can something be abstracted quidditatively common, so also from such and such an incommunicable is something common abstracted, which is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative: some such thing Richard describes and Boethius, with this added, that it be 'in intellectual nature', so that as the description of a superior should not include the proper idea of anything inferior, so the description of a person – whereby it is incommunicable in intellectual nature – ought not to include anything properly pertaining to an incommunicable absolute, nor properly to an incommunicable relative, but ought to be indifferent to both; and so each describes a person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Boethius nor in that assigned by Richard is anything relative posited, and so I say that neither is there posited anything whence the thing defined may be expressed to be absolute, but it is indifferent to

both: so that, as in some nature is not found ‘the idea assigned in general’ save in an absolute and by reason of an absolute (as in a creature), so in the divine nature it is not found save in a relative.

## V. To the Principal Arguments

95. To the principal arguments [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] it is plain how the persons do not differ in species, nor even is the production of person by person equivocal – as was touched on in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50] about this

96. To the second [n.2] it is said (according to the holders of the second opinion) that common relations do not first burgeon in the essence, but that first burgeon in it relations of origin [n.28]. However it does not seem that this can be proved, because magnitude more pertains to the essence as it is understood abstracted from the persons than action or passion, which are only of a supposit; therefore relations consequent to magnitude – of which sort is the relation of equality – can more be understood in the essence as essence, as it seems abstracted from person, than relations of origin. Similarly can it be argued – in the matter at hand – about likeness, which follows the essence as it has the idea of form, wherein the suppositis are assimilated. Therefore the latter do not first burgeon before the former, or if they do burgeon first, what is the reason? But if common relations burgeon equally first or beforehand, and these can constitute [sc. persons], – therefore they do constitute. For there is not there a possibility for anything which is not in act, nor can any form constitute a person unless it constitute actually (if the form is in act), as it seems, just as neither can any form constitute in act something in a species without it constituting – if it exist and not have imperfect existence – something in a species.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] To this it can be said that, just as any created essence, although it be a quiddity and a quantity (because in a certain degree of perfection) and an essential quality (as is touched on in distinction 31 nn.10, 16-17, or *Ord.* I d.19 n.8), yet it is a quiddity first before it is a quantity or a quality (and therefore first in the individual is the idea of identity with another individual before of equality or likeness), so too there is first in a supposit the idea of acting – if it is an active form – before there is the idea of equality or likeness; for the idea of the active does not follow it after [it follows] the being of the idea of identity. In divine reality, therefore, since to communicate is an action whose formal principle is the essence as a ‘what’, there will in some way be in it first relations pertaining to communication before others, of equality or likeness, which are founded on the idea of virtual quantity and essential quality. Hereby I say to the argument [n.2] that neither action nor equality can be understood in the same nature inwardly unless it be of suppositis or relata (yet they will be of nature as of the foundation), and of these action is prior to equality, just as action itself follows the foundation first – by reason of which it is of suppositis – before equality follow.

On the contrary: this response seems to suppose that essence merely as a ‘what’ is the idea of communicating in divine reality, the opposite of which was said in distinction 13 [nn.45, 63].

I reply: the essence ‘as what it is’ is the reason for communicating the essence, but not only this, but along with this the essence ‘as it is intellect and as it is will’ is the co-productive principle of a person and communicative of the essence, as was said there [*ibid.* n.93] and in distinction 2 of this first book [nn.221, 226, 300-303, 355-356]. But now, just as essence is understood to be the idea of communicating itself before it be understood to be a quantity or a quality, so too is it understood to be the idea of operating before to be a quantity or a quality;

for it does not belong later to the essence to be the operative principle with respect to operations proper to such a nature than it belongs to it to be the active principle, and this whether productive with respect to producibles in that nature or communicative of the nature. But the divine essence is a principle of operations proper to such a nature, insofar as the nature is intellect and will, because to understand and to will are the proper operations of that nature; therefore first it is essence, not only essence but also intellect and will, before it is a quantity or a quality. Therefore, although production does not belong to the essence alone 'as it is essence' as to a productive principle but also to intellect and will as productive principle along with the essence insofar as it is essence – it still stands that the relation of producer and produced first burgeon in the essence before the relation of equal and like.

On the contrary: from this response it seems to follow that intellect and will are not attributes, because an attribute quasi-perfects in second being something quasi-presupposed in first being; therefore nothing that pertains to essence before it is understood to be a quantity or a quality is an attribute. Similarly, from this it seems that intellect and will are not distinguished there from the nature of the thing: the consequent is contrary to what was said before in distinction 13, nn.64-67; the consequence is proved because that which in God precedes the idea of quantity and quality is only a 'what', – but a 'what' as 'what' is not distinguished in God from the nature of the thing, because then his 'what' would not be simple.

To these points. To the first I say that if in created substance the power – or that which is the principle of proper operation belonging to such nature – is not something pertaining to the genus of quality, but is either merely the substance itself to which operation belongs, or it is some perfection identically contained in substance (and this belonging to it as it is substance, but not as if a certain quality circumstancing the substance, – in the way it must be posited about powers, by positing some real distinction between them and yet that they are not accidents), much more does the divine essence – when everything is removed that is a quasi-quality – have in itself 'as it is essence' the things that are principles of the proper operation belonging to God: of this sort are understanding and willing. I concede therefore that, when properly calling 'attributes' those things only which, quasi-qualities, perfect in second being a thing presupposed in perfect first being (namely as to every perfection that belongs to the thing as it is substance), [then] in this way intellect and will are not attributes, rather they are certain perfections intrinsic in the essence as it is pre-understood to every quantity and quasi-quality.

This is made clear, because if by some [Henry of Ghent etc.] it is conceded that life or living is not an attribute (because it states such sort of being, not with a quasi accidental suchness, but as if per se contracting the thing, – as man is such sort of animal, because rational), in the same way, since intellect is a certain life and will a certain life, they will not properly be attributes.

Or it is made clear in another way, and better, because this essence as 'this essence' – preceding every quasi-quality – is an intellectual and volitive essence, such that, as rationality is not an attribute in man, so neither is intellectuality in this essence. The is plain from a likeness about the infinite, which I denied elsewhere [d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19] to be properly an attribute, because it states a mode intrinsic to whatever is in God, both substance and any attribute: so intellectuality states a mode intrinsic to this essence (but properly the attributes are wisdom and charity – and in another way the transcendentals, namely truth and goodness).

To the second I say that 'a simple what' is not a punctal simple (as if containing in itself a single sole perfection), but this essence is simple and unlimited, because unlimited not only intensively in one idea but in all that are principles of the proper operations of God, just as created substance is in some way unlimited because it is by identity any such principle of operating. However along with this quasi-extensive illimitation of the divine essence stands simplicity; indeed from infinity does simplicity follow, because the infinite is combinable with nothing as part with part, but yet it can be really the same – although not formally – as any infinite whatever.

97. To the third [n.3] it was responded in distinction 3 [nn.519-520], that certain relations of the second mode are impossible in the same thing, which state an essential order of origin, – but some of the same mode are not impossible, because namely they state an accidental order, as mover to moved. For the moved does not depend on the mover save per accidens, namely as to the act which it receives from it, namely to move, – and therefore, although the will can move itself, yet no same supposit can produce itself; and therefore the relations of producer and produced sufficiently distinguish the supposits really.

98. To Boethius [n.4] I reply that he is thinking of relation of identity according to nature, not formally, as if he is saying that certain relations necessarily require a diversity of nature in the extremes; but this relation – which is a relation of origin – has no such requirement, but identity of nature is compatible with it, and therefore it is ‘quasi of the same thing to itself’ because of the identity of those related in nature, although it [identity] be of distinct to distinct, speaking of the distinction of supposits.

## VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion

99. To the arguments for the opinion of Praepositinus [nn.7-8] I reply:

To the first [n.7] I say that it is true that ‘person is simple as is essence’; however person includes certain things one of which is not formally the other, not so does the essence include, and therefore it is itself totally distinct although person is not itself totally distinct, because of the essence, which is common: for such non formal identity is sufficient in something for this, that the Son be distinct by one and not by the other.

100. To the second [n.8] I say that a concrete – whether it signify or connote – at any rate gives to understand a subsistent in form or nature, but an abstract precisely gives to understand form;<sup>a</sup> but in the matter at hand a subsistent, having paternity, has also with this the divine essence, which is not formally paternity, nor conversely (according as is said in *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3), and therefore to say ‘the Father is distinguished by paternity’, taking Father not adjectivally but substantively for a hypostasis (as the Master takes it in distinction 27 ch.2 n.238<sup>b</sup>), is not to say ‘the Father is himself totally distinct’ first, but by something that is in him, yet giving to understand the whole.<sup>c</sup>

a. [Interpolation] but if this be doubtful to anyone about a concrete adjective, it seems sufficiently certain about a concrete substantive, which either signifies or necessarily connotes a subsistent in the nature that is imported by the abstract of it.

b. *A blank space was left here by Scotus*

c. [Interpolation] for not in the whole same way does Father (as taken substantively) and paternity per se include deity.

## Twenty Seventh Distinction

### Question One

*Whether the Created Word is Actual Intellection*

1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word, and first about the word of a created intellect, whether a created word is actual intellection.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9: “the image of Carthage, in my memory, this word is its;” the image is taken there for the species, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same way the intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual intellection.

2. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 n.20: “the word that sounds outwardly is a sign of the word that shines inwardly;” now the external word is a sign of a thing and not of an intellection, – otherwise anything affirmative would be false in which the same thing is not predicated of itself, because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection of the predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore the word is the object and not actual intellection.

3. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18: “the word is offspring and generated by memory;” now action is not born, but is that by which another is born; therefore the word is something formed by act of understanding and is not the act itself.

4. On the contrary:

In the same place Augustine calls the word knowledge: “the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;” and *On the Trinity* XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: “It is vision from vision and knowledge from knowledge.”

## Question Two

*Whether the Word in Divine Reality State what is Proper to the Generated Person*

5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality state what is proper to the generated person.

That it does not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge with love;” all these [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is too.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Again, word is the term of intellectual operation; not only is ‘to understand’ a personal [property], whereby the Son is produced, but also a common essential; therefore through it is produced the essential word.

6. Moreover, *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” now the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there is formally intelligence as intelligence, so in him there is word as word.

The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to them in turn, – the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore,



just as there is not perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is not perfect intelligence – as it seems – without word formally.

7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is of one thing constituted in being one formal constitutive; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine *On the Faith to Peter* [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), not therefore word; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.

8. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “By that word by which Son,” and each is said relatively.

### Question Three

#### *Whether the Divine Word state a Respect to the Creature*

9. Third it is asked whether the divine word state a respect to the creature.

That it does:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “the Word is the art of the omnipotent God, full of all living ideas;” art states a respect to an artifact; therefore also word to creatures.

10. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respect to creatures; therefore neither does word, because “by that word by which Son.”

#### I. To the First and Second Questions

##### A. The Opinion of Others

##### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. [To the first question] – To the first question it is said that the word is actual intellection, and not any intellection but declarative intellection.

12. For understanding this the following is set down:

The intellect first receives a simple impression (or intellection) from the object, by which received impression the intellect – as it is active – converts itself to itself and to its own act and object, by understanding that it understands; third, there follows an impression of declarative knowledge in the bare converted intellect, and this from the intellect informed with simple knowledge, so that the intellect informed by such knowledge is the idea of impressing declarative knowledge, – and this converted bare intellect is a proper receptive. And between these two intellections, namely the first, which is the idea of impressing, and the second which is the idea impressed, there is a middle disposition that is an action of the genus of action, which is indicated by this, which is ‘to say’; for this ‘to say’ is to express or impress declarative knowledge of simple knowledge, – and so this ‘declarative knowledge’, impressed on the converted bare intellect and being the term of this act of saying, is the word.

13. Not then is any actual intellection the word, but that which is declarative, which presupposes simple actual intellection and actual conversion to it, and which is

born in the act of saying, whose active principle is simple knowledge and whose receptive principle is the converted bare intellect.

14. [To the second question] – Agreeably with this a response is given to the second question [n.5], that the intellect of the Father is first informed with quasi simple knowledge of the essence, to which it was quasi merely in passive potency, and, when made in this act of ‘simple knowledge’, it is as bare turned back on itself thus informed; and on it converted, as if on a passive disposed, is impressed declarative knowledge by virtue of simple actual knowledge, which declarative knowledge and term of the act of saying is the word [cf. Ord. I d.2 nn.277-279]. And according to this, it is plain that the word is the term of generation as also of the Son, and so it will be proper to the second person.

15. This opinion [nn.12,14] was recited above in distinction 2 nn.273-277, 280, in the question ‘On the two Productions’.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

### a. As to the First Question

16. Against this opinion – as to the first question [n.12] – I argue first, because it seems irrational to posit that the same power is active with respect to one of its acts and passive with respect to another act, because from this it seems that it is not a power of the same idea. For any power of one idea imports a like disposition of the power to the object: for sight is not active with respect to one act of seeing and passive with respect to another; hence any act of a single power has a like disposition of the power to the object. Therefore if the intellect is only passive with respect to simple knowledge of a stone, and perfectly active with respect to conversion – which is second act – whereby it understands that it understands a stone, it will not (as it seems) be one power; it also seems unacceptable that it could not have some activity with respect to a more imperfect act and yet could be the total active principle with respect to a more perfect act (and it is posited by some that that conversion is a more perfect act than simple intellection).

17. As to what is added afterwards, that actual intellection is the reason for generating declarative knowledge [n.12], this seems to be unacceptable in us, because a more imperfect form cannot be a perfect reason for generating the perfect; but the first knowledge in us is confused and more imperfect than distinct knowledge; therefore etc.

18. Besides, if the first is the reason for generating the second knowledge [distinct or declarative knowledge] – either when the first is not, and then a non-being will be reason for acting, or when it is, and then they [sc. first and second knowledge] will be either of the same idea or of different idea; if in the second way [sc. of different idea], and the first is more imperfect than the second, then it is not the principle for generating the second, because the more imperfect is not a principle for producing the more perfect (hence in equivocal production always is the cause more perfect than the effect); if in the first way [sc. of the same idea], then two acts of understanding of the same species will be in the same intellect or in the same power (and with respect to the same object), because memory and intelligence are one power.

19. Again,<sup>a</sup> then a trinity would not be posited in the mind according as it is mind, because the mind will not have any proper activity according as it is mind, but precisely according to an accident of it through an accident (which is simple knowledge), just as

neither does wood have any activity with respect to the heating that is attributed to it through the heat that is an accident of it through an accident; and so it seems Augustine in vain sought for parent and offspring in the mind ‘according as it is mind’, because the idea of parent does not seem to belong to the soul according to anything in it, but according to some accident precisely, which is imprinted on it by the object.

a. [Interpolation] Further, as to any reflexive act of the intellect, some more perfect direct act can be had, because a direct act of the intellect – by which it understands quiddity – is more perfect than the act by which it understands its own understanding, because it has a more noble object; therefore since the word is perfect knowledge of the thing, it does not include the act by which [the intellect] knows that it knows.

20. Further, to generate a word is not an act of intelligence but of memory, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.24; but every actual intellection is of intelligence, not of memory, according to him *ibid.* XIV ch.7 n.10; therefore no actual intellection is the reason for generating a word.

21. Further, what [the opinion] says about conversion, that it is necessarily previous to generation of the word [n.12], seems to be against Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.16 n.26, where he seems to say that our most perfect word will be in the fatherland with respect to the beatific object, – and yet that act will not be a conversive one, because the beatific vision does not have any created thing for immediate object (but every conversive act in us has something created for object, as the act or the power); nor does that vision presuppose conversion, because if that vision is the effect of the divine essence alone (or of the intellect cooperating with the divine essence), it naturally precedes the conversion of the intellect to its own understanding.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] Again, as confused intellection is to an object confusedly presented, so is distinct intellection to distinctly presented, – nor will it be a word of the object but of the act.

22. Also as what it says that [the intellect], as it is converting, is merely active and yet, as converted, it is purely passive with respect to the generated knowledge that is the word, – it seems thoroughly irrational that the same thing under the idea under which it is ‘active’ is only passive with respect to an act of the same idea, or that insofar as it is purely ‘passive’ it is active with respect to an act of the same idea; but the intellect, insofar as it receives simple knowledge, is only passive and, insofar as it converts, it is only active; therefore it seems that it is unacceptable that insofar as it converts it is passive with respect to generation of the word, and insofar as it has simple knowledge it is active with respect to the same generation.

#### b. As to the Second Question

23. Against that too which it says to the second question can the same objection, it seems, be made, because the intellect of the Father ‘as it is converting’ is purely active and ‘as having simple knowledge’ it is purely passive, according to him [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.60 q.4 ad1]; therefore it seems unacceptable that ‘as converted’ it be that as from which the word is generated, and ‘as knowing with simple knowledge’ it be the reason for generating the word quasi-actively.

24. Further, some say that this conversion of the intellect is a quasi disposition of matter, – which seems unacceptable, because the disposition of matter is not more perfect nor as equally perfect as the active form of the agent; but this conversion is as equally perfect as simple knowledge, or more perfect; therefore etc.

25. Further, this conversion is with respect to first act as object, – therefore it is declarative knowledge of that act, just as any knowledge declares the object of which it is; therefore, before the generation of the word that follows this conversion (according to him [Henry]), declarative knowledge of first act is had, and so a word before the word

26. Again, this opinion as to this, that it posits the intellection of the Father to be the reason for generating the word, was refuted above in distinction 2 nn.291-296, in the aforesaid question ‘About Productions’, and as to this, that it posits the intellect of the Father to be that from which [the word] is generated, it was refuted in the same place, nn.283, 285, and also in distinction 5 nn.72-75; and I repeat one of the arguments touched on there.

Because the intellect, as converted, is of some supposit; for this conversion is, according to him, a certain action of understanding [n.12], and acts are of suppositis; therefore conversion is of some supposit. I ask whose supposit it is as it is converted? If the Word’s, and ‘as it is converted’ it precedes generation (according to him [n.25]), then it precedes the Word, and so the Word is before the Word. If this conversion is the Father’s, and whose it is ‘as it is converted’ is his as from whom it is generated by impression, and whose it is ‘as from whom something is generated by impression’ is his as it is impressed on him and consequently is his ‘as he has that impressed thing’ – then, from the first to the last, it follows that the intellect of the Father ‘as Father’ formally has generated knowledge impressed on him, and so the Father formally understands by generated knowledge, contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2.

27. It is replied that, just as in generation in creatures there are three moments of nature to distinguish, the first in which matter is under the form to be corrupted, the second in which the matter is under no form but is quasi bare and in proximate potency to the form to be generated, and the third in which it is under the form of the generated thing, – so can it correspondingly be said in divine reality, that the intellect in the first moment, as it is in the Father, is thus being converted on itself, and this conversion is a quasi disposition of matter for generation of the Son; in the second moment, in which it is as it were of no person, it is then in proximate potency to the term of generation; and in the third moment, in which it is under the property of the generated person, it is then of that person.

28. An example is posited: if wine is in proximate potency to vinegar (so that the form of wine is pre-required by natural order in the matter so that it be in proximate potency with respect to vinegar), if along with this the matter of wine were not limited to these two forms and consequently neither of them, when induced, would expel the other, and if along with this each were hypostatic [forms], giving personal being – then vinegar would be generated from matter ‘as it was of the wine’ as if from matter disposed with a previous disposition necessarily preceding this form. But if it were asked of what it is as vinegar is immediately generated from it, – the response is that it is none but is generated from it immediately as matter is under neither hypostatic form.

29. Hereby to the argument here in the matter at hand [n.26]: it is conceded that it [the intellect as converted] is the Father's, like the matter is the wine's as it is disposed to the form of vinegar.

30. And when it is argued 'therefore as it is the Father's it receives generated knowledge' [n.26], the consequence is denied; indeed, by this, that it receives generated knowledge, it is of another subsistent, and even what the Word is immediately generated from is not as of the Father but as converted.

31. And if against this it be objected that [the word] is not more generated from the intellect as it is of the Father than from the intellect as it is of the Son and the Holy Spirit, – the consequence is denied, because there is a double 'as' there. One that indicates the idea of immediate principle 'from which' – and thus is [the word] generated from it as it is no one's, as from the immediate receptive, which indicates the idea of what is disposed to the form that is the term, although it not be the idea of the immediate receptive absolutely; therefore the word is generated from the intellect as it is no one's, but as it was first of the Father and first existent in the Father, such that neither reduplication [sc. reduplication of 'as'] is precisely without the other. And yet by the fact the Word is generated from it [sc. the intellect], it is not in the subsistence of the Word nor of the Father nor of no one.

32. But it is added that some are deceived when arguing against this opinion 'from which, as from matter or quasi-matter', as if imagining to be there [sc. in God] a distinction of passive quasi-potency from act, – which is not true, the way it is held generally by certain people about the attributes; but only, just as there is wisdom there formally and goodness formally without distinction, so it is posited that there is truly impression there and truly the one impressing, – and that everything that is said there is without distinction: and the distinction of these things is only by act of intellect busying itself about the same one thing that is in reality.

33. Against these [arguments; nn.27-32]:

Generation in creatures seems to be change formally, to the extent that matter is understood as of nothing before but afterwards under the form of what is generated; for by this it is understood to be changed from privation to form, which change is formally generation-change. Therefore if under this idea passive potency be posited in divine reality, then there will be true change in divine reality.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] at any rate in the busying intellect, and so necessarily imperfection; or if only by act of the busying intellect this conversion and generating of the word come to be, the word will not be a real person real but only of reason and intentional.

34. The reason is confirmed in their example [n.28], because although the wine not be corrupted in the generation of vinegar, yet truly would the generation be a change from privation to form, although there would not concur with it the other change 'from form to privation', as now commonly happens when one thing is generated and another corrupted: for then commonly concur there two changes and four terms (two forms and two privations), but – with one of the changes and its terms removed – the other change would no less exist; therefore so will it be in the matter at hand, that it, insofar as it is of none before (and thus is under privation of the term 'to which' and afterwards under that term), that it changes.

35. Further, if first it is of the Father and second of none, and third is of the Son by the fact it receives the impressed knowledge (therefore by the fact it is of the Son, because it is quasi-potential, receiving the formal [element] of the Son [nn.27, 30]), and is of the Son as the formal term communicated to the Son by generation (as was shown in distinction 5 nn.64-85), – therefore the Son will have intellect in a double way of having, such that, with either of these ways removed, he would no less have it in the other way of having: just as in creatures the composite has matter as something of itself, and truly has it, although it not be the formal term of generation; also the same composite has the form as something of itself, and truly has it, although it not be the subject of generation.

36. But the consequent inferred, namely that the Son has the essence in two ways of having, seems impossible, both in reality and in the consideration of the busying intellect. It is also proved by this, that what is the material of generation is in potency to the formal term of the same generation; but the same thing, under the same idea, is neither in reality nor in the intellect in potency to itself; therefore neither will the intellect be at the same time the receptive potency and the formal term of the same generation.

37. And as to what is added about the double ‘as’ on the part of the matter, as if for that ‘as’, which is the idea of the proximate susceptible factor, is necessarily pre-required the ‘as’ that is of the same ‘as’ under the form ordered to the form of generating [n.31], – it does not seem to be per se in creatures, because if the matter which is under the form of wine were posited without any form and a created agent could act on it as denuded of form, it would be the proximate receptive of any form of a nature to be impressed on pure matter, and by any sufficient agent at all could such a form be induced. Therefore the second ‘as’ is precisely sufficient in creatures for proximate potency, although frequently now that order be concomitant, because never is matter without form, and as it is under form it is not changed indifferently from any form to any form – by a created agent – but from determinate form to determinate form; this is proved, because when it is understood as of nothing, then it is not under the prior form, which is posited as if the disposition for the form of generating [nn.27-29]: so its order then to that form is only a relation of posterior to prior, which perhaps is not a positive relation (because the term ‘to which’ is not then of the nature of the thing), or if it is a real relation, it does not seem to be the proper reason in matter for receiving the form to be induced. – From these points to the matter at hand, it seems that although the intellect should be prior in origin in the Father than in the Son, yet if it were posited as receptive of generated knowledge, it would be posited such, not essentially because of any such order to existence in the Father, but according as it is precisely of none and according as they themselves say ‘quasi of none’.

38. What also is added to exclude a deception [n.32], seems to be the statement of one deceived, because that statement seems in itself absurd and to destroy itself.

39. The first point is proved by this, because then as truly is the intellect in the nature of the thing a passive power, and as truly does it receive, as God is from the nature of the thing truly act and wise and good, – which seems absurd, because what in creatures necessarily has imperfection annexed, or is an imperfection (as is the idea of passive potency, because it always states imperfection insofar as it divides being against active potency), is as truly posited in God as what is perfection simply.

40. And if you say, on the contrary passive power states a perfection, although not distinct from act, – this seems to be a fiction, because nothing is in creatures lower than

the idea of passive power: for this idea truly belongs to prime matter, which is posited the lowest of beings; therefore more truly can it be said that God is formally a stone than passive potency if, because of some perfection in the idea of passive potency, passive potency ought there to be formally posited.

41. Second I prove that this statement destroys itself [n.38], because it does not seem intelligible for opposite relations to be there without there being, as opposite relations, so distinct relations (if real, really, – if of reason, by reason); so if, from the nature of the thing, there is there what impresses and what is impressed and that on which it is impressed (which cannot be understood without relation), to posit them there from the nature of the thing without any distinction is a contradiction.

## B. Scotus' own Response

### 1. To the First Question

42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions.

To the first. – Because the idea of the word we chiefly take from Augustine, in the book *On the Trinity*, certain definite things must be supposed that according to him belong to the word;<sup>a</sup> from these must be investigated what is in the intellect to which they most belong, and that is to be set down as the word.

a. [*Interpolation*] and second, through division, they are to be removed from everything that is not the word (as the Philosopher does in *Ethics* 2.5.1105b19-06a13 for seeking the genus of virtue, where he divides that which is in the soul into powers, passions, and habits); third, with those things removed that do not belong to what is being investigated.

43. The word according to him<sup>a</sup> is not without actual thought, as is plain from *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25.

b. [*Interpolation*] is an act of intelligence, as is plain from him by comparing the trinity he posits in *ibid.* IX to the trinity that he posits in *ibid.* X (for knowledge corresponds to intelligence). Also the word...

44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science, or from the object shining forth in science, as is plain from him in *ibid.* XV ch.10 n.19: “Thought formed by the thing we know is the word;” and ch.14 n.24: “Our word is born from our science in the way the word of God is born from the science alone of the Father.” And all these are the same, because according to him *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18: “from the knower and known together is knowledge born,” which two are one integral cause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said in distinction 3 question 2 n.494.<sup>a</sup>

a. A blank space was left here by Scotus.

45. Third, the word is inquired into by him on account of an image in the mind and it is set down as the second part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plain from him *ibid.* IX ch.32: “There is a certain image of the Trinity; the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring and its word from its very self), and love third.”

46. The description therefore of the word could be, that the word is an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not having being without actual intellection, representing the divine word (for because of this did Augustine inquire about our word).

47. From these it is apparent that the word is nothing pertaining to the will, nor to memory (because it is the second part of the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is not intelligible species nor habit, nor anything pertaining to memory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object terminating the intellection, or [3] according to others the species generated in intelligence from the species in memory, which ‘species in intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or [4] according to others something formed by act of understanding, or fifth [5] according to others intellection itself as passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.<sup>4</sup>

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because it is superfluous to posit such a species. For it would not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.

50. But that [it does not represent] ‘more perfectly’ is plain from Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23: “There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent.”

51. Also then two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same idea; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is the same first act, both what the haver operates by and what the haver of first act is in second act by [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.580, 578].

52. Then too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental potency to acting according to that habit, because a form would be required prior to operation, other than the habit.

53. Nor could this ‘species in the intelligence’ be posited to be born naturally, if it never could be without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to command of the will; nor too could it be said to be born freely or its generation to be subject to command of the will – as it seems – if it be posited a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object according to itself is not something produced by virtue of memory (or of something in the mind), of which sort the word is, – nor is the object ‘as in memory’ produced by virtue of memory, as is plain; and the object ‘as in the intelligence’ is not generated save because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the Vatican editors the first opinion is of Henry of Ghent and Scotus himself; the second of an unknown author; the third of Roger Marston; the fourth of Giles of Rome; the fifth of William of Ware.



55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not an action productive of some term; for then it would be impossible to understand it to be and not to be of the term, just as it is impossible to understand that there is heating and no heat for which the heating is. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56. There is confirmation too, because such operations must be ultimate acts, from *Ethics* 1.1.1094a3-5 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a-b1. – This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, how there is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort is intellection [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.600-604].

57. This way is also rejected, and the following one about intellection-passion [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, because then intelligence, and not memory, would generate the word, which is against Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any – and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.

58. This way too ‘about intellection-action and passion’ [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet from this it does not have such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or be the term of action according to this [sc. the subject] and not according to that [sc. the agent]; because if it be the term of action, this is according to itself and not according to this respect or according to that, but these respects are concomitants of it.

59. It follows, therefore, by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60. And it is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and thence formed, is our word.” The same is held by him in *ibid.* ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc. “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].

61. And this is confirmed through a likeness about vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear that which is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone understanding insofar as he is understanding but through another middle power (namely a motive one), this is a mark of imperfection; if therefore it were at once generated or formed as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the intellect understanding, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it there is at once caused some actual intellection, which may generated express and make clear the object there latent, – truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent, and generated by virtue of it for expressing it.

#### b. Whether any Actual Intellection whatever be the Word

62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actual intellection at all be the word.

63. [*Opinions of others*] – To this it is said that no, but it is necessary to add – as a specific difference – ‘[intellection] which is declarative’ [n.11].

64. I argue against this because in the Father there is declarative knowledge formally, – for the intellection that is in the Father ‘insofar as he is intelligence’ is

declarative of the Father ‘insofar as he is memory’, and thus perfectly, just as actual intellection ‘as it is in the Son’ declares habitual [intellection] as in the memory of the Son; in the Father, however, there is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution of the question [n.71].

65. Similarly, the word declares itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4: “If,” he says, “this temporal word that we pronounce manifests both itself and that of which we are speaking, how much more does the word of God” etc. also manifest itself? ‘To declare’ then does not state a real relation, nor consequently the relation of the generated; and the word is only generated intellection (*ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited in the Father formally.

66. In another way it is said, as to this article [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge ‘which is the term of inquiry’.

67. Which is shown through Augustine *ibid.*, where it is said that a word is what is born or offspring; and it is born because it is found, – but it is not found save because inquired into; hence [Augustine] means that this born from the mind is preceded by appetite impelling to inquire.

68. He seems to mean the same in *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25 when thus saying: “Then a true word comes to be when that which I said ‘drives us by a certain revolving motion’ comes to that which we know, and is thence formed, taking on its likeness in every way, so that the way each thing is known so may it also be thought;” this ‘revolving thinking’ is inquiry, of the sort that will not be in the fatherland, as he indicates [*ibid.* ch.16 n.26]: “Perhaps there will not be revolving thoughts there.”

69. Then it is posited that after confused knowledge follows inquiry by division and argumentation, and finally perfect knowledge is reached, which is as it were begotten in this inquiry; and the perfect knowledge which is the term of inquiry is the word.

70. Against this I argue as follows: if it is of the idea of the word ‘to be born by inquiry’, then God does not have a word; second, then an angel does not have a word about things naturally known to him; third, then a blessed does not have a word about the divine essence, nor about anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth, therefore he who has the perfect habit of science cannot, when immediately operating through the habit, have a word, – all which things seem absurd.

71. [Scotus’ own opinion] – Therefore, omitting these opinions, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actual intellection at all is a word (as was proved against the way that posits ‘declarative’ to be proper to the word [nn.64-65]), but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father there is not word formally.

72. Now any generated knowledge – which Augustine calls offspring – is a word, though not in the way Augustine posits a perfect word, namely which represents the divine word [nn.45-46].

73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generated knowledge is a word], because any actual intellection is generated from memory, imperfect from imperfect just as perfect from perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring and expressive of the parent, and is generated for expressing the parent. – And this is confirmed first from Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Everything that is known is called a word impressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory;” again *ibid.* XV ch.12 n.22: “Nor does it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it; for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it.” And briefly, whatever difference may be

found between the first generated imperfect knowledge and that which follows inquiry, there is not a formal difference because of which the latter could be called word and the former not, as it seems.

74. I make the second clear [sc. not just any generated knowledge is the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does not at once have perfect knowledge of the object, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.1.184a16-23, the way inborn in us is of proceeding from confused to distinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, is impressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before a distinct one, – and therefore inquiry is necessary for this, so that our intellect may come to distinct knowledge; and therefore is inquiry necessary on the way to the perfect word, because there is no perfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.

75. So therefore it needs to be understood that when some object is known confusedly inquiry follows – by way of division – of the differences belonging to it; and when all the differences are found, definitive knowledge of the object is actual perfect knowledge and perfectly declarative of the habitual knowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitive knowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.

76. This does Augustine say *ibid.* IX ch.10 n.15: “I define what intemperance is, and this is its word;” and in the same place Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what was already above set down: “as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” [n.73] – that is distinctly and definitively actually known, by virtue of that which is in memory.

77. It is not therefore of the idea of a word to be begotten after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect – which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of the object – to have such knowledge after inquiry; and therefore a perfect word is not in us without inquiry. And yet when a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is not the generation of the word formally, but as it were on the way to this, so that the word may be generated; which Augustine well indicates in the afore cited authority [n.68] “hither and thither in fleeting thought” etc. “when it comes to that which we know and thence is formed,” it is the word etc., – indicating that this agitation (that is, inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but the generation of the word follows from that which we know, that is, from the object habitually known in memory.

78. And if it be objected ‘for what then is inquiry necessary?’ – it could to this be said that motion is necessary for this purpose, that a perfect form may be induced which could not be induced at the beginning of the motion, or there is the bringing in of many forms ordered to the inducing of the final form, and without that order of forms the final form could not at once be induced. And according to this is posited this order: first there is habitual confused knowledge, second actual confused intellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many words of many habitual knowledges virtually contained in memory), on which inquiry follows distinct and actual knowledge of the first object the knowledge of which is being inquired into, – which ‘actual distinct’ knowledge impresses perfect habitual [knowledge] on memory, and then first is there perfect memory and it is made like the memory in the Father; ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word, without inquiry mediating between it and the word, – and this generation is likened to the generation of the perfect divine word, from perfect paternal memory. No word then is perfect, representing the divine word (which Augustine chiefly is investigating), save that which is born of perfect memory without inquiry intermediate

between such memory and such word, although neither could that memory be had by us – because of the imperfection of our intellect – unless inquiry precede.

### c. Whether Will be Concurrent for the Idea of Word

79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whether for the idea of the word the will is concurrent, – namely whether it is of its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by an agent will ‘joining intelligence with memory’, according to what Augustine says in many places.

80. This question Augustine moves in *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Rightly,” he says, “is it asked whether all knowledge is a word, or only loved knowledge;” and he replies: “Not everything that they in any way touch on is conceived, but other things that they may only be known and yet not be called words – as things that displease must be called neither conceived nor born;” “in another way everything that is known is called a word, as long as it can be pronounced or defined from memory, although the thing itself displease.” And afterwards he adds: “However, although the things we hate displease, the knowledge of them does not displease us,” – so that it is not of the idea of a word to be generated by love of the object known, nor even to be generated by love of knowledge that the word is.

81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act of will: one previous, whereby the act and the preceding inquiry are commanded, without which the perfect word would not be reached (as is plain in *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), and the other in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledge already had, without which the intellect would not persist in the knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not of the essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but it is concomitant necessarily with the generation of it in us because of the previous search for it and the continuation of it; likewise because of this, that the intellect – if the will were not well pleased with this knowledge – would not remain in it, and so this knowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yet this permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of the word intensively, because no less perfect is a whiteness of one day than of one year [Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.4.1096b4-5]; but a will respecting an object – of which there is a word – does not pertain to the idea of the word, save when taking word strictly, the way Augustine treats of it in the afore cited chapter [n.80], “No one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ if not in the Holy Spirit” (this ‘say’ includes acceptance of the object said and adds something beyond the idea of word absolutely).

## 2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3].

As to the first [n.1] it is plain that the authority needs exposition. For he [Augustine] says there: “the image itself of it” (namely of Carthage) “in my memory is its word;” but it is plain – according to him *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25 – that the word is not formally in the memory; therefore it is necessary that it be understood causally, not formally.

83. To the second [n.2]. Although there is much altercation about ‘vocal sound’, whether it is a sign of a thing or a concept, yet I concede briefly that that which is signified properly by a vocal sound is the thing. However ordered signs of the same

signified thing are letter, vocal sound and concept, just as there are many ordered effects of the same cause, of which none is cause of another, as is plain of the sun illumining many parts of the medium; and where there is such an order of things caused, without this that one is cause of another, there is an immediacy there of any of them in respect of the same cause, excluding another in idea of cause but not excluding another in idea of more immediate effect. And then it could be conceded that in some way a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properly, but because of the priority that exists among such effects to the cause; so can it be conceded about many ordered signs of the same thing signified, that one is in some sense sign of another (because it gives to understand it), because a remoter one would not signify unless a prior were in some way to signify more immediately, – and yet, for this reason, one is properly not a sign of the other as [it is], on the other side, about cause and caused.

84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is the offspring and truly generated, namely actual intellection, – but that is not an action of the genus of action (because, as said above d.3 nn.600-604, actual intellection is not an action of the genus of action), but it is a quality that is of a nature to be term of the sort of action which is signified by this, which is to ‘say’ and – in general – by this, which is to ‘elicit’. A word, then, is not something produced by an action that is intellection, because the intellection is not productive of anything, but is itself produced by an action that is of the genus of action, as was said above [*ibid.*]

### 3. To the Second Question

85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete and abstract per se signify the same thing, although in another way of signifying, as son and filiation, – because just as filiation signifies a relation of the genus of relation, so does son (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit), and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies the same as such a subsistent thing. So therefore do word and the abstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract – if it were named – would be ‘word-ness’, which indicates a relation formally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression of something of the intellect); but just as son connotes a living nature, in which there is such relation, so word connotes actual knowledge, of which it is such expression; therefore since in divine reality ‘to be intellectually expressed’ is the property of the second person, it follows that the word is there purely personal, and it signifies a personal property.

86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is not the Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfect memory (namely as intellect having the actually intelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ [nn.291-293, 221, 310].

87. It is plain too that the word does not have anything from which it is produced, from distinction 5 nn.80-82, – because if the productive principle have virtue sufficient for producing a per se subsistent, it produces such a subsistent, and especially if such subsistent not be of a nature to inhere in anything; but this expressed knowledge is not of a nature to inhere in anything, therefore it is of a nature to subsist per se; and the productive principle of it is of sufficient virtue, therefore etc.

### 4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

88. To the Arguments [nn.5-7].

When it is argued first from Augustine, “the word is with known love” [n.5], I say that his saying ‘with love’ is a circumlocution for generated knowledge in us, because love does not have causality with respect to the word save as to command the generating of it, as was said in the preceding question [n.81]. But in divine reality the word is knowledge naturally expressed, because that the will in us has causality with respect to generating the word by its command, this is a mark of imperfection in our intellect because it does not immediately have a perfect word; and as to how the will is disposed in God and in us was stated in distinction 6 nn.16-29.

89. To the other – from *On the Trinity* XV [n.6] – I concede that in the Father there is intelligence formally, but I deny this, that ‘every act of intelligence formally is a word’, because this is not true save of the intelligence that can have some generated act or generated knowledge; such an act can intelligence not have as it belongs to the Father, because the Father is of himself and has nothing by generation. Yet it can be conceded that the actual intellection of the Father is as it were generated by virtue of memory as it is in the Father, but it is not truly generated, because it is not distinct.

90. To the third [n.7] I say that they are not two properties but the same, because ‘son’ and ‘word’ per se signify the same relation, although they connote different things (namely ‘son’ living nature in general, and ‘word’ actually expressed knowledge [n.85]). These connotations are not always the same, but the signified passive relation is always the same.

## II. To the Third Question

### A. The Opinion of Others

91. To the third question [n.9] it is said that yes [sc. that the divine word does state a respect to creatures], because of the authority of Augustine 83 *Questions* question 63, where speaking of the beginning of John’s *Gospel* he says: “*Logos* we translate better in this place as ‘word’” (than as ‘reason’), “so that there may be signified not only a respect to the Father but also to the things that are made through the word by his operative power.”

92. Added as well is that the word states a proper respect to creatures, because a word is of its idea declarative knowledge; therefore it belongs to it of its idea ‘to declare’ things.

93. Appropriated also to the Son is relation to creatures: but the appropriation is only made because of the agreement of such appropriated thing with the property of the person to whom it is appropriated. And it is made clear by a likeness about gift.

94. And in a similar way is it posited that just as there gift, as it connotes an aptitudinal relation, pertains to the property of the Holy Spirit, so the word, as it states an aptitudinal relation – not an actual or habitual one –, pertains to the second person.

### B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus’ own Response

95. Against this it can be argued as was argued above about gift [Appendix, d.18], that no respect to creatures is a property of a divine person nor is per se included in any

property of a divine person, and just as it was rejected there so can it be rejected here, – which I concede.

96. And then there is no force [sc. to the question] save about the name ‘word’. For formally the respect of expressed knowledge to the one expressing it is different from its respect to the creature declared; and not only this, but also the respect of the expressed word to the one expressing it, and the respect of the same as declaring to the same as declared, are two respects, because the first is real and the second of reason. And these two do not make anything per se one, because a true thing and a being of reason constitute nothing ‘one per se;’ and therefore if both these respects are signified by one name, not for this reason do they make ‘one per se’ concept, but one of the two is precisely the property of the second person (namely the passive expression, which is a real respect), and the other – namely the respect of the declarative – is only a respect of reason, whether it be to the Father declared or to the creature declared. This was otherwise touched on above through the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4, where he means that the word declares itself, – and the same *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23: “The Father is perfectly saying himself,” that is perfectly declaring himself etc.;<sup>a</sup> from which two authorities it is plain that the same can be referred to itself as declarer to declared, and consequently it is not a real relation.

a. [Interpolation] “The Father, as if saying himself, has begotten a word equal to himself in everything; for he would not have perfectly said himself if something less or more was in his word than in himself;” and *ibid.* VII ch.1 n.1: “With a word, equal to himself, he is always saying himself.”

97. But with this posited about these respects in themselves, that one is a property and the other not, what will be said about this noun ‘word’, – does it signify both or one?

And then indeed it seems that the word per se and first signifies that real respect, because the abstract of it – as was said [n.85] – and its concrete first signify the same thing; but because it connotes perfect knowledge, by which knowledge it has a respect of reason to what is known through it, therefore it also connotes – as if still more remotely – the idea of the ‘declarative’. And so the word will signify the property of the second person, although it connote something absolute in that person (which is as it were the formal term of the production of that person) and, with it in between, it will as if more remotely connote a respect to all that to which the absolute can have a respect of reason, namely to all things declared.

### C. To the Principal Argument

98. To Augustine *On the Trinity* VI [n.9] I concede that the Word or Son is the art of the Father; thus too is he called the wisdom of the Father and the virtue [*I Corinthians* 1.23-24], and yet just as the Father is formally wisdom and virtue, so also is the Father formally art; for if he formally creates, and this as artisan, the creative principle is formally in the Father, – and so the respect of art to creatures ‘as to artifacts’ is common to the three, although it be appropriated to the Son, just as to him is wisdom appropriated because of suitability with his production.

### D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

99. To the remark – on behalf of the opinion – from 83 *Questions* question 63 [n.91], it can be said that *logos* (in Greek) is better translated through that which is ‘word’ than through that which is ‘reason’, because reason does not thus signify a respect to the Father as word does, nor does it thus connote a respect to what is declared as word does. Now Augustine does not mean to say that word states essentially a relation to the creature under the idea of what is declarative, because he says “so that not only is a respect to the Father signified but also to those things that through the word are made operative power;” but the word is not called the ‘operative power’ of the Father save as it is called the wisdom and art of the Father, which are not his save by appropriation. Or if Augustine intend that this name ‘word’ signify both respects, then it does not signify precisely the property of the second person but, along with this, another appropriated respect; and then the translation of *logos* into ‘word’, not into ‘reason’, is fitting, because ‘reason’ thus signifies neither a proper nor an appropriated respect. The translation into ‘word’ is indeed true (for the reason that it says more than the property of a person), nor does Augustine say that the translation is into something that signifies a property of the second person.

100. When is added that it asserts a respect to creatures, proper to itself [n.92], – this seems much more false than the conclusion opposite to it which I maintain [nn.95, 98, 100], because not only is relation to creatures not included in the essential idea of any person, but neither can it in any way pertain to any person without uniformly pertaining to the whole Trinity, because the whole Trinity is uniformly disposed to everything other than itself, according to any being whatever, whether being in reality or intelligible being.

101. And when it is proved through ‘declarative’ [n.92], I say that the actual intellection of the Father is declarative. Nor is ‘declarative’ the proper idea of the word, but ‘declarative’ is concomitant with expressed knowledge, because that expressing is of actual knowledge; and therefore declarative is appropriated to it, although it not be a property of it.

102. When afterwards it is proved that ‘appropriation is only made because of agreement with what is proper’ [n.93], it does not follow – from this – that the appropriated is proper, but the opposite; and I concede that what is proper to the Son – which is ‘to be expressed’ – has an agreement with wisdom and the declarative, and with art, to the extent that this expression is of something by way of intellect and by virtue of intellect; and such expression is of actual knowledge, whose job it is to make clear the habitual knowledge from which it is expressed [n.64].

#### E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word

103. Here, however, there is a difficulty (better than to be about ‘the idea of declarative’), whether the word is expressed by virtue of the paternal intellect not only about the divine essence as object present to the intellect of the Father, but about other intelligibles, so that thus it have a respect to creatures not as they are in themselves but as they have being in the paternal intellect first in origin (as it seems) before the word is expressed. And then it would have to them the relation of what is expressed; for it would then be a word expressed not only from the essence as it is an object for the intellect of the Father, but also from other intelligibles. – But about this difficulty elsewhere, in the



question ‘On the Uniform Relation of the Trinity to what is Other than Itself’ [*Ord.* II d.1 q.1 nn.12-19].<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Whether by natural reason it can be known that the word is not an ‘essential’ in divine reality.

That not: for then the Trinity would be known by natural reason; again, in a creature the word is equally of any supposit in nature.

On the contrary: it is known that it is not necessary that the first person is the word, – it is another person.

Solution:

To that about negation it is plain, because the concept of a term – whether true in itself or not – shows that the negation of an affirmative can be demonstrated. It cannot because of an effect causing a common concept. The non-impossible can be known and anything contrary solved.

Whether the idea of Word is prior to the idea of Son in the second person.

That it is: it is more per se term of the productive principle (on the contrary: no prior knowledge).

On the contrary: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 [“He is Word by that by which he is Son”].

Opinion: intellectual nature. – On the contrary: nature thus states a mode of active principle.

Solution: the Son is subsistent in intellectual nature, generated by virtue of a nature of the same idea, existing in the first person (Hilary, *On the Trinity* V n37 [“For not by cutting or extension or derivation is he God from God, but by virtue of nature in the same nature does he by nativity subsist.”]).

## Twenty Eighth Distinction

### Question One

*Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is the Property of the Father*

1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask whether ‘unbegotten’ is the property of the Father.

That it is not:

No property is formally asserted of the essence, because then it would not distinguish, just as neither does the essence, which is not called formally begetter nor begotten, nor spirator nor spirated; but the essence, as it seems, formally is unbegotten; therefore ‘unbegotten’ is not a property of any person. – The Holy Spirit too, as I will prove, is formally unbegotten; therefore etc.

Proof of the assumption, because the essence is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten (the consequence is plain from the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 10.2020-21: “On the negative about a finite predicate follows the affirmative about an infinite predicate”), – and further, therefore it is unbegotten (this consequence is proved through

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8 where he says that the same is ‘unbegotten’ and ‘non-begotten’). And similarly can it be argued about the Holy Spirit: ‘if he is not begotten then he is non-begotten’.

2. Further, every personal property is relative, because whatever is said for itself is common to the three (from *ibid.* V ch.8 n.9); now unbegotten does not state a relation, as I will prove; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor, because if it does, then everything unbegotten is related. This is true: ‘everything begotten is related’; this I convert by contraposition: ‘therefore everything non-related is non-begotten’.<sup>5</sup> Then I argue: everything non-begotten is related, everything non-related is non-begotten, therefore everything non-related is related. The conclusion is impossible, therefore also one of the premises; not that which follows from a true proposition by conversion through contraposition [sc. ‘everything non-related is non-begotten’], therefore the other one [sc. ‘everything non-begotten is related’].

3. Again, if ‘unborn-ability’ were a property of the Father, then ‘unspirat-ability’ would be a property of the Father and the Son, and so there would be six notions [sc. in divine reality], which is commonly denied.<sup>6</sup>

4. Further, Ambrose *On the Holy Spirit* IV [*On the Incarnation* ch.8 nn.79-80] refused to use the name ‘unbegotten’, as the Master says in the text [*Sent.* I d.28 ch.4 n.249].

5. The opposite:

Augustine to Orosius [Ps.-Augustine, *Dialogue of 65 Questions* q.2]: “Sure faith declares that there are not two unbegottens.”

## Question Two

### *Whether Unborn-ability is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality*

6. Next after this I ask whether innascibility [sc. ‘being unable-to-be-born’] is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality.

That it is:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: Everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides ingeneration and generation and spiration.” But it is plain that he [sc. Damascene] is not excluding all personal properties (because then in the Father there would not be any property besides innascibility), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in idea of constitutive personal property; therefore it is necessary that all and only these are such relations; therefore ingeneration is a property constitutive of the first person.

7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore innascibility is paternity.

8. Again, Praepositinus [*Summa* I q.14] argues thus: “By what the Father is Father, he is this person, – by what he is this person, he is innascible.”

9. Again, it is worthier to have [something] not from another than to communicate it to another.

<sup>5</sup> Sc.: ‘Everything begotten is related’ – obvert – ‘Nothing begotten is non-related’ – convert – ‘Nothing non-related is begotten’ – obvert – ‘Everything non-related is non-begotten’.

<sup>6</sup> There only five commonly accepted notions in divine reality: 1. unbegotten; 2. active generation (paternity); 3. passive generation (filiation); 4. active spiration; 5. passive spiration.

## 10. The opposite:

As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but by filiation is the second person constituted; therefore also the first by paternity.

## I. To the First Question

11. As to the first question [n.1] two things need to be seen, – first how unbegotten belongs to the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems only to import negation.

## A. In What Way Unbegotten Belongs to the Father Alone

12. As to the the first [n.11], I say that every name, composed of something multiple [sc. with several senses, as ‘begotten’] and a privative particle [sc. as ‘un-’ in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly multiple, both from the multiplicity of the opposed affirmation and from the multiplicity of the privation – as is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of power and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in the chapter ‘On Privation’, *ibid.*, 22.1022b22-31; so this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, by the multiplicity of that which ‘begotten’ is and by the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first [sc. the multiplicity of ‘begotten’], the begotten is called properly ‘produced by generation’ as first term; but by extension, the begotten is called ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary says *On the Trinity* IV ch.10, that the Son has nothing “save to be born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it in itself not be the term, neither first nor formal, of generation.

14. Privation too can be distinguished in many ways: into privation said properly, namely when something lacks what it is of a nature to have, and when, and as etc. [it is of a nature to have it]; and into privation said more commonly, when something lacks what it is of a nature to have but not according to the aforesaid conditions;<sup>7</sup> and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision – of which it is deprived by blindness – is not repugnant to animal according to genus though it is repugnant to mole according to itself). And, in this way, the more generally [privation is said] the more the habit – of which it is the privation – is of a nature to belong to the more common feature fitting the thing deprived; for example, more commonly would something be called deprived that did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body than [if it did not have] what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal – and still more commonly [if it did not have] what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of substance than what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body – and most commonly if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of being.<sup>a b</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Dogs are born blind but develop sight soon after birth, which is privation in this second way, for dogs born blind are not deprived of sight when and as they should have sight. A dog by contrast that never developed sight would be deprived of sight when and as it should have sight, which is blindness in the first way. Moles, as is immediately explained, are blind in a third way.

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Privation (namely lack of that which is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to specific idea, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation is in any created thing, because it is limited, – the second is not, because it includes eminently every perfection. – But is not the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: essence in any person eminently contains it. – On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b. [*Interpolation*] Example of the first: as a stone is called inanimate and deprived of soul, which is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is called incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is called imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus, but because to have every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, – and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being;<sup>8</sup> another is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, – and it can be understood in many ways, according to multiple genus, more common and less common.

16. To the matter at hand, therefore, when speaking of the multiplicity imported by this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it imports negation in genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the matter at hand, taking negation according to genus most commonly and privation according to genus most commonly, because negation in something naturally fitted [sc. to have what is negated] is privation (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.2.1004a9-16), such that privation adds nothing above negation save that it requires a fit nature in which it may be. Therefore negation in a genus – however genus be taken – since it is in something naturally fit in some way (although not as to itself fit), will be privation in some way according to genus, though not properly in such according as it is such.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] Privation formally is only negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but is not of the per se idea of privation unless privation include two concepts, – but each is separable from the other, each is noted or connoted by the noun privative.

17. And if you object against this [n.16] you object against this [n.16] that no privation is in divine reality, because the deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion is about privation according to the proper idea of the deprived subject: for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have [what it lacks], it would be imperfect – but if it be of a nature to have it according to idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that in this way also are many privations taken is plain not only from the remark of the Philosopher about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of what is common into habit and privation – as ‘animal’ into rational and irrational: ‘irrational’ indeed states privation in an ox not of that which is of a nature to be had in an ox according to species, but of that which would be of a nature to be had in ‘that which is animal’; for the genus, as if common to habit and privation, is that to which belongs aptitude for for each.

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<sup>8</sup> Vatican editors: e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera.

18. But in the matter at hand, by extending what is a genus (whether we understand it for privation or for negation as to genus, by both which I understand the same thing), I can here take as ‘quasi genus’ this which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus – or that in the Father there is some negation in genus – of something that is of a nature to belong, not only to being, but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the matter at hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies the proper lack of that which is properly imported by this name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, – and in this way it is not in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present to it. In a second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of that which is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong – by virtue of words – to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is subsistent and is not begotten (not thus does it belong to the essence, because although it is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way – as it seems – it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be un-generable, by removal of aptitude for communication – but as in the Father it can be called non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten be taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘as to genus’ of ‘begotten’ most commonly taken, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way is it taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; which appears from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and [*Letter*] to *Orosius* [n.5] means the same.

20. I say then that ‘unbegotten’ according to the usage of the saints, namely insofar as it signifies the negation of ‘begotten’ most commonly taken (that is, ‘produced’), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

## B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

### 1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in genus or only a negation, and consequently does not of its formal idea state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it be something pertaining to dignity, therefore it is necessary that unbegotten connote something positive, by reason of which thing connoted it is a property; now this positive is posited by them to be the fontal fullness which is in the Father alone, – in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

22. But against this:

First because this fontal fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is not in the Father save a double

fecundity, namely for generating and for spirating; and this fecundity is not any single positive thing in the Father save the essence, – but it does not connote the essence so as to be said for this reason to be a property of the Father. And that this fontal fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then in the Father there would be three positive relations, namely active generation and active spiration and the relation which is by circumlocution this which is the ‘fontal fullness’ of fecundity, although it be without a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, – at any rate there are not conceded in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fontal fullness, because not the first fecundity, – because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if *per impossibile* there could not be production by way of will, yet still there would be a stand in generation at some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fontal fullness, which states nothing save double fecundity, cannot be connoted by this which ‘unbegotten’ is.

24. Third: their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if the property of a person were to state dignity simply, then the person who did not have it would not have every dignity simply, – which is unacceptable.

## 2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive is ‘being from itself’ (and it is said to be the intention of Richard [of St. Victor]), and that ‘being from itself’ is a proper positive circumlocuted by ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore it must be that – according to Richard [*On the Trinity* V ch.4] – all being and all existence are from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is positive – either absolute, and it will be common to the three; or relative, and not to a prior (because it is only negation of relation to a prior), therefore it will be to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation if it is positive or, if it state a disposition to what precedes, it will be negation of relation, and thus negation like ‘unbegotten’; therefore it is not a proper positive of him [sc. the Father].

## 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems it must be said that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is not indignity; for this is enough for a personal property, that it not be an indignity, just as also are the personal features in divine reality not said to be imperfections (nor yet perfections simply, that is, universally in anything whatever).

28. And if altogether a dispute be made that altogether must a property state dignity, not absolute but personal – it can be said that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some positive proper thing, connoted by this which

‘unbegotten’ is. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in it, – the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he not be ribald.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so also this negative one; for from the nature of the essence is it that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and so the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, – so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have deity formally from himself and from none principatively [by way of principle] is to have it freely (as a king a kingdom), – therefore it is a mark of dignity (a notion is precisely by reason of negation; it imports dignity from this, that it is founded around such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity, but only by reason of a noble mode of having it, namely through generation and spiration.

*Ibid.*, to the seventh [sc. the seventh argument posited by Henry]: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because negation of a dignity does not state a dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply says: ‘in no way to be from another’.”

To the second, there: “Therefore non-spirated does not state dignity, because spirated does state it” (therefore not a sixth notion).

a [= the first paragraph above] is expounded there, to the fifth [argument of Henry]: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is substrate to the negation of it in three ways: namely either ‘as on what it is founded’, or ‘as by what it is founded on another’, or third ‘as of what it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

On the contrary: one would say better to the seventh that [unbegotten] imports dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a dignity proper, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

The first argument that he [Henry] posits in [*Summa*] a. 57 q.3 is confirmed, because where there is a positive disposition to a prior, it is prior to the prior before to the posterior; therefore also the negative, – and this is what is said that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and nowhere elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, – ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there were one.

Godfrey [of Fontaines *Quodlibet* V q.3]: A notion notifies, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is doubly noted according to origin: because ‘from none’ and ‘another from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it imports dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states a dignity from this, that it is founded on affirmation. It is the essence, which is strewn under all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having the divine essence not from another’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how it is a dignity proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as about such matter); in the first way only the essence is strewn beneath, whatever be the supposit, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to what needs founding’, ‘as by what’, ‘as of what it is’ (thus is a supposit with its property strewn beneath).

### C. To the Principal Arguments

29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in *De Interpretatione*, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds through the truth of the first principle, namely of this ‘from what one contradictory is removed, of the same is said the other’; and as such, the affirmative of an infinite predicate cannot be proved to follow on the negative of a finite predicate, save as the infinite predicate signifies negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘negation in a genus’ does not contradict an affirmation), then ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with unbegotten, although it convert when taking non-begotten as it states negation in the genus, which is the way in which Augustine [n.1] is understanding it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person – according to the common way [d.26 n.15] – states something for itself. Yet it is not necessary to say every property is a relation positively, but it is enough that [it is so] either positively or negatively; for if the relation be personal and proper to some person, the negation also of the relation will be personal proper to another person, and so not for itself nor common to the three; and in this way – namely negatively – unbegotten states relation, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8. And then this is false, ‘every non-begotten is related’ [n.2], – and yet it does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something for itself’, but it follows that it state either something for itself or negation of a proper relation or a relation negatively.

31. To the third [n.3] it is said that unspiritable does not state some dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. – But this seems false in itself, because it is of equal dignity in the Father and Son not to be spirated as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid to the matter at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. In another way it can be said that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of the solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way unspiritable – because it is contained in it – is not a different notion from it; for ‘non-produced therefore non-spirated’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, unspirated is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] be conceded there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why unspiritable is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly are not so many posited), it could be said that the [argument] place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not’.<sup>9</sup> For in the time of Ambrose three notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he refused to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time also of Anselm two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he does not himself use ‘spirative force’, but in its place takes ‘deity’, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning there were noted but three properties, namely paternity and filiation and spiration (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, *Matthew* 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, *I John* 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards through

<sup>9</sup> Vatican editors refer to Peter of Spain *Summulae Logicales* tr.5 n.42.



investigation did other notions and properties become known, which were before in the thing though not before known; and so, just as the later conceded more notions than the earlier (yet the earlier did not deny them, though they did not state them), so it does not seem unacceptable [sc. to say the same] about those later than those [later] doctors, provided however they could conclude them from the statements of the prior ones.

35. To the final one [n.4] – from Ambrose – the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his [Ambrose’s] time, nor even so necessary for expression of the faith, that it was necessary for every Catholic to use it; and to express the first person with that property [‘unbegotten’] was also an occasion of erring for the simple, because it seems to state something for itself, because it does not as manifestly import a relation as ‘begotten’ imports; and therefore care was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, on account of malignant heretics, although the word in itself does properly and first belong to the Father.

## II. To the Second Question

### A. Opinion of Others

36. To the second question [n.6] it seems it can be said yes, – understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to be communicated through production, seems in something to be understood non-communicated in act, as in the first person; not to be sure non-communicable (because it is not non-communicable), but not in act communicated, because it does not seem it is possible for anything to be communicated quasi-passively unless it be pre-had in something, not having been communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which is understood only essence and this ‘non-communicated in act’ negation, there seems to be had the understanding of something incommunicable: for if essence ‘as non-communicated in act’ were not incommunicable then it ‘as non-communicated’ could be in several things, – and then there could be several unbegottens in which the essence equally first would be, and there would be no stand in anything first; but if some incommunicable be had, subsisting in divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.

37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se being’, – therefore to an unbegotten hypostasis. The antecedent is proved: as prior it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as thus it gives ‘per se being’ (Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11). The consequence is proved: as ‘non-communicated’ it is not common to several suppositis; therefore in one only, and only in the unbegotten, because in the begotten it is communicated.

38. In this returns the fact that the ‘per-se-being’ essence or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se being [cf. *Ord.* I d.25 n.9]; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were awaiting a consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up once the term [sc. Son] is posited.

39. On the contrary: therefore by generation there is a positive property in the Father, just as in the Son. – It can be conceded that in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor formal), but concomitant to the first term which is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’ which is one extreme.

40. And this opinion is confirmed though Augustine *ibid.* V ch.6 n.7, when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” – therefore someone ‘unbegotten’ can be understood without pre-understanding him to have generated; but in understanding unbegotten, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that first is a person constituted there by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.

41. Further, in every essential order, the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first than the order of it to the second, because the negation seems immediately to follow it insofar as it is such; therefore similarly in order of persons there will first belong to the first person the negation of order to a prior before the order of him to the second person; therefore ‘unbegotten’ is understood first before ‘generating’, and in that prior moment a person incommunicable in divine nature is understood.

42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without positive property, – and if any [property] were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that – since origin posited in divine reality takes nothing away from the essence, neither too from this negative property ‘not being from another’ – it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].

43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ – the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by this, then, that it has nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can be posited in it; and by the co-understood negation it can have the idea of incommunicable, and this most of all if incommunicability states only some negation in genus.

## B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus’ own Response

44. Against this way it is argued as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or indivisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, – and by this it belongs to negation not to be divided; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, because to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommunicability.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: negation of being-from-a-principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything other than unique being is from a principle.

Is hence ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? – I say that from the nature of being [it is], because it is repugnant to it for this negation to be communicated in it.

On the contrary: therefore the positive is incommunicable first. – It does not follow; rather, if not just one being were principle, neither would just one be without a principle.

Instance: inanimation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remain the same as before. – It is no instance, because although inanimation be in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.<sup>10</sup>

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follow; therefore to the first person is this negation ‘not being from another’ not proper save because proper to the same is some prior affirmation to which this negation is consequent; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, – therefore some positive property [sc. paternity].

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely filiation) and the third likewise (namely passive spiration), – then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not perfect personality equally.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they would not convince an adversary without being able to be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.

### C. To the Principal Argument

48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say – as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] – that this exclusive expression ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential ones, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active spiration as it is in the Father. Which is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. – Therefore, he was not intending in the first place that those three alone were personal properties (nor was he intending even that those three were constitutive personal properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essentials – which are excluded by the ‘besides’ – are one in the three.

### D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42].

When argument is made through Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet it is never present unless in the deprived thing such a positive be formally present; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never in the eye by reason alone of the eye but through some positive entity

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<sup>10</sup> Vatican editors: “If animation were not present (as it was not present in the mixed thing that is a stone), inanimation would be proper and would not then suppose animation; but because inanimation is not proper to a subject in which there was animation, and in the matter at hand negation is proper to the subject [cf. n.45], the instance is null. So it still remains that the non-principled, and also the innascible, is first incommunicable. This conclusion is according to the first opinion [n.36].”

which this privation follows, – to wit through the sort of mixture in the eye that vision cannot stand with. So it can be said here that although unbegotten connote only some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole idea of the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but it must be that in the thing some positive property in some way precedes unbegotten by which it may be present in it, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And according to this must the statement of Augustine be understood that, so far as concerns the *per se* idea of unbegotten, it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) be as it were the reason for the inherence of it.

50. To the second [n.41] it is said that the proposition is true of the first in the order which is for itself, namely whose ‘to be’ is not ‘to be to another’.<sup>a</sup> It is not so in an order of persons who have the same nature in such a disposition as in the matter at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to a second; and therefore the order to the second as it were precedes the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive of any positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Or thus: [the proposition is true] where the nature of the first is not the same as the nature of the second; therefore negation of what is from a principle at once follows the nature of the first, before order to a second thing be understood. But where there is the same nature of first and second, the negation of being from a principle does not follow the nature, but something proper; that here cannot – according to the common opinion – be but relation [n.30].

51. To the third [n.42]. If things were as according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but by itself (according to them), because it would in every way be determined to this, just as in of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, it is necessary that the essence not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore that it not *per se* constitute some person. And when it says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that which is *per se* constituted’ [n.42], – it is true, it does take nothing away: but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence would of itself constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take away the perfection of the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis – positing an origin – does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] For the first opinion ‘an incommunicable property constitutes this sort of unbegotten’:

*On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “Even if he had not generated the Son, nothing would prevent him being called ‘unbegotten’ – even if each generate a son, not by that is he unbegotten, because men who are begotten beget others;” later ch.7 n.8: “Nor for this reason is each a father because unbegotten, nor for this reason unbegotten because a father;” later: “There is one notion by which begetter is understood, another by which unbegotten;” later: “When the Father is called ‘unbegotten’, not what he is but what he is not is shown;” ch.9:

“ When he is called ‘unbegotten’, he is not said relative to himself, but that he is not from a begetter is shown.”

Again, about the respect to a prior.

Again, the absolute is prior; therefore the more it has of the idea of an absolute, the more it is prior.

Again, ‘not to have through production’ precedes ‘to be produced’, because it pertains to the idea of proximate power, or it is the removal of an impediment. – Response: proximate power does not in any way precede in the thing generation, but only according to concepts absolute in idea (as was said in distinction 27 [of the *Reportatio*])

Mode: an essence first non-communicated in something before communicated (add if you will: ‘essence in itself is not communicated’).

On the contrary:

Negation does not constitute the first [person], because neither the second; ‘unbegotten’ is a negation. Proof of the minor, because a different notion; and as such it does not state the essence only, nor a positive thing different from the two. – Instance: it concludes that it is not a notion. Response: Henry [v. note of Scotus to n.28] (on the contrary: insofar as it is a notion it states dignity; response: ‘personal dignity’, everything other than itself – above [note to n.28].

Confirmation from the like about un-spiratable. – It is not like, because in something not constituted by order to a posterior, prior is negation of order to a prior.

Again, negation is incommunicable and proper (because neither one, just as neither being) only because of position.

Again, a first person is not without a second.

Again, Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.2 n.7: “Not that he is not begotten, but that he has begotten a single Son.”

Again, paternity prior, – therefore property of a person; otherwise property of nature. – Proof of the antecedent: in the same thing affirmation is the idea of being of negation; not conversely, because although the negation infer it, it yet presupposes it. I concede the conclusion.

Mode: essence of itself determines for itself first the first production, such that essence, not as with some property nor as under some property nor as in some person, is principle of generating (such that as it retains something prior, in whatever manner in reality), but only thus as quasi of itself it actually is principle (by which it is principle), by which – that is – as it does found it in act; it does found it in act, because (distinction 28, last question) generation is altogether the first determination of essence, and it follows that what produces them is altogether unproduced (for he truly is father who does not have a father, – hence Damascene, ch.8).

To the arguments ‘for the opinion’:

Augustine makes comparison thrice: he asserts the third; he understands the second perhaps ‘because per se in the first mode’; the first is posited under ‘if’, as the statement of heretics (Alexander in another way: “Augustine did not have regard to the nature of being but of understanding;” Praepositinus: “If you note the property of the word, the locution is false;” Henry: “If he were an absolute person;” otherwise: nothing prevents ‘unbegotten’, – it follows by reason of form).

### Question Three

#### *Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person*

52. Lastly I ask<sup>a</sup> whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person.

That he is not:

Because the first person is pre-understood in personal being before he begets; for to act belongs to a supposit; therefore he is understood to be a supposit before he act. But if he were constituted by relation to a second person, it would be co-understood with him existing that there is a second person, and consequently the second person would be pre-understood to be before the first person beget, and so the second person would not be the term of the generation.

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Whether the divine essence of itself determine first for itself active generation.

That it does not: then in anything; then it would not stand with the opposite; again, relations equally first in the essence.

On the contrary: if through another, the first person would not be constituted by this.

Solution: distinction about indeterminate and determinate, and to determine against contingency, against illimitation. Essence determines, because first and aptitudinal, – therefore actually through something; not through relation, because it is not before it is founded, – not through something else, because [regress] to infinity; therefore from itself first. Doubly: adequately, immediately. In the first way: according to intension yes (reason, example, corollary ‘Against Godfrey’), according to extension no. Immediately: whatever is related to several things having an order with respect to it, one has the ‘first’ thus and so (example ‘sun’, example ‘soul’); the essence then immediately to the first, and through this to the second.

Doubt: in what respect of principle? – Henry: of matter. On the contrary: of the one producing (by division); again, form ‘per se being’. Mode here, and congruence of threefold principle; on the contrary in three ways. Here another mode.

After to the arguments.<sup>11</sup>

53. The reason is confirmed, because as to all things that are simultaneous in nature, whatever one is prior to, another is as well; relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore if the first person is formally constituted in personal being through relation to the second, by whatever the first is prior in personal being, by that also is the second. But by generation, which is an action of the first person, does the first person seem to be prior in personal being, therefore also the second; and, as before [n.52], he will not then be the formal term of generation.

54. Further, in every order the first seems to be most absolute, as is apparent in running through in any orders whatever; therefore so will it be in the order of persons, that the first will be most absolute, and so it will not be constituted by relation to the second.

55. On the contrary:

The first person is not constituted in personal being by deity, because deity is not incommunicable, – nor by active spiration, because it is common to him and the Son, – nor by innascibility, from the preceding question [n.47]; therefore, by way of division, by some positive relation to the second person.

## I. To the Question

### A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations

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<sup>11</sup> Most of these points are dealt with in nn.70-74, 80-111.

56. Here the affirmative part of the question is commonly conceded, but because of the difficulty of the first argument [nn.52, 67], a distinction is made about the relation that constitutes the first person.

### 1. First Opinion

57. In one way that 'it can be considered as a property or as a relation; as a property it precedes generation, – as a relation it follows' [from Aquinas via Roger Marston]; and then, according as it constitutes [sc. as it is a property], the second person need not be simultaneous with the first, although according as it is a relation – quasi consequent to generation – it must be that the second is simultaneous with it.

58. Against this:

A property 'as property' is some entity, otherwise it does not constitute any being. Either then an entity to itself or to another or neither: that some entity is a singular, which is neither an entity for itself nor for another, does not seem intelligible; therefore it is necessary that this entity formally be either for itself, and then it will constitute an absolute person – or for another, and then 'as a property' it will be a relation; and then the difficulty is not avoided, even though there be one way of considering it as a property, and another as a relation.

59. And the reason can be confirmed by an example, because although whiteness can be considered as whiteness or as a quality (and if it be considered as whiteness, this is according to its proper specific reason, – but if as quality, this is according to the idea of 'an imperfect' of its kind), yet whatever is constituted by whiteness is not constituted by any entity that is not a quality, because whiteness even 'as whiteness' essentially includes quality and is essentially quality, so that whiteness cannot constitute anything save in qualitative being. So does it seem in the matter at hand, about a relative property considered in this way and in that [n.57].

60. Further, he [Aquinas/Marston] says elsewhere that 'in divine reality there cannot be order' (because neither of essence to relations, nor of relations among themselves), 'because relatives are simultaneous in nature'. – But if a property can be considered in the way in which it would not be a relation (and in this way it is not necessary that it would have a correlative simultaneous in nature), their argument would not be valid.

### 2. Second Opinion

61. In another way [Bonaventure] is a distinction drawn about relation, as it is relation and as it is origin; and it is posited that it constitutes as origin (and not as relation), because the idea of origin in some way precedes, and on it as it were is relation founded; and the first person is constituted by the first relation there, by which he is distinguished.

62. Against this objection is made [by Aquinas], because origin 'as origin' is not a form: not of the person to which it is but as it were the way, – and then neither of the first person is it the form, but as it were presupposes it; but nothing constitutes anything in any being save insofar as it is its form.

63. However if this opinion [sc. of Bonaventure, n.61] be understood of distinguishing as it were by way of beginning principle (correspondingly to efficient cause in creatures, as was expounded in distinction 26 [n.58]), and not by way of formal principle, then this position could have truth, nor would this argument [n.62] be against it.

### 3. Third Opinion

64. In another way it is said [Henry of Ghent] that just as the same action can be diversely understood – insofar as it is aptitudinal or insofar as it is potential, insofar as future, insofar as in act, insofar as past – so relations ‘founded on action’ can be diversely taken: so that relation is founded on generation as quasi in some way past, in another way as quasi present, in another way founded on it as quasi future, in another way founded on it as quasi potential, and further quasi aptitudinal.

65. Now it is said that relation under the first idea constitutes a person; and the first idea is the ‘aptitudinal idea’, because it follows on another and not conversely; therefore generation in such way constitutes the Father, and in this way is it signified by this which is ‘generativity’.

66. Against this:

The first person is not constituted by a property having positive being less perfectly than the [property] constitutive of the second person has it, because then they would not seem to be equally perfect in personal being; but the second person is constituted – according to them – by filiation as it is filiation; therefore the first person will not be constituted by a potential relation that has a less perfect being of the idea of relation than the property of the second person. But the relation of the generative to the generable – which they [n.65] posit to be first and constitutive – is a potential relation; therefore it does not constitute as perfect an actual person as the second does.

Proof of the assumption: no actual being requires a potential being, because potential being is less perfect than actual, provided they are of the same idea; but the relation of the generative requires the generable, which states a potential relation on the part of the Son; therefore the relation of generative in the Father is not an actual relation.

67. Further, against this opinion (and against the two preceding [nn.65, 57, 61]): If a relation constitutes a person there, this is only according as it is in reality, – otherwise it would not constitute a real person; but there is in reality only a single relation of the first person to the second, and it is not there save under the most actual idea, however diversely it could be taken [sc. as generativity, property, or origin, nn.65, 57, 61]; therefore under the most actual idea will it constitute that person, and under that idea will a relation in the second person correspond to it (there is not anything in the second person save as most actual). In vain then is a distinction quasi potential or aptitudinal sought for from an idea of what is active, because this distinction in conceivable modes does nothing for what is constitutive of the first person without the first person always requiring along with it at the same time the second person; and yet because of this difficulty, lest the first person be posited to have with him at the same time the second, this distinction of relations actual and aptitudinal and potential is sought for, lest the Son be posited to precede the generation of the Father. – In the same way could it be argued against the first opinion and the second, because that relation – however it be conceived – is not there save as unique.



#### 4. Against the Three Opinions Together

68. Further, against all three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65]:

Because if the Father generates the Son by this, that by the action of the Father the relation of the Son is in the divine essence, and by his action – according to these opinions – paternity ‘as paternity’ is in the divine essence (because according to them paternity ‘as paternity’ then first is when filiation is as filiation, although something has first preceded as origin, either generativity or property), therefore the Father will generate himself as he will generate the Son, or at least thus will paternity be in the Father by generation as filiation in the Son, which seems absurd.

69. Further, against all the opinions there is another difficulty: how will the essence be determined to the first person? For if from itself, then it does not seem common to the other persons, because whenever something is determined of itself to something else, it has whenever it is, – and then the essence, whenever it is, would have the personality of the first person; if from another, this seems to be against the idea of a first person, because then he would seem to be originated, or seem in some way able to be by something posited in such subsistence.

70. Further, third: if he be determined of himself, I ask, the idea of what principle does the essence have in determining itself to the first property? Not of matter (distinction 5 [nn.64-85]); not of form, because principiation of form pre-requires principiation of producer, just as about formal and efficient cause; therefore the essence quasi productively determines itself, and so the first person will in some way be produced [cf. n.105]. Nor can it be said that the property is determined of itself, because it is impossible – in any way whatever – for two things to be altogether first, but every multitude stops at something altogether one; that is here only the essence as it is a ‘sea’ [sc. of perfection]; therefore to it will be attributed the idea of some sort of principle with respect to anything second.

71. If someone want to say that the essence ‘as this’ is per se and thus per se acts (according to the first argument made in distinction 7 against Thomas [*Ord.* I d.7 n.11]), he could say that ‘this essence’ communicates itself – quasi productively – to the first person, and in the first communicates itself to the second, and in the first and second to the third, and thus three productions according to a triple principle, namely: essence as essence, as intellect, as will.

72. On the contrary:

Nothing produces itself – so there is a distinction between essence and first person. The reason is confirmed by the authority of the Master who – in distinction 5 [*Sent.* I d.5 ch.1 n.58] – denies because of it that the essence generates or is generated; by parity of reason it seems that ‘to produce’ must be denied of it.

73. Again, this production [of Father from the essence] is not generation, because ‘the Father is unbegotten’; nor [is it] spiration, it is plain, – and there are no others in divine reality.

74. Again, action is of a supposit; therefore the essence is a fourth supposit.

75. It can be said that something of the produced can well produce the whole, when that ‘something’ is a prior per se being, and possessing in virtue the rest that concurs with it in the composite. There is not an example in creatures, in substantial

production (because there only matter pre-exists, which does not have form virtually), but there is well an example in accidental production: wherever a subject has an accident actively, it produces the composite, – as water, first heated and afterwards left to itself, produces cold water. So might it be said here that essence, a ‘per se being’ in the altogether first moment – when relation is burgeoning – produces itself in a relative person, or more properly: it communicates itself to it.

76. To the form of the reason [n.72]: the antecedent [sc. nothing produces itself] is conceded, insofar as ‘itself’ refers precisely to the same thing – and thus the consequent [is conceded], that ‘there is a distinction’ (that is, not a complete identity of essence with the related person, because it [person] includes something in addition to essence).

77. To the second [n.73]: this [production] can be called ‘generation’, and the production of the Word ‘saying’, – just as if fire were intelligent, by fire-ness would it generate and by intellect would it speak.

78. To the third [n.74]: a ‘per se being’ form, that is, not inhering as an accident (either substantial form or quiddity) in a supposit, can be an agent; and yet it is not a supposit, because it is not incommunicable.

Thus the three reasons [nn.72-74] seem to be evaded.

79. But two authorities remain unsolved: the first, confirming the first reason, namely the authority of the Master [n.72] – the other in the second reason, that Augustine says the Father is unbegotten [n.73].

80. Because of the first it could be said that in altogether the first moment there is not only ‘per se being deity’, but ‘this God’, and he produces himself Father; and then this logic, ‘the essence produces’, is avoided, although he [the God] produce in which there is nothing but essence. Thus is the stated way [nn.70-71, 83] corrected, as to its sum.

81. Because of the second authority [of Augustine] it could be said that the saints who suppose there is a first property in the essence, whencesoever it has burgeoned (because about this they were not then asking), did have a first supposit and were not speaking save of production of supposit by supposit; therefore they said that that person is unproduced ‘which is not produced by a supposit’ [n.19]. Likewise they said that opposite relations of origin ‘can only be in distinct supposits’, – which is true if each be of a supposit, but not if one be of some singular ‘per se being’ and not of a supposit, namely ‘of this God’. And the reason is because ‘a singular non-supposit’ can communicate itself, and so is not distinguished from the product: for because [this God] is ‘a singular per se being’, therefore it can act, – because it is ‘a non supposit’, therefore it can be communicated; but a supposit never communicates itself, and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces a thing distinct, of which it is nothing.

82. How is this phantasy [nn.70-71, 75-81] refuted, so dissonant to the sayings of the saints [Augustine, Anselm, nn.79-81]?

Although in divine reality all priority according to nature is denied and only priority of origin is commonly conceded (or a priority according to natural intelligence), yet it is in every way necessary to give some priority given to the essence in respect of relation: both because [it is] the foundation (according to everyone), and because [it is] formally infinite, relation [is] not, – and because, however they be distinguished, they are not equally altogether first, nor [is] relation prior. Rightly then is it asked wherefrom essence determines for itself a first property [nn.69, 100-107] – and since another determinant is not found (because always there is the same question whence the essence

has it, unless there be a process ad infinitum), a stand must be made, that the essence of itself precisely determines in itself, as in a foundation, the first relation. False then is the root principle that ‘nothing undetermined of itself to certain things determines itself of itself to any of them’, as is well had here within,<sup>12</sup> about the double indeterminate [nn.106-107] and double primacy of adequation and immediacy [nn.100-104].

83. But a doubt remains: what circumstance of the principle does ‘from’ or ‘of’ indicate when it is said ‘the essence of itself determines for itself the first property’ [n.70]? And if you take refuge in that it does not there state the idea of some principle but excludes a joint participating principle, that is no obstacle; for I ask how the essence determines, what principle is it in idea of in respect of the property?

And the way here below<sup>13</sup> [nn.70-71] says that it is the producer’s, because without it there is not an idea of formal or material principle, and because an active ‘per se being’ form per se acts (about which proposition see distinction 7 extra, sc. n.74), and because of the congruence of productive triple principle [n.71] (from which congruence an instance arises in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Two Productions’ [*Ord.* I d.2 n.304]); but there is a correction, that ‘this God’ produces the Father, and not the essence properly speaking [n.80].

84. But, against this way, here are three reasons made before and three authorities [nn.72-74. All seem to be avoided in some way [n.78]. But because it does not sound right that the first person is produced, it can be said that the essence determines for itself the first property in idea of formal principle, not indeed of in-forming [principle] but as quiddity is said to be form of a supposit, and that a non-causable quiddity necessarily does thus formally determine for itself some supposit (as pagans would posit about an absolute supposit, and we about the first relative); and the reason is because such quiddity itself stops itself and is itself the quiddity of something.

85. Then to the [arguments] for the other way [n.83]:

To the first I say that an efficient cause precedes every informing form (therefore the first efficient does not have a form thus), but not every quidditative form ‘giving being to a supposit’ is preceded by an efficient or producing cause, because here there is not a cause, and a cause intrinsic to the composite, that must be united through an agent but there is perfect entity, which itself is of being in itself.

86. But if you object that ‘either the essence in-forms the property or conversely’, – a response was given in *Ord.* I d.5 n.137: “Neither is the case, but there is perfect identity,” which identity does not have an efficient principle, but it has quiddity in idea of the formal principle of that with which it is itself first the same.

87. To the second [n.83], seek the response in *Ord.* I d.7 n.75.

88. To the third: this way [n.84] does well preserve congruence, because it is of the essence as essence, and as prior to all idea of power, to give being formally, and thus does it determine itself; and, as it is such and such a power, it belongs to it to be principle. Therefore two productive principles – a single one not productive by itself alone, but giver of being formally to the first supposit.

## B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes

<sup>12</sup> The Vatican editors note that this reference is left over from the original text before Scotus was able fully to revise it.

<sup>13</sup> Another left-over reference according to the Vatican editors, as nn.70-71 were ‘below’ in Scotus’ original text.

89. Another position is by holding a conclusion opposite to these three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65], – because the first person is not constituted by any relation to the second person (and this when speaking of what is first constitutive of that person in personal being), but by some absolute non-quidditative reality, as was touched on in the third<sup>14</sup> opinion of distinction 26 [*Ord.* I d.26 nn.56-59].

90. For this opinion argument is made especially about the first person, because [1] unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity, and [2] to unbegotten seems to be pre-understood some reality proper to the first person; therefore since it cannot be a relative reality, it will be some absolute one, proper to that person.

Proof of the assumption [1]: both from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “if he had not generated, nothing would be preventing him being unbegotten;” and because fecundity for some production in divine reality is not understood as ‘quasi proximate power’ save as it is in something not having that fecundity through an act of that fecundity, just as the will is not understood as fecund for spirating ‘as in some person’ save in whom it is as non-communicated by fecundity of the will. And therefore it seems commonly conceded that to the force of the spirating power in the Father and Son is pre-understood that the will is not had through spiration; therefore by the like here, to the fecundity of generating ‘as it is a quasi proximate power’ innascibiliy seems to be pre-understood, which indicates that it is not had by act of fecundity of the intellect, namely of generation. – Proof of the second assumption [2], from the rejection of the preceding opinion in the preceding question [nn.44-46].<sup>15</sup>

91. Further, no relatives are first referred to each other, such that a related thing ‘as related’ is first term of a relation (it is plain in creatures), because the related thing ‘as related’ requires that to which it is referred for its being and for its definition; therefore that to which it is referred is in some way prior to the related thing as related. Likewise conversely, it as being term would be referred; therefore by parity of reasoning it would require that to which it is referred on account of its being and its definition. So there would be a circle in co-requiring, from this that each would require the other as essentially prior to itself, as defining itself; but that there is a circle in essential priority is impossible; therefore it is impossible that a relative ‘as relative’ – by the fact that it depends on its correlative as to its term – be the term of dependence of the other correlative. And by the like does it seem in the matter at hand, that a relative is not referred first to a relative as to the term; therefore the second person, if he be referred to the first, must set down some absolute as term of this relation: now that absolute is not the essence, because as it is not referred, so is it not term of a relation, because it is not distinguished; therefore there is some personal absolute which can be distinguished by the second person.

92. Against this opinion [n.89] is argument made as if it were heretical, but the arguments and responses are touched on in distinction 26 [*Ord.* I d.26 nn.60-64, 73-83], – now I pass over.

### C. Scotus’ own Response

<sup>14</sup> Vatican editors: Scotus put ‘fourth’ in place of ‘third’.

<sup>15</sup> Vatican editors: from nn.44-46, and in this way: “Unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity (as just proved), but unbegotten – as being a negation – cannot constitute the first person as was proved [nn.44-46]; therefore some absolute reality, constituting the first person, must be pre-understood to unbegotten.”

93. To this question [n.52] – to him whom the last opinion about absolute persons [n.89] does not please – it can be said holding the common way (namely supposing that the persons are relative), that the first person is constituted by a positive relation to the second, because by nothing else as was argued for the opposite by way of division [n.55]. Nor is it necessary to distinguish how this relation may be considered as it is constitutive; for however it may vary in consideration, it is the same in reality, – and according as it is in reality, it constitutes a real person [n.67].

94. Nor is there any difficulty save how it require the second person to be simultaneous with him, since however it precede him [n.52].

In brief I say that the simultaneity of correlatives – whereby they are said to be ‘at the same time in nature’ [n.53] – is this simultaneity, namely not being able to be ‘without each other’ without contradiction, if they be mutual relatives: for one relation cannot be without a term, because if it could be without it, it would be a being for itself; by parity of reason neither can the other relation corresponding to it be without this term, because then it would be for itself; therefore these two relations, when they are mutual, cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction. But everything ‘prior in nature’ can be without contradiction without a posterior, so that if this be posited without that, there would not be a contradiction; it is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a1-4, the chapter ‘On the Prior’.

95. In this way do I concede that the first person and the second cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction (and it is not a contradiction from something extrinsic but from the formal idea of these persons), and yet with this stands priority of origin, that one be from the other.

Which point is made clear first, because if Socrates is father of Plato, Socrates is not understood as subject of paternity but as under paternity, and Plato understood as under filiation; these are together in nature, because they are thus understood as correlatives, – and yet as such Socrates is prior in origin to Plato, because he is thus understood under paternity, which is formally priority of origin. Therefore it seems that by the same thing by which something is prior in origin in creatures, it is also simultaneous in nature with the same thing, in the way that simultaneity of nature is required for correlatives.

96. This is also – secondly – proved, because priority of nature is in one way priority according to perfection, so that prior things are said to be more perfect according to nature, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a7-9. But now along with simultaneity of correlatives according to nature it seems there can stand priority according to perfection with respect to the other, – because if the genus of relation be divided through proper opposed differences as other genera, one of the divisive difference will be more worthy and the other more unworthy (because two species are not equal, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11), and consequently a species constituted by a less noble difference will be less noble; and since two species constituted from two opposed differences can be referred to each other mutually (because every relation of disparity is to something of another species), therefore of relations corresponding to each other one can be prior – that is more perfect – than the other, and yet together in nature, as to this which is ‘not able to be without each other’. Therefore much more does it seem too that priority of origin – by

which namely one extreme in nature does not exceed the other extreme but is ‘by which is another’ – can stand with simultaneity of correlatives.

97. It is confirmed by the remark of Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15: “you rightly put equality before inequality,” – and he is speaking not by reason of foundation, because from nobility of equality he concludes that the foundation is nobler to which it belongs than the foundation to which it does not belong (the thing is plain there about circle and other figures); therefore relation has a proper nobility in its genus. Thus one is nobler than the other, and yet the two species are correlative, whenever there is a relation of disparity.

98. For this is also adduced Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (91vb-92ra), where he seems to mean that a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is prior to the caused insofar as it is caused, and yet a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is simultaneous with the caused, with the simultaneity required for correlatives. But this priority of nature, which is of cause to caused, seems more repugnant to the simultaneity of nature of correlatives than the priority of origin alone.

99. Then briefly: the first person is constituted in personal being by positive relation to the second, and conversely, and it is impossible for them to be without each other; and yet the first person, constituted in such being, is prior in origin to the second person (such that the first person, constituted in such being, is ‘from whom the second is originated’), and so priority of origin is not repugnant to simultaneity of relatives.

100. But there is another doubt (which was touched on against the three opinions [n.69]), namely: by what is the essence determined to the first subsistence?

To this I say that whenever something is unlimited in some idea of cause, such that several things correspond to it in the other extreme (or something one, containing many things), if between those several things there be some order, either absolutely or in itself, in having some respect to that unlimited thing, then the same thing is not ‘first’ in respect of such unlimited thing – and this speaking of the primacy of adequacy – and ‘first’ with the primacy of immediacy.

101. An example of this – first in efficient cause, where it is more manifest:

If the sun ‘as cause’ illumine the whole medium, and yet is a quasi unlimited agent to which correspond many parts of the illumined medium, and between these parts there is some order, because first is a closer part illumined before a remoter one, – the first thing corresponding to the sun as illumining is the whole medium as it includes all the parts; first, I say, quasi adequate; it is not however first as immediate, but a part nearer the sun is more immediately illumined than a remoter part.

102. So in form:

Taking the intellective soul (which is a form in some way unlimited), there corresponds to it for first perfectible an organic body including in itself many perfectible parts; therefore the first perfectible, that is the adequate one, for the intellective soul is the whole organic body. But because in the parts of this whole there is an order of origin, either in itself or in having soul (because first is the heart, then the other parts, *Generation of Animals* 2.4.740a1-30, 5-6.741b15-31), therefore this form does not first – that is equally immediately – perfect the whole, but it thus first perfects the heart and, with it mediating, the other parts. If therefore the soul were the whole essence of heart and hand by identity, and yet it were to give them distinct being of the sort it now gives (although in the whole), and with this the heart and hand were not parts of the same

whole (because this would be a mark of imperfection) but they were distinct supposits, – still would the soul, because of its illimitation, be in possession of an organic body for its adequate perfectible thing (or in possession of those then supposits, which are now parts of the body, for single adequate object), and yet it would have one of them – which namely is first in origin – for first (namely immediately) perfectible.

103. So can it be said universally in every unlimited thing, to which correspond several things between which there is some order, because of which, one of them is more immediately regarded by that unlimited thing than is another.

104. So in the matter at hand: the divine essence does not have some one first subsistence, that is, [subsistence] adequate to itself (because then it could not be in another), but in this way are three subsistences adequate to that nature; yet in these three there is an order in having the nature, and so the essence by one primacy – namely of immediacy – respects the first of those ordered things, such that just as the essence would of itself first be in the three if it were in them without order (and this both primacy of adequacy and primacy of immediacy), so now it is of itself in the three by primacy of adequacy – but not of immediacy, but in the first of them, and by virtue of it in the others, to which it is communicated by that first.

105. When therefore you ask ‘by what is the essence in the first person?’ [n.100], I say that of itself. And if you still wish to say no, but through a determining property, the same question is: ‘by what is it determined to determining property?’, or ‘by what does that property first burgeon in the divine essence?’ And then either it is necessary to proceed to infinity, or it is necessary to stand at this, that the essence of itself is first (that is adequately) in the three, and it would be of itself immediately in the three if they did not have an order, and that it is of itself immediately in the first of the three having an order.

106. And if you ask ‘whence is the essence determined to the first person, – and if of itself it be determined, then it cannot be in another’, I reply:

Determination is double, opposed to a double indetermination. One is indetermination ‘to opposites contradictorily’ (as matter is indeterminate to form and privation), another is ‘to diverse positives’, which however stand with a determination to one part of each contradiction (an example of this second: if the sun is indeterminate to producing a worm and a plant as if to diverse positives, yet since it is of itself determined to one part of the contradiction – both of this one as of that one – just as if it were a particular agent only of a nature to produce one of them). Then I say in the matter at hand that the essence is of itself determined to the first person by a determination opposite to first indetermination, which is to contradictories; not however by a determination opposite to second indetermination, because that would not stand with illimitation to several things.

107. And hereby it is plain to the argument ‘if of itself it is determined to this, then it cannot be in another’ [n.106]. The consequence holds in speaking of the second determination, which is opposed to illimitation to several things, – and in this way the essence is not determined to one but to three subsistences, because this determination is to a ‘first’ thing adequate; and the consequence does not hold, speaking of determination in the first way, because that is to a ‘first’ thing immediate (not adequate),<sup>a</sup> and it stands with illimitation of what is thus indeterminate to several things.<sup>b</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*: in place of ‘because...adequate)]’ But there only follows, ‘therefore it cannot be in these’! By this determination too is it determined to the three, because the determination that is to a ‘first’ adequate is as necessary as that which is to a ‘first’ immediate; when is added ‘because it is to the first immediate (not adequate)’, it is false, understanding it precisely.

b. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Godfrey [of Fontaines] *Quodlibet* VII qq.3: “The perfection of divine nature requires that it be had by several in several ways, for these three (to have it thus and thus and thus, without order of duration, of nature, of dignity) come together for the constitution of divine perfection (to the extent it consists in the most perfect acts according to intellect and will), just as three angles equally constitute the perfection of a triangle;” in question 4: “Order should be in perfect acts, namely of saying and spirating, by which are produced declarative knowledge and incentive love, in which are quasi perfected the divine beatific operations.”

## II. To the Principal Arguments

108. To the first principal argument [n.52] the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.94-99], because the first supposit precedes the second in origin, and yet they are simultaneous in nature as is required for relatives.

109. And when you argue that the first supposit precedes generation, therefore also the second [n.52], – I reply that in the antecedent can be understood active and passive generation. If active generation, I deny it, nay the first supposit is subsistent active generation; because, in whatever way this relation be understood, there is no difference in reality in saying ‘the Father subsists’ or ‘generation subsists’ or ‘generativity subsists’. But if in the antecedent it be understood of passive generation, I concede that the first person, just as he precedes in origin the Son, so he precedes in origin passive generation.

110. And when you argue ‘therefore the Son precedes the same passive generation because he is simultaneous with the Father’ [n.53], – this consequence is not valid, because he is not in this way simultaneous with the Father, the way the Father is prior to passive generation: for the Son is simultaneous in nature with the Father (as pertains to correlatives), and the Father precedes passive generation not in this way but in origin. And now this proposition ‘when some things are simultaneous, in whatever way one is prior, the one left is too’ [n.53] is false, unless it be understood of a simultaneity of the same idea as is that priority and posteriority: just as this proposition is false ‘if some things are simultaneous in time, whatever is prior in nature to one, is to the other as well’; but this proposition is true ‘they are simultaneous in time, – therefore what is prior in time to one is also to the other’.

111. To the second argument [n.54] I say that the major is true in the order of essences, because there it is understood in quidditative perfections, and there is a stand at infinite quidditative perfection, which is absolute. But in persons having the same nature, distinct only in origin (as it is necessary to understand in the matter at hand, according to common opinion [v. n.82]), the major proposition is false, because there the ‘first’ is precisely that which is formally precisely in relation to the second.<sup>a</sup>



a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Whether there be only five notions. – That there are not: ‘from another’ is not, because it needs a correlative, – one, because it [needs] several; no ‘spiratable’.<sup>16</sup> – On the contrary: Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7 [“one notion is whereby begetter is understood, another whereby begotten is”]. – Solution: notion fundamentally, formally, accidentally; ‘because of which’ notional person or also idea of personality. In the first way all properties essential (or according to essence) are notions; in the second way we are speaking here (formally only); third, because quiddity becomes a notion. In the second way, because those notions, ‘because of which’ essence is. – Doubt about spiratable. Some power for second production.

## Twenty Ninth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God*

1. About the twenty ninth distinction I ask whether principle be in one way said of principle taken personally and notionally, and taken essentially.

That it is not:

Because if principle were of one idea in this triple way, then what is from the principle would be of one idea; this is false, because neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are from a principle in one way, nor are creatures [from a principle] in the same way as they are.

2. On the contrary:

‘Creating therefore principiating’ follows, and ‘generating therefore principiating’, and ‘spirating therefore principiating’, – and not conversely; therefore the consequent is common to all the antecedents.

### I. To the Question

3. To this question I say that principle is not said univocally of principle taken essentially and notionally, – and this speaking of the relation that is per se signified by this name ‘principle’, and taking principle principiatively, for ‘that which principiates’ (or for principle ‘which’ not ‘by which’). And the reason is because principle essentially taken only states a relation of reason (not real, because there is no real relation of God to creatures, as will be plain from the following question [d.30 nn.48-51]), but as it is taken inwardly, notionally or personally, it does state a real relation; but to relation real and of reason there is not anything common the same that is common really in one and of reason in another, because to that which is in a certain respect such and to that which is simply such, insofar as it is of this sort, what is taken in them in a certain respect and simply is not a common univocal: but a real relation is a relation simply, and a relation of reason is a relation in a certain respect, because just as ‘to be in reason’ is to be in a certain respect,

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<sup>16</sup> Vatican editors: filiation is not a notion because it needs paternity, and similarly paternity is not a notion because it needs filiation; spiration, both common active and passive, is not a notion, because it needs certain things, namely two (the Father and Son); spiratable, spiratability of Father and Son, is no notion (from what was said nn.31-32); therefore it follows that only innascibility is a notion.

so to be referred in reason or to be compared by reason is to be referred or compared in a certain respect; therefore there is no principle univocal to these.

4. Now if we speak of principle inwardly, as it is personal and notional, it does seem that there could for them be the idea of a common principle univocally; just as to paternity and filiation can this which is ‘relation of origin’ be common univocally, also can to generation and spiration this which is ‘production’ be common univocally, as was touched on above in distinction 23 [*Ord.* I d.23 n.9] about the common univocally to the persons insofar as they are persons.

## II. To the Arguments

5. To the arguments [nn.1-2].

The first [n.1] proves that there is not a principle of one idea there, for notional and personal.

I reply that in creatures any two things ‘distinct in species’ are said to be of different idea, and yet there can be abstracted from them one common thing of one idea, as the genus. So it is in the matter at hand: these productions – generation and spiration – are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas, and yet some one common thing can be abstracted from them; and in the same way about this common thing which is ‘principle’, it can be a common thing of one idea, although the things of which it is said are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas.

6. And if you object against this, because then there is a universal in divine reality – this was touched on in distinction 23 [*Ord.* I d.23 nn.12-13].

7. The argument for the opposite [n.2] proves the commonness of this which ‘principle’ is, for such and such principle – just as it proves univocity for principle inwardly and outwardly.

Therefore it can be replied that ‘creating, therefore principiating’ does not follow and ‘generating, therefore principiating’, taking the ‘principiating’, which is inferred, for some common univocal simply – because the principiating, which is inferred for this which ‘creating’ is (as it is said of God), states only a relation of reason, but the principiating which is inferred from ‘generating’ states a real relation.

## Thirtieth Distinction

### Question One

#### *Whether Some Relation of Time be Said of God*

1. About the thirtieth distinction I ask first whether any relation of time is said of God.

That it is not:

Because whatever is said of God is God, – therefore it is eternal; not therefore new, nor of time.

2. Further, nothing eternal is said of the temporal; therefore not conversely either.

3. Further, making does not seem to be without change – therefore God, who is immutable, does not come to be anything; but if some new relation were said of God, he could be said to be come to be according to that relation.

4. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [sc. God is said to be Lord of creatures in time]. And by reason, because relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore to the relations in creatures of time to God there correspond relations in God of time [to creatures].<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Whether a new relation of the creature to God necessarily co-requires a new relation of God to the creature.

That it does:

[Augustine] *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17: “As there cannot be a servant who does not have a master, so there cannot be a master who does not have a servant.”

Again, “relatives are together by nature” [Aristotle, *Categories* 7.7b15]

Again, [Augustine] *ibid.*: “If a coin – with no change of the whole – can be said relatively, how much more easily that substance?”

Argument against is here [*Rep.* IA d.30 nn.4-6].

Opinion of Henry [of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q.1 ad 1]: ‘Only according to reason do those three things differ in God, and they are the same respects in idea, differing only in name, ‘creative’, ‘going to create’, and ‘creating’. The name ‘creating’ belongs to him from time, because the creature is referred to him, – however ‘to create’ (actively) is rather the idea of ‘to be created’ than the reverse (*Six Principles*). Relations that it is customary to say of God from time are not properly relations, but new names of eternal relations.’

Whether every relation by which the creature is really referred to God and by which God is according to reason referred to it [the creature], is the same in the creature as in God to creatures.

“It is one in reality, diverse in reason.”

First in God. New denomination, no new relation; not even as in a column [sc. as a column is to the right of an animal because the animal is to the left of the column], before the passion by which the creature is created, is it new; hence from it there is a new name of action, just as. – “Hence Augustine *ibid.*, names of this sort rather new appellations than new relations: ‘Our Lord, only when he begins to have a servant, and this is a relative appellation from time; for the creature [sc. is not eternal, whose Lord he is].’”

Solution. Three things: in the creature there is a new relation to God; it does not co-require a new [relation] in the other extreme; third according to which idea God is term of the new relation.

Proof of the first: because a new foundation, because ‘creation passively’ is a relation.

Second: not real, – not of reason, caused by the divine intellect.

On the contrary: he knows he is creating; either then he knows a new relation of himself or an eternal one. – I respond: neither; in another way: he knows an eternal relation of reason, because to a thing eternally known, but not the same relation; and not by the creative intellect of the Father, ‘this is created’ having been removed.

Third: under no idea of relation is it the term (Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5, 9).

To the matter at hand, Augustine, the Master [Scotus, *Rep.* IA d.30 n.27].

False understanding is rejected, and opposites at the same time: the foundation as form denominates.

## Question Two

*Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures*

5. Secondly I ask whether of God to creatures there can be some real relation.

That there can:

Because God from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is omnipotent and omniscient (for these are posited in God as attributes stating in God perfection simply, and everything such is there from the nature of the thing, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15); but these [sc. omnipotent, omniscient] state a respect to possible and knowable creatures; therefore etc.

6. Besides, God from eternity willed every to be created thing to be for the time for which he created it; ‘to will to create’ includes a relation, and not of reason (proof, because he was able to will the creature before he understood he willed it; for not because he knew the creature did he therefore will it, but because he willed it therefore did he know he willed it); therefore the eternal relation of the will of God to the creature is real, because it is not in the will through act of any intellect comparing it to anything.

7. Besides, relations founded on quantity are real, from *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-14; therefore the inequality of God to creatures, founded on the quantity of virtue in God (namely on the infinity of his magnitude), and on the finite virtue of creatures, and on the magnitude of virtue in creatures (namely the finite magnitude of creatures), will be a real relation. – There is confirmation, because magnitude in God is foundation of equality, which is a real relation inwardly, and magnitude in creatures is foundation of a real relation; therefore, by comparing this magnitude with that, it seems that the habitude founded on them is real.

8. Besides, relations of the second mode of relatives (which namely are founded on action and passion, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b28-30, 21a14-29) are real relations; but such is the relation of God to creatures insofar as he is efficient cause; therefore etc. – If you say that this is not true save in things acting naturally [sc. and not by will], on the contrary: therefore will the created will not have a real habitude to its effect.

9. Besides, as a form is in something, so does it denominate it; therefore if there is not any relation in God to creatures really, God is not really lord of creatures (or not really creator), which seems absurd.

10. On the contrary:

A real relation is to a term according to its real being; but a term is necessarily required for a real relation; therefore if God is really referred to creatures, creatures according to their real being have been eternal.

## I. The Opinions of Others as to Each Question

### A. First Opinion

#### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. To the first question [n.1] it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there is no new relation in God, because just as action is the same, although considered in diverse ways (as in aptitude, as in power, as present, as past, as future), so the relation founded on action – thus and thus considered – is the same relation; therefore it states the same relation in God, that he is creative and creating;<sup>a</sup> but he was eternally creative; therefore when he is called ‘creating’ there is not in him a new relation but a new relative appellation. This is confirmed from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17, where he seems rather to say new ‘appellation’ than new ‘relation’.

a. [*Interpolation*] so what he [Henry] says elsewhere, that they [creative and creating] are the same relation in idea, differing according to one or other way of naming (which is a minor difference), and this sort of ‘other way of naming’ is because of a new property in creatures.

12. To the second question [n.5] he [Henry] says no, because that which is really related is really ordered – just as a whiteness, which is the idea of referring really to another whiteness, is naturally and really ordered to it, for the reason that this one has some perfection from that one insofar as there is in them a more perfect nature together than in either one of them. But everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered (namely to the extent it is waiting for that, so that on itself may the relation to that be founded): and if it does depend, then it is changeable, because the dependence is not without potentiality for act; and if it is changeable, then imperfect, because lacking the perfection to which it is changing; and if imperfect, then limited. Therefore, from first to last: if really related, then limited.

13. And because it could be objected that then there would not be a real relation in divine reality, so it seems that that proposition needs expounding ‘about what is related to another in nature’ [n.12: “everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered...”]: for if it be really referred to something that is the same really as it in nature, there is no need that it depend, because it is not waiting for something other than itself in nature so that on it the relation to that may be founded.

14. Then to the matter at hand: since God is not an imperfect something, nor changeable, nor dependent, etc. [n.12], – therefore he is not really related to anything other than himself; not therefore to creatures.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

15. Against this opinion, as to what it says to the first question [n.11]:

If actual and aptitudinal relation be the same, and because of this there not be any actual new relation of God to creatures, then by parity of reasoning there is not any new relation of creatures to God, because to the aptitudinal in God will correspond an aptitudinal in creatures,<sup>a</sup> as actual corresponds to actual; and then, if the actual and aptitudinal are the same in God, by parity of reasoning the aptitudinal in creatures will be the same as the actual, and thus there will be no new relation in one extreme just as not in the other either.

a. [*Interpolation*] because as God was creative from eternity, so was the creature creatable.

16. The consequent seems absurd in truth, because then neither would essence be new nor ‘anything absolute’ new; for it is impossible for a foundation to be new and for a relation to be eternal according to that foundation. And also the impossible according to them follows, because then, since all things are ‘what they are’ with respect to God as to exemplar cause or efficient cause, it follows that all things are eternal and nothing new (because if a respect is not new neither is the absolute [sc. the absolute on which the respect is founded]), because a respect cannot be eternal without eternity of foundation. It also seems especially unacceptable according to them, because they say ‘the being of existence states a respect to the efficient cause as it is efficient’ (and that is ‘to be’ new,<sup>a</sup>

by creation), and yet this respect is in creatures in comparison to God; therefore notwithstanding the preceding aptitudinal relation as it is aptitudinal, there can be an actual new one, as being different from that aptitudinal one.

a. [*Interpolation*] or there will be nothing new.

17. Further, a relation cannot be the same save between extremes the same. And now the divine intellect not only understood from eternity Antichrist's soul as possible for such and such a time before it was created, but understood it as actually existing for that instant of creation; and this intelligible seems to be distinct from that intelligible in idea of being intelligible, because the being 'potential' and 'actual' of a soul seem to be a different intelligible;<sup>a</sup> therefore divine intellection, which is single, can have them for distinct objects of a single act distinct in idea, just as they can be distinct objects of two acts of our intellect; and consequently, the divine intellect, comparing itself to the first extreme 'as creative to creatable' and to the other extreme 'as creating to created', seems in its essence to quasi-produce two relations of reason to distinct extremes, and so the relation of creative and creating is not one relation of reason, just as neither [are] the extremes the same to which it is compared.

a. [*Interpolation*] because there can be two acts of understanding concerning them, since each can be understood with the opposite of the other; therefore in respect of the divine intellect they are two intelligibles, according to two acts according to reason.

18. This reason is confirmed: in any genus, that which is in potency is only 'in a certain respect' such; therefore it is not simply the same as that which is actually such, – and consequently, if this be understood as in potency such and that as in act, it will be 'another intelligible' simply.

19. Further, as to what is said about new appellation [n.11], it seems irrational, because whatever the same form has the same being in seems it can in the same way be called by it: for because such form is in such thing, therefore such is it called by it, and not conversely; therefore if there be the same relation, and uniformly, to creatures on the part of God, it does seem why God could not always be uniformly called by it.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] For that a form is in something, and yet that it cannot be denominated by it so that it be called 'having the form', is a contradiction, because the concrete and abstract of a form do not differ save in denomination alone of the subject; therefore that creation-action is in God, and yet that God not be able to be denominated by it, is a contradiction.

20. Against what is said to the second question [n.12], it seems that the things that are posited connected there [sc. real relation and dependence] are not connected:

First indeed, because if two things most white are posited, they will be perfectly alike (which is made clear, because now there is perfect likeness and equality in the divine persons, and perfection of likeness is not taken away because of the infinity of the foundation but rather is the more posited);<sup>a</sup> so there would be there the most perfect likeness, and yet neither would be ordered to the other as from what it had the perfection.

a. [Interpolation] and if *per impossibile* there were there two foundations, there would be a real likeness, because now it is not posited to be one of reason save because of the intellect comparing that one magnitude.

21. If you say that specific nature is more perfect in two than in either alone [cf. n.12], – this is not that ‘one of them is ordered to the other’, because one of them has no perfection from this, that there is another, whether nature be more perfectly in both together than in one, or not.

22. Further, a natural created agent does not act insofar as it is imperfect, because to act belongs to it insofar as it is in act (and ‘to act’ belongs supremely to God), and yet such an agent – insofar as it is thus agent – is posited to have a real relation to its effect; therefore there is no need that every related thing, insofar as it is such, depends really on that to which it is referred; for although a created agent depend on something, yet it does not seem to depend on anything that is caused by it, nor insofar as it is potential and imperfect and changeable does it cause it, but insofar as it is in act.

23. Further, if *a*, insofar as it is referred to *b*, really depends on it, by parity of reasoning (if the relations are mutual) *b* will depend on *a* insofar as it is referred to *a*, and so there will be a circular dependence of *a* on *b* and conversely – which seems impossible, because in no essential order is there a circle.

## B. Second Opinion

### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

24. In another way it is said [by Richard of Middleton] to the first question [n.1] that there is not in God any relation from time to creatures, but in the creature alone is there relation from time to God, – and thus the relation by which God is spoken of [relative] to the creature is only in the creature, and not in God. This seems to be taken from Augustine in the cited chapter [nn.11, 4] and from the Master here in the text.<sup>a</sup>

And to the second question [n.5] it is said that no such relation can be real, because a real relation is not without order; God has no real order to creatures, because he is above order.

a. [Interpolation] There is confirmation, because action is in the patient (from *Physics* 3.3.202b5-6), and yet it does not denominate the patient but the agent; thus too is God denominated by the relation that is in the creature.

### 2. Rejection of the Opinion

25. Against the first [n.24]:

Because then relation would be in that in which there is not foundation; for the foundation of the relation by which God is said [relative] to the creature (if he is so said) is not in the creature<sup>a</sup> but in God; therefore the relation will not be in the creature.

a. *Interpolation*: [in place of ‘foundation...not in the creature’] because the power, which founds the relation, is not in the creature.

26. Further, the opposite relations of cause and caused cannot be in the same thing, because they are more repugnant than the relation of producer and produced, – which however cannot be in the same supposit, although they may be in the same nature.

27. And if you say that here there are opposite relations in the same supposit, but they do not denominate it, – this seems altogether irrational, that some form be in some subject and yet the subject not be able to be called the sort of thing that is of a nature to be constituted by that form.

28. The response that is set down to the second question [n.24] seems to beg the question, and to fail according to the consequent.

Proof of the first [sc. begging the question], because since God is prior to the creature with multiple priority – extending the name of ‘order’, not only that a later be called ordered to a prior but also a prior to a posterior (although in different way) – it would be necessary to prove that this priority (which can be called order) is not a real relation in God; this then is begged. Nor does it follow from this known fact ‘that God is above order’, taking order as it is of posterior things ordered to a prior; for from this it only follows ‘that he is not posterior’, and from this it does not follow that he has no order, taking order generally.

29. But that the reason fails as to the consequent is proved because order is a certain relation; but not every relation is an order (because not ‘a common relation, founded on something one’, as relations of equivalence); but only relations of non-equivalence state order. Arguing therefore from negation of order to negation of relation is to argue as if first the antecedent were denied and afterwards the consequent.<sup>17</sup>

## II. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

30. I respond therefore to the first question [n.1] that the relations of creatures to God are new and from time, nor on account of them, insofar as they are related to God ‘as to their term’, is it necessary to posit any relations in God from time that are the term of them.

31. Which I prove:

First, because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a26-30 ‘About relation’, relatives are said in the third mode that are said ‘to something’ because other things are of them, – so that this is the per se difference of the two first modes from the third, that in the first two the relation is mutual, but in the third the relation is not mutual, but one [of the relatives] is precisely referred to the other and the other is not referred but is only something of it; now all relations of creatures to God pertain to the third mode of relatives; therefore of whatever sort are those which are in one extreme, it is not necessary for the other extreme – according to some relation in it – to be the term of those relations, but it can be the term precisely under the idea of an absolute.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* a.55 q.5 ad 4]: “Praepositinus responds saying that ‘not every relation has a correlation, for there is a relation in the creature in respect of the creator, yet there is none in the creator in respect of the creature, – which is true as to the thing; yet it is present according to consideration of the intellect.’”

<sup>17</sup> The fallacy of the consequent, as in: if x is a horse then x is an animal, but x is an animal therefore x is a horse; which conclusion is false, since x could be a dog.



32. And this is also proved from the intention of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he proves that ‘act is prior to power in definition, because power is defined by act’; but if act were referred to power, then – conversely – also would act be defined by power, as Porphyry says *Book of Predicables* ch.3 ‘About species’, that in mutual relatives “the ideas of both must be posited in the ideas of both.”

33. Then it is argued: act defines power as it is the term of the relation; either then it is term of the relation as an absolute, and the proposed conclusion is had, – or as a correlative, and thus power will define act; therefore as act is ‘prior’ in definition it is ‘posterior’ in definition!

34. Therefore act so defines power that it is not conversely defined by it, and consequently act is not referred to power but is purely absolute, and this under the idea under which it defines power; and it defines power insofar as power is to it as a relation to a term; therefore act, according as it is a pure absolute ‘what’, is the term of this relation, of whatever sort the relation be, whether simply or in a certain respect.

35. This is also proved more generally through all relatives, because no relative is referred first to the correlative as to a term, in creatures.

Proof: a relative, insofar as it is relative, is first defined by the term to which it is referred, – therefore the term ‘as term’ is prior in definition to the relative as relative. The consequence is plain from *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030b4-7, where the Philosopher compares accident to substance – and by him in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he compares potency to act.

36. If then the term, insofar as it is term, is referred to the related thing insofar as it was related, then ‘insofar as it is term’ it will have respect to the related thing for what defines it, and consequently for something prior in definition; therefore father would be prior to son in definition and conversely. But it is impossible for there to be a circle in any essential priority, therefore it is impossible for father to be referred first to son insofar as son is referred to father. Therefore it is referred to the absolute first that is the proximate foundation of the relation (namely of filiation), and that absolute is prior to the father as father; and conversely, son ‘as son’ is referred to the absolute which is the proximate foundation of paternity, and that absolute is prior to filiation and to son insofar as he is son.

37. Nor according to this is there any circle, as that to the father ‘insofar as father’ *a* is prior (which is an ‘absolute’ and the proximate foundation of filiation), and that to filiation ‘insofar as filiation’ *b* is prior (which is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity). For from this it only follows that these two absolutes are prior to two relations, and this is true; indeed, both absolutes are prior to each relation, because any relation pre-requires not only a foundation but also a term as it is term. So it is, then, when the relations are mutual; but it happens to the term there [sc. in the mutual relations of creatures], as it is term, that it be conversely referred. It is possible therefore for something to be referred to an absolute, – and so it seems reasonable to posit this in God, who most of all has the idea of an absolute as creatures are [referred] to him.

38. Further, although the intellect can busy itself about the term of some relation of the third mode [n.31], and cause in that term a relation of reason, yet that [relation] is not the idea of being a term: for although some intellect confer the squaring of the circle on science [cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 7.7b29-33], causing in that absolute [sc. science] the

relation of reason which is knowability, yet that [relation of reason] is not the idea of being the term of a relation of science to it; for this relation of reason is not in this absolute save as it is actually considered by the intellect, but science is referred to it really, not just as it is considered by the intellect; therefore the relation of reason in a knowable was not the idea of being the term of a relation of science.

39. This can also be made clear in the matter at hand about God, because although the divine essence can be compared to creatures, and this through an act both of the created and of the uncreated intellect, and so can in it [= the essence] cause a relation of reason, yet that will not be the idea of terminating a relation of creatures to him. Not indeed that [relation] which is caused by an act of the created intellect: proof, because then, while no created intellect is considering, there would, when comparing God to a stone (if God were to produce a stone), not be in the stone a real relation to him [God], because neither in God a relation of reason that would be the idea of terminating a real relation of the stone at himself; the consequent [sc. no real relation in the stone because no relation of reason in God] is false. Therefore neither too [is real] that [relation] which the divine intellect causes in its own essence: proof, because if *per impossibile* God were not an intellectual nature (as some have said, positing that the sun is the first principle [Wisdom 13.1-2]), and he were to produce a stone, the stone would be really referred to God and yet there would then not be a relation of reason in God to it.

40. Absolutely then I say that, because the terming of relations in creatures is from time to God, there is no necessity to posit any relation in God, either new or old, which may be the reason for the terming of the creature's relation.

41. There can however be posited in God some relation of reason, new indeed, such as that which is caused in him by act of our intellect considering him, but not a new one by act of his own intellect.

Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why more one of the contradictories could now be true than the other, nor why more the other false than it, and so both false together or both true together; but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his intellect, the other extreme of some contradiction would now be true of something which before was not true;<sup>a</sup> therefore some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, – nor in the object considered, because it not yet is. Nor in anything to which it is compared by the intellect, unless change be posited in the intellect comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared – insofar as they are such – do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or be in another way unless there be another understanding or another way of understanding of them; but if a diverse understanding or another way of understanding of them cannot be without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect in comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not because of this, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but because of this, that the divine intellect – to whatever it compares its essence – compares it in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity it compares its will 'as creative' to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so it compares in eternity its will 'as creating' to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that

soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, – but each is eternal, although not for eternal [time].

a. [*Interpolation*] because now it is being considered under some idea under which before it was not being considered by the divine intellect.

40. Absolutely then I say that, because the terming of relations in creatures is from time to God, there is no necessity to posit any relation in God, either new or old, which may be the reason for the terming of the creature's relation.

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Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why more one of the contradictories could now be true than the other, nor why more the other false than it, and so both false together or both true together; but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his intellect, the other extreme of some contradiction would now be true of something which before was not true;<sup>a</sup> therefore some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, – nor in the object considered, because it not yet is. Nor in anything to which it is compared by the intellect, unless change be posited in the intellect comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared – insofar as they are such – do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or be in another way unless there be another understanding or another way of understanding of them; but if a diverse understanding or another way of understanding of them cannot be without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect in comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not because of this, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but because of this, that the divine intellect – to whatever it compares its essence – compares it in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity it compares its will 'as creative' to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so it compares in eternity its will 'as creating' to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, – but each is eternal, although not for eternity.

a. [*Interpolation*] because now it is being considered under some idea under which before it was not being considered by the divine intellect.

42. And from this is apparent the response to this objection: 'If there can be no new relation in God by act of his own intellect, then if no created intellect were possible and God could create a stone, he could not understand himself creating a stone as a created intellect can understand him now creating a stone when he does create it; the consequent appears unacceptable, because whatever is knowable by us is much more knowable also by him'. – I reply: God could know himself creating a stone at time *a*; but he could not newly know himself creating a stone, but in eternity he would know himself creating a stone at time *a* just as in eternity he knows himself at some time creative of a

stone. This is to say, in eternity he knows the actual relation of it to that at time *a*, just as he also knows his quasi potential relation – one of reason, however – to it at some time.

43. In brief therefore it is plain that there is no new relation in God that is per se term of a new relation of a creature; yet there is a new one by act of a created intellect, and none by act of his own intellect.

44. But then the first member [n.43] seems dubious, how God is posited to be lord, – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [above, n.4].

I reply: by the sole new relation that is in the creature to him is he denominated ‘lord’; not indeed that in creatures there are two opposite relations<sup>18</sup> (by one of which he is denominated [n.24]), but there is one only [sc. servant], which is to God as to an absolute. And for this reason, that ‘as absolute’ he is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new relation corresponding [sc. lord], – in the way that a work made by a man is called ‘human’, not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in man, to whom the work has a relation.

45. And this seems the intention of the Master expressly in the text [d.30 ch.1 n.264], concluding this from the words of Augustine. For he speaks thus: “The appellation by which the creature is said relatively to the creator is relative, and it indicates a relation that is in the creature; but the appellation by which the creator is said [relatively] to the creator is indeed relative, but no relation does it indicate that is in the creator;” and this same thing does Augustine seem to say *On the Trinity* V [nn.4, 11, 24, 44], according to which the Master adduces him: “The fact that in time God begins to be called what before he was not called, it is manifest is relatively said, not however according to an accident of God (that something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins to be relatively said.”

### III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

46. To the arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1]: I concede that whatever is in God is eternal by identity; but it is not necessary that whatever is predicated of God, by the fact that something else has a disposition to him, is eternal formally, because neither does anything else have an eternal disposition to him – just as if God is eternal and loved in time by a created will, he is called indeed loved by us but not ‘loved eternally’.

47. To the second [n.2]: the consequence does not hold, because when extremes are of different idea, on account of the fact one extreme exceeds the other, it is not necessary that there is a like coexistence of one with the other and conversely, – just as it does not follow, ‘whatever is eternal is with the whole of time, therefore everything temporal is with the whole of eternity’; for the first part is true by reason of the immensity of eternity, and that is lacking in the other extreme, – and so it is not necessary that there is concomitance conversely of the kind there is here. Thus here the eternal can be term of a new relation to itself (because the eternally existent can produce something *de novo*), and of it can some appellation be said from time, but the temporal cannot so have the relation of something eternal to itself; or it can be conceded that the temporal too

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<sup>18</sup> That is the relations of servant and lord.

can be denominated from a relation of the eternal to itself, – as a stone, not only as object of an idea but as existing, is eternally known by God.

48. To the third [n.3]: a ‘to be made/come to be’, not determined by anything (namely when it is predicated second adjacent), indicates the making simply of that of which it is said, – as if it be said ‘man is made’, being made simply is indicated to be present in man; but if it is predicated third adjacent, as ‘man is made white’, it is not indicated that he comes to be save according to something of him, namely which specifies him.<sup>19</sup> And so someone might perhaps concede that God ‘comes to be’ lord, indicating a coming to be ‘in a certain respect’, namely a coming to be according to some relation of reason or according to the termination of some relation; but it is more conceded that he ‘begins to be’ lord, because this does not signify imperfection as ‘is made’ does; in no way, however, is either ‘is made’ or ‘begins’ conceded absolutely.

#### IV. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

49. To the second question [n.5] I respond that in God there is not any real relation to creatures.

50. The reason for which is taken from the perfect simplicity and from the perfect necessity of God: for because God is perfectly simple, nothing is in him which is not him (according to Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10: “God is simple, because he is what he has”); also his perfect necessity is of itself such, that his being will not be varied whatever hypothesis is set down – whether possible or impossible – about what is other than himself, because other things are not necessary except secondarily.

51. From this it follows that no reality is in him which necessarily co-requires what is other than itself; for such a thing, necessarily co-requiring something other than God, would not be if that co-required thing does not exist, and consequently something that was perfectly the same as God would not exist when something else – which is not necessary of itself – does not exist; but a real relation of necessity co-requires for its ‘being’ the term of the relation; therefore in God there is no real relation to anything other than himself.

52. Against this reason it is objected:

First, because although the creature is not necessary in actual being, yet it seems that ‘something other than God’ is necessary in possible being, because the ‘possible being’ is necessary (which is proved from this, that first does something seem possible by the possibility of it in itself before relation of God to it, for there is no power in anything save with respect to something possible in itself; therefore a relation to a creature ‘insofar as it is possible’ does not co-require anything that is not necessary under the idea under which it is its term); but a relation in God to a creature ‘as possible’ seems to be the same as his relation to a creature as actual, by the deduction set down for the first opinion to the first question [n.11]; therefore some relation can be in God simply – while his necessity stands – to creatures as possible, and the same as that which is to creatures as actual.

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<sup>19</sup> The Latin for ‘is made’ can be and is also translated as ‘comes to be’ or ‘becomes’. This ambiguity in English can obscure the point the Latin is making. For God simply is, and is never made to be or comes to be. So God cannot be said to be made with ‘is made’ taken really or existentially. But God can be said ‘to be made/come to be lord’, where there is a third adjacent and ‘is made’ serves as a copula. Here the ‘is made’ with ‘lord’ states in God nothing absolutely (no real being or change of being in him) but only a relation of reason to creatures.

53. Again, if a creature has quidditative being insofar as it has exemplified being (according to one opinion), this being of the creature is necessary; therefore a respect to this, as such, seems it is possible to be without possibility in that in which such respect is.

54. Again, if the philosophers were to posit some other things produced by God formally necessary (as was said about the opinion of Aristotle and Avicenna in distinction 8 nn.251-253, 255, 248, 242), then the respect to them could be the same as God and yet the necessity of the divine entity could stand by the fact that the term of the relation according to that opinion would be necessary; therefore, by holding the position of the philosophers [e.g. Avicenna, *Metaph.* 8.4 ch.7] who yet denied in God a real relation, this reason already posited (from the simplicity and necessity of God [n.51]) does not seem sufficient.

55. Again, fourth: then in no creature more necessary ought there to be posited a real respect to a creature less necessary, and so in the celestial bodies there would not be a real respect to generable and corruptible things.

56. To these [objections, nn.52-55].

Although to the two first [nn.52-53] it could be replied as if in one way (to the first by this, that to be possible is only to be in a certain respect,<sup>a</sup> and therefore to it there is not any relation simply but in a certain respect, – and to the second in like manner, that to be copied is only to be in a certain respect, and therefore a relation to such term would not be real, just as neither is the term real); however it can be said, with a single general response to all these instances [nn.50-55], that the necessary of itself – as was said [n.50] – will not change according to anything perfectly the same as itself, whatever possible position is made about what is other than itself; and whatever is in the perfectly simple is perfectly the same as it; therefore the necessary of itself can according to nothing in it be changed, whatever is posited about something else. And nothing other than God is as formally necessary as God, according to any position, because if something else were posited formally necessary, not however without all dependence on the first necessary, and so not of itself necessary, then no reality in the first will change because of any position whatever about anything such that is not of itself formally necessary: but some change could come to be in some reality in the first because of a change in something other than itself, if some reality in itself were necessarily to require something other than itself.

a. [*Interpolation*] because this sort of to be is not to be simply, just as neither ‘to be a dead man’ is to be a man – nor does this possibility posit more in reality than blindness does in an eye.

57. And then to the two instances about potential and quidditative being (according to some) I reply [nn.52-53] that neither is that ‘possible’ of itself necessary in such being – even a necessary possible – in the way God of himself is necessary act; thus too neither are those quiddities of themselves necessary in that quidditative being, but by participation are they thus necessary beings; nor, third, would creatures – if they were necessary (according to the philosophers [n.54]) – be as necessary as the first thing, but would have a necessity only participated. And so to posit these not to be would not be as impossible as [to posit] some reality in the first not to be (because none of these is as necessary as any reality in the first is necessary), and yet from the positing of ‘the less impossible’ the more impossible would seem to follow! Not then for any one of these,

although in some way necessary (yet not of itself necessary) could there be any reality in the necessary of itself.

58. To the fourth [n.55] I say that if something ‘more necessary’ were also simple (that is, not composite, nor composable with any non-necessary reality), the more necessary would it be when it would not have a respect outside itself to the less necessary; but this supposition is false, because although some celestial body were posited in itself to be necessary, yet it is not a simple that could not receive any non-necessary reality other than itself: but God, just as he cannot be that which is ordered to something not of itself necessary, so he cannot have any reality ordered to anything such, because that reality would be himself.

#### V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

59. As to the arguments about omnipotence and omniscience [n.5], and the will of things future [n.6], there will be discussion in special questions about them [I d.43 nn.6-14, d.35 nn.27-34, d.45 n.7].

60. To that about action and passion [n.8]: the Philosopher does not say that those relations are real, but he says that they are mutual; and precisely in this are the relations in the first and second mode distinguished from the third mode of relation [n.31]. But whatever may hold of the words, the proposition of the Philosopher is not of itself true when the agent is of itself necessary and perfectly simple, as was said in the solving [nn.49-51].

61. But you ask: why then are the relations real that are founded on action and passion in creatures?

62. Although there is no need to speak to this point for the solution of the argument [nn.8, 60], yet it can be said that this is true in a natural agent, because the form that it has – by which it is active – is naturally inclined to producing the effect; and a free agent is not naturally inclined, from the form that it has, to the effect, – and then, since God is an agent acting freely, it follows that on his action will not be bestowed a real relation.

63. On the contrary:

The philosophers, in conceding that God by natural necessity produces things, denied a real relation of him to them [n.54]; therefore that [n.62] is not the precise reason.

64. Likewise, a created will seems to have a real relation to its effect, although it be free.

65. Further, an effect by its absolute entity does not necessarily require a proximate cause (for the same absolute entity could be from a remote cause), and yet when it is produced by its proximate cause it has a real relation to it; therefore there is not required for a real relation that the absolute nature, on which it is founded, be necessarily inclined of itself to either extreme.

66. Again, the likeness of two white things is a real relation in them, and yet one white thing, precisely considered insofar as it is the foundation of the relation, does not seem to be inclined from its entity (whereby it is foundation) to either extreme – especially a supreme whiteness, if it is put next to another supreme whiteness, as was argued against his [Henry’s] first argument to this question [nn.12, 20].

67. Again, if in advance of a real relation it is always necessary to posit in the foundation a natural inclination to a term, then before a real relation there is a real relation, because inclination to either of them is a real relation!

68. Therefore in brief:

It does not seem necessary for a real relation that the absolute, which is foundation of the relation, be of itself inclined to the rest, but that it be such that, when the term is posited, there be consequent to it and to the term that sort of disposition from the nature of the extremes,<sup>a</sup> – and then that every created agent is such that, when some effect is posited by it, on it as on a foundation and on the product as on a term the disposition of them follows.

a. [*Interpolation*] such that whatever relation follows the extremes from the nature of the thing is, without consideration of the intellect, real.

69. And the reason why a real relation follows is only because this is this and that is that: just as the reason why on whiteness and whiteness – once posited – a real relation (as ‘likeness’) follows is only this whiteness and that whiteness; and why on a double and a triple – once posited in being – follows a real larger-ness, there is no other reason but that this is a double and that is a triple.

70. And yet the reason for potentiality in the foundation and the term can be assigned a general cause, namely why a real disposition can follow:

For all the things that can be parts of some whole are potentials for the form of the whole, – and if they can be parts of something per se one, they can be potentials for the form by which it is per se one (as is plain about the parts of the organic body with respect to the intellective soul), and also, if they can be parts of something one with oneness of order, they can be potentials for the form of it, by which the ‘whole’ is one according to order; and generally, the proposition about the potentiality of parts is plain, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21, where he means that parts are like matter with respect to the whole. All created things – because limited – are of a nature to be parts of the whole universe, which is ‘one’ with oneness of order (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a16-19), and therefore any of them is potential for this form which is ‘order’, so that namely it may have order to another part; and this either according to the eminence that is in diverse natures in the universe, or according to equality (because “order is of things equal and unequal,” according to Augustine *City of God* XIX ch.13 n.1), or according to action and passion or according to causality. And therefore any created agent, when producing an effect, is potential in such way that on it and on its produced effect an order among them can follow.

Not thus however can it be as to an unlimited agent and its effect, because that unlimited agent is potential neither for absolute form nor for relation, on account of its infinity.

71. Through the same point can it be replied to the argument about quantity [n.7], because every created ‘how much’ – whether in virtue or mass – even if to another ‘how much’ it be posited to be able to have a real relation (because of this, that the order, from which the unity of the universe is, can be attended to between such quanta), yet there can be no real relation of an infinite quantity to a finite quantity.



72. And when the argument through equality, which is a real relation in creatures and even in divine reality [n.7], is confirmed – I reply that in divine reality it is real because it is a disposition from the nature of the thing, and it stands with the simplicity and necessity of the thing related in itself because it is not referred to another that is less necessary formally than the related thing itself; in creatures there is a real relation on account of the potentiality of the related quantities. But in comparing that infinite quantity to this, each idea is destroyed, because now are simplicity and necessity in one extreme taken away, and potentiality and limitation in the other taken away.

73. To the other [argument] [n.9] I say that reality sometimes determines the composition [sc. of a sentence], and then it is nothing other than that which is truly, – as when ‘that proposition is really false’ is said, that is ‘it is truly false’. But if reality is taken as it adverbially determines the predicate, here ‘God is really lord’, – although this can be denied, yet it can be conceded according as ‘lord’ does not indicate any relation in God but according as God is the term of a real relation of the creature, as was said in the preceding question [n.44].

## Thirty First Distinction

### Single Question

#### *Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God*

1. About the thirty first distinction I ask whether identity, likeness, and equality are real relations in God.

That they are not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “We ask, according to what is the Father equal to the Son? Not according to this, that he is said relative to the Father, is the Son equal to the Father; it remains then that according to that which he is said relative to himself is he equal;” and Augustine infers: “it remains then that according to substance is he equal.” Therefore, equality is not said there according to relation.

2. Further, a form of the same species is not multiplied in number save by matter; proof: every form separate from matter has the whole species, according to some. Therefore equality in divine reality, since it is a form of the same idea and without matter, is not multiplied nor distinguished; therefore there is not a different equality in the Father and in the Son, and consequently it is not real in the Father, because then it would require a corresponding distinct relation in the Son.

3. Further, if equality in the Father is different from the equality that is in the Son, by parity of reasoning from the equality that is in the Holy Spirit – and then to the equality in the Son and to the equality in the Holy Spirit there will correspond different equalities in the Father, because correlatives are co-multiplied; therefore in the Father there will be two equalities, which seems unacceptable.

4. Further, if these relations are real, then they are equally distinct, just as are relations of origin – and consequently they could thus constitute distinct persons just as also do relations of origin; and if they can constitute, they do constitute, because there is no potency there without act.

5. The opposite:

Hilary *On the Trinity* III n.23: “There is no likeness to oneself.”

## I. To the Question

### 6. To the question:

It seems it must be said that for a real relation three things are sufficient; first, that the foundation is real and the term is real; and second, that there is a real distinction of extremes; and third, that from the nature of the extremes such a relation follows without the work of any other power comparing one extreme to the other.

### A. As to the First Condition of a Relation

#### 1. Opinion of Others

7. As to the first condition of real relation [n.6], it is denied [Henry of Ghent] that there is here a foundation, because it is said that magnitude passes over into essence (according to Augustine, in many places), and so it does not remain under the idea of magnitude save in reason.

#### 8. But against this:

The divine essence as it is the first object of the divine intellect, seen in first intuitive cognition before all busying [sc. of thinking about it], is the beatific object of that intellect, because it is not beatified by a busying act; therefore of itself, without any busying of the intellect, it is formally infinite, because nothing beatifies save the formally infinite. So there is magnitude of virtue there – indeed infinity of magnitude – from the nature of the thing.

9. Again, the intellect, before it understands that it is understanding something or is busy about something, comprehends the essence as first object, and from this – being busy about it – it can reduce to act all ideas that can be considered about the essence; therefore from the nature of the thing the intellect is infinite, – therefore the essence too, on which it is founded.

10. Further, their reasoning [n.7] is not valid, because although quantity of bulk states something added to the nature of the subject, and therefore cannot remain under its formal idea and pass over into the essence according to identity, – yet magnitude of virtue in every being passes over into that to which it belongs by identity, even in creatures. – Proof: for if an angel has some magnitude of virtue (about which Augustine speaks in *ibid.* VI ch.8 n.9: “In things that are not great by bulk, to be greater is this, to be better”), if this perfectible magnitude is not the same as its essence, let it be removed from the essence. With the essence remaining, I ask what grade of perfection it has among beings? For it will be nothing unless it have among beings some determinate grade of perfection; therefore in the essence there still remains a magnitude of virtue, whereby it is said to be thus or so perfect. Therefore the quantity in everything passes over by identity, and remains in everything according to its proper idea, because such idea of quantity is to state the intrinsic mode of the perfection of which it is; and from this, that it states ‘mode’, it remains, and from this, that it states ‘intrinsic’, it passes over by identity into the essence of which it is.

#### 2. Scotus’ own Opinion

11. I say, therefore, that here there is a real foundation of equality and from the nature of the thing, not only a remote one, which is the essence, but a proximate one, which is magnitude or specifically ‘infinity’. And this is proved by all the reasons that are made for showing that the essence of the first thing is infinite: they do all indeed prove that it is from the nature of the thing infinite; for whatever depends on it – whether on it as first in idea of effective principle, or of final principle, or in idea of eminent and measuring and participated [principle] (which ways were touched on in distinction 2, *Ord.* I d.2 nn.111-144) – all these, I say, depend on it according to what it is from the nature of the thing, every act of intellect being removed, because no dependence of a finite effect is on something under the formal idea of a being of reason, as can be proved by the reasons given in distinction 13 against the sixth opinion [*Ord.* I d.13 nn.31-42]). There is also here from the nature of the thing that which is posited the proximate foundation of equality, or the idea of founding it, namely unity, because according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.8: “In him” (namely in God) “common and one are considered in the thing;” not so in creatures, but the common there is ‘one’ in the understanding only.

#### B. As to the Second Condition of Relation

12. In this way, namely that the relation requires extremes distinct really [n.6]: It is plain from Hilary, as was said in ‘the opposite’ [n.5].

13. And from Augustine, *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “In the Son,” he says, “is equality first.” Which would not be true if some person could be called equal to himself; for then the Father would first be equal. But because equality cannot be understood without distinction, and the first distinction is in the Son produced, so there the ‘first equality’ is in him, – taking as term or as quasi subject the equality by which the Son is equal to the Father.

14. This is also proved by this, that real relations of origin are posited, and yet they do not pre-require distinction of the extremes, but as it were formally cause it; and these relations presuppose that distinction ‘as if caused by relations of origin’, just as it is commonly posited that they cannot burgeon in the essence save with already pre-existing relations of origin in it [d.26 n.96]; therefore these more seem to require distinct extremes than relations of origin, or at any rate not less.

15. And if you object that these are not of another idea as those of origin are, – this only proves that they are not distinct in species; but in creatures not only are the relations of supposition and superposition real, where the extremes differ in species, – but also the common relations are real, where extremes differ only in number; therefore here a real numerical distinction in the extremes is sufficient for the reality of common relations, just as for the distinction of the relations of origin, which differ as it were in species.

#### C. As to the Third Condition of Relation

16. As to the third article [n.6] – it seems that this relation [sc. equality, likeness, and identity] is consequent to the persons from the nature of the thing, without any comparison through some extrinsic comparing power.

For because the Father by generating communicates his essence perfectly to the Son, therefore he communicates to him the same infinite magnitude – as Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.18 n.3: “If,” he says, “you say ‘the Father by that itself is greater than the Son, because he generated’, I will quickly reply: rather, therefore is the Father not greater than the Son, because he generated an equal.” There does not seem therefore to be any reason why the equality of the Father with the Son should not be posited a real relation.

17. Similarly can it be said of likeness. And – just as in creatures – there is a double likeness: namely essential, according to specific difference, and accidental, according to some accidental quality. And though the first be denied in the matter at hand (because God does not have any specific difference), yet because – if that which is in the specific difference in a creature were the whole essence of the individual – no less would there be a form in respect of the individual (therefore no less a relation of likeness than now), therefore it seems that properly can there be conceded there a likeness as to essence (not insofar as it is a ‘what’, but insofar as it is act and quasi form, whereby the persons are God), and also a likeness as to all the attributes, which are as it were properties of this nature (as Damascene says ch.4: “Things that concern the nature state it”): and then, just as from the nature of the thing there is a foundation of equality and a real distinction of extremes (and this relation without operation of the intellect [nn.11-13, 16]), so of likeness.

18. About identity too it can be said that it is doubly taken in divine reality; in one way of the same person with himself, as the Father is the same as himself, – in another way of one person with another, as the Father is the same as the Son and conversely. About the first identity, elsewhere [II d.1 qq.4-5 n.24].<sup>a</sup> About the second it can be said – as also about the others [sc. equality, likeness, nn.16-17] – that it is real, because there is there a true unity from the nature of the thing and a sufficient distinction of extremes, nor does a comparison by the intellect seem necessary for the being of this identity. And if the identity of the same supposit with itself in creatures is a relation of reason only, then never is there a true and perfect identity save in God only; for of Socrates with himself there is not perfect identity, because of reason only, and so everything such is in a certain respect; nor of Socrates with Plato is there perfect identity, because it is not founded on perfect unity. Here however of Father with Son there is a perfect identity as to foundation, because there is of Father with Son perfect unity, – and real identity, because a real and sufficient distinction between extremes.

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Response.

In distinction 19 to the last one: it is a mark of imperfection in creatures that the foundation is distinct; there is not required save a distinction of supposits.

There, at the bottom: the property of quantity of virtue as also of bulk.

Again, here in this distinction in question 1: it does not state only negation, as neither does the unity of essence and the distinction of persons which it follows.

Here in question 2: respect formally is in the idea of it, causally also of person, and unity of essence, – just as in creatures there is a respect of supposit to supposit according to one form.

But what he [Bonaventure] does not understand, that they are only in reason, is not only proved in d.19 (‘passion’) and in the first question here (‘it follows’), but because he never adds the diminishing element [cf. *Ord.* I d.36 nn.32-26] (in distinction 30, ‘About the relation of God to the creature’).

## II. Doubts about Equality

19. But about equality there are two doubts:

For first it seems it is not a distinct relation from identity and likeness because (as was said elsewhere [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221, d.10 n.30, d.13 nn.72, 80]) ‘infinite’ is not a special attribute but states a mode intrinsic to any attribute, – and by parity of reasoning ‘great’, which as it were states indistinctly what ‘infinite’ states distinctly: therefore the magnitude of the essence is not distinct from the essence (nor by the distinction that is between the attributes), and then equality according to this magnitude is not distinct from identity that is according to the essence; likewise, magnitude is not distinct from wisdom by the distinction that is between the attributes, – therefore equality according to magnitude of wisdom is not distinct from likeness according to wisdom. But every magnitude is either of the essence, according to which there is identity, – or of an attribute, according to which there is likeness; therefore no equality seems in divine reality to be distinct from identity and likeness.

20. Further, if also any attribute has its own proper magnitude, in accord with any at all does equality seem to be founded; therefore there will be as many equalities of the persons as there are attributes.

21. To the first [n.19] it can be conceded that – as in creatures – there can be likeness without equality (as a dark white is like a bright white, although not perfectly) but not conversely, in the form by which some things are of a nature to be likened; and through this, by comparing some things in the form according to which likeness is of a nature to be, equality seems as it were to determine likeness and the foundation of likeness. So it can be conceded here that equality is not so distinct from identity and likeness as they are among each other, but that it state a mode proper to the foundation of each of those two relations, and as it were also a mode proper to each relation, – that namely both identity and likeness are perfect: because if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater deity and the Son a lesser one, there would be some identity, but because the foundation of the identity would not have the same magnitude, there would not be perfect identity, and not along with equality; likewise, if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater knowledge and the Son a lesser, they would in some way be alike, but because the mode of the foundation – namely perfect magnitude – would be deficient, therefore would there not be a perfect likeness. But now the magnitude, which is as it were the mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, founds equality, which is as it were the mode of likeness and identity, – because it states each of them as perfect.

22. As to the second [n.20], it can be conceded, because there are as many magnitudes and equalities as there perfections in God simply; however just as they are all simply one thing, so too are ‘equalities according to them’ simply one thing. And from this is plain how the Master did – distinction 19 ch.1 n.168 – well assign ‘perfect equality’ among the three (according to Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4), namely ‘in magnitude, in power, and in eternity’: by magnitude indeed is understood equality in all attributes (taking magnitude not for any distinct attribute, but as it is common to the magnitude of any attribute at all), and by power they are indicated to be equal as to objects outside, and by eternity equality is indicated to be in them as it were according to duration. But equality according to discrete quantity is not acquired

there, but to continuous quantities in creatures – which are quantity permanent and successive – do magnitude and eternity there correspond.

### III. To the Principal Arguments

23. [To the first principal argument] – To the first argument [n.1] I say that a white and a white are said to be alike according to whiteness (and this insofar as the ‘according to’ indicates its determinable to be the proximate foundation of the relation); and they are said to be alike by likeness formally. So I say that the Father and Son are equal according to essence as according to proximate foundation [nn.11, 35], because these common relations are founded on something as it is common; but nothing is one in the persons save essence or an essential.

24. Against this solution it is argued in many ways:

First, because by parity of reason there seems to be in God a single equality, just as a single paternity: both [1] because each relation is equally adequate to its foundation; and [2] because anything in God of one idea is single, – otherwise he would not be of himself supremely one, but he would be by one thing ‘a being according to quiddity’ and by another ‘this being’, and so potentiality and composition; and [3] because in the same way infinity in all of them seems to follow, because it will not be possible to give what it is a multipliable thing is determined by to a definite plurality; and [4] because what has a cause of one idea and a single receptive idea is single, because it is distinguished neither by agent nor by matter, *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044a25-32 (likeness is of this sort).

25. Again, not only does it follow that there are six equalities in three persons; indeed any person is equal to two and conversely, – and not by the same equality by which it is to one, because not the same extreme; indeed any person is equal to the three, because *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2: “The three are not a greater thing than one is” (nor a lesser, as is plain; therefore they are equal). And this last point [sc. any is equal to the three] seems sufficiently to show that [equality] is not real, because it is of the same thing to itself, provided not to itself precisely but with the others; never is it real to itself, however much it may be co-numbered with the others. And why it is not to itself precisely, – it can be said, not because it states a relation, but it only signifies unity of quantity; yet it connotes distinction of supposits, and therefore it is to another. – Further, this equality is equal to that equality, and so *ad infinitum*; this one also is like that one, and the same in quasi species, and so again *ad infinitum*.

26. To these:

To the first [n.24 – 1] it is said that no relation there equals the foundation, because the essence is the immediate foundation of them all: for since a relation does not found a relation, and there is only essence and relation there, the conclusion follows. – To this it is said that distinct attributes are the proximate foundations of the relations of origin, as memory of ‘active saying’ and actual knowledge of ‘passive saying’; to this proximate foundation one relation of origin is equal.

27. In another way it is said to the first [n.24 – 1] that in creatures disparate relations [sc. correlates denoted by different names, as father and son] require distinct foundations (because they differ in species), common relations do not: therefore the [relation] of disparity in this way equals what is not the same foundation of the opposite

relation; not so in common ones. To the matter at hand [the answer] is plain [sc. paternity is adequate and unique, equality is not adequate or unique].

28. But, given this response [n.27], why is there only a single paternity? Because although its proximate foundation is not of the opposite relation (which as it were differs in species), yet why does ‘this paternity’ equal, and ‘this equality’ not equal, its foundation? – Response: no unique common relation can be adequate, because the opposite has to have the same foundation; some relation of the disparate can be.

29. On the contrary: why is ‘this paternity’ necessarily adequate? – Response: nothing of one idea is multiplied unless some things of another idea are pre-understood, which are causally necessarily required for its multiplication; therefore paternity cannot be multiplied because it does not pre-require such things of different idea (which are to be as it were the cause of its multiplication), – equality can be, because it pre-requires relations constituting persons, by which distinction of persons are the equalities distinguished. Proof [sc. that in something of one idea multiplication is made by something of another idea]: by what is *a* other than *b*? If by something of another idea in them, or causally, the thing proposed is got; if not, but only by some [cause] of the same idea, I ask again by what it is distinguished, and so *ad infinitum*. – Whatever be [the case] about this general proof, there is a special proof in God; because otherwise [sc. if multiplication were not made by something of a different idea] there would be an infinity, because nothing there is determined to a certain multitude by any prior cause; therefore only by some [cause] of a different idea, because ‘whatever of one idea is related to several things does not determine to how many such things it may extend itself’ (it is got from distinction 2 above, question 7, in the solution, extra [*Ord.* I d.2 q.7, sub n.303]).

30. Hereby is plain the response to the third [n.24 – 3]; why a certain plurality of equalities, but there would not be of paternities.

31. To the second [n.24 – 2]: whatever is of one idea in reality – not only in concept – is unique, I concede. To the proof [*ibid.*] I say that in concept not by the same one is ‘equality’ and ‘this’, but anything in reality is ‘equality’ and ‘this’ by the same thing – as is replied in [*Ord.* I] distinction 8 nn.137-150 about a concept common to God and creatures, or a common thing (so too in [*Ord.* I] distinction 29 nn.3-4 about principle and in distinction 23 n.9<sup>a</sup> about several relations having a common concept).

a. *A blank space was left here by Scotus.*

32. To the fourth [n.24 – 4]: the proposition can be conceded, and it is true when ‘one receptive’ is only in one recipient and is an absolute form; in relations several are in the same, and necessarily several in opposite, extremes.

33. To the other [n.25]: it is conceded that there are six other equalities, between any person and two others; but between one and three, or two and two, it is conceded as of a quasi numeral part to a quasi numeral whole – and then is the proposition ‘never is it real etc.’ denied. In another way is real denied, when the same person is in both extremes: it does not follow ‘not greater nor lesser therefore equal’, because the premise is true of the Father with respect to the Father, the conclusion false.

34. To the last one, about infinity of equalities [n.25], it is replied in book II, distinction 1 question 4 nn.23-24,<sup>a</sup> which relations are referred to other [persons], which to themselves.

a. *A blank space was left here by Scotus.*

35. And if you object that then the Father could be spoken of according to essence, because essence is foundation of paternity (which however is not conceded), although I have made this argument elsewhere for proving that a relation of origin is not an act of essence [I d.5 n.137], yet by holding the common way [Vatican editors: sc. opposite to the objection here, that the Father cannot be called Father of the Son according to essence or according to divinity], a reason can be assigned why according to essence the Father is said to be equal to the Son but not Father of the Son; because although it [the essence] be foundation of both [sc. of common relation and of relation of origin], and is not distinct (neither by the latter nor by the former), yet it is the foundation of the common relation insofar as it is one – but not insofar as ‘one’ is it the foundation of relation of origin, although it is one; and because essence ‘as essence’ is not taken there save insofar as it is one formally in the three, therefore the Father is said to be equal according to essence, because of this that the essence as ‘one’ is the proximate foundation of this relation [sc. equality]. But he is not said according to deity to be Father, because deity as ‘one’ is not ‘the idea of the foundation’ of this [sc. paternity], such that unity be the idea of the foundation, as would be indicated if he were said according to deity to be Father; because wherever relation is act of the foundation, there can a supposit be spoken of [relatively] to another according to that foundation (as Socrates according to whiteness is like, fire by heat heats, a stone according to the quiddity of stone is measure of the knowledge about a stone); but this is not conceded ‘the Father by deity is Father, or according to deity’ [nn.23-24]; therefore etc.<sup>20</sup>

36. But in this way it seems it can be argued that neither according to deity is he equal, because this relation is not act of the foundation. – Response: where relation is act of the foundation, there according to the foundation something is said [relatively] to another (this [response] I have accepted), but I do not concede conversely that wherever something is said [relatively] to another according to the foundation, that there relation is act of the foundation – because universally such ‘according to’ is a mark of a cause of inherence per se in the second mode, not the first. And well does ‘actuation of the foundation through relation’ prove that the foundation is the cause of inherence of the relation in the supposit (cause, I say, per se in the second mode), but not conversely, because ‘to be per se the foundation’ sometimes suffices for being a per se cause of inherence of the relation in the supposit without this that the relation actuates, although sometimes it not suffice, because then the Father according to essence would be Father.

37. But at any rate, what is the idea of dissimilarity here, that a common relation is said to be present [sc. in a supposit] according to essence – proper or of origin not, since neither is more act than the other? In creatures each is act, and each is said to be present according to the foundation: for ‘hot’ according to heat both makes hot and according to heat is similar!

38. [To the second principal argument] – To the second [n.8] I say that the major proposition is false; rather, when a form is distinct in matter and with matter, the matter is not the principal idea of this distinction, because in any distinction that is the principal

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<sup>20</sup> Vatican editors: “therefore paternity is not act of essence or of deity, and consequently the Father cannot be called Father of the Son, or to the Son, according to deity.”



idea of distinguishing which is the principal idea of being in that being (about this elsewhere, in the question ‘On individuation’ [II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6 nn.9, 15, 20]).

39. [To the third principal argument] To the third [n.3]; it seems it must be conceded that in the Father there is one equality with the Son and another with the Holy Spirit, just as, if the Father had generated the Holy Spirit, there would be in him one paternity to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit – and about this statement there will be discussion generally in book III d.8 q. un. n.6-11, 21-22, ‘whether in one thing, related to several, there are several relations’.

40. [To the fourth principal argument] – To the fourth [n.4]; the argument seems difficult to those who posit the persons to be relative (as was argued against them in [Ord. I] distinction 26 n.96, for the third<sup>21</sup> opinion), yet by holding the common way [sc. that the persons are relative] it is necessary to say that first burgeon in the essence the relations of origin before the common ones, and those ‘burgeoning first’ distinguish and constitute the persons, – but not the common ones, because they are as it were adventitious to the persons [n.14] (just as it is posited that spiration-action constitutes no person, because it is understood to quasi-happen to the Father and the Son already constituted in personal being); for the first things burgeoning there that can distinguish personally, distinguish personally and constitute.

## Thirty Second Distinction

### Question One

#### *Whether the Father and the Son Love Themselves by the Holy Spirit*

1. About the thirty second distinction it is asked whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit.

That no:

Because ‘to love’ is taken either essentially or notionally; not essentially, because any essential is present in any person, not through another; if notionally, then the Father and Son spirate by the Holy Spirit, – which is false.

2. The same is proved second because no notional act returns back to the same agent form which it is or proceeds, because of the distinction which such notional act requires between agent and term; therefore, if this act [sc. to love] returns back, it is not taken notionally.

3. Further, if Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, then the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, because by the same thing does the Father seem to love himself and the Son; but the conclusion seems unacceptable, because the Father loves himself in the first moment of origin, in which the Holy Spirit is not understood [as] spirated.

4. Further, they love themselves and creatures by the same thing; but the Holy Spirit does not seem to be ‘what they love the creature by’, because then just as the Holy Spirit, from the necessity of his production, is love, so love of creatures would be from necessity – and so God would necessarily love creatures.

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<sup>21</sup> Vatican editors: Scotus actually wrote ‘fourth’.

5. On the contrary:

*On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7: the Holy Spirit is “by whom the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his begetter.”

## Question Two

### *Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom*

6. Second I ask whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom.

That yes:

‘The Father speaks by the Word’, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1; but according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.63, “nothing else is it to speak by the supreme spirit than to intuit as it were by thinking;” therefore the Father intuits by the Word, and so he is wise by the Word.

7. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1: “By that by which he is wise he is, because it is the same thing for him to be wise and to be;” therefore if he were wise by the Word he would be by the Word.

### I. Opinion of Others to the First Question

8. The first question [n.1] the Master reckons difficult and he dismisses it unsolved.

#### A. First Opinion

9. Some have denied [Gottfried of Poitiers] the proposition ‘the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’ [nn.1, 5], and have said it was retracted by Augustine in a like case, *Retractions* I ch.26, where he retracts this one ‘the Father is wise by generated wisdom’, to which that one seems to be likened, and therefore they say the former is retracted in the latter.

10. On the contrary:

Not only does Augustine separately retract diverse matters that need to be retracted, but also the same matter that is spoken off in diverse books (which yet needs to be retracted) does Augustine several times retract, when namely he makes mention of the diverse books; therefore much more would he retract this one separately, if it needed to be retracted.

11. Augustine also does not retract the sayings of other saints who seem to concede this proposition, – as of Jerome *On the Psalms* [Ps.-Jerome, *Breviary on the Psalms*, ps. 17.1]

#### B. Second Opinion

12. Others [Simon of Tournai, Gottfried of Poitiers] have said that the proposition needs exposition, so that the ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken in idea of sign, – so that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit as by a sign of common love.

13. On the contrary:

Thus could it be said that they love themselves by a creature, because a creature is a sign of their love.

### C. Third Opinion

14. Others say [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure] that they love themselves with a love appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and so they are said to love themselves by the Holy Spirit by appropriation, not properly.

15. On the contrary:

Thus would they be good by the Holy Spirit, because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

### D. Fourth Opinion

16. In another way it is said [Aquinas, *Sent* I d.32 q.1 a.1]] that “this ablative [sc. ‘by’] is to be construed in idea of formal effect.”

17. This is made clear first because, although not every thing is a form, yet [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.37 a.2] “all that by which something is denominated – to this extent – has the disposition of a form; as if I say ‘he is clothed by clothing’, this ablative ‘by clothing’ is construed in relation of formal cause, although it not be the form of man.”

18. “But it happens that something is denominated by that which proceeds from it not only as an agent by the action but also as by the term of the action, which is the effect, when the effect is included in the understanding of the action: for we say that ‘fire is a heater by heating’, although heating is not heat (which is the form of fire) but an action that proceeds from fire; and we say also that ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, although the flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it.”

19. “According to this, then, it must be said that since ‘to love’ in divine reality is taken in two ways, namely essentially and notionally – according as it is taken essentially, in this way do the Father and Son not love themselves by the Holy Spirit but by their essence; hence Augustine says *On the Trinity* XI ch.7 n.12: ‘Who dares say that the Father loves neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit save through the Holy Spirit?’”

20. On the contrary [n.18]:

‘To build’ distinctly imports this term which is ‘a building’, yet it is not conceded that ‘a builder builds by a building’; and in the matter at hand too, ‘to spirate’ more distinctly imports the Holy Spirit than ‘to love’, and yet it is not conceded that ‘the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Spirit’.

21. Again, even if such a predication were conceded, yet not as turning back to the agent – because it would not be conceded that something is said of fire that would have its term at fire by something produced by itself [sc. by fire].<sup>22</sup>

22. Further, in a transitive construction never is the effect ‘as effect’ construed in the ablative; but to love is a transitive verb. Hence the example – on which they rely – is

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<sup>22</sup> Fire is said to be hot and bright by the heat and light it produces, but the heat and light it produces are not what first make it hot and bright – as if it were cold and dull and became hot and bright only when the heat and light it produced returned to it and made it hot and bright. So Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit but they do not spirate by the Holy Spirit – as if the spiration by which they spirate the Holy Spirit is something they receive from the Holy Spirit they first spirate.

not to the purpose [sc. ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’ n.18]; for ‘to flower’ is a neutral verb and does not signify formally the production of anything.

Every neutral verb indeed signifies the same as an adjective name (if a name were imposed), save that the name signifies by way of habit and rest, but a verb quasi-signifies in becoming, – just as ‘to be hot’ signifies the same thing as it were at rest and ‘to heat’ signifies it as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative name could be said of something with the ablative, indicating that by which the subject is denominated by such denominative, so a neutral verb could be construed with the ablative in the same disposition of denominating form: for fire ‘heats by heat’ just as it is ‘hot by heat’, and each is in idea of the form whereby this denomination [sc. ‘by heat’] is in the mode of rest in one case [sc. ‘is hot’] and in the mode of becoming [sc. ‘heats’] in the other. And the form is sometimes inherent, as a quality, – sometimes it is disposed by way of a form denominating from without, as of the category of having or by way of it (in both ways can the denomination happen); and just as something is denominated not only by the form but by something extrinsic, sometimes with the extrinsic thing taken in the ablative (thus could a denominative be said of it), and this whether the denominative is signified nominally or verbally; for just as it could be said ‘he is adorned with a garment’ (insofar as ‘adorned’ signifies something in the category of having), so it could be said ‘he gleams with a garment’ (or by some other neutral verb that would signify the same as this denominative ‘to be adorned’), – and so it is in the matter at hand, because ‘the tree flowers’ does not formally signify that the tree produces a flower. For if an active verb is posited that would thus signify, namely ‘to florificate’ (if it were in use), this proposition would be false ‘the tree is florificating with flowers’; but this proposition is true ‘the tree flowers with flowers’, because by this neutral verb [sc. ‘flowers’] is signified that it denominates the subject as it were by way of having, because although there is not properly having in inanimate things, they can yet be denominated by something attaching to them,<sup>23</sup> which – insofar as it is in some way an ornament or covering of them – can be reduced to the category of having; and then, just as ‘the tree is florid with flowers’ might be said and the ablative [sc. ‘with flowers’] would be construed in idea of that by which the subject is denominated according to such denomination [sc. ‘is florid’], so too is the ‘with flowers’ construed with this verb ‘to flower’. The example, then, is to the opposite, when speaking of an active verb; and is nothing to the purpose – the way it is true – when speaking of a neutral verb.<sup>24</sup>

## II. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

23. For solving this question [n.1] (because things that are in the intellect are more manifest [sc. than those in the will]), reply must first be made to the second question [n.6].

<sup>23</sup> As a table is said to have the table cloth it is covered with, or a bed the blanket it is covered with.

<sup>24</sup> A tree can be said to flower with flowers either if it is adorned with flowers by people adorning it (as at a festival), or if it flowers with the flowers (the ‘blossom’) it itself produces. So ‘to flower’ in the case of a tree is in this sense neutral. The like holds of Father and Son spirating the Holy Spirit. For if the phrase ‘Father and Son spirate with the Holy Spirit’ is taken as thus neutral (as in ‘the tree flowers with flowers’), it is not to the purpose because it does nothing to answer the question (sc. how Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit). If however it is not taken as neutral but in its active way (as in ‘the tree blossoms with – produces – flowers’), it signifies the opposite (sc. of such way of taking the Thomistic view), for the Father and Son cannot thus spirate the Holy Spirit with the Holy Spirit because then the Holy Spirit would have to be spirated before he was spirated.

And first let us look at our own intellect:

For there memory generates actual knowledge, which has a double relation to memory: namely ‘of generated to generating’ and this relation is of the second mode of relatives and mutual – and another ‘of declaring to declared’, and this is of the third mode of relatives and not mutual [d.30 n.31]. But just as generated knowledge makes clear formally an object latent in memory, so can that which produces actual knowledge, and gives it this power of making clear, be said ‘to make clear by this knowledge’ quasi-effectively: for if someone produce a mirror and images shining back in it, although the mirror formally makes those images clear, yet what ‘produces the mirror’ effectively makes them clear. And this is more apparent if acts of the soul, which are not true makings, were signified by neutral non-active verbs (but now they are signified by active verbs, because of the disposition they have to the object to which they are transitive as into their term, although they cause nothing in that object); for then, if they were neutral, they would signify formally that the reality is in the subject by which they are imposed, and then such active verbs could be imposed by the same forms which would signify the production of such things; and then ‘generated knowledge’ would be formally declarative of the object, but ‘the one producing’ would be said to cause the form effectively (just as was said elsewhere that likeness can be in what the relation of active and passive is founded on, so that ‘making like’ is giving a likeness [I d.19 n.28]), and then ‘declaring’ – actively taken – would be effective of the formal declaring in the act of the soul or in the subject of that act.

24. To the matter at hand:

The divine Word is expressed by the Father, and this expression is a relation of origin; now to this expressed [word] is communicated, by force of its production, infinite knowledge, which – from this fact – is declarative of everything declarable. It has therefore a real relation to what expresses it, from which it is born, but the other [relation] – namely of the one declaring – it has not only to it but, because it is infinite, it has this respect of ‘declarative’ to itself and to it and to everything else: and this is only [a relation] of reason, because it is not only to creatures but to itself; and if there is no real relation to creatures (from distinction 30 nn.49-51), much more then is there not either a real relation of the same thing to itself.<sup>a</sup> But this ‘to declare’ belongs formally to the Word, and to the producer it belongs by way of principal (just as in us it belonged to the memory effectively), – and then the Word formally makes clear everything declarable; and the Father declares to the Word not formally but by way of principal, insofar as he communicates to him actual infinite knowledge, by which the Word actually makes [things] clear.

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] The word declares the object, the ‘saying’ clarifies the object by the word, whereby is indicated that it has the idea of the sub-authentic [principle] in respect of that which belongs to itself formally, and to another by way of being principle: just as the Father creates by the Word by which the Word is indicated to have sub-authority with respect to action, because it belongs to each as agent.

25. Applying this reality then to this verb which is ‘to say’, I say that ‘to say’<sup>a</sup> can signify the relation of origin which is ‘of generating to generated’ and in this way only the Father says, – not indeed by the Word but he says the Word; and in this way Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* VI ch.12 that “only the Father says,” and as Augustine

said “the Word, by which he has disposed all things.” In another way, ‘to say’ can signify the disposition of reason which is ‘to declare’, and this insofar as ‘to declare’ belongs to something formally, – and in this way the Word says all declarable things and by himself formally; and about this Augustine speaks *ibid.*, VII ch.3 n.4: “For if this word is our temporal word etc.”<sup>b</sup> In the third way it can signify the same disposition of the declarer, insofar as it belongs to someone not formally but principiatively, and in this way it is said of the Father that ‘he speaks by the Word’, – and in this third way Augustine says *ibid.* that ‘the Father speaks by the Word’; in this way too he says *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23 that “the Father, speaking himself, generated the Son equal to himself,” where he takes ‘to say/speak’ for ‘to declare principiatively’, although he does not add there the principle by which the Father says.<sup>c d</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] in one way it is taken essentially, as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* ch.63 (and thus does Augustine not speak, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1); because according to him [Anselm] the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one speaker, and any person speaks formally and no other ablatively. In another way he is taken personally, and thus...

b. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] And thus it is an essential and is appropriated to one person: for any person makes clear his own intelligibles that are in him, – it is appropriated however to the Son, as is plain from the following doubt.

c. [*Interpolation*] and thus the principal significate of it is an essential, but it connotes a notional, as was said above about gift [*Reportatio* IA d.32 n.35] – In what disposition therefore is it construed? I say that if it were the same as ‘to create’ it would be denoted to have the idea of subauthentic active principle – but because they are not the same, therefore I say that it is denoted to have the idea of authentic formal principle and is construed in the disposition of such principle.

d. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] To say is purely an essential (*Monologion* 64 [nn.6, 30]). Purely personal (‘to verbalize’): thus does the Father say the Word, not ‘by the Word’ unless it is dative (= ‘for the Word’) and taking ‘to say’ for ‘to communicate by expressing’. In the third way, to declare formally: thus it is an essential (as in the first way), and thus does any of them here speak by his own actual knowledge, as in the first way any of them speaks by his own intelligence; but in this third way it is appropriated to the Word, and first to the Father. In the fourth way, to declare principiatively; which connotes a personal by the ‘principiatively’, and it signifies an essential by ‘to declare’.

26. But then there is a doubt, whether to declare formally everything declarable is proper to the Word.

27. Some say that it is, because from the force of his production this belongs to him.

28. But about this there was discussed above, in *Ord.* I d. 27 nn.100-101; and generally, since this verb ‘to declare’ states a relation of reason, and no such is proper to any person nor is included in what is proper to any person, ‘to declare’ will not be proper to the Word, but it is only appropriated to him to this extent, that the Word by force of his production has actual knowledge communicated to him: and the Father, although he have the same yet, by the force by which he produces, is memory, and does not produce insofar as he is actual knowledge; but to actual knowledge – whence it is actual – it belongs to declare, and therefore ‘to declare’ more belongs with a property of the Son

than with a property of the other persons, and so it is more appropriated to him. Yet truly it is in every other person, because any person has actual declaration insofar as it is actual knowledge, and [has it] as equally declarative really as is the actual knowledge which is ‘word’. Therefore the Father formally declares everything by himself, just as the Son formally declares everything by himself and the Holy Spirit declares everything by himself. Therefore the Father and Son declare by the Holy Spirit principiatively, although these ways of taking ‘to declare’ – formally and principiatively – are not as in use as those by which the Word is said to declare formally and the Father principiatively by the Word; and the reason for the greater usage of these words is the appropriation of actual knowledge to the Word.

29. To the second question [n.6] then, I concede the negative part of the question, because of the reason of Augustine *ibid.* [n.7].<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] The declaration of which is this: an essential act cannot be of any supposit by mediation of any principle as the ‘by which’ unless it be for such person the formal principle of being (as the Father is wise by ungenerated wisdom), or the principiative principle for him of being (in which way the Master concedes [I d.32 ch.2 n.287] that the Son is wise by ungenerated wisdom, whereby he has the fact he is wise), or the sub-authentic principle with respect to such act (by which way it is conceded that the Father creates by the Word); but the Son – or generated wisdom – is not for the Father the formal principle of being, nor the principiative, nor the sub-authentic active principle, with respect to essential act, because he does not produce this act in himself (but it is communicated to him from<sup>25</sup> the Son), and the sub-authentic active principle has the idea of producing with respect to the act with respect to which it is called such principle. But to be wise is an essential act, therefore the Father is not wise with generated wisdom. – But this he [sc. Scotus] said first [*Reportatio* IA d.32 n.27], and then, so that the solution of the question may be better seen, it needs first to be seen as it is had above etc. [nn.23, 25].

### III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question

30. To the argument against the opposite [n.6] I say that Anselm takes ‘to speak’ there purely essentially for ‘actually to understand’, as he expressly means in that chapter, where he says that they are ‘one speaking as they are one understanding, and although any may speak and speak anyone, yet they are one in idea of speaking and spoken just as they are one understanding and one understood’. This way very much extends this which ‘to speak’ is, because it neither signifies the relation of origin nor connotes it, just as neither do to understand or to be wise; and in this way Augustine does not say that the Father speaks by the Word [nn.6, 25].

31. But how is it conceded that the Holy Spirit speaks the Word? – I reply: just as he understands the Word [sc. purely essentially, n.30]. But not for ‘to express’; nor for ‘to declare’, unless it be taken formally, because the Holy Spirit declares formally everything declarable; and not for ‘to declare principiatively’, save perhaps in respect of creatures, because, in speaking of the manifesting of creatures, the whole Trinity effects that. And because absolutely over the formal manifestation of the Word – not in comparison to creatures – the Holy Spirit does not have any idea of principle (because he does not give to the Word that by which formally he [the Word] is manifestive), therefore it does not

<sup>25</sup> The remark is peculiar and the Vatican editors change the ‘from’ of the mss. (the Latin ‘a’) to ‘and’ (the Latin ‘et’).

seem in any way to be conceded. Nor does Anselm say that ‘the Holy Spirit speaks by the Word’, although he may see everything in the Word; so too any of the blessed sees everything in the Word, and any person sees in any person (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.23), but ‘to speak by the Word’ seems to import some authority of ‘speaking by the Word’ in respect of the Word insofar as it is declarative formally.

#### IV. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

32. As to the first question, about the Holy Spirit [n.1], it is necessary to proceed in the same way as was done in the preceding question [nn.23-25].

And first about our will:

Where I say that love in us, as it is produced, has to the will as producer a relation of the second mode, and it is perhaps mutual. It also has another relation, to the object, pertaining to the third mode of relatives, – and it is not mutual, because just as science is referred to the knowable and not conversely [d.30 n.38], so love to the lovable and not conversely; and just as love has formally some disposition to the object, so could that which produces love be denominated by that disposition, if a word were imposed signifying this actively.

33. So I say in divine reality that the Holy Spirit, by force of his production – not indeed properly but by appropriation –, is love of everything necessarily loved, and therefore he has some relation of reason formally to what is thus loved; and the producer of him can be denominated by the same disposition quasi-principiatively, and that disposition, as denominating principiatively, is imported by this verb ‘to love’, when the Father and Son are said ‘to love themselves by the Holy Spirit’; this indeed is for ‘the Father and the Son to produce the Love’ that is of the Father and the Son, just as for ‘the Father to say himself by the Word’ is to produce the Word, which is what declares the Father himself.

#### V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

34. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it is held neither purely essentially nor purely notionally, but it connotes a notion (namely the production of the Holy Spirit), and it signifies the disposition, consequent to the Holy Spirit, to that loved thing (not indeed formally but principiatively); and, by reason of that consequent disposition, it is an ‘essential’ as to the term of the disposition, because the term is not only the Holy Spirit but everything necessarily lovable, – and to this extent a conversion happens, but not as to the notional connoted (from this is plain the answer to the second argument [n.2]). And this can be made clear in the example of ‘to say’, that, in the way in which it is conceded that the Father says by the Word, it is not a ‘to say’ either merely essential or merely notional, but it connotes a notional (namely begetting), and it imports the disposition of a declarative, which disposition is to everything declarable; something similar to this (although not as perfectly) can be had in this that is ‘to be sent’, which connotes procession in divine reality, although it signifies principally a temporal effect: and as to that which it signifies, the whole Trinity works that effect, – but as to the notion, it does not regard the whole Trinity in idea of principle (for the Son can be sent, though he is not from the Holy Spirit).



35. To the third [n.5]. Although some force could be put in this proposition [sc. the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit], that the ‘themselves’ can be understood retransitively or reciprocally (discussion of this double construal can be had from Peter of Elias *On Priscian on Construal*<sup>26</sup> – and it is plain in the sophism ‘they are fighting so that they may conquer themselves’<sup>27</sup>), and according to some the proposition would seem it should more be conceded according as the ‘themselves’ is construed retransitively than reciprocally, to the extent that the Holy Spirit according to them is spirated by the Father and the Son by concordant will (insofar namely as the Father bestows love on the Son and the Son bestows it back, according to Richard *On the Trinity* [I d.12 n.10]), yet when speaking in accordance with the things that are said in *Ord.1 d.12 n.36* on this matter, that the Father and Son spirate formally by will insofar as it is one (and is not the relation of concord of Father with Son, and conversely, the formal idea of spirating, because it does not seem that the Father and Son, insofar as they have the respect of origin to the Holy Spirit, have a mutual relation to each other: for then they would not have only a mutual relation of origin of paternity and filiation; and this, I say, by saying that although, in having one will, they agree in it formally, yet the concord is not per se the reason but the one will is – and that fecundity is complete in one just as in two; therefore, however, do two spirate, because the fecundity is pre-understood to be one in the two before they have their term), it can be conceded that the truth is the same in taking the ‘themselves’ in this way or in that; and then I concede the consequent [n.3], that ‘the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit’. And when you say ‘he loves himself in the first moment of origin’ [n.3], it is true, – but then he loves himself by will as it is in him formally; but by spirating the Holy Spirit, who necessarily is love of him, he loves himself by the Holy Spirit quasi-principiatively – in which way too does the Son love himself by the Holy Spirit.

36. To the last one [n.4] I say that it is not necessary to concede that the Father and Son love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way they love themselves by the Holy Spirit, because this way of loving – as it is taken principiatively – seems to be first of that term of love which the love is of formally, from the fact that it is principiated: for thus to love the object is to principiate the love, which – as principiated – is formally of the object; and the Holy Spirit, by force of his principiation, is neither first nor concomitantly love of the creature, because the creature is only contingently loved by God. But although from the force of his production he first be love of the essence, yet concomitantly he can be called love of the Son, because the persons are ‘in the first loved nature’ from necessity of the nature; and therefore it can be conceded that the Father does not love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way in which [he loves] the Son, because he does not produce a love that, by the force of production, is love of the creature; rather, with the complete necessary production of the love, still there is a contingency of that love as it is of the creature – and this is in the power not only of producing this love but of the love produced, because the Holy Spirit as contingently loves the creature as do the Father and Son.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Peter of Elias: “Possessive pronouns cause reciprocation through this pronoun ‘himself’, as ‘my son loves himself’; similarly, ‘he asks you to love himself’ is retransitive construction.”

<sup>27</sup> Sc. reciprocation: “that they may themselves conquer” or retransitive: “that they may conquer over themselves”

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The will in love formally accepts the object or is valued; and if it were not informed by love but were only to spirate it (as now, insofar as it spirates it), it accepts or is valued principiatively, that is, it renders the object accepted or valued by its love, as if what by it [love] is formally accepting. In this way can be expounded the formal effect, that is of the product, having from production that it is the formal ‘by which’ with respect to something.

But for whom accepted? – Response: as if for whom [it is] declared, because ‘to everyone seeing the word’; so here, to everyone loving love.

Does then every will loving the essence as it is the object of love (who is the Holy Spirit) love it by the Holy Spirit, – and seeing the essence in the Word as it is the object of knowledge in the Word know it by the Word? But if so, not because of this does it say the Word, and consequently neither does it love by the Holy Spirit – as it corresponds principiatively on this side and that, because it is not the principle of the Word or of the Holy Spirit.

## Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions

### Questions One to Three

*Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence, and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence*

1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask – without arguments – whether the property is the same as the essence;<sup>a</sup> and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.

a. [Interpolation, Appendix A, (mainly taken from *Rep* IA d.33)] That no: Augustine, *On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6; one and many; in the essence; what is the same as one thing, infinite; paternity, perfection simply; really; “he is wise not by that by which [he is Word];” per se or per accidens.

On the contrary: there is something or nothing (something created?); again, in the person with the essence; again, four things (on the contrary: Extra: “We condemn,” Gregory, *Decretals*).

Simplicity proves identity (*City of God* XI ch.10). Many contradictions prove some difference (*Topics* 7.1.152b34-35: “If one can be without the other, it will not be the same”).

Aquinas *ST* I q.28 a.2: “Relation is the same as essence in the thing,” because it is not an accident but has the same being as the divine essence, – “and it does not differ save by according to relation of intelligence, insofar as in relation is imported a respect to the opposite that is not imported in the name of essence.” To the second: “In a creature, besides what is contained under the signification of a relative name, there is found something else; in God not, but one and the same, which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as if comprehended under the signification of such a name.” To the third: “Just as in the perfection of the divine essence more is contained than what is signified by the name of wisdom,” rather “than what can be comprehended under the signification of any name.”

On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above that common [element]. – I respond otherwise: *a, b, c*, where there is a greater distinction than of attributes (‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’, as ‘good’, Augustine, *ibid.*, VII ch.4 n.9).

Henry [of Ghent] *Summa* 56.4: “Reality of relation, as it respects the essence, it is different only in idea from that, and therefore the essence is not simpler than the person.

Insofar, however, as relation is compared to opposite relation it posits a diversity of the thing of relation, not of the thing of substance; and thus they are in person as person, that is as something related to the opposite, both – both essence and relation – as two things: essence, as absolute thing, by which it is not distinguished, – relation as a thing of respect, by which it is distinguished. And thus although essence and relation, as they are compared among themselves, do not differ save in idea only, yet as compared to opposites they differ in reality, but not simply but with the determination ‘by the thing of substance and by the thing of relation’, without all composition, because the difference of certain things in something does not make a composition unless it be of things compared among themselves in constituting one thing, in the way matter and form differ in constituting a natural composite.”

On the contrary. Relation as it respects essence or is compared to the opposite: and thus in both ways it differs in reality or not; then relation is not compared. Again, relation, as it constitutes, respects the essence as in what it is; both because real, and thus it respects foundation, for you; second because a third is not constituted save as one is in the other; and as it constitutes it respects the opposite of the preceding term, because person is formally relative, – therefore it is distinguished really under the same idea and respects the essence with which it constitutes; therefore composition!

Solution. Some distinction, not only made by the intellect (*a, b, c*). How? Is it real? Henry concedes [*supra* here]. And Bonaventure [*I Sent.* d.33 a. un. q.2: “By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way being disposed, in comparison to the opposite, as it states the thing;” to the second: “The property distinguishes in the fact of differing not in essence but in mode; which mode does not make composition, because it is transitive to the substance, – nor does it state only understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object.”

In another way it is shown: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine *ibid.* VII ch.4 n.9), and double predication; example: it is an identity non-adequate, not precise; ‘this is that’ (it is from the nature of the thing; not potency, save in virtue only; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). More, distinction adds non-identity; then it is called also virtual or non-formal.

2. Over these questions there is no need to delay, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, *Ord.* I d.2 nn.388-410, in the question ‘whether along with unity of essence there stands a plurality of persons’, – where it was shown how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in *Ord.* I d.26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence [*Ord.* I d.2 etc.] entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what some distinguish between all these, that they only differ in reason, was rejected in d.2 nn.389-395, and d.8 nn.177-190 (in the like, about the attributes), and in d.13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere.

3. And yet along with this, that this is not formally the same as that, stands that it is truly and simply the same as it; indeed, this is necessary because of divine perfect simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of the essence, – because of which simplicity and infinity the essence cannot be along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as it. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded many predications to be true in divine reality by identity, non-formal [predications]; which does not seem intelligible save by this, that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from this was the affirmative proposition true by identity and yet the predicate was not formally the

same as the subject – and because of this there was not there formal predication. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in *Ord.* I d.8 (in the question ‘on the attributes’ nn.191-122) and elsewhere frequently [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], – therefore now I pass it by.

## Thirty Fifth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known*

1. About the thirty fifth distinction I ask first whether in God there are eternal relations to all knowables as quidditatively known.

That yes:

Augustine 83 *Questions* q.46 n.2: “Ideas are eternal and immutable forms in the divine mind;” not absolute, so relative, – and only to things other than itself as quidditatively known; wherefore they will be distinguished according to the distinction of those.

2. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7 (100vb-101rb) concedes that in God there is a relation of God, as understanding, to understood forms.

3. Again, God knows distinctly things other than himself, therefore through some distinct ideas of knowing; and they cannot be absolute, therefore relative.

4. Again, according to Augustine *De Gen. ad Litt.* V ch.14 n.31: “Everything in God is life;” and thus does he seem to say *On John* tr.1 nn.16-17: “Everything in him was life,” and this, “eternal life, not created but creative.” This is not true when speaking of these objects formally in themselves, – therefore of the very formal ideas by which they are known.

5. On the contrary:

Then the relations would be real, which is contrary to what was said in *Ord.* I d.30 nn.49-51. Proof of the consequence [n.1], because God first understands things other than himself before he understands that he understands them, because a reflex act presupposes a direct act; therefore the relations that were in God to other things were in God from the nature of the thing and not by an act of the intellect considering that intellection; but what is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the object as it is known, is real.

6. Further, the reason that there would be eternal relations in God to all things known is equally reason that to all things willed as willed, and then those relations would be real, because he first wills things other than himself before he understands that he wills them, – and so the relation of his will to other things will be real, because not in the object as known.

### I. To the Question

7. On the supposition that God understands (from *Ord.* I d.2 nn.75-78), and that his own essence is the first object in his reason (from the question ‘About the subject of theology’ [*Prol.* nn.152, 200-201]), and that his intellect is about all intelligibles, not

quasi in potency but in act and all at once (from *Ord.I* d.2 nn.98-101), and this distinctly (because is a mark of imperfection in what understands to understand confusedly, *ibid.* nn.105-110), – about this question it must be noted that for the intellection of anything three things seem to concur, namely the knowable object, the intellect itself, and the reason of knowing.

8. But in the intellect as it is a power there is no need to posit a distinction for this, that it understand distinctly, because our intellect – altogether indistinct according to idea of power – can understand many things. Therefore if there is a distinction [sc. in God’s intellect for understanding many things], let it be looked for in the object, or in the reason of knowing the object, or in intellection itself.

## A. Opinions of Others

### 1. First Opinion

9. It is posited then that there are in God eternal relations to what is other than himself, known by simple intelligence, and that these relations are in the essence as it is the idea of knowing for this reason, that nothing is the idea of knowing many things save as that idea is appropriated in some way to those many known objects.

10. Which is also confirmed, because knowledge comes about by likeness; therefore it is necessary that the idea of knowing has some proper idea of likeness to the thing known.

11. Because of this determination, therefore, and of this assimilation of the idea of knowing to the object, eternal relations are posited as ideas determining the essence as it is the idea of understanding, and whereby the essence is distinctly similar to the objects known.

### 2. Second Opinion

12. In another way it is posited that these relations are in the divine essence as it is the altogether first know object: it is understood indeed ‘by an intellection altogether first’ as completely indistinct, but for this, that the creature may be understood, the intellect first compares it [the essence] – known first – to the creature under the idea of imitable, and then, by understanding the essence as imitable, it understands the creature through that first object, thus considered under such relation of idea.

13. And this opinion differs from the first [n.9] as these two ways of speaking differ, one of which would posit ‘the same species’ to be the reason for knowing both the principle and the conclusion, only however as under distinct relations of reason, corresponding to these things known under their proper ideas – but the other [way of speaking] would say that ‘the principle known’ is the reason for knowing the conclusion, and this not as a principle absolutely understood, but in comparison or relation to the conclusion.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] A third opinion posits quasi the same, which posits ideas or ideal reasons in the act of understanding. And they [proponents of this opinion] have the following reason.

Our understanding, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b18-21, 15.1021a29-33, has a respect to the intelligible as measured to measure; therefore if it were

infinite like the divine [intellect], it would have a respect to infinite intelligibles, and so there would in our intellect be infinite respects to infinite intelligibles; but because it is finite, it has respect to one intelligible; therefore since the divine understanding is infinite, in its intelligibility will be infinite relations to infinite intelligibles.

## B. Rejection of the Opinions

### 1. Against the Common Conclusion

14. Against these opinions, – and first against the conclusion in which these opinions agree, namely that the relations of reason must necessarily be posited in God for this, that creatures may be understood distinctly, according to reason, by God in idea of objects [nn.9, 12].

It is argued first as follows: those ideas are knowable by the divine intellect. I ask, by what idea of knowing? If by other ideas, determining the essence as it is the idea [of knowing, n.9] or determining the essence as it is the first object with respect to secondary objects [n.12], there will be a process *ad infinitum*, because others again precede for understanding those ideas, and thus never are those other ideas intelligible by God, because it will be necessary for him to understand, before the ones understood, infinite others infinite times. Therefore a stand must be made, that those ideas can be understood by God through his essence as taken bare, either as through reason [n.9] or as they are understood through it as through the first known object absolutely [n.12]; and the reason whereby these will be able to be known by the essence whence it is essence bare, will be equally reason whereby those other secondary objects will be, because thus do those reasons seem to have ideas of distinct objects just as also do other things.

15. But you will say that these ideas of knowing are known by the divine intellect through the objects to which they are, such that the essence under these ideas is the reason for knowing other objects, and they – known together with the essence under diverse ideas – are the reason for knowing those ideas, as the extremes of a relation seem to be the reason for knowing the relation. – This seems to cheapen the divine intellect, because then it will be passive with respect to the other objects known through these ideas, by which it will be actuated for knowledge of these ideas.

16. Further, second: any object of which ‘some idea of knowing [it] determinately’ can be something limited to it, of that same [object] there can be something unlimited to it and to something else; but if the essence were limited with respect to any single determinate knowable, it would be determinately the reason for knowing that [knowable] without any respect real or of reason; therefore if it is posited as an unlimited reason with respect to several knowables it can be of itself the reason for knowing any and all of them, without all relation real or of reason.

17. Proof of the major: illimitation does not take perfection away from anything, but, with the perfection standing that was for something, it posits as it were a similar perfection for something else; and therefore, as was said in *Ord.* I d.7 nn.20-21 and d.28 nn.106-107, something indeterminate from illimitation (namely which is indeterminate to several positives) is of itself determinate to any of them, with determination being repugnant to indetermination to contradictories.

18. Proof of the minor: the essence is posited the proper idea for knowing itself, and this whether as first object or as idea of knowing the object. And this belongs to the essence purely under an absolute idea without all real respect, because a real respect is

not in the same person to himself. Without also any respect of reason, proof: because that intellection is not collative or comparative or negotiative; therefore by it no relation of reason is caused in anything.

19. Further, third: of one operation it is necessary to grant a principle 'by which' per se one and an object per se one, and this especially in the simply first operation, of which sort is divine intellection; but a relation of reason and a real being make nothing 'per se one', because they cannot even have a unity of the second mode per se (*Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b36-16b3), which is less than essential unity is (for a relation of reason cannot follow a thing from the nature of the thing, and therefore it cannot be a property of it); therefore the essence – whether as object or as idea of understanding – and that relation of reason are not 'one per se' object, nor one idea of understanding. Therefore it is necessary to grant a second thing precisely in idea of first object or reason 'by which'. Not precisely that relation of reason, because it is not first object known whereby, when known, something else is known to which that respect is; nor even is it the reason by which the divine intellect has intellection of this sort of object, because to understand a stone is a perfection simply, so that the divine intellect would not be altogether perfect intellect if it were not to understand stone: and no relation of reason seems to be the reason of the inherence of any perfection simply. Therefore it is necessary to grant precisely the essence – which is under this relation – as the first object whereby, when known, a stone is known, or as the formal reason for understanding a stone.

20. And from this further: in vain is such a relation posited determining the divine essence; for under a respect of reason it is an infinite form, because the intellect, however it compare the essence and thereby cause in it a relation of reason, does not compare it save as it is formally infinite, and so as it is under such idea it is formally infinite – and consequently as indeterminate as it is under that idea as [it is] in itself; and so as it is under the first idea it can found another (because of its infinity) just as it can in itself; therefore it is not determined by a relation of reason.

## 2. Against the First Opinion

21. Again, against the first opinion [n.9] especially it seems to follow that the relations are real, because the idea of understanding as it is idea naturally precedes intellection, – and consequently, as to nothing that is of it as it is the idea of understanding, is it caused by intellection, nor does it follow intellection; if then under a relation of reason is the idea of understanding a stone, that relation of reason is not produced in the essence by intellection of a stone, because it naturally precedes that intellection. Therefore that [relation] will be produced by some other [intellection]. But only that which is of the essence as essence precedes it; and by this is it not produced (which they concede – where it less appears – 'about the divine persons and about the principles of producing them'); therefore the relation will be in the essence as it is reason, and not by some action of the intellect.

22. Further, according to some of these [sc. of those who hold the two opinions, nn.9, 12], for a real distinction in things principiated there suffices a distinction of reason in the principles; therefore this distinction of reason as it is the idea of understanding *a*

and *b* will suffice for a real distinction of *a* from *b* (and conversely), such that one reason [will suffice] for the distinction of *a* and another for the distinction of *b*.

23. Further, an external thing is immediately understood [sc. according to the first opinion], because the whole distinction that is posited precedes intellection; nothing then within is term of intellection then as if a secondary object.

### 3. Against the Second Opinion

24. Against the second position [n.12]:

Every relation of reason, which is in the object from this, that it is compared by the intellect to something else, is in it precisely as a diminished thing having being in the intellect as known in knower; and it could be in it if *per impossibile* it did not have being of existence, provided however it had in a like way being in the intellect comparing. Therefore the relations would be or will be in the divine essence precisely as it has diminished being in the intellect comparing it to the creature, and not as the essence is something in itself; and further, they would be in the essence if *per impossibile* the essence were not, provided however it were by some understanding intellect compared to the same terms; and further, if *per impossibile* there were two Gods, they [the relations] would be in the intellect of this God comparing that God to the creature, and not in that God in himself.

25. Further, God is first naturally imitable by the creature before he is understood to be imitable: for because he is imitable, therefore is he truly compared as imitable by creatures, as it seems, and not conversely; therefore, before the comparison made by the intellect of the essence as imitable, there is imitability in the essence. But according to some of this [second] way [n.12], aptitudinal relation is the same as actual (because of which identity in God they say [Henry, *Ord.*I d.30 n.11] there is not some new relation, nor another old one, of creative and creating); therefore these relations in the essence as in compared object will not be first to the external, but there will be other prior and real relations, as it seems, because before every act of the comparing intellect.

26. Besides, although the essence ‘as known’ is the reason for reaching knowledge of a stone, yet it seems afterwards that the divine intellect could know a stone in itself and not precisely by this, that it compares its essence to a stone, because thus, without such comparison of something else with it, can we understand a stone. In this understanding of a stone, I ask what the relation of reason to the stone is in? Not in the essence as in object compared, because in this object as such there is not a ‘to understand’ as object compared; therefore it is necessary to look for it [the relation of reason] in intellection [sc. the third opinion] or in the idea of understanding [sc. the first opinion], and then back it will be to one of the other opinions [sc. the first or third].

### C. Scotus’ own Response

27. It can be said to the question [n.1] that relations of the third mode differ per se from the others of the two other modes, because in the third mode there is no mutuality as there is in the two other modes, – and from this follows (as was brought forward in *Ord.*I d.3 q.1 n.31) that the term of the relation is something absolute as absolute. Just as therefore the object of our intellect is the term of its [the intellect’s] relation insofar as it



[the object] is purely absolute, and thus it [the intellect] is measured by it [the object], so – it seems – since divine intellection is simply the measure of all things understood other than itself, it follows that other things are referred precisely to divine intellection, and it will be the term of this relation under the idea of the purely absolute; this is confirmed, because the altogether first divine intellection, which is beatific, is of the essence as it is essence, without any respect of thing and idea, and this because of the perfect real identity of the intellect with the essence as object.

28. It is not necessary, then, on account of the intellection of any object precisely, to look for a relation, either in both extremes or in one of them – therefore it is necessary to add something else, on account of the fact there is a relation in both or one of them. But that seems to be only either a mutual co-requirement, if the relation is mutual, or a dependence in one of the extremes, if it is not mutual; but here, when God understands something other than himself, no mutual co-requirement can be posited in either extreme, as it seems; therefore it is precisely enough to posit a relation in one of the extremes, where there is dependence; that is the object as known.

29. In addition the will, by loving the end or enjoying it, does not produce something other than itself in willed being by loving the end in order to something else, or by comparing it to something else lovable, but rather by comparing something else lovable to this end, so that the relation caused by comparison of the will seems to be in something else ‘loved for the end’; but no comparison through will seems to be in the loved end; therefore by similarity, in the intellect knowing the first object and, from knowledge of it, knowing a secondary object, no relation seems to be produced in that first object to the secondary object, but conversely.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Further, this first intellection is direct and has a real mode, the second is of reason; for if I understand man absolutely, this intellection is real and has a real mode; but if I understand it [sc. humanity] afterwards by comparing it to Socrates, this is a comparative intellection and is of reason. If therefore those dispositions are understood by non-reflex intellection, then they will be real.

30. Besides, as was argued [nn.18-19], it does not seem it can be laid down by what act of intellect that relation would be produced: not by the first, because of the absolute perfection of that act; if by the second, then it is not the principle of that second act, and in that second act the creature is perfectly known; therefore in no act will such relation be a quasi-reason prior to the creature in idea of object.

31. The conclusion can be conceded of the three reasons made against the two common opinions recited above [nn.14, 16, 19], and can these reasons now made here be conceded [nn.27-30]; and, in this respect, it can be conceded that there are eternal relations in God to things known, but not prior naturally to the things known in idea of objects.

32. This can be set down as follows: God in the first instant understands his essence under an idea purely absolute; in the second instant he produces a stone in intelligible being and understands a stone, so that there is a relation there in the understood stone to divine intellection, but none yet in divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection is term of the relation to itself ‘of the stone as understood’; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can make comparison of its own intellection to any intelligible that we can make comparison to, and then by comparing itself to the

understood stone it can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant it can be quasi-reflected on this relation caused in the third instant, and then the relation of reason will be known. Thus therefore is a relation of reason not necessary for understanding the stone – as if prior to the stone – as object, indeed this relation ‘as caused’ is posterior (in the third instant), and it will still be posterior as known, because in the fourth instant.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] According to this way [nn.31-32] it is plain what it is the idea of; because it is of every secondary object (whether it be producible or co-producible), and one is singular and universal, and the others (universally) of inferior and superior, – as you advance from the intellect [sc. the process described in n.32].

33. And this fourth way [nn.31-32] can hold the proposition – which seems probable – that ‘a relation is not naturally known save when the term is known’ (but neither does the intellect make comparison to anything save naturally prior to the term known), which proposition can the other way [the second, [n.12] not hold, because it is necessary that it say that, by the relation by which it compares this intellection, it compare the essence to something not first known naturally.

34. This opinion, ‘about the relations of things other than God as they are understood to the divine intellect as absolute’, is in like manner confirmed and understood as the one above – in distinction 30 [nn.31-39] – ‘[about the relations] of understood creatures’ to God.

#### D. Instances against Scotus’ own Solution

35. Against this [nn.31-32] it is argued, and it seems that it destroys Augustine’s intention, 83 *Questions*, question 46 n.1, where he says that “there is so much force in the ideas that, unless they are understood, no one can be wise;” but according to this position [sc. of Scotus, n.32] the perfect wisdom of God to creatures will be in the second instant, and it will precede naturally both the being of the ideas and the being known of them. In the same place too he [Augustine] says that “by vision of these will the soul be made most blessed;” which would not be true about the first beatitude, which is in the Creator, – nor about the second beatitude, which is in creatures.

36. Further, it is argued: things that are divided among inferiors that are of different idea are not reduced to something one in the superior; just as, although the cognitive powers in us be reduced to one cognitive power in angels, because of the unity of idea of all [their] cognitive powers, – yet the intellect and will, which in us are of different idea, are not reduced to one power in an angel. Therefore there will be in God an intellect under the idea of such power, distinct from the will under the idea of such power, and the intellect ‘as in God’ will be passive; therefore it is necessary to grant it some form before it operate in act, and consequently for this, that it have a distinct operation, it will be necessary to give it a distinct form: there cannot be given to it any distinct form if the ideas are posited to follow intellection of creatures.

37. Further if, because of the illimitation of the divine essence, it be posited to be, ‘as altogether absolute’, the reason for knowing all creatures [n.16], since it is as unlimited insofar as it is object as it is [unlimited] insofar as it is reason, it follows that it alone will be known under the idea of object; or if a plurality be posited on the part of

objects (notwithstanding the infinity of one object), by parity of reasoning it seems it can be posited on the part of idea of understanding.

38. To these [nn.35-37]:

The opinion of Augustine, in that question [n.35], can be collected from this description of the idea: “an idea is an eternal reason in the divine mind, according to which something is formable as according to the proper reason of it.”

39. Proof of the first part: God causes or can cause everything, – not irrationally, therefore rationally; therefore he has a reason according to which he forms. But not the same for everything, – therefore he forms singulars with proper reasons; and not with reasons outside himself (because he does not need in effecting [things] anything other than himself), therefore by reasons in his mind. But nothing [is] in his mind save the unchangeable; therefore he can form every formable according to the reason proper to it, eternal in his mind: such is posited [to be] an idea.

40. Now according to this description [n.38] it seems that ‘a stone understood’ can be called an idea: for it has all these conditions, because it is the proper idea of ‘the extrinsically makeable’ – just as ‘a box in the mind’ can be called the idea with respect to a box in matter, and it is the proper idea according to which ‘a box in matter’ is formed. And this ‘eternal idea’ is in the divine mind as known in knower by act of the divine intellect; but whatever is in God, according to whatever being (whether of thing or of reason), by act of the divine intellect, is eternal, as was made clear in *Ord.I* d.30 nn.41-43, that no relation can be new in God by act of the divine intellect.

41. This also seems to agree with a saying of Plato’s (from whom Augustine [*Diverse Questions* 83 q.46 n.2] takes the name of idea). For he [Plato] posited ideas to be the quiddities of things: per se existing indeed, and badly [posited], according to Aristotle – in the divine mind, according to Augustine, and well [posited]; whence he [Plato] sometimes speaks of the intelligible world according to him [Augustine]. Just as, therefore, the ideas would be posited as the quiddities of things, according to the imposition of Aristotle, so they are posited according to Plato as they state quiddities having known being in the divine intellect.

42. On this position, it is not necessary to labor over any relations formally (whether in the essence as object, or in the essence as reason, or in the essence as divine understanding [nn.12, 9, 26]), which relations may be called ideas; rather the known object itself is the idea, according to this view.

43. And then the authorities adduced from Augustine can be conceded [n.35]: that “unless the ideas are known, no one can be wise,” namely as to the whole plenitude of wisdom. For although God principally is wise by the wisdom of his essence as object, yet not in every way if he were not to know the creature – which creature ‘as understood by him’ is an idea, and so when the ideas are not understood he cannot be completely wise; for he is posited as being wise most perfectly in the first instant, but not ‘altogether wise’ in the first instant without the second [n.32]. But if the ideas were posited as certain relations of reason in God, it does not seem that he is formally wise by intellection of them, because they would also be there as reasons of understanding before they were understood.

44. Likewise the other authority of Augustine, “by vision of these the soul becomes most blessed” [n.35]: if the ideas be posited to be quiddities as known, it [the authority of Augustine] must be expounded of the beatitude that can be had in creatures

as in objects, because it is certain that the most perfect beatitude is only in the absolute essence (according to him in *Confessions* V ch.4 n.7: “blessed is he who knows you and them, and not more blessed is he because of them”). But it is necessary to understand ‘[soul] most blessed’, that it is blessed with the total possible beatitude; not indeed formally blessed in them, but in the object (knowledge of which is presupposed to ‘the being known’ of them), and as it were concomitantly in them, in which some beatitude is, though not the first.

45. And if Augustine elsewhere speak otherwise about the ideas, as if they are reasons of knowing something, although however here he say only that they are reasons ‘according to which are formed the things that are formed’ [n.1], it is possible, I say, for that saying of his (if it is said elsewhere) to be expounded: ‘according to which’, not that the ‘according to’ indicates the formal reason of understanding, but ‘according to which’ as according to the objects; not first [objects], not moving the intellect, but according to secondary objects, being terms of the intellect.

46. To the second [n.36]:

How the intellect is passive in itself and how it is passive with respect to its intellection was stated in *Ord.I* d.3 nn.537-542. But when it is posited that it is passive in us and quasi-passive in God, and that a form or quasi-form needs to be assigned here as what it operates by, – it can be said that it is the essence under the idea by which it is essence, which under the absolute idea is the idea of knowing not only itself but everything else, under whatever idea it is knowable.

47. And in this way understanding it: for by this, that the divine intellect is in act by its essence as [essence] is the idea for understanding, it has a sufficient first act for producing everything else in known being, and, by producing it in known being, it produces it having dependence on itself as intelligence [n.32] (and by this is it the intellection of it, that that other thing depends on this intellection as on something absolute), as will be said in other things, that the cause, under purely absolute idea, is the first act from which the effect proceeds, and the produced effect has a relation to the cause – sometimes as to an absolute, and sometimes there is mutually a relation of effect to cause and conversely; never however on the part of the cause is there required a relation before the effect is posited in being.

48. Which now is briefly proved by the fact that nothing having a more perfect being in some genus depends on that which has a less perfect being (in anything such); therefore the actual relation does not depend on anything that is only a potential being and not an actual, – therefore every term of an actual relation is some being in act. In whatever instant, therefore, of nature the cause is referred in act to the effect, it is then the actual ‘to be’ in the term; but this ‘absolute’ can be doing the terminating without a respect to it [sc. without a relation of the absolute to the effect], – therefore thus is it together with the respect which is naturally prior to it; therefore there cannot be any relation in the cause naturally before this ‘absolute’ is, to which this relation has to be.

49. And so [according to n.48] I understand that in the first instant there is *a* under the idea of the absolute; in the second there is *b* under the idea of the absolute, having being through *a*; in the third *b* is referred to ‘*a* under the idea of the absolute’, if the relation is not mutual – or *a* and *b* are related with mutual relations. Here, then, in the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as purely absolute, as if in first act, sufficient for producing anything in intelligible being; in the second instant it produces a

stone in understood being, so that it is the term and has a respect to the divine intellection: but there is no respect conversely in the divine intellect, because the respect is not mutual.

50. What has been said, that the relation cannot be in the cause before it is in the caused [nn.48-49], has instances against it, about which elsewhere [II d.1 q.2 nn.1, 8].

51. According to this [nn.48-49] it could be said that infinite intellect itself alone, without any respect of it to anything else or conversely, is of all objects, – just as the absolute has being first through the absolute before a relation be understood from this side or that; which is proved, because in the moment of nature in\* which *a* is posited to be understood through the understood essence, it [the essence] is posited to understand the being of this [*a*], and yet no relation – even of the *a* – is then understood, because an absolute precedes relation: therefore this is false ‘intellection is not distinctly of this object unless at the same time in nature there is some relation of intellection to this object, or conversely’ (yet it is true of ‘simultaneously in duration’, if this were so), nor is it necessary to posit a relation in the intellection, nor in the object.<sup>a</sup> This is proved, because ‘intellection of itself’ is without all relation (as was concluded in the solution [n.18]), therefore no relation is required because of ‘intellection being of this’: if because of something else, then either of co-requirement or of dependence. God’s understanding does not have co-requirement for a stone (it is plain), nor dependence, nor conversely. Proof: the object is nothing; again, it does not have a real relation (it is plain), nor of reason, because it is understood before it may be compared to another; again, if it has a relation of reason (or being in reason, as is had here [at \* here above, n.51]), it is first understood under an absolute idea before it is understood under any idea of respect to understanding. Therefore just as, when an ass is posited, not for this reason does my intellection have any being or being of thing or of reason (absolute or relative), but only in potency, – so, when this intellection is posited, not for this reason does the object have any being unless in potency; nor is there difference unless that the intellection is said now to be actually of this object, but the object is not said now to be the object of my intellection. What reason for the difference? – Response.<sup>28</sup>

a. *Text cancelled by Scotus*: “at any rate simultaneous in nature with that which is ‘intellection of this’. What does this help, if the relation is simultaneous in duration – because there are the same difficulties (of what it is and to what) which there would also be if it was posited as being simultaneous in nature!”

52. To the third, about unlimited object [n.37], I reply: the object insofar as motive and insofar as it is first terminative (and by this doubly necessarily required or co-exacted for act) is equally unlimited, – therefore nothing else is thus object; yet something else is an object secondarily terminating. Nor need ‘the unlimited object’ be precisely in anyway at all term of the act, just as it is precisely mover and idea of the act, because something can follow the first term and be the second term. Nothing can be secondarily mover to act; the reason is because, in whatever way it precedes act, not terminating in any way does it precede, nor is it co-exacted for act; but ‘terminating secondarily’ it follows act, as measured and caused, – just as intellection in us follows the object.

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<sup>28</sup> Vatican editors: However no response is given.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the principal arguments [nn.1-4].

To that from 83 *Questions* [n.1], it is plain how [Augustine] speaks about the idea [n.38].

54. To Avicenna [n.2]: I concede that in God there can be a relation of [him] understanding, either as this, which is '[he] understanding', is term of a relation of the intellect (as 'being lord' is a new appellation), or as '[he] understanding' states a relation of reason, but then [he] is not this in the first instant, nor in the second, but in the third.

55. To the other,<sup>29</sup> the thing is plain from what has been said, because the same 'unlimited idea of understanding' can be the proper idea of understanding any of those at all to which it is unlimited as if it were limited to that alone, and especially in respect of this act which is 'to understand' in which there is not always required [an idea] univocal with the thing known (otherwise nothing could be known through a cause, nor could a conclusion through a principle), but a more eminent idea suffices, containing perfectly the virtual likeness of the thing known.

## III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

56. And as to what is argued for the first opinion, that it is necessary for the indeterminate to be determined [n.11], –

I say that it is of itself determinate, with a determination opposite 'to the indetermination which is to contradictories' [n.17], although it is not of itself determinate with determination of limitation; nor is this necessary for this, that by it the object may be determinately understood.

57. And if you say 'let it be however much exceeding the middle [term], it is not a reason for understanding this in particular unless it is determined to it by something else', – I reply that always, in arguing from antecedent to consequent with distribution [of terms], there is a fallacy of the consequent from the form [of the argument]. But it holds by reason of the matter when the consequent cannot be unless it is numbered in plurals; and hereby does this form of arguing by Augustine hold, *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: 'if two men, also two animals'. But this is from the imperfection and limitation of the consequent to the antecedent. Hence it does not follow 'if the Father, then God, – if the Son, then God, – therefore if the Father and Son are two, then two Gods'. So I say that, for the understanding of the former, it is necessary to give an idea by which it may be understood and a proper one (either formally or eminently containing whatever there is of perfection in the proper idea); and, for understanding the latter, it is necessary to have a proper and determinate idea. But by inferring 'therefore for understanding the one and the other it is necessary to have the one and the other determinate idea' is a fallacy of the consequent, because this consequent – namely 'to have a determinate idea of understanding' – is unlimited to other antecedents<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> *Vatican editors*: Actually a response to an argument found in *Rep.* IA d.36 nn.3, 87. No response is given here by Scotus to the arguments stated above in nn.3-4.

<sup>30</sup> Scotus is contrasting two conditionals: 'If two men, then two animals' and 'if two divine persons, then two Gods'. The fact that the first holds but not the second is because such inferences hold by virtue of the *matter* of the inference and not by virtue of the *form*. So the form of 'if two x then two y', while it holds of 'if two men then two animals', does not hold of 'if two men then two species'. Or, as Scotus says, the argument holds 'from the limitation of the consequent

58. As to what is also added there for the first opinion, that the reason for understanding is an ‘intelligible’ likeness [n.10], – I reply: not a formal likeness, but either that or something else analogically alike, that is, containing perfectly the formal likeness according to everything of perfection that is in it, insofar as it is the relation or reason of understanding – and so it is in the matter at hand.

## Thirty Sixth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the fact it is under Such a Respect*

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask whether the foundation of an eternal relation to God as knower [sc. the relation of the creature to God in the second instant, d.35 nn.32, 49] has truly the being of essence from this, that it is under such respect.

That yes:

Man is not of himself a ‘ratified’ being [*ens ratum*] (because then he would be God), therefore he is formally ratified through something; only through a respect to the first ratified thing of itself: and not by respect to it as to efficient cause, because since definition is of ratified being, and an efficient cause ‘insofar as efficient’ produces an existent in act, if man had ratified being from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient, definition would not be of him save as existing, and so the definition would answer the question ‘whether he is’, which is unacceptable; therefore he is a ratified being insofar as he participates the first as exemplar; and this is insofar as he has an eternal relation to God as knower and exemplar, – therefore etc.

2. Further, correlatives are together by nature, – therefore together by nature is God understanding a stone and a stone understood by him; therefore since a stone understood by the divine intellect is understood insofar as it is other than the divine essence, and this science of God was real and metaphysical (not logical), then that which was the term of this intellection was a true thing; therefore etc.

3. The opposite is stated by the Master in the text, chapter 1 of this distinction (d.36 ch.1 n.326). Expounding the authority of Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36 (namely the authority “they were in the knowledge of God, they were not in their own nature”), he [the Master] says as follows: “God had them” (namely the elect) “with him from eternity, not in their nature (that is, of them, who not yet were), but in his foreknowledge, because he knew them as if they were.”

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to the antecedent’, because the consequent ‘two animals’ – but not the consequent ‘two species’ – is limited to the antecedent ‘two men’ by virtue of the matter of common countability. The same is not true of ‘if two men then two species’, where there is no such common countability, or no ‘limitation of consequent to antecedent’. It is not enough, therefore, that the antecedent is determinate in idea (the Father and Son are two) and the consequent determinate in idea (therefore two Gods); it is necessary that the determinacy be relevant, that is, limited to what fits the argument. But the determinacy of the consequent, ‘there are two Gods’, is not thus relevant or limited. In fact, as to the Son and Father being one God, it is altogether irrelevant and unlimited because fitted to almost anything except the Son and Father of the one God.

I. To the Question  
A. The Opinion of Others

4. [Reasons for the opinion] – Here look for the opinion [of Henry] of Ghent about the eternity of essences, and specifically in *Summa* 21 q.4<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Here certain say [sc. Henry] that being taken most commonly – or ‘thing’ – can be said to be from ‘think’ [Latin *reor*; ‘thing’ in Latin is *res*], and thus is it common to figments and many other things. In another way, proceeding further, a thing is said to be from ‘ratitude’, as it is a ‘ratified’ thing and distinct from a fictitious thing; and this is double: for it is distinguished as a thing to which being can belong or to which being does belong, – and prior is ‘to which being can belong’; and this thing, as it is by relation to the exemplar, is thus essence, because just as God as efficient cause produces a thing in being of existence, so as exemplar [he produces it] in being of essence.

5. For this opinion the strongest argument is through what was touched on in the second principal argument, God’s knowledge and its real eternal object [n.2].

6. Added to this [n.5] is that proportion is a property of being; and of an object known in eternity there is some proportion to the knower, and this such that the ‘impossible to be’ is not thus proportioned.

7. Further, as being to non-being, so possible to impossible – therefore by permutation [sc. as being to possible so non-being to impossible]; but every being is possible; therefore everything that is pure non-being is impossible.

8. And the reason [n.7] is confirmed, because if some pure non-being (or a nothing) were possible, and some pure non-being (or a nothing) were impossible, one nothing would be more nothing than the other, which seems absurd; therefore the ‘possible’ is not altogether nothing but some being.

9. Further, Augustine *On the Nature of the Good* ch.18: “If good is some form, the not non-good is capacity for form;” therefore the not non-good is possibility for actual goodness.

10. Again, [Augustine] *On John* homily 18 n.8: “Heart and mind form the same letters, but one in one way and the other in another;” therefore they are made by the heart before by the hand.

11. And Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7, about the double flow of things from God [sc. according to being of essence and being of existence].

12. And it is added by them [sc. Henry etc.] that the distinction of the being of essence from the being of existence [n.4] suffices for composition, to the extent that essence (understood as having being of essence) is still in potency to being of existence, which it receives from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient – and then “it is composite of potency and act.”

13. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against these it is argued:

First, because creation is production from nothing; but if a stone from eternity pre-had true real being [Henry of Ghent, n.4], then when it is produced by the efficient cause, it is not produced from nothing simply.

14. Secondly as follows: if it is not produced save only according to a new respect to the efficient cause [Henry, *ibid.*], it does not seem to be production in being simply,



but only in being in a certain respect – and creation will be less ‘a production simply’ than is alteration, where there is production at least of something as to absolute being.

15. Third, argument is made according to the same way [sc. of inferring negation of creation from Henry’s opinion, nn.13-14], because it posits the same actual and aptitudinal relation on the part of God, and that, because of this, there cannot be any new aptitudinal relation on account of an old aptitudinal one [d.35 n.35]; therefore likewise, on the part of that which is referred to God, there is the same actual and aptitudinal relation, and it will not be an actual new one on account of an old aptitudinal one: therefore since the aptitudinal [relation] to being of existence will have always been in a being having being of essence, there will be in it no actual new relation insofar as it is existent.

16. Fourth (according to the same way, nn.13-14), because in the same foundation to an immutable term there cannot be a new respect; here [in Henry’s position] the foundation is the same, namely the being of essence, and the term immutable, namely God; therefore to such a term no new respect of the sort of respect that is posited ‘being of existence’.

17. Again, fifth (according to the same middle term, about creation [sc. creation from nothing, n.13]), because the production of a thing according to this being of essence is most truly creation (for it is purely from nothing as the term from which, and to a true being as to the term to which); and this production according to them is eternal [n.12]; therefore creation is eternal, – of which the opposite he [sc. Henry] tries to show and says he has demonstrations of.

18. Sixth (according to the same way [nn.13, 17], through the opposite about annihilation), it follows that it cannot be that anything is annihilated: for just as it is produced from a being according to essence, so it seems to return to a being according to essence, – not to nothing.

19. Further, second principally [sc. after the arguments in nn.13-18]: those reasons – which were touched on in *Ord.I* d.8 nn.263, 269 against Avicenna – that ‘nothing other than God is formally necessary’, can be made against this opinion [sc. the opinion about the being of essence from eternity, n.4], because they are as conclusive about quidditative being (if it be true being) as about being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will ‘something other than itself’ in quidditative being than it wills ‘something other than itself’ in being of existence, because there is the same reason on both sides [d.8 nn.270, 272] – and so about the other middle terms there [d.8 nn.271, 273-274].

20. Further, third: a thing according to being of essence is either the term of a relation of an idea (which they posit in God) or not, but according to some other known being. If in the second way, then in vain is a thing posited in this being; for essences do not seem to be posited because of anything other than so as to be terms of the ideal relations that are eternally in God. If in the first way, then something is in God, by act of the divine intellect, according to which God can be otherwise or change, the opposite of which was proved in *Ord.I* d.30 n.41. – Proof of this last consequence, because every ‘to be’ other than God is formally non-necessary of itself; therefore let it be posited (although *per impossibile*) that this ‘being’ is quidditatively disposed otherwise, it follows that the entity in God – whether real or of reason –, which has this ‘to be’ for term, will be differently disposed and thus, from the positing of something about what is

other than God, something will be able to change that is in God by act of his intellect, which is impossible.

21. Further, when a cause is perfect and naturally independent in causing and acts naturally, it seems it can make more perfect the things more immediate to it, because it produces according to the ultimate of its power; the divine intellect as intellect precisely – according to this way – produces in God ideal reasons and essences themselves in idea of essence, and as it were first ideal reasons in themselves before these essences in this being (for they [the latter] are by this, that they are copied); therefore the ideas have truer being – since it [the divine intellect] is naturally acting – than the things copied [sc. from the ideas]; and it does not cause ideas but ‘beings of reason’ and not in any real being – therefore neither does it give any real being to the things copied [from the ideas], which are as it were more remote ‘caused things’.

22. Besides, fifth: these essences it produces in being either knowingly or not. If knowingly, then they are in the knower before they are in this being, and so in vain are these entities [sc. ideas] posited on account of God’s eternal knowledge. If not knowingly, then he produces them merely naturally (as fire heats), which seems absurd about whatever is produced other than him in nature; indeed, he even produces the Son as intellect, although not as understanding formally, as was expounded elsewhere [*Ord.I d.2 nn.290-296*].

23. In addition, that he [sc. Henry] attributes a different effect to exemplar cause and efficient cause does not seem probable, because an exemplar cause is but a certain efficient cause; for the efficient [cause] is divided into efficient by intellect or intention and efficient by nature, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22. Just as therefore the naturally producing is not a different cause from the efficient cause, so neither is the exemplar cause or the exemplarily producing – and so ‘the effect’ will be the same as the ‘exemplarily produced’ of anything intelligent artificially producing, insofar as it is intelligent and insofar as it is being example.

24. As to what also he adds, ‘that composition is in creatures through this potentiality for act’ [n.12] does not seem reasonable, because nothing seems to be there that may be compared with something else: for if the whole of whiteness pre-exists in a power as the term of power and afterwards it comes to be in act, not for this reason is there any composition of thing and thing; therefore if there pre-exist a thing according to being of essence and it is produced according to being of existence (which is not other – according to them – than essence, just as neither generally is a relation different from the foundation, for which reason they do not posit that relation and foundation make a composition), there will not be a composite thing on account of these two.

25. And this could be the seventh [argument] (according to the first way [nn.13-18]) for rejecting creation, because of the identity of relation with foundation [n.24]: because the same thing cannot be really new and not new; therefore if being of existence state a relation that is the same as essence, no creature will be simply new.

### B. Scotus’ own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which does especially this appear, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but also the being of existence, because according to Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36: “not otherwise does he know things made than things to be made;” he therefore foreknew being of existence just as being of essence – and yet because of this founded relation no one concedes that ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being of existence, from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, neither should it be conceded about being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are brought forward about the divine intellect seem able to be brought forward about our intellect:

Because if something is not, it can be understood by us (and this whether its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection is it posited that it have true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference – as it seems – between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces the intelligibles in intelligible being, ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply: and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being – by comparing it to our intellect – does not require being simply, by comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’, it will not be being simply, because if to be white is only to be qualitative, ‘to produce in being white’ is not to produce in being of substance but in this qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it be produced before – and yet, because of our agent intellect’s producing, the thing ‘so produced’ is not posited to have being simply.

### C. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

30. [Exposition of the objections] – Against this [nn.26-29] it is objected that the foundation of a relation, when it founds a relation, is according to the being according to which it founds, – otherwise it would not found according to that being; but a stone according to true being of essence founds an eternal relation to God as knowing, and this in eternity; therefore a stone is in eternity according to this being. Proof of the minor: according to that being it founds a relation to God knowing according to which the being of it as object is known by God; but it is known by God under the idea of true essence, not under the idea of diminished essence, because the first intellection of a stone by God is not reflexive.

31. Further, production is not only of some relation, because a relation is only in an absolute; therefore since it was conceded in the preceding question [d.35 nn.31-32, 40, 42] that God produces things in intelligible being ‘according as the known thing is said to be an idea’, it follows that in the second instant [*ibid.*, nn.32, 49] it is necessary to posit some absolute entity of the thing produced in order that, on the absolute being having such entity, a relation to the producer may be founded.

32. [Response to the objections] – To the first [n.30] I say that a canceled term is not canceled with respect to the canceling term but with respect to a third to which it is compared under the idea of what cancels, – because according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 11.21a21-24, when predicating this of someone that he is ‘a dead man’, there is an opposite in the adjective on which follows a contradiction [sc. a dead man is

not in fact a man any more]: therefore when comparing a determinable precisely to a determination, the determinable is not canceled with respect to the determination but includes contradiction to itself; but with respect to a third – of which ‘dead’ is said – there is a canceling determination and that which is determined by it is canceled, so that it is not called it save ‘in a certain respect’.<sup>31</sup>

33. Thus I say that the diminished in respect of the diminishing [term] is not diminished, but with respect to a third to which it is compared under a diminishing determination: just as when I say ‘he is white as to his teeth’, the white is not diminished but is taken for white simply with respect to this determination (otherwise it would be frivolous); and as it is taken under it, it is said of a third – as of an Ethiopian – as diminished.<sup>32</sup>

34. Now this determination ‘to be in opinion’ is diminishing (according to the Philosopher, *ibid.* 21a24-33), and as ‘being in opinion’ so also ‘being in intellection’ or ‘being exemplified’ or ‘being known or represented’, – which are all equivalent. Although therefore what is compared to any of these, as it is compared to it, is not diminished – yet as under any of these it is compared to a third, it is diminished; for the being of man simply – and not diminished – is an object of opinion, but this ‘being simply’ as it exists in opinion is being ‘in a certain respect’; and therefore it does not follow ‘Homer is in opinion, therefore Homer is’, nor even ‘Homer is existent in opinion, therefore Homer is existent’ – but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect.

35. So here: when comparing to divine intellection a stone in eternity, the stone is indeed simply compared to that intellection (and this not only according to the being of essence of the stone but also of existence), and [so] anything comparable – yet, as it is taken under this comparison to the knowledge of God, it is diminished; it is not indeed canceled, as if ‘being simply’ cannot stand with such a respect, but it is diminished so that such a respect does not posit necessarily that ‘its determinable’ is a being simply.

36. Then to the form of the argument [n.30]: ‘the foundation of a relation is according to the being according to which it founds the relation’ is true when the relation founded is not simply diminishing the being of the foundation. And the real reason of this ‘in a certain respect and simply’ seems to be this, that the first distinction of being seems to be into being outside the soul and into being in the soul, – and the ‘outside the soul’ can be distinguished into act and potency (of essence and of existence), and any of these ‘to be outside the soul’ can have being in the soul, and the ‘to be in the soul’ is other than every ‘to be outside the soul’; and therefore about no entity nor about any ‘to be’ does it follow that, if it has diminished being in the soul, it has because of this ‘to be’ simply – because that being is in a certain respect absolutely which yet is taken ‘simply’ insofar as it is compared to the soul as foundation of the ‘to be’ in the soul.

37. Argument [sc. against nn.35-36]:

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<sup>31</sup> Scotus, via Aristotle, is comparing ‘dead man’ and ‘the man is dead’. In the phrase ‘dead man’ the determinable ‘man’ is not canceled by the determination ‘dead’ (for ‘dead man’ still says something intelligible, unlike say ‘non-man man’). But it is contradicted by it, for ‘dead’ contradicts ‘man’ insofar as ‘man’ properly includes the idea of ‘alive’. By contrast, in the phrase ‘(the) man is dead’ the term ‘dead’ is now a third term after ‘man’ and ‘is’; and the ‘dead’ in ‘is dead’, instead of *contradicting* ‘man’ (the way ‘dead man’ does), *cancels* ‘man’, for to say ‘man’ and then to say ‘is dead’ is as it were to cancel the ‘man’ first said. For it is to ‘cancel’ the being alive that is integral to being a man, and so to say he is a man only in a certain respect, namely the respect of being alive before but not now.

<sup>32</sup> To say an Ethiopian is white as to his teeth is not to diminish the term ‘white’ (for let the teeth be as white as one could wish), but to determine its application, namely from the whole body to the teeth alone.

A stone is not of itself a necessary ‘to be’ in any ‘to be’;<sup>a</sup> therefore in known being it is caused: only by an efficient cause, of which there is no term but being simply.

a. [*Text canceled by Scotus*] This does not follow, if it is a true being, and not divisible into necessary and possible.

38. Again, what is only in something virtually is never formally such save through actual causation; a stone ‘as known’ is only virtually in the divine essence; therefore it does not become known in act without causation – and then as before [n.37].

39. In response to these [nn.37-38]:

It can be said otherwise than is responded here within [= above, nn.35-36], namely that the intellection of God, although it not be absolutely caused yet, as it is of this secondary object (to wit, a stone), it does as it were have a principle, and this from the essence as equivocal objective formal idea – and so it is more from a principle than as of the first object, because thus does it have a principle as by univocal objective formal nature. And that intellection, as ‘of this’, is as if from a principle equivocally is that ‘this’ has a principle in diminished being, just as that an intelligible species is from a principle in the intellect is that the object ‘in a certain respect’ is from a principle as actually intelligible, or – a better example for the matter at hand – just as that, through the species of the subject, intellection of the property has a principle is that the property as actually understood has a principle; therefore this example fits, because a stone does not have a principle equivocally from the essence as intelligible before as understood: for none has formal being in memory before being in intelligence, but only virtual. Nor does it seem unacceptable to concede that the divine intellect has as it were a principle (not in itself, but as of this object), because this it is necessary to posit about volition (as it seems), since volition is contingently of this object and nothing contingent is altogether uncaused.

40. So there will be an order between the altogether without a principle (as essence), and the quasi-with a principle univocally (as intellection of essence), and the quasi-with a principle equivocally but necessarily (as intellection of a stone), and the quasi-with a principle equivocally and contingently (as volition of a stone).

41. This way [nn.39-40] speaks well in this, that the essence as ‘reason moving’ is altogether without distinction, univocally quasi-moving to itself as to first term of act, and quasi-equivocally moving to a secondary object as to second term of act; such that neither in the intellect (it is plain), nor in motive reason, nor in understanding, nor in first term, is it necessary to posit distinction. But when it is said ‘act is quasi-equivocally from a principle as it is of a secondary object’ [n.39], not other is it but that it – quasi-beyond the first object – is extended to the second in virtue of objective principle, equivocal as to a second term.

42. But what is it for an act to be thus extended? Not to be a relation in act nor in the first object to the second, – for you [sc. Scotus himself, nn.35, 32,49]; therefore it is for the second object to be referred to act or first object: this is only of what has some being [sc. diminished being], – and then follows what is had therein [sc. in the first version of the text, cf. nn.35-36].

43. Thus false is the imagination that ‘to understand’, so as to be of many things, is distinguished quasi into many ‘to understands’; indeed there does not need to be in it any difference as it is a quasi-mean between reason and the first term, which the secondary objects follow; therefore it is false that the secondary objects are the

immediate term of ‘to understand’, just as neither do they move it – for in neither way are they necessarily required for act; but they are required in idea of term for an act as it is of this; ‘this’ only states a relation in a second object.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] God: intellect, essence as reason; to understand: essence as first term, – stone, angel etc., secondary objects.

44. To the the second [n.31] I say that this production is in a ‘to be’ of an idea other than every ‘to be’ simply, – and it is not of relation only, but also of foundation; not indeed according to the ‘to be’ of essence or existence, but according to a diminished ‘to be’ (which is ‘to be’ true), which ‘to be’ is to be in a certain respect even of absolute being, which ‘absolute being’, however, according to this diminished ‘to be’, has a relation of reason as concomitant.

45. An example of this: if Caesar were annihilated and yet there were a statue of Caesar, Caesar would be represented by the statue. This ‘to be represented’ is of another idea than all ‘to be’ simply (whether of essence or of existence), nor is it a diminished ‘to be’ of Caesar, as if something of Caesar had this being and something not – the way an Ethiopian is white in diminished fashion because something of him is truly white and something not [n.33]. But of the whole Caesar, his ‘to be from a cause’ is true being of essence and of existence, and to that whole – according to such being of his – belongs this being in a certain respect, and in him, according to this being in a certain respect, there can be some relation to a statue.

46. And although a calumny could be posited in the example, it cannot thus be said in the matter at hand about intellection and object without the whole object, and according to its whole being, having ‘diminished being’ in act. And if you wish to look for some true being of this object as such, there is none to look for save ‘in a certain respect’, save that this ‘to be in a certain respect’ is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection; but this ‘being simply’ is not formally the being of that which is said ‘to be in a certain respect’, but is of it by way of term or principle, so that to this ‘true being in a certain respect’ it is reduced such that without this ‘true being’ of this there would not be the ‘being in a certain respect’ of that.

47. Now from this appears something said above in *Ord.I d.3 nn.265-267* (‘About knowledge in eternal rules’), namely that the motion of our intellect is ‘by intelligible quiddities’ reduced to the divine intellect, through whose ‘being simply’ those objects have being in a certain respect, namely objective being (which is the being moving our intellect to know genuine truths), and because of their motion the intellect is said to move, just as also do these have ‘their own to be in a certain respect’ because of the ‘to be’ simply of that.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘ratified being’ is either called that which has of itself firm and true being, whether of essence or of existence (because one is not without the other, however they may be distinguished), or ‘ratified being’ is called that which is first distinguished from figments, namely to which the true being of essence or of existence is not repugnant.

49. If ratified being is taken in the first way, I say that man is not of himself a ratified being but from the efficient cause – from which he has all true being, both of essence and existence. And when you say that then he is never a ratified being unless effected, – I concede it in this way; and when he has been effected, he is existent, therefore he is never a ratified being unless he be existent, – I concede it; therefore there is not a definition of him save as he is existent, – this consequence I deny, because definition is a distinct knowledge of the defined thing according to its essential parts. But distinct knowledge can be of something although it not be a ratified being; for there is only need that a ratified being be the term of definitive cognition; and now it does not follow ‘a ratified being is definitively understood, therefore it is ratified’.

50. If in the second way [n.48] ratified being is understood, I say that man is of himself a ratified being, because formally of itself being is not repugnant to him: for just as whatever something is repugnant to, it is repugnant to it formally from its idea, so what it is not repugnant formally to, it is not repugnant to because of its idea; and if ‘to be’ were of itself repugnant to man, by no respect that comes to him could it not be repugnant to him. And if from this you infer ‘man is of himself a ratified being in this way, therefore he is God’, the consequence is not valid, because God is not only he to whom being is not repugnant but he is of himself being itself.

51. And as to what is said here that man is formally a ratified being by some relation, which is his being ratified [n.1], it was rejected in *Ord.I d.3* in the question ‘On the vestige’ nn.310-323. And it seems most absurd because – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 – if nothing is to itself, nothing is to another; and this they concede, that a relation cannot be founded on a relation but on an absolute [*Ord.I*, nn.311, 302].

52. I ask therefore about the foundation of the sort of relation that is called ratification; let it be called *a*. If it is to itself, then it does not include essentially in its understanding a per se respect, because nothing that essentially includes a respect is to itself formally. This *a* insofar as it is to itself is either ratified, and then I have the conclusion proposed, – or it is not ratified, and then that respect will be founded on a being that is not ratified; and a respect for them is the same as the foundation, therefore the respect is the same as a being that is not ratified. And the consequent is altogether unacceptable, if ‘ratified’ be taken for that which ‘to be’ is not repugnant to, because it would follow that the ratification will be founded on a thing non-ratified, which is a ‘nothing’ – and so the respect will be a ‘nothing’, and then a ratified being will be from two nothings [*Ord.I d.3* nn.311, 313]

53. To the second argument [n.2] I concede that from eternity God has understood stone, and not as the same as himself, – and this intellection was real and metaphysical, not logical. Nor, however, does it follow from this about a stone that it is more essence than existence, not even when comparing it more to the divine intellect than to mine; the inference does indeed follow ‘therefore the thing was always understood’, but to argue ‘therefore the thing was in some real being’ is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply.

### III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

54. Through the same point [n.53] to what is adduced for the opinion, about proportion to intellect [n.6] – I say that this proportion is a relation of known to knower, and this [relation] is the diminishing being on which it is founded, as was made clear [nn.34-35]; now a ‘diminishing being’ relation does not have to require with it the entity simply of the being which it determines. And when you say there is no such proportion ‘of the impossible’ to the divine intellect [n.6], – I say that it can well be that the altogether black is not white, and yet not for this reason is ‘a man white in teeth’ simply white; so it can be that disproportion in every way is ‘impossible’ for the divine intellect, and yet that some sort of proportion is ‘possible’ for his intellect, but not through a ‘to be’ simply.

55. To the point about permutation of proportion [n.7], I say that that way of arguing takes its rise from Euclid, in the sixteenth conclusion of the fifth book [*Elements* V prop. 16]: “If,” he says, “there be four proportional quantities, they will be proportional by permutation;” which is proved by the preceding fifteenth conclusion: “The proportion of multiples and of sub-multiples is the same.”<sup>33</sup>

56. And this permutation, certain and known in the case of quantities, others use in their arguments. Now the Philosopher used it in *Prior Analytics* 2.22.68a3-8, 11-16 (in two rules): ‘If *a* and *b* convert and *c* and *d* convert, and *a* and *c* contradict, *b* and *d* will contradict’ and conversely. The consequence is necessary because, in the case of contradictories, one of them is said of anything;<sup>34</sup> and because what is convertible with one contradictory does not receive the predication of the other (nor conversely), therefore does it convert with the remaining contradictory. And generally, whenever some true proportion can be had (corresponding to the fifteenth [conclusion] of Euclid) through which this permutation holds (corresponding to the sixteenth conclusion), then the permutation is good, – and when not, not.

57. To the matter at hand then: generally never does such a permutation hold when comparing extremes to inferior and superior; rather, there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the extremes of two contradictions when compared with each other have a converse proportion in inferences and not the same one (for the opposite of the consequent entails the opposite of the antecedent and not conversely), and therefore to argue thus, ‘as the first to the third, so the second to the fourth’, commits the fallacy of the consequent. But it should be argued conversely (when drawing inferences): ‘as the first to the third, so the fourth to the second’, – and so in the matter at hand, ‘as every being is possible, so every impossible is non-being’.<sup>35</sup>

58. And as to what is added there, that then ‘one nothing would be more nothing than another’ [n.8], – I reply:

In three ways is a negation present in something. Sometimes not because of repugnance of the positive to the affirmation of the negative, but because of the sole

<sup>33</sup> As in the case of the submultiples 2 and 6 and the multiples 4 and 12 in the proportion 2:4::6:12, for the first pair are the halves of their doubles in the second pair. The proportion changes if the numbers are permuted, as 2:6::4:12, but it changes the same way on both sides.

<sup>34</sup> Contradictories logically exhaust the whole of being, for everything is either *x* or not-*x*, as that everything is either square or not square, and the not-*x* or not square cover everything else whatever except *x* or square.

<sup>35</sup> The argument in n.7 runs: “as being to non-being, so possible to impossible; therefore by permutation, as being to possible so non-being to impossible; but every being is possible; therefore every non-being is impossible.” Scotus’ response is that from ‘every being is possible’ what follows is not ‘every non-being is impossible’ but ‘every impossible is non-being’. So also from ‘all swans are birds’ it does not follow that ‘all non-swans are non-birds’, for some non-swans, as eagles and sparrows, are birds. What follows rather is that ‘all non-birds are non-swans’.



negation of the cause positing the effect – just as if some surface were neutral, it would indeed be non-white, not because of the repugnance of the surface to the affirmation opposite to this negation, but because of the sole negation of the cause that does not put whiteness present on the surface. And sometimes the negation is present in the positive because of the repugnance of it to the affirmation and opposite of the negation, and this in two ways: for sometimes there is precisely such repugnance because of some one thing of the understanding of both – just as in ultimate species of the same proximate genus the negations of them are said mutually of each other, because of their repugnance, which is only because of one thing included in the understanding of both, namely because of the ultimate embracing difference; but sometimes because of several things included in the understanding of both or of one of them, – just as, if the most special species of two most general genera are taken, the affirmations indeed are repugnant to each other because of the many things included in them, as many namely as are the predicates stated in the ‘what’ of each one in its genus: for nothing is said in the ‘what’ of white which is not a middle term for showing this [proposition] ‘man is not whiteness’, nothing too is said of man in the ‘what’ which is not a middle term for showing the same – and therefore this [proposition] ‘man is not whiteness’ is true because of the repugnance of the terms simply, or because of the many things included in the understanding of the repugnant things, each of which would on either part would be sufficient reason for such repugnance.

59. And yet in all these inferences of negations, although they are present from diverse causes, it is not said that anything is more or less negated, but that each simply is ‘not that sort’: for flavor is as simply nothing of whiteness as man is, and likewise a surface has nothing of whiteness – in the case posited [n.58]; and the reason why this is no more a negation than that one is because any negation at all negates the whole affirmation opposed to it, of whatever idea of ‘that sort’, and whether because of one idea or because of several.

60. So in the matter at hand: in man in eternity there is present ‘not being anything’, and in chimaera ‘not being anything’; but to man the affirmation is not repugnant which is ‘being something’, but negation is only present because of negation of the cause, not positing him – but to a chimaera it is repugnant, because no cause could cause in it ‘being something’. And why to man it is not repugnant and to a chimaera it is repugnant is because this is this and that is that, and this whatever intellect is doing the conceiving, because – as was said [n.50] – whatever is repugnant to something formally is of itself repugnant to it, and what is not repugnant formally is not of itself repugnant.

61. Nor must it here be imagined that to man it is not repugnant because he is a being in potency and to a chimaera it is repugnant because it is not a being in potency, – indeed rather the converse, because to man it is not repugnant therefore he is possible with logical potency, and because to a chimaera it is repugnant, therefore it is impossible with an impossibility opposed to it; and on the former possibility there follows objective possibility, and this on the supposition of God’s omnipotence, which has regard to every possible (provided it be other than himself); however, that logical possibility can – by reason of itself – stand absolutely, although *per impossibile* no omnipotence had regard to it.

62. Therefore the reason altogether first and irreducible to another as to why ‘being’ is not repugnant to man is because man is formally man (and this whether really

in fact or intelligibly in the intellect), and the first reason why ‘being’ is repugnant to a chimaera is the chimaera insofar as it is a chimaera. In different ways then is this negation ‘nothingness’ present in man in eternity and in a chimaera, and yet not for this reason is one more nothing than the other.

63. Or it could also be said that from man is removed only the being and not anything consequent to being (of which sort is ‘possible to be’), but from chimaera is removed being and its consequent; and therefore is being negated for more reasons of chimaera than of man, yet this negation is not more in one than in the other. But the prior response [nn.61-62] seems more real.

64. To Augustine [n.9]: capacity for form – according to him – is matter, because it has some true entity, and not only some such as the soul of Antichrist has before it be created. About this in the second book, distinction 12 q. un. nn.1-9.

65. To that from *On John* [n.9]: I concede that, when there are two ordered causes, both cause the effect, – and in different ways because the higher causes more; and so if the heart is the higher cause and the hand a lower one with respect to letters, each causes (both heart and hand), yet the heart does not before the hand produce letters in some true being, and the hand afterwards adds to them some respect!

66. To the last one from Avicenna [n.11]: he is speaking of the flow of forms from God insofar as they are understood, and of the flow of all that which is (that is, of the thing in true being); and I concede that just as the ‘being’ of something understood insofar as it is understood is other than true ‘being’ (which is of essences outside the soul), so are this flow and that different, and by each flow do things flow from God. Not so in us, because things pre-exist outside the soul – or in the cause – to this effect, to move our intellect to act of understanding. But he [Avicenna] does not say that the flow ‘in understood being’ is a flow in quidditative being, because understood-being is distinct from the whole of real being, both quidditative and of existence.

## Thirty Seventh Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God’s Omnipotence necessarily entail his Greatness*

1. About the thirty seventh distinction I ask whether God’s being present everywhere by his power entails that he is everywhere by his essence, – that is, whether omnipotence necessarily entails immensity.

That it does:

Every agent is present to what it acts on (according to the *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6), and this immediately, if it is immediately able to act on it, – or mediately, if it act on it mediately; but the omnipotent can act on anything at all immediately; therefore it is present to anything at all immediately.

2. The opposite:

It can cause anything outside the universe, and yet he is not there by essence.

### I. To the Question

### 3. Response.

A created agent can act where it is not; however commonly it is necessary that it be immediate to any affected thing proximate to it so it may act on it, although sometimes it does not act on the affected thing by an action of the same idea as the action by which it acts on what is remote – just as a fish does not deaden the net in deadening the fisherman’s hand.

4. And sometimes it does not act on a proximate affected thing with the same active power as it acts on a remote thing, although it do act by another active power, – just as a celestial body, generating a mineral in the bowels of the earth (or some mixed thing, animate or inanimate, here below), acts by its own substantial form, because a non-substance cannot generate a substance, nor can any accident in between be the reason for generating substance.

5. The form then of a celestial body is a power active on something remote without this, that the body act on what is proximate to it according to the same active power according to which it acts on what is remote, although it do act on what is next to it according to another active power. But this happens either because of the conjunction of these two active powers in the same thing, each of which is active (and one has something proximate for proportionate affected thing, and the other active form has a remote proportionate affected thing), or this happens because of the imperfection of the agent, in which there is a defect of active virtue, because of which defect it acts first according to the more imperfect form before according to the more perfect, – just as what generates the corruptible causes alteration before it generates, because of the imperfection of the agent, whereby the ‘prior in origin’ is more imperfect.

6. If we first take the concurrence of two such powers away from the created agent, and if we secondly take away from it that imperfection (that it not be necessary first for it to produce what is more imperfect), there does not seem any reason why it will not be present to what is remote according to power according as it is now present to it in idea of active power; and yet it will not act on what is close by, neither with that power (just as not now either) nor with another, and this especially if the power according to which it acts on what is remote is a simply perfect active power: for the more perfect the form is in creatures, the more does it seem to be the idea of acting on what is more remote.

7. From these to the matter at hand: it seems that omnipotence – which is simply perfectly active power– does not require action on one passive object before on another, neither because of diverse powers concurring in the agent, nor because of prior generation of what is more imperfect. It seems that such omnipotence is the idea of acting on and of producing any possible whatever, although *per impossibile* it not be everywhere – and in this respect the negative side of the question [n.1] seems needing to be held.

8. And it is confirmed: for if omnipotence is a will on whose willing it follows that a thing is, since the will can equally will the distant as the near, it seems that if the omnipotent were *per impossibile* present in some determinate place and not everywhere, it could will something to be in another place to which being would not be repugnant, and consequently, by its [the omnipotent’s] willing, it would have ‘being’ in that place, – and consequently it would be made by the omnipotent without the fact that the omnipotent was there according to essence.

9. It is also confirmed because an infinite vacuum is not to be imagined before the creation of the world, as if God was there present according to his essence before he produced the world; indeed, not as being present anywhere according to his essence was God able to make the world. Therefore just as the presence there of immensity was not pre-required for the presence of his power as it is power (indeed as if power had its term before it was present according to essence), so it seems that now there is no need to pre-understand God existing in any part of the universe so as to cause something, but rather – quasi conversely – he is there first according to his power in order there to cause something; and then, although *per impossibile* he were not present there according to his essence, he yet could cause something there.

## II. To the Principal Argument

10. To the argument against the opposite [n.1] it can be said that that statement of the Philosopher is true about natural agents, which act through natural qualities or through active natural forms, which are not principles of acting on something remote unless there are other concurrent forms which are principles of acting on what is nearby; but it is not thus about the will by which the omnipotent acts.

## Thirty Eighth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God's Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical*

1. About the thirty eighth distinction I ask whether God's knowledge with respect to makeables is practical.

That it is not:

*Metaphysics* 2.1.993b210-21: "The end of practical [science] is a work;" but nothing outside God is his end.

2. On the contrary:

*On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: "Art belongs to the wise God, etc.;" art is a practical habit; therefore etc.

3. Likewise *83 Questions* q.46: "Ideas are the reasons according to which everything formable is formed."

### I. To the Question

4. Above in the question 'On theology, whether it is practical' [*Prol.* nn.217-366], much there was said about practical and speculative knowledge. Briefly applying some things to the matter at hand, it can be said that two things are of the idea of a practical habit, namely conformity to praxis (which conformity it has from the object about which it is) and the natural priority of it to the same praxis, because praxis –as operation is by it called practical – is operation that is distinct from speculation: and no operation, other than speculation, is in the power of the speculator unless it is or can be naturally posterior

to speculation; and knowledge is not posited as practical in anyone, as it is his, save in respect of praxis that is in his power.

5. From this it needs to be known further, that since the practical knowledge the most practical and the closest to praxis is some opinion about eliciting some praxis (namely a judgment about the conclusion of a practical syllogism), which ‘knowledge’ is the end of the movement of intelligence but from it operation begins (and not only is the knowledge practical that is thus proximately practical, but also the knowledge of practical principles that virtually includes that one, and also the quidditative knowledge of the terms that includes the practical principles, as was said there [*Prol.* nn.26-263, 276-277, 314]); whatever intellect therefore is unable to have some such prescriptive knowledge about operating that is naturally prior to the praxis which such knowledge regards (and unable to have a knowledge of principles from which it may infer such prescriptive knowledge of things to be done, and unable to have quidditative knowledge of the terms in which are such principles included) – such an intellect does not seem able to have practical knowledge taken most properly according to the two conditions before stated, namely conformity to the object and priority [n.4]; but the divine intellect – comparing his knowledge to his act of will – does not pre-have any prescriptive knowledge about anything to be done (nor knowledge of any principle nor quidditative [knowledge] of the term) that includes a practical principle; therefore it does not have any knowledge that is conform and prior to such praxis.

6. Proof of the minor [n.5: “but the divine intellect...of the term”]: if prior to an act of the divine will the divine intellect could have any such knowledge, it would have it purely naturally and necessarily, because all knowledge that precedes the act of will there is purely natural and by the essence as it is purely the natural idea of understanding; of necessity therefore would it know that this is to be done, and then the will – to which it would offer this – would be unable not to will it, because then it would be able not to be right, capable of being discordant with right practical reason; and so it is able to be not right. Of necessity would the divine will, therefore, will whatever was to be done, because there would be the same reason for one and for another.

7. Here it is first objected, because by this reason [n.6] the divine intellect would not have any speculative knowledge: for either the will would necessarily will the intellect to speculate, and then there would not be liberty first on the part of the will, – or it would be able not to will the intellect to speculate, and then it would be able not to be right.

8. And besides, if first is presented to the divine intellect some universal law (to wit, that there must be glorification or gratification), and the divine will accept this (and from this is established a law of wisdom), and if second the intellect offer to the will that Peter must be beatified, – if the will accept that, it seems from this that the intellect knows Peter must be glorified, and this by prescriptive knowledge, not accepted in itself formally by the will, although the will would have verified the premises from which the intellect has it.

9. To the first of these [n.7]: the divine intellect by necessity of nature is speculative, and there is not formally liberty for this, although it is not without the will approving; for God necessarily is knowing, but not by will is he properly knowing just as by necessity – not by will – he is God. When therefore you argue ‘if the will cannot not will the intellect to speculate, then it is not supremely free’ [n.7], there is a non sequitur,

because the freedom of it is not to things intrinsic (which as it were precede its act), but its freedom is to all things doable, and therefore it is necessary to posit a first determination in the will with respect to doable things; but it would not be thus if the practical intellect determined beforehand, indeed properly liberty could not be saved in the will with respect to doables (but not any contingency either), because the intellect would necessarily determine it beforehand by pure natural necessity and the will would be necessarily conformed to the intellect: but what is necessarily – even by necessity of consequence – conform ‘necessarily’, cannot be contingent.

10. To the second [n.8] I say that the divine intellect does not thus know anything discursively, as the argument proceeds; but, by making distinction about moments of nature, in the first moment it apprehends any doable thing whatever (those that are principles of doable just as particular doables), and in the second moment it offers them all to the will (of all of which it accepts some, both of practical principles and of particular doables), and then in the third moment the intellect knows as equally immediately the particulars as the universals, and so it does not acquire knowledge of the particulars from principles pre-determined by the will. This will be plainer in the question ‘About the knowledge of God with respect to future contingents’.<sup>36</sup>

## II. To the Principal Arguments

11. To the authority of Augustine [n.2] I say that art is “a habit, with true reason, of making” (*Ethics* 6.4.1140a20-21); and, so far as the definition of art is taken completely, reason ‘right’ is understood, that is, [reason] directive of or rectifying the power whose it is to operate according to art; now in lessened way is art ‘a habit with true reason’ when it is only a habit that apprehends the rightness of things to be done and is not a habit that directs or makes right in things to be done. In this second way can art be conceded in God because, when a determination of his will has been posited with respect to certain things to be done, his intellect knows this order of things to be done: and then there is there a reason right, that is knowing rightness – not however a right reason, that is directive of the power of the one operating, and this most of all if the power ‘operating externally’ be posited to be the will and not some other executive power; but if some executive power were posited other than the will, a right reason it would seem can be saved that is disposed in another way in respect of the power operating according to it than could now be saved in respect of the will.

12. By the same point is it plain to the other argument of Augustine [n.3], because ideas are secondary known objects (as was said before [d.35 nn.40, 42]), according to which things outside come to be – yet they do not include any prescriptive knowledge about operating or non-operating, although they do represent operable things; but a knowledge operable precisely is not a practical science unless it virtually include a practical principle or conclusion: so is it not as to the ideas in the divine intellect.<sup>a</sup>

a. [An empty space for the second part of d.38 and for d.39 was left here by Scotus. Translations from Appendix A are provided in their place]

<sup>36</sup> In d.39, which is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. See the Appendix immediately following.

## Appendix A

### Thirty Eighth Distinction, Part Two, and Thirty Ninth Distinction<sup>37</sup>

#### Questions One to Five

##### *On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

i.<sup>38</sup> In the second part of the thirty eighth distinction the Master [Lombard] treats of the infallibility of divine knowledge, and in the thirty ninth distinction he treats of the immutability of divine knowledge [*Sent.* I d.38 ch.2, d.39 chs.1-4]. As to this material, then, according as divine knowledge has regard simply to the existences of things, I ask five questions:

ii. First, whether God has determinate knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; second, whether he has certain and infallible knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; third, whether he has immutable knowledge of all things as to every condition of existence; fourth, whether he necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything; and fifth, whether with the determinateness and certitude of his knowledge can stand some contingency on the part of things in existence. And these can be asked together, because they are solved by the same things at the same time.

iii. To the first question I argue no:

Because, according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 9.18a28-19b4, in future contingents there is no determinate truth, – therefore neither determinate knowability; therefore neither does the intellect have determinate knowledge of them.

iv. The reason is confirmed by his own proof in the same place, because then it would not be necessary to take counsel nor be busy; thus, it seems, if there is any determinate knowledge about any future contingent, it is not necessary to be busy nor to take counsel, because, whether we take counsel or not, it will come about.

v. Further, if God's power were limited to one part it would be imperfect, because if God so had power for this that he did not have power for the opposite, he would be of limited power and not omnipotent; therefore, in the same way, if he so know one part that he [not know the other], he will be limited in knowledge and not omniscient.

vi. To the second question I argue no:

Because it follows, 'God knows that I will sit tomorrow, and I will not sit tomorrow, therefore God is deceived', – therefore by similarity it follows, 'God knows I will sit tomorrow, and I am able not to sit tomorrow, therefore God can be deceived'. The first [inference] is manifest, because he who believes what is not in fact is deceived; I prove from this that the consequence [about similarity] holds, because just as on two [premises] about inherence [of predicate in subject] a conclusion about inherence follows, so from one about inherence and another about possibility a conclusion about possibility follows.

<sup>37</sup> The Vatican editors report that the text of the questions interpolated here is put together from the *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1-5 (whose order it generally follows) and *Reportatio* IA d.38 qq.1-2, d.39-40 qq.1-3.

<sup>38</sup> Paragraph numberings are not given in the printed text and are added here (in Roman numerals) by the translator for ease of reference.

vii. Further, if God knows I will sit tomorrow and it is possible that I do not sit tomorrow, – let ‘I will not sit tomorrow’ be posited in being, it follows that God is deceived; but from the positing in being of the possible the impossible does not follow; therefore this [statement] ‘God is deceived’ will not be impossible.

viii. To the third question I argue no:

From contradictory to contradictory there can be no passage without some change; but if there is altogether no change, it does not seem in any way that what was true before may now be false. Therefore if God in knowing *a* is able not to know *a*, this appears possible through some change only in the *a* as known by God, because nothing has being save within God’s knowledge, and consequently the change of it cannot be without change of God’s knowledge, – which is the proposed conclusion.

ix. Further: whatever is not *a* and can be *a* can begin to be *a*, – because it does not seem intelligible that the affirmation of a negation that is the case can be the case if it does not begin to be; therefore if God does not know *a* and he can know *a*, he can begin to know *a*; therefore he can change to knowing *a*.

x. Further, third: if God does not know *a* and he can know *a*, – I ask what this ‘can be’ is? Either it is passive, and then it is to a form, and change follows. Or it is active, and it is plain it is natural because the intellect ‘as intellect’ is not free but acts naturally; such a power cannot act after it has not acted unless it change; therefore, as before, change follows.

xi. To the fourth question I argue yes:

Because God immutably knows *a*, therefore necessarily (by *a* let be understood that ‘Antichrist will be’).

xii. Proof of the consequence:

First, because no necessity is posited in God save necessity of immutability; therefore whatever is in him immutably is necessarily.

xiii. Second, because everything immutable seems to be necessary formally, just as everything possible – which is repugnant to ‘necessarily’ – seems to be mutable; for every ‘such possible’ of itself is not and by another can be. But that it is after it is not (whether in order of duration or in order of nature) does not seem it can be without some changeability; therefore etc.

xiv. Further, whatever can be in God can be the same as God, and consequently be God; but whatever can be God, of necessity is God, because God is immutable; therefore whatever can be in God, of necessity is God. But to know *a* can be in God; therefore of necessity it is God, and consequently he simply necessarily knows *a*.

xv. Further, every perfection simply is of absolute necessity in God; to know *a* is a perfection simply, because otherwise God would not be imperfect if he did not know *a* formally, because he is not imperfect save by lacking some perfection simply.

xvi. To the fifth question I argue no:

Because it follows, ‘God knows *a*, therefore it will necessarily be’.

xvii. The antecedent is necessary. – Proof of the consequence, because a rational act is not canceled because of the subject-matter it covers, just as ‘to say’ is not canceled if it covers this which is ‘I am saying nothing’: for it follows, ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I say something’; therefore, by similarity, ‘to know’ is not canceled because of the subject-matter it covers. Therefore since the ‘to know’ of God is simply necessary, it is not canceled of this necessity by the fact it covers the contingent.



xviii. Besides, everything that God knows will be, necessarily will be; God knows that *a* will be; therefore etc. – The major is true to the extent it is of the necessary, because the predicate is of necessity in the subject; and the minor is of what is in [the subject] simply, because it is true for eternity; therefore a conclusion follows about the necessary.

xix. To the opposite [sc. against the arguments adduced for the first three questions]:

*Epistle to the Hebrews* 4.13: “All things are naked and open to his eyes;” and the *Gloss* there (look for it) [*Glossa Ordinaria*, “because they are fully seen from every side”]. Therefore he has determinate and certain knowledge of all things as to everything knowable in them; and immutable knowledge, it is plain, because nothing in him is mutable (from distinction 8 n.293).

xx. To the opposite of the fourth question:

If God necessarily knew *a*, then *a* would be necessarily known – and if necessarily known then necessarily true. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent [too].

xxi. To the opposite of the fifth question:

Being is divided into necessary and contingent; therefore the intellect, when understanding these according to their proper ideas, understands this as necessary and that as contingent (otherwise it would not understand them as they are such beings), and consequently that knowledge does not take away contingency as to the thing known.

## I. The Opinions of Others

### A. First Opinion

xxii. About these questions is posited the certitude of divine knowledge – with respect to everything as to all conditions of existence – on account of the ideas that are posited in the divine intellect, and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent ‘the things of which they are’ not only in themselves but according to every idea and relation of the extremes; and so they are in the divine intellect a sufficient reason, not only for simply apprehending the things ideated, but also for apprehending every union of them and every mode of the ideated things pertaining to the existence of them.<sup>39</sup>

xxiii. On the contrary:

The reasons for knowing the terms of some combination [sc. proposition] do not sufficiently cause knowledge of that combination unless it is of a nature to be known from the terms; a contingent combination is not of a nature to be known from the terms, because then it would not only be necessary but also first and immediate; therefore the reasons for knowing the terms, however perfectly they represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing the contingent combination.

xxiv. In addition, ideas represent purely naturally what they represent, and under the reason by which they represent anything; which is proved by this, that the ideas are in the divine intellect before any act of the divine will, so that in no way are they there by act of the will; but whatever precedes an act of will is purely natural. I take then the two ideas of the extremes that are represented in them, as of man and white; I ask do these of

<sup>39</sup> The Vatican editors were unable to find any author of this opinion.

themselves represent either the combination of the extremes, or the division of them, or both? If only the combination, then [the divine intellect] naturally knows it (and so in a necessary way), and consequently in no way will it know the division. In the same way if [the ideas] only represent the division. If both, then God by them knows nothing, because to know that contradictories are simultaneously true is to know nothing.

xxv. In addition, ideas are in the same way of things possible as of things future, because this difference of ‘possible non-futures from futures’ is only by act of the divine will; therefore an idea of a future no more represents it of necessity to be future than does an idea of a possible.

xxvi. Further, no more will an idea of the future represent by positing it to be in this ‘now’ than in that.

## B. Second Opinion

xxvii. In another way it is posited that God has certain knowledge of future contingents by this, that the whole flow of time, and all things that are in time, is present to eternity.<sup>40</sup>

xxviii. Which is proved by this, that eternity is immense and infinite, and consequently, just as the immense is present at once to every place, so the eternal is present at once to the whole of time.<sup>41</sup>

xxix. And it is made clear by examples, and one indeed is ‘about a stick fixed in water’, past which stick although the whole stream flow (and so it is present successively to all the parts of the stream), yet the stick is not immense with respect to the stream, because it is not simultaneously present to the whole; therefore in the same way, if eternity were something standing (like the stick), past which time flowed, such that never would there be present to it at once save one instant of time (just as neither is there present at once to the stick but one part of the stream), eternity would not be immense with respect to time.

xxx. This is also confirmed, because the ‘now’ of eternity as it exists with the ‘now’ of time, is not coequal with it; therefore as it exists with this ‘now’ it exceeds it: and it would not exceed it unless, as it exists with this ‘now’, it existed together with another ‘now’.

xxxii. This is also confirmed, because if the whole of time could exist at once extrinsically, the ‘now’ of eternity would be present at once to the whole of time; but although it be repugnant to time, because of time’s succession, to exist at once, nothing of perfection is, because of this, taken away from eternity; therefore eternity itself is now equally present to the whole of time and to anything whatever existing in time.

xxxiii. This is confirmed by another example ‘about the center in a circle’, because if ‘flowing time’ were posited to be the circumference of a circle and the ‘now’ of eternity to be the center, however much there were of flux in time, the whole flux and any part of it would always be present to the center. So therefore all things having to exist in any part of time (whether they be in this ‘now’ of time, or they be past or future), all are present in respect of the ‘now’ of eternity, – and so what is in eternity sees them

<sup>40</sup> The Vatican editors refer to St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g. *ST* Ia q.14 a.13, *Sent.* I d.38 q.1 a.5, *De Veritate* q.2 a.12, *CG* I ch.66-67. The first reference is reported almost word for word by Scotus in *Rep.* IA d.38 nn.14-15, also 51.

<sup>41</sup> The Vatican Editors refer this argument to Richard of Middleton, *Sent* I d.39 princ.1 q.1.

‘presentially’ because of such co-existence, just as I can see ‘presentially’ that which in this instant I am seeing.<sup>42</sup>

xxxiii. Against this I argue:

First, by bringing back against them what they themselves bring forward about immensity [n.xxviii] – because on their posit that space can increase continually to infinity (so that just as time is in continual flux so does God increase and increase place in its coming to be), still the immensity of God would not be for him the idea of co-existing with any place (in any ‘now’) save with an existing one; for God does not, by the immensity of himself, co-exist with anything save what is in him, although he could cause a place outside the universe, and then by his immensity he would co-exist with it. If then immensity is not the idea of co-existing with place save actual place and not potential (because it is not existent), by parity of reasoning eternity will not be a reason for co-existing with anything unless existent: and this is what is argued, that ‘that which is not can co-exist with nothing’, because ‘to co-exist’ states a real relation, but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real.

xxxiv. Again, if an effect has being in itself in respect of the first cause, it is simply in itself, because it has in respect of nothing a truer being; hence what is said to be such with respect to the first cause can simply be said to be such. If then something future is in act in respect of God, then it simply is in act; therefore it is impossible that it is later posited in act.

xxxv. Further, if my future sitting down (not only as to the entity it has in being knowable but also to that it has in being of existence) is now present to eternity, then it is now produced in that being by God, for nothing from God has being in the flow of time unless it be produced by God according to that being; but let God produce this sitting down (or the soul of Antichrist, which is the same); then that which has already been produced by him will again be produced in being, and so it will be produced in being twice.

xxxvi. Further, this position does not seem to be of help for what it is posited for, namely for having certain knowledge of things future:

And first indeed because this sitting down, beside the fact it is present to eternity according as it is in some part of time, is yet future in itself according to the fact it is future and to be produced by God. I ask whether he has certain knowledge of it. If so, then this is not by the fact it is already existent, but according as it is future, – and this certitude it is necessary to posit through something else, and that suffices for all certain knowledge of the existence of this thing. If he does not know it thus future with certitude, then he produces it without foreknowing it; but he will know it with certitude when it will have been produced; therefore he knows things made differently from things to be made, which is against Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36.

xxxvii. Second, because the divine intellect receives no certitude from any object other than its own essence; for then it would be cheapened. Hence now too about my making, which is posited in act, the divine intellect does not have certitude such that this making causes certitude of itself in the divine intellect; for it does not move his intellect. Therefore, in the same way, all temporal things – if they are in their own existence present to eternity according to those existences of theirs – fail to cause certitude about

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<sup>42</sup> Cf. Thomas, *CG* I ch.66.

them in the divine intellect, but it must through something else about them have certain knowledge of their existences, and that something else suffices for us.

xxxviii. Besides, they posit that the ‘aevum’ of angels [sc. angelic eternity] is altogether simple, co-existent with the whole of time;<sup>43</sup> therefore an angel, who is in angelic time, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time; therefore an angel, who is in the ‘aevum’, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time: therefore it seems – according to that reason of theirs [n.xxvii] –, that an angel could naturally know future contingents.

### C. Third Opinion

xxxix. A third position says that although some things with respect to divine knowledge are necessary, yet it does not follow that with respect to proximate causes they cannot be contingent.<sup>44</sup>

xl. And it is confirmed by Boethius *Consolation of Philosophy* V prose 6, where he says as follows: “If you say, ‘That which God sees will happen cannot not happen, – but that which cannot not happen happens of necessity’, and you constrict me to this name of ‘necessity’, I will reply: the same future thing, when it is referred to divine knowledge, is necessary – but when it is weighed in its own nature, it is altogether free, etc.”

xli. For this too it is argued because imperfection can be in an effect from a proximate cause, although not from a remote or prior cause, – just as deformity is in an act from a created will and not insofar as it is from the divine will; therefore sin is not reduced to God as to cause, but only imputed to the created will.<sup>45</sup> Although therefore as far as concerns God’s part – who is the remote cause –, there were necessity in things, yet from their proximate causes, there can be contingency in them.

xlii. Against this it was argued in *Ord.*I d.2 nn.80, 85-86, where it was proved that ‘God is understanding and willing’ from the contingency of things, because no contingency can be in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently disposed to the cause next to it or to its effect. Which is proved, briefly, from this that a moving cause – insofar as it is moved – is, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily mover; any second cause, therefore, that produces insofar as it is moved by the first, if it is necessarily moved by the first, necessarily moves the cause next to it or produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes, then, up to the ultimate effect, will necessarily produce if the disposition of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.

xliii. Further, a prior cause naturally regards its effect first before a later cause does [d.8 n.287]; therefore in that prior stage, if it has a necessary disposition to it [the effect], it will give it necessary being. But in the second instant of nature the proximate cause cannot give it contingent being, because it is already pre-understood to have from the first cause a being repugnant to contingency; nor can you say that in the same instant of nature these two causes give being to the thing caused, because on that being cannot be

<sup>43</sup> The Vatican Editors refer to Aquinas *ST* I q.10 a.5, *Sent.* II d.2 q.1 a.1.

<sup>44</sup> Aquinas, *Sent* I d.38 q.1 a.5, *ST* I q.14 a.13, *SG* I ch.67.

<sup>45</sup> Aquinas, *Sent.* II d.37 q.2 a.2.

founded a necessary disposition to a cause perfectly giving being, and a contingent disposition to some other cause.

xliv. In addition, whatever is produced by posterior causes could be immediately produced by the first cause – and then it would have the same entity as it has now, and then it would be contingent as it now is contingent; therefore it has its contingency also now from the first cause, and not only from the proximate cause.

xlv. Besides, God has produced many things immediately (as he created the world and now creates souls), and all of them contingently.

## II. Scotus' own Response to the Questions

xlvi. As to the solution of these questions it is necessary to proceed as follows: first it is necessary to see how there is contingency in things, and second how with this there stands the certitude and immutability of divine knowledge about them.

### A. How there is Contingency in Things

#### 1. Contingency in things is Evident and Manifest

xlvii. As to the first point I say that this disjunction 'necessary or possible' is a property of being, speaking of convertible property, as are many such unlimited properties in beings [d.8 n.115]. But convertible properties of being – as rather commonly – are said immediately of being, because being has a concept simply simple; and therefore there cannot be a middle between it and its property, because of neither is there a definition that could be the middle. If too there is some property not first of being, it is difficult to see by what prior as by a middle it could be proved of being, because it is not easy to see an order of the properties of being; nor, if that order were known, would the propositions taken from them as premises be seen to be much more evident than the conclusions.

xlviii Now in disjunct properties, although the whole disjunct cannot be demonstrated of being, yet, commonly, when the extreme is supposed that is less noble about some being, an extreme can be proved that is more noble about some being; just as it follows, 'if some being is finite, then some being is infinite' and 'if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary', because in such matters the more imperfect extreme could not be in being in particular unless in some being were present the more perfect extreme, on which it would depend,.

xlix. But neither in this way does the more imperfect extreme of such disjunction seem it can be demonstrated; for if the more perfect is in some being, it is not necessary that the more imperfect is in some being (and this unless the disjunct extremes were correlatives, as cause and caused); so therefore the disjunction 'necessary or contingent' cannot – by any prior middle – be demonstrated of being. Nor even can this part of the disjunction – which is the 'contingent' – be demonstrated of anything, supposing 'necessarily' of something; and so this [proposition] 'some being is contingent' seems true first and not demonstrable by a demonstration 'why'.

l. Hence the Philosopher, arguing against the necessity of things future, does not make a deduction to something more impossible than the hypothesis, but to something

impossible more manifest to us, namely that it is not necessary either to take counsel or be busy about things [n.iv].

li. And so those who deny such manifest things need punishment or perception,<sup>46</sup> because – according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.9 (74vab) – those who deny a first principle are to be flogged or exposed to fire until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not to be burned, to be flogged and not to be flogged.<sup>47</sup> So too these who deny that some being is ‘contingent’ should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tortured.

## 2. Contingency in Things is because of the Contingent Causation of God

lii. On the supposition, then, of this as it were manifest truth, that some being is contingent, – it is necessary to inquire how contingency in beings can be saved.

liii. And I say – because of the first reason made against the third opinion (n.xlii, which is more explained in *Ord.*I d.2 in the question ‘On the existence of God’ [nn.80, 85-86]) – that no causation of any cause can be preserved as ‘contingent’ unless the first cause is posited as immediately causing contingently, and this by positing perfect causality in the first cause, as Catholics do posit [*Ord.*I d.42 n.9].

## 3. The Cause of Contingency in Beings is on the Part of the Divine Will

liv. Now the first thing is causing by intellect and will, and if a third executive power (different from these) be posited, it does not help for the matter at hand, because if it necessarily understands and wills, it necessarily produces. It is necessary then to look for this contingency in the divine intellect or in the divine will. But not in the intellect as it has first act before every act of will, because whatever the intellect understands in this way it understands purely naturally and by natural necessity, – and so no contingency can be in knowing something that it does not know, or in understanding something that it does not understand with such first intellection.

lv. The first contingency, then, it is necessary to look for in the divine will, – which, so that it may be seen how it is to be posited, must first be seen in our will. And there three things: first, for what there is liberty in our will; second how possibility or contingency follow this liberty; and third, about the logical distinction of propositions, how possibility for opposites is expressed.

### a. How our Will can be Cause of Contingency in Things

lvi. [What things there is liberty for in our will] – As to the first I say that the will, insofar as it is first act, is free for opposite acts. It is free also, by means of those opposite acts, for the opposite objects to which it tends. And, further, for the opposite effects which it produces.

<sup>46</sup> cf. Aristotle *Topics* I.11.105a5-7.

<sup>47</sup> The Vatican Editors suitably quote Avicenna thus: “We must dismiss the obtuse to the flames, as long they hold that fire and not-fire are one – and we must make them suffer the pain of beatings, as long as they hold that to be pained and not to be pained are one... This principle, then, which we defend against those who falsify it, is the first of the principles of demonstration; the philosopher in truth should be the first to guard them.”

Ivii. The first liberty has necessarily some imperfection annexed, because passive potentiality of will and mutability. The third liberty is not the second, because even if, *per impossibile*, [the will] were to effect nothing outwardly, still – insofar as it is will – it could freely tend to objects. But the middle idea of liberty [sc. the second liberty], it is without imperfection (indeed necessary for perfection), because every perfect power can tend to everything that is of a nature to be object of such power; therefore a perfect will can tend to everything that is of a nature to be will-able. Liberty therefore without imperfection – insofar as it is free – is to the opposite objects to which it tends, and to it as such is incident that it may produce opposite effects.

Iviii. [How contingency follows the liberty of our will] – About the second I say that concomitant to this liberty is a single power manifest for opposites. For although there not be in it a power to will and not will at the same time (because this is nothing), yet there is in it a power for willing after not willing, or for a succession of opposite acts; and this power is manifest in all things mutable for a succession in them of opposites [e.g. as that x can be white now and black later].

lix. Yet there is also another [power] (not as manifest), without any succession. For, positing that a created will only has being in one instant, and that in that instant it has this volition, it does not necessarily then have it. Proof: for if in that instant it had it necessarily, since it is not a cause save in that instant when it would cause it, then the will simply – when it would cause – would necessarily cause; for not now is it a contingent cause because it was pre-existing before this instant in which it is causing, and then, ‘as pre-existing’, it was able to cause or not cause; because just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so a cause, when it causes, then causes necessarily or contingently. From the fact, then, that in this instant it causes this willing and not necessarily, therefore contingently. There is therefore this power of a cause ‘for the opposite of what it causes’ without succession.

lx. And this power, a real one, is a power of the naturally prior (as first acts) to opposites that are naturally posterior (as second acts); for a first act, considered in the instant in which it is naturally prior to a second act, so posits it in being – as its own contingent effect – that, as naturally prior, it could equally posit the other opposite in being.

lxi. Also concomitant to this real active power (prior naturally to what it produces) is a logical power, which is the non-repugnance of terms. For to the will as first act, even when it is producing this willing, the opposite willing is not repugnant: both because it is a contingent cause with respect to its effect (and so the opposite in idea of effect is not repugnant to it), and because, as it is a subject, it is contingently disposed to this act as [the act] informs it, because to the subject the opposite of its ‘accident per accidens’ is not repugnant.<sup>48</sup>

lxii. With the liberty of our will, therefore, insofar as it is for opposite acts, is concomitant a power both to opposites successively and to opposites at the same instant, – this is, that either of the two could be present without the other, and so the second power is a real cause for an act as naturally prior to logical power [n.lxi; a third power]; but the fourth power – namely to opposites simultaneously – is not concomitant with it, because it is null.

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<sup>48</sup> The accident per accidens is the act the subject is disposed to, and since the disposition is contingent to the subject, the opposite act is not repugnant to the subject, and the subject could be disposed to it instead.

lxiii. [About the logical distinction of propositions] – From this second point a third is plain, namely the distinction of this proposition ‘a will willing *a* is able not to will *a*’. For this is false in the sense of composition, such that the possibility of this proposition is signified: ‘the will willing *a* does not will *a*’; it is true in the sense of division, so that the possibility is signified for opposites successively, because the will willing for [time] *a* is able not to will for [time] *b*.

lxiv. But if we also take a proposition uniting extremes for the same instant about something possible, to wit this one, ‘the will not willing something for [time] *a* is able to will it for [time] *a*’, this must still be distinguished according to composition and division: and in the sense of composition it is false, namely that there is a possibility that the will is simultaneously willing for [time] *a* and not willing for [time] *a*; the sense of division is true, namely so as to signify that to the will in which ‘willing for [time] *a*’ is present there could be present ‘not willing for [time] *a*’ – but it will not so stand at the same time, but ‘not willing’ thus [would stand], because then the ‘willing’ would not be present.

lxv. And for understanding this second distinction [n.lxiv] – which is more obscure – I say that in the sense of composition there is one categorical [proposition], whose subject is this ‘the will not willing for [moment] *a*’ and whose predicate is ‘willing for [moment] *a*’; and then this predicate is being possibly attributed to this subject to which it is repugnant, and consequently what is being indicated able to belong to it is unable to belong to it. In the sense of division there are two categorical propositions, asserting of the will two predicates: in one proposition, about inherence, there is asserted of the will this predicate ‘not willing *a*’ (which categorical proposition is understood through implicit composition); in the other categorical proposition, about the possible, there is asserted as possible ‘willing *a*’. And these two propositions are verified, because they are signified as attributing their predicates to the subject for the same instant; and this indeed is true, for to this will in the same instant belongs not willing *a*, with the possibility of the opposite for *a* – just as inherence is signified along with the one about possibility.

lxvi. An example of this distinction is in this [proposition] ‘all men who are white run’ – which, once this case is posited that all the white are running (and not the black or in between [viz. brown]), is true in the sense of composition and false in the sense of division; in the sense of composition there is one proposition, possessing one subject, which is determined by the term ‘white’; in the sense of division there are two propositions, asserting two predicates of the same subject [sc. ‘all men are white’ and ‘all men run’]. Similarly in this one, ‘man who is white necessarily is an animal’: which in the sense of composition is false, because the predicate does not belong necessarily to this whole subject [sc. ‘man who is white’<sup>49</sup>]; in the sense of division it is true, because two predicates are indicated to be said of the same subject (one necessarily [sc. ‘man is necessarily an animal’] and the other absolutely, without necessity [sc. ‘man is white’]), and both predicates belong and both the categorical propositions are true.

lxvii. But against this second distinction it is argued in three ways, that it is not a logical one and that no power is for any instant to the opposite of what is in it at that instant.

lxviii. The first is through the proposition in *De Interpretatione* 9.91a23-24: “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is.”

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<sup>49</sup> ‘Animal’ does necessarily belong to man, but to man qua man and not to man qua white.



lxix. The second is through that rule of the art of disputation [‘ars obligatoria’]: “When a false contingent of the present instant is posited, it must be denied that it is.” Which rule he [Giles of Sherwood, *Obligationes*] proves by this, that what is posited must be sustained as true; therefore it must be sustained for any instant for which it is possible: but it is not ‘a true possible’ for the instant for which it is posited, because if it were possible for that instant then it could be true through motion or through change; but in neither way, because motion is not in an instant, and change is not in any instant to the opposite of that which it then is in, because change and the end of change are simultaneous.

lxx. Further, third: if for any instant there is a potency for something whose opposite is present, that potency is either with act or before act; not with act, as is plain – nor before act, because then it would be toward an act for a different instant than for which the potency is present.

lxxi. To the first [n.lxviii] I reply that that proposition of Aristotle can be categorical or hypothetical, just as also this one, ‘that an animal runs, if a man runs, is necessary’. This [proposition], indeed, according as it is a conditional, is to be distinguished according as ‘necessary’ can state the necessity of the consequence [sc. the whole conditional] or of the consequent [sc. the apodosis of the conditional]; in the first way it is true, in the second way it is false. According as it is categorical, this whole ‘...runs if man runs’ is predicated of animal with the mode of necessity, – and the categorical [sc. ‘it is necessary that an animal runs if man runs’] is true, because a predicate so determined [sc. ‘...runs if man runs’] is necessarily present in the subject, although not the predicate absolutely [sc. ‘runs’ without the ‘if’]; and therefore then to argue from the predicate so determined to the predicate taken absolutely is the fallacy of ‘in a certain respect and simply’ [sc. to argue from ‘it is necessary that an animal runs if man runs’ to ‘it is necessary that an animal runs’].

lxxii. So I say here, that if this proposition [sc. from Aristotle, n.lxviii] is taken as it is a hypothetical of time, the term ‘necessity’ indicates necessity either of the concomitance or of the concomitant; as of the concomitance it is true [sc. ‘it is necessary that everything is when it is’], – as of the concomitant it is false [sc. ‘everything that is, necessarily is when it is’]. But if it be taken as it is a categorical, then that which is the ‘when it is’ does not determine the composition implicit in the ‘[everything] that is’ which is said, but it determines the principal composition, which is signified by this which is the ‘is’ – and then this predicate ‘is when it is’ is denoted to be said of the subject ‘that is’ with the mode of necessity, and thus the proposition is true [sc. ‘everything necessarily is when it is’]; nor does it follow ‘therefore it necessarily is’, but there is a fallacy of ‘in a certain respect and simply’ in the other part [sc. by reducing ‘necessarily is when it is’ to ‘necessarily is’]. No true sense, then, of this proposition denotes that the being of something – in the instant in which it is – is necessary, but only that it is necessary in a certain respect, when it is; with this stands that in the instant in which it is it is simply contingent, and consequently that in that instant the opposite of it could be present.

lxxiii. To the second [n.lxix]: that rule [of the art of disputation or ‘ars obligatoria’] is false and the proof not valid, for although what is posited should be maintained as true, yet it can be sustained for that instant without denying that that is an instant for which it is false, because it does not follow ‘it is false for that instant, therefore it is impossible’,

as the proof insinuates; and when it says ‘if it can be true [for the instant] for which it is false, it can be made true for that instant either etc.’ [sc. by motion or change, n.lxix], I say that neither this way nor that, because this possibility for its truth is not any possibility with succession (as one thing after another thing), but is a potency for the opposite of that which is in something insofar as it is naturally prior to that act.

lxxiv. To the third [n.lxx]: I say that potency is before act; not ‘before’ in duration but ‘before’ in order of nature – because that which naturally precedes the act, as it naturally precedes act, could be with the opposite of the act. And then it must be denied that every potency is ‘with act or before act’, understanding ‘before’ of priority in duration; it is true when understanding by ‘before’ priority of nature.

lxxv. It is objected fourth against that [sc. the second distinction, n.lxvii]:

Because ‘if it is able to will *a* for this instant and it does not will *a* for this instant, therefore it is able not to will *a* for this instant’, because on the [proposition] about presence [of predicate in subject], that about possible presence follows; and then seems to follow that it would be able to will *a* and not will *a* together at the same instant.

lxxvi. To this I reply – according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a21-24 – that what has power for opposites will do as it has the power of doing; but not as it has the power of doing such that the mode [sc. ‘at the same time’] be referred to the term of the power, not to the power itself; because I have at the same time power for opposites but not for opposites at the same time.

lxxvii. Then I say it does not follow: ‘[a power] is able to will this in *a* and able not to will this in *a*, therefore it is able to will and not will in *a*’, because there can be a power for both the opposites disjunctively at any instant, though not for both of them together; because just as there is a possibility for one of them, so there is for the not being of the other – and conversely, just as [a possibility] for the latter so for the not being of the former. Not therefore at the same time for the being of this opposite and of that, because it would not be a possibility for simultaneity unless it were concurrently for both in the same instant, which is not got from this that the power is for each divisively at the same instant.

lxxviii. An example of this is plain in permanent things: that ‘this body can be in this place at instant *a*, and that body can be in the same place at instant *a*, therefore these two bodies can be together at instant *a*’ is a non sequitur; for thus can this body be there that that body cannot be there (and conversely), and so it does not follow ‘if there is a power for either at the same instant or place, then for both’, but it fails whenever either of the two excludes the other. For thus too does it not follow: ‘I am able all day to carry this stone (let it be something portable, equal to my strength), and I am able all day to carry that stone, therefore I am able at the same time to carry both’; it is a non sequitur because here either of the two for which there is power divisively excludes the other. And simultaneity can never be inferred from the identity alone of the one thing (instant or place), but it is necessary with this to have a conjunction of these two with respect to a third that are said to be together.

#### b. How the Divine Will is Cause of Contingency in Things

lxxix. Following the aforesaid about our will, certain things need to be seen about the divine will: and first, for what its liberty is; second, what contingency there is in

respect of things willed (third, namely as to the logical distinction of propositions, it is the same there as here).

lxxx. [What things the liberty of the divine will is for] – As to the first I say that the divine will is not indifferent to diverse acts of willing and non-willing, because in our will this was not without imperfection of will. Our will also was free for opposite acts, so that it would be for opposite objects, because of the limitation of each act in respect of its object; therefore, with illimitation posited of the same volition to diverse objects, it is not necessary, on account of liberty for opposite objects, to posit liberty for opposite acts. The divine will too is free for opposite effects, but this is not the first liberty just as not in us either.

lxxxii. There remains then the liberty that is per se a matter of perfection without imperfection, namely for opposite objects, so that just as our will can by diverse volitions tend to diverse things willed, so the divine will can by a single, unlimited, simple volition tend to any willed things whatever, – so that if will or the volition were only one of one will-able thing and could not be of the opposite (which is however, of itself will-able), this would be of imperfection in the will, as was proved earlier about our will [n.lvii].

lxxxii. And although in us the will can be distinguished as it is receptive and as it is operative and as it is productive (for it is productive of acts, and it is that by which what has it operates formally in willing, and it is receptive of its own volition), yet freedom seems to be its insofar as it is operative, insofar namely as ‘having it formally’ it can by it tend to the object; so let freedom therefore be posited in the divine will per se and first, insofar as it is an operative power, although it is not receptive nor productive of its own volition. And yet in it can some freedom be saved insofar as it is productive: for although production in being of existence not be necessarily concomitant with its operation (because operation is in eternity and production of being of existence is in time), yet production in willed being is necessarily concomitant with its operation; and then this power of the divine will does not produce first indeed as it is productive, but in a certain respect (namely in willed being), and this production as it is operative is concomitant with it.

lxxxiii. [What is the contingency of willed things] – As to the second article, I say that the divine will has respect necessarily to nothing other for object than its own essence; to anything else whatever therefore it is disposed contingently, so that it could be of the opposite, and this when considering it as it is naturally first the tendency to the opposite. And not only is it naturally prior to its own act (as to volition), but also insofar as it is willing, because just as our will, as naturally prior to its own act, so elicits that act that it could in the same instant elicit the opposite [n.lx], – so the divine will, insofar as it is by volition alone naturally prior, with such tendency so tends to the object contingently that in the same instant it could tend to the opposite object: and this both by logical power, which is the non-repugnance of the terms (as was said about our will [n.lxi]), and by real power, which is prior naturally to its own act [n.lx].

#### B. How with the Contingency of Things Stands the Certitude of Divine Knowledge

lxxxiv. Having seen the contingency of things as to existence, and this by a consideration in respect of the divine will – it remains to see the second principal point, how with this there stands certitude of knowledge.

lxxxv. This can be posited in two ways:

In one way by this, that the divine intellect, in seeing the determination of the divine will, sees that that thing will be at time *a*, because the will determines it will be at that time; for it knows that the will is immutable and cannot be prevented.

lxxxvi. Or in a second way: Because this way [n.lxxxv] seems to posit a certain discursiveness in the divine intellect (as if from intuition of the determination of the will and of its immutability it conclude that this will be), it can be posited in a second way, that the divine intellect either offers the simples of which the union is contingent in reality, or – if it offers the complex of them [sc. the proposition uniting them] – offers it as neutral for itself; and the will, choosing one side, namely the conjunction of these for some ‘now’ in fact, makes it to be determinately true: ‘this will be at [time] *a*’. But, when this ‘determinately true’ exists, the essence is the reason for the divine intellect of understanding this truth, and this naturally (as far as is on the part of the essence), so that just as it naturally understands all necessary principles as if before act of the divine will (because the truth of them does not depend on that act and they would be known by the divine intellect if, *per impossibile*, it were not willing), so the divine essence is the reason for knowing them in that prior [moment], because then are they true; not indeed that those truths – nor even their terms – move the divine intellect to apprehending such truth (because then the divine intellect would be cheapened, because then it would be acted on by something other than its own essence), but the divine essence is the reason for knowing the terms as also such propositions: but then they are not true contingents, because there is nothing then by which they may have determinate truth; but when the determination of the divine will is posited, then they are true in that second instant, and the same thing will be the reason for the divine intellect – the same as also in the first instant – for understanding the things that are now true in the second instant and that would have been known in the first instant, if they had then been in the first instant.

lxxxvii. An example: just as if in my seeing power ‘an always standing single act’ is the reason for seeing an object, if now this color be present, by something else presenting it, now that color, – my eye will see now this, now that, and yet there will, through the same vision, be only a difference in priority and posteriority of seeing, because of an object first or later presented; and if one color were made naturally present and the other freely, there would not be a difference formally in my vision without the eye naturally on its own part seeing both; however, it would be able contingently to see one and necessarily the other, insofar as one is made present to it contingently and the other necessarily.

lxxxviii. In whichever of these ways the divine intellect be posited as knowing the existence of things, it is plain that – according to both – there is a determination of the divine intellect to the existent thing to which the divine will is determined, and that there is a certitude of infallibility (because the will cannot be determined without the intellect determinately apprehending what the will determines), and an immutability (because both the will and the intellect are immutable, from *Ord.I d.8 n.293*), – and this as to the first three questions [n.ii]. And yet along with these [sc. determination, infallibility, immutability] stands the contingency of the known object, because the will, when it determinately wills this, contingently wills it – from the first article [sc. of Scotus’ own response to the questions, n.lxxxiii].

lxxxix. As to the fourth question [sc. whether God necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything; n.ii,], it seems perhaps necessary to draw a distinction about this [proposition] ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ according to composition and division – so that in the sense of composition is noted the necessity of knowledge as transitive to the object, and in the sense of division is noted the necessity of knowledge absolutely, which knowledge is *not*<sup>50</sup> transitive to this object; in the first way it is false, in the second way true.

xc. However such a distinction does not seem logical, because when an act is transitive to the object, it does not seem necessary to make a distinction about the act absolutely or as transitive to the object, – to wit, if I say ‘I see Socrates’, which may be distinguished as to sight as it is transitive to Socrates or about sight absolutely, which is however of Socrates; and just as there is not there [sc. in ‘God necessarily knows *a*’] a distinction in a proposition about assertion [sc. ‘God knows *a*’], so neither when a mode is added [sc. the modal term ‘necessarily’ as in ‘God necessarily knows *a*’] does there seem to be a distinction, but a distinction only seems necessary if the act is transitive to the object necessarily: and so this seems simply to be denied, ‘God necessarily knows *a*’, by the fact that this predicate so determined [sc. ‘necessarily knows’] does not necessarily belong to this subject, although the non-determined predicate [sc. ‘knows’, without ‘necessarily’] does belong.

xc. Against this it is objected, because a rational act is not canceled by the matter it is transitive to; for there is as simply a ‘to say’ that is transitive to ‘...that I am saying nothing’ as when it is transitive to ‘...that I am saying something’; and therefore it as follows ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I say [something]’ as it follows ‘I say that I am sitting, therefore I say [something]’. Therefore, in God ‘to know’ is not canceled by the matter it is transitive to without there being an equal necessity.

xcii. To this. Although it [the proposition about God’s knowledge] not be so canceled that it stand in a certain respect, yet there can fail to be a necessity of it so that it signify that it is transitive over the matter (although there may be necessity of it in itself), and this if an act is maximally in itself able to respect diverse objects: just as if I were to have an act of speaking the same in motive power, and the act could be transitive to diverse objects contingently – although necessarily I would have the act (just as also the power), yet not necessarily would I have the act as it is transitive to such object; nor would it then follow ‘I am necessarily speaking, therefore I am necessarily speaking this’, indeed there could be a necessity of the speaking in itself with contingency in respect of this object; yet the speaking of this object would be simply [a speaking] so as not to be a speaking in a certain respect.

### III. To the Principal Arguments

xciii. To the principal arguments, in order.

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<sup>50</sup> The Vatican editors note that here ‘not’ [*non*] should be read rather than the ‘however’ [*tamen*] of the ms., and they refer to the source of the text in *Lectura* I d.39 nn.67-68. Translator: The distinction anyway is between ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ [composition] and ‘God necessarily knows – *a*’ [division], or between necessity belonging to the whole sentence and to the subject of it only. The first way is said to be necessary only given the object, for the object does not necessarily exist. The second way is said to be necessary simply, because God’s knowledge simply is necessary. But Scotus proceeds to object to this distinction.

To the first, for the first question [n.iii], I say that there is not a like truth in those about the future as in those about the present and the past. In present and past ones, indeed, there is determinate truth, so that one extreme is posited, – and as it is understood as posited, it is not in the power of the cause that it be posited or not posited, because although it be in the power of the cause ‘as it is naturally prior to the effect’ to posit the effect or not to posit it, yet not as the effect is understood already posited in being. And such [positing] is not determination on the part of the future, because although for some intellect one part be true determinately (and also [although] one part be true in itself, determinately, although no intellect were to apprehend it), yet not in such way that it is not in the power of the cause at that instant to posit the opposite. And this indetermination suffices for taking counsel and being busy about things – if neither part were future it would not be necessary to be busy or deliberate – therefore, that one part is future while yet the other could happen, does not prohibit deliberation and being busy.

xciv. To the second [n.v]:

I say that for knowledge to be of one part, so that it could not be of the other, posits imperfection in it – likewise too in the will, to posit that it is of one willable object so that it could not be of the other. However, for knowledge to be of one such that it not be of the other (and about the will likewise) posits no imperfection, just as also a power is of one opposite in act determinately, which it produces, and not of the other. There is unlikeness however about power and knowledge and will in this, that power seems said to be of one opposite only because it is only capable of that, and knowledge and will such that they only know or will that. But if it be taken in like manner on both sides, there is equal determination on both sides, because any of these in act is of one opposite and not of both; any also of these can be of each. But that power is of something, this seems to signify a potential disposition of it to that; that knowledge or will are of it seems to signify an actual disposition to the same. Nothing bad however follows if it be taken in like way on this side and that, because then, just as to knowledge is ‘to know’ and to the will is ‘to will’, so to power is ‘to produce’ (but not ‘able to produce’), and just as to power is ‘able to produce’ so to knowledge is ‘able to know’ and to will ‘able to will’.

xcv. To the first argument of the second question [n.vi] I say that although on two [propositions] about inherence [sc. of predicate in subject], a conclusion about inherence follows (not indeed syllogistically, because the discussion is not syllogistic, being reducible to many syllogisms), yet from one about inherence and another about possibility neither syllogistically nor necessarily does a conclusion about the possible follow; the reason is because ‘to be deceived’ is to think a thing to be other than it is at the time when it is believed to be. Now this is included in the two premises about inherence, one of which signifies that he believes this and the other denies that this is the case, and this at the same instant, – and therefore the conclusion about being deceived follows. But it is not so on the other part, because the one [premise] about inherence affirms one opposite for that instant, the one about possibility affirms potency for the other opposite, not conjointly at the same instant but disjointly, – and so it does not follow that at any instant there could be a conjunction in reality of the opposite with what is believed; and therefore a possibility of deception, which includes this conjunction, does not follow. The like reasoning is in the mixing of the contingent and the inherent, as to why it does not hold unless the major is about presence simply.

xcvi. This response too is plain, because if from the opposite of the conclusion an argument be made with the [premise] about possibility, an opposite is not inferred save of something of the necessary, and so it would be necessary for the major to be really the same as the one about the necessary for it to infer the conclusion; for it does not follow ‘God cannot be deceived, and *a* is able not to be, therefore God does not know that *a* will be’, but it follows ‘therefore he does not necessarily know that *a* will be’; the point is clear, because if my intellect always followed change in the thing, such that when you are sitting I would believe you are sitting and when you get up I would believe you get up, I could not be deceived, and yet from these ‘you are sitting at moment *a*’ and ‘I cannot be deceived’ it only follows that ‘therefore I do not necessarily know you are sitting at moment *a*’. So in the matter at hand: although the divine intellect not follow the thing as effect the cause, yet there is a concomitance there, because just as the thing is able not to be, the divine intellect is able not to know – and therefore it never follows that the divine intellect know a thing other than it is; and therefore never can the things that are required for deception stand together at the same time, but just as the thing known is able not to be, so God is able not to know it, – and if it will not be, he will not know it.

xcvii. As to the second, about the positing of the possible in being [n.vii], I say that from such positing in itself never does anything impossible follow; however that about inherence, insofar as one about the possible is posited, can be repugnant to something to which that about a possible posited in being is not repugnant, because the antecedent can be repugnant to something to which the consequent is not repugnant – and then from the antecedent and its repugnant can follow something impossible that does not follow from the consequent and the same [antecedent] which is not impossible with it. And no wonder if from impossibles follow the impossible because, according to the Philosopher, *Prior Analytics* 2.15.64b7-10, 15-16, in a syllogism ‘from opposites’ an impossible conclusion follows.

xcviii. I say then that, with this posited in being ‘it is possible for me not to sit’, from this alone nothing impossible follows; but from this and another – namely ‘God knows that I will sit’ – the impossible does follow, namely that God is deceived; and the impossible does not follow from the impossibility of that which is posited in being, nor even from any impossibility that is absolutely in it, but from itself and a certain other thing at the same time that is impossible. Nor is this unacceptable, that that which is impossible follow from one about inherence, insofar as there is posited one about possibility and one about inherence – because with this, ‘I am sitting’, stands this, ‘it is possible that I am standing’; but the former about inherence [‘I am sitting’], insofar as the latter is posited [‘it is possible that I am standing’], is repugnant to that other about inherence [‘I am standing’] – and from those two about inherence the impossible does follow, namely ‘the one standing is sitting’. And yet it does not follow ‘therefore the one that was posited about the possible in being [sc. ‘it is possible that I am standing’] was false’, but either it was false or the other [sc. ‘I am sitting’] (with which its about inherence [‘I am standing’] is taken) is impossible with its about inherence.

xcix. To the first argument of the third question [n.viii], I concede the major, that there is no transition without change – but in the minor [‘God in knowing *a* is able not to know *a*’] I say that here there is no transition (nor can there be), because transition is impossible without succession, so that opposite succeed to opposite; and such succession cannot be in the matter at hand: for just as it is impossible at the same time to know and

not know, so too there cannot stand at the same time that sometimes he [God] know and sometimes not know, – without which transition from opposite to opposite successively there is no change.

c. And if you ask ‘at least if he cannot not know *b* which he does know, something would be differently disposed, – what is that?’, I say that it is *b* in known being; not however differently than it was disposed before, but differently than it is now disposed, such that this ‘differently’ would not be of some succeeding opposite to opposite, but it would be of the other of the opposites which can be inherent in the same instant in which its opposite is inherent, – and this does not suffice for change.

ci. To the second [n.ix]: the consequence is not valid, ‘he who does not know *a* can know *a*, therefore he can begin to know *a*’, and this when there is a power precisely for something naturally prior to the opposite of the posterior at the same instant at which and in which this posterior contingently is, just as in the matter at hand; only it holds thanks to matter in creatures, where there is potentiality for opposites successively – but even if that [potentiality] were not, yet still there would be a possibility for each of them in the same instant.

cii. To the third [n.x], it can be conceded, as to this argument, that this power for opposites is an active power, – namely that the divine intellect, insofar as it is in act by its essence and by actual infinite intellection, is an active power with respect to any objects that it produces in understood being.

ciii. And when it says [n.x] ‘therefore it cannot act about anything about which it did not act before unless it change’, I say that the consequence is not valid when it requires an object about which to act; just as in created agents, it is not necessary that the agent – which acts *de novo* – is changed if the passive thing on which it acts comes to be *de novo* next to it. So in the matter at hand. The divine will, determining a ‘will be’ of something shown by the intellect, makes such a complex [= understood state of affairs] to be true and so intelligible; therefrom it is present to the intellect in idea of object. And just as the will is able to make this willed object and not to make it, so it can be true and not true, and so it can be known and not known by this natural intellect; not indeed because of any contingency that indeed is prior in this natural agent, but because of contingency on the part of the object, which is contingently true by act of the will making it true.

civ. And if you object that still it cannot be without change, at least in the object understood (just as neither can there be a coming near of a natural passive object to a natural agent without change in the passive object, and perhaps in the agent coming near) – I reply that this object is not changed in this being, because it cannot be successively under opposites; yet it is contingently in this being, and this contingency is on the part of the will producing it in such being; and this contingency of will can be without change of will, as was made clear in the first article of the solution [n.lxxxiii].

cv. To the arguments for the fourth question [n.xi].

As to the first [ I deny the consequence.

cvi. As to the first proof [n.xii], I say that if there is not in God a necessity other than that of immutability (that is, no other mode of necessity among those that the philosopher assigns, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a33-35, than the fourth, according to which is the ‘not contingent to being disposed otherwise’, – because the other modes of necessity require imperfection, as the necessity of coercion etc.), yet there is not there a necessity



only of immutability such that immutability of itself be necessity, because immutability only takes away the possible succession of opposite to opposite; and necessity simply takes away absolutely the possibility of this opposite and not the succession of the opposite to it, – and it does not follow ‘opposite cannot succeed to opposite, therefore the opposite cannot be inherent’.

cvii. To the second proof [n.xiii], I say that although all being of existence ‘able to come to be’ is changeable, when positing that creation according to the understanding of Avicenna [*Metaphysics* VI ch.2 f.92ra] – even from eternity – is change, yet in understood being or willed being (which is to be in a certain respect) it is not necessary that every possibility which is repugnant to ‘necessity of itself’ formally entails mutability, because this being is not real being but is reduced to the real being of something in itself necessary, because of the necessity of which other there cannot be here mutability and yet the ‘necessity of itself’ of the other does not belong to this [sc. what has being in a certain respect] formally; and therefore this is not of itself necessary formally, because it does not have the being of the extreme that it has regard to really – nor yet is it changeable, because according to that ‘diminished being’ it regards the immutable extreme, and change in something according as it has regard to another cannot be without change in that.

cviii. As to the second argument [n.xiv], I say that something can be in God in two ways: either formally, – or in him subjectively, just as logically any predicate is said to be in a subject. In the first way I concede the major, that everything such is God and the same as God necessarily; in the second way I do not, because a relative appellation can be in God according as God is said to be ‘Lord’ from time, and yet this appellation does not signify anything the same as God (such that necessarily it be the same as God or is God himself), because then it would not be from time. Now I say that for God to know *b*, by reason of this which is ‘to know absolutely’, is to know formally – but, by reason of ‘to know’ as it is of this term, it is not in God save in the second way; for it is of this term because this known thing has respect to divine knowledge, and hereby some relative appellation is in God as a predicate in a subject.

cix. To the third [n.xv] I say that no ‘perfection simply’ in God depends on a creature, nor does it even necessarily simply co-require a creature, in any being whatever; and so for God to know *b*, according as he is understood not only ‘to know’ absolutely but also according as he passes over the *b*, is not a perfection simply. Then I say that the major of the argument is true of the perfection of that science taken absolutely; but thus is the minor false and its proof only proves that on a perfection simply follows necessarily that it be of such object, because it follows necessarily that it have such a respect to such perfection simply – although however neither from such respect of another to it, nor from a relative appellation of it, is there a perfection simply in it.

cx. To the arguments of the fifth question [xvi].

To the first I say [n.xvii] that the antecedent is not necessary simply. And when it is proved that ‘a rational act is not canceled by the matter’, the response to that proof is in the argument made against the solution of this question [xci].

cxi. To the second [xviii]. That mixed [argument] is not valid unless the minor is about inherence simply, and this not only that it is true for all time, but that it is necessarily true; and perhaps it is necessary that it signify that what is taken ‘under’ is per se contained under the middle term (it suffices for the matter at hand that it must be that it

is necessarily true). And that this is required is plain in this instance ‘everything at rest is of necessity not in motion – a stone at the center of the earth is at rest, therefore of necessity it is not in motion’; the conclusion does not follow, and yet the minor is always true, – not however necessarily true. So it is in the issue at hand: for although the minor about inherence is always true, it is not however necessarily true; for God is able not to know *a* as he is able not to will *a*, on account of the contingency that is first in the will as to secondary objects and from this, is concomitantly in the intellect, as was expounded before [n.ciii].

#### IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

cxii. To the arguments for the second opinion.

To the first [n.xxviii] I concede that immensity is present to every place, but not to every place actual and potential (as is argued in the first reason against this opinion, n.xxxiii), and so neither will eternity because of its infinity be present to any non-existent time.

cxiii. And through this is plain the example about the stick and the stream [n.xxix]. For because the stick does not have whence it could be present to all parts of the water, therefore it cannot be immense with respect to them; but the ‘now’ of eternity does have this, as far as is on its own part, that it would be present to all parts of time if they were.

cxiv. The other example ‘about center and circumference’ [xxxii] is like the opposite one [sc. about the stick and stream]. Because if we imagine a straight line having two end points *a* and *b*, let point *a* be stationary and point *b* be led round in a circle (as of the leg of a compass, one being immovable the other movable); *b* moved around causes a circumference according to the imagination of geometers, who imagine that a flowing point causes a line; on this posit, if nothing remain of the circumference through the moving of *b* but only this point is on the circumference (such that whenever the point ceases to be anywhere, then nothing of the circumference is there), then never is the circumference present together to the center, but only some point of the circumference would be present to the center; if however the whole circumference were together, the whole would be present to the center. So here: since time is not a standing circumference but a flowing one, of which circumference there is nothing but an instant in act – nothing also of it will be present to eternity (which is as it were the center) save the instant which is as it were the present; and yet if *per impossibile* it were posited that the whole of time were standing together, the whole would be present together to eternity as to the center.

cxv. By this it is plain to another [n.xxx]. When it is said that the ‘now’ of eternity, as it co-exists, does not equal the ‘now’ of time – it is true, because the ‘now’ of eternity is formally infinite, and therefore it formally exceeds the ‘now’ of time; not however by co-existing with another ‘now’. Just as: the immensity of God – present to this universe – is not co-equal with this universe, and therefore it exceeds it formally; yet it is not anywhere if not in this universe.

cxvi. By the same it is plain to another [n.xxxi]: because if the whole of time were together, eternity would embrace it, – and so I concede that eternity, as it is of itself, has infinity enough for embracing the whole of time if the whole were together; but however great is the immensity posited on the part of one extreme, on account of which it could

co-exist with however much in the other extreme, since co-existence states a relation between two extremes (and so it requires both), it is not possible, because of the immensity of one extreme, for co-existence with the other extreme to be proved except only with that which exists of the other extreme.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Additional note*, from *Rep.* IA d.38]: Hence there is in the argument a fallacy of the consequent when it is argued ‘nothing is lost to eternity by this that the whole of time is not simultaneous, therefore because of its [eternity’s] infinity it can be simultaneous with all the parts of time’. For that it is not present to some part or other of time can be understood for two causes: either because the whole of time is not, or because something would be lost to eternity; and in the antecedent one cause is denied – therefore it [the fallacy] follows. Example: although nothing is lost to the white when there is not another white, it is never alike unless there be another white.<sup>51</sup>

cxvii. And therefore all these arguments proceed from what is insufficient, namely from the immensity of eternity, – from which there does not follow a co-existence that states a relation to the other extreme, unless something were had in the other extreme that could be the term of co-existence with this foundation; and such cannot be a non-being, of which sort all time is except the present.

#### V. To the Authorities of the Saints

cxviii. All the authorities of the saints, which seem to signify that all things are present to eternity, must be understood of presence in idea of knowable; and not only ‘knowable’ as if by abstractive knowledge (as a non-existent rose is present to my intellect through a species [sc. the idea of the thing in my intellect]), but of true intuitive knowledge, because God does not know things made in a way other than things to be made, and so things to be made are as perfectly known in their presence by the divine intellect as things made.

#### VI. To the Arguments for the Third Opinion

cxix. To the first [n.xl] for the third opinion: Boethius expounds himself in the same place directly [*Consolation of Philosophy*, V Prose 6]; for there he at once immediately makes a distinction about necessity of consequent and necessity of consequence, and by this I concede that contingent things ‘related to divine knowledge’ are necessary by necessity of consequence (that is, this consequence is necessary, ‘if God knows that they will be, they will be’); but they are not necessary by absolute necessity, nor by necessity of consequent [sc. not because the consequent is necessary in itself].

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<sup>51</sup> Translator: The inference, ‘Eternity loses nothing of itself because the whole of time is not simultaneous, therefore eternity can be simultaneous with the whole of time’, is fallacious. It assumes that eternity’s lack of simultaneity with time would be because of some loss to eternity (and eternity cannot lose anything of itself); whereas it could be because of some loss to time (namely that the whole of time is not, but comes and goes). To exclude the latter without argument is to beg the question by assuming the conclusion, or the consequent, without argument. The parallel with the white makes the point. A white loses nothing of its whiteness if there is no other white to compare it with. It only loses the extrinsic relation of comparison. So eternity too loses nothing of its eternity if there is no time to compare it with. It only loses the extrinsic relation of comparison.

cxx. To the other for the third opinion [n.xli], I say that contingency is not only privation or defect of entity (as is deformity in the act that is a sin), rather contingency is a positive mode of being (as necessity is another mode), and the positive being – which is in the effect – is more principally from the prior cause; and therefore it does not follow, ‘just as the deformity of an act is from the second cause, not from the first cause, so also contingency;’ rather, contingency is in priority more from the first cause than from the second, – because of which nothing caused would be formally contingent unless it was contingently caused by the first cause, as was shown before [liii].

## Fortieth Distinction

### Single Question

#### *Whether the Predestined can be Damned*

1. About the fortieth distinction I ask whether the predestinated can be damned.

That not: Everything past is simply necessary, because – according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 6.2.1139b9-11 – “of this alone is God deprived, to make undone what has been done;” but the predestination of this predestinated has transitioned into the past, because God predestined him from eternity; therefore it is simply necessary. Therefore God cannot not predestinate, and consequently this person cannot be damned.

2. Further, if a predestinated could be damned, this would not be except through his act; therefore through the act of a created will could an act of the divine will be impeded, which is impossible

3. On the contrary:

If not, then no one need be solicitous about observance of the precepts and the counsels, because however he might act he will be saved, if he is predestined – and however he might act, if he is fore-known, he would be damned. Vainly then is the whole divine law set down!

#### I. To the Question

4. To this question.

‘Predestination’ properly states an act of the divine will, namely ordination by the divine will of a choice of some intellectual or rational creature for grace and glory, although it can be taken for an act of the intellect concomitant with that choice. Just as, therefore, has in general been said about the liberty and contingency of the divine will with respect to certain special secondary objects [dd. 38-39], so should it be said with respect to this secondary object, that is ‘to will for this person grace and glory’.

5. And from this I say (because of what was said in the preceding question [sc. the preceding appendix]) that God contingently predestines him whom he has predestined, and he is able not to predestine him, – not both at the same time nor successively, but each separately, in the instant of eternity.

6. I say likewise to the question in itself [n.1], that he who is predestined can be damned; for not because of his predestination is his will confirmed, – and so he can sin,

and so by parity of reason he can stand finally in sin and so justly be damned; but as he can be damned, so can he not be predestined.

7. But as to the logic of the proposition proposed [n.1], it must be distinguished according to composition and division: and in the sense of composition the *per se* extreme is a man or person predestined, under the determination ‘predestined’, – and this sense is false; and in the sense too of division there are two categoricals, and there is enunciated of some beatifiable person in one categorical ‘is predestined’ and in the other ‘can be damned’, – and these two are true of the same subject. And not therefore true because they could be opposites at the same time, nor even because one can succeed the other (because in eternity both are), but true together insofar as divine volition is considered as naturally prior to its passage over this object, which is ‘glory for this one’; in that prior stage it is not naturally repugnant to it to be of the opposite object; indeed it could equally be of the opposite, though not at the same time of both.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

8. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it proceeds from a false imagination, the understanding of which imagination helps to understand the truth of the question proposed: for if *per impossibile* we were to understand that God had still not determined his will to one of the two parts, but is as it were deliberating whether he willed to predestine this person or not, our intellect could well grasp that he would contingently predestine or not predestine him, as is plain in an act of our will; but because we always recur to an act of the divine will as if past, therefore as it were we do not conceive of liberty in the divine will for an act as it were already posited by the will. But this imagination is false: for the ‘now’ of eternity, in which is this act, is always present; and so it must be understood of the divine will, or the volition of it, as it is of this object, just as if *per impossibile* God were now to begin to have to will in this ‘now’, – and thus can God freely in the ‘now’ of eternity will what he wills, as if his will were determined to nothing.

9. Then I say to the form of the argument [n.1] that predestination of this sort does not pass by into the past. For although it has co-existed with past things that have gone by, not however has it passed by, – but the other things have passed by that co-existed with it. Hence, as was said in *Ord.I d.9 n.17*, verbs of diverse times said of God – to the extent they most truly belong to him – do not signify parts of time measuring the act but co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity as if measuring that act insofar as it is co-existent with those many parts; and therefore it is the same for God to predestine and to have predestined and and to be about to predestine, and thus one is contingent as the other, because nothing is save the ‘now’ of eternity measuring the act, – which is neither present nor past nor future, but co-existent with all these.

10. To the second [n.2] I say that a created will cannot impede the ordination of the divine will, for there would not be a ‘to impede’ unless the purpose of the divine will stopped and the opposite came about through a different will; but this is impossible, because just as a created will can merit damnation, so too can it concomitantly follow that the divine will did not pre-ordain it to glory. Hence it was said in the preceding distinction (in the solution of the first argument to the second question [in the interpolation above, n.xcv]) that God cannot be deceived, because his intellection with

respect to something cannot stand with the opposite of it; so too his will cannot be impeded, because the ordination of it cannot stand with the opposite of what it has ordained.

## Forty First Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation*

1. About the forty first distinction I ask whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation.

That there is:

Because if by his will alone – without any reason – he [God] were to predestine this one and reprobate that one, then he would seem not to be supremely good, because not supremely generous nor communicative: for he could equally communicate his good to him whom he does not predestine; that whereby, without any reason in anything else, he predestined that [person] of his sole generosity, so could he predestine this one.

2. Further, if two [people] equal in natural endowments, are apprehended by his intellect, and by sole act of will – without any reason on their part – he reprobates this one and predestines that one, then there seems to be acceptance of persons; because they are equal as concerns their own part and equally able to be ordered to the end, he does not equally love them for that end; for this seems to be ‘to have acceptance of persons’, to prefer that person to another for the end for which he is not of himself more to be preferred. But the consequent is impossible, and contrary to Peter in *Acts* 10.34: “In truth,” he says, “I find that there is no acceptance of persons with God.”

3. On the contrary:

*Romans* 9.11-13: “Although they were not yet born, or had done anything good or bad, so that the election of grace might remain according to his purpose,” – look there.

4. Further, 9.21: he gives an example about a potter, who from the same mass of clay can form one vessel for honor and one for contempt – from which he seems to argue by similarity about the predestination of one and the reprobation of another.

### I. To the Question

#### A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine

5. About this question Augustine once thought that although good works in the fore-knowledge of God are not the reason for predestining, faith however in his fore-knowledge is the reason for predestining – as is plain from him *On the Epistle to the Romans* (the one namely where he means that because of the faith – which he [God] fore-knew – of Jacob, whereby he would be going to believe in him, and the infidelity of Esau, God preferred this one and not that one), and it is contained in the text [of Lombard]. But the same does he himself [Augustine] retract in *Retractions* I ch.23, intimating a reason against himself ‘because faith is a gift of God just as are also other good works’ (which is proved by the Apostle *1 Corinthians* 7.25); hence Augustine says that ‘I would not have said that, if I had known to number faith among the gifts of the Holy Spirit’.

## B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard

6. The master seems to think that there is altogether no merit of predestination or reprobation; and he seems to rely on the authority of the Apostle [n.3] precisely and on the statement of Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38: “Not,” he says, “because he knew we were going to be such did he choose us, but so that we might be such through that choice.”

7. And the Master adduces the authority of Augustine against himself [n.6] saying in *83 Diverse Questions* q.68 n.4: “On whom he wills,” he says, “he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens” [cf. *Romans* 9.18]. But this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from most hidden merits, because although sinners themselves, on account of general sin, have formed one mass, not however is there no diversity between them; for something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification – and again, there precedes in other sinners that whereby they are worthy of obtuseness.”

8. The Master replies that this authority [n.7] seems to have been retracted [by Augustine] when what he said on *Romans* was retracted [n.5]; and the Master confirms it by this, that certain things he [Augustine] had added in the same question he retracts [n.7], as is plain in *Retractions* I ch.26, – and they [the things added] seem to agree with this opinion [n.7], from which it also seems he retracted this opinion.

9. But against this response of the Master – about the retraction of his authority on *Romans* [n.8] – an objection might be made by this, that Augustine published the book on *Romans* when he was priest, but the book *83 Questions* he did not make to be compiled before he was a bishop [*Retractions* I chs.23, 26]; therefore it does not seem that in retracting something from the first book he retracts something from the second, because to retract something said before – when he knew less – is not to retract something said later, when he knew more.

10. But this argument [n.9] is not compelling, because although he wrote one book before another, yet he produced the *Retractions* at the same time (and at that time he had both those published books), and an opinion stated in one book he was able retract in other books, whether earlier or later published. For it appears that all those books – about which he makes mention – he had published before the book of *Retractions*, and yet if in the first chapter of the first book of *Retractions* he had retracted any opinion which he had stated in some other book, later indeed published and retracted, it would not be necessary that he would again repeat the retraction of that opinion in some chapter assigned to another book later published.<sup>52</sup> Hence he says in book 1 chapter 3, retracting the opinion ‘God, whom sense does not know’: “An addition,” he says, “was necessary, so that ‘sense of mortal body’ would be said;” and he subjoins: “Nor must continuously be repeated what also from above onwards I already said, but this is to be recalled wherever this opinion is found in my books.” Therefore when an opinion has been asserted in a book retracted and published before, he more retracts the same opinion as said in books published later rather than conversely.

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<sup>52</sup> The Vatican editors note that Augustine in his *Retractions* followed the chronological of the words he wrote, assigning a distinct chapter to each one.

11. But it could be argued in another way [n.9] against the exposition of the Master [n.8], – that it is not found where Augustine retracts those words [n.7]: because, as he himself [Lombard] admits (and as is true), after the words he adduces [n.8] other words follow that he [Augustine] retracts (from the question 68) in *Retractions* I ch.25 – and these words he does not retract; but it seems that if he intended them to be retracted, he would not begin from words following these, omitting these.

### C. Third Opinion

12. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way “it is said<sup>53</sup> that whatever God does concerning creatures, he does by the good pleasure alone of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.

13. “Which is confirmed by that which is said in *Romans* 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything of bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, – not from works;”<sup>54</sup> the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.

14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason why from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part one of contempt, with no difference existing in the lump (just as neither is there in prime matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the will alone of God well-pleased is the reason why from the same mass – equally vitiated in the first parent – he chooses this one for glory, but that one he dismisses to condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated and all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, and another he would dismiss – on both sides doing grace for him whom he chose (but greater for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom from the damned mass he did not choose, and not injustice to him whom, existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose.”

15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that it is possible to assign his extrinsic reason why God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but no reason why this one rather than that one.

16. “A reason for the first is posited, namely so that his goodness – existing simple in himself – might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things together, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole [of his goodness] be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; as in the way for perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness to perfection are diverse grades in moral reality required, because in this his goodness would be manifested as to any supernatural degree: for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as in the glorified is manifested the goodness of his mercy.

17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in morals, as in the matter at hand, and

<sup>53</sup> Henry of Ghent (*Quodl.* VIII q.5).

<sup>54</sup> The Vatican editors make reference here to Aquinas *ST I* q.23 a.5.



in natural reality, as in the man born blind (*John* 9.3), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be made manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in blindness, but from its marvelous illumining by the Lord.

18. “And it seems as if the Apostle assigns this reason in *Romans* 9.22-23 saying: ‘God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.’; with which agrees the example of the potter, making from the same clay one vessel for honor and another for contempt [n.14], about which in *2 Timothy* 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII q.5; Aquinas, *ST Ia* q.23 a.5 ad 3].

19. About the second – namely in particular [n.15] – “it is said that (as in natural things), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason why one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can well be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but why this part of matter is under this form and that under that, and not conversely, there can be no reason save the will alone of the artificer so determining [Aquinas, *ST Ia* a.23 a.5 ad 3]: just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned that it be placed on the altar but another in the sewer (according to what the Philosopher says *Physics* 26.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the matter at hand – in particular there is no reason why he [God] prefers this person and not that.”<sup>55</sup> And this “is confirmed by Augustine on *John* 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father etc.’, where he says: ‘Why he draw this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [Henry, *ibid.*].

20. “And they say that from the fact God does thus make things unequal for things equal is not iniquity – because in things that are done by grace, without debt, the giver can without all iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of *Matthew* 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But then it would be iniquity if it were given from debt” [Henry of Ghent, *ibid.*, Thomas, *ibid.*].

21. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, certain<sup>56</sup> argue, – first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]:

For no defect of guilt or penalty is of the per se perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that it is alike as to the differences of things in natural and moral being, because all the species of things – distinct in natural being – are of the perfection of the universe; but not so as to moral being between good and bad or between blessed and miserable.

22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, for this the damnation of demons seems sufficient: for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ in species in moral being; and a plurality of individuals is not per se of the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those punished – on the contrary: thus were divine mercy manifested in several ways if God had glorified some men (or if some either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it

<sup>55</sup> Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII q.5 c.

<sup>56</sup> The reading of the mss., but the Vatican editors change it to the singular ‘a certain one’

would more seem of the perfection of divine goodness for God's mercy to be manifested in more ways than God's justice.

23. In addition, this [person] argues that it does not seem that God by intention permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone's intention are 'evils done' more to be permitted than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. – And if it be said that "the will in permitting is in no way carried to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil in idea of a part," he argues that at any rate "it is not manifest how God may from intention will one and not the other." Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen: this is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man's blindness but in a marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things: for God does not intend defect, but if second causes be impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin, if he could prohibit or impede it, sins. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.

24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), – because the example is not similar: for in matter as it is bare there cannot be a difference on account of which it be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump [of clay] with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in men it does seem possible for some diverse disposition to be found on account of which to this [person] being predestined is fitting and not to that one, just as in matter 'not as bare' there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain of wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later if it had not been under the prior.

25. And that they adduce the Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this "not because of lack of means for giving a reason, but to repress the rashness of the incapable;" "nor is it alike in the Apostle's example" – about the lump of clay and the potter – "save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject," because here [sc. on the part of the end] there can be in choice a difference of subject, but there [sc. on the part of the subject] not; and as to this, there is a more fitting example from the Apostle in 2 *Timothy*, which he posits about silver and golden vessels [n.18], "because there is a difference there in the subject, whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden for lesser contempt, golden for greater honor and silver for lesser honor."

#### D. Fourth Opinion

26. [Exposition of the opinion] – He [Henry], rejecting [nn.21-15] this opinion [nn.12-20], speaks in another way, and this as follows:

A divine act can be considered as it is from God as agent, or as it is received in something passive or as it has a term in some object.

27. In the first way there is no reason for the divine action; neither as end, save his goodness – nor as efficient cause, save his will.

28. In the second way, however, there is an assigning of a reason, namely because of which the being about which the action is – as a being for an end – agrees with the end.

29. And that there is some such reason on the part of the being for the end, he shows in three ways:

First, because in things altogether equal choice cannot be spoken of; therefore if God chooses some things, there is some difference in the thing chosen, – or there is no choice.

30. Second, because in all the works of divine mercy justice seems to concur; therefore there is some congruence on the part of that which he operates mercifully about.

31. And third (quasi similarly): it seems that there is not, or there is, a merit of election or reprobation, and so although malice on the part of him who receives [sc. damnation] is not the cause of damning on the part of God (because “then God would be passive” and “the temporal would be cause of the eternal”), yet it is well conceded that on the part of the one to be damned there is a motivating reason on account of which this action is received in him and is about him; therefore by similarity it seems, on the other side [sc. election], that, without imperfection of God in acting, some reason could be posited on the part of the person predestined. And, in this conclusion, it rests on the authority of Augustine cited before [n.7], *83 Questions*, which does not seem to have been retracted.

32. Further, he says in particular what this reason [n.28] is, because: good use of free choice, foreseen on the part of the elect person, and bad use of free choice foreseen on the part of the reprobate.

33. And this he makes clear as follows: although grace operates principally in good acts yet free choice cooperates; this is proved from Augustine “on the verse of *Psalms* ‘Help us, God, our savior’ [*On Psalms* 78, 9 n.12], where Augustine says: “When he wishes us to be helped, he is neither graceless nor does he take away free choice; for he who is helped also does something of himself.” When grace, then, is offered to the wayfarer, if he receive the grace offered and cooperate well with it according to use of free choice, he merits grace according to a further degree – as he exemplifies in many intermediate degrees, from the state of mortal sin up to the state of glory, all which it is not necessary for us now to enumerate;<sup>57</sup> and so it seems that the whole good use of free choice, foreseen for all states, could be the reason for eternal election of him who will well use [free choice], and so on the other side about evil use and reprobation.

34. And if it be objected against this that the good use of free choice is by grace, therefore it pertains to the effect of predestination and so is not the reason for election – the response is that good use “is in a certain way included under predestination, and not under its effect (although it not be without its effect), nor is what is of predestination distinct from that which is of freewill.”

35. Thus, therefore, according to him, and in general, to the whole human race can good use and bad use be assigned, and about any man can a reason be assigned on his part (not “because of which so” but “without which not so”); yet in particular, about a definite man, “it is not man’s to investigate it, although it is not lacking and could be multiple.” However “in particular” – according to him – “the Apostle labored under a great want of means for giving a reason, when he said (*Romans* 11.33) ‘O the depth of the riches’,” because in this (*Psalms* 35.7) “consists the great abyss of God’s judgments.”

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<sup>57</sup> Vatican editors: Between the state of mortal sin and the state of glory there are (according to Henry, *Quodl.* VIII q.5) five degrees of good use of free choice, namely for having the five states of grace: grace freely given, justifying or gratifying, greater, perfect, final.

36. [Rejection of the opinion] – But against this I argue: First, because God does not foresee that this [person] will use free choice well, save because he wills or pre-ordains that he will use it well, because – as was said in distinction 39 [see Appendix section II, n.xlvi ff.] – definite foreseeing of future contingents is from the determination of his will. If therefore to the divine will there be offered two persons equal in natural powers, I ask why he pre-ordains that this one will use free choice well and that one not: it is not possible, as it seems, to assign a reason for this but the divine will; and this is the first distinction between them, which election or reprobation for you [Henry] has to follow; therefore in the first distinction, pertaining to predestination or reprobation, the only reason is the divine will.

37. Besides, this reason that he posits [n.32], does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate:

First indeed because not for little ones, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of freewill.

38. And if you say that, although he not foresee such use, yet he does foresee that this one would have been going to use it well if he had survived, and that that one would have been going to use it badly if he had survived (and therefore he leads this one to baptism and that one not, and this one is saved and that one is damned), – this he himself thus rejects, because on account of someone’s foreseen good use, if he had survived, he is not accepted or reprobated; for then – according to him – an adult dying in grace would not be rewarded according to the merits that he already has, but according to those that he is foreseen to be going to have, if he had survived.

39. Let us speak similarly of the predestined and non-predestined angels; which use of freewill does God foresee in this one – if grace be offered – which he does not foresee in that one, because of which he predestines this one and reprobates that one?

#### E. Scotus’ own Opinion

40. [Exposition of the opinion] – It can be said in a different way that there is no reason for predestination, on the part even of the predestined, in any way prior to the predestination; to reprobation, however, there is some prior [reason], not indeed because of which God effectively reprobates insofar as the action is from God (as was argued in the opinion set down before, because then ‘God would be passive’ [n.31]), but because of which this action thus terminates at this object and not at that.

41. The first one is proved, because he who in ordered way wills the end and what is for the end, wills the end first before any of the beings for the end, and because of the end does he will other things; therefore since, in the whole process by which a beatifiable creature is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God – willing something of this order for this creature – first wills the end for this beatifiable creature, and as it were afterwards wills for him other things, which are in the order of those things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits, and good use of freewill, all these are for the end (although some further away and others nearer). Therefore God first wills for this person beatitude before any of these things; and he first wills for him each of these first before he foresee that he will have each of them, therefore because of the being foreseen of none of these does he will him beatitude.

42. The second [n.40] is proved, because damnation does not seem good save because just, for – according to Augustine *On Genesis XI* ch.17 n.22 – ‘God is not first avenger before anyone is sinner’ (for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when there is no pre-existing guilt in him); therefore by similarity, God does not will first to punish before he see that someone is a sinner. Not then is the first act of the divine will about Judas to will to damn Judas insofar as Judas is presented in his purely natural state (because then it seems it wills to damn without guilt), but it seems that it is necessary for Judas to be offered to the divine will under the idea of sinner before it will to damn him. Reprobation, therefore, has its reason on the part of the object, namely foreseen final sin.

43. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in his book *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38, and it is put in the text [n.6].

44. [Objections against the opinion] – Against this [n.41]. Peter and Judas, equal in natural state, willed by God in being of existence, in the instant in which they are presented to the divine will in natural existence and equal: God – for you [sc. Scotus] – first wills beatitude for Peter; I ask then what did he will for Judas? If damnation I have the conclusion intended ‘therefore he reprobates without all reason’, – if beatitude, then he predestines Judas.

45. It can be said that in that instant God wills nothing for Judas; there is only there a negation of volition for glory. And likewise, as if in the second instant of nature, when he wills grace for Peter, still there is no positive act of the divine will about Judas, but only a negative one. In the third instant, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition or worthy of perdition (and this either because of original sin or actual sin), then he wills Judas in a like way to be a son of perdition; and here is the first positive act – uniform indeed – about Peter and Judas, but from this act is this true ‘Judas will be finally a sinner’, with the negations in place, namely that he does not will to give him grace or glory. In the fourth instant, then, Judas is offered as finally a sinner to the divine will, and then he wills justly to punish and reprobate Judas.<sup>58</sup>

46. Nor is it a wonder that there is not posited a like process for predestination and reprobation, because all goods are attributed to God principally, but evils to us; and thus, that God ‘predestines without reason’ agrees with his goodness, but that ‘he wills to damn’ does not seem it can be immediately attributed to him with respect to the object as known in its pure natural state, but only in respect of the object as known in final mortal sin.

47. This response can be confirmed by a likeness: let us posit two people, equally graced on their own part, one of whom I love and the other not, – and him whom I love I

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<sup>58</sup> Translator: This explanation is no doubt compatible with orthodoxy, but it seems wholly unconvincing that God should make creatures whose perfect end is glory and yet not choose to give them the grace to reach it (this criticism would apply to Aquinas’ position too, of course, but not perhaps to Henry’s, as Scotus reports it, nn.26-35). Better, then, perhaps to focus on the fact of free choice (also necessary for glory) and say that while God chooses to give grace to everyone yet some, like Peter, do not resist the gift while others, like Judas as it seems, do. The gift is free and precedes all merit; the resistance comes, not from God, but from the creature (though from the creature using freely the natural powers God gave the creature to use freely). And if it be said that grace is irresistible, or that God also gives the grace not to resist grace, the answer will be that free choice is precisely free and so can resist any grace, including the grace not to resist grace. If it be said, further, that then God is passive with respect to who resists or does not resist grace, let it be conceded. But the passivity is not with respect to the possibility (God knows all possibilities by his eternal essence); it is only with respect to this possibility being actual in creatures and that one not. But the relation of God’s knowledge to creatures is real on the part of creatures and not on the part of God, and so no change is undergone by God because of anything that happens in creatures. Thus there is no real passivity on God’s part either. This proposal is made in light of Scotus’ n.52 below, and of course lies under correction.

pre-ordain to some good through which he can please me, but him whom I do not love I do not pre-ordain to such good. If so it was that in my power it were to permit them to be able to offend, I could will to permit both to offend – and from the fact I do not will to lead that one to that by which he could please me, I would fore-know his perpetual offense (and thus that I can justly punish him), and I would fore-know the remitting of the other's offense, or the committing of it, to what I will.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A, and *Rep. IA d.41 nn.69-73*] From these follow four corollaries:

The first, that the number of the elect is complete before anyone is reprobated, because in the first instant is someone pre-destined, another fore-known.

The second is that the predestined, insofar as they are predestined, are objects of the first divine act after their purely natural being; in the second instant [God] foresees their final justice, namely damnation or impenitence (which is perseverance in sin). From this it follows that no blessed can, or is it necessary that he do, rejoice over the damnation of someone, that he himself is elect in his place, because the blessed had been predestined before the others had been reprobated – and thus that good would never have belonged to the damned, even if they had stood.

A third follows, that no one is predestined because of the fall of another, nor anyone saved by happenstance; nor that Christ would by occasion of sin have been incarnate and thus supreme in merit and reward, because this would have been if never had anyone sinned.

Again, a fourth follows, that they alone who are to be saved would have been saved if Adam had not sinned, because they were all predestined, or foreseen and guilty of sin, before Adam had sinned.<sup>59</sup>

48. But still against this [n.47] there is an instance:

Because God does not with certitude foresee that Judas is bad according to this way [n.47] – for permission alone for some act and certitude about the permission do not make certitude about this act, because it is necessary to have some effective cause; therefore from this alone that God fore-knows he wills to permit Judas to sin, it is not certain that Judas will sin; or let us speak of a good and bad angel (who were not in original sin): from this alone – I say – it does not seem that he would know that Lucifer sins, and from this (as it seems) Lucifer is not offered to him as sinner.

49. In addition, what is this 'to will to permit Lucifer to sin'? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to sin, then it seems he wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin but with respect to the act of permission, then it will be a reflex act, – and then it will be necessary to ask of the permission what act it is; if a positive act of the will, then it still seems that God would have a positive act with respect to the sin that he permits.

50. The first of these [n.48] is solved by this, that God fore-knows that he will co-operate with Lucifer for the substance of the act that will be a sin (and he fore-knows this, because he wills to co-operate with it if it is a sin of commission), or he fore-knows that he will not co-operate for some act if he does not will it (and this if the first act is a sin of omission); and by knowing that he will co-operate for such substance of act (not with due circumstances), or will not co-operate with him for a negative act (and consequently which he would omit), he knows that he will sin, so that he knows 'he will sin' not only because he knows he will permit this but because he knows that he will co-operate with

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<sup>59</sup> Translator: On this see the comment in the previous footnote, fn.58.

him for the substance of the non-circumstanced act and consequently he would commit it – or that he will not co-operate with him for a negative act, and consequently he would omit it.

51. The second argument [n.49] raises a difficulty touching on the divine will, – about which not now but elsewhere [d.47 nn.8-9].

#### F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions

52. About all these opinions [nn.5-6, 12-20, 26-35, 40-43]: because the Apostle, when disputing about this matter in *Romans* 11.33-34, seems as it were to leave the whole thing inscrutable ('O depth', he says, 'of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God,' and 'who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?'), therefore lest by investigating of the depth – according to the opinion of the Master<sup>60</sup> – there be a going into the depth, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided however that the divine liberty (without any injustice) be saved, and other things that must be saved about God as freely choosing; and he who has hold on any opinion, let him respond to the things that have been touched on against it.

#### II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the first principal argument [n.1] I reply: supreme goodness can stand with liberal communication, although it not be equal for everyone. For someone 'supremely good' can with liberality freely communicate himself, and so as to show that he is not liberal necessarily but 'freely communicative' liberal, he can for any two persons – apprehended as equal – will 'to communicate a good non-equally'; nor in this is any injustice done (as the third opinion says [n.20]), because nothing is owed.

54. To the second [n.2]: when two things are equally will-able for some end, and on their own part they have the idea for which they are to be willed by some will, a will pre-accepting one of them before the other for that end sins by acceptance of persons; such is every created will, because with respect to that the lovable good is the reason for rightly loving. Not so the uncreated will with respect to any good other than its essence: for no other good is, because it is good, for that reason loved by that will, but conversely; and therefore it cannot accept persons, because there is not in them the goodness that is the reason for loving.

55. To the first for the opposite [not in fact to nn.3-4 here, but to *Rep* IA d.41 nn.7, 81]. He who wants to hold another way [sc. other than Scotus', nn.40-42] can say as the fourth way says [nn.25, 35] that the Apostle in this passage [*Romans* 11.33] is rebuking the presumptuous inquiring into things they have no capacity for, – but not because of want of rendering a reason, at any rate in general, although in particular it not be known what evil God foresees in this person because of which he reprobate him; and in these special sins foreseen is 'the depth of riches' and are 'the judgments past finding out'. – With which seems to agree the word 'of judgment', because judgment is about a particular doable: for usually we do not say of practical principles – or about established laws –, that they are 'judgments', but of some particular act is judgment made according

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<sup>60</sup> Lombard, *Sent.* I d.41 ch.2 n.377: "Wishing to dispute about God's depth, they have been overthrown into the depth."

to practical principles or established laws; and therefore notwithstanding that there is a practical principle, established by the divine will, that ‘everyone foreseen to be finally evil will be damned’, however about assuming particulars under it (‘this person is foreseen in this way finally evil, that one in that’, and as it were for this reason the former is reprobate for this evil and the latter for that), these judgments are inscrutable: for man does not know, nor can know, into what sin God wills to permit this person to fall, with respect to which there is a non-volition for conferring grace, so that thus he be offered as finally a sinner in that sin and thus, because of that foreseen sin, be reprobated. But about the good it can be posited that there is no reason, as was said in the fifth opinion [nn.40-41].

56. And if against this you argue that at any rate about the good the judgments of God will not be inscrutable (for it is easy to say about them that ‘because he wills, therefore he saves’), – it can be said that about them, insofar as he predestines, there is no judgment, neither of the thing done in existence nor as it were in divine foreknowledge; for judgment is of something done or foreseen. But about the evil, although there not be judgment of the fact (because they have not sinned), yet condemnation can be said to be a judgment about them in God’s foreknowledge (where they are called ‘evil’), and then the inscrutability of judgments can be referred to the evil on whose part some reason is posited, although the reasons on the part of diverse [persons] – because of which as if on their part the judgments are passed – are inscrutable, and thereby are the judgments inscrutable.

57. To the other [nn.6, 43]: Augustine makes for the fifth opinion [n.43], because he proves that, on the part of the predestined, there is no reason.

## Forty Second Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent*

1. About the forty second distinction I ask whether it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent.

That yes:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.4: “For everything we hold by faith [sc. there are probable, even necessary arguments].”

2. Further, it is proved by reason that God is of infinite power (as is proved in *Physics* 8.10.266a10-24 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-13); but infinite power is known to be omnipotence; therefore etc.

3. Proof of the minor, because it is known that any other power greater than infinite power cannot be thought of without contradiction; but a greater power than any power that is not omnipotence can be thought of without contradiction (proof: without contradiction can omnipotence be thought of under the idea of omnipotence; but it is thought greater than any other that would not be omnipotence).

4. If you say that it cannot naturally be proved that omnipotence is thinkable without contradiction – on the contrary: that there is omnipotence among beings is true, therefore any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical; every



sophistical reason can be solved by the intellect by pure natural powers; therefore such an intellect can through purely natural powers know that nothing impossible follows from omnipotence, and knows that that is possible on which nothing impossible follows; therefore it knows that the omnipotence of God is possible.

5. But from this can a reason per se be made, because if it can naturally be proved that omnipotence is possible (because it is not impossible [n.4]), then it can naturally be proved that it is necessary, because it cannot be unless it could be necessary; and what can be necessary, is necessary; therefore etc.

6. On the contrary:

No philosophers using natural reason, however perfectly even they were considering God under the idea of efficient cause, has conceded that he is omnipotent according to the understanding of Catholics [nn.9-13].

7. It is also confirmed, because there is an article of faith, in the *Apostles' Creed*: "I believe in God, the Father almighty etc."

### I. To the Question

8. Here it could be replied by distinguishing that an agent can be in one way called 'omnipotent' that has power for everything possible, mediately or immediately, – and in this way the active power of the first efficient [cause] is omnipotence, insofar as it extends itself to every effect in idea of proximate or remote cause; and thus, since it can be naturally concluded that something is a first efficient [cause] (as was shown above in *Ord.I d.2* [nn.43-59]), it can be naturally concluded that it is omnipotent, in this way of speaking.

9. In another way 'omnipotent' is taken properly theologically, insofar as he is called omnipotent who has power for every effect and anything whatever possible (that is, for anything whatever that is not per se necessary nor includes a contradiction) as immediately – I say – as without all co-operation of any other agent cause; and in this way it seems that omnipotence is believed of the first efficient cause and not demonstrated, because although the first efficient cause have in itself an effective power more eminent than the power of any other effective cause whatever, have also in itself eminently the effective power of any other cause whatever (as was deduced in *Ord.I d.2* [nn.117-120] and by this was proved that it has infinite power), and this be as it were the ultimate to be known about God that natural reason can attain, yet from this it does not seem that omnipotence is proved according to the second understanding [sc. here in n.9], because although it be true, yet it is not manifest by natural reason that what has a more eminent causality in itself – and also the causality of a second cause more eminently than that cause have with respect to its own effect – would have power immediately for the immediate effect of a second cause: for the order of inferior and superior causes does not yield this, because even if the sun had in itself a more eminent causality than an ox (or another animal), yet it would not be conceded that the sun can immediately generate an ox as it can mediately generate through an ox-cause.

10. And this would philosophers most of all posit, for they did not posit a second cause – necessarily concurrent – because of some perfection needing to be added to the effect, but on account of some imperfection needing to be added; but further, the causality of the first cause is immediately perfect, and so they posited it not able

immediately to be cause of any imperfect effect. And therefore it would be necessary for some other agent cause to concur (a more imperfect one), so that the first would not produce according to the utmost of its power but would, along with that second agent cause, produce a diminished and imperfect effect – that is, it would not produce as perfect an effect by means of an imperfect second cause as it would if it immediately produced.

11. In addition, the philosophers were not able by natural reason to conclude that God is able to cause contingently, how much more not immediately able either for any effect at all or for anything at all that he can produce by means of other second causes?

12. Further, if they had as it were for principle ‘from nothing does nothing come to be’ (at any rate in these generable and corruptible things), it does not seem that God is so omnipotent that he can totally produce any effect without any other jointly causing cause.

13. Besides, if the philosophers posited that God was necessarily agent (as many of them seem to have thought and posited), if along with this they posited that he was omnipotent according to this second understanding [n.9], they would have to deny all causality of any other second cause (which is especially unacceptable for them): for a cause ‘necessarily causing’, in whatever instant it is compared to the effect, necessarily in the same instant ‘necessarily causes and acts’; therefore since the superior cause would be compared first to the effect before an inferior cause, and then for you [sc. he who holds omnipotence can be proved by natural reason] it is necessarily omnipotent, therefore in that instant it produces the whole effect; therefore in the second instant, in which the second cause is compared to the same effect, nothing is understood then as needing to be, – and so a second agent or a second cause can cause nothing

14. And from this is apparent that this proposition ‘whatever the first efficient cause can cause with a second cause, it can cause per se immediately’ is not known from the terms, nor by natural reason, but is only believed; because if omnipotence itself – on which [the proposition] depends – were known by natural reason, it would be easy to prove to the philosophers many truths and propositions which they deny, and it would be easy to prove to them at least the possibility of many things which we believe that they deny.

15. Omnipotence however, taken in this way [sc. the second way, n.9], although it were not sufficiently demonstrated, can however be probably proved as true and necessary – and more probably than certain other believed things, because it is not unacceptable for certain ‘believed things’ to be more evident than others.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

16. To the authority of Richard [n.1] I say that although there be necessary reasons for proving omnipotence and any other things believed, they are not however evidently necessary and true: just as the reason that proves the Trinity, because of the double production inwardly in divine reality [d.2 nn.300-303, 353-358, 370]) – because although it [the proof] be from things necessary, yet the premises are not necessarily evident, because they are not known from terms known to us; nor from what is immediately known to us is it possible to infer this, as was said in *Ord.I* d.2 nn.26-29.

17. To the second [n.2] I say that the infinite power of God, although it can be proved of God by natural reason, yet not omnipotence according as it is properly taken.

18. And when you say that ‘no power can be thought greater than infinite power’ [n.3], it is true intensively; but it does not seem a contradiction that thus may a greater power be thought, one extending itself to more things extensively, be thought. Or it might be said that although it not be a contradiction that an omnipotence is thought which – as such – in some way exceeds an infinite power ‘not understood as omnipotent’, nevertheless it is not naturally known that a power so understood is omnipotent.

19. And when it says [n.3] that it is known that omnipotence properly taken can be thought without contradiction, this is denied.

20. And when it is proved ‘because every reason, proving that the impossible follows from it, is sophistical’ [n.3], – to this it is said that it is sophistical; however it cannot be solved by natural reason, because insofar as it is sophistical it fails in matter and having a false premise; and it cannot be solved unless by removal of that premise, which however cannot be known needs to be taken away by natural reason, just as it cannot be known to be true by natural reason.

21. But against these I argue as follows:

That [proposition] which appears true, and does not appear from natural reason it should be removed, either appears to be true from the terms as immediate, or appears to be proved from immediate terms. If in the first way, then our intellect cannot be certain, as to immediate propositions, which is true and which not; for they appear true to it as immediate propositions which however are simply false, and so there will not be any propositions as certain ‘as doors in a house’ (against the Philosopher and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5, Averroes ad loc.), about which it is not possible to err. If in the second way it appears to be true (that is, concluded from immediate terms), then I argue about that sophistical syllogism as about this one, – either it fails in matter or in form: if in matter then it can be solved, because a false premise, ‘failing in matter’, can be removed; if in form, still it can be solved by the art of logic. And if it be said that it fails in form and yet cannot be solved by natural reason, – this seems absurd, because as the intellect ‘enclosed in its natural powers’ hands on the whole art about apparent syllogism, unformed and defective, thus could it [the argument] be solved by the art for dissolving every such syllogism, by applying such art to such paralogism.

22. Therefore I say differently [n.4] that although any paralogism, apparently making deduction to something impossible from a premise signifying that God is omnipotent, could be solved by the intellect and natural reason (whether the failure be in matter or in form), and the intellect can know that any such paralogism ‘separately made’ is soluble, yet it does not follow that it know this one is not impossible; for the opposite stands, namely that it may doubt this to be an opposite first [sc. ‘immediate’] from the repugnance of the terms (from which however could not follow anything more manifestly impossible), or that it doubt whether from this could be inferred something impossible other than whatever has been inferred, and that that argument ‘inferring the impossible’ is insoluble, although that not be so of some things that have been done of which it knows the ‘necessary to solve’.

23. Or generally it could be replied to the argument [n.4] (which can be done generally for anything believed), that it is necessary for anything possible and believable.

## Forty Third Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of God or of the Makeable Thing*

1. About the forty third distinction – where the Master rejects the opinions of others – I ask whether the first reason for the impossibility of a thing to be made is on the part of God or of the makeable thing.

That on the part of God, proof:

The Master argues, in the following distinction ch.1 [*Sent.* I d.43 ch.1 nn.390-398], that the universe could have been made better: ‘because if not, this would either be because of this, that no good would be lacking to it, and then it would be God’, ‘or because something would be lacking to it, but it would not be capable of receiving it’, and then he argues that ‘it would be better done if were given to it a capacity by God for it’. So I argue in the matter at hand: if something be un-makeable, then if capacity were given it by God, it could be made; in that way then can it not be made because capacity is not given it; therefore this impossibility seems first to be on the part of God not being able to give it the capacity.

2. On the contrary:

Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.2: ‘Because God gave perseverance to the good angel, therefore did the good angel have it – and not because God did not give it to the bad angel did he therefore not have it, but because the bad did not accept it’, because he was not capable of it [n.19].

### I. To the Question

#### A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

3. Here it [n.1] is asserted by Henry *Quodlibet* VI q.3 – of the manifestly opposite, seek *Quodlibet* VIII q.3.

4. Against this second opinion [n.2], whether it be asserted by retracting the first opinion [n.1] of this article or be asserted as retracted by the first, – it would not be necessary to argue against him save from his own words, which manifestly imply opposites.

5. However, I specifically argue against him thus: nothing is simply impossible save because ‘to be’ is simply repugnant to it; but what ‘to be’ is repugnant to, to that it is repugnant of itself first and not because of some affirmative or negative respect of it to something else first. For any repugnance is of extremes from their formal and per se essential idea, circumscribing any other respect of either extreme – positive or negative – to anything else, just as white and black are contraries per se and from their formal ideas and have a formal repugnance, circumscribing *per impossibile* every respect to anything else. That therefore is simply impossible to which to be is per se repugnant, and which is of itself first such that being is repugnant to it, – and not because of any respect to God, affirmative or negative; indeed, being would be repugnant to it if *per impossibile* God did

not exist. Therefore it seems the first opinion is more probable than the second [sc. that the first reason is on the part of the thing and not of God, nn.1-2].

6. But against the first opinion I argue first as follows:

The active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not formally the intellect but as it were presupposes the action of the intellect, whether that omnipotence be the will or another executive power; but a stone is able to be of itself formally; therefore also by reducing it as it were to the first extrinsic principle, the divine intellect will be that from which is the first idea of possibility in a stone. Not therefore is the active power by which God is said to be omnipotent the first idea of possibility in a stone.

7. Proof of the assumption: the possible, according as it is the term or object of omnipotence, is that to which being is not repugnant and that cannot of itself be necessarily; a stone, produced in intelligible being by the divine intellect, has these of itself formally and from the intellect as from first-principle; therefore it is of itself formally possible and quasi-from first-principle through the divine intellect.

8. Badly then does the first opinion [n.3] seem to posit that ‘omnipotence in God is the power which is the active power, from which there first is possibility in a creature’, and this if we speak of the active power by which God is called omnipotent and with respect to which the [possibility] is called passive power in a creature.

9. The reason is confirmed [n.6]: the active power ‘which is omnipotence’ does not give to anything any being save by producing it, because it is a power productive of a thing externally; but before any production of a thing externally, the thing has possible being, because – as was proved in *Ord. I d.36 nn.26-29, 36* – for a thing to be produced in intelligible being is not for a thing to be produced in being simply, and if it were, it would not be by the power by which God is called omnipotent; not then by the power ‘that is omnipotence’ is a thing, other than God, first possible.

10. Again, in precise causes if affirmation is cause of affirmation, also is negation cause of negation (according to what the Philosopher says *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78b20-21), just as if having lungs is cause of breathing, also is not having lungs cause of not breathing; therefore if the active power, which is omnipotence in God, were the precise cause of possibility in a creature, negation of active power in God would be cause of the negation of ‘possible to be’ in a creature, which he himself [Henry] denies (and well to this extent [sc. as concerns impossibility on the part of the makeable thing], because the impossibility in a creature is because of the formal repugnance of its parts [nn.5, 15-17]).

11. Further, this respect which follows active power in the fourth instant, is either real or not. If real, and outwardly, this was rejected in *Ord. I d.30 nn.49-51*. If of reason, then in the third instant the possibility has its term at God under an absolute idea – which I do not infer as in itself unacceptable, but as needing to be conceded by many (if it be granted), and at any rate not to be held as unacceptable by those who hold the opinion of that doctor [Henry], from whom it follows on it [=that opinion].

12. Likewise, for the same reason, I infer from this position another conclusion, namely that there is not any respect on the part of the cause before on the part of the caused: rather, from the cause under idea of an absolute is the caused under an absolute idea, and afterwards – third – a respect follows in the caused, and fourth in the cause to the caused. This order then of absolutes and relatives, which he concedes, must never or nowhere be held unacceptable to those who hold it.

13. A third I likewise infer, that omnipotence as it is a divine attribute and states a perfection simply, does not state any respect to the creature (which he himself proves in the first opinion, *Quodlibet* VI q.3), because no perfection divine and simply depends on the creature (and this Anselm proves in *Monologion* ch.15). Since that ‘relation to the creature’ does not state a perfection simply even in God, because God would not be such if the creature were not (and he is a thing perfect with all perfection simply, both himself and of his nature, and not from any respect to the creature), this inference then [beginning of n.13]– which I think to be true (as also the other two [nn.11-12]) – should not be spat out by any holding his [Henry’s] statements.

#### B. Scotus’ own Opinion

14. I speak differently from the first opinion (as to what the two arguments prove [nn.6, 9]), because although the power of God to himself – that is any absolute perfection by which God is formally powerful – is in God in the first instant of nature, just as also any perfection simply (as to be a power of heating follows on heat, which however is an absolute form), yet through the power ‘under the idea by which it is omnipotence’ it does not have an object that is first possible but through the divine intellect producing it first in intelligible being, and the intellect is not formally the active power by which God is called omnipotent [n.6]; and then the thing produced in such being by the divine intellect in the first moment of nature – namely intelligible being – has itself to be possible in the second instant of nature, because formally is to be not repugnant to it, and by itself formally is repugnant to it to have being necessary from itself (on which two points stands the whole idea of omnipotence, corresponding to the ideas of active power). There is not then possibility in the object in any way before there is omnipotence in God, taking omnipotence for an absolute perfection in God, just as neither is the creature prior to anything absolute in God. If however a thing be understood to be possible before God produce by his omnipotence, it thus is true, but in that possibility it is not simply prior but is produced by the divine intellect.

15. Now as to impossibility, I say that that cannot be first on the part of God but on the part of the thing (as the first opinion says), and this for the reason made against the second opinion, because the thing is impossible on account of its repugnance for coming to be.

16. Which I understand thus: ‘impossible simply’ includes impossibles that are of their formal ideas impossible, and by that are they principiatively impossible by which principiatively they have their formal ideas. So there is there this process, that just as God by his intellect produces a possible in possible being, so he produces two entities formally (each in possible being), and these ‘produced’ things are of themselves formally impossible, so that they cannot be together one thing nor some third thing from them; but this impossibility that they have, they have formally from themselves, and principiatively from him – in some way – who produced them. And on this impossibility of theirs follows the impossibility of the whole construct that includes them, and from this impossibility of the construct in itself and from the impossibility of its parts is the impossibility of it with respect to any agent at all; and from this has to be completed the whole process of the impossibility of the thing, as if the ultimate degree of impossibility or impossibility be the negation of respect to

any agent whatever. Nor must there be any negative respect on the part of God, nor on the part of any other thing at all (nor is there any, perhaps, in the nature of the thing), although the intellect can compare God – or another agent – to it under a negation of respect.

17. So therefore is the first impossibility formally on the part of the impossible and principiatively in God; and if it be principiatively reduced to anything, yet it is not reduced to a negation of possibility in God: rather it is reduced principiatively to the divine intellect, principiating it in that being in which the parts are formally repugnant, because of which formal repugnance the whole from those parts is simply impossible.

18. And from this it appears that the imagination of those is false who look for the impossibility of some things as if in some one thing, as if some one thing – whether an intelligible or any kind of being – is of itself formally impossible, just as God is of himself formally necessary to be. For nothing is such first in non-entity, nor even is the divine intellect the idea of the opposite possibility of the entity that is opposite to such non-entity; nor even is the divine intellect the precise idea of the opposite possibility about nothing, because then would the argument hold ‘about precise causes in affirmation and negation’ [n.10]. But everything ‘simply nothing’ includes in itself the ideas of many things, such that it is not first nothing from its own idea, but from the ideas of the things that it is understood to include, on account of the formal repugnance of those several included things; and this idea of repugnance comes from the formal ideas of them, which repugnance they have first through the divine intellect.

## II. To the Principal Argument

19. To the first argument [n.1]: the Master’s reason holds, supposing that the universe would be capable of greater perfection, because then, if that capacity were given to it, it would be made better than it is made to be without that capacity, although<sup>61</sup> it were capable of many other things; absolutely however the Master’s reason does not hold when this is denied, namely that it was able to be made better, – just as neither does it follow that fire ‘remaining as fire’ could be made better if it were made capable of intellect or will, which cannot be capable of them. I say then to the form of the argument that God cannot give to nothing a capacity of passive making; but this is not the prime reason, but because such a thing cannot have such a capacity – and this reason is reduced to the formal repugnance of parts, and further to the divine intellect.

## Forty Fourth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God can Make Things other than it has been Ordained by Him for them to be Made*

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<sup>61</sup> The Latin text has ‘ut si’, which would mean ‘as if...’ or ‘so that if...’, and is hard to construe. Changing the ‘ut si’ to ‘etsi’ or ‘although/even if’ produces a more readily intelligible sense. Hence that emendation is adopted here.

1. About the forty fourth distinction – where the Master treats of ‘whether God could have made things better than he did’ – I ask this question: whether God can make things otherwise than has by him been ordained that they are made.

And it seems not:

Because then he could make things in disordered way. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent.

2. On the contrary:

Things being made otherwise than they have been made does not include a contradiction; nor is it<sup>62</sup> necessary; therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In every agent by intellect and will able to act conformably to right law and yet to act not necessarily conformably to right law, it is [possible] to distinguish ordained power from absolute power; and the reason for this is because [the agent] is able to act in conformity with that right law and in that case according to ordained power (for it is ordained insofar as it is the principle for carrying out things in conformity with right law), and able to act aside from that law or against it, and in this is power absolute, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in every agent freely – who can act according to the dictate of right law and aside from that law or against it – it is [possible] distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that someone can do this *de facto*, that is of his absolute power – or *de iure*, that is of ordained power according to rights.

4. But when that right law – according to which must orderly action be – is not in the power of the agent, then his absolute power cannot exceed his ordained power about any objects, unless he act about them in disordered way; for it is necessary that the law stands – comparing it to such agent – and yet that an action ‘not conformed to that right law’ is not right nor ordered, because such an agent is held to act according to the law which he is under. Hence all who are under the divine law, if they do not act according to it, act in disordered way.<sup>5</sup> But when in the power of the agent is the law and the rightness of law, so that it is not right save because it is established, then an agent acting of his own freedom can otherwise ordain than that right law dictate; and yet along with this he can act in ordered way, because he can establish another right law according to which he may act in ordered way. Nor does then his absolute power simply exceed ordained power, because it would be ordained according to another law, just as [it was] according to the prior one; yet it exceeds ordained power precisely according to the prior law, against which or aside from which it works. This could be exemplified of prince and subjects, and of positive law.

6. Applying this to the matter at hand, then, I say that some general laws, giving right dictates, have been pre-fixed by the divine will and not indeed by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will, as was said in *Ord.I* d.38 nn.5-6, 9-10;<sup>a</sup> but when the intellect offers some such law to the divine will, namely that ‘everyone who is to be

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<sup>62</sup> The Vatican editors think that ‘universe’ should be supplied in place of ‘it’.



glorified must first be endowed with grace’, if it please his will – which is free – it is right, and so it is of other laws.

a. [*Interpolation*]: because there is not found in those laws a necessity from the terms (as that every sinner will be damned), but only from the acceptance of the divine will, which operates according to the sort of laws it has established; or it suffices for the matter at hand to say that they are established by divine wisdom [*Rep. IA d.44 n.9*]

7. God then, able to act according to the right laws as they are pre-fixed by him, is said to act according to ordained power; but as he can do many things that are not according to the laws already pre-fixed but aside from them, it is called his absolute power: for because God can do anything he likes that does not include a contradiction, and can act in every way that does not include a contradiction (and many other ways are such), therefore is he then said to act according to ordained power.

8. Hence I say that he can do many other things in ordered way; and that many things can be done in ordered way, other than those which are made in conformity with the laws, does not include a contradiction when the rectitude of this sort of law – according to which someone is said to act rightly and in ordered way – is in the power of the agent. Therefore just as he can act otherwise, so he can establish another right law, – which, if it were established by God, would be right, because no law is right save to the extent it is established by the divine will accepting it; and then his absolute power for something does not extend itself to other than to that which would in ordered fashion be done, if it were done: not indeed would it in ordered fashion be done according to this order, but it would in ordered fashion be done according to another order, which order could the divine will so establish as it has the power to do.

9. It must be noted too that the fact something is ordained and done in ordered fashion, this happens in two ways:

In one way by a universal order – which pertains to common law, just as is ordained according to common law that ‘everyone finally a sinner is to be damned’ (as if a king establish that every murderer die). In a second way by particular order – according to this judgment to which law in general does not pertain, because law is about universal cases; but about a particular case there is not a law, but a judgment according to law, of that which is against the law (as that this murderer is to die).

10. I say then that God not only can act otherwise than has been ordained by particular order, but he can act in ordered way otherwise than has been ordained by universal order – or according to laws of justice, – because both the things that are aside from that order as those that are contrary to that order, could be done by God in ordered fashion by absolute power.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*, Appendix A. From *Rep. IC d.44 q.1 in corp.*, and *Rep. IA d.44 n.11*] Again, it needs to be known that here must these be distinguished, ‘God can otherwise produce things than he has disposed’. In the sense of composition it is false: for it is signified that this is possible, ‘God produces otherwise than according to his disposition’; in the sense of division it is true, and there are two categorical propositions, and the sense is: ‘God can make in this way’, ‘he has not disposed to make in this way’. Nor yet does it follow that he acts in disordered way, as is plain from the aforesaid.

11. However it is not called ordered power save according to the order of universal law, and not according to the order of right law about some particular. Which is plain from this, that it is possible for God to save whom he does not save, who however will die in sin finally and be damned – but it is not conceded that he can save Judas already damned (and yet this is not impossible by God’s absolute power, because it does not include a contradiction); therefore this, namely ‘to save Judas’, is impossible in the way in which it is possible to save this one [sc. the one mentioned just before Judas]; therefore this one he can save by his ordained power (which is true) and that one not [sc. Judas]. Not indeed by particular order (which is as it were about this particular doable and operable only), but by universal order, because if he were to save, it would now stand<sup>63</sup> with right laws – which he truly pre-fixed – about the salvation and damnation of singulars. For it would stand with the proposition ‘that the finally evil will be damned’ (which is the pre-fixed law about those to be damned), because this one is still not finally a sinner but can be not a sinner (especially while a wayfarer), because God can prevent him by his grace; just as, if a king were to prevent someone from committing murder, he does not, if he does not damn him, act against his universal law about a homicide. But with that particular law would not stand that he [God] saved Judas; for he can fore-know that Judas is to be saved by ordained power, but not ordained in this way but absolved/absolute<sup>64</sup> by this way, and in another way ordained according to some other order, because according to another order then able to be instituted.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] Absolute power then can save Judas, – but ordained power can save this sinner, although he will not be saved; but a stone can be beatified neither by absolute nor by ordained power. And according to this, it is plain with respect to what is absolute power spoken of in God, that it is insofar as he has power against universal law and not particular.

12. But how the divine will has power about particulars, and about instituting right laws, by not willing the opposite of that which he now wills, was stated above in distinction 39.<sup>65</sup>

## II. To the Principal Arguments of Each Part

13. To the argument [n.1] it is plain that the consequence is not valid, because if he [God] were to make things in a way other than he has ordained them to be made, not for this reason would they be made in disordered way, because if he were to establish other laws according to which they would be made, by that very fact would they be made in ordered way.

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.2] I concede what it proves about absolute power – which, however, if it were the principle of anything, would by that very fact be ordered, but not according to the order pre-fixed by him, the same which it had before.

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<sup>63</sup> Following the emendation by the Vatican editors of ‘staret’ (taken from the appearance of that word in succeeding lines) for the ‘statutum’ or ‘established’ of most mss. If ‘statutum’ is retained the sense would be something like “...if he were to save, [it is] established now with...”

<sup>64</sup> The Latin word can be taken in either way in English.

<sup>65</sup> In the interpolation for that question translated earlier, and cf. *Lectura* I d.39 nn.53-54.

## Forty Fifth Distinction Single Question

*Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself*

1. About the forty fifth distinction I ask whether God from eternity willed things other than himself

That he did not:

Because then in the divine will there would have been a real relation to creatures. The consequent is false (as is plain in distinction 30 [*Ord.I* d.30 nn.49-51]), therefore also the antecedent.

2. Proof of the consequence: God first wills something before he understands that he wills it (let that be *a*), because – as was said in distinction 39<sup>66</sup> – the certitude of the divine intellect about future contingents is not without the certitude or rectitude of the will; therefore that relation, which is in the divine will first to *a*, itself precedes all consideration of the intellect about that volition; therefore it is not in the will or in volition as it is known but as it is in itself, – and consequently it is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the known as it is known.

3. On the contrary:

If he did not will from eternity, then neither does he now will *de novo*, because then he would be mutable; therefore he wills nothing [sc. if he did not will from eternity].

### I. To the Question

4. I reply:

Every perfect operative power can be the principle of operating about any object at all that is of a nature to have a respect from such power, – just as a perfect intellect can be the principle of understanding anything intelligible at all and perfect sight of seeing anything visible at all; therefore since in God there is will formally from distinction 2 [*Ord.I* d.2 nn.75-88]), and also will supremely perfect ‘because infinite’ (from the same distinction [nn.94, 101, 117-118, 234-235, 300-303]), it follows that it can be the principle of willing anything at all will-able.

5. Now it cannot be a principle of willing anything from time, because this could not be without change of something: and not of the willed object, because the willed object only has being because willed and because it is in the divine will itself; therefore this change would be of the will itself, as was deduced in distinction 30 [*Ord.I* d.30 n.41] about the idea of the will itself. Therefore the divine will can in its eternity be the principle of willing anything at all will-able.

6. But it is not the idea of willing both opposites at the same time, because those can be together with respect to nothing;<sup>67</sup> nor is it the idea of willing neither of them, because then nothing in creatures would be willed by God, – and consequently he would cause nothing in creatures, because contingency cannot be in God save on the part of the

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<sup>66</sup> In the interpolation for that question translated earlier, and cf. *Lectura* I d.39 nn.43-44, 62-66.

<sup>67</sup> The reading of the Vatican editors, who report that most mss. read “because they can be respects together of nothing.”

will, as was deduced in distinction 39.<sup>68</sup> Therefore in eternity there is the idea of willing some other object in anything whatever other than himself.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the arguments [nn.1-2] I reply that as was said before in distinction 30 [*Ord.I* d.30 n.31] about relations from time, that they terminate at God under a reason purely absolute, and in like manner about the ideas in distinction 35 [*Ord.I* d.35 n.27], and in like manner about omnipotence in distinction 43 [*Ord.I* d.43 nn.11, 14] (and it [omnipotence] is purely absolute according as it is a divine attribute and thus is term of the relation of a possible creature to God), – so I say here that the divine will under a purely absolute idea is the term of the respect of the will-able thing to himself, that indeed the divine will produces in willed being in eternity just as the intellect produces in known or understood being; and in like manner must it be said that this is in the will as it is in itself, as was said of known being in distinction 36 [*Ord.I* d.36 nn.26-29, 34-35].

8. But then you will argue: if the thing willed has a relation to the divine will, – either then a real relation or according to reason only. If real then its foundation is real; therefore the thing has real being from eternity. If a relation of reason only, – on the contrary: it is not by act of the divine intellect comparing the object to his intellect, – therefore it is not a relation of reason in it; for although the divine intellect first compare the object as known to his intellect before it be willed by him, and although in that prior stage he cause a relation of reason of the object as known to his intellect, yet he does not seem to cause any relation of it to the will.

9. Although it could here [n.8] be responded that this relation of the willed thing to the will is by act of the divine intellect comparing the willed object to his will (because he first compares his will to the object before he compares it to his intellect), if it were posited that the same ‘to be’ suffices in the object of the intellect as it is an object known and of the will as it is willed, and that in no way would it be present to the will save because it will have been present to the intellect, – yet I reply otherwise that in the willed object there is another relation to the divine will than the [relation] in it [the object] which is as of the understood object to the divine intellect; and the other relation is not a real relation, – nor yet is it one of reason, speaking strictly of relation of reason, namely of the intellect.

10. Nor is this division sufficient, that every relation ‘either is real or of reason’ [n.8], taking relation of reason strictly, because every power that can have an act about an existing object not as it is existing, and can by its act compare that object to another to which such object is not compared from the nature of the thing – it can in the object, as it is object, cause a relation of reason of itself to another; which indeed is not real, because it is not from the nature of the object in itself, – nor yet is it strictly of reason, because the power comparing is not always reason only or the ratiocinative power.

11. For the will can, using some object for end, cause in the object a relation of reason to that end: and neither is it a real relation, because it is not in the object from the nature of the thing but from the comparison of the will comparing (for it can use God relative to the creature); nor is it a relation of reason, because the power ‘causing the comparison’ is not reason, – whether intellect or imagination be called such comparing

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<sup>68</sup> In the interpolation for that question translated earlier, and cf. *Lectura* I d.39 nn.43-44, 53-54, 60-61.

power, or anything else whatever: for it is certain that the will is such a comparing and collative power (and the imaginative similarly), in as well a way as the intellective power; and therefore it is certain that each of these powers [sc. intellective and volitional] can compare its own object and in its own object cause a relation: not real, because thus it would be there, in such object, from the nature of the thing without any comparison, – nor a relation of reason strictly taken for a relation caused by the intellect, although sometimes a relation of reason caused by the intellect may accompany it. But the divine will, and also every will (whatever may be so about imagination, about which not now), can compare itself to the object in willed being from eternity (and conversely), and so can it cause in the object a relation of reason to itself.

## Forty Sixth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether God's Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled*

1. About the forty sixth distinction I ask whether God's will of being well-pleased is always fulfilled.

And it seems that not:

*I Timothy 2.4*: "God wills all men to be saved;" however not all will be saved; therefore etc.

2. In addition *Matthew 23.37*, the Savior says to the children of Jerusalem: "How often have I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and ye would not;" therefore as before.

3. On the contrary:

*Romans 9.19*: "Who hath resisted his will?"

4. And *Psalms 113.11*: "All things whatever he willed he did."

### I. To the Question

5. I reply:

The will of God<sup>a</sup>, as to all things, must always be fulfilled, – because as the Almighty can do everything possible, so, when the divine will is determined for positing something in being with final determination, it will be; but to will that with will of being well-pleased is to will it with the last determination that can be posited on the part of the omnipotent will willing the effect into being; therefore, in respect of whatever effect God is thus willing, it will be.

a. [*Interpolation*] double will, will of being well-pleased and of sign; the first is double, namely antecedent and consequent. The antecedent will of being well-pleased is whereby God wills conditionally (as far as is in himself) and antecedently that all men become saved, and this is not always fulfilled;<sup>69</sup> the will of being well-pleased absolute and consequent. [See also the *Interpolation* after n.6]

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<sup>69</sup> The Vatican editors say this is against Scotus' doctrine, and they refer to *Rep.* IA d.46 nn.17-18, 12-14, and to nn.7-8 here below.

6. And the reason can be confirmed, because if a cause, with ultimate determination determinate to something, were not to posit the effect in being, this would seem only to be because of its impotence – as suppose because it were not sufficient of itself or were impeded by something else, or because of its mutability before the effect be understood to be put into being; but the omnipotent is neither impotent nor mutable; therefore etc.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolation*] But the will of sign is distinguished into five: into prohibition, into precept, into counsel, fulfillment and permission [see below d.47 n.6]. The three first are reduced to conditional will of being well-pleased, because not always is the precept or prohibition or counsel of God fulfilled; fulfillment and permission are reduced to absolute will of being well-pleased, and so nothing happens against this sign.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the first argument [n.1] I say that although the saying of the Apostle could be expounded with a distribution accommodated for all those who will be saved – yet it could much better be expounded of antecedent will, thus: ‘he wills to save all men and that all are saved’, namely as far as concerns his own part and by his antecedent will, forasmuch as he has given them natural gifts and right laws and common aids sufficient for salvation.

8. Just as of a king, establishing good laws and prefixing ministers to guard those laws, it could be said that he wills all his subjects to live peaceably and quietly, as far as in him, and yet, if he see someone being unjustly oppressed, it would not be necessary that the king at once involve himself, to make him live quietly, unless he were turned over to him by a complaint of fact (he does indeed antecedently will everyone to live peaceably and quietly, but he does not will everyone immediately so to live), – so I say in the matter at hand, that although God not have a will of being well-pleased to save this person, yet he wills for him the common aids to salvation, by which he too can live sufficiently well and be saved; on account of which it can be said that, as far as is on his part, he wills all to be saved.

9. To the second [n.2]: the Master expounds (and well, *Sent.* I d.46 ch.2 n.414), not that he willed all to fulfill the will of Christ, but that all whom he gathered he gathered by his will. See the exposition of the Master and note it.

## Forty Seventh Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether Divine Permission is some Act of the Divine Will*

1. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether divine permission is some act of the divine will.

That it is:

Because otherwise it does not seem that God knows with certitude that this man will sin (for he does not know a future contingent without determination of his own will);

but about a sinner it does not seem that he has any act save to permit him to sin (for neither does he have with respect to him to will or to will not); therefore if ‘to permit’ not be some act, God will not be certain about his future sin, because there will not be any determination of his will for knowing that future contingent with certitude.

2. On the contrary:

Permission is enumerated along with the other signs of the divine will; but precept is not any elicited act of the divine will; therefore much more strongly not permission either.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In us can be distinguished a double act of will, namely to will and to will-not, and each is a positive act; and if they be about the same object, they are contrary acts – which also are expressed by different words, which are ‘to love’ and ‘to hate’.

4. And both in us can be distinguished, so that to will is distinguished into efficacious and remiss: so that ‘efficacious willing’ is called that whereby to the will is not only the being of what is willed pleasing but, if it can at once put what is willed into being, it at once does; so too ‘efficacious willing-not’ is called that whereby not only does he who wills-not impede something but, if he can, he altogether destroys it. ‘Remiss will’ is that by which a willed thing so pleases that yet the will does not put it into being, although it can put it into being; ‘remiss willing-not’ is that whereby the thing willed-not thus displeases that it [the will] not prevent it from being, although it could.

5. In us, therefore, weak willing-not – properly speaking – seems to be the permission of something bad that I know: for I am not said to permit that about which I know nothing, or that which is so done by another that it pleases me – but that which I know is wrongly done by another but do not prevent, this I permit.

6. A sign of efficacious willing, if it be done immediately by the will, is fulfilment, if through another, it is precept; and of weak willing in us perhaps counsel is a sign, or persuasion or warning. And a sign of weak willing-not is permission or dissuasion, and a sign of efficacious willing-not is prohibition.

7. But this distinction could be posited in God, so that as one act of his is willing and willing-not (and this without contrariety or dissimilarity in the act in itself), so over certain objects of his willed would be put ‘efficacious willing’, and similarly his willing-not over certain objects willed-not ‘efficacious’, and over certain, not. And then could God’s willing-not be called weak with respect to those objects which he so wills-not that he wills-not to prohibit them; and this willing-not of God can be called his permission – and so the act in God, insofar as it passes over the object, thus disposes itself to the divine will.

8. But if this [n.7] does not please (to the extent the willing-not of anything posited in being would seem to be with some sadness and with some imperfection of the volition and will), then it can be said that permission outwardly or the sign is that an effect be, which [sign] however is against the divine precept – and this is the permission that is a sign of the divine will; but to this does not correspond anything in the divine will save the not-willing to prohibit something being done, or the not willing-not, which is a negation of a divine positive act and consequently is not a positive [act].

9. And that he is called ‘willing to allow’, this can be meant, not that he has a direct willing about what he permits, but a reflex act; for he offers to his will that this man will sin or is sinning, and first his will does not have a ‘to will’ about this man (for he cannot will him to have sin); secondly he can understand his will not to be willing this, and then he can will his will ‘not to will this’, – and so he is called willing to allow and to allow willingly, willing to permit and to permit willingly. Just as on the other side, with Judas presented to him: first God has a not willing him glory, and not first a willing-not (according to the final position in *Ord.I* d.41 n.45); and he can then secondly reflect on this negation of act and will it – and so willing (or willingly) he does not choose Judas going to sin finally and a willing-not of glory, but a non-willing of glory.

## II. To the Principal Argument

10. As to the first argument [n.1], it was said in *Ord.I* d.41 n.50 how there is not a foreseeing of God about future sin by this alone, that he knows he will permit this man to sin finally (and so finally to have to be damned), but with this is required that he know he will co-operate with him in the act of sinning, and will not co-operate in the act of which the omission is a sin of omission; concomitant however with both of these permissions is that God foresees that he does not will him to sin, – and thus is it plain how divine permission is an act of will and how not.

## Forty Eighth Distinction

### Single Question

*Whether a Created Will is Morally Good whenever it Conforms to the Uncreated Will*

1. About the forty eighth distinction I ask whether the human will – or more generally – whether a created will is morally good whenever it conforms to the uncreated will.

That yes:

The truth of the created intellect is whenever it is conformed to the uncreated intellect; therefore by similarity about the created will, that it is then good when it is conformed to the uncreated will.

2. On the contrary:

The Jews wanted Christ to suffer and die, which also Christ wanted – and yet they sinned (“Forgive them, Father,” he says, “because they know not what they do,” *Luke* 23.34); therefore etc.

### I. To the Question

3. I reply:

According to [Ps.-] Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.4 sect.30, good is from a complete cause, and according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 2.2.1104b24-28, it is necessary that all the circumstances concur in any whatever moral act for this, that it be morally



good; however the lack of one and any circumstance suffices for this, that it be morally bad.

4. A created will, therefore, conform to the divine will in the substance of the act, whether in the substance as circumstanced by any single circumstance, whether it be conform to it in all circumstances pertaining to goodness of morals (and perhaps if it were conform to it in all circumstances, namely that they will because of the same thing and in the same way, and so of all other circumstances), – still it would not be necessary for it to be good as the uncreated will is good, because the same circumstances are not suited to an act as the act is of diverse agents. For to a created will is not suited as intense a willing of some good as to the uncreated will, – and the intensity of an act in respect of an object in the created and uncreated agent is very different in them; and at any rate, whatever may be of the conformity of the created and uncreated will in all circumstances, – conformity in goodness of act and object does not suffice, because there can be deformity in other circumstances that are necessarily required for the goodness of an act of will.

## II. To the Principal Argument

5. To the argument for the opposite [n.1] I say that it is not similar because the truth of the intellect depends on the object alone, and if this object be disposed in the way it is understood, the intellect is true; but the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone, but on all the other circumstances, and chiefly on the end: because of which it must be noted that all our volition is most of all ordered to the ultimate end, who is “the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end,” – to whom “be honor and glory for ages of ages. Amen.” [*Revelation* 1.8, *Romans* 16.27].