

This translation of Book 1 Distinctions 4 to 10 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on volume four of the Vatican critical edition of the text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi. [I have decided not to translate volume three, containing distinction 3, because a translation of that volume has been completed by Professors John van den Bercken and Paul Bakker, and is apparently now under consideration at a university press.]

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
July, 2012

The translation has now been revised and reformatted, to tidy up some looseness of translation, supply some omissions, and to reduce file size.

November, 2022

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Fourth Distinction

First Part

On the Predication of Otherness in Divine Generation

Single Question: <i>Whether this proposition is true</i> <i>'God generates another God'</i>	<i>Page 6</i>	Num. 1
--	---------------	--------

Second Part

On the Predication of the Name of God in the Divine Persons

Single Question: <i>Whether this proposition is true</i> <i>'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'</i>	<i>Page 7</i>	Num. 7
I. To the Question		Num. 9
II. To the Principal Argument		Num. 14

Appendix from <i>Reportatio</i> IC d.4 q.1	<i>Page 9</i>	
--	---------------	--

Fifth Distinction

First Part

On the Generation of the Divine Essence

Single Question: <i>Whether the divine essence generates is or</i> <i>generated</i>	<i>Page 12</i>	
I. To the Question		Num. 1
A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard		Num. 8
B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim		Num. 10
C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard		Num. 12
II. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 25

Second Part

On the Generation of the Son

Single Question: <i>Whether the Son is generated from the</i> <i>substance of the Father</i>	<i>Page 22</i>	Num. 46
I. The Opinion of Others		Num. 52
II. Scotus' own Response to the Question		

A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter	Num. 93
B. The Son is truly from the Substance of the Father	Num. 98
C. How Relation and Essence can exist in the Same Person	Num. 106
III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others	Num. 142
IV. To the Arguments	Num. 150

Sixth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether God the Father generated God the Son by Will</i>	Page 40	Num. 1
I. To the Question		Num. 7
A. How the Father generates the Son willingly		Num. 8
B. How the Father does not Generate the Son by Will as by Productive Principle		Num. 16
II. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 30

Seventh Distinction

Question 1: <i>Whether the Power of Generating in the Father is something Absolute or a Property of the Father</i>	Page 46	Num. 1
I. The Opinions of Others		
A. First Opinion		Num. 9
B. Second Opinion		Num. 18
II. To the Question		
A. On the Distinction of Powers		Num. 27
B. The Father's Power of Generating is Something Absolute		Num. 35
C. To the Form of the Question		Num. 65
III. To the Arguments		
A. To the Principal Arguments		Num. 66
B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion		Num. 74
Question 2: <i>Whether there can be several Sons in Divine Reality</i>		Num. 92
I. The Opinions of Others		Num. 93
II. To the Question		Num. 101

Eighth Distinction

First Part

On the Simplicity of God

Question 1: <i>Whether God is supremely Simple</i>	Num. 1
I. To the Question	Num. 5
A. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Particular Middle Terms	Num. 6
B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms	Num. 16
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 20
Question 2: <i>Whether any Creature is Simple</i>	Num. 27
I. To the Question	
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 29
B. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 32
II. To the Arguments	Num. 35
Question 3: <i>Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus</i>	Num. 39
I. First Opinion	
A. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 44
B. Reasons against the Opinion	Num. 51
C. To the Arguments for the Opinion	Num. 80
II. Second Opinion	Num. 90
III. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 95
A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion	Num. 96
B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion	
1. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna	Num. 97
2. By what is Proper to God	Num. 100
3. Statement and Refutation of Some People's Proof	Num. 116
IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion	Num. 128
V. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 136
Question 4: <i>Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections preceding the Act of the Intellect</i>	Num. 157
I. The Opinions of Others	Num. 159
A. First Opinion	Num. 160
B. Second Opinion	Num. 174
II. To the Question	Num. 191
III. To the Principal Argument	Num. 218

Appendix

[From the *Reportatio*, IC d.8 p.1 q.3]

Question 3:	<i>Page 114</i>
Point D.	See n.104
Point E.	See n.117

Second Part

On the Immutability of God

	<i>Page 116</i>
Single Question: <i>Whether only God is Immutable</i>	Num. 223
I. God is Simply Immutable	Num. 226
II. Nothing else besides God has Immutability	Num. 230
A. Of the Intention of the Philosophers	
1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 232
2. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 250
B. Reasons for and against the True Intention of the Philosophers	
1. Reasons for this Intention	Num. 259
2. Reasons against this Intention	Num. 263
C. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 292
III. To the Principal Arguments	
A. To the Principal Argument	Num. 294
B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers	Num. 302

Ninth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Generation of the Son in Divine Reality is Eternal</i>	<i>Page 132</i>
I. Solution of the Question	Num. 1
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 6
	Num. 12

Tenth Distinction

Single Question: <i>Whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the Act and Mode of the Will</i>	<i>Page 136</i>
I. Solution of the Question	Num. 1
II. Doubts	Num. 6
A. Response of Henry to the Two first Doubts	Num. 10
B. Against the Response of Henry	Num. 13
C. Scotus' own Response	Num. 25
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 30
	Num. 59

Appendix

Extended annotation by Scotus to n.41: <i>about a doubt how the will could be a necessary principle of producing</i>	<i>Page 147</i>
Addition to n.25, from <i>Rep.IA d.10 n.9</i>	<i>Page 152</i>
Addition to n.62, from <i>Rep.IA d.10</i>	<i>Page 153</i>

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

Fourth Distinction

First Part

On the Predication of Otherness in Divine Generation

Single Question

Whether this be true 'God generates another God'

1. There is another question, about 'other' [sc. whether God generates another God, *Parisian Reportatio* IA d.4 n.1] – It is contained in the Cambridge question [*Reportatio* IC], but in this way [sc. as opposed to the way it is contained in *Reportatio* IA]: as in the case of all concrete terms, whether substantives or adjectives – wherefore they are not numbered the way something having a form is.¹ Another question, a common one, 'whether God generates God', of which the Cambridge question can be the article.

2. For the arguments 'pro' and 'con' see the *Parisian* [*Reportatio* IA d.4 nn.2-5].

3. Solution. Corresponding to any entity, as if to its 'which', is some being or someone; deity is of itself a 'this', therefore God is of himself a 'this'; therefore non-identity is in itself repugnant to him; 'other' posits of him non-identity, because it is a determinable of it [IA d.4 n.6].

4. These three things are distinct: – other than God, other by deity, other in deity: this locution 'another God' does not posit the first two but the third. [IA d.4 nn.7-10].

5. On the contrary: 'other' connotes that the extremes are the same in determinable form. – Response: they are the same in one way, other in another, in that form [IA d.4 n.10].

6. Another doubt, same God and other God: the term 'God', as it is compared to subject and determination, is understood in the same way in both cases, otherwise in one proposition the same term would be understood under opposite modes of understanding; therefore, if it has personal and not simple distinction with respect to the subject, it has the same distinction with respect to the term 'other' [IA d.4 n.13].²

¹ *Reportatio* IC d.4 p.1 q. un: "...but in a thing which is a 'this' there does not fall any otherness as such; therefore since 'another entity' or 'another deity' cannot be said there, neither can 'another God' be said there, for 'God' in the concrete mode responds adequately to deity... Hence when it is said 'Socrates is other than Plato in humanity', a distinction is imported between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of each in humanity, and it imports a distinction and enumeration of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the suppositis, therefore this proposition is false 'the Father is other than the Son in deity'."

² See appendix to this distinction, point A. The Vatican editors opine that Scotus intended the lacunas in the *Ordinatio* to be supplied from materials in the two *Reportationes*. Hence, they include the relevant sections in an appendix

Second Part
On the Predication of the Name of God in the Divine Persons
Single Question

Whether this be true 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'

7. About the second part of the fourth distinction I ask about the truth of this proposition 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'.

It seems that it is not true, because its contradictory seems to be true 'no God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', because each singular is true – because God is not Father and not Son and not Holy Spirit.

8. On the contrary:

Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God – this is true, therefore also what converts it. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity*, in many places [IX.1 n.1, VII.4 nn.8, 12, V.8 n.9].

I. To the Question

9. I reply that the proposition is true, because what the term first signifies, this it puts first in the utterance, and if the other extreme is the same as it, the affirmative proposition denoting such identity is true: but 'God' signifies the divine nature as it is naturally predicated of the supposit, and the thing signified is the same for the three persons [cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.54 q.3 ad.1]; therefore the proposition signifying this is true.³

10. But is there the same to that one and to this, 'deity is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'?

I reply. Just as predication in divine reality is distinguished into formally true and true by identity,⁴ so this one 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are God' is true formally, and this one is true by identity 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are deity', but not formally; therefore this one too 'God is Father' etc. has some truth – speaking of formal predication – which this other one 'deity is Father' etc. does not have.

11. But for what does 'God' supposit, understanding that truth ['God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'] to be quasi formal predication?

I reply. To each 'in which' there corresponds a proper 'what' or 'who', and therefore to deity as deity there responds a 'what' or a 'who'. First, 'God' is a being by deity as he is deity, and just as deity is of itself a 'this', so God – who is God by deity – is of himself a 'this' [*supra* n.3], and in this concept is not included incommunicability nor the idea of person, because deity is communicable, – and therefore God as he is God by deity does not include anything incommunicable formally. To this concept then thus understood, without the concept of persons or personal features, some real predicates can belong, namely those which do not belong to the nature as existing in idea of supposit, but to it as existing in this nature, insofar as it exists in it; in this way perhaps this is true

³ See appendix to this distinction, point B.

⁴ An interpolated text is worth noting here: "that is, that it be formal when the predicate agrees formally with the subject, – by identity when, because of divine simplicity, the predicate is the same as the subject though not formally."

‘God creates’, and the like, understanding the subject to be ‘this God’ existing in divine nature, without understanding any supposit, nor anything incommunicable in this nature, because incommunicability is not the idea of such acts; and thus can it be posited that this ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’ is true, insofar as ‘God’ stands for ‘this God’ – insofar as he is by deity a *per se* being – but not for any supposit properly speaking, in which the divine nature exists, because when there is truth for the things first signified by the terms, one should not look for truth in others in which those things first signified are included, – just as, when the consequent has its own truth, one need not seek the truth of it precisely for any antecedent.

12. An example of this: ‘this’ color, an existing singular, does not determine for itself the idea of a supposit (because the proper idea of a supposit is not in accidents), and although it be in a supposit of a substance, yet insofar as it is understood without the substance in a supposit – as ‘this existing color’ – it can be the principle of a real operation, just as, if the same whiteness were in three surfaces, it would have one real act, namely the one idea of diffusing [sight]. And if, about the truth of this proposition ‘this color diffuses [sight]’, you ask of me what the term ‘color’ supposits for, – I say that it supposits for its first signified thing, namely for ‘this existing color’, but not for any color inferior to this color, namely for ‘this color’ in this surface or in that, because the things that contract color are not the causes of the truth of this proposition, but it is true because of the first terms.

13. Much more would this be true if this color as ‘this’ were *per se* being. But deity is *per se* existence, and so God insofar as he is God by deity is *per se* being, because *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: ‘the Father is by the same thing by which he is God, although it is not by the same thing that he is and that he is Father’; and so to ‘this God’, without understanding any idea of supposit or person – nay, without understanding the idea of ‘this God’ – can be attributed ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit’.

II. To the Principal Argument

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.7] I say that that is not the contradictory of it if the distribution be done precisely for the persons, because then what is first affirmed in the affirmation is not denied [n.9]; but if it deny the predicate of the first thing signified of God, namely of this God [n.11], it is false. – And this is what is usually said, because ‘such a universal negative does not contradict a term having simple supposition, although it do contradict a term having personal supposition’; but this [contradicting the term having simple supposition] seems probable if the maxim of the sophists is true – ‘when two things are included in any well-formed phrase, one of them is not referred to anything that the other is not referred to’;⁵ but in this quantifier ‘no’ there is included negation and distribution, therefore since the distribution has regard precisely to the

⁵ Cf. Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.12 n.32: “Hence the ancients say that premises are double but the conclusion is not, because of a certain reason they give of this sort: ‘as often as a negation and a distribution are included in the same phrase or single term, whatever one of them is referred to the other is as well.’ Hence since a distribution put obliquely cannot reach the verb, neither can a negation, as in this case: ‘he who sees no thing is he who sees something’.” This remark of Peter’s seems oddly expressed but the fallacy is clear enough, since ‘seeing no thing’ is taken to be like ‘seeing a blue thing’. But the ‘no’ here is negating the verb ‘sees’, not qualifying the noun ‘thing’, so that ‘seeing no thing’ means ‘not seeing anything’.

supposits of such a nature, the negation too will have regard to the same, – and then the universal negation is true; but it would not be the contradictory of the first proposition, but this would be ‘God is not Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, where the same thing is denied as was first affirmed, – and this negation is false of the same thing, in the subject, of which the affirmation is true.⁶

Appendix
[*Reportatio* IC d.4 q.1]
Book One
Fourth Distinction

First Part. Single Question

[Point A]

About the fourth distinction I ask whether this proposition is true ‘God generates another God’.

It seems that it is:

God generates God; either himself God or another God; not himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore another God.

Second thus: the one generating is distinguished from the one generated; but God generates God; therefore God generated is distinguished from God generating, and consequently God generates another one.

Third thus: God generates another; either then another God, and thus the proposition is obtained, – or another non-God, which is false, because thus the one generated would not be God.

Fourth thus: God generates another possessing deity, therefore he generates another God. The consequence is plain from Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.55: “‘God’ means one having divine nature, ‘man’ human nature.

On the contrary:

“There is no other God” [*Tobit* 13.4.]

“Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one” [*Deuteronomy* 6.4]

One must say that this proposition is not true. The reason for which is that there adequately responds to any entity some thing or someone; but divine essence is a singular entity and in no way multipliable, as is plain from what is said below [IC d.4 q.2]; therefore there determinately responds to it some thing or someone. But in a thing which is a ‘this’ no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say ‘another entity’ or ‘another deity’, one could not there say ‘another God’, for ‘God’ in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity.

One must understand, then, that just as in creatures there is a difference between ‘Socrates is other than humanity’, and ‘he is other by humanity’, or ‘he is other in humanity’, so also, with respect to deity or God, ‘other’ implies negation of identity. Hence ‘other’ means non-same.

⁶ See appendix point C.

When therefore ‘other’ is placed first, negation is posited universally with respect to the predicate, which is understood to be universally negated from the subject; and so this proposition is false ‘Socrates is a thing other than man’, but this is true ‘Brownie (or a donkey) is a thing other than man’. And therefore this proposition is simply false of the person of the Father ‘the Father is other than God’ or ‘he is another God’. I say the same of the other divine persons. – But when in the second way there is taken ‘Socrates is other by humanity’, there is likewise universal denial with respect to anything not participating humanity, and it constitutes a true proposition: as ‘Socrates is other than a stone by humanity’, likewise ‘God the Father is other than a stone by deity’; but it makes a false proposition with respect to those things that do participate it; hence this proposition is false ‘Socrates is other than Plato by humanity’, and likewise ‘the Father is other than the Son by deity’. But in the third way, when it is said ‘Socrates is other in humanity’, one must understand that in this manner of locution ‘other’ implies two things, namely distinction between the things that are compared together and community of that in which they are compared, along with distinction and enumeration of it in them; hence when it is said ‘Socrates is other than Plato in humanity’, there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposit, therefore this proposition is false ‘the Father is other than the Son in deity’.”

To the first argument one must say that this proposition is true ‘God generates God’; for terms taken concretely supposit for supposit. And when it is said ‘either himself God, or another God’ [n.2], I grant neither, but I say that neither himself, nor another. But if you argue ‘either he generates the same God or another God’ (for, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b17-23, ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are said of everything, and are reduced to contradictories), one must say that he generates the same God, – not however himself, because it is the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this something’; for when I say ‘he generates the same God’, there is no reciprocation, which however there is when ‘himself God’ is said.

To the second one must say that in that argument and like ones – where the relation of the middle term varies – there is the fallacy of accident. For when it is said ‘the one generating is distinguished from the one generated’, the otherness is taken with respect to the supposit, along with opposite relation, but when it is said ‘God becomes other than God’, it is taken absolutely, not along with relation.

To the third one must say that God generates ‘another’. But one must not concede the other proposition, that ‘another God, or another non-God’; for ‘other God’ and ‘other non-God’ are not contradictories, but these are ‘other God’ and ‘non-other God’; – and so one must grant this proposition ‘he generates a non-other God’.

But if you say ‘on a negative about the finite predicate – with constancy of subject – there follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate, and so if he generates a non-other God, therefore he generates another non-God’, one must say that this rule does not whole of complex predicates, as the Philosopher says in *Prior Analytics* 1.46.52a18-21; hence those two propositions about a stone are false ‘a stone is white wood’ and ‘a stone is non-white wood’, just as also these two ‘God generates another God’ and ‘God generates another non-God’.

To the fourth one must say that when it is said ‘God generates another possessing deity’ only in the supposit is otherness implied, but not in deity, – and so when otherness is included in deity, more is concluded than was in the premises, and so there is the fallacy of the consequent. For the conclusion can only be thus: ‘what possesses deity is God, God generates another possessing deity, therefore God generates another who is God’, not ‘another God’. Or one could say that there is there the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘this something’ to ‘qualified what’.

Second Part. Single Question

[Point B]

Hence God, in subject position, indicates the divine nature in agreement with the supposit, – Father and Son and Holy Spirit, on the part of the predicate, indicate the same nature by indifference and they state suppositis; from which it follows that the proposition is true. However it is true that in its converse there is rather formal predication, because there the superior or common thing is understood to be predicated of its *per se* suppositis; but predication is always more formal when the common thing is predicated of the less or quasi-common than conversely.

[Point C]

To make evident the second argument, one must know that, as was said in the preceding question, to any unique nature there adequately corresponds one singular, which singular is either incommunicable, as it is in creatures, or communicable, as it is in God. But the divine nature is altogether unique, un-multipliable and un-numerable, therefore to it there adequately corresponds one singular, which is expressed by the name of God, which is understood by natural intelligence before any property of persons is. And that singular is considered as some being for itself, to which belong all the properties, essential and perfective, before any property of persons; but that indeed which is a being for itself and of itself is in no way multipliable or numerable, although it be communicable to several suppositis, which communication is understood through the notional properties. And just as the proposition is true ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is that one ‘this God is Father’ etc. An example of this has been touched on, because if there were one color on three surfaces, that color – suppose it whiteness – would diffuse sight and would have all the perfections belonging to whiteness, but not as it is first on this surface or that, but according to itself, although it have them as a universal existing on those surfaces, yet not first. Now so it is here.

Fifth Distinction

First Part

On the Generation of the Divine Essence Single Question

Whether the divine essence generates is or generated

1. About the fifth distinction I ask first whether the divine essence generates or is generated.

That it is so:

From Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “Let us accept that the same thing is said when ‘Word’ is said as if ‘Wisdom born’ be said, so that in one of them, which is ‘born’, both Word and Son are taken, and that in all these names the divine essence that is said in reference to itself is not displayed, but that in one of them, namely ‘Wisdom’, the essence is displayed as it is thereby said in reference to itself.” Therefore, he expressly means that Wisdom, as it is Wisdom and said in reference to itself, is said to be born as ‘born’ is proper to the Son.

2. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.22 seems expressly to speak against the Master of the *Sentences* [I d.5 ch.1]. “Many,” he says, “have arisen in our times who do not dare to speak of generated substance without always rather (and this is more dangerous and against the authorities of the saints) daring to deny and in every way disprove that substance generates substance. They stubbornly deny what all the saints affirm. As to that which they themselves affirm, they can find no authority; as to that which we say, they themselves even adduce many authorities, in the manner of Goliath [*I Kings* [*Samuel*] 17.45-51]” etc. And because the Master [Lombard] gives exposition of the authorities which he adduces against himself [*Sent.* I d.5 ch.1 nn.57-64, from Augustine and Hilary,], Richard [of St. Victor] subjoins about him: “They say [sc. the Master and his followers], ‘The Fathers do indeed say that substance generates substance; our exposition contends that we believe substance does not generate substance’: – a faithful ‘exposition’, and worthy of all praise! because what all the Fathers proclaim, they contend to be false, and what none of the saints asserts, they contend to be true.” Thus Richard. – He seems to mock the Master who expounds as it were against the intention of the Fathers the authorities which he adduces against himself, and asserts – as it seems – the opposite of what the Master holds to be true and of the intention of the Fathers.

3. Again, by reason: essence is communicated, therefore it is produced. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “on the Son without beginning does generation bestow essence.” Proof of the consequence: first because to communicate and to be communicated are relational opposites and only state a relation of origin (for they do not assert common relations, as is plain; therefore they assert opposite relations of origin; therefore they are the same as to produce and to be produced); second because if there be two correlations, and if one extreme of one of them be the same as one extreme of the other, then the remaining one is the same as the remaining one. Example: if *a* and *b* were correlatives and *c* and *d* correlatives, then if *a* and *c* are the same, then *b* and *d* are the same, – proof: because otherwise the same thing would be said relative to several correlatives, as *a*, which is the same as *c*, would be said correlatively to

b and *d*, which for you are diverse; and here is one combination of relatives of this sort, ‘producing’ and ‘produced’, and another ‘communicating’ and ‘communicated’; but ‘producing’ and ‘communicating’ are the same, therefore the extremes corresponding to them are also the same.

4. Again, by logical arguments:

When a predicate is predicated *per se* of a subject, it can supposit for it, – the thing is plain in superiors said of inferiors; essence is predicated *per se* of the Father, ‘the Father is essence’; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor, because it is not *per accidens*, because one is not an accident of the other nor are both of a third, and these are the two modes of unity *per accidens* that are posited in *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-36, the chapter on ‘one’.⁷

5. Again, essence is father of the Son, therefore essence generates. Proof of the antecedent, by conversion: father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son. Proof of the consequence: essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence; proof of this consequence, because in relatives the consequence is mutual: *a* is father of *b*, therefore *b* is son of *a*; therefore, if essence is father of someone, this someone is son of essence.

6. Again, what is generated insofar as it is generated is something, because it is not nothing and between nothing and something there is no middle; but nothing in divine reality is something unless it is essence, therefore the Son insofar as he is generated is essence; therefore essence is generated.

7. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard

8. On this question Abbott Joachim was in error, whose argument is reported in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.2, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “We condemn” etc. For he said that Master Peter [Lombard] was a heretic, because he said there was a thing in divine reality that neither produces nor is produced [Lombard, I d.5 ch.1 n.54]. For from this Joachim drew his inference, insinuating that Peter [Lombard] posited a quaternity in divine reality; for he posited three things in divine reality, a generating thing and a thing generated and a thing spirated, and he posited a thing neither generating nor generated nor spirated [*ibid.* n.58]; therefore he posited four things.

9. Joachim, in avoiding this discordant result that seemed to follow, posited that no one thing is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but only said that the persons were one thing in the way that many faithful are said to be ‘one Church’, because of one faith and one charity; and this he proved by the saying of the Savior (*John* 10.30) praying to the Father on behalf of his faithful: “that they might be one,” he says, “as we are one.”

⁷ *Interpolated text, from* Lectura I d.5 n.8: “Again, the essence is Father, therefore the essence generates. The antecedent is plain through its converse [sc. the Father is essence]. Proof of the consequence: whatever the subject is predicated of, the proper property is predicated of too, and the proof of this is because the subject is the middle for demonstrating its proper property of that to which that property does not first belong; to generate seems the proper operation or property of the Father; therefore the consequence is good.”

Joachim therefore inferred: since the faithful are not one by unity of nature, therefore neither is the Son one thing with the Father.

B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim

10. This second thing [n.9] in the opinion of Joachim is heretical, namely that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not some one thing, because as is argued in the afore cited chapter [of the *Decretals*, n.8], ‘The Father by generating gave his essence to the Son’ (for he could give nothing else by which the Son would be God), and for a like reason both gave their essence to the Holy Spirit; ‘for the communication was not of part of the essence, because the essence is simple and indivisible; therefore of the whole essence; therefore the whole same essence which is in the Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit and, because of the divine simplicity, each person is that thing and all three persons are that thing’.

11. Now as to what Joachim argued from the Gospel [n.9], it is there solved, for ‘the Savior understands in his prayer that his faithful are one in a unity proportional to them, just as the Father and Son are one in a unity proportional to them, – that is, just as the Father and Son are one in the unity of charity which is their nature, so the faithful are one in participated charity’. And this exposition is there proved by the like saying of the Savior (*Matthew* 5.48) saying to his disciples: “Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect,” namely with essential goodness; where he did not admonish that we be perfect of ourselves naturally, as the heavenly Father is perfect of himself naturally, with a perfection essentially belonging to himself, but that we be perfect with the perfection belonging to us, namely of grace and the virtues.

C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard

12. [*As to the reality of the question*] – As to the first article [n.9], however, in which Joachim said that Master Peter was heretical, the Pope contradicts him [Innocent III, 4th Lateran Council, 1215AD]: “But we, the sacred Council approving, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], that namely one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things – Father and Son and Holy Spirit – are that one thing.” But there could not be a quaternity unless there were a fourth, really distinct from the first three.

13. For this opinion then [n.12], thus solemnly approved, there is adduced this sort of reason: a generating thing generates some thing, and a really distinct thing, because “nothing, in order to exist, generates itself,” *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; but essence in divine reality is altogether indistinct; therefore it is neither generating nor generated, because there is a generated for the reason there is a generating.

14. To this are reduced the reasons of the Master in the text, that essence ‘would be referred to itself’ and ‘would be distinguished from itself’ [I d.5 ch.1 n.55]; but a third reason is that the Father would exist formally by that by which he generates, because he is formally the very essence that is in the Son, because of the lack of distinction of the essence, – and if he were to generate it, he would not be it formally, because it would be distinct from him and posterior in origin.

15. There is added too another reason, because in creatures form does not generate nor is generated, but the composite; now deity is disposed as form is in a person; therefore it neither generates nor is generated.

This reasoning has less evidence here than in creatures, because in creatures form is not something *per se* existing so that it could be something operating; but here deity, without co-understanding the personal properties, is of itself a being in act [d.4 n.11].

16. The reasoning is confirmed, however, because an operation that is necessarily of a distinct thing operating cannot be of what here exists as form, because it is *per se* indistinct in the three; but such operation is personal, as is to generate.

Let this be said as to the reality of this question.

17. [*As to the logic of the question*] – But speaking of the logic, why cannot this be true ‘essence generates’ as essence supposits there for a person, just as this is true ‘God generates’ because God supposits for the Father, – and yet God is not distinguished from himself, nor is God formally he who is generated although God does generate God?

18. I reply and give this sort of reason for what is proposed: whenever a subject is abstracted with ultimate abstraction⁸ and the predicate of its idea cannot be predicated save formally, the proposition cannot be true of such terms save *per se* in the first mode [cf. Aristotle *An.Post.* 1.4.73a34-37]; the subject here, namely deity or the divine essence, is abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and the predicate, namely generating, cannot, of its own idea, be predicated save formally; therefore the proposition could not be true save *per se* in the first mode; but in this way it is not true, because the predicate is not *per se* of the understanding of the subject – “for everything that is said in relation to something is something beside the relation” (Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2), such that the relation is not internal to the concept of that absolute thing.

19. The major of this syllogism I make clear in this way:

In the case of substances, although there can be in the same one really (even if it is simple) many substantial perfections formally distinct, and although there one formal idea could be abstracted from another while the concretion remains still of each formality with its own proper supposit (for example, although this be true ‘an intellective substance is volitive’ – where the perfection of one substantial feature is concretely predicated of another – yet this is denied ‘the intellect is will’, because these terms signify the perfections as abstracted from each other, and this according to their proper formalities; yet still these terms, thus abstracted, are about their proper supposits, because this intellect is an intellect), yet by taking substance, whether simple or composite, precisely according to one formal quidditative idea, there is only abstraction from the supposit of a proper nature generally, because the substances are not of a nature to be about anything of another nature; therefore this first abstraction [see n.20 for the second abstraction] is the greatest. For by abstracting human nature from the supposits that truly are of that nature – the way it is abstracted when humanity is conceived – there does not remain another abstraction further; and this as so conceived is precisely itself, because extraneous to anything else, – as Avicenna says *Metaphysics* 5 ch.1 that ‘equinity is only equinity’ and nothing else.

⁸ Interpolated note [*Reportatio* IA d.5 nn.19, 21]: “Note, ultimate abstraction is when the formal idea of something is considered according to itself, apart from whatever is not included *per se* in it; if the idea of something be taken most precisely, nothing formally agrees with it save what is *per se* included in that idea.”

20. But in the case of accidents, the more things they can be about the more abstractions can be made. Accidents indeed are about suppositis of another nature, and although they are abstracted from them, yet they are about individuals of their own nature, – just as white is about wood, and although whiteness is abstracted from this, yet it is still about this whiteness and that, which are its individuals. – But further, there is abstraction of quiddity from supposit of the sort said to happen in substances [n.19], and we have a circumlocution for it in that we say ‘quiddity of whiteness’⁹ – and this is not about any subject either of the same or different nature.

21. In relations too, that are about many things, there can still be many abstractions; for a relation is about its proper individual, both foundation and subject, – and although it may be abstracted from the latter yet not from the former.

An example. This concrete term which is ‘cause’ is said of fire, which generates heat in wood. – But, when abstracting from the subject, there still remains a concretion with the foundation, to wit if it be said ‘the power of causing’; for heat is a power of causing heat, yet fire is not a power of causing it. – There can still be a further abstraction to the proper genus, to wit if ‘causality’ be said, and then neither fire nor heat receives the predication of it; yet this causality is ‘causality that is the ultimate abstraction of the sort that is in substances’ [n.19] by the fact that we speak of ‘quiddity of causality’, and this is predicated of nothing else.

22. And, from the things thus shown or narrated, it is apparent what ultimate abstraction is, because it is ‘of quiddity most absolute, removed from everything that is in any way outside the idea of the quiddity’,¹⁰ – and from this is apparent the first term of the major.

23. About the other term of the major, namely that the predicate ‘is of necessity formally predicated about whatever it is predicated,’ [n.18], one must note that substantives can be doubly predicated in divine reality, sometimes formally and sometimes by identity; but adjectives, if they are predicated, are of necessity predicated formally, and this because they are adjectives, – for, from the fact they are adjectives, they signify form by way of what informs; and so they are said denominatively of the subject, and consequently by way of what informs the subject, and thus they are said formally of it; of such sort are not only adjectival nouns but all participles and verbs.

⁹ The proper term for the quiddity of whiteness would be something like ‘whiteness-eity’ or *albedineitas* (as the editors suggest) if it were in Latin.

¹⁰ Note by Scotus: “This point ‘about multiple abstraction’ what is it worth? ‘This humanity’ is humanity, and ‘this whiteness-eity’ is whiteness-eity, – and universally, there can be no abstraction, however ultimate (provided, however, the concept be common, as it always should be), without the abstracted thing being said of its singular ‘*per se*’; but the singular is not the supposit when the quiddity is abstracted from what has the quiddity; thus in the case of accidents the abstracted thing never has for singular a supposit.

Therefore in the case of accidents let a multiple abstraction be posited, from a more remote and from a nearer subject [n.20], – thus relation from its supposit (or subject) and from its foundation [n.21] –, in the case of substance a single abstraction, from the supposit, but not from the singular [n.19]; nor is it that in some abstraction ‘the abstracted thing’ not be predicated of something nor something of it, because this is impossible [as stated in the previous paragraph of this note], but it is enough for the thing proposed here [n.18] that the ultimately abstracted thing – that is, abstracted from everything of a different nature and from the proper supposit, but not from the singular [n.22] – that of it nothing is formally predicated unless it be predicated ‘*per se* in the first mode’.

So is it the case then that ‘humanity’ is animality? – No. Humanity is not the singular of animality but this animality is; but man is as it were the supposit of animal.”

24. With these things understood, the assumed major is plain, that ‘when something is abstracted with ultimate abstraction – such that it is abstracted from everything which is outside the idea of it – and the predicate is not predicated of anything save formally, there is no true union of such extremes unless it be formal and *per se* in the first mode’. Because this predicate is precisely of a nature to be predicated formally, therefore truth cannot be saved on account of identity alone, – and because the subject is abstracted with the highest abstraction, it cannot stand for anything in any way other than itself, but precisely for itself formally, and so it would be necessary [sc. for saving the truth of the union of the extremes in such a proposition] that its idea were precisely formally the same as the predicate, which could not be unless the idea precisely included the predicate: the major then is plain. – The minor too [n.18] is plain, that the extremes ‘essence generates’ or ‘deity generates’ [n.17] are not of such a sort, because ‘deity’ is something abstracted with highest abstraction; but ‘generates’ is a verb, therefore it cannot be predicated save formally.¹¹

II. To the Principal Arguments

25. To the arguments for the opposite. – To the first authority of Augustine [n.1] – *Sentences* I d.21 ch.2 ‘the words of the authority occur...’ – the Master [Peter Lombard] responds in d.28 ch.6, that Wisdom stands for the hypostasis; “‘the essence is demonstrated’ [n.1], namely it is demonstrated that the Son is essence,” because an essential name stands for the person. The reason stated for this [sc. by Lombard]: although wisdom is abstracted from wise man, which is the one who is operating, yet it still signifies the operative power or the operative principle, and so it is not abstracted with highest abstraction, because the operative power in some way is about something; and, because of some concretion of this sort, it is some way conceded that Wisdom is born, but not in any way that essence is born. But as to Augustine sometimes saying that the Son is essence from essence, this is expounded in the following question ‘because this does not prove that the essence is generated or generating, but that it is that from which the Son is generated’ [nn.98, 101].

26. To the statement of Richard [n.2]. If he intends to blame the Master there (as appears from his words), since the doctrine of the Master, and this one especially, is authenticated by a General Council in the chapter cited above [n.12], I deny Richard¹² by holding to the Master. And as to his saying that the Master adduces many authorities against himself [n.2], the Master well expounds them, as will be plain in the following question [n.100]. And he does not have no authority for himself but has that of the Universal Church in the afore cited chapter, which is the greatest, because Augustine says *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel if I did not believe the Catholic Church,” – which Church, just as it has decreed what are the books to be held in authority in the canon of the *Bible*, so too has it decreed which books are to be held authentic in the books of the doctors, as is plain in the canon, and after that

¹¹ Interpolated text: “This name ‘God’ is not thus abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and therefore it can supposit for a person, as when it is said ‘God creates’, ‘God generates’ [d.4 n.11].”

¹² Note by Scotus: “The assertion [Richard *On the Trinity* VI ch.22] ‘In himself the person of the Father is nothing other than ungenerated substance, and the Son nothing than generated substance’ could be expounded the way the Greeks take it [sc. understanding substance as hypostasis].”

authority of the canon there is not found in the *Corpus Iuris* any writing as authentic as that of Master Peter in the chapter cited before.

27. To the reason about ‘communicating’ [n.3] I say that production has the thing produced for its first term, and the first term I say here is the adequate term; and in this way does the Philosopher say, *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b16-18, that the composite is first generated, because it is what first has being through production, that is, adequate being.

28. In the composite, however, the form is the formal term of generation, but not the *per accidens* term, as is plain from the Philosopher, *Physics* 2.1.193b12-18, where he proves that form is nature by the fact that ‘generation is natural because it is the way to nature, and it is the way to form, therefore etc.’, – which reason would be null if form were only the term *per accidens* of generation. And in the same way too does he intend that form and end coincide in the same thing, which is not true of the end of the thing generated, but is true of the end of generation. Therefore, form is truly the end of generation.

29. The thing, then, that generates has one relation to the first term – which is called the thing produced or generated – and has another relation to the formal term. And in creatures each relation is real, because each relation has terms really distinct, and there is a real dependence of each produced thing on what produces it. But in the proposed case [sc. of God] the producer has to the thing first produced a real relation, because it has a real distinction and a real origin, but to the formal term in the thing produced it does not have a real relation because it does not have a real distinction [sc. from it], without which there is no real relation. ‘To produce’ then in divine reality states a real relation, but ‘to communicate’ states a relation of origin, and as it were of idea, concomitant to that real relation; an example of this about the principle ‘by which’: in creatures this principle is really referred to the product, as to the ‘what’ (for art and builder belong to the same genus of cause, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33), but here [sc. the case of God] the ‘by which’, because it is not distinct, does not have a real relation to the thing produced (I d.7 n.13), so neither, conversely, does the formal term to the producer.

30. When he says, therefore, that these are opposite relations, to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some opposed real relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former are not formally of the same relatives.

31. By this same fact to the second [n.3], that no extreme of one correlation is the same formally as some extreme of another. For the communicating and the producing, although they come together in the same supposit (because the nature is properly said to be communicating itself just as it is said to be communicated¹³), yet the communicating does not state formally the same relation that producing as producing states – now to be

¹³ Note by Scotus: “Whether essence is communicating or communicated? – That it is not: then the things produced are [n.3]; it is proved in two ways, as above [n.3]. – On the contrary: *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 and *John* 10.29, “My Father that gave them to me.” – Solution: about the double term first and formal [nn.27-29]; likewise about the double term first and formal. – To the arguments...” – that is at the end to the arguments, namely two [n.6]: to the first n.30, to the second nn.31. [Eds.: From nn. 5-10 Duns Scotus appears to have wanted to supplement one argument of the *Ordinatio*, nn.3, 27-31, with a new question, “Whether essence is communicating or communicated,” in which case the principal question, n.1, would lack nn.3 and 27-31.]

communicated and to be produced neither state the same, nor do they first denominate the same.

32. To the logical arguments [nn.4-6].

When it is first argued about predication '*per se*' [n.4], I say that essence is not predicated 'in the first mode *per se*' of the Father, nor is it predicated formally. – When you prove it 'because not *per accidens*' [n.4], I say that, just as in creatures, not every predication is '*per se*' or '*per accidens*', taking accident properly, as when an accident is predicated of a subject; for the genus is not predicated *per se* of the difference, nor is it predicated *per accidens*, – because neither is accident to the other but is an extraneous or inferior middle there contracting the other, which inferior can be called 'accidental' to the superior, that is, extraneous, but not properly an 'accident'; however in divine reality not everything is '*per se*' the same, that is, formally,¹⁴ nor yet is something '*per accidens*' properly¹⁵ of something, but something is the same as something by absolute identity, without formal identity, – and so is it in the matter at hand.

33. To the other I say that this proposition 'father is essence'¹⁶ can be distinguished, because 'father' can be taken adjectivally or substantively. In the second way it signifies the person to whom belongs paternity, and I concede that the proposition is true by identity, because a substantive can be predicated of something by identity. In the first way it signifies the property denominatively, and in this way does the Master expound [I d.27 ch.1 n.237] that it is the same to be father and to have generated;¹⁷ in this way is this false 'essence is father', because it signifies that father is formally predicated of the subject.

34. When therefore you argue about subject and property, I say that when the property can be predicated by a predication of the same idea as that by which the subject is predicated, the property can be inferred from the subject when it has the like mode of predicating [n.24], – but when not, not. Here the subject – if it be subject – can be predicated by identity, the property – if it is property – cannot be, but only formally, because it is an adjective [n.23].

35. To the other, 'essence is father of the Son' [n.5]:

A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] repeats the opinions of others, the first of Master Alexander [of Hales, *ST* Ia d.20 ad 5], who distinguished the proposition 'essence is father of the Son' in the way the preceding one, namely 'essence is father', was already distinguished [n.33], – that 'father' can be taken adjectivally or substantively, and in the first way he says it is false and the consequence ['therefore father of the Son is essence']

¹⁴ Note by Scotus: "[Aristotle's] 'predications *per se*' are formal; Aristotle did not treat of 'identicals' [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a21-73b26]."

¹⁵ Note by Scotus: "*On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6: in God there is a middle between 'according to substance' and 'according to accident' [to wit: 'according to relative']."

¹⁶ Note by Scotus: "father generates; father is essence; therefore [essence generates; IA d.5 n.36]. – Response: the predication varies [cf. n.33 supra]."

¹⁷ Note by Scotus: "The master in I d.27 ch.2 takes father only substantively." [Eds.: namely that 'to be father' and 'to have generated' are not altogether the same, and thus, taking it formally, the proposition 'essence is father' is true by identity in this second way; which way indeed, namely 'substantively', Duns Scotus wants to confirm by the authority of the Master, just as he confirmed the first way, namely 'adjectivally'. So Lombard, *Sent.* I d.27 ch.2 n.238: "Nor does it seem to us altogether the same to say something 'is father' and 'has generated a son'... Otherwise father would not be the name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but of a property only... God or divine essence is father, that is, he who has generated, namely a hypostasis that has a son."

not valid, – in the second way he says it is true. Another opinion he repeats from Master Praepositinus, who says that it is simply true, for which Praepositinus has two reasons, – one by conversion (because if the converting proposition is true, the converted proposition will simply be true): “this is true ‘father of the Son is essence’, therefore essence is father of the Son;” the other reason, because “this is simply true ‘essence is father’: either then father of someone or of no one; if of no one, then [essence] is altogether not father, – if of someone, and if of none but the Son, then essence is father of the Son.”

36. Against Master Alexander – nay against both [Alexander and Praepositinus] – he argues thus and proves “the term ‘father’ is only held adjectivally, since names that are imposed from active and passive power (as are master and disciple, father and son, builder, etc.) are only significant adjectivally, and this from the respect that they have to another thing that the power from which they are imposed has regard to. But whenever something has the idea of adjective or of adjacent from a respect to something else, the more determinate its respect the more it has the idea of adjacent or of adjective, and the less it has this idea the more indeterminate it is, – as is plain about the respect of the infinitive mode, which grammarians say has or says an infinite inclination to the supposit and can supposit more than other modes can [Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae* VIII ch.12 n.63, ch.13 n.69], because the others also have a finite inclination to the supposit, but the former has an infinite one; but an infinitive and an adjective in the neuter gender are more substantive than in the masculine or feminine. Therefore since ‘father of the Son’ has a finite and express relation – but not so when the ‘father’ is posited *per se* – therefore, although it could be held substantively in saying ‘essence is father’, yet it is only held adjectivally in saying ‘essence is father of the Son’, and thus this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false.”¹⁸

37. “It is also plain that the first argument of Praepositinus is not valid, ‘father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son’, by conversion [n.35], because it should be converted in this way: ‘therefore something that is essence is father of the Son’; just as this proposition ‘an individual is man’ is not converted in this way ‘therefore man is an individual’, but in this way ‘therefore something that is a man is an individual’. – Likewise, the second reason [n.35] is not valid. When it is argued ‘essence is father, therefore either of someone or no one’, – one must say that it does not follow, because of the fallacy of figure of speech (because as soon as ‘of someone or of no one’ is added it [essence] joins [the terms] otherwise than it supposed first), and it must be said that of no one is it father, that is, not of anyone is it father: and it does not follow from this that it is not father, because of the fallacy of figure of speech, but there only follows ‘therefore the property of paternity does not belong to it’.”

¹⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus [quoting Henry]: “And if it is objected ‘essence is father, but is not father except of the Son, therefore it is father of the Son or is altogether not father’,” – response: “it is plain that there is a fallacy of figure of speech, because in the first proposition the term ‘father’ *per se* supposit for the whole person; but in the second proposition, when it is said that ‘is father of the Son’, it combines a property only about the subject.”

38. So he responds in a third way, that this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false, because of the aforesaid reason [n.36], because the term ‘father’ here is only held adjectivally.¹⁹

39. Against his way of speaking [n.38] I argue as follows:

What is included essentially in the concept of something as a part of the concept cannot be excluded from it under whatever mode it is conceived, because if it is conceived under some mode and that [part] is not included, then the mode is repugnant to the idea of the concept which is conceived. Since, therefore, in the concept of a relative [sc. father] (from the fact that a relative concept is not as a concept in this way),²⁰ is necessarily included the correlative of it as it is a term (because it can neither be nor be understood without it, just as neither without the term), therefore in whatever way it is conceived, whether adjectivally or substantively [n.36], the correlative will always be included as term, and so in no way can it be understood as absolute; there is confirmation from filiation [sc. filiation is correlative in the same way].

40. Again, then [sc. if Henry’s position is correct] this proposition ‘father of the Son is essence’ would be incongruous, and a non-substantivated adjective does not supposit congruously. Indeed in this case in the subject [‘father of the Son’] father is determined by Son, to which it has a determinate respect [n.36].

41. Therefore I hold the opinion of Alexander, distinguishing as he does, that substantively it is true, adjectivally false.

42. To the reasons of Praepositinus: I say that the converse [‘essence is father of the Son’; n.35] is true substantively, adjectivally incongruous, because the masculine cannot be made substantive [sc. ‘father’]; to his second reason [n.35] I say that essence is father, and of someone, – and I concede too that it is father of the Son.

43. But when it is argued in the principal reason ‘if essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence’ [n.5], I deny the consequence.

When it is proved through ‘mutual consequence’ in relatives, I say that mutual consequence holds in those relatives that are first relatives [as father-son]; it holds also in those that are referenced through relations [as paternity-filiation] – if they are called formally relations of them, – just as if formally Socrates is father of Plato, then conversely, formally Plato is son of Socrates. But in those relatives that are not referred first nor are denominated formally from relations themselves, but the relation is predicated of one of them by identity, the [mutual] consequence is not valid, because in that case more is indicated in the consequent than in the antecedent; for in the antecedent is noted the identity of the relation with that of which it is said, but in the consequent is indicated that the other thing is formally referred to it: for although it were said ‘the Son is son of essence’, from the force of the construction would be indicated that essence is proper correlative of that which is the Son, and so the Son is formally son of essence; but the antecedent does not indicate that the relation of paternity agrees with the essence formally, but only by identity.

¹⁹ Editors’ note: The first way is Alexander’s: true substantively, false adjectivally [n.35]; second Praepositinus’: simply true, because substantively only [n.35]; third Henry’s: simply false, because adjectival only [n.38]. Scotus also cancelled here a repetition, less full, of Henry’s remarks quoted in n.36.

²⁰ The Latin here is obscure. The translation given is an attempt to give sense to it in context, which sense would be that a relative concept is not a concept in this way, that is, when taken in itself, but only when taken implicitly or obliquely with its correlative, as the next remarks indicate.

44. To the final one [n.6] I say: when you take ‘the generated insofar as it is generated is something’, I deny it. And when you say ‘it is not nothing’, I say (as has often been said before, I d.1 n.58, d.2 nn.422-423, 431, d.3 n.326): between contradictories there is a middle with ‘insofar as’, so that neither is present with ‘insofar as’, as man ‘insofar as he is man’ is neither white nor ‘insofar as he is man’ is he non-white; yet there are not two complex contradictories at the same time false; for the contradictory is true, ‘man not insofar as he is man is white’; so here ‘the generated not insofar as it is generated is something’, because the idea of being generated is not the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate, although the generated – taken formally in itself – is by identity the essence.

45. What then will be said of ‘generated insofar as generated’? – It can be conceded that ‘generated insofar as generated’ is the person, or subsistent, but it does not further follow ‘therefore insofar as generated it is something’, taking something for essence, – because of the formal non-identity of the personal idea with essence, etc. [I d.2 nn.388-410].

Fifth Distinction

Second Part On the Generation of the Son Single Question

Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father

46. Second a question is raised about the second part of the fifth distinction, whether the Son be generated from the substance of the Father.

That he is not:

Because [Augustine] *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: “We do not say three persons out of the same substance;” but substance seems to be disposed uniformly to any of the persons; therefore no person is from the substance.

47. Again, the construal of something with the genitive does not indicate a greater distinction of construable parts than a preposition does with its own case when it is added to the same construable; therefore no greater distinction is indicated here ‘the Son is of the essence of the Father’ than ‘the Son is from the essence of the Father’; but it is not conceded that ‘the Son be of the essence of the Father’ [n.43], because then the essence of the Father would generate the Son.

48. Again, when the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, either the ‘from’ indicates a distinction or it does not; if it does the proposition is false, because essence is not distinguished really from the Son; if it does not, then this proposition is true ‘the Father is from the essence of the Son or from the essence of the Father’, which is not conceded.

49. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37 treating the saying in *Colossians* 1.13 ‘he has translated us to the kingdom of the Son of his charity’ says: “what is said ‘Son of his charity’ is nothing other than Son of his substance;” therefore the Son is from the substance of the Father.

50. Further, for this there is the authority of Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 n.2, and it is in the text: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father.”

51. Again, a son in creatures is only he who is generated from the substance of the father; for that is why there is in inanimate things no paternity and no filiation, because they generate from foreign matter, – just as fire generates fire from the matter of air; therefore there is no true filiation save where the substance of the father, or something from the substance of the father, is the matter with respect to the son.

I. The Opinion of Others

52. [*Exposition of the Opinion*] On this question it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, which is presupposed to generation, as matter, and something introduced by generation, as form, and from these the product that is generated; so proportionally there correspond as it were three similar things in divine realities: person indeed is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasi-matter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter.

53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine *Against Maximinus*, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: “but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance”]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, neither negatively, as when someone is said to be ‘speaking of nothing’ when he is not speaking; nor by affirming the ‘from’ so that it be a mark of materiality or quasi-materiality, because a nothing cannot be the matter of anything; nor by affirming the ‘from’ by way of origin or order, that is as after nothing. Which three ways of understanding ‘something is from nothing’ Anselm sets down in *Monologion* ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than from the substance of the Father, then it is plain that he is from the substance of the Father.

54. And if it be responded as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, – the argument is made that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the ‘from’ so that it indicates the idea of originating or effecting principle; and, once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), then from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.

55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is ‘Wisdom born’.

56. If it be argued against this opinion [n.52] that ‘pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because in no way is it in potency’, and further, by the reason of the Master, ‘since there is one essence of three persons the Son would be generated from

the essence of three', – response is made to the first by saying²¹ that “something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of thing or idea; in another way something is in potency to something that is a respect only, and differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing in reality from it, and passing from potency to act by real transmutation in matter, – and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something differing in intention from it, and passing from potency to act by change in idea: in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and about this potency does the middle term in the argument have truth, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. It is not thus from potency in the second way because, from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act, it is also what would be – in the second way – in potency to several respects.”

57. “Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs especially from the natural production that is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject – which is in potency ‘in a certain respect’ – is something existing in act; but it differs in this that the subject in alteration is in potency to something absolute, really differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, – and in this divine production agrees more with the production of species from genus (but it differs), because in this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but here [sc. in divine production] the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it in idea alone; and so, although the production of species from genus is more like divine production than the other is [sc. production-alteration], yet it differs in many respects, because the production of species from genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, by assuming a determination of the complement through the difference, so that, according to this and that really other thing, it descend to this and that other species and is only a common thing in idea. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, made determinate by an assumed property, but one and the same singular existence has, through production, existence in diverse relative properties, and is common not in idea but in communication.”

58. To the second [n.56] it is said that [the Son] is not from the substance insofar as it is of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.

59. To this opinion [n.52] is added by others that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subject to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion, through this argument: ‘what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved’. He takes ‘what is moved’ for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while the motion is the term is not. But if he were to

²¹ Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.54 q.3 arg.7 of the third principle and response to arg.3.

take ‘what is generated’ for the term of generation, not for the subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore, he must take ‘what is generated’ there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, in the same place [*Physics* 5, com.8-9].

60. For this opinion these sorts of reasons are adduced:

That is said to be truly generated subjectively, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.

61. A confirmation of the reason is because transmutation and term are in the same thing as the disposition is and the form to which it disposes; therefore, since in the essence is the relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, in it also will be the generation.

62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the quasi-active fecundity of the Father there corresponds some quasi-passive power that it could produce from.

63. Finally there is argument as follows: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So is it in the matter at hand, the essence of the Father – from which the Father generates – will be quasi-matter with respect to generation.

64. [*Rejection of the opinion*] – I argue against this opinion [n.52].

First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter.

Proof of the antecedent:

65. *John* 10.29: “What the Father gave me is greater than all things;²²” only something infinite is ‘greater than all things’; only essence is this, so he gave that.

66. This is also the intention of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so also does procession from both bestow essence without beginning on the Holy Spirit.” But it is not conceded that any form is given or communicated by production, or bestowed by generation, unless the communicated form is the formal term of production.

67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]:

First, because no formally univocal entity, simply more perfect than the formal term, is had through production; essence is formally infinite, relation is not; therefore if relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have essence by production.

68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, – as is plain in *Physics* 2.1.193b12-13, where is had that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is “the way to nature” [n.28].²³

²² This reading of the cited verse is found in many mss., but bibles now read: “My father who has given [them] to me is greater than all things.”

²³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is also proved because otherwise this generation would not be univocal, because the formal idea of the term would not be the idea of the agreement of the generator with the generated; the consequent is inappropriate, as will be touched on in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.43].”

69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b6-8, – just as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because there it is the form that is the formal term of alteration; therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.

70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]:

First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, – and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc.

71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence only in one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes – as formal term of production and along with this as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is because, if it had it by force of production as formal term, it would have it when everything else was removed; therefore it does not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have deity in a way that, if that way is removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. It also seems to follow that it would have essence twice, and that it would naturally have it before it have it if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.

72. Again, second to the principal point [n.52]:²⁴ to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being – in whatever genus of principle – does not belong to anything save to a real being.

73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which by impression the Son is generated; either precisely being for itself, which is of essence as essence, – and then the Son is of the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or it belongs to it to be in some subsistence. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, – and if so, since in the understanding of that which is ‘to be that from which something is produced’ there is included this, which is ‘to be that in which form is induced’, and in the understanding of that which is ‘being in which’ is included ‘having that which is in it’ and consequently ‘being formally through it’, – therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that, as it is in the Father, it will be that in which generated knowledge is impressed, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or be generated knowledge knowing, which is inappropriate [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is in a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and ‘insofar as it is that from which’ precedes in some way the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is inappropriate.

74. If he says that ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ it has no existence in a person, just as matter too ‘insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated’ does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in generating the supposit, – this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really

²⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Let the reason that is put fifth below be second and the third be third, and let what is here second be fourth, and let what is fourth be fifth.” Hence the paragraphs would have had to be renumbered thus: 64=71, 80=82, 76=79, 83=85, 72=75.

principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, one must attribute some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is a principle of the composite, although there do not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participation of it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which is naturally before it is part of the composite. So here, then, it is necessary to give to the essence, ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’, being either in a supposit or being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].

75 If it be said in another way that ‘insofar as it is of the Father’ it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation (insofar namely as generated knowledge is actually formed) it is actually of another supposit, – this has been rejected in argument because, in the understanding of that which it is ‘to be from which’ by impression, there is included ‘to be in which’ and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed [n.73]; likewise, then the communication of essence to another supposit would, according to understanding, precede production, such that communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, – just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to the term; likewise, although something which is not of itself of some supposit in act, may come to be by generation actually of some supposit, – just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, – yet that that which is of one supposit may come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter, seems impossible without every action that is toward it.

76. Besides, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of active to passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.

77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, – and it is plain from the example of fire that makes heat and wood that can be heated and generated heat.

78. Again,²⁵ these respects, namely of active to passive and of the same to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active, nor is the ‘to the product’ prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, – because the active acts on the passive by itself alone in idea of cause, it does not produce save with another concurring with it in idea of co-causer; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny but that necessarily the respect of active to passive is not posterior to the respect of both to the product [n.76].

79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and something quasi-matter concurring for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasi-matter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since a thing does not naturally pre-require – nor does it necessarily require at the same time – that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that this relation, which is naturally pre-required, of the quasi-active to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in it, prior to the relation of it to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems unacceptable.

80. Again, fourth: the first effectively causative power causes by itself alone, to the exclusion of every other cause – both of the same genus and of a different genus – in idea of material cause.

²⁵ n.78 is the second proof of the reason given in n.76.

81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which does not include imperfection, – to wit to something first in the genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power *per se*, without any material principle as the ‘in which’, produces the product.

82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without another quasi-matter; for there seems to be a like reason about productive and causative principle, because if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not – insofar as it is such – be of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to need being reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.²⁶

83. Again, fifth, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 n.2 says: “the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but thence he is whence he proceeds;” so Augustine therefore concedes that the Holy Spirit is not of nothing but of the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is of the substance of the Father.

84. And this is proved by reason, because in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in the deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him – as it seems – according to that opinion, because it posits the Word to be generated by impression on that of which he is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exsufflation of himself, from the formed will from which he is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some ‘from which’ does not have that ‘from which’ as matter in its production, because all matter – of production and of product – is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not from nothing, nor yet from a quasi-matter of his production.

85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, – there is no need that the essence as ‘that from which the Son is generated’ be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].

86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry’s opinion, n.52]:

That the Son is of the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation as to real existence of generation; but for the existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter; therefore etc.

87. The major is plain from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [*ibid.*]: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is of the substance of the Father [n.50].” The minor is plain, – no being of reason precisely is necessarily required for this generation as existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the busy-ness of the intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.

²⁶ *Interpolated text*: “If it is argued that all causality of the creature is reduced to a like causality in the first cause (as the efficient cause to God as first efficient cause, and end to ultimate end, and form to exemplar or idea), then so will it be about the material cause – I reply that it is not alike, because it includes imperfection and is always annexed to privation, and so it was *per se* by no philosopher posited as a cause; hence theology, which is about God, whether naturally or supernaturally, does not make determination about material cause, according to the Commentator [Averroes] *Physics* I com.1.”

88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore in nothing is it quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.

89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same in the generator and generated is not proper to matter: rather soul is the same in the heart generating and in the part generated [n.135], matter never in a creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by a single form; in propagation the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the propagator; there is a deception here [in Henry]: ‘because the matter of thing corrupted and thing generated is the same’ as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.

90. Again, things impossible simply cannot be the act of the same thing simply; however the same thing can well be the act of impossibles, as the soul of the organic parts [n.133].

91. Again, the composite is constituted by this, because the potential is actuated by the act of the composite and made determinate; therefore will essence be referred to and made determinate. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save according as the thing actuated is a ‘what sort of’, so the relation of nothing is act save according as it is referred. Essence is not referred.²⁷

92. Again, another reason – which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] – that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. – An instance [of Henry against this]: ‘the Father is like the Son in deity’. However, this relation is not act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry, *Summa* a.55 q.6, a56 q.3 ad 6].

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter

93. Therefore, holding with the ancient doctors – because they all from the time of Augustine up to the present did not dare in divine reality to name matter or quasi-matter, although all said in agreement with Augustine that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father – I say that the Son is not generated from the substance of the Father as from matter or quasi-matter.

94. And this can be made clear as follows:

Generation in the creature states two things, change and production, and of these the formal ideas are different and separable from each other without contradiction.

95. For production is formally of the very product, and it is accidental to it that it happen with change of some composite part, as is plain in creation [sc. where there is production but not change]; change is formally the act of ‘the changeable’, which passes over from privation. But change accompanies production in creatures because of the imperfection of the productive power, which cannot give total being to the term of the production, but something presupposed of it is changed to another part of it and thus it

²⁷ Sc. essence as essence is not referred to anything but the properties of it are referred to it.

produces a composite. Therefore without contradiction can they be separated, and they really are separated by comparison to perfect productive power.

96. This is also plain in creation where, because of the perfection of the productive power putting it first into total being, there is truly the idea of production, insofar as through it the produced term receives being, – but there is not the idea of change there, insofar as change states that some substrate ‘is now otherwise disposed than it was before’, *Physics* 6.3-4.234b5-7, 10-13. For in creation there is not any substrate.

97. To the matter at hand. Since in divine reality nothing of imperfection is to be posited but the totality of perfection, and since change in its idea states imperfection, because it states potentiality, and that in a changeable thing, – and concomitantly too it states imperfection of active power in the changer, because such a changer necessarily requires a cause for this causing along with it so that it may produce (but no imperfection at all happens there [sc. in divine reality], neither of the sort that is in passive power, nor even any imperfection of active power, but supreme perfection), – in no way will generation be posited there under the idea of change or quasi-change, but only generation as it is production, namely insofar as something by it gets being, will be posited in divine reality. And therefore generation as it is in divine reality is without matter, – and therefore of generation as it is in divine reality there will not be assigned matter or quasi-matter, but only a term; and this either total as a first term, that is adequate term – namely which is first produced in being [n.27] – or formal term, according to which a first term formally receives being [n.28].

B. The Son is truly of the Substance of the Father

98. Second I say [n.93] that when all materiality and quasi-materiality have been denied, the Son is yet truly ‘of the substance of the Father’, as the authorities [Augustine, Hilary] adduced in the text [of Lombard] say.

99. Here by the ‘of’ [sc. in ‘of the substance’] is not indicated only efficiency or origination [n.54], because if it were only efficiency then creatures would be of the substance of God, – nor is by the ‘of’ only consubstantiality indicated, because then the Father would be of the substance of the Son, – but there is indicated origination and consubstantiality together; namely so that, in the [ablative²⁸] case of the preposition ‘of’, consubstantiality be indicated, such that the Son has the same substance and quasi-form as the Father, of whom he is originally, – and that, by what is construed in the genitive [sc. ‘of the Father’] with this ablative case [sc. ‘of the substance’, n.98], the originating principle be indicated; so that the total understanding of this phrase ‘the Son is of the substance of the Father’ is this: the Son is originated by the Father as consubstantial with him.

100. And in this way does the Master [Lombard] expound the authorities adduced in the text, – not precisely by consubstantiality, nor precisely by origination, but by both, as commonly appears. “Of²⁹ the Father’s substance, that is, of the Father, who is the same substance [n.54]” – by the first [‘Father’s’] origination is had, by the second [‘Of...substance’] consubstantiality.

²⁸ The ‘of’ in ‘of the substance’ [n.98] would, in English, indicate the genitive case of the word it goes with, if English properly had cases; but the ‘de’ here in the Latin is followed by the ablative case.

²⁹ The Latin is ‘de’, which is sometimes to be translated as ‘from’ (as originally in n.54).

101. And that this be the intention of Augustine in his authorities *Against Maximinus* [n.53] which are put in the text, is apparent from the goal of the authorities, – for in one authority Augustine sets down: “If you do not find another substance, recognize the substance of the Father, and confess the Son is *homoousion* (Greek: ‘of the same substance’) with the Father;” in this then he understood by ‘the Son is of the substance of the Father’ that the Son is so of the Father that he is *homoousion* with the Father. Again, in the other authority he says: “But if he is of the substance of the Father, then the substance of Father and Son is the same.”

102. But to understand this affirmative proposition, by which it is said that ‘the Son is of the substance of the Father’ [n.98] according to the aforesaid understanding [n.101], I say that that understanding truly saves the fact that the Son is not from nothing, – it also truly saves the fact that the Son is ‘of’ in the way required for filiation.

103. I make clear the first point, because a ‘generated creature’ is not from nothing, because something of it pre-exists as matter. Therefore, since form is something of the composite, and something of it more perfect than matter, if the form of something pre-existed and matter came to it *de novo* and were informed by the already pre-existing form, the product itself would not be from nothing, because something of it would have pre-existed, nay something of it more perfect than the matter which commonly pre-exists. Therefore, if the Son would not be said to be from nothing ‘because his essence according to order of origin pre-existed in the Father’, and this too if the essence were the quasi-matter of the generation of the Son, much more will the Son not be from nothing if the essence ‘existing in the Father first by origin’ be the quasi-form communicated to the Son.

104. I make clear the second point [n.102] in this way, namely that this ‘from/of’³⁰ suffice for the idea of filiation, because in animate things, where there is paternity and filiation, let us see what the act is by which the generator is said to be formally ‘father’. It is surely the act of disposing semen, and if it were a perfect agent, so that now, when it disposes semen, it could immediately dispose offspring, it would be truly father and much more perfectly than is now the case when so many intermediate changes are required; but now, in this act of disposing semen, that which was the substance of it, or in some way was something of it, is not matter, but is as it were the formal term, communicated or produced through this act, just as the offspring would be if it were immediately disposed by the father; therefore that something of the substance of the generator is the term of its act, by which it is father, this truly saves the fact that a product alike in nature ‘is from the substance of it’, so that the ‘from’ truly suffices for the idea of father and son, – and that the thing ‘disposed as term’ is the matter of the subsequent changes, this happens to the ‘of’ as it belongs to father and son.

105. Therefore the eternal Father, not by disposing something of himself but communicating his whole essence, and this as formal term of the production, most truly produces the Son of himself, in the way that ‘of’ pertains to father and son; and although essence be there the ‘of which’ as of quasi-matter, the ‘of’ would not do anything for the idea of father, – just as neither in creatures, if the generator had its semen both for formal term and for matter of its action, it would not be ‘father’ insofar as its semen were matter subject to his action, but insofar as it would be the term of the action, in the way too that,

³⁰ The Latin is ‘de’ which, as often in these passages, is captured in English variously by ‘of’ or ‘from’.

if a created father immediately disposed a son from itself, it would be truly father, because that which would be of it would be the term of action, and in no way matter.

C. How Relation and Essence can be in the Same Person

106. Third principally, to the solution of the difficulty of this question, one must see how relation and essence can be in the same person without essence being material with respect to relation, since no relation is material with respect to it.

107. And there are here four difficulties.

[*Difficulty 1*] – First, in what way the divine person is one unless this [sc. relation] be act and that [sc. essence] potency.

108. To this I say as follows:

First, that created quiddity is that by which something is a being quidditatively, and this is not a mark of imperfection; for it belongs to quiddity from the idea of quiddity.

109. Created quiddity, however, for example humanity, because it is of imperfect actuality, is therefore divisible through that which contracts it to an individual, namely by the individual property – whatever it be, let it be called *a* – and it receives from *a* some actuality (either also unity or also individuality), which it has in the individual and does not have from itself, so that the contracting thing (as *a*) is not only in Socrates ‘what Socrates is formally Socrates by’, but is in some way formal with respect to nature, and nature is in some way potency with respect to it; hence, secondly, nature is contracted and determined by the *a*.

110. And third: humanity however in Socrates is some act, and precisely by taking humanity and distinguishing *a* from it, humanity is the more perfect act than is *a* itself, although *a* is the more proper act and in some way the act of nature insofar as it determines nature.

111. By application of these three things [nn.108-110] to the divine things, let that be left which belongs to imperfection.

112. As to the first point [n.108]. Deity is of itself that by which God is God, and also that by which the subsistent thing ‘whose property is *a*’ is formally God, because to be ‘by this’ in this way is not a mark of imperfection in the creature, but belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity.

113. As to the second point [n.109]. It is dissimilar, because deity itself is not determined or contracted nor in any way actuated by the personal property, because this was a mark of imperfection and of potentiality in created nature; likewise, deity is of itself ‘this’, and so just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so it has actuality too. The personal property therefore is so the proper act of the person that yet it is not an act of the divine nature itself in any way perfecting or informing it.

114. As to the third point [n.110]. It is in some way alike, because although relation be the proper act of the person, and essence not be the proper act but some act of the person, yet the essence is formally infinite act; but the relation is not of its formal idea infinite act.

115. But how can these two acts come together for the constitution of one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For one must be in the other because, if not, then each is *per se* subsistent and so they will not be in the same *per se* subsistent thing; likewise, the

unity of things distinct in any way at all does not seem, according to Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-10, 23-25], to be except by reason of act and potency.

116. I reply. The unity of a composite is necessarily by reason of act and potency, as is assigned by the Philosopher, *ibid.* and 7.13.1039a4-5. But the person in divine reality is not composite, nor quasi-composite, but simple, – and as truly simple as the essence itself considered in itself, having no composition nor quasi-composition in the thing; and yet the formal idea of the divine essence is not the formal idea of relation, nor conversely, as was said above, *Ord.* I d.2 nn.388-395, 403-406, in the solution to the question.

117. But how the fact stands that the idea of relation in the thing is not formally the same as the idea of the essence and yet, when they come together in the same thing, they do not constitute a composite, – this therefore is the case because the former idea is perfectly the same as the latter; for because of the infinity of the one idea [sc. of the essence, nn.67, 114, 127], whatever can exist along with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore perfection of identity excludes all composition and quasi-composition, which identity is because of the infinity, – and yet infinity does not take away the formal ideas so that this formally is not that.

118. Not from these then is there a quasi-composite. And so there is nothing from them as a composite of act and potency, but there is from them one most simple thing, because one idea is perfectly – nay most perfectly – the same as the other, and yet is not formally the same; for there does not follow ‘they are perfectly the same even by identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same’, as was touched on about identity in the pre-cited question [n.116], and as will be touched on below in distinction 8 [nn.209, 217]. And the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated with itself.³¹

119. And as to what is added that ‘one must be in the other’ [n.115], I concede that as a relation it is in the foundation or the root, but this is not as act in potency but as they are identically contained in the infinite sea [sc. the divine essence, n.131].

120. In another way [sc. to the issue in n.119] can it be said that all these propositions are true, ‘deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father’, ‘the Father is in deity or in the divine nature, paternity is in deity’, and yet no ‘in’ is there as act in potency.

121. For the first is true as nature is in a supposit that has quidditative ‘being’ by it (because this belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity [n.112]), but not for this reason is it a form informing a supposit, even in creatures [nn.132, 138].

122. The second [n.120] is true as the hypostatic form is in the hypostasis, – but it does not inform it; for as well the quiddity as the hypostatic form, even in creatures, although it be the form of the supposit, is yet not the informing form, but is there [in creatures] as a part [sc. as Socrateity-humanity in Socrates], while here it is as one formal

³¹ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Against the conclusion [nn.116-118] of the first difficulty [n.107] here [sc. in the *Ordinatio*] is it argued in the *Oxford Collations* question 1 and question 14, where is contained the first part of it [the conclusion], afterwards this part [here nn.117-118], – and there [question 14] the idea of act and potency is treated of; however the major can be denied, – it suffices that there be respect and foundation, – and precisely is it false about respect, because the respect is by itself to the foundation. When there [in the *Collations*] the minor is denied, – on the contrary: ‘the person is *per se* one formally’ etc.”

idea concurring with another [sc. as in the case of paternity-deity], formally, for the same simple thing yet having in it several formal ideas.

123. The third [n.120] is true as supposit is in nature, – plainly not as informing it [n.147].

124. The fourth [n.120] is true in the same way of ‘in’ [sc. the same as in in.123], because in the way a whole is first in something, in the same way is the part *per se* but not first in the same thing, – it is plain about being in place; therefore if the Father is first in nature, as the supposit of nature, paternity ‘will be *per se* in the same nature’ in the same way of being ‘in’, although not first.

125. In addition to this, the prior response [n.119] gives the manner of ‘in’ – which is that of relation in the foundation – which is not reduced to the being of form in matter save where the foundation is limited, to the extent that it does not have the very relation perfectly identically in itself.

126. [*Difficulty 2*] – The second difficulty is how relation can be distinguishing the person and not distinguishing the essence without relation having the idea of act, – because it belongs to act to distinguish, *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a7.

127. I reply. I concede that relation is a personal act, not a quidditative act, – because it distinguishes personally and not quidditatively. But the essence is a quidditative act and a quidditatively distinguishing one; but the quidditative act is simply perfect, because infinite, – but not so is the personal act of itself formally infinite.

128. And if you say that ‘a distinguishing act is an act of that which does not distinguish’, it is false, unless what does not distinguish be distinguished by a distinguishing act, as it is in creatures: humanity is distinguished in Socrates and Plato by *a* and *b*, and therefore the distinguishing act there – even individually – is an act of what does not distinguish, because the distinguishing act distinguishes the nature itself, which does not distinguish. It is not so here [sc. in divine reality], because the personal property does not distinguish the essence, nor does it contract or determine it.

129. [*Difficulty 3*] – The third difficulty is how there can be a relation if it do not require the proper idea of foundation. For the foundation seems to be prior to the relation and as it were perfectible by it, and not conversely; for a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would be presupposed to its foundation. Therefore, since the essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems to be quasi-matter.

130. I reply. In creatures the order of generation and the order of perfection are contrary, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, that “things that are prior in generation are posterior in perfection;” and the reason is because creatures proceed from potency to act, and so from imperfect to perfect, – and therefore by way of generation is the imperfect reached before the perfect. But, when going to what is simply first, it must be that the same thing is simply first both in origin and in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, *ibid.*), because the whole order of generation is reduced to something first in perfection, as to something first in total origin. In divine reality, then, the order of generation and the order of perfection must be understood together.

131. Just as in creatures, therefore, if these two orders were always uniformly to come together, we would not seek first for the matter that would underlie the form and secondly for the form, but we would seek first for the form which would be of a nature to give act to the matter and secondly we would seek for the matter which would be of a

nature to receive being through that form, or the supposit that is of a nature to subsist through that form, – so it is in divine reality. Beginning from the first moment of nature, the divine essence altogether first occurs as it is being *per se* and *ex se*, which does not belong to any created nature, because no created nature has being naturally before it is in a supposit. But this essence – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 – is that by which the Father is and by which the Son is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father and the Son is Son. To this essence, then, considered in the most abstract way, there belongs, as prior to all the personal features, being *per se*; and in this first moment it arises not as something receptive of some perfection, but as infinite perfection, able indeed in the second moment of nature to be communicated to someone; not as informing form is communicated to matter, but as quiddity is to the supposit as to what exists formally through it. And thus do relations – as some say – ‘sprout up’ from it and the persons ‘sprout up’ in it; not as quasi certain forms giving being to it, or quasi certain supposits in which it receives the being which is simply its, but supposits to which it gives ‘being’ as that by which formally the supposits are, and by which they are God; and so the sprouting relation – if it be *per se* subsistent – sprouts up, not as form of the essence, but as of a nature to be God by deity itself formally, although not as informing it but as existing the same with it, with the most perfect identity; but relation, conversely, is in no way of the essence as that by which formally the essence is determined or contracted or in any way actuated by it, because all these things are repugnant to the infinity of the essence as it first arises under the idea of infinite act.

132. I concede then that the essence is the foundation of those relations [n.129], but not a foundation quasi-potential receiving them, but a foundation as if by way of form, in which these forms are born to subsist, – not indeed by informing, as likeness does in whiteness, but as the subsistent is said to be in the nature, as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity, because ‘Socrates is a man by humanity’. Not then from the idea of foundation will you have the idea of potency or quasi-potentiality in the divine essence, but precisely will you have the idea of form – as that by which the relation founded on it simply is God.

133. An example of this can be taken in creatures, by positing there a certain ‘*per impossibile*’. Increase now happens by the fact that food coming to the body is corrupted, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and is thus informed by the soul. Let it be posited that, while the same matter remains, it is of a nature to receive some part of form [sc. of flesh] (as is posited in rarefaction); the matter remains one, which was formed before and now is formed with a new form, – it itself however is formally truly changed, because from privation it passes to form. – Let us posit, from another side, that the same soul would perfect first one part of the body (as the heart); afterwards another part of the organic body would arrive, perfectible by the soul; the soul would perfect the part arriving *de novo*, – and the soul itself would yet not be changed, because there would not be in it first privation and later form. For privation is a lack in that which is naturally apt to receive [what is lacked]; but the soul, first non-informing and later informing, is not of a nature to receive something but to give.

134. In each of these extremes [n.133] there would truly be production of some product, but in the first there is change, in the second not.

135. The example seems more apt if we posit that the matter of the animated heart is able to be communicated the same to diverse forms – as of the hand and foot –, and this by the active virtue of the animated heart producing these composites from its own

communicated matter and from these forms; here truly would there be production of all that has the same matter, and it would be with change of that matter; but if, from another side, we posit that the soul – because of its lack of limitation in idea of act and of form – can be communicated to many and, by virtue of the soul in the heart, be communicated to hand and foot, produced by the animated heart, this would truly be production of many things consubstantial in form, without change of that form.

136. In each example [nn.133, 135] let the products be posited to be *per se* subsistents, not parts of the same thing, because to be a part is a mark of imperfection. With this posited, the second mode in each example, which is about the communication of form to the product, perfectly represents production in God, but not the first mode, which is about the communication of matter, – and this, by still adding in position, that the soul in the heart and hand and foot not be the informing form, because being composable involves imperfection, but be the total form by which they are subsistent and are animated; so that deity is understood not to be communicated to quasi-matter, but to subsistent relations (if the persons be posited to be relative) is deity communicated by way of form, not informing form, but form whereby the relation or the subsisting relative is God.

137. Neither then does the essence inform the relation, nor conversely, but there is perfect identity. – But essence has the mode of form with respect to relation, just as nature does with respect to the supposit, insofar as nature is that by which the subsisting relation is God. Conversely, however, in no way is the relation an act of the essence, because just as relation (says Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50) ‘does not determine nature but hypostasis’, so it is not an act of nature but of hypostasis; likewise, when relation informs the foundation, the supposit is said to be related *per se* in the second mode according to that foundation, just as Socrates is alike according to whiteness or in whiteness: but the Father is not Father by deity, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, – therefore here there is no such mode of relation to foundation as there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated through relation, but relation is only the act of the supposit or is the supposit.

138. I say briefly, then, that relation and essence are so in the person that neither is form informing the other, but they are perfectly the same, though not formally. As however they are not formally the same, relation in no way perfects essence, nor is it the formal term received in essence, but essence in this way is the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is, and likewise is God, – and also, the essence is the formal term of generation [n.64], just as in creatures nature is the formal term of generation but not individual act.

139. [*Difficulty 4*] – Against this there is objection because ‘the formal term of generation is communicated, therefore it presupposes that to which it is communicated; now the essence does not presuppose relation but conversely; therefore essence is not communicated to relation [from Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.60 q.8]’, – and it can be the fourth difficulty: because something is communicated there, and it will be the formal term, and it will presuppose that to which it is communicated; now essence cannot presuppose the relation to which it is communicated but conversely – therefore conversely; and so relation is communicated to essence, and then relation will be the formal term of production and essence the quasi-matter.

140. I respond. Because production is of some first term – that is of an adequate term – which includes in it something in idea of formal term of the very production, and something in idea of subsistence in such term [nn.27-28, 97]; therefore it is a contradiction in respect of production for these to be separated, namely the formal term and the idea of subsistence insofar as, namely, they have being by production, although absolutely there would be priority of one to the other (also as to ‘being separated without contradiction’), by considering them absolutely, not insofar as they have being through production, – although there would also there be a priority of perfection, that one would be more perfect than the other, – because nature is more perfect by reason of subsistence (even in creatures), and from this it follows that nature is the formal term of production, because no simple entity more perfect than the formal term of production has being through production [n.67].

141. Then to the form of the argument I say that the thing communicated ‘insofar as it is communicated by production’ does not presuppose that to which it is communicated, nor conversely, because this communication is not to something already existing, as it is in the case of alteration, but is to something in order that it simply be; therefore neither is nature communicated before the production of the supposit (because then it would be communicated also to a non-produced thing), nor conversely, although absolutely it be communicated prior in proper idea of supposit (in priority of perfection and in priority of being without one another) in creatures: to the first priority in creatures there corresponds here in God that the essence is formally infinite, the relation however is not.

III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others

142. To the arguments for the opinion. To the first, from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [n.53]: it is plain how the Son is in no way from nothing, but is truly from the substance of the Father [nn.98-103].

143. But if you ask: once origination and consubstantiality have been posited, it is still asked: is it as from matter or from quasi-matter that the Son is from? – I reply that there is not matter or quasi-matter there, and therefore let him not be from anything.

And further: therefore from nothing? – It does not follow; but it does follow: therefore he is not from any matter.

But you will say, then he is a creature. – I say it is false, because a creature is after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it; not so the Son, – not only because his being is eternal, but also because, as he is the second person, so his formal being is prior in origin in the first person.

144. To the other, from Augustine *On the Trinity* ch.4 [n.55]: it is of no value for the matter at hand [n.46], as was expounded in the preceding question [n.25].

145. As to what others argue, ‘essence is subjectively generated’ [n.59]: from the false is inferred the false.³²

146. To their arguments[n.145]:

To the first [n.60] I say that here there are not any terms corresponding to generation as it is change, because nothing is here as if in any way first under privation

³² Vatican Editors: From Henry’s [false] opinion that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter [n.52] is inferred the [false] conclusion that essence is subjectively generated.

and later under form. But the terms of generation are privation and form as generation is change, but generation as production has as term the product itself [n.95]; now generation does not thus have a term ‘from which’ save by speaking of productive principle, and thus the terms of generation are producer and product; and from this does not follow that something is a quasi-subject, but there follows from this – if generation is univocal – that something be common to the generating and generated, and this I concede, but it is not common as matter but as form or act, in each of them.

147. When argument is next made ‘about generation and term’ [n.61], the response is plain, that relation is not in substance as form in matter, but if person is there relative, then relation is in essence as the property of the supposit is in nature [sc. as the Socrateity of Socrates is in humanity, nn.109, 113, 124];³³ but to be in something as a supposit or idea of supposit in nature entails nothing about being ‘in’ as form is in matter, although, when nature is imperfect, the individual property in some way informs nature, as was said in the third article of the solution, in the first difficulty [n.109].

148. When it is argued third that ‘to every active potency there corresponds a passive potency’ etc. [n.62], I reply: to the first active power there does not correspond any passive power, as is plain from the power of creating, – and this speaking properly of passive power as that in which, or from which, something is produced; however to ctive power corresponds some passive power which they [followers of Henry] call ‘objective power’, – which is producible power, – and in this way I concede that if the Father is actively fecund, that the Son is producible, but from this does not follow some power of quasi-matter, just as it does not follow in the case of creation.

149. When finally it is argued ‘about fire’ [n.62], I say that if fire were to generate from itself, it would communicate to the thing generated its form as formal term of the generation; but its substance would not be in potency to the form of generating, if fire itself were perfectly something productive, – for then there would not be required another co-causing cause. So it is in the case at hand: the first principle – and not another principle in the same genus of principle nor in another – does not require anything else concurring with it to be principle.

IV. To the Arguments

150. [To the Principal Arguments] – When it is argued to the principal argument from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.46] I reply: Augustine subjoins in the same place: “as if one thing there be substance and another be person.”

Likewise, I concede that not properly is it said that some person is from the essence absolutely, but when adding along with the substance some originating person it

³³ Note of Scotus: “But it is objected: in the way in which generation precedes the Son – according to way of understanding – in what is it? Not in essence as in the Father, because as it is in him it is not had by generation, – not as in the Son, because it precedes him; and it is in something because it is not *per se* subsistent because then it would be a person; not the first person, – therefore the second person would precede the Son.

Response: what is generation-passion in? – it is the same question, nay a more difficult one, because here can be given what is ‘in essence’ in two ways, both as in a foundation and as property of a person in the nature – in which the person is – and each without potentiality of essence; nor is the second way [sc. as property of a person in the nature] more difficult than that about relation, because passive generation is the same property as filiation – only conceived in a different way.”

is well said that some originated person is of the substance of that person, such that this, ‘the Son is from the divine essence’ is not to be conceded in the way that this is ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’, because by the second is expressed consubstantiality and origination, on account of the genitive [‘of the Father’] construed with the causal case of the preposition [‘from the substance’], – but by the first something originating is not indicated.

151. To the other [n.47] it must be said that although Augustine say the Son is ‘Son of the substance of the Father’ (*On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37, n.49), and a certain doctor [Henry] say it is proper, – yet it seems more probable that whenever a relative [‘Son’] is construed with something [‘substance’] in that sort of causal relationship [‘of’] in which something [‘the Father’] is of a nature to terminate the relative as its correlative, then it is construed with it [‘Son of the substance’] precisely as with its correlative [‘Son of the Father’]. – Example. ‘Father’ is construed with the relative in the relation of genitive [‘of the father’], ‘similar’ in the relation of dative [‘similar to...’], ‘greater’ in the relation of ablative [‘greater than...’]. According to common speech, it seems that with whatever ‘such a [determinate] relative’ is construed in ‘such a causal relation [genitive]’, it is indicated to be the correlative of this relative [as in ‘son of the father’]; for we do not say ‘this dog is the son of a man’ because it is a son and is of a man as of the dog’s master, such that ‘of a man’ is construed with ‘dog’ by force of possession or possessor, but it seems to indicate that it is construed with ‘of a dog’ in the idea of relative, as ‘of the father’.³⁴

152. Thus therefore in this ‘the Son of the essence’, it seems that essence is taken as the correlative of the relative with which it is construed. – And then the authority of Augustine [n.151] ought to be expounded as he himself expounds it [sc. and not as Henry does, n.49]: “‘of the Son of his charity,’ – that is ‘of his beloved Son’.”

153. And then to this argument [n.151]: when it is argued that on this ‘from the essence’ follows this, ‘that he is of the essence’, – I deny the consequence, because the consequent indicates that the relation is between the Son and the essence as its correlative; which the antecedent does not indicate, but it only indicates consubstantiality in the essence, along with origination, indicated in that which is construed with essence.

154. To the final one [n.48] I say that ‘from’ [as in ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’] does not indicate only identity, but it indicates identity of the noun it governs [‘substance’] (and this in idea of form) and distinction of that which is added to that noun [‘of the Father’] as originating principle, in the way said before [n.99].

155. [To the arguments for the opposite] – To the arguments for the opposite: To that from *On the Trinity* XV [n.49] the response has been given [n.152].

156. To the one from *Against Maximinus* [n.50] the response is plain too from what has been said [nn.98-101].

157. To the final one [n.51], about ‘son’ in creatures, – the response is plain from what was said in the solution of the question, because the ‘from’, which pertains to the idea of filiation, does not state the circumstance of material cause [n.104], but rather it is enough if that from which the son is be a form common to father and son and be, not the subject of generation, but the formal term of the same [n.105].

³⁴ In other words [to cite the note of the editors of the Vatican edition], although we can say that a dog is a son [of some dog] and is of a man [as of its master], common speech does not allow us to go on to say ‘the dog is a son of a man’ because here ‘of a man’ indicates paternity and not, as it did originally, mastership.

Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God the Father generated God the Son by Will

1. Concerning the sixth distinction I ask whether God the Father generated God the Son by will.

That he did:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17, after other treatments about the production of the persons, says: “Do you wish to hear a brief word on these things that we have said? That the ungenerated wishes to have of himself one of the same form and dignity seems to me to be the same as that he generates a Son; and that both generated and ungenerated wish to have one of the same love seems to be the same as that they produce the Holy Spirit.” Thus, that the Father wants to have one of the same form is to generate; therefore, just as by will he wants to have one of the same form, so by will he has generated.

2. From the same authority there is argument as follows in another way: in the same manner he [Richard] concedes that ‘to will as it is of the Father’ is disposed to generating as ‘willing as it is of the Father and Son’ is disposed to inspiriting; but now the Holy Spirit is inspirited formally by the will ‘as it is of the Father and Son’; therefore etc.

3. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.7 (and the quote is put in [Lombard’s] *Sentences* I d.20 ch.3 n.189): “If the Father did not generate a Son equal to himself, either he did not want to or he was not able to; if he did not want to, then he was envious.” – From this as follows: for envy only pertains to those things that are taken away by will and can be communicated by will, just as I am not envious if I do not make you wise because I cannot cause science in your soul; therefore the Father generated an equal Son by will, because according to the aforesaid authority he would be envious if he did not generate an equal Son.

4. Again, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a26-30, ch. ‘On the Necessary’: “Everything involuntary is painful;” there is nothing painful in divine reality, therefore there is nothing involuntary; therefore the Son by will is generated.

5. Again, the Word is love, as is plain, – and it is produced, because according to Hilary *On the Trinity* IV ch.10: “the Son has nothing save what is born;” the principle of produced love is the will; therefore etc.

If it be said that it is love concomitantly, because first it is produced knowledge; – and the same is principle with respect to the first formal term and to anything concomitant with that term.

6. To the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: “Generation is a work of nature;” and the Master [Lombard] in the text [I d.6 ch. un. n.69], and it is a quote from Augustine [Ps.-Augustine *Dialogue on 65 Questions* q.7]: “The will cannot precede knowledge.”

I. To the Question

7. In this question there seem to be two difficulties: one, how the Father generates the Son willingly, – the other, how the fact may be saved that the Father does not generate the Son by will as by productive principle.

A. How the Father generates the Son willingly

8. [*The opinion of others*] – As to the first article [n.7] argument is given [from Godfrey of Fontaines] that the Father does not generate the Son ‘willingly’ but only by natural necessity (the way fire heats), although the will of the Father is as it were pleasing to the as it were posited act of generating.

9. The argument is as follows: the intellection of the Father precedes the will in some way; but the intellection of the Father as of the Father seems to be the generation of the Word or Son; therefore the generation of the Son as it is of the Son precedes any volition of the Father.

The first proposition [the major] is evident from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. – I prove the second [the minor], because there are not two acts of the same power, because powers are distinguished by acts, *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-20; but to generate the Son or to speak the Word – which is the same in God – belongs to the intellective power, and similarly does to understand; therefore to speak is formally to understand something, and it is only of the Father as of the Father generating; therefore etc.

10. [*Against the opinion*] – This reasoning relies on a false minor, namely on the identity of to understand and to speak, – and from it there follows a false conclusion, namely that the Father does not properly speak willingly. First then [nn.11-12] I show the falsity of the minor, second [n.13] that the ‘false consequent [conclusion]’ follows, third [n.14] I reply to the proof of the false minor, fourth [n.15] how the false consequent should be avoided and the opposite be held, which is the principal point in this article [n.7].

11. On the first point [the falsity of the minor, n.10], I argue against the identity of these two, to understand and to speak, as follows:

First: to understand is a perfection simply; to speak is not; therefore they are not the same formally. Proof of the first: the Father, as to intellect, is formally blessed by intellection, – and, as to will, by volition; but he is only blessed by perfection simply; therefore, etc. – Proof of the second: in that case [sc. if to speak were a perfection simply] the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be simply perfect, because they do not speak – taking to speak in this way – because they do not express a word.

12. Secondly thus: because just as in creatures the idea of action and of making are formally distinguished (because action is ultimate term, – but of making there is another term, produced by the making), so in divine reality the operation by which the Father formally operates seems to be distinguished from the production by which he formally produces; and this seems so because operation has an object as it were presupposed, but production has a term that is produced by it. Therefore to understand –

which is the operation of the Father – is not formally to speak, which is the production of the Son by the Father.³⁵

13. To the second point [that the false consequent follows, n.10], which is also a confirmation of the first point, I argue thus:³⁶ just as in our intellect, when it naturally has its first intellection – which is not in our power –, our will is able to take pleasure in the intellection already posited, but properly speaking we do not elicit the act willing it, but we will it to be when it has been elicited, thus it would follow, if to understand were formally to speak, that the Father would not formally generate willingly, although the generating would as it were in some way later please the Father.

14. About the third point [the proof of the false minor, n.10], to the proposition ‘powers are distinguished by acts’, – I respond thus, that action in creatures is taken in one way for action in the genus of action, in another way for second act, which is an absolute quality, as was expounded before [I d.3 nn.601-604]. Of one power, then, there is only one act speaking of this act only or of that act only – but of one power there can well be a double act, one of which is an action and the other is in the genus of quality: just as our intellect, of which sort action in the genus of action is ‘to generate a word’, yet has another act in the genus of quality, namely generated knowledge. So in the matter at hand: the divine intellect has one act corresponding to our intellection that is quality, namely the act by which the intellect of the Father formally understands; it has also an act corresponding to act in the genus of action, by which it expresses the Word. – A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] says otherwise, that the intellect as it is intellect has the act which is ‘to understand’, – but that it also has the act which is ‘to speak’, according to the fact it has already been made to be in act by ‘to understand’; but this was rejected in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.273-280, 290-296], where it was argued that the first act – which is to understand – is not the formal idea of generating the Word [cf. *Ord.* I d.2 nn.290-296].

15. I say then about the fourth point [sc. avoiding the false consequent, n.10] that in this way does the Father willingly generate: – because in the first moment of origin the Father understands formally, and then too he can have an act of willing³⁷ formally; in the second moment of origin he generates the Son; and yet he does not will the generating by a volition that follows the generating, but by a volition possessed in the first moment of origin, by which the Father formally wills, presupposing already in some way the intellection by which the Father understands, but not [presupposing] the generation of the Word.³⁸

B. How the Father does not Generate the Son by Will as by Productive Principle

³⁵ *Text cancelled by Scotus*: “This conclusion I concede.”

³⁶ *Text cancelled by Scotus*: “because otherwise [sc. if to understand and to speak were formally the same], it would not be well saved how the Father generates the Son willingly, as was argued in the first argument [nn.11-12] – unless that he is naturally generating so as later to will the generation already posited.”

³⁷ Note by Scotus: “‘of willing’: – it is true, as to whatever is then known; the generating of the Son is not pre-known to its existence in itself. – Response: the essence is known, it can be willed not only in itself but as needing to be communicated; therefore, as willing the essence to be communicated it generates the Son, and so as willing, not to generate as it is to generate, but as it is a sort of to communicate.”

³⁸ Interpolated text: “To the argument about distinction of powers by acts [*supra* n.9], it could be said that it is true of adequate acts and otherwise not, because an unlimited power can, while remaining the same, have many acts.”

16. As to the second article [n.7], it seems that the Father does not produce the Son by will as by productive principle, because a productive principle of one idea in divine reality cannot have two productions; for no production of one idea is there save a single because adequate one; since therefore the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will as productive principle, the Son will not be thus produced [cf. *Ord.* I d.2 nn.300-303, 354-358].

17. But in this article there is a difficulty, on account of the word of Augustine, because he seems to attribute generation to the will in us as to productive principle, *On the Trinity* IX ch.7 n.13: “the word is conceived by love;” and in the same, ch.11 n.16, “knowledge pleasing and worthily loved is the word;” and XI ch.3 n.6: “The will itself, in the way it was moving the sense to be formed by the object and uniting it when formed, was thus converting the vision of the remembering soul to memory;” and in the same, ch.4 n.7: “The will, which carries mental vision this way and that, and brings it back to be formed, and conjoins it when it is formed.” There are also many similar passages. – Therefore, he intends that will have the idea of converting mental vision before begetting, and of retaining it in act.

18. Thus then it seems in the Trinity – whose image is in the soul – that the will has there some idea of principle with respect to production or begetting, or has the idea of some superior applying a proximate principle to its act, just in us.

The consequence is confirmed, because thus to conjoin belongs to the will from its perfection, insofar namely as it is first in the kingdom of the soul; therefore it belongs most of all to the most noble will.

19. There is argument also for this in us, because if our begetting were merely natural, in no way would it be in the power of the will, – and so we would always have the same word, about the same object moving the intellect more strongly.

20. As to this article,³⁹ although some [Henry] make distinction that the ‘by will’ can be held adverbially, so that the sense is ‘he generated by will’, that is ‘he generated willingly’, – or that it can be held ablatively, and then it indicates cause and elicitive principle with respect to generating, and then it is false, – but whatever may be the case with this distinction, it does not seem one should concede that the Father will have produced the Son by will, such that the will be the proximate or remote principle. That it is not the proximate principle has been proved [n.16], because a principle of one idea is only principle of one production; that it is also not remote principle is plain, because just as the will, as it is operative principle in some way, operates after the intellect, – so, as it

³⁹ Interpolated note: In the solution of this question proceed thus – second article:

Let first be this ‘As to this article...That it is not the proximate’; let it be the reason made there ‘As to the second...’ [n.20].

Thence the ‘But in this...’ n.17. The consequence will be confirmed by two things: first because ‘to conjoin belongs to the will from its perfection, namely insofar as it is first in the kingdom of the soul; therefore it belongs most of all to the noblest will; let second be ‘Against this there is argument...’ [n.23]. Solution: ‘Because of these’ [cf. nn.21-22] and the ‘I reply. Although frequently’ [nn.24-27]. – From those gather three things in our will: with respect to the object, with respect to generating pleased knowledge, third, how in us; because ‘not a single intellection’ – ‘therefore not in God’; two others in the divine will: as in the principle productive of love, and therefore it is spirative of the Holy Spirit; hence how love of the object is prior to love of knowledge, not only more common, and so the Holy Spirit is first love of the divine essence [n.27].

About the first let the sense be as is corrected here: ‘This reason rests’ [n.10].

is in some way productive principle, it produces posterior to the intellect, and so it will not be a superior or prior cause in a production that is properly the intellect's.

21. However, because of the authorities of Augustine [n.17], one must understand that in us there is not only a single act of understanding (taking 'act' in the genus of quality), nor only a single act of generating (taking 'act' for action in the genus of action), because if there were only the single latter act and only the single former act, and the latter and the former act were the same, – our will would have no causality, either with respect to the act of understanding which is of the genus of quality, or with respect to the act of generating which is of the genus of action. In divine reality, therefore, since there is in the Father only a single act of understanding, with respect to that act the will of the Father will not have any idea of principle or cause, – since too there is only one act of speaking, the will with respect to it will not have the idea of principle, because the will – being principle in the way it is operator – in some way follows the intellect; therefore the act of speaking precedes every way of the will's being a principle. But the will can have, as being well pleased – not as being principle –, an act with respect to the generating, from the fact that the will, as operating in the Father, does not presuppose the generating but only the intellection by which the Father formally understands.

22. Now in us the authorities of Augustine are true, that the will moves mental vision to act of knowing and holds it in knowing [n.17], – because once our first act has been posited, whether of the genus of quality or of the genus of action, we can have other later acts from the command of the will; but in the Father the will does not move the intelligence of the Father as something to be formed by the memory of the Father, because there is in the Father only a single intellection formally, which precedes in some way the production of the Word, – nor does it move the memory with the object so that the Word may be generated.

23. Against this [nn.21-22] there is argument that Augustine understands it not only in us but also in God, because Augustine never seems to assign an act to the will as it is the third part of the image, save that act which is to conjoin parent with offspring, and in this way it has some causality with respect to generation of offspring; therefore this part, as it is part of the image, will represent nothing in the prototype unless the divine will in some way has to conjoin them thus.

24. I reply. Although he frequently assigns that act to the will – as it is part of the image – yet sometimes he assigns another to it, namely 'love of the same object' (which is the 'object' of the memory and of intelligence), as is apparent in *On the Trinity* XV ch.20 n.39: "Hence it is possible," he says, "for eternal and immutable nature to be recollected, considered, and desired" (which authority is set down at distinction 3 of the last question, I d.3 n.591); for there he expressly posits a trinity "in memory, intelligence, and will" as they have an act about the same object, namely uncreated truth. Likewise in XIV ch.8 n.11 he posits a trinity in the mind insofar as "it remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself." He also touches on both acts in XV ch.3 n.5: "The mind and knowledge, by which it knows itself, – and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge."

25. And these two acts well come together in our will, because in loving the object the will loves also knowledge of the same object, and from love of the object it moves the intelligence to understanding it, uniting it to memory (from which it is formed)

and holding it in that sort of conjunction, and thereby in actual understanding of one object.

26. Now of these two acts of the will, the more principal one in us is that which is ‘love of the object’, because it is sometimes cause of love, – but the other act, namely ‘love of the act’, is more universal, because even in respect of a bad object we love the act of knowing, although not the object, as Augustine says IX ch.10 n.15: “I am defining intemperance and this is the word for it; I enjoy defining, although I do not enjoy incontinence.”

27. The will then in us, as it is part of the image, represents will in God, not as to this act of uniting, which belongs to our will, but as to the other act, namely insofar as our will is the principle of producing an act about the same object that was of our memory and intelligence, because will in divine reality is a principle of producing love adequate to the divine essence, which is the first object of the divine memory and intelligence and will, – and the love produced is the Holy Spirit, to whom corresponds in us produced love, which love is frequently called will by Augustine; but will properly in us – which is a power – does not correspond to the Holy Spirit but to the force of the inspiriting power which is in the Father and the Son, and this according to the act by which the will in us has to produce love of the object understood, but not first insofar as it has to produce love of generated knowledge, and in no way insofar as it is a superior cause of generated knowledge; if indeed the inspiriting force is the principle of producing the Holy Spirit in divine reality, who is love of the divine essence and also love of generated knowledge, – although perhaps according to a certain order, – yet the inspiriting force is not in any way productive principle of generated knowledge, because although the Father in the first moment of origin is willing and in the second moment generates, yet the will of the Father does not have the idea of principle with respect to the generating of the Word. – Thus then is it plain how the Father willingly generates and yet not by will as by formal elicitive principle of generation.

28. However, as to Augustine’s intention ‘about the intention of uniting the parent with the offspring’ [n.23], a certain doctor [Henry] says that the uniting intention – speaking in respect of the act of sensing – is an ‘inclination’ made in the power by the sensible species [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.451]. Hence the five things that that doctor posits (namely sensible object, species, and the inclination made, and power of sensing, and act of sensing), he proves by one authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XI ch.2 n.2, – and when Augustine numbers the ‘[uniting] ‘intention’, saying that “‘the intention of the spirit’ detains the sense of the eyes”: “behold,” says that doctor [Henry] “the third. For what ‘detains’ the sense is only the excitation by the said inclination; but Augustine calls it” (according to him) “intention of the spirit causally, because by it the sense of the spirit becomes intent on perceiving the object.”

29. But this is not there to the intention of Augustine, because in the same place – distinguishing these things from each other – he says of intention that “the third is of the soul alone”: therefore, according to him, the intention which was ‘the third’ is not the excitation or inclination by species; likewise, the ‘third’ is attributed to the will about which he says later that “the will...carries mental vision this way and that” [n.17] etc., – which is not true of inclination but only of will and the power of the soul.

II. To the Principal Arguments

30. To the principal arguments. – To the first, when Richard says “this seems to me” etc. [n.1], – this does not ‘seem’ to Augustine, that the to will of the Father be formally to generate, because he says *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15 that the Holy Spirit proceeds “in some way given, not in some way born,” – that is, by way of will, freely, and not by way of nature; and therefore one should expound Richard to mean ‘concomitantly’.

31. To the second [n.3] I say that ‘envy’ exists not only in taking away goods that can be communicated by act of will immediately but [also] whatever goods someone willing can communicate; now the Father willing generates, as was said [n.15], and therefore the argument of Augustine about ‘envy’ holds. 32. To the third [n.4] I say that nothing is involuntary there, and so the generation of the Son is not involuntary (which I concede), – but it does not follow further ‘therefore it is by will as by elicitive principle’: for we do many things – whether with will preceding or will concomitant – of which the immediate principle is not will, but of some it is nature, of some necessity, and of some other such things.

Seventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Power of Generating in the Father is something Absolute or a Property of the Father

1. Concerning the seventh distinction I ask whether the power of generating in the Father is something absolute or a property of the Father.

That it is a property of the Father, – proof:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6: “By that by which he has a Son is he Father,” therefore he is Father by the fact he generates; the proof of the consequence is because by generation does he have a Son. But by paternity is he Father; therefore by paternity does he generate.

2. Or thus: ‘he is Father by paternity, therefore he generates by paternity’; or thus: ‘he generates by deity, therefore he is Father by deity’. – Response: neither consequence is valid, because an ablative with a verb [‘generates – by paternity/deity’] signifies the principle of acting, with an adjective name or concrete name [‘Father – by paternity/deity’] it signifies the formal concerning principle [e.g. as a white thing is white by whiteness]. But as it is, ‘that by which he is formally such’ and ‘that by which he elicitive acts’ need not be the same, although to be such and to act are convertible with respect to the supposit of the agent; nor is the added phrase the same, because an ablative cannot be construed uniformly with the latter and the former, but there is a figure of speech in the first mode [Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.7 n.35, Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.166b10-14], because ‘similar termination’ shows identity of concept – with the latter and with the former – although it is different.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The point seems to be that though ‘by paternity/deity’ are the same in verbal form (having in Latin a similar ablative termination) as to each statement, ‘he is Father by paternity/deity’ and ‘he generates by

3. Again, by reason:

A proper act is from the proper form of the agent; but to generate is the proper act of the Father; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: both because the proper form gives being, therefore it also gives acting, and also because, if the form is common, the effect is common too, because cause and effect correspond to each other, universal to universal and particular to particular, *Physics* 2.3.195b25-27 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a10-13.

4. Again, the middle term is of the same genus as the extremes; but the suppositis, which are the extremes, are relatives; therefore that by which the supposit acts – which is the middle between them – is a relative.

5. Again, potency is of the same genus as act, nay in divine reality they are the same; but the act of generating is a relation; therefore the principle too will be a relation, or a relative.

6. To the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8 says: “Generation is a work of nature” [cf. I d.6 n.6]; but it is not a work of nature as generating, because nature does not generate; therefore it is a work of nature as of the principle of generating.

7. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* V ch.37: “From the virtue of the nature into the same nature does by nativity the Son subsist.”

8. Again, the Master [Lombard] in the text: “the Father is not potent save by nature,” – and he is speaking of the power of generating; therefore etc.

I. The Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

9. There is here an opinion [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.41 a.5] of this sort, that that by which the Father generates is essence, – for this reason, because the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts; but the Son is assimilated to the Father in essence, not in property; therefore etc.

10. And the reason is made clear because just as in creatures the individual property is not the idea of the acting but the nature in which individual things agree, so in divine reality the personal property – which corresponds to the individual property in creatures – will not be the idea of the acting or generating.

11. Against this [n.9] there is argument in many ways. – First thus: every form sufficiently elicitive of some action, if it exists *per se*, acts *per se* with that action (example: if heat is a sufficiently heating power, separated heat heats); therefore if deity is the generative power, and it is agreed that it is sufficient, – it follows that if deity exists *per se*, that it will *per se* generate. But deity exists in itself – in some way – before it is understood to exist in a person, because deity as deity is *per se* being, such that the three persons exist *per se* by deity itself and not conversely (Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, ch.5 n.10: “God subsists for himself;” and later: “for God to exist is this, which is to subsist”); therefore in the first moment of nature in which deity is understood, before it be understood in a person, it will generate, – and thus deity considered as such is distinguished from the generated.

paternity/deity’, yet they are different in concept, because in the first statement they indicate the formal principle and in the second the acting principle.

12. If it be said that deity does not have ‘*per se* being’ save in a person, and therefore it does not *per se* act but the person *per se* acts, – on the contrary: the argument proves the opposite, because if heat, having *per se* participated being, were, by a miracle, to exist *per se*, it could *per se* operate with the operation of which it is the principle; therefore the essence itself, which is ‘*per se* being’ of itself (and it does not participate ‘*per se* being’), will be able *per se* to be an agent with the action of which it is the elicitive principle in the supposit, and so stands the argument [n.11].

13. Second thus: of the producer and the form by which it produces there is the same relation to the product. This is taken from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.3.195b21-25, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33, where he means that art and builder pertain to the same genus of cause. Therefore to the same genus of principle pertain the producer and that by which the producer produces, and so, if the essence be that by which the Father generates, the essence will have a real relation to the generated; this is false, therefore etc.

14. Again, third: the form, insofar as it is that in which generator and generated are alike, does not have unity save of idea, therefore neither does it have entity save of idea;⁴¹ therefore, according to this, it is not an elicitive principle of real action.

15. Again, fourth: the form is not a principle of acting save insofar as the agent is in act by it, and it is not in act by it save insofar as it is in the agent; but as it is in the agent it is a ‘this’; therefore as a ‘this’ is it principle.

16. Again, production distinguishes before it assimilates – which is plain (for every production distinguishes but not every production assimilates) – therefore the form which is the principle of production is a principle of it insofar as form distinguishes before it is so insofar as form assimilates; the form distinguishes insofar as it is a ‘this’, and it assimilates insofar as it is a ‘form’; therefore it is a productive principle insofar as it is a ‘this’ before it is so insofar as it is a ‘form’.

17. Again, there is an instance against the proof of the argument for the position [n.9]: first because when a brute generates a brute it is assimilated to it in species, and yet the specific form of a brute is not the principle of generating, but the vegetative power is, – therefore the major [‘the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts’, n.9] seems to be false; next because in the increase of flesh heat is the active principle (according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.4.416a13-14), and yet animated flesh is generated, being similar to the generator in form of vegetative [soul].

B. Second Opinion

18. In another way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that for generation in divine reality one must give some positive principle, because action is positive; but the only positive principles in the divine persons are essence and relation, – but relation cannot be a principle of that production, because relation is not a principle or a term of motion, from *Physics* 5.2.225v11-13; therefore essence is. But essence, considered in itself, is indeterminate to several persons and to the actions of several persons, therefore it is necessary that, in order for it to be principle of determinate action, that it be determined; and it is determined by relation, – and therefore relation is posited to be the principle, not an elicitive principle but a determinative one.

⁴¹ Interpolated text: “as is taken from Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* I ch.8.”

19. For this a confirmation is adduced from creatures, where the same form gives first and the second act [sc. being and action, n.3]; but it is determined to the former and to the latter from diverse respects, because to the first it is determined from a respect to the subject, to the second from a respect to the object.

20. To the contrary. One sort of indetermination is of ‘passive power’⁴² and another is of ‘active power’ unlimited to several effects⁴³ (an example: as the sun is indeterminate to producing many generable things, not that it receive some form so as to act, but because it has an unlimited productive virtue). What is indeterminate by ‘indetermination of matter’ must receive a form so that it may act, because it is not in act sufficient for acting, but what is indeterminate ‘by indetermination of active power’ is of itself sufficiently determinate for producing any of the effects: and this if the passive disposed thing is close by when something passive is required, or of itself when something passive is not required; proof: if such active thing were of itself determinate to one effect, it could of itself sufficiently produce it, – but if it is indeterminate to this and to that, by such lack of limitation is the perfection of its causality with respect to such an effect not taken away, but there is only added causality with respect to one or other of them; thus therefore can it produce it just as if it were of it only, and so there is not required anything determining it.

21. To the matter at hand [n.18]. The divine essence is not a principle that is indeterminate by indetermination of matter; therefore if it is indeterminate by the indetermination of something else as an active principle, it will be simply determined by the determination that is required for acting, and so there is not required anything else is. A confirmation is because such indetermination of an active principle, although it is to disparate things, is yet not to contradictory things, but it is determinately to one or other part of the contradiction with respect to any at all of the disparate things; but no indetermination prevents it acting determinately of itself save an indetermination that would be in some way to contradictories, as to acting and not-acting; therefore etc.

22. Again secondly thus: when some active principle is indeterminate to two effects, not equally so but according to a natural order, – it is of itself sufficiently determined to the first of them, and, once the first is in place, to the second;⁴⁴ but the divine essence is not indeterminate to these two productions equally [sc. generation and inspiring], but is disposed first to generation; therefore it is of itself sufficiently determined to both, because it is of itself determined first– in order of origin – to the first, and, with that in place, it is determined to the second, – and so in no moment of origin is it indeterminate to each as needing then to be elicited.

23. Again third: relation is the idea of the supposit of the agent. Therefore if it is determinative of the principle ‘by which’, it will have a double idea of principle with

⁴² *Interpolated text*: “and this is to contradictories, as to acting and not acting, and this, whatever it is, is indeterminate and has no power for act unless it be determined by something (otherwise it would have power for contradictories): as matter is in potency to being and not being in a genus, and it is determined to being by form.”

⁴³ *Interpolated text*: “and this is not to contradictories but to disparate things.”

⁴⁴ *Note by Scotus*: “Note here that the indeterminate thing is determined by itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity, because to those [it would be determined] by what it would be determined to others and to those others by others. – On the contrary: what is determined of itself to one opposite is impossible with the other; again in anything at all is it determined to it. – Response: this holds of contradictories; to the second, – in anything at all it is determined, etc. [sc. by itself].”

respect to generation: one insofar as it is the idea of the agent, and another insofar as it is the determinative idea of the principle of acting, – and so it will mediate between itself and the action.

24. Fourth thus: nature as nature is posited as the elicitive principle of action. But ‘as nature’ it is not determinable, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50: “The properties determine the hypostases, not the nature” as nature. Therefore none is determinative of the principle ‘by which’ as it is the principle ‘by which’, but only of the acting principle.

25. Again, relation according to you differs only in idea from the foundation: therefore it cannot be the determinative principle for a real act, in some way distinct from the essence, because nothing concurs in the idea of some principle in respect of a real action save something real.

26. Again, what is said of determinative relation in creatures [n.19] seems to be false, because heat in itself – not by some intermediate respect – is the foundation with respect to this heating power; also, it is not necessary that the determination for first and second act be done through respects, because the same absolute form gives a first absolute act and not a respective one, and also the principle of acting is absolute and not respective.

II. To the Question

A. About the Distinction of Powers

27. I respond to the question, then, by first making a distinction about ‘power’.
For in one way it is said to be ‘logical power [possibility]’, which states the mode of composition made by the intellect, – and this indicates the non-repugnance of the terms; about which the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b30-32: “That is possible whose contrary is not by necessity true.” – And if in this way one ask about ‘power’ in divine reality I say that it exists by comparing generation to any act non-repugnant to generation; and then power, or possibility, is of the Father or of God to the predicate, which is ‘to generate’, because these terms are not repugnant; but there is an impossibility that the Son or Holy Spirit generate, because these terms are repugnant. And if it be asked what is the power of generating in divine reality, there is in this way [sc. of logical possibility] no need to give some principle by which some [person] is able to generate, – for the sole non-repugnance of the terms suffices: just as if, before the creation of the world, the world would not only not have been but, *per impossibile*, God would not have been but would have begun of himself to be, and then he would have been able to create the world, – if there had been an intellect before the world combining this proposition ‘the world will be’, this proposition would have been possible because the terms would not be repugnant, not however because of any principle in a possible thing, or any active principle corresponding to it; nor even now was this proposition ‘the world will be’ possible – formally speaking – by the power of God, but by the possibility that was non-repugnance between these terms, because these terms would be non-repugnant, although the non-repugnance would be concomitant with a power active with respect to this possibility.

28. In another way there is said to be ‘power divided against act’ [*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a15-16], – and this power is not in God.

29. So there is left ‘real power’ – which is called ‘principle of doing or suffering’ [*ibid.* 5.12.1019a15-20; I d.2 n.262] – as the proximate foundation of the relations, because this noun ‘power’ is not abstract with ultimate abstraction, but is concrete by concretion with the foundation (although not by concretion with a subject), – which multiple abstraction in relatives was spoken of above in distinction 5 [I d.5 n.21]. Here however the question is only about the power of acting.

30. And then I draw a distinction, that this noun ‘power’ can be taken for that which it *per se* signifies, or for that which it denominates – which is ‘the proximate foundation of such relation’.

31. Taking it in the first way [n.30] I say that power signifies relation, like potentiality or principiation, – and in this way the question poses no difficulty, because ‘the power of generating in divine reality’ states essentially a relation.

32. In the second way [n.30] there is a difficulty to the question, by inquiring what that ‘absolute’ is which is the proximate foundation of this relation. And then (speaking always precisely of active or productive power, which is what the discussion is now about [n.29]) I distinguish further that ‘power denominatively taken’ is sometimes taken for its foundation precisely, and sometimes for the foundation with all the other things that concur for this, so that it can elicit the act, namely the things that are required for the idea of proximate power – of which sort in creatures are proximity with the passive thing and removal of impediment.

33. This last distinction of power, of power taken for the foundation precisely or for the foundation along with the other concurring things, is taken from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16 and 9.1.1046a10-11. For the definition of power that he there sets down is of power taken in the first way. And power taken in the second way he himself manifestly expresses in *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b35-8a2, 5-7, 16-21: “Since,” he says, “the possible, something possible, and when, and how, and anything else that must be present in the definition;” and he subjoins: “in such powers” (namely the irrational powers) “it is necessary that, when they approach so that they can be active and passive, the former must act and the latter must undergo.” And if it be objected against him [Aristotle] that these irrational powers can be impeded, he says excluding this: “When no outside thing impedes there is need to add nothing further, – for it has the power as it is a power of making: it is, however, not so altogether but of things disposed in some way, wherein are excluded things that hinder from outside; for certain of the things that are placed in the definition remove this” (he means to say that ‘certain of the things’ pertaining to the definition of active and possible power exclude impediment, but ‘active power’ there – according to him – is taken ‘along with all the things that concur for proximate possibility of acting’).

34. Again, third, ‘power of generating’ signifies the principle of eliciting the act from the supposit having this principle. Therefore it connotes a double relation, one of principle to act, the other connotes [relation] of act to supposit, – which is to say: it notes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the act and connotes the relation of the act to the principle ‘which’; and perhaps, third, it connotes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the principle ‘which’. Whether there be two or three relations, there is none save a relation of reason, because of the lack of distinction of the extremes (the first [sc. the relation of principle to act] belongs to paternity as to proximate foundation). – What

Boethius⁴⁵ says, then, that the idea of original principle is directed ‘within’, is true in respect of the person originated, but not in respect of the origin or act of originating, save according to reason only.

B. The Father’s Power of Generating is Something Absolute

35. Speaking then of power, that is, of the proximate foundation, precisely taken, of this relation, – I say that the Father’s power of generating is not a relation but something absolute.

36. [Proof] – I prove the negative part:

First, because every relation seems equally naturally to respect its own proper correlative, therefore the relation of inspiring will equally naturally respect its correlative as the relation of generating will regards its; but in divine reality productions are not distinguished by way of nature and will, save because the principle ‘by which the producer produces’ is disposed differently to the production and the product, because of this one it naturally is and of that one freely; therefore there would not then be two productions formally distinct, by way of nature and of will.

37. Second, because then [sc. if the Father’s power were a relation] the same relation would be principle of itself, because there is in the Father only a single relation to the Son, and it is the ‘by which’ with respect to generation, – which is the same relation, although differently named; therefore etc.

38. Third, because then paternity would be simply more perfect than filiation. – Proof of the consequence, in two ways. First, because that by which the producer produces, if it is not of the same idea as the form of the product, contains it virtually and is more perfect than it: therefore if paternity is that by which the Father acts, and it is not of the same idea as filiation, it contains filiation virtually and is more perfect than it. Second, because filiation does not give to the Son that he act: for nothing, neither inwardly nor outwardly, does the Son produce by filiation; therefore if the Father acts by paternity formally, paternity will be something more perfect than filiation.

39. The affirmative part of the solution [that the Father’s power is something absolute, n.35] I prove thus:

What is of perfection in the productive principle does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything; but to communicate itself in numerical identity, and with a communication adequate to itself, posits perfection in the productive principle: therefore this does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything. But if God, *per impossibile*, were to generate another God, and that other a third, deity would be posited as the productive principle of the other [sc. the third] and not a relation; and then deity would not communicate itself in numerical identity, nor communicate itself with a communication adequate to itself in idea of productive principle, because deity would be able to be the principle of another communication, namely the one done – *per impossibile* – by the second God. Therefore since now deity is communicated in numerical identity and by a communication adequate to it, such that by deity there cannot be a numerically other communication of the same idea as the first, – it follows that the

⁴⁵ *Vatican editors*: What text of Boethius is here referred to is unclear. The name ‘Boethius’ may possibly be an error and perhaps a reference to an ‘argument’ is meant, as to that in n.22.

productive principle will much more now be posited to be an absolute productive principle than it would be posited to be then.

40. In brief: if a form were not communicated the same in number nor adequately, it would be posited to be a principle of communicating; therefore if now it be more perfectly communicated, it – or something more perfect – will be the principle of communicating in that [more perfect] way.

41. An example of this is if heat in fire were to communicate itself the same in number to a piece of wood, and with an adequate communication, such that this heat could not be the principle of another heating, it would not be denied that the heat of the fire was the productive principle of heat in the wood, since now in fact the heat is posited as the principle of it, and this with a double imperfection, opposed to the double perfection here supposed (because now there is there a diversity of communicated heat and the communication is not adequate, but then there would be an identity of communicated heat and an adequate communication); and yet – on the basis of the posited hypothesis – the wood would not be able to heat by heat: for not able itself, because it receives heat by the heating which is from this heat, and then it would have heat before it would have heat, – nor something else able, because this heating of the wood is posited as adequate to the heat in idea of active principle. – Thus must it be understood in the matter at hand, because that which would be posited to be the principle of another heating, if the communication were to happen in numerical diversity and not adequately, the same should now be posited as the principle when a communication of the same thing happens, adequate to the productive principle.

42. Second I prove the same: something absolute is the formal term of generation, therefore something absolute is the formal idea by which the agent acts. – The antecedent was proved in distinction 5 question 2, in the first reason against the first opinion [I d.5 nn.64-69]. – I prove the consequence, because it is impossible for an ‘agent’ to communicate the formal term of production unless it act with a form equally perfect if it act univocally, – or if it act equivocally, with a more perfect form; but in divine reality nothing is more perfect than the absolute, because the ‘absolute’ is formally infinite, but relation is not; therefore etc.

43. [*Instance*] – An instance against this reason [n.42] is because the consequence is only valid in univocal generation. But this generation [sc. generation in divine reality] is proved to be equivocal, first on the part of the persons, second from the productions, and third from the idea of specific difference.

44. The first way as follows: paternity and filiation differ in species, therefore the persons constituted by them. – The proof of the antecedent is because they differ in their quiddities, and such difference is specific; and because they are pure acts, but the difference of act and form is specific. – The proof of the consequence is, first, because there is no greater distinction in principles than in the things they are principles of; second, because there is the same difference of things according to which some are precisely different as there is of the differences themselves; third, because relations are the same for the divine essence as for the person, – therefore a specific difference of the persons will not be denied by this as neither of the relations; fourth, because there is the same difference of formal constituents as of the things constituted.

45. In the second way (about productions) the argument is: in divine reality the productions differ in genus, therefore so do the products. – The antecedent is plain,

because in divine reality there is only a single production of a one idea. –The proof of the consequence is, first, because otherwise there would not be proportion of productions to products; also, second, because productions are of the same idea as the products; and, third, because powers of a different idea require objects of a different idea, – therefore, if they were to produce their own objects, they would produce them of a different idea: therefore, just as will and intellect presuppose that ‘good’ and ‘true’ are formally distinct, so they will produce formally distinct terms, or they will be that by which such distinct terms are produced.

46. In the third way (about specific difference) the argument is as follows: specific difference seems to be more perfect than numerical difference, – the proof of which is that the distinction of species belongs to the *per se* perfection of the universe, but the distinction of individuals does not; therefore specific difference, in the way it is more perfect, seems it should be posited in divine reality.

47. [Against the instance] – To these arguments I reply that, whether generation is set down as equivocal or univocal, the argument is not affected, because in equivocal generation the productive principle must be more perfect than the terminating form; but nothing is more perfect than the absolute, and specifically no relation is more perfect; for it seems most absurd to say that relation virtually contains the divine essence.

48. The conclusion, however, to which these reasonings [n.43] lead, namely about equivocal generation, seems to be false, because since in the first term of generation – namely in the product itself – two things come together, namely nature and the proper relation of product by which it is a ‘this’, – either generation is called equivocal or univocal by some formal term of generation, or by some formal [term] proper to the produced supposit itself. If in the first way, since nature – which is the formal term of this production – is the same in producer and produced, univocity follows, because most perfect likeness does. If in the second way, then no generation is univocal, because nothing generated is assimilated in its own individual form to the one generating. – That is, and it is argued in another way and it is almost the same, because generation both distinguishes and assimilates. But the more perfect idea in it is that it assimilates than that it distinguishes, – as is plain, because thus it is from the form under the idea of form, not under the idea by which it is a ‘this’, and the idea of form is more perfect in the supposit than this individual difference is. If it is more perfectly in generation that it is assimilative, then it will according to this be called univocal or equivocal. For if it were said to be such or such insofar as it distinguishes, any generation at all would be called equivocal, because any generation at all distinguishes, – and this is the more imperfect idea in generation, because it belongs to the most imperfect generation. Therefore by this is univocal generation not distinguished from equivocal.

49. Therefore to the matter at hand. Since generation is assimilative insofar as the same nature is communicated, distinctive insofar as it is of a distinct generated thing of a distinct generator, it follows that there is univocity as to the nature of generator and generated, and not as to the distinction between generator and generated.

50. Second, the application to the matter at hand is because if the individual differences – which are diverse first – constitute products not diverse first but between which there is univocal generation (because of likeness in nature), if these individual differences were species of another genus, they would still not constitute things distinct with as much distinction as they would have in their own genus, because then the

individual differences would constitute things diverse first. But that the things constituted now are not diverse first is because of the nature, in which nature the individuals agree; so they would also then agree in the same nature, although the constituting differences would be species of a different genus. Therefore the constituted things would then be of the same species, as they now are.

51. So to the arguments for the opposite [sc. for the opposite conclusion, that the generation is equivocal, nn.43-46]:

To the first [n.44] one must say that there is properly neither genus nor species there, nor specific difference. But I do well concede that paternity and filiation are relations of a different species and of a different idea, because they are opposites and are not founded on unity – even immediately – as are likeness and equality; there is also a greater distinction between paternity and filiation than between paternity and paternity. But when you infer ‘therefore the things constituted too are of a different idea quasi-specifically’, I deny the consequence.

52. And, on account of the proof of the consequence, one must understand that some things are sometimes said to be more distinguished because of a greater repugnance or impossibility between them, as contraries are said to be more distinguished, like white and black, than disparate things are, like man and white, – and in this way it is not said properly that ‘some things are more distinguished’; for more are those things ‘properly distinguished’ which agree less in something; and thus things distinct in the most general genus are more distinct than contraries which are of the same species, even though contraries are more repugnant.

53. Hence universally: the distinction between distinct things is as great as is the distinction, that is, the repugnance, of what constitutes or formally distinguishes them, because if white and black are impossible, the things constituted by them are also impossible. And so it is in the matter at hand: the impossibility of Father and Son, such that the Father is not the Son, is as great as is the impossibility of paternity and filiation – because of which paternity is not filiation.

54. But taking it in the second way of [sc. ‘more distinguished’, n.52], never do the distinguishing things agree as much as do the things distinguished by them, as is plain by running through all the things that distinguish. For specific differences do not include the genus in which they agree, but the species distinguished by them do include the genus in which they agree; and the reason is because the distinguishing things presuppose something in the distinct things that the distinguishing things do not include in their understanding, but the things distinguished by them do include it; therefore the distinguished things agree in it, but the distinguishing things do not agree in it.⁴⁶

55. From this [n.54] is plain the response to the arguments and the proofs [n.44]. – When you speak of ‘the principles and the things they are principles of’, I say that there can be a greater distinction – that is, a greater non-agreement (that is, an agreement in fewer things) – between principles than between the things they are principles of, just as specific differences, which are the principles of species, do not agree in the genus in which the species themselves agree; and so is it also in the case of individual differences and individuals in respect of the specific nature.

⁴⁶ *Interpolated text*: Hence the Commentator on *Physics* 1 [Averroes, *Physics* I com.52] says that some things are contrary in form but not in subject, as simple things that agree in subject; for the same subject underlies both.

56. From this [n.54] is the answer plain to what is said about ‘formal constitutives and things precisely distinct’ [n.44]; for, in the case of all of them, it is false that the difference of the things constituted is as great as the distinction or difference of the formal constituents.

57. But I weigh the argument further: because these relations – in the matter at hand – are subsistent, therefore they have as much difference insofar as they are subsistent as they have in their proper ideas; but the subsistent relations are persons, therefore the persons have as much difference as the relations have. – And in addition to this: the persons differ by some formal difference, and by none save by the difference that the relations have, because they have no other; but the difference the relations have is specific, – therefore the difference of the persons will be in species or in nothing.

58. To these arguments I reply. – To the first [n.57], that although the relations are subsistent, yet the persons do not include only the relations but also the very nature in which they subsist, – but the relations do not formally include the nature. The persons then formally agree in something in which the relations formally do not agree, and so there is not as great a distinction here as there.

59. To the second [n.57] I say that this consequence does not follow: ‘by these precisely are they distinguished, and these are distinguished in species, therefore the persons are distinguished in species’, – just as neither does it follow about individual differences with respect to individuals. And when you say ‘then there will be no difference between distinct things, since what belongs to the distinguishing things does not belong to the distinct things, nor does anything else that comes through the former’ [n.57], I say that through them there can be some distinction of distinct things, different from the distinction of the distinguishing things, – and a lesser one, just as by individual differences there is some distinction between individuals different from that of the differences, because differences are diverse first; but ‘distinct things’ are not diverse first, but they are only distinct in number within the same species. So here, in the matter at hand, by relations distinct in species, or in quasi-genus (to which, however, insofar as they are distinct, distinction in species is an accident), some things can be distinct only in person within the same species or within the same nature.

60. As to the second way, about productions [n.45], I deny the consequence, because here, from the perfection of the divine nature, there can be some principles of a different idea yet communicative of the essence, – which does not happen in any imperfect nature. And because of the distinction of these formal principles, there can be productions of a different idea and yet products of one idea, because of the unity of the formal term, namely of the nature which is communicated.

61. When the consequence is first proved, through proportion [n.45], – I say that the proportion ‘of the production to the formal term’ is that by it the formal term is communicated. But such proportion is not required for the production to be of one idea, provided the formal term is of one idea, because productions can be distinguished through their ideas differently than from the formal terms, as here [sc. in divine reality], from the formal principles. An example of this is whenever the same form can be acquired by changes of a different idea, just as the same ‘where’ can be acquired by local motion over a straight and circular magnitude, which motions are so of different idea that they are not comparable, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.248a10-b6,

5.4.228b19-21; so would it be if the same health could be induced immediately by art and immediately by nature.

62. When that consequence is proved, second, by the fact that ‘productions are of the same idea as their products’ [n.45], – I say that to this extent are they of the same idea, that just as productions are relations so products are relatives; but because products are subsistent in the same nature, and productions are not formally supposit subsistent in that nature, therefore the products can have some unity in the nature formally – communicated to them through the productions – which the productions do not formally have.

63. When argument is made, third, about the distinction of powers and of distinct objects, that there is a similar distinction of objects to powers [n.45], – the response was plain from distinction 2 question 4, ‘Whether there are in divine reality only two productions’ [I d.2 nn.342-344].

64. About the third way, namely ‘about the perfection of the specific difference’ [n.46], – I say that specific difference is not more perfect than specific identity in divine reality. But in creatures it is a mark of perfection. – For once limitation in creatures is posited, there cannot be a total perfection in creatures without specific distinction, but if in some one nature there were an infinite perfection, specific distinction there would not be required for perfection simply. Therefore in creatures specific difference is a perfection supplying for imperfection, but in divine reality – where nature is simply perfect – there is no need to posit such ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’, because there is no imperfection there to be supplied. An example: generation in creatures is ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’ in corruptible things, which without generation could not be conserved either the same numerically or of the same species, – but in divine reality there is no need to posit such ‘perfection supplying for an imperfection’ that there may be there, or in any eternal thing.

C. To the Form of the Question

65. Now as to the form of the question, whereby is asked about the power of generating ‘whether it is something absolute’ [n.1], – I reply that a gerundive construed with ‘power’ [sc. ‘power of generating’] indicates the act as coming from the same supposit as the power is attributed to. The like is true of science and will when these are construed with the gerundive: for then they indicate the act as proceeding from the supposit to which science or will is attributed. For which reason one does not allow this proposition ‘the Son has the science or the will of generating’ as one does allow that ‘the Son knows the generation of the Father and wills it’. – Nay, the first one seems it should be denied, just as also these, ‘he knows how to generate’ and ‘he wills to generate’, – because ‘to will to act’ seems to be the same thing as ‘to have the will of acting’; but ‘to will action’ does not seem to be the same as these, because it does not include willing the action as action is of the one willing, which the other [‘to will to act’] does seem to fashion.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

66. To the arguments. First to the principal ones [nn.1-5] To the arguments. First to the principal ones [nn.1-5]. – First, as to Augustine [n.1], I say that he understands ‘by the fact that’ formally, not foundationally or causally; an example: we say that Socrates is similar by similarity formally, but he is said to be similar by whiteness foundationally or causally. So it is in the matter at hand, the Father generates by generation formally, but we are not in this way asking by what he generates, but we are asking what generation is elicited by as by formal elicitive principle, which namely is the proximate foundation of this relation. Therefore Augustine intends that ‘he is Father by that by which he has a Son’, that is, by that notion, – this is, that the Father is not called Father in relation to himself but in relation to the Son; but Augustine does not mean there what the Father is Father by – or what he generates by – as by elicitive principle of generation, as is plain there from his text.

67. To the second [n.3] I say that⁴⁷ from a form common in the first mode there is a common operation, because if some form taken universally is followed by some operation taken universally, any singular form under it will be followed by a singular operation of the same idea, unless some singular form is imperfect. But if we are speaking of the second community, which is of the form with respect to what participates it, I say that it is not necessary that a common form be the principle of a common operation, and especially when it is possessed by many suppositis in order, such that it is communicated to one from another, and this by adequate communication, as was made clear in the example adduced in the first reason for the affirmative part of the solution [n.41].

68. To the matter at hand I say that the major, ‘proper operation is from proper form’ [n.3], is false when speaking of proper-ness in the second mode [n.67], which is the sort of proper-ness – or at least no other one – that can be understood in the matter at hand.

69. And when the first proposition is proved, first because “it is the proper form, therefore, because it gives being, it gives acting” [n.3], – I deny the consequence; for there are many forms giving being which yet are not active and which in no way give second act; and such is paternity, just as also filiation.

70. But what is the reason why some forms are active and some not?

It is difficult to assign a common reason, because some substantial forms are active, and some qualities are active, but some substantial forms and some qualities are not active, – and yet qualities and qualities agree more in some common concept than do qualities and substances. Likewise, some substantial more imperfect forms are active, as the elementary ones, and more perfect ones are not active, as the forms of mixed things, as of stone and other inanimate objects, – some forms too of mixed and perfect things are active, as of animate things; however some of the more perfect forms are not communicative of themselves, as the forms of celestial bodies and angelic forms. There does not then seem to be a reason why some forms in general are active and some not – just as, in a specific case, there does not seem to be any reason why heat heats save

⁴⁷ *Interpolated text*: “community of form can be understood in a double way: one which is universal, which is by identity to many inferiors, each of which is ‘it’ (in the way a universal is communicated to singulars), another which is relative to many things each of which is ‘by it’ (in the way a form is communicated to matter) but is not ‘it’, – as was said above [I d.2 nn.379-380].” See also below, n.71, where it is pointed out that the second mode does not exist in creatures without the first mode.

because heat is heat; and thus it seems that this proposition is immediate ‘heat is effective of heat’. Thus too it seems that all forms of the genus of quantity, and all relations (about which the discussion now is), are not active, and about such it is not valid that ‘if they give first act therefore they give second act’.

71. When the second consequence is proved through the Philosopher in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* [n.3], – I say that he is talking of universal and particular speaking in the first mode of ‘common’ and not taking it in the second mode, namely insofar as the same form in number is common to the things that participate it; for this commonness is not in creatures, nor a commonness universal to the things that participate it without a commonness of ‘universal’ said in the first way [n.67].

72. When the argument is given, third, about potency and act [n.5], I say that there is an equivocation about potency. For the major is true as potency is a difference of being dividing being against act, because thus not only is being in general divided into act and potency, but also any genus of being and any species and any individual, because thus is the same whiteness in potency first and later in act, – and in this way act and potency belong to the same genus; and in this way, properly speaking, there is no potency of generating in divine reality, namely a potency which may be opposed to act, because that generation is simply necessary and in act, and therefore it is not in potency as potency is repugnant to act. But here the discussion is about potency as potency is a principle, and in this way the proposition is false which says that ‘power is of the same genus as act’; for a substantial form can be a principle of action in the genus of action and of action in the genus of quality – as was touched on above in distinction 3 question on ‘generated knowledge’ [I d.3 n.518], that a subject is the *per se* cause of its proper passion.

73. When the argument is made ‘about the middle and the extremes’ [n.4], I say that something is a middle by participation in each extreme, as grey is a middle between white and black, which middle is from the nature of the thing, and of such a middle it is true that it is in the same genus as the extremes, as the Philosopher proves *Metaphysics* 10.7.1057a18-26. Another middle is in a way taken accidentally, as operation between the operator and the term: this need not be of the same genus as the extremes because, when the soul understands itself, its understanding is a quality, and yet operator and object are substances; such a middle is taken – namely in the intended proposition – as the ‘by which’ between the generating and the generated supposit. Or one can say in another way that the ‘by which’ is not properly a middle but is on the side of one of the extremes, namely the generator; but a proper middle, if any be granted, can be said to be generation, and about that it is true that is of the same idea as the extremes, because it is a relation, just as the extremes are relatives.

B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion

74. Now because some of the arguments ‘against the first opinion’ are against me, I respond to them.

To the first [n.11] I reply that the major has greater probability here than in creatures, because this form is so *per se* that there corresponds to it its proper ‘that which is able to act’, – to wit ‘this God’, who in some way precedes the relations and so acts; the thing is plain because thus does he first understand and will; therefore it seems he

would have power for every action of which his ‘by which’ is the proper formal principle, and so ‘this God’ generates first.

75. But about the elicitive principle the major is false, when the elicitive principle – if it exists *per se* – cannot be the proper power for operation. An example: the species – if one posits an elicitive principle for the operation of seeing in the eye – could not, if it *per se* existed, be the principle of the operation, and the reason would be because it could not be in proximate potency to acting because it could not have the thing that undergoes the act approximate to it, because approximation – as was said before [n.32] – is required for the idea of proximate power. And just as approximation in creatures or a removal of impediments is required, so was it said that in the matter at hand there is required a supposit suited for acting [n.32]. Therefore the form, which would be the principle of action in a distinct supposit, if it were *per se* existent, would not be a supposit nor a distinct principle, nor in a distinct supposit suited to generation, and, from the fact that the supposit is required for proximate potency of acting, such a form could not act *per se*. But something ‘essential’, if it exist *per se* in some instant of nature before it be understood to exist in a supposit or a person, is not in that prior instant an acting supposit in proximate potency to acting; for this action requires a distinction of certain things in this nature, which distinction can only be of supposits. Therefore a supposit suited to this action is a distinct supposit, existing in this nature: in nothing such is nature, insofar as it is understood, a being *per se*, although it in some way is *per se* before it is in a person – and therefore it will not be able ‘to act *per se*’ by this action.

76. Note that ‘a form being *per se*’ can be understood in three ways: in one way that ‘*per se*’ excludes ‘the being in of a form’ in matter, whether the being in is of an accidental or a substantial form; in another way ‘the being in of a quiddity or nature’ in the supposit, and this actually so; in a third way ‘aptitudinal’ or ‘potential’ – both a case of being in.

77. The third way sets down what is to be thus *per se* a complete supposit, and therefore to take it like this in the major [nn.74-75] is to take contradictories, because the form, which is, for the thing that has the form, the principle by which it acts, cannot thus be *per se*. Therefore *per se* in the major is understood in the first two ways, – and thus do I prove the major, because there is only required for ‘acting’ actuality and ‘*per se* existence’; the first is possessed equally in an inherent form and in a *per se* being, the second is possessed sufficiently if it is *per se* in the first two ways (otherwise a separated soul would not be an agent).

78. There is also a confirmation, because if the nature assumed by the Word were let go without any positive action concerning it, it would not be *per se* in the third way (because then it would be un-assumable, as such), and yet ‘this man’ could do every act which the Word now possesses by means of this nature, – nay if, according to the article of the first distinction in book 3 (III d.1 q.1 nn.6,9), nothing positive constitutes a created supposit, it is certain that the idea of supposit gives nothing to anything that is positive for acting; but neither does it give order for other things that are undergone, as is imagined by Averroes in *Metaphysics* VII com.31, that an idea could not move a body or matter because of defect of order.

79. Against this [sc. what Averroes says, n.78], because it is accidental that the order of agent to patient insofar as it is consequent to ‘this existent’ exists ‘incommunicably’.

Therefore it can be replied in another way, that the major [nn.74-75] is true, because the form is active with respect to a term distinct of itself (but not when it is with respect to an indistinct term, because then, although it could be that by which the supposit produces, it cannot however be the producer, because it is not distinct from the term, which is required for it to be producer; but this is not required for it to be that ‘by which’).

80. More plainly is it said that the major is true of immanent acting and making, and universally of the production of a term distinct from the productive form. Here the term is indistinct from the form by which it produces.

81. On the contrary. If deity or ‘this God’ creates, therefore it acts by the action that necessarily precedes creating;⁴⁸ of this sort is generating.

Proof of the first consequence: what is simply first does not require any ‘acting later’ for it to have power for an action proper to itself; ‘this God’ is in some way prior to the relative person; therefore etc.

82. This argument requires that an order be posited how ‘this God’ is in the persons before there can be a power proximate for creating; not because of impotence in ‘this God’ for creating (even if, as the Gentiles imagine, he did not exist in persons), but because of a greater closeness of the persons than of creation to the essence, according to the ancient rule: ‘about any two things, compared according to an order to some same first thing, power is not proximate to the second unless the first has already been posited’ [Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b9-12, 22-23; Averroes *ad loc.*; also n.22 above].

83. Therefore ‘this God’ understands too not precisely as he is in the persons, because essential action is as it were prior to relation, and thus more immediately altogether first; second, ‘this God’ is *per se* unlimited existence, and in that [second] moment of nature [n.82] is first in the three persons (that moment does however have signs of origin); in the third moment of nature ‘this God’ has power proximate for action outwardly.

84. Therefore let the minor [n.81] be denied, because deity never exists *per se* in such a way that it is not in a supposit, except in the intellect.

85. On the contrary. What belongs to something first of itself formally is in some way prior outside the intellect to that which does not belong to it from itself formally; (a) deity is altogether first, because it is a ‘sea’ [I d.8 n.200], and (b) to it belongs of itself formally *per se* existence; (c) but it is not of itself formally in this relative supposit, therefore it is *per se* first before it is in this supposit.

The proof of (b) is because the same thing is *per se* the being of the three persons, – *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.7-8; nothing is common to the three save what is of the essence first.

The proof of (c) is because the foundation in some way precedes the relation, at least it does not have relation by its formal idea, because it is something besides relation – *On the Trinity* VII chs.2, 3; there is also the proof because otherwise it would have that relation in anything, because it has everywhere what belongs to it from its own formal idea.

86. To the other, about ‘what’ and ‘by which’ [n.13], I say that the saying of the Philosopher is true in the case of cause and caused, because there is a real distinction there of cause and of principle by which it causes from the thing caused; there is also essential dependence there of the caused on the causative thing just as also on the cause,

⁴⁸ Note by Scotus: “Note this for the order of production inwardly and outwardly.”

and the reason there is because the causative principle is only single, in one supposit. In the matter at hand, however, it is opposite, because the producing supposit is distinct, but that by which it produces is indistinct, – and so the product is not referred really to the principle ‘by which’ as it is referred to the principle ‘which’ produces, and therefore in the matter at hand there is no real relation of productive principle to product; but of the producer there is a real relation, while of the productive principle there is a relation of reason, as was said before about communicated and communicating, in distinction 5 question 1 [I d.5 n.29].

87. To the third [n.14] I say that the form ‘according as it is that in which the generator is assimilated to the generated’ is not only a being of reason but also has some unity preceding all act of intellect, because in no existing act of intellect would fire generate fire and corrupt water, and this because of natural likeness here and contrariety there. This will be plainer in the question about individuation [II d.3 q.1 nn.3-7]. – To Damascene [n.14] I say that his understanding is about commonness of something one in nature and in number (as divine essence is common to the three persons), but there is now no such commonness in the creature. There is however a commonness of something one by a unity less than numerical unity [II d.3 q.1 nn.8-9].

88. To the remark ‘form is the principle of acting insofar as it is a this’ [n.15] – the conclusion is on my side, because the absolute thing that is for the Father the power of generating is not a power of generating for the Son.

89. And when it is argued that generation distinguishes before it assimilates, and that, from this, the form is elicitive prior as ‘this’ than as form [n.16], – I respond that ‘prior’ in consequence is not always ‘prior’ in causality. An example: this follows, ‘fire, therefore hot’, and not conversely; therefore hot is prior in consequence and yet fire is prior in causality to the heat. And thus I concede that to distinguish is prior in generation to assimilate, that is, it is more common, because many things distinguish that do not assimilate, – but to distinguish is not more perfect in generation than to assimilate, because it belongs to generation (even the most imperfect) insofar as it is from a form as ‘this’; to assimilate belongs to it insofar as it is from a form absolutely, and the idea of form is more perfect than the idea of singularity.

90. I concede the argument ‘against the opinion positing only a distinction of reason’, because it does not conclude against me, as will be clear in distinction 8 [I d.8 n.169, 185].⁴⁹

91. The instance ‘about heat and the vegetative soul’ [n.17] is not valid, because there each form is communicated – both the principal active form [sc. the vegetative soul]

⁴⁹ [The Vatican editors:] The text of n.90 is a response to an argument that is lacking in this question of the *Ordinatio*, but it is found in the *Lectura* I d.7 n.21: “Further, against the one who has this opinion [cf. *Ordinatio* I d.7 nn.9-10], there is the following argument from his own words: for he himself posits that nature and will and everything essential in divine reality are only distinguished by reason, through an operation of intellect. If therefore – according to him – the principle of the generation of the Son is essential and, for the same reason, the principle of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is essential, then the principle of each production in divine reality will be essential, and consequently – according to him – the principles of each production are distinguished by reason. But that two real productions ‘of different reason’ are from the same principle simply – differing only in reason –, when the thing from the principle is adequate to the principle, is altogether impossible; therefore it is impossible that the essence be the formal production of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. It will not then be the case that the essence alone is the principle of producing.” The remark ‘from his own words’ points to Aquinas *Sentences* I d.13 q.1 a.2 and d.2 q.1 aa.2-3.

and the immediate form [sc. heat]; for the generated flesh is animated, and it has some natural generated heat; also each form is a principle of generation, although one is mediate and the other immediate. But the other instance ‘about the generation of the brute’ seems more difficult, if the sensitive soul does not there have any operation but only the vegetative soul.⁵⁰

Question 2

Whether there can be several Sons in Divine Reality

92. Whether there can be several Sons in divine reality.
Arguments.⁵¹

I. Opinions of Others

93. It is posited [by Henry of Ghent] that there cannot be, because the total fecundity is used up in one act; therefore it is not for another one.

On the contrary. To be used up in bodily things signifies not remaining in that from which it is being used up; thus can it not be understood here, but that it does not remain for another act. Therefore the premise is improper, – and in the way it is true it is the same as the conclusion.

94. Therefore in another way – more properly – it is said that a ‘single generation’ is an act adequate to the generative power and always stays in place, and that the single Son is a term adequate to the power and is always being produced; therefore there cannot be another one.

95. On the contrary. Is the adequacy understood as intensive or extensive? If in the second way there is a begging of the question. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion does not follow from the adequacy of the act, because fire generating a fire as equally perfect as itself – and so adequate – can still generate another fire elsewhere; therefore the consequent is inferred ‘because an adequate act always stays in place’, and consequently the power is not of itself determined to this act but absolutely would have power for another act, – just as if the sun always stood in place and so were with a single adequate illumination to illuminate the medium present to it, it would not have power for another illumination, because that single illumination always stands in place; but from this it follows that of itself it would have power for another – and suppose that it does not stay in place, it will proceed to another.

96. Thus therefore the generative power of the Father can absolutely be the principle of another generation; therefore another is absolutely possible, therefore another one actually is – and so the standing in place of this ‘adequate’ act will not here prevent another act from being, because whatever is here possible from the nature of the thing necessarily is; it is not thus in the case of the sun, where the medium is in potency to an illumination other than the adequate one standing in place, but if that other illumination is possible it does not follow that it is necessary.

⁵⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “and about this in book 2 [II d.18 q. un n.10 – although this reference corresponds not to the words here in n.91 but to the text of the *Lectura* I d.7 n.95], where there will be a discussion about seminal reasons, ‘how there can be univocal generation in animals’.”

⁵¹ For the arguments pro and con Scotus refers, by a symbol, to the Parisian *Reportatio*, IA d.2 nn.183-184.

97. Again the argument. – ‘A principle produces insofar as it is prior’ [I d.2 n.308-309]; therefore the staying in place of the posited effect takes nothing away from the principle as it is a principle; therefore if, when the effect is not posited or not standing in place, the principle would have power for another, it will also have power for another when the effect is standing in place. – But although the argument [n.95] appears sound, it would conclude against the sun being adequately illuminating.⁵² Hence one should solve the argument by asking whence it is that the actual positing of the adequate effect limits the virtue of the cause to the ‘then’ (although absolutely it extends to others), and to the ‘then’ in the sense of division, and to ‘other times’ in the sense of composition.

98. I concede, however, that adequacy, neither absolute nor standing in place, sufficiently entails the unity of divine generation, because it does not entail that to be the principle of another generation is repugnant to the generative power absolutely of itself, nor consequently does it entail the absolute impossibility of another generation, – nay it entails the absolute possibility, if this [sc. the adequacy of the one generation] were the precise reason for the impossibility – because where the impossibility is for this reason, there is there an absolute possibility (the result is plain from induction).

99. One must then look for another reason to show that the generative power is determined of itself to this generation, such that if *per impossibile* it would not proceed to this generation, or if this generation were not adequate or were not always standing in place, it would altogether have power for no other, just as sight cannot hear, – in the way that, if the Father did not here exist in the divine nature, altogether no person could there be what the Father was; because if for this reason precisely there could not be another Father, namely because in the essence – although indifferent to several ungenerated persons – this person would as it were subsist by itself and adequately to the essence, then absolutely there could be another Father, and if there could be there would be.

100. Not only does this argument [n.99] refute the reason ‘about adequacy’ [n.94], but also, if this Father or this generation were not by itself, but the essence were as it were indifferent to several Fathers and the generative power were indifferent to several generations, one would not be able to give more a reason for this generation existing in divine reality than for that one, because that one too would be adequate, and so for the case where this one prevents that one, which is altogether impossible; nay for the reason that one is posited, any at all might be posited; and for the reason that another is not posited, none would be posited.

II. To the Question

101. I say therefore.⁵³

⁵² Presumably because, if the sun can have another illumination, the one it has cannot be adequate after all.

⁵³ Scotus gives no solution to this question here in the *Ordinatio*. One must look in the *Reportatio* instead.

Eighth Distinction

First Part

On the Simplicity of God

Question 1

Whether God is supremely Simple

1. Concerning the eighth distinction I ask whether God is supremely simple, and perfectly such.

That he is not:

Because simplicity is not a mark simply of perfection, therefore it should not be posited in God as essential. – Proof of the antecedent: if it were a mark simply of perfection then anything having it would simply be more perfect than anything not having it, and so prime matter would be more perfect than man, which is false, – nay, generally, in corruptible or generable creatures the more composite things are more perfect.

2. Again, it is a mark perfection in a form to be able to give being, although it is a mark of imperfection to depend on matter; therefore if the first idea were separated from the second, because there does not seem to be a contradiction in such a separation, deity can be a form giving being, although it not depend on that to which it gives being, and so a composition of matter and form or a combinability at least of deity as form, can be posited without imperfection.

3. Again, what is a non-substance for one thing is a substance for nothing, from *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5; but wisdom in us is an accident; therefore in nothing is it a substance or a non-accident. But wisdom is in God according to the same idea according to which it is in us; so it is an accident there, and so composition of subject and accident.

4. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.7 n.8: ‘God is truly and supremely simple’.⁵⁴

I. To the Question

5. I reply to the question, and first I prove the divine simplicity through certain particular middle terms, and second from common middle terms, namely infinity and necessity of existence.

A. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Particular Middle Terms

6. Proceeding in the first way, I show simplicity [is] opposed to composition from essential parts, second opposed to composition from quantitative parts, and third opposed to composition from subject and accident.

7. [God is not from essential parts] – The first thus: the causality of matter and form is not simply first, but necessarily presupposes a prior efficient causality, – therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form it would presuppose the causality of

⁵⁴ These words are in fact not Augustine’s but a prefatory comment by Lombard [*Sentences* I d.8 ch.4 n.85].

an efficient cause; but not of this First thing, because this does not make itself by joining its matter with form – therefore of another efficient cause, a prior one; therefore God would not be the first efficient cause, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 2 question 1 [I d.2 nn.43-59]. Proof of the first proposition: the causality of matter and form includes imperfection because it includes the idea of a part, but the causality of efficient and final cause include no imperfection but perfection; every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect one as to what is essentially prior to it; therefore etc.

8. I prove the same thus: matter is of itself in potency to form, and this a passive potency and a potency of contradiction, as far as concerns itself, – therefore it is not of itself under any form but through some other cause that reduces the matter to the act of the form; but this reducing cause cannot be called form only as it is form, because it does not thus reduce matter save by formally actuating the matter itself; therefore it is necessary to posit something effectively reducing the matter to this actuality. Therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form, there would be some efficient cause through whose efficiency its matter would be under the form, and so it would not be the first efficient cause, as before [n.7].

9. Third as follows: every single caused entity has some one cause from which it gets its unity, because there cannot be unity in the caused without unity in the cause. The unity therefore of a composite, since it is caused, requires some one cause by which it is this caused entity. The causality in question is not of matter or form, because each of these is a diminished entity in respect of the composite entity; therefore besides these two causalities, namely of matter and form, some other one must be posited – it will be the efficient cause, and so the same result returns as before [n.8].

10. [God is not from quantitative parts] – The second, namely the lack of quantitative composition, seems to be proved by the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.10.226a24-b6 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-11, because the First thing is of infinite power; but infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude; and the proof of this is that a greater power is in a greater magnitude, and so an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude; but no magnitude is infinite; therefore neither does any infinite power exist in a magnitude.

11. But this argument seems deficient, because he who would posit an infinite power to be in a finite magnitude would say that the power is of the same idea in a part of the magnitude as in the whole magnitude, and so in a greater and in a lesser magnitude: just as the intellective soul is whole in the whole of the body and whole in any part of it, and is not greater in a greater body, nor greater in the whole body than in a part; and if an infinite power of understanding were consequent on this soul, it would exist in a finite magnitude, and in a part just as in the whole, and in a little part just as in a big one. So should it be said in the matter at hand, that an infinite power in a magnitude would be of the same idea in the whole as in the part.

12. Making clear, then, the reasoning of Aristotle [n.10], I say that his conclusion is this, that an infinite power, extended *per accidens* to the extension of the magnitude, ‘does not exist in a finite magnitude’. His reasoning proves this in the following way: any power that is extended *per accidens* is, *ceteris paribus*, greater – that is more efficacious – in a greater magnitude, and is not greater in this way, that is, more intense formally, because a small fire can have more heat than a big one if the big one is very diffuse and the small one concentrated (and therefore one must add the ‘*ceteris paribus*’ clause in the major); an example too is about heat in the same fire, which although it is of

equal intensity in the part as in the whole, yet a greater fire is ‘of a greater power’, that is, more efficacious.

13. And from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, can be understood to grow in efficacy by increase of magnitude – but as long as it is understood to be able to grow in efficacy it is not infinite in efficacy; and from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, is finite, because an intensive infinity cannot exist without infinity in efficacy; and from this it follows that a power infinite in efficacy cannot exist in a finite magnitude, – nor therefore a power infinite in intensity; and then further: since there is no infinite magnitude, it is plain that there is no such infinite power in a magnitude.

14. But what is this to the matter at hand, that every such power is not in a magnitude [nn.5-6]?

I reply. By joining with this result the conclusion proved earlier by the Philosopher [*Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b19-22], – that such a ‘potent thing’ is without matter – the proposed conclusion follows. For, because by extension is something extended or, if extension were *per se* existent, something would be the form, extended *per accidens*, informing the extension – therefore if this infinite power were to be posited in a magnitude, I ask what is this extension of magnitude? Not the infinite power itself, as was proved [n.13], – nor does it perfect this as form does matter, because it is not in matter, from the conclusion shown before [sc. by the Philosopher *ibid.*]; therefore one would have to posit a matter extended with this magnitude, which matter would be perfected by infinite power, just as our matter or our body is extended in magnitude and is perfected by a non-extended intellective soul; but there is no matter in a possessor of such power, from the conclusion shown before by the Philosopher [*ibid.*]. From this immateriality then – shown before by the Philosopher and just shown in this conclusion [n.13] – does this reasoning [that God is not a quantity, n.10] get its efficacy.

15. [God is not from subject and accident] – The third conclusion is proved especially from these [first two conclusions, nn.7, 10]: for because God is not material or a quantity, therefore he is not capable of any material accident fitting a material thing, as a quality of a material thing; therefore he is only capable of those that befit spirits – to wit intellection and volition and the corresponding habits – but such things cannot be accident to that nature, as was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.89-110], because its understanding and its willing are its substance, and its habits and power etc.

B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms

16. Second I prove generally the matter at hand [n.5].

[From necessary existence] – First from the idea of necessary existence, – because if the First thing is composite, let the components be *a* and *b*; I ask about *a*, whether it is of itself formally necessary existence, or is not but is possible existence (one of these two must be given in each thing, or in the whole nature of which something is composed). If it is of itself possible existence, then necessary existence of itself is composed of possible existence, and so it will not be necessary existence; if *a* is of itself necessary existence, then it is of itself in ultimate actuality, and so with nothing can it make a *per se* one thing. Likewise, if it is of itself a composite necessary existence, it will be necessary existence

through *a*, and by parity of reasoning it will be necessary existence through *b*, and so it will be twice necessary existence; it will also be composite necessary existence through something that, taken away, will leave it no less necessary existence, which is impossible.

17. [From infinity] – Second I show the matter at hand generally from the idea of infinity, – and first that God is not combinable; for this reason, that everything combinable can be part of some composite whole which is combinable from itself and from something else; but every part can be exceeded; but to be able to be exceeded is contrary to the idea of infinity; therefore etc.

18. And there is a confirmation of the reason, and it is almost the same, – because everything combinable lacks the perfection of that with which it is combined, such that the combinable does not have in itself total identity complete in every way with it, because then it could not be combined with it; nothing infinite lacks that with which it can in some way be the same; indeed it has everything such in itself according to perfect identity, because otherwise it could be understood to be more perfect, for example if it had all that in itself as a ‘composite’ has it and if the ‘infinite’ does not have it;⁵⁵ but it is contrary to the idea of infinity simply that it could be understood to be more perfect, or that something could be more perfect than it.

19. From this follows further that it is altogether incomposite, – because if it is composite, then composed either of finite things or of infinite things; if of infinite things, nothing such is combinable, from what has been proved [nn.17-18]; if of finite things, it will not be infinite, because finite things do not render anything infinite in perfection the way we are now speaking.

II. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the first argument [n.1] I say that simplicity is simply a mark of perfection according as it excludes combinability and composition of act and potency, or of perfection and imperfection, as will be said in the following question [nn.32-34].

21. Nor, however, does it follow that every simple creature is a more perfect creature than a non-simple one [n.1], because something that is simply a mark of perfection can be repugnant to some limited nature, and so it would not be simply such a nature perfectly if it had that which is repugnant to it; so a dog would not be a simply perfect dog if it were wise, because wisdom is repugnant to it. Likewise, to some limited nature one perfection simply can be repugnant and another not, – and then it does not follow that the nature to which such a perfection belongs is more perfect than one to which it is repugnant, especially when to the one to which this perfection is repugnant there belongs another perfection simply, which is perhaps simply more perfect than that other repugnant one. An example: ‘actuality’ is a perfection simply and ‘simplicity’ is a perfection simply; but to a composite there belongs greater actuality though not greater simplicity, – while to matter, although there belongs simplicity, there does not however belong as much actuality as belongs to the composite; simply, however, actuality is more perfect than simplicity, – and so simply can that be more perfect to which actuality without simplicity belongs than that to which simplicity without actuality belongs.

⁵⁵ Sc. suppose the infinite combined with something, then by itself, or uncombined, it does not have that something; therefore, when combined with it, it is more perfect.

22. But here there seem to be doubts: one, how there is a perfection simply which is not a perfection everywhere, since it is of the idea of perfection simply that ‘it be simply better in each thing than not-it’, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15; the second doubt is how one perfection simply is more perfect than another absolutely.

23. To the first I say that this description [from Anselm’s *Monologion*] ought to be understood thus, that perfection simply is better not only than its contradictory (for thus anything positive is better and more perfect simply than its negation, nay no negation is a perfection formally), but this is how ‘it is better than not-it’ is understood – that is, than ‘anything impossible with it’ – and then this remark ‘in anything it is better’ must be understood by considering the ‘anything’ precisely insofar as it is a supposit, without determining in what nature the supposit subsists [cf. I d.2 n.384]. For, by considering something insofar as it subsists in some nature, some perfection simply can be not better for it, because impossible with it as it is in such nature, because repugnant to such nature; yet insofar precisely as it is subsistent it is not repugnant to it, but if it be considered to have it in this way it will be simply a more perfect being than if it had whatever [sc. perfection simply] is impossible with it.

24. To the second doubt [n.22] I say that ‘what is the order of perfections simply’ requires clarification. And now let it be briefly supposed that there is some order of perfection among them such that one is of its idea more perfect than the other taken precisely, although when any exists in supreme degree then let all be equally perfect because infinite – and any of them then is infinite. About this elsewhere.⁵⁶

25. To the second principal argument [n.2] I say that ‘to give being formally to something’ necessarily posits a limitation, because what thus gives being does not include by identity that to which it gives being; nor can imperfection be separated from giving being thus, because neither can limitation, nor even any sort of dependence, be separated from it: for although dependence on matter be separated from it, yet there always remains dependence on the efficient cause by virtue of which the form informs the matter. And if an instance be made about the Word, that it gives being to human nature, – this is not to give being formally, as will be clear in book 3 distinction 1 [III d.1 qq.1-5]

26. To the third [n.3] I say that wisdom, according to the idea according to which it is a species of quality and an accident in us, is not of the same idea in God, as will be clear better in this distinction at the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [nn.112-113].

Question Two

Whether any Creature is Simple

27. Following on from this I ask whether any creature is simple.

And I argue yes as follows: a composite is composed of parts, and those not from other parts, therefore those parts are in themselves simple.

28. The opposite of this is in *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, where Augustine says that no creature is in itself simple.

I. To the Question

⁵⁶ Vatican Editors: No such ‘elsewhere’ is to be found in Scotus.

A. The Opinion of Others⁵⁷

29. Here it is said that ‘any creature at all is a composite of act and potency’: because none is pure potency, because then it would not exist, – nor pure act, because then it would be God.

30. Further, ‘any creature at all is a being through participation’, – therefore it is a composite of participant and participated.

31. Against this conclusion I argue because, if in anything at all there is composition of thing and thing, I take the composing thing and ask if it is simple or composite; if it is simple, the proposed conclusion is gained, – if it is composite, there will be a process to infinity in things.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. I concede then that some creature is simple, that is, not a composite of things. However no creature is perfectly simple, because it is in some way composite and combinable.

How it is composite I clarify thus, because it has entity along with privation of some grade of entity. For no creature has entity according to the total perfection that there naturally is of entity in itself, and therefore it lacks some perfection which is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and so it is ‘deprived’, – just as a mole is said to be blind ‘because it is of a nature to have sight according to the idea of animal, but not according to the idea of mole’ according to the Philosopher at *Metaphysics* 5.22.1022b24-27. Therefore it is composed, not from positive thing and thing, but from positive thing and privation, namely from some entity, which it has, and from lack of some grade of perfection of entity – of which perfection it is itself not capable, though being itself is capable of it: just as a mole in itself is not of a nature to see, yet according as it is an animal it is of a nature to see. Nor yet is this composition ‘of positive and privative’ in the essence of the thing, because privation is not of the essence of anything positive.

33. On this also follows composition of potency and act objectively; for anything that is a being and lacks some perfection of being is simply possible and a term of potency simply, of which the term cannot be infinite being, which is necessary existence.

34. It is also the case that any creature at all is combinable:

This is plain about accident, which is combinable with a subject. In the case of substance too it is plain, about form as well matter. As to *per se* generable and corruptible substance too, it is plain that it is receptive of accident; no substance then would be non-receptive save on account of its perfection. – But the most perfect intelligence [sc. creaturely intelligence] is receptive of accident, because it is capable of its own intellection and volition, which are not its substance; first, because then it would be formally blessed in itself, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 1 [I d.1 n.175]. Second, because any intelligence can understand infinities, because it is all intelligible; therefore, if its intellection were its essence, it could have an infinite essence, because it would have a single intellection of infinities. Third, because its own intellection would not depend on any object save that on which its own existence would depend, and so it could understand nothing inferior to itself – not even itself – in its proper genus, but only in the

⁵⁷ Aquinas *Contra Gentes* II chs.53-54, I ch.22; *ST Ia* q.50 a.2 ad 3.

superior object moving it; indeed, an intelligence could understand nothing save in God, because its own existence is not caused by any other intelligence – therefore not its intellection either. Fourth, because the word of an angel would be personally distinct from it and essentially the same as it, as was proved in distinction 2 about the divine Word [I. d.2 n.355].

II. To the Arguments

35. [To the principal argument] – To the principal argument of Augustine [n.28] I concede that no creature is truly simple, because composite – in the aforesaid way – from positivity and privation [n.32], act and potency objectively [n.33], and combinable with some other creature [n.34].

36. [To the argument of the opinion of others] – And from this is plain the response to the argument of the first opinion [n.29]; for there is no pure act that lacks any degree of actuality, just as light is not pure that lacks some degree of light, even if there is not mixed with that impure light any positive entity but only lack of a more perfect degree of light.

37. To the second [n.30] I say that ‘to participate’ is in some way the same as ‘to take part in’, so that it imports a double relation – both of part to whole and of taker to taken.

The first is real. Nor yet is part taken for that which is something of the thing, but it is taken extensively, insofar as every less is said to be part of a more; but everything that is a ‘finite such’ is simply a ‘less such’ if anything such is of a nature to be infinite; but any perfection simply is of a nature to be infinite – therefore wherever it is finite it is less than some like perfection, and so it is a part extensively.

38. But the second relation – namely of taker to taken – is a relation of reason, as in the case of creatures between giver and given. However, part is taken in three ways: either such that the ‘whole’ taken is part of the taker, as species participates genus (as concerns the essential parts of genus, not the subjective ones),⁵⁸ or as ‘part’ of the taken is part of the taker, or – in the third way – ‘part’ of the taken is the whole taker itself. In the first two ways the relation of taker and taken can be conceded to be real, in the third way not: this third way is what is at issue, because every limited perfection (which however is of itself not determined to the limitation, which is the part taken) is itself a limited whole,⁵⁹ except that the supposit taking and the nature taken can there be distinguished – but not thus is it a real distinction.

Question Three

Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus

⁵⁸ The essential parts of something are what define it; the subjective parts are the kinds it divides into. So ‘animal’, which is by definition ‘animate sensing body’, is taken wholly by the species ‘man’ (for man is a rational animate sensing body), but the subjective parts of animal are all the kinds of animals (horses, dogs, giraffes), and of course none of these is taken into the definition of man.

⁵⁹ I.e. no perfection is of itself limited, but in creatures every perfection is limited, being a partaking of the perfection that is of itself unlimited [n.37]. Thus, a limited perfection is a part of unlimited perfection, but in creatures this limited perfection is the whole creaturely perfection itself.

39. Third I ask whether with the divine simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus.

That it does:

Because God is formally being, but being states a concept said of God in the ‘what’ – and this concept is not proper to God but is common to him and creatures, as was said in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.26-45]; therefore, in order for it to become proper, it must be determined by some determining concept; that ‘determining’ concept is related to the concept of being as the concept ‘what sort’ to the concept ‘what’, and consequently as the concept of difference to the concept of genus.

40. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* II ch.1 (74vb): between ‘being in a subject’ and ‘being not in a subject’ there is no middle – and he seems to be speaking according to the fact that ‘being not in a subject’ is the idea of substance and ‘being in a subject’ is the idea of accident. Therefore God, since he is being formally and is not ‘being in a subject’, therefore he is ‘being in a non-subject’ – therefore he is substance; but substance as substance is a genus.

41. Further, where there is species there is genus – according to Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3] – because these are correlative; the divine nature is a species with respect to the persons, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48; therefore etc.

42. Again, wisdom is formally said of God, and this according to the same idea according to which it is said of us, because the reasons that were set down in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 nn.27, 35, 39] about the univocity of being are conclusive about the univocity of wisdom; therefore, according to the idea according to which wisdom is said of God, it is a species of a genus [n.153]; and this is proved by the saying of the ancient doctors [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas], who say that species is transferred to divine reality because it states a perfection, although genus is not because it states an imperfection – as ‘science’ is transferred but not ‘quality’.

43. To the contrary is the Master [Lombard] in the text, and he adduces Augustine [*On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2] – and shows through him that ‘from God are removed the categories of the art of dialectic.’

I. First Opinion

A. Exposition of the Opinion

44. There are here two extreme opinions. – One negative [Henry of Ghent], which says that with the divine simplicity does not stand that there be some concept common to God and creatures, and it was touched on above in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 n.20].

45. For proof of this certain reasons are set down not touched on before [sc. not touched on by Scotus in I d.3 qq.1-3].

The first is this: for things that are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction nothing is a common univocal term; God and creatures are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction – to depend and not to depend, caused and not caused, to be from another and not to be from another; therefore nothing is for them a common univocal term.

46. Again second thus, and it is a confirmation of the other reason [n.45]: every common concept is neutral with respect to the things to which it is common; no concept is neutral with respect to contradictories, because it is one or other of them; therefore etc.

47. Again third thus: things primarily diverse agree in nothing; God is primarily diverse from any creature, otherwise he would have that in which he would agree and that in which he would differ, and so he would not be simply simple; therefore God agrees in nothing with the creature, and so not in any common concept either.

48. Again, where there is only unity of attribution, there cannot be unity of univocity; but it is necessary to posit unity of attribution of the creature to God in the idea of being; therefore in this there is no univocity.

49. For this opinion [n.44] is adduced the intention of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], who posits three degrees of knowing God – by eminence, causality, and negation – and he posits that the knowledge by negation is ultimate, when from God are removed all the things that are common to creatures; therefore he himself does not understand that any concept which is abstracted from creatures remains in God according as it was common to creatures.

50 For this there is also Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3 n.5 (in the middle of the chapter): “When you hear good this and good that (which could otherwise also be said to be not good), if you could perceive, without the things that are good by participation, the good itself by participation in which they are good (for you also at once understand if when you hear this good and that good), and if you could, with them taken away, perceive the good by itself, you would perceive God, and if you cleaved to him with love, you will at once be blessed.” Therefore he means to say that by understanding this good and that good I understand the good by participation in which they are good, that is ‘the infinite good’; therefore I do not have there only a concept of good in general [I d.3 n.192], but also of good by essence.

B. Reasons against the Opinion

51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons,⁶⁰ which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27].

[First reason] – One reason is ‘because this concept proper to God could not be naturally caused in our intellect’; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for this present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or species of the intelligible thing, has for adequate effect the causing in us of a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that not essentially is plain,

⁶⁰ Note by Scotus: “For the commonness of being, besides the two argument of distinction 3 and their confirmations [I d.3 nn.27, 30, 35], there are these: comparison in being [n.83] (a); number of all beings whatever, and that the determinable of that which is ‘other’ is common to each of the others [n.84] (b); Aristotle *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29 [n.79] (c); Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6 [n.71] (d); the confirmation that God is not called a stone [n.74] (e); Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 [n.72] (f); Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7 [n.73] (g); the masters [n.72] (k); against the one holding this opinion [sc. Henry of Ghent, nn.44, 53-54] (h).”

because denying univocity, – that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc.⁶¹

52. The response of some people⁶² is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation – and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of ‘as subsisting in itself’, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.⁶³

53. Against this argument [n.51] seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object naturally knowable by us and intelligible (however it be present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], in no way is the absolute included that is the foundation of relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way does a concept of that absolute come to be in us, and so we will not be able to have naturally any concept of anything absolute about God.

54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], – because although the said response [n.52] supposes that relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), – although it supposes too that a created ratified thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Footprint’ [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9: “Every thing subsists for itself, – how much more God?” – and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as by what naturally it is not a created thing and naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, ‘if each thing subsists to itself, how much more does God’, would not be an argument if the same thing be taken in the premises and in the conclusion), – omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by an adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature have in its power the causing of a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself any absolute concept on which it may be founded, because the relation of a creature – conversely – to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection is naturally it), yet that essence or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not be caused by these relations any concept in us of absolute perfections unless another relation had in itself virtually that absolute which is the perfection proper to God, which is impossible.⁶⁴

⁶¹ That is, since we could never naturally get this concept proper to God, we do not now have it, and so we do not now have a concept of God that is proper to God and not univocal with creatures; therefore any concept of God we do now have cannot be proper but must be univocal with creatures.

⁶² Probably Richard of Conington, according to the Vatican Editors, who give references to Robert of Walsingham, John Baconthorp, Giles of Nottingham, and Giles of Alnwick.

⁶³ The relation corresponding to the relation of the thought-on being to the first being will, of course, be the relation of the first being to the thought-on being. Hence (or so goes the theory) to think this correlative relation is to think the first being as in some way the foundation of the relation, and so to have a non-univocal concept of this first being.

⁶⁴ The passage from n.53 to the end of n.54 is marked by Scotus with the letter *h*.

55. This point [sc. end of n.53] is also proved because, according to them, the divine essence is not of a nature to cause of itself save a single concept in the intellect, – therefore only a single real concept is of a nature to be had of it. The proof of this consequence is because the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that, as to simple intelligence, is of a nature to be had of it (and this does not belong to more imperfect objects). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause some real concept of this essence is of a nature to cause that single concept which is of a nature to be had of it – and if it does not cause it, then it causes no concept of it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then it could be known from the creature under the idea by which it is this singular essence; therefore through no creature – according to that position [n.53] – can any singular concept be possessed of the divine essence.⁶⁵

56. [Second reason] – The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, which certain concept is common to them.⁶⁶

57. To it there is a threefold response.⁶⁷ – First, that there is some concept the same that is ‘certain’ and ‘doubtful’; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, – and yet this one and that are the same.

58. This is nothing, because although the same concept could be diversified as to grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones, as to any modes of signifying; logical ones, as to any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as the definition expresses it – implicitly as the thing defined expresses it), and through these differences not only could certitude and incertitude be posited, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, – yet that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to these modes or as to these modes, this is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it as to logical modes of conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended conclusion – or the concept will be diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended conclusion.

59. In another way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept – and

⁶⁵ Interpolated text: “The consequence is denied, and also the first proposition proving it, because an effect is of a nature to make some imperfect concept of the cause, which that object, if it in itself move, will in no way cause but a more perfect one; because it is a mark of imperfection in a mover to cause as imperfect a concept of the object to which it moves.”

⁶⁶ A reference to an argument from I d.3 n.27: “Every intellect which is certain about one concept, and doubtful about diverse ones, has a concept about what it is certain of that is different from the concepts about what it is doubtful of; the subject includes the predicate. But the intellect of the wayfarer can be certain about God that he is a being, while doubting about finite or infinite being, created or uncreated being; therefore the concept of the being of God is different from this concept and from that; and so neither term [finite or infinite, created or uncreated] is, in itself and in each of those concepts, included in it [sc. included in the concept of the being of God]; therefore [the concept of the being of God] is univocal [sc. of the same meaning whether it is a concept of something finite or something infinite, of something created or something uncreated].”

⁶⁷ Perhaps from Richard of Conington et al.; see footnote to n.52 above.

it seems certain about ‘one’, that is, about the two concepts doubtfully conceived, and doubtful about the two concepts distinctly conceived.

60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, naturally conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of that unity and doubtful about them under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving being said of God and creatures – if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first or at the same time under their idea of being distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of one while doubting about them under the idea of many.

61. Proof of the major [n.60], because if there were certitude about some concept (or about any concepts) while doubting about *a* and *b* (or with doubt about *a* and *b*), that one concept or those two concepts are conceived first naturally – under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them – before *a* and *b* are conceived [sc. but this is false].⁶⁸

62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. – On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, – therefore they do not ‘seem’ one; or as having some or any unity of order or distinction among themselves, – and then the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are naturally first – or at least at the same time – conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its proper idea and that one under its proper idea, because these concepts under their proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of ‘order’ or of ‘attribution’.

63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which he concludes is common through knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of whose difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this sort of respect which is ‘difference’, without its knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the matter at hand, *a* and *b* cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation – namely of the unity of order – unless *a* be known under its own proper idea and *b* under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common to them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as distinct in themselves.

64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim ‘they seem to be one concept’ [n.59]:

⁶⁸ *Interpolated text*: therefore by opposition, if nothing can be conceived of *a* and *b* unless they be conceived first under a distinction proper to them, the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of something one and doubtful under the idea of distinction. [The point seems to be that one cannot be certain about a given concept and doubtful about whether it does or does not include some other concepts unless one first conceives those other concepts (for otherwise what is one doubting about?).]

Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (*Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Let an argument, then, be formed as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if ‘they seem’ to be one, something is plain to it about each concept, and something else is not plain – clearly – otherwise they would always seem ‘one’; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse and most abstract.

65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it ‘a known object’ from the concept that it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, – therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore when conceiving this one it conceives it repugnant to another; for example, sight does not see anything repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. Concepts I call formal objects. For that two objects under their proper ideas (one of which ideas is first diverse from the other) be understood by me and I am not able to distinguish what this is, then I do not understand the proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or something common.

66. Again, when ‘if it is’ is known, the question ‘what it is’ remains, *Posterior Analytics* 2.1.89b34.⁶⁹

67. Again it is more briefly argued thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a one ‘by unity of analogy’. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended conclusion. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, – but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one ‘by unity of analogy’ unless it is certain about the two as they are two; therefore the two do not seem to the intellect to be ‘one’, because they are together conceived as distinct concepts.

68. Response is made in a third way [nn.57, 59] that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two disjunct concepts and doubt about one or other of them: as for example, ‘I am certain that this is a being, that is, a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.’

69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of whatever divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude ‘about the whole disjunct’. – The proof of the antecedent is because it is not necessary in the first apprehension by which ‘this’ is known to be something or a being, to apprehend it by itself or by another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.

70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] – Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which

⁶⁹ Therefore, presumably, while one can know that something is, one does not know what it is, or does not have a concept of it (as opposed to a name for referring to it), until one asks what it is, and asking what it is will force one to come to a concept which, if not entirely adequate to the object, will be sufficiently adequate to it that it is known to be the concept that it is and not, say, two concepts seeming to be one [cf. n.69].

was about the inquiry of the intellect that we have of God by natural investigation [I d.3 n.39], wherein the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves we separate from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute supreme perfection to them; and we attribute them, thus taken at their highest, to the Creator as proper to him.

71. Thus does Augustine argue *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: “Since we put the Creator without doubt before created things, it must be that he is both supremely alive and perceives and understands all things.” This he proves himself from the fact that “we judge living things to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones, good things to evil ones,” – which argument does not seem valid if such things as they are preferred in creatures were not of the same idea as those which, being such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.

72. The like arguments [sc. taking away imperfection and attributing supreme perfection, n.71] are frequently made or held by doctors and saints.

For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, – thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 criticizes the definition that says free choice ‘is the power of sinning’, because according to him free choice would then – according to this – not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.

73. This is also the way of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or in the third degree, he has come to ‘knowledge by remotion’ [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, – and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there, to which the negation is attributed, – and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if by way of causality and eminence some concept is not had previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.

74. There is a conformation of this reason [n.70], because we do not say that God is formally a stone but formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept were precisely considered, a stone could be formally attributed to something in God – as to its idea – just like wisdom is.

75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because in him is such perfection simply, although of a different idea from created wisdom.

On the contrary:

76. Of that wisdom in God is our wisdom a certain participation, and likewise of the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.

77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, – the idea is the measure of it; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, – wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and

is common, not proper, because one creature participates that perfection just as another does).

78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of an effect, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient – this does not answer to the argument, but confirms it [n.70], because by considering God under the idea of cause he is known proportionally from creatures well enough, but in this way is not known about God any idea that is in creatures formally of what is perfect but causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections said simply of God formally – therefore such attributes are known of God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept common in such things to God and creatures, which sort is not common in the first way, in knowing God by way of causality.

79. For this [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’, proves this through this major, because ‘each thing is maximally such according as univocity is present in other things’, and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that ‘the principles of eternal things must be most true’. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of this minor, that the eternal principles ‘are the univocal cause of truth in other things’. For if in the minor be taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher’s syllogism, which is not likely.⁷⁰

80. To the arguments for the opposite opinion [n.44].

To the first [n.45]. Either he understands in the minor that ‘they are totally under the extremes of contradiction’, that is, that they are precisely the extremes of contradiction, – and thus is the minor false; for God is not precisely this ‘not from another’, because this negation is said of a chimaera, nor is a creature precisely this negation ‘not necessary to be’, because this belongs to a chimaera, – but both God and creature are something to which one extreme of contradiction belongs. Take the major then that whatever things are of such sort as the extremes of a contradiction belong to, these are not univocal in anything: this major is false, for all things that per se divide something common are such that the extremes of contradiction are said of them, and yet they are univocal in the division. So in the matter at hand: these things can all in themselves receive the predication of contradiction, and yet they can have something abstract – or something substrate to the extremes of the contradiction – which is common to both.

81. As to the confirmation about the ‘neutral’ [n.46], I say that even a concept common to two things is neutral formally, and so I concede the conclusion that the concept of being is not formally the concept of created or uncreated [I d.3 n.27]; but if the understanding be that this concept is neutral such that neither of the contradictories be said of it, it is false. For so it is about rational and irrational, that the concept animal is formally neutral with respect to them, and yet that which is conceived is not neutral but is truly one of them. For one of the contradictories is said of anything, and yet it is not

⁷⁰ *Interpolated text*: “True if it should be reduced to one syllogism, but it will not in this way be reduced but argument will be first ‘a minori’: it is maximally such through the fact there is univocity, therefore much more is it eminently such (in perfection simply) through the fact it is an equivocal effect; but the principles of eternal things are of such sort; therefore etc.”

necessary that any concept whatever is formally one or other concept among contradictories.

82. As to the third [n.47] the answer will be plain in the third article ‘because God and creatures are not first diverse in concepts’ [nn.95-127]; however they are first diverse in reality, because they agree in no reality – and how there can be a common concept without agreement in thing or reality will be stated in what follows [nn.137-150].

83. To the other, about attribution [n.48], I say that attribution alone does not posit unity, because unity of attribution is less than unity of univocity, and the lesser does not include the greater; yet a lesser unity can stand with a greater unity, just as some things that are one in genus are one in species, although unity of genus is less than unity of species. So here, I concede that unity of attribution does not posit unity of univocity, and yet along with this unity of attribution stands unity of univocity, although this unity is not formally that unity, example: species of the same genus have an essential attribution to the first in that genus (*Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18), and yet along with this stands unity of univocity of idea of the genus in those species. So must it be – and much more so – in the matter at hand, that in idea of being, in which there is unity of attribution, attributes may have unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure, or as exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in some one thing. For just as comparison simply is in the simply univocal (*Physics* 7.4.248b6-7), so every comparison is in the somehow univocal. For when it is said ‘this is more perfect than that’, if it be asked ‘more perfect what?’, one must assign something common to both, so that the determinable of every comparative is common to each extreme of the comparison; for a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but a more perfect animal. And so, if certain things are compared in being where there is attribution of one relative to another (‘this is more perfect than that; more perfect what? – more perfect being’), there must be a unity in some way common to each extreme.

84. So also could it be argued about number or about distinction, because all distinct or numbered things have something common, as Augustine maintains in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: “If three persons be spoken of, common to them is what person is,” – so that the determinable of a numerable term is always something common (according to Augustine) to all the numbered things. – And if it be objected that there is properly no number of God and creatures, I argue about the diverse or the distinct or the other, thus: God and creature are diverse or distinct, or God is something, or someone, other than a creature. In all these the determinable of the distinction, or of the stated singularity or plurality, must be common to each extreme – it is plain in all examples, because a man is not ‘another man than an ass’ but ‘another animal’. This is proved by reason, because in relations of equal comparison the extremes are of the same idea; otherness is such a relation; therefore in all things ‘other’ there is a mutual otherness of one idea, and consequently the determinable of otherness will be of one idea. Do not rely on this, because it would conclude that the foundation is of the same idea, hence the minor [‘otherness is such a relation’] is contrary to the article about ‘other’.⁷¹

⁷¹ Sc. according to an article that Scotus intended to put together from the Cambridge and Parisian *Reportationes*: “otherness connotes some agreement of the extremes in their determinable, and also notes some non-identity corresponding to the same” [Rep. IA d.4 q.1 n.9], which non-identity however would here be lacking [n.54].

85. When argument is made from Dionysius [n.49], it is clear rather in the third argument [n.73] that the intention of Dionysius is to the opposite, because at the third level a stand is not made at negation alone, but at some concept taken from creatures, to which that negation is attributed.

86. To Augustine [n.50] I reply that ‘the good by participation in which other things are good’ (which is understood by understanding this good and that) can either be posited universal to all goods, and then by participation in it are other things good (the way species participates genus, or any inferior participates the superior), or it can be understood as good in essence, by participation in which as in their cause are other things goods, and then it is true that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good in essence, but universally, as by understanding this being I understand being as part of the concept, and in being I understand any being whatever universally. And when Augustine adds ‘if you can know it per se’ [n.50], I say that if the ‘per se’ is referred not to the act of knowing but to the object [sc. if ‘per se’ goes with ‘it’ not with ‘know’], – to wit, that I know the good, which I know universally, with the determination ‘per se’, namely such that I conceive the good with the sort of determination that it is a non-dependent good and good by essence – then I understand God not only in a common concept but in a proper concept, and then, by assertion of the ‘in itself’, the good that was common is contracted and is made proper to God; and beatitude lies in cleaving to this by enjoyment (speaking of the beatitude of the way [sc. as opposed to the beatitude of the heavenly fatherland]), because this concept is the most perfect we can have in conceiving God naturally.

87. And this appears to be the intention of Augustine in *On Free Choice of the Will* II chs.8-14 nn.23-28 – or elsewhere in the same book [*On the Trinity* VIII, n.50], where he says about truth: “do not look for what truth is, because at once phantasms will present themselves, etc.,” which would not be true if there were an altogether different concept of being or of good in God from the concept of them in creatures. For then it would well need to be asked ‘what is truth’, because then a truth would have to be looked for that is proper to God, nor would phantasms present themselves there disturbing the concept of truth as it is proper to God, because that concept does not have a concept corresponding to it. But they disturb the concept of truth as it belongs to God, speaking of truth in general, as has been expounded elsewhere [I d.3 n.193].

88. But some shamelessly insist that there is one concept of being and yet none is univocal to this thing and that, – this is not to the intention of this question, because, however much what is conceived be in accord with attribution or order in diverse things, yet if there is a concept of itself one, such that it does not have a different idea according as it is said of this and of that, that concept is univocal.

89. If too someone in any way shamelessly insist that a denominative concept is not univocal, because the idea of the subject is not the idea of the predicate, – this instance seems puerile, because in one way a denominative predicate is a middle between a univocal and an equivocal predicate, in another way an equivocal and a univocal predicate are immediate for a logician. The first is true when taking a univocal predicate which is univocally predicated, that is, namely, that its idea is the idea of the subject, and in this way a denominative predicate is not univocal. The second is true when understanding it of unity of idea of what is predicated; thus a univocal predicate is that whose idea is in itself one, or the idea is the idea of the subject, whether it denominate the

subject or be said *per accidens* of the subject, but an equivocal predicate is that whose idea is different, however that idea be disposed to the subject. An example: animal is univocal, not only as it is said of its species but also as it is determined by differences, because it has one concept determinable by them, and yet it is not said univocally of the differences, such that it is said in the ‘what’ – such that its idea is the idea of the differences, in the way it is said univocally of the species. Also, this dispute is nothing to the purpose, because if being is said according to one concept of itself about God and about creatures, it is necessary to say that the idea of being is the idea of the subject; for it will be said of both in the ‘what’, and so it will be univocal in each way.

II. Second Opinion

90. Another opinion is affirmative, at the other extreme [n.44], which posits that God is in a genus – and they [sc. those who hold this opinion]⁷² have on their behalf also the authority of Damascene *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.7: “Incorporeal substance etc.”⁷³

91. Again Boethius in his little book *On the Trinity* ch.4, where he seems to say that two genera⁷⁴ remain in divine reality. This cannot be understood only according to some similar mode of predicating, because Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.8 speaks thus: “If God be called good, just, spirit” etc., “only the last one I mentioned seems to signify substance, and the rest qualities;” again *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 he seems to say that action most properly agrees with God. Therefore not merely do the modes of predicating similar to these genera remain, and so it seems one should understand Boethius ‘about those two genera’ that they remain in themselves.

92. Third for this opinion seems to be the authority of Averroes *Metaphysics* X com.7 (and the text begins “And being is said”), where the Philosopher says that “there is some one first substance,” which is the measure of the others [*Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a8-9, 11-13]. The Commentator understands it to be the prime mover. Therefore, just as in other genera the ‘first’ is something of that genus, so the first mover is something of the genus of substance.

93. A first reason is set down for this of the following sort, because created substance can be conceived and uncreated substance, and neither concept is simply simple. Therefore, by resolution, the idea of substance will remain, indifferent to each contracting instance – and the idea of genus seems to be thus indifferently taken.⁷⁵

94. A second reason is because many simple entities are placed in a genus, such as angels, according to those who posit them to be immaterial – accidents too, according to those who posit them to be simple. Therefore the simplicity of God does not exclude the idea of genus from him.

III. Scotus’ own Opinion

⁷² Who these people are is unknown, but their arguments given here [nn.90-93] are reported by Thomas of Sutton.

⁷³ Damascene *ibid.*: “Incorporeal substance embraces God, angel, soul, demon,” cf. also: “The most general genus is substance, for it has no genus above it.”

⁷⁴ The two genera are substance and relation, n.130.

⁷⁵ The Vatican editors refer this argument to David of Dinant.

95. I hold a middle opinion, that along with the simplicity of God it stands that some concept is common to him and to creatures – not however some common concept as of a genus, because neither a concept said of God in the ‘what’, nor said of him in any way whatever by formal predication, is *per se* in some genus.

A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion

96. The first part was proved when arguing against the first opinion [nn.44, 51-79].

B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion

I. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna

97. The second part [n.95] I prove by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.5 n.10: “It is manifest that God is improperly called ‘substance’.” – His reason there is because substance is said to be that which stands under accidents; but it is absurd to say that God stands under any accident; therefore etc. This reason holds in this way: Augustine does not understand that the idea of substance is ‘to stand under accidents as substance is a genus’, because he has premised there that “it is absurd that substance be said relatively.” But substance, as it is a genus, is limited, as will be immediately proved next [nn.101-107]; and every limited substance is capable of an accident; therefore any substance that is in a genus can stand under some accident, – God not, therefore etc.

98. Again, Avicenna argues *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb) that God is not in a genus, because a genus is a ‘part’; but God is simple, not having part and part; therefore God is not in a genus.

99. These two proofs [nn.97-98] are true at the same time by authority and reason.

2. By what is Proper to God

100. I now show the proposed conclusion [n.95] by two middle terms (and they are made clear from things proper to God): first from the idea of infinity, – second from the idea of necessary existence.

101. [From the idea of infinity] – From the first I argue in two ways.

First as follows: a concept that is indifferent to certain things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus; but whatever is commonly said of God and creatures is indifferent to the finite and infinite, speaking of essential features, – or at any rate indifferent to the finite and non-finite speaking of any features whatever, because divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to finite and infinite, therefore etc.⁷⁶

102. The first part of the minor is plain, because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, – in creatures it is finite.

103. I prove the second part of the minor because a genus is taken from some reality which in itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is plain from what was said in the preceding

⁷⁶ This paragraph is marked as ‘p’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

question.⁷⁷ This proof stands on the composition of species and on the potentiality of genus, but both these are removed from God, because of infinity.

104. This assumption [n.103] is plain from the authority of Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b25-26: “The term” (that is, the definition) “must be an extended proposition,” “by the fact that it signifies something of something, so that that is matter but that form.”⁷⁸

105. It [the same assumption, n.104] is also apparent by reason, because if the reality from which the genus is taken were truly the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would completely define it, – also genus and difference would not define it, because the account composed of them would not first indicate the same as the thing defined: for each thing is itself once, and therefore the account that would express it twice would not indicate the same first as the quiddity of the thing.

106. Treating further in some way of this reasoning [n.105], I understand it thus, that in some creatures genus and difference are taken from different realities (as, by positing several forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellective one), and then the thing from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by the thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there is not there thing and thing (as in accidents), at any rate in one thing there is some proper reality from which genus is taken and another reality from which difference is taken; let the first be called *a* and the second *b*; *a* is in itself potential to *b*, so that, by understanding *a* precisely and understanding *b* precisely, in the way *a* is understood in the first instant of nature – in which it is precisely itself – it is perfectible by *b* (as if it were another thing), but that it is not perfected really by *b* this is because of the identity of *a* and *b* with some whole with which they are really first the same, which whole indeed is produced first and in the whole both these realities are produced; but if either of them were produced without the other, it would be truly potential to it and truly imperfect without it.

107. This composition of realities – of potential and actual – is minimal, which is sufficient for the idea of genus and difference, and this does not stand with the fact that any reality in something is infinite: for if the reality were of itself infinite, however much precisely taken, it would not be in potency to any reality; therefore since in God any essential reality is formally infinite, there is none from which could formally be taken the idea of genus.

108. [Again from the idea of infinity] – Second, from the same middle [n.100], I argue as follows: the concept of a species is not only the concept of a reality and of a mode intrinsic to the same reality, because then whiteness could be a genus and the degrees intrinsic to whiteness could be specific differences;⁷⁹ but those by which something common is contracted to God and creatures are finite and infinite, which state intrinsic degrees of it;⁸⁰ therefore these contracting things cannot be differences, nor do

⁷⁷ The Vatican editors refer to nn.7-19, but the reference might be as well or better to nn.36-38.

⁷⁸ See Appendix to this question, point D.

⁷⁹ Note by Scotus: “‘An intrinsic mode is not a difference, in any degree of form at all’; therefore here there is no difference included. – On the contrary, ‘about infinite line’ [below n.117].”

⁸⁰ Note by Scotus: “‘but those...’, – response: not those only, just as neither does color descend to whiteness only through the primacy and perfection of whiteness to the other colors, but through the specific difference. – To the contrary. Nothing else contracts anything indifferent to God save the infinite, – because if so what is its order to the infinite? Either the intrinsic mode will be posterior ‘to the quasi-extrinsic

they constitute with the contracted thing a concept as composite as the concept of a species is composite, nay the concept from such a contracted and contracting thing is simpler than the concept of a species could be.⁸¹

109. From these middles about infinity, the reasoning of Augustine stated above about ‘standing under the accidents’ [n.97] gets its evidence. Thence too does Avicenna’s reasoning get its evidence, in *Metaphysics* VIII ‘about the partial nature of genus’ touched on above [n.98], because never is a genus without some partial reality in the species, which reality cannot be in something truly simple.

110. [From the idea of necessary existence] – I argue, third, from the second middle, namely from the idea of necessary existence [n.100], – and it is the argument of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb): if necessary existence has a genus, then the intention of the genus will either be from necessary existence or not. If in the first way, “then it will not cease until there is a difference;” I understand this as follows: the genus will then include the difference, because without it the genus is not in ultimate act, and ‘necessary existence of itself’ is in ultimate act; but if the genus includes the difference, then it is not the genus. If the second member be granted, it follows that “necessary existence will be constituted by that which is not necessary existence.”⁸²

111. But this reasoning [n.110] proves that necessary existence has nothing common with anything else, because the common intention is ‘non-necessary existence’; hence I respond: the intention as understood includes neither necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; and that in the thing which corresponds to the intention, in ‘this’ is necessary existence, in ‘that’ possible existence (this is rejected if to the intention of the genus a proper reality corresponds and does not thus correspond to the common intention, – as is said [later, n.139].

112. [As to ‘whatever is said formally of God’] – As to that which is added in the question ‘about whatever is formally said of God’ [n.39], I say that nothing such is in a genus,⁸³ for the same reason [nn.95-111], because nothing is said formally of God that is limited; whatever is of some genus, in whatever way it is of that genus, is necessarily limited.

113. But then there is a doubt, as to what sort the predicates are which are said of God, as wise, good, etc.

I reply. Being is divided into finite and infinite before into the ten categories, because one of them, namely ‘finite’, is common to the ten genera; therefore whatever agrees with being as indifferent to finite and infinite, or as it is proper to infinite being, belongs to it not as determined to a genus but as prior, and consequently as it is

contracting mode’ just as the difference is, or the infinite understood as ‘infinite’ will be further contractible and potential.”

⁸¹ This paragraph is marked as ‘q’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112

⁸² This paragraph is marked as ‘s’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

⁸³ Note of Scotus: “The negative [side of the question] – ‘nothing said of God is in a genus’: for this three reasons, two of which, p [n.101] and q, [n.108] from infinity (the instance r against them, through infinite line [n.117], and there two things: the intention of Aristotle and what is true in the thing); the third reason s, [n.110] the idea of necessary existence – the fourth t from others [nn.118-119] (it will be refuted).

The affirmative – ‘anything said of God is transcendent’: where first is the v about transcendents. “But then there is a doubt” [n.113]; thence x ‘to the contrary’, that about the four predicates [n.120], – and the other y ‘to the contrary’, about the reality corresponding to the common concept [n.137] (it is difficult at o [see footnote to n.136]), – the solution to them [sc. x and y, nn.212-127, 138-150].”

transcendent and outside every genus. Whatever is common to God and creatures is such as to belong to being as it is indifferent to finite and infinite; for as it belongs to God it is infinite, – as to creatures it is finite; therefore it belongs to being before being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent.

114. But then there is another doubt, how wisdom is posited as transcendent although it is not common to all beings.

I reply. Just as it is of the idea of ‘most general’ not to have several species under it but not to have any genus above it (just as this category ‘when’ – because it does not have a genus above it – is most general, although it has few or no species), so any transcendent at all has no genus under which it may be contained. Hence it is of the idea of the transcendent not to have a predicate above it save being; but that it be common to many inferiors, this is accidental.

115. This is plain from another fact, because being not only has simple convertible properties, – as one, true and good – but it has some properties where opposites are distinct against each other, as necessary being or possible, act or potency, and the like. And just as the convertible properties are transcendent, because they follow being insofar as it is not determined to any genus, so disjunct properties are transcendent, and each member of the disjunct is transcendent because neither determines its determinable to a definite genus: and yet one member of the disjunct is formally special, not agreeing save with one being, – as necessary being in this division ‘necessary being or possible being’, and as infinite in this division ‘finite or infinite’, and so of other cases. Thus too can wisdom be transcendent, and anything else that is common to God and creatures, although something such be said of God alone, and some of God and some creature. But that a transcendent, as transcendent, be said of any being is not necessary unless it be convertible with the first transcendent, namely being.⁸⁴

3. Statement and Refutation of the Proofs of Some

[Proof by Some] – Some⁸⁵ prove it in a fourth way [v. nn.101, 108, 110], that God is not in a genus because “he contains in himself the perfections of all genera.”⁸⁶

[Refutation of the proof] – But this argument is not valid, because what contains something contains it in its own way. Substance too, which is now the most general genus, as it is taken for all inferior species contains virtually all accidents: so that, if God were to cause only individuals of substances, they would have in themselves virtually the wherewithal to cause all accidents, and yet created substances would not on this account be denied to be in a genus because they virtually contain accidents in their own way, not by way of accidents. So, therefore, from the fact alone that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that he is not in a genus, because to contain them in this way does not exclude finitude (for this ‘to contain virtually’ is not ‘to be infinite’), but from the absolute infinity of God this does follow, as was deduced before [nn.101-109].

117. [Instances from infinite line] – But against this [sc. the last clause of n.116] an instance is made that infinity simply does not prove the matter at hand [sc. that God is not in a genus], because the Philosopher *Topics* 6.11.148b23-32 takes exception to the

⁸⁴ This paragraph is marked as ‘v’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112

⁸⁵ E.g. Aquinas *On Power* q.7 a.3.

⁸⁶ This paragraph is marked as ‘t’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

definition of straight line (namely this, ‘a straight line is that whose middle does not go outside the extremes’), for this reason, that if there were an infinite line it could be straight, – but then it would not have a middle, nor extremes or ends; but a definition is not to be taken exception to because it does not belong to that with which being in a genus is impossible; therefore it is not impossible for an infinite line to be in a genus, and consequently infinity does not necessarily exclude being in a genus.⁸⁷

118. I reply, first to the intention of the authority [sc. of Aristotle, n.117], – because a straight line is a whole *per accidens*, and, if this whole be defined, one definition will be assigned corresponding to line and another corresponding to straight. That which will correspond to ‘straight’ in the place of the definition will not formally contradict the infinite (because straight does not formally contradict the infinite), and what a definition is formally repugnant to, the thing defined will also be repugnant to; but that in the definition which the Philosopher takes exception to is assigned a definition as if it were of straight (that is, to hold the middle between the extremes), this is formally repugnant to the infinite; therefore, it would have to be that if this definition were good, that straight would be formally repugnant to infinite, – but this is false, although it be virtually repugnant to the infinite insofar as its subject, namely line, is formally repugnant to the infinite. The Philosopher, then, does not intend to say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that to the idea of straight infinity is not formally repugnant, – and therefore the definition to which infinity is formally repugnant is not ‘of straight insofar as it is straight’: for he would not have taken exception to this definition ‘a straight line is length without breadth, whose extremes are two points equally protended’, because here there would be something repugnant to infinity, but it would be assigned as idea of line, not as idea of straight, – and then would it be well assigned, because infinity is repugnant to the line.

119. But there is another doubt to the purpose, whether an infinite line could be in the genus of quantity, – and if it so, then the two reasons taken from infinity [nn.101, 108] do not seem valid.

I reply. Never on the supreme in an inferior does the supreme in a superior follow unless the inferior is the most noble thing contained under that superior, just as there does not follow ‘the most perfect ass, therefore the most perfect animal’, but thanks to the matter there does follow ‘the most perfect man, therefore the most perfect animal’, because man is the most perfect of animals; therefore the best or most perfect being does not follow on the most perfect something among what is contained under being unless it be the simply most perfect thing contained under being: now quantity is not such, nor anything of any genus – because anything in it is limited – indeed, nothing is such save what is perfection simply, which of itself can be infinite; and so it does not follow ‘the most perfect quantity, therefore the most perfect being’, nor does it thus follow about anything in any genus, but there only follows, ‘the most perfect truth or goodness, therefore the most perfect being’. So therefore⁸⁸ with the infinite, that it not only states supreme perfection but also perfection not able to be exceeded, infinite being does not follow save precisely on an infinite such as is most perfect, in which is the idea of being, that namely states perfection simply. And therefore, although there were a quantity infinite in idea of quantity, although however quantity is not perfection simply, it would

⁸⁷ This paragraph is marked as ‘r’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112. See also appendix point E.

⁸⁸ Interpolated text: “with intellectual nature which is noblest, and”

not follow that it be an infinite being, because it would not follow that it be a being which cannot be exceeded in perfection. It would, then, be a line infinite in the genus of quantity, because it would be a limited being simply and exceeded simply by a simply more perfect being. But ‘an infinite being simply’ cannot be in a genus. And the reason is because the first infinity [sc. that of a line] does not take away all the potentiality that the idea of the genus requires, but it only posits infinity in a certain respect of some imperfect entity (in which, as it is that, there can well be composition, in whatever degree it, such as it is, be put). The second infinity does necessarily take it away, as was made clear before [nn.106-107, 103].

120. [Instance from the insufficiency of the categories of Aristotle] – Opposed to this [n.119] is that then contradictories would be in place, by conceding a common concept said in the ‘what’ of God and creatures and by denying that God is in a genus; for every concept said in the ‘what’, if it is a common concept, is either the concept of a genus or of a definition, otherwise there will be more predicates than Aristotle taught in *Topics* 1.4.101b15-28.⁸⁹

121. To this I say that they are not contradictories. The thing is plain from the authorities of Augustine given above [n.97], – where he denies that God is a substance and concedes that properly and also truly he is essence. But if there were a different, equivocal, concept of essence as it belongs to God and creatures, so could there be an equivocal concept of substance, – and so he could then be called substance just as essence.

122. Similarly Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb), where he denies God is in a genus, concedes him to be substance there and a being not in another. And that he is taking ‘being’ non-equivocally from the concept according to which it is said of creatures appears from himself in *Metaphysics* I ch.2 (71ra), where he says that “being in itself does not have principles, which is why science will not look for principles of being absolutely, but of some being among beings.” But if being had a different concept in God and in creatures, there could well be a principle in itself of being, because the principle of being according to one concept would be being itself according to another concept.

123. When you argue ‘it is said in the ‘what’, then it is genus or definition’ [n.120], – I reply: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b23-32 teaches what sort of ‘predicate said in the what’ is a definition. For he introduces there, against the ‘ideas’ of Plato, the sayings of the followers of Antisthenes, – whom in this he approves when they say, “a term is a long account.” And later he adds that “it is a feature of a substance of which there happens to be a term (to wit of composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible), but of the first elements from which these are, there is not” (supply, a definition), – and he adds the reason: “since a definition is what signifies something of something” (this needs to be understood virtually, not formally, – as was said elsewhere [I d.3 n.147]); and he adds: “this indeed must be as matter, but that as form.” From which he seems to be there arguing that the [Platonic] ‘idea’, if it were posited, would not be definable, and if his own reasoning has validity in any way, because of the simplicity of ‘idea’, he would himself much more deny definition of God, whose simplicity is supreme. Therefore it follows from his authority that nothing is said of God in the ‘what’ as a definition.

124. From the same it follows that nothing is said in the ‘what’ of God as a genus. For whatever has a genus can have a difference and a definition, because (*Metaphysics*

⁸⁹ This paragraph is marked as ‘x’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

7.12.1038a5-6) genus ‘either is nothing besides the species, or if it is, it is so indeed as matter’, and then of what there is a genus it is necessary to posit that it can have a difference as form. If, therefore, something is said of God in the ‘what’, it follows, by arguing constructively from Aristotle’s authority not destructively, that it is not a genus or definition; but when you infer ‘it is a genus or definition, because Aristotle did not say there were other predicates said in the ‘what’, therefore there are no others’ [n.120] – you are arguing from the authority destructively, and there is a fallacy of the consequent.⁹⁰

125. But you will say: then Aristotle did not sufficiently hand on all the predicates said in the ‘what’.

I reply. The Philosopher in the *Topics* [n.120] distinguished predicates because of the distinction of problems, because diverse problems have a diverse way of determining from the diversity of predicates. So he does not there number all the predicates, because not specific difference (although he included general difference under genus), and yet specific difference has the proper idea of a predicate; and species too has the proper idea of a predicate, different from definition, otherwise Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.1] would have badly posited five universals. For that reason, therefore, Aristotle did sufficiently there distinguish predicates, because he distinguished everything about which problems of inquiry require a special art of determining, which he there intended to hand on. – But transcendentals are not such predicates, because there are no special problems about them; for a problem supposes something certain and queries what is doubtful (*Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b4-11), but being and thing “are impressed on the soul at first impression” (Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.6 (72rb)), and therefore about those most common concepts there are no problems *per se* determinable. It was not necessary, then, to number them among the predicates of problems.

126. But is it really the case that Aristotle never taught these general predicates [sc. the transcendent ones]?

I reply. In *Metaphysics* 8 [n.123] he taught that nothing was said as a genus of God (from the afore-mentioned authority [n.123]), and yet he did teach that ‘truth’ is said univocally of God and creatures, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31, as was mentioned above (where he says that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’ [n.79]); and in this he taught that entity is said univocally of God and creatures, because he adds there (sc. *Metaphysics* 2, *ibid.*) that “as each thing is related to being, so is it related to truth;” it is also plain – according to him⁹¹ – that if being is said of God, this will be in the ‘what’. Therefore in these passages he implicitly taught that some transcendent predicate is said in the ‘what’, and that it is not genus nor definition, – and that other transcendent predicates are said in the ‘what sort’ (as true), and yet are not properties or accidents

⁹⁰ Those whom Scotus is criticizing are arguing that if a genus or definition is predicated in the ‘what’, then something predicated of God in the ‘what’ must be a genus or definition, and they are arguing thus on Aristotle’s authority. But, first, this argument is the fallacy of the consequent (for even if genus and definition are predicated only in the ‘what’ it does not follow that anything predicated in the ‘what’ is only genus or definition, for perhaps something else might be so predicated), and, second, they are arguing destructively from Aristotle and saying that if Aristotle spoke of nothing else as predicated in the ‘what’ then he denied that anything else could be predicated in the ‘what’. Scotus is arguing constructively, that since Aristotle denied definition of simples he would admit that anything predicated of a simple in the ‘what’, as in the case of God, could not be a definition or a genus.

⁹¹ Vatican editors: because Aristotle posited that God was substance (first, eternal, and immutable), and that being is said of substance in the first mode of saying *per se*, etc.

according as these universals [sc. property and accident] belong to the species of some genera, because nothing that is a species of some genus belongs to God in any way.

127. He also in some way taught the same in *Topics* 4.6.128a38-39: “If it follows,” – he says – “something always and does not convert, it is difficult to separate it from being a genus.” And he afterwards adds: “To use as a genus what is always consequent, although it not convert,” – as if he were saying that this is expedient for the opponent; and he adds: “when the other grants one of the two sides, one should not obey him in everything,”⁹² – as if he were to say that this is expedient to the respondent, not to concede that every non-convertible consequent is a predicate as a genus; and, if he were not speaking of a predicate said in the ‘what’, there would be no plausibility to what he teaches, that the opponent is using such as a genus. Therefore he insinuates there that something is a common predicate said in the ‘what’ which is not a genus. – And that he is speaking of predication in the ‘what’ is seen from his examples, ‘tranquility is rest’. For predication in abstract things is not predication in the ‘what sort’ or denominative predication.

IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

128. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.90-94]. I respond to Damascene [n.90]. Although he says many words, in diverse places, which seem to say that God is in a genus, yet one word – which he says in *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.8 – solves everything. For there he says as follows: “Substance, which contains the uncreated deity super-substantially, and the whole creation cognitively and content-fully, is the most general genus.” Therefore he does not say that substance, which is the most general genus, contains deity as it contains creature but ‘super-substantially’, that is, by taking what is of perfection in substance according as it is a genus, and leaving out what is of imperfection – in the way Avicenna says in *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 [n.122] that God is ‘being in itself’.

129. As to Boethius [n.91] I say that nowhere is he found to say in that little book that ‘two genera remain in divine reality’. In brief, neither genera, nor modes of genera, nor the ideas of them remain there, – because, just as genera and what is in them are limited, so also the modes and ideas of them (speaking of ideas of first intention, which are founded on these), because on the limited cannot anything be founded save the limited.

130. Yet Boethius does say – in his little book *On the Trinity* chs.4, 6 – that (after having enumerated the categories) “if anyone has turned these into divine predication, everything is changed that can be changed: but ‘relative to something’ is not at all anything predicated,” – and later, “essence contains unity, relation multiplies trinity;” and from these is taken [in the argument, n.91] that he intimates substance and relation to remain in divine reality. But he expressly says there that neither substance, which is a genus, nor anything of it, remains there; for he says “When we say God, we seem to signify substance, but a substance that is beyond substance,” in the way Damascene said

⁹² Vatican editors: sc. but one should in some things respond with an instance, that is, by using this objection, *Topics* 4.6.128b6-9: “Non-being follows everything that comes to be (for what comes to be is not), but it does not convert (for not everything which is not comes to be); but non-being is not the genus of what comes to be; for, simply, there are no species of non-being.”

substance ‘super-substantially’ [n.128]. Boethius intends, then, that there are two modes of predicating in divine reality, namely of relative essential predicate, which modes Augustine expresses rather as ‘to itself’ and ‘to another’ – *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – , and all the predicates said formally of God are contained under one or other of these two members: but under the first member [‘to itself’] are contained many predicates that have a mode of predicating like quality and quantity (and not only those that have a mode of predicating similar to the ones which are of the category of substance); under the second member [‘to another’] are contained all that have a mode of predicating similar to certain relatives, whether they are properly relatives or not.

131. And as to why all essentials are said to be predicated according to substance, and against them are distinguished predicates said ‘relative to something’, although however the predicates said ‘relative to something’ by identity pass over into substance, just as also do others, – the reason will be assigned in the following question ‘About attributes’, in the second doubt against the principal solution [nn.215-216, 222].

132. As to Averroes [n.92] I say that he does not seem to hold the intention of the master, because Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18-1053b3, 2.1053b9-1054a19, asks whether in substances there be something one that is measure of the others, whether this itself is one. And he proves – from his intention against Plato – that it is not itself one, but something to which one itself belongs, just as in all other genera, speaking of one and of all other measured things in those genera. And he concludes at the end: “Wherefore indeed, in properties and qualities and quantities one itself is something one but not is this the substance of it; and in substances must the disposition be similar – for disposition is similar in everything” (about which text the Commentator set down the words afore mentioned [n.92]). But if the first mover were posited as the measure of the genus itself of substance, this one thing itself would be posited as the measure, because the first mover – on account of its simplicity – would much more truly be this one itself than the idea of Plato.

133. What then is the first measure of the genus?

I reply: some substance of the genus is first, to which unity belongs. – But the first mover is not the intrinsic measure of the genus, just as not of the others either. Yet insofar as it is the extrinsic measure of everything in some way, it is more immediately the measure of substances, which are more perfect beings, than of accidents, which are more remote from it. Of no genus, however, is it the intrinsic measure.

134. To the first reason [n.93] I say that if you contract substance with ‘created’ and ‘uncreated’, substance is not taken there as it is the concept of the most general genus (for ‘uncreated’ is repugnant to substance in this way, because substance in this way involves limitation), but substance is taken there for ‘being in itself’ and not for ‘being in another’, whose concept is prior and more common than the concept of substance as it is a genus, – as was plain from Avicenna above [n.122].

135. To the other reason [n.94] I concede that composition of thing and thing is not required in being ‘in a genus’, but there is required composition of reality and reality, one of which – precisely taken in the first moment of nature – is in potency to the other and perfectible by the other: and such composition cannot be of infinite reality to infinite reality; but all reality in God is infinite formally, as was made clear above [n.107], – therefore etc.

V. To the Principal Arguments

136. [To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.39] I concede that this concept said of God and creatures in the ‘what’ is contracted by some contracting concepts stating the ‘what sort of’, but neither is this concept said in the ‘what’ the concept of a genus, nor are those concepts stating the ‘what sort of’ concepts of differences, because this ‘quidditative’ concept is common to finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus, – these contracting concepts state an intrinsic mode of the contracted thing, and not some reality perfecting it; and differences do not state an intrinsic mode of reality of any genus, because, in whatever degree animality is understood, not on this account is rationality or irrationality understood to be an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is still understood in such degree as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.⁹³

137. But there is here a doubt, how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as ‘real’ save from some reality of the same genus, – and then it seems that it is potential to the reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was argued before ‘about the concept of genus and difference’ [n.39], and then the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that if there were some reality that distinguishes in the thing and another that is distinct, it seems that the thing is composite, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs [n.47].⁹⁴

138. I reply that when some reality is understood along with its intrinsic mode, the concept is not so simply simple that the reality cannot be conceived without that mode, but then it is an imperfect concept of the thing; it can also be conceived under that mode, and then it is a perfect concept of that thing. An example: if there were a whiteness in a tenth degree of intensity, however much it were in every way simple in the thing, it could yet be conceived under the idea of such an amount of whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived with a concept adequate to the thing itself, – or it could be conceived precisely under the idea of whiteness, and then it would be conceived with a concept imperfect and lacking in the perfection of the thing; and an imperfect concept could be common to that whiteness and to another, and a perfect concept would be proper.

139. A distinction, then, is required between that from which a common concept is taken and that from which a proper concept is taken, not as distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same thing, – which distinction suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept of the same thing, of which concepts let the imperfect be common and the perfect proper. But the concepts of genus and difference require a distinction of realities, not just of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.

140. This [n.139] can be made clear. If we posit that some intellect is perfectly moved by color to understand the reality of color and the reality of difference, however much it have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality, it does not have in this a concept of reality from which difference is taken, nor conversely, – but it has there two formal objects which are of a nature to terminate distinct proper concepts. But

⁹³ Note by Scotus: “Note how some intention first of *a* and *b* indifferently and nothing of one idea corresponds in reality, but formal objects first diverse are understood in one first intention, although each imperfectly.” This note is marked as ‘o’ by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

⁹⁴ This paragraph is marked as ‘y’ by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

if there were only a distinction in the thing as of reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not have a proper concept of the reality and not have a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing (at any rate as of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode would not be conceived, just as is said elsewhere ‘about conceived singularity and the mode under which it is conceived’ [I d.2 n.183]), but in the perfect concept it would have one object adequate to it, namely the thing under the mode.⁹⁵

141. And if you say ‘at any rate the common concept is indeterminate and potential as to the special concept, therefore also reality as to reality, or at any rate the concept will not be infinite, because no infinite is potential with respect to anything’, – I concede that the concept common to God and creatures is finite, that is, not of itself infinite, because if it were infinite it would not of itself be common to finite and infinite; nor is it of itself positively finite, such that it of itself include finitude, because then it would not belong to the infinite, – but it is of itself indifferent to finite and infinite: and so it is finite negatively, that is, not positing infinity, and to such finitude it is determinable through some concept.

142. But if you argue ‘therefore the reality from which it [sc. the concept common to God and creatures] is taken is finite’, – it does not follow; for it is not taken from some reality as a concept adequate to that reality, or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but diminished and imperfect, to such an extent too that if the reality from which it is taken were seen perfectly and intuitively, he who intuits there would not have distinct formal objects, namely reality and mode, but the same formal object [n.140], – yet he who understands with abstractive intellection, because of the imperfection of that intellection, can have it for formal object although he not have the other.

143. As to the ‘I concede...’ [n.141 near the middle]: the concept is not that finite act [sc. whereby we conceive] but is the formal object [n.65]. If it is determinable [n.141], then it is formally finite and potential, so not common to an infinite thing.

The final consequence [sc. the clause immediately preceding] is to be denied, because an infinite thing is understood imperfectly in a finite formal object, insofar as that infinite object would be of a nature to make in the intellect such formal object if it were to move it in diminished fashion [n.142], just as also a created object moving in diminished fashion is of a nature to make the same; and therefore it is common to both, as a sort of common and imperfect likeness.

144. To the contrary: an infinite thing is not anything finite; God is that object if it is predicated of God in the ‘what’, as ‘man is an animal’ – similarly, God is not anything potential.

Response. Although there is in the intellect a composition of concepts, yet it is for an external thing. Just as signs are taken for the things signified, and just as several concepts can be signs of the same thing (although one common, another proper), so the composition of those concepts is a sign of the identity of the things signified by those very concepts. Because, therefore, the thing signified by a finite concept, as by a common sign, is the very thing which is signified by the concept of God, therefore, this is true ‘God is a being’, by compounding the finite concept in the intellect with the concept of God; but it is not in place of the finite signified in this way, but of the infinite commonly signified.

⁹⁵ This and the previous two paragraphs [nn.138-140] are marked by Scotus with a reference back to n.111.

145. Then to the proposition ‘God is this object, a being’ [n.144, *init.*], I reply: God is that which in reality is signified by being as by a common sign, and therefore in the intellect this composition is true ‘God is a being’, which composition is a sign of that identity.

146. When you say ‘God is not anything finite’ [n.144, *init.*], it is true speaking of identity in reality, which namely is what is signified and belongs to things signified; but, when speaking of being as it is a composition in the intellect, that in a composition nothing can be predicated of God which is a finite sign in the intellect is false. An example of this: ‘man is an animal’, – in the intellect ‘animal’, as it is there the formal object, is a diminished being. But no diminished being is true of Socrates existing in reality.

147. So this is false, then, ‘Socrates existing is an animal’? – I reply: a composition is always made of concepts, and is a sign and of things signified; but it is for material objects, which are signified by the concepts, and for identity, which is signified by the composition, such that if there is an identity of the things signified, namely of the material objects, the composition is true of the concepts, which are the formal objects.

148. This [n.139, 140] can also be further clarified. If of any universal a proper individual is posited (to wit in reality, a proper individual of substance, a proper individual of animal, a proper individual of man, etc.), then not only is the concept of genus potential to the concept of difference, but a proper individual of the genus is potential to a proper individual of the difference. And if we take a proper individual of this concept ‘being’ which is individual in God, and a proper individual of this which is ‘infinite’, it is the same individual, and it is not potential to itself.

149. But you may at least ask: why does not entity have a proper individual in reality which is in potency to the individual of the determiner, so that ‘this’ being be first understood before ‘infinite’ is?

I reply, because when something is of itself being and is not only capable of being, it is of itself a haver of whatever condition is necessarily required for existence; but being as it belongs to God – namely being through essence – is infinite being itself and not something to which being itself only belongs (it is of itself ‘this’ and of itself ‘infinite’), so that infinity is as it were first understood in some way to be a mode of being by essence before it is understood to be ‘this’: and therefore one should not ask why ‘this’ being is infinite, as if singularity first belonged to it before infinity. And so is it universally in these things that can be beings through essence. Nothing by participation such is first determined of itself to be such by essence, and so to be infinite such and to be of itself ‘this’.

150. And if you argue that individual includes individual, therefore common includes common, therefore if ‘this’ being includes ‘this’ infinity, and if being in common includes infinity in common, – I reply that the consequence is not valid, because individual includes some perfection which common does not include, and on account of that perfection it can formally include the infinite, and yet the common – by reason of the common concept – does not include it as an included concept, but is in some way determinable by it.

151. [To the second] – As to Avicenna *Metaphysics* II [n.40], the answer is plain from himself in *Metaphysics* VIII, as was said [n.122].

152. [To the third] – As to Damascene [n.41], the answer is plain from the Master [Lombard] in distinction 19 [*Sentences* I d.19 ch.9 n.182], that he puts species there ‘for some likeness of species to individuals’; there is however a greater unlikeness, according to Augustine, and therefore Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 denies species there, as also genus. Hence the definition of Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3], ‘species is said to be that which is predicated of many things in the what’, should be understood as that in those many the species is multiplied in nature, but in the divine persons the divine nature is not multiplied; species too in itself has a reality corresponding to it, potential to the proper reality of the individual, but the divine essence is in no way potential to relation, as was said in distinction 5 question 2 [I d.5 nn.70, 113, 118-119, 132, 138].

153. [To the fourth] – To the final one, about wisdom [n.42], I say that it is not a species of a genus as it is transferred to divine reality, nor is it transferred according to that idea, but according to the idea of wisdom as it is transcendent. But how such a thing could be transcendent was said in the principal solution, the third article [nn.114-115].

154. There is, however, a doubt about this wisdom which is in us, whether it is an individual of wisdom that is transcendent and a quality, or whether of one only.

And it seems that it is not of both.

Because nothing the same is contained under diverse predicates said in the ‘what’ of the same thing and not subalterns; but transcendent wisdom and quality are not subalterns; therefore etc.

155. Again, transcendent wisdom is a property of being, – therefore being is not said of it in the ‘what’, nor conversely, from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.131, 134-136]; therefore neither does anything in which transcendent wisdom is included include being in the ‘what’, because then it would be a being *per accidens*: for it would essentially include the idea of subject and property which do not make anything one *per se* but only *per accidens*.

156. If these arguments [nn.154-155] are valid, and this wisdom in us is only an individual of transcendent wisdom or only an individual of the genus of quality – the second of these does not seem it should be granted, because then it would not be in us a perfection simply, which seems to be contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: ‘Every creature around us cries out’ etc. [n.71]; if the first be granted [sc. ‘an individual of transcendent wisdom’], then not every habit is formally in the genus of quality, but all that import perfection simply are transcendent.⁹⁶

Question Four

Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections preceding the Act of the Intellect

157. I ask whether along with the divine simplicity there can stand in any way a distinction of essential perfections preceding in any way every act of the intellect.

I argue that there cannot:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.7: “Not as wisdom and justice are two qualities in creatures are they so in God, but what is justice is itself also goodness.” From

⁹⁶ The Vatican editors remark that nn.154-156 have the nature of notes (not of finished discussion).

this I argue: predication in the abstract is only true if it is ‘*per se* in the first mode’; therefore this ‘wisdom is truth’ is *per se* in the first mode, and so in no way is there a distinction between subject and the predicate, but the subject *per se* will include the predicate, because this belongs to the *per se* in the first mode [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-37]; therefore etc.

158. On the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* I ch.4: “If you have said just or good or anything of the like, – you are not speaking the nature of God but about that nature.” And you are saying something that precedes the act of the intellect; therefore, before every work and act of the intellect, there is something in God which is not the nature formally.

I. The Opinions of Others

159. On this question there are many opinions, all of which I do not intend to recite. But there are two holding the negative conclusion that nevertheless contradict each other; each posits that along with the simplicity of God no distinction of attributes stands save only a distinction of reason, but the first [from Thomas of Sutton] posits that it cannot be had save through an act of the intellect ‘understanding God himself in an outward respect’, – the second [from Henry of Ghent] posits that this distinction of reason can be had ‘without any outward respect’.

A. First Opinion

160. [Exposition of the opinion] – The first rests on this reasoning:⁹⁷ “whenever there is in one extreme a difference of reason to which a real difference corresponds in the other extreme, the distinction or difference of reason is taken by comparison to things really distinct (an example of a distinction according to reason is of the right and left side of a column, which is taken by respect to the real distinction of these in an animal, – likewise, an example of a distinction of reason is in a point as it is beginning and end, which distinction is taken by respect to lines really diverse); but the divine attributes have in creatures certain things really distinct corresponding to them, as goodness to goodness and wisdom to wisdom, and other things that are truly called attributes (by which are excluded certain divine properties, as everlastingness and eternity, which are not properly attributes); therefore etc.”

161. “Those⁹⁸ who adhere to this reasoning say that the attributes are distinguished by respect to our intellect to the extent that, once the corresponding

⁹⁷ Scotus seems to be following, somewhat freely, Henry’s report, *Quodl.* V q.1, of this opinion (with which opinion Henry himself did not agree), and the Vatican editors suggest that Henry’s report is not fully accurate to Sutton’s own view.

⁹⁸ The Vatican editors, for accuracy, quote the following directly from Sutton [*Quodlibet* II q.2]: “Therefore the divine intellect, insofar as it is the same, never distinguishes several reasons in its essence. But, once all respect to creatures is removed, the divine intellect is, in knowing its essence, only disposed in one and the same way alone; therefore it does not distinguish several reasons of attributes without respect to creatures, but it has one reason of the essence, by which it perfectly knows the essence... The divine intellect knows distinct attributes through respect to the human intellect distinguishing the attributes.” Again: “For because our intellect – on account of its imperfection – cannot know in one conception the perfection of the divine essence, therefore it has need to understand it in diverse conceptions, which are diverse reasons that it

attributes have been removed, only a single and simple concept could be formed about the divine essence (which would be expressed in a single name for, if other names were imposed, either they would be synonymous names, because the same thing in reality and in reason would correspond to them – or empty, because nothing would correspond to them).”

162. “Their mode, then, of positing [attributes] is of the following sort: to all the ideas of the attributes (namely those that state a perfection in God and in creatures) there corresponds in God the unity of essence, not according to the being which he has absolutely” – as was said [sc. by Thomas] – “but according to the respect which he has to creatures; not in the genus of efficient cause (for no attribute is thus taken, as wisdom because he causes wisdom), nor even as to removing something from God – which two modes Avicenna [*Metaphysics* VIII chs.4 and 7 (99ra, 101rb)] and Rabbi Moses [Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* p.1 chs. 53, 55-60] seem to assert – but insofar as the divine essence is compared according to the idea of formal cause to creatures, containing in itself the completeness of every perfection that is separately and imperfectly in creatures, and in this respect is the divine essence imitable by everything in diverse ways. – Further: the plurality of attributal perfections, as it is in the divine essence, is as it were in potency, but as it is in a concept of the intellect, it is as it were in act (example about the universal in reality and in the intellect). But these many [sc. attributal perfections] have being diversely in diverse intellects: in the divine intellect indeed and in a blest created intellect it is, from the fullness of perfection of that simple essence, conceived according to diverse ideas, and from this comes the multitude of conceptions according to an act in intelligence, but by an intellect understanding with natural light they are conceived *a posteriori*, insofar as from perfections really diverse in creatures it forms conceptions and perfections corresponding in God, proportional ones; yet no intellect actually understands them without respect to the proportional ones – whether it understand them from the proportional ones, as a third intellect, or not, but from the essence, as do the first and second intellect [sc. the divine intellect and the intellect of a blessed creature]. – Limited perfections insofar as they are actually in the intelligence are called ideas, and idea here is said to be the conception of a determinate perfection, from respect to the determinate perfection corresponding to it in creatures.”

163. [Godfrey of Fontaine’s clarification as to the opinion] – Others clarify this position in the following way, that “the divine intellect, apprehending its own essence according to a single and simple reality, virtually⁹⁹ however containing the simple and

receives from creatures and attributes to God.” Again: “For because the created intellect cannot know the one divine perfection, in the way it is, according to its own single reason, therefore it has need, because of its imperfection, to know it under many distinct reasons.” They also quote the following from Bernard of Auvergne criticizing Henry [*Quodlibet* V q.1]: “But as to his [Henry’s] imposing on this position that ‘only one concept can be formed of the divine essence’, it is false, because the position says that ‘one complete concept is formed of the divine essence and that concept God forms, who conceives himself completely; but the created intellect can form many concepts of the divine essence, because it cannot capture the whole perfection all at once’; hence that position is true.”

⁹⁹ *Interpolated text*: “yet containing the perfections, however much limited and determinate, of all things (because of which it is imitable by certain things that import all limited perfections whatever), by understanding the essence, and a single one, in reality, yet understands it as in some way multiple in idea (or understands in that one thing many things in idea), insofar as it apprehends it under one idea as imitable by a lion and under another idea by an ass (and this insofar as ass and lion, according to diverse perfections

absolute perfections of all things without limitation and defect, insofar as (because of the eminence of its perfection to the same perfections) it is more eminently perfect, understands that essence as one in reality, perfect with a multiple perfection that differs according to idea; and if it did not apprehend that the creature was perfected with diverse perfections really different insofar as it is good and wise, or that these perfections import diverse things in the creature, it would not apprehend itself as perfect in wisdom under one idea and perfect in goodness under another idea, nor would it apprehend a difference in idea between its own wisdom and its own goodness unless it apprehended a difference in reality of wisdom and goodness in the creature, – otherwise unity and plurality would be taken from a single thing disposed in the same way in reality and in concept. Since, therefore, the divine essence, as it is considered in itself, is something wholly without distinction – altogether simple – in reality and in idea, it cannot be said that, without comparison of it to certain things in which is found a diversity of reality and idea, such a distinction could exist, because when that is apprehended which is altogether simple and single under the idea that belongs to it in itself without relation to anything else in which there is some distinction, then, as it is not apprehended save as one in reality, so it cannot be apprehended save according to one simple idea.”

164. “Nor can [the divine intellect] apprehend those too – namely the intelligible and the intelligent – as certain differences concerning its essence from comparison of them with each other, or as mutually regarding each other, unless they are already supposed to exist in their own difference, or as importing a certain difference. For things which are apprehended as certain differences mutually regarding each other, and which also, by operation of the intellect, are compared as certain mutual differences – they are now supposed to exist in their difference; but things that, by operation of reason or intellect, do not have the fact that they are certain beings according to idea and differing from each other in idea – they cannot be said to be constituted in their own such being and to have this difference in idea through comparison of them among themselves by operation of reason or intellect; nay this second operation necessarily presupposes the first, so that, first, they are by one operation of reason constituted in such distinct being and, second, by another operation of the intellect they are compared with each other as thus distinct: for just as when things of absolute nature are compared with each other they are supposed to have a distinct being in reality, so too, when beings of reason are compared with each other they are supposed to have a distinct being in idea. Therefore, if the divine intellect apprehends its own essence as differing in idea from attributes, and if it also apprehends attributes as differing in idea, and if attributes are compared with each other under this very difference, they are actually in it in themselves as so differing; and under their own actual distinction – which they thus have of themselves – they move the divine intellect so that it conceive them as so distinct and compare them with each other. But this does not seem to be acceptable.”

165. This reasoning is confirmed as follows: “For all things that differ, or have a difference in themselves or from themselves formally through that which they are in themselves, without comparison to other differences, such things differ in reality. But there are other things that have plurality or difference from comparison with things really different, and these differ in idea: and this is plain in creatures, for once unity of specific

of diverse degrees, participate in and imitate divine perfection itself) – so the divine intellect [understands] its essence according to a simple thing in virtue.”

form in reality is supposed, the intellect distinguishes in it the idea of genus and difference – which are said not to be diverse things – but this diversity could not be taken in any single and simple thing unless it were compared by the intellect to some things really different and agreeing, according to some order, with that single thing; one and the same thing too would not have diverse ideas of true and good unless to understand and to will that ‘one and the same thing’ were, for some subject, acts really diverse and ordered with respect to each other. This is plain also in God, because, because when every kind of comparison with the diverse essences of creatures introducing a real diversity has been stripped away, the divine essence would not be apprehended by the divine intellect under the reason of diverse ideas (or forms), differing by reason alone, but under one simple altogether indistinct reason.”

166. “And this is the intention of the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.39 where, speaking of this matter, he says that life, wisdom, etc. are said of God properly, because God is said properly and truly to be living and wise etc. But such and the like things, which are signified by way of disposition and disposed, in immaterial things “are reduced to one thing in being and to two in consideration; for the intellect is of a nature to divide things united in being, but in composite things – when it disposes the composite, or what has a form, through the form – it understands both things united in some way and differing in another way; but when disposed and disposition in immaterial things have been considered, then they are reduced to one intention altogether, and there will be no mode by which the predicate is distinguished from the subject outside the intellect, namely in real being. But the intellect understands no difference between them in being, save according to acceptation, namely that the same thing receives disposed and disposition as two, of which the proportion is mutual like the proportion of predicate to subject; for the intellect can understand the same thing according to a likeness to a categorical proposition in composite things, just as it understands many things according to likeness.”

167. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this position I argue first thus:¹⁰⁰ “whatever is of perfection simply in a creature is more principally and of itself in God, and not with respect to another;” an attribute is of perfection simply in a creature, such that simply ‘better is it than not it’ [n.22]; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: “the perfect is always independent of the imperfect, just as the imperfect is dependent on the perfect;” an attributal perfection is in God perfectly, in creatures imperfectly. – Likewise it would not be of infinite perfection simply unless it were containing all perfection simply without respect to anything external.

The minor is made clear thus: for because anything created in quidditative being, and any perfection of it essential to it, is limited, therefore from none such is an attribute taken (for by parity of reason from any created essence might an attribute be taken), but an attribute is taken from that which is an accidental perfection of a creature – or in its existing well – which states a perfection simply in the subject substance, – because, although it have as a certain nature a limited degree, yet as perfecting another in its existing well it imports no limitation and thus it is an attribute. Thus too in God it does not indicate a proper perfection but as it were an accidental one, in existing well, – *On the*

¹⁰⁰ Scotus’ arguments here [nn.167-173] are, according to the Vatican editors, freely based on statements by Henry of Ghent (indicated by the quotation marks).

Trinity XV ch.5 n.8: “If we say wise, powerful, beautiful, spirit, what I put last seems to signify substance, but the rest qualities of this substance.”

168. Again, those things are not distinguished by respect externally of which any one contains essence according to every ideal reason; but “any attribute contains the essence according to every reason of ideal perfection;” therefore etc.

The proof of the minor is because the ideal reason corresponds to the perfection of the creature insofar as it is perfected in quidditative being and, consequently, under that reason by which the essence is limited (hence also according to diverse degrees of limitation are they distinguished), but not insofar as the essence is perfect simply, because thus one attribute in God, as good or perfect, corresponds to all of them; from this the proof of the minor is apparent: for because any attribute is a perfection simply (from the clarification of the minor of the first proof [n.167]), it follows that any one at all is imitable by every limited degree.

The proof of the major is that what contains every idea seems to regard equally everything idea-ted, and so by respect to none can it be distinguished from another, because it similarly regards any one of them; hence the wisdom attribute does not more regard idea-ted wisdom than idea-ted color, because each is equally limited, nor is an attribute taken more from one than from the other.

169. Again [Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* 5 q.1], “the distinction of attributes is the foundation of the distinction of the personal emanations, because the Son proceeds by being born as word in the intellect, the Holy Spirit by being inspirited as love in the will, and not as word, – which could not be unless there were some distinction of intellect and will internally,” such that the production of the persons is compared necessarily to nothing external; therefore etc.

170. Again [Henry, *ibid.*], “he [God] understands his essence insofar as it is true, not insofar as it is good, – and he wills it insofar as it is good, not insofar as it is true;” “also from eternity he understood that he understands his essence and wills it simply, not in respect of what is external,” because this act follows natural immateriality. Therefore, without such respect he includes in his essence the idea of true and good, and similarly the idea of understanding and understood, of willing and willed, ideas formally distinct; therefore etc.

171. Again [Henry, *ibid.*], “divine beatitude consists in its perfect acts of intellect and will, but all the divine attributes mutually regard each other in perfecting those acts,” as will be plain [n.175]; but the beatitude of God depends on no extrinsic respect; therefore etc.

172. Against his reason [sc. of Thomas of Sutton as reported by Henry].

The major is false [n.160]. First because the divine essence is as distinguished by reason from an attribute as one attribute is from another; can it therefore follow that ‘essence as essence is not there save by external respect’? – Second because true and good in creatures are distinguished by a distinction of reason; from which really distinct things, then, is this distinction taken? From none but from true and good in God, which differ in reason. – Next, third because where there is “a mere distinction of reason, no external respect is required” (just as in definition and defined): and such is the distinction in attributes, “which are objects of the divine intelligence, differing in reason/idea, although they are one act of understanding in God.” For when an outward respect is required, then the distinction is partly from the intellect and partly from elsewhere: and

this either from diverse circumstances extrinsic in diverse ways, as is plain in the examples adduced of column and point [n.160], – or from the same thing diversely circumstancing, as is plain in the second instance [n.172] against the major.

173. Again, against the minor of the reason [n.160] there is argument thus [from Henry *ibid.*]: “since all the attributes pertain to intellect and will (which are principles of emanations), to persons really distinct can the distinction of attributes be reduced, such that those which pertain to intellect have respect to generation, those which pertain to will have respect to inspiriting; as just as the natural intellect does not distinguish these and those save by respect to things in creatures, to which it turns back all its understanding, so does the blessed intellect about the persons, to which it directs all its understanding.”

B. Second Opinion

174. [Exposition of the opinion] – There is another position [Henry of Ghent’s],¹⁰¹ which says that “the divine essence absolutely considered, insofar as it is some nature or essence, has no distinction of ideas save as if in potency, – for the Commentator says *Metaphysics* XII com.39 that ‘the multiplicity of ideas in God does not exist save in the intellect alone, not in reality’; but the divine essence considered, not in itself, but insofar as it is truth – insofar namely as it has being in intelligence – can be taken in two ways, either insofar as it moves the intellect as if by simple intelligence, and thus is it still conceived by reason of its simplicity nor does it have any plurality save as if in potency, – or insofar as the intelligence, after this apprehension, busies itself about the plurality of attributes, as if reducing them from potency to act. In the first way [sc. the divine essence absolutely considered] the natural intellect does not attain it but then only perceives it from attributes, conceived from creatures,” according to this opinion; “in the second way [sc. as it moves the intellect as if by simple intelligence] the blessed intellect grasps it as if by the first action of understanding; in the third way [sc. insofar as the intelligence busies itself about the plurality of attributes] the same intellect [sc. of the blessed], as if combining and dividing, and the divine intellect in a single, simple intuition, distinguish the ideas contained in the essence, which essence, of its supreme perfection, contains all the perfections simply that are to be distinguished by sole operation of the intellect.”

175. “These ideas of the attributes, which the intellect forms from the simple essence through diverse conceptions, are only respects founded on the essence (because simplicity impedes the concept of several attributes within it), and there are several concepts, lest the concepts be synonymous, and in the essence, lest they be empty, but they are not outward respects” (as was proved [nn.167-171]), “but inward ones. Thus all the divine attributes pertain to the intellect or will, and they mutually regard each other inwardly insofar as they all – these and those – fall, by congruence, under the apprehension of the intellect: which intellect first by simple intelligence conceives the essence as it is essence, then, by busying itself about it, conceives it as it is understood and as understanding and as the idea of understanding, – such that the essence, insofar as it is essence, has a respect to other things as that which they are founded in; but the essence as conceived, and as moving the intellect to understanding, is called truth, whose proper idea is that it have a respect to the essence, insofar as essence is as it were that of which it is clarificatory, and to the intellect as that to which it has to declare it, and to the

¹⁰¹ Scotus again quotes, somewhat freely, from Henry.

act of understanding as that by which it has to declare it, and to wisdom as the habit by which the intellect is fit for declaration to be made to it. But the essence itself, as it is by act of understanding conceptive of itself, is the intellect, and it has a respect to truth as that through which is made manifest the essence that is conceived,” – and likewise of act, etc. – So too about what pertains to the will.

176. “From the supreme unity of the essence, in ordered manner, according to the mode of conceiving, the diverse ideas of the attributes are first conceived (and among these attributes there is still order, according as they are more immediately or more mediately ordered to the emanations), next the emanations are conceived, and there a stand is made inwardly, and then follow all the respects outwardly, which are *per accidens*; and just as the distinction of real relations is to what corresponds to them, so too is the distinction of rational relations to what corresponds to them, and the whole is inward, according to the argument that was made for this part” [sc. that the relations of reason are inward only; from Henry, *Quodl.* 5 q.1].

177. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion argument is made through those reasons that I adduced against the first opinion [nn.167-176], – first, by the third reason, because it is against them [sc. the followers of Henry, n.169]: the distinction of attributal perfections is foundation with respect to the distinction of emanations, – but the distinction of emanations is real, it is plain; but no real distinction pre-requires necessarily a distinction that is only of reason, just as neither does anything that is truly real pre-require another thing that is merely a being of reason; therefore the distinction of attributes is not only one of reason but is in some way from the nature of the thing. – The assumption is plain, because real being, which is distinguished against being of reason, is that which has existence of itself, when all work of the intellect as it is intellect is set aside; and whatever depends on a being of reason, or pre-requires it, cannot have its being when all work of the intellect is set aside; therefore nothing that pre-requires a being of reason is a truly real being.

178. A confirmation of this reason [n.177] is that what is naturally posterior cannot be more perfect than a being naturally prior; but real being is more perfect than the being that is a being of reason only [sc. therefore a real being cannot be posterior to a being of reason].¹⁰²

Although this reason be sufficient against one who holds the opinion, yet it is necessary to confirm it because of the conclusion in itself [nn.180-181; the conclusion is that attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing,].

179. It is said to it that attributes are not foundations of distinct emanations,¹⁰³ nay the essence alone along with the relations is the principle of diverse emanations; yet the intellect can afterwards consider the essence itself as, along with relations, it is principle of this and that, and then can consider the idea of nature and of will, and yet these do not precede there from the nature of the thing.

180. On the contrary: in the instant of origin in which the Son is generated I ask: either his productive principle is related to him in a way other than the productive principle of the Holy Spirit is related to him, or not in another way. If not in another way,

¹⁰² Interpolated text: “But a distinction of emanations is real and posterior, therefore it is not founded save on a prior entity real and distinct.”

¹⁰³ Note by Scotus: “This response is rejected in distinction 13, by arguing against the third opinion [I d.13 q. un n.5].”

then the Son is not more son or image of the Father by force of his production than the Holy Spirit is, – if so [sc. if in another way], then in the moments of origin before all act of the intellect some distinction and formal non-identity is had.

181. Nor is it valid to attribute this distinction to relations, because every relation has a respect equally naturally to its correlative; therefore the essence, as it is under the idea of inspiring, equally naturally has a respect to the inspired, just as under the idea of generative it has a respect to the generated or begotten. So the different modes of producing – naturally and freely – could not there be saved because of the relations, but only if the absolute, by which the producer produces, be of a different idea.

182. This point too [that the attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing, n.177] is argued against this position [of Henry] also by another reason of theirs, about the objects of true and good [n.170] – because if ‘from eternity God, of his immateriality, understands himself and wills himself’, and this under the idea of true and good, then there is there a distinction of true and good by reason of what is formal in the objects, before every act about such objects.

183. This is also confirmed by their argument about beatitude [nn.174-176], which belongs to God from the nature of the thing before every act of the busying intellect, because the act of busying is not formally beatific; but the beatitude (as is said) requires the proper idea of object and of power and of operation; therefore etc.

184. This position however [of Henry’s, nn.174-176] is expounded in this way, that we can speak about the idea that the object makes in the intellect about itself, or about that which the intellect can make about the object by being busy [about it];¹⁰⁴ if we

¹⁰⁴ Note by Scotus: “[Henry of] Harkeley argues otherwise – first proposition: a thing one in reality can be many in the intellect (Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.39 [n.166], ‘the intellect is of a nature to divide what is united in reality’); the reason is, one cause can have many equivocal effects, because none is adequate to the virtue of the cause; conception or intellection is an equivocal effect with respect to the object. Second proposition: yet two intellections have two formal objects (namely in known being), although they have the same material object in reality, – or they have the same object under different ideas, and then there is a difference of reason only, and not of formal objects.

From these as follows: on the supposition from distinction 3 [I d.3 n.35] that the creature can cause absolute in our intellect some concept ‘proper to God’ – either it will be a single concept differing only in reason (for whether it is a composition of the intellect according to logical ideas, or a composition outwardly, there are no differences about an absolute concept save only a relation of reason), or there will be many concepts having many formal objects, which may by diminution be the same object in known being, because they are ideas of it as exceeding [sc. the intellect].

In the first way it is easy to save the distinction of attributes in every intellect, even the divine one, because every intellect can understand the same absolute object under one or another relation of reason; relation outwardly is plain, – and no less inwardly, to the persons; since indeed essence is understood by God ‘to differ in idea from person’. But then in knowing all attributes of God there is no real science, because the same formal object about himself is not known, but the first proposition [above] holds; but as it is under an idea, if it has the idea of ‘knowable of itself’, it only exists on account of the idea under which it is understood, which in some way distinguishes it from itself absolutely understood, or under another idea. – In the second way, several absolute concepts can be posited.

But it seems difficult to distinguish these [sc. several absolute concepts] in a blessed intellect, because there is only one as existent, intuited by that intellect; again, one ‘object in itself’ has, in the intellect to which it is present in itself, one concept, adequate to itself according to the virtue of that intellect, otherwise it cannot show itself to it as it is intelligible. – On the contrary, this can cause every concept that can be had about it, and if something else – to wit its effect – can cause imperfectly, it itself can cause perfectly; again, otherwise something would now be known of God which would not be seen in

speak of the first, it is single, as it is also single in reality, – and this did the opinion in itself say, that as it is in the intelligence by act of simple knowledge, it has altogether the idea of something indistinct [n.174]; if in the second way, thus can the intellect form about that one idea of the object many distinct ideas, comparing this to that, – and this similarly did that opinion say, that the object, as it is in the intellect busying itself, has distinct ideas, quasi-formed about it [nn.174-175]. Yet this exposition adds – which the opinion in itself does not seem to say – that that one idea in itself is formally truth and goodness, and any perfection simply, and that that one idea, which comes to be in the intellect by virtue of the object, is also the idea of goodness formally and of truth, etc. [sc. and of any perfection simply]. The opinion, however, in itself seems to say that these state diverse respects founded in the essence [n.175].

185. Because, therefore, the said opinion [nn.174-176] can be understood in diverse ways, besides the arguments already made I append other reasons, – and first I show that truth and goodness are formally in the thing, and any perfection simply, before all work of the intellect: because any perfection simply is formally in a being simply perfect from the nature of the thing; truth is formally a perfection simply, and goodness likewise; therefore etc.

The major is plain, first because otherwise it would not be simply perfect, because there would not be ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [I d.2 n.137] (for a greater than it would be thought if it were perfect thus and so), second because otherwise perfection simply would be in nothing perfectly (for there is no perfection perfectly in a creature, because it is there finitely, nor is it in God perfectly if it is not in him as existing but only as it is known, because ‘to be known’ is diminished being as it is distinguished from existing being), then third because perfection simply in something would be formally by participation and not formally in that by which it would participate it (nay, such perfection in the participant would not be by participation of that perfection in the cause, because there is nothing by which there is participation in the existent save the existent), all which – namely all these inferred results – seem absurd. – The minor is plain, because otherwise Anselm would not posit such things in God, because according to him, *Monologion* ch. 15, nothing such should be posited in God which is not ‘better it being than not being’, and thereby a perfection simply. The same minor is also plain because anything such can formally be infinite; infinity is repugnant to anything that is not perfection simply; therefore etc.¹⁰⁵

the fatherland; again, theology will be a science for no intellect, not for ours, because of faith, not for a blessed intellect, because of single concept.

Theology is knowledge of God (of the things that are present in him, known naturally to the divine intellect alone), therefore of the things that are in this essence ‘as it is this’ (of which sort are properties of the persons and notional acts, attributes), under the ideas by which they are these. If however some distinction of reason be held to or of formal objects, and third some aptitudinal respects to creatures (as creative, resuscitative, remissive of sins, retributive), – against the first: nothing there is present ‘*per se*’, as it seems, because then common to the three [persons]; against the second: how does the metaphysician know them [sc. if the ideas of formal objects are not there from the nature of the thing]? – against the third: ‘respects of reason’ are in potency. Against the first proof for all of them [sc. the preceding paragraph]: an angel naturally knows it [sc. the divine essence] as ‘this’, although he does not see this ‘as this’, – therefore he could have theology; again, any concept about it [sc. the divine essence] is proper to it, because not common, – wherefore about it ‘as it is this’.”

¹⁰⁵ Note by Scotus: “Harkeley proceeds speaking in this way: the intellect according to its own proper and formal reason, namely according as it is distinct from the will, is a perfection simply, – and the same about

186. Further, I prove that such perfections in the nature of the thing, before the work of the intellect, do not have formal identity; because the intellect by its own act can only cause a relation of reason, from this fact, namely, that it is a collative virtue, able to collate this as something known to that. I ask then whether truth state precisely the perfection that is in a thing formally, or precisely the relation made by the intellect, or both? If precisely a relation of reason, then truth is not a perfection simply, because no relation of reason can be infinite: for if a real relation – as paternity – is not formally infinite, how much more is a relation of reason. If both, since they are not one *per accidens* – because a relation of reason along with a real being never makes one *per se* thing (as is plain, because it makes one thing with a real being much less than a property

any attribute; the second proposition, the intellect according to its proper formal idea is in God from the nature of the thing as it is existent; third proposition, the intellect does not include *per se* any relation.

The proof of the first proposition, as the minor here, is the following: first, because according to Anselm ‘anything that is better than not it’ is posited there (and he and the doctors treat of many cases [nn.195-197]). There would be only one single perfection simply (namely deity) unless the intellect were formally such, because if only materially – insofar as it includes deity – it is a single perfection simply, multiply understood or compared. – The second proof (and it is a confirmation of the first proof) is because the idea gives to understand the perfection which is the essence, although the formal idea of it is not simply perfection – so neither of the attribute, for you; nor does it avail about different genera of cause, because an idea in a foundation which is a perfection simply indicates eminence with respect to the thing ideated. – Third, because no perfection simply would be able to be attributed; because it would not be second perfection (perfection in well being [n.167]); because nothing is a perfection simply save the first perfection in God. – Fourth, by that which is here within ‘because it can be infinite’ [n.185, end] and prove it by the two reasons that are made for this in distinction 13, against the seventh opinion in the second response [I d.13 q. un n.15]. – Fifth, because according to an idea common to God and creatures it is a perfection simply; it is had here, at the beginning of the solution [nn.192-193].

The proof of the second proposition: in three ways, as here the major [n.185]. – Again, fourth: as here* [Scotus marks here the reference back to the same sign in the previous footnote], by intuitive cognition of anything as intuited object in the first object. – Again, fifth: ‘he is blessed by nature’, as in distinction 13 as before [*ibid.*]. – Again, sixth, because it is the principle of a real production; and it requires the rejection of the seventh and sixth opinion in distinction 13 [*ibid.* nn.11, 7], hence let it be supposed up to that point, unless it will have been proved in distinction 2 in the question ‘about the number of the intrinsic productions’ [*eds.*: not found in d.2 now, but perhaps intended to be transferred from d.13 opinions 6 and 7 and d.2 n.303]. – Again, seventh, because if the intellect is not there from the nature of the thing, never will it be there by act of the uncreated intellect, if there is not to be a process to infinity; this reason is touched on here [n.189, at sign Z], and in distinction 13 as before [*ibid.* n.13]. – Again, eighth: science about these things would not be real, because there would only be known of God the relation of another idea to him (or conversely), otherwise they would not denominate; a confirmation: if they denominate through eminence, then God is in thus a stone. – Ninth Augustine *On the Trinity* XV as in distinction 13 [*ibid.* n.14].

Proof of the third proposition: from the first proposition, because no relation is a perfection simply (it is plain about divine relation), therefore it is not included in perfection simply. The proof of this consequence is, first, because a perfection simply includes nothing to which the idea of perfection simply is repugnant (because then ‘it’ would in anything be better, and something ‘included in it’ would not in anything be better), second because perfection simply is *per se* one, relation does not make a *per se* one with the absolute [n.186]. – Again the third proposition is proved from the second, for from the second it follows that no relation of reason can be included in perfection simply, because then it would not be in reality ‘from the nature of the thing’; and no real relation is posited as common to the three persons.

From these statements it follows that any attribute, as distinct from another, is in God as he is existent and to himself; and for this inferred conclusion there are some reasons added to the three others, which are made plain herein [nn.177-178, 182, 183; arguments made against the three of Henry, nn.169-171].”

does with a subject: for a property follows the subject from the idea of the subject, but no being of reason follows a real being from the idea of itself) – therefore separate these two things which concur in this being *per accidens*, and it then follows that truth always states precisely the perfection in the thing, and goodness does likewise; and then further, since there is no distinction in reality, whether according to the opinion or according to exposition of the opinion [nn.174-176, 184], it follows that goodness and truth are formally synonymous (which they themselves deny [n.175]), because they would state the same perfection as it is a perfection in the thing, as was proved [just above at “therefore separate...”], and without all distinction of thing and of idea.

187. Further, the intuitive intellect has no distinction in the object save according as it is existent, because just as it does not know any object save as existent, so it does not know any distinct things formally in the object save as it is existent. Since, therefore, the divine intellect does not know its own essence save by intuitive intellection, whatever distinction be posited there in the object – whether it be of distinct formal objects or as of ideas caused by act of intellect [sc. either according to the expositor or according to Henry] – it follows that this distinction will be in the object as it is actually existent: and so, if this is of distinct formal objects in the object, these will be distinct formally (and then the proposed conclusion follows, that such distinction of formal objects precedes the act of the intellect), but if it be of ideas caused by an act of understanding, then the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence ‘as a relation of reason’, as it is existent, which seems absurd.

188. Again, there is an argument against the exposition [n.184], – because if about some object only one real concept is of a nature to be had, nothing causes a real concept of that object unless it cause that single one; but about the divine essence, according to them, only one real concept is of a nature to be had, because it [the divine essence] is only of a nature to cause one real concept (and it is of a nature to cause every real concept that can be had of it, otherwise it would be a more imperfect intelligible than is any created intelligible, which indeed is causative of every real concept that can be had of it); therefore nothing will cause in the intellect any concept of God unless it cause that single one, and so since a creature cannot cause that concept in the intellect – because that concept is of the divine essence as it is a ‘this’ in itself under its proper idea – it follows that by no action of a creature can any natural concept be had of God in this life [n.55].

189. Further, against the opinion in itself, because if these [attributes] be distinguished in some way or other by reason, they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by an act of intellect or will. From this I argue: a distinction preceding the idea of the first distinguishing thing is not made through such distinguishing thing; but a distinction between nature and intellection or will and intellection precedes intellection, which is a principle distinguishing things which are distinguished by reason; therefore the distinction between nature and intellection, or between intellection and will, will not be made by intellection.¹⁰⁶ – The assumption is plain. For if no distinction between them preceded, these [attributes] would no more be distinguished by intellection than by nature or will; and whatever is distinguished by intellection, as it is altogether indistinct from nature, is distinguished also by nature; for whatever belongs to *a* as it is in every way

¹⁰⁶ The passage ‘From this I argue...’ to the end of the paragraph is marked as Z by Scotus. See the third paragraph of the long note to n.185 above.

indistinct from *b*, the same belongs to *b* itself, – the opposite seems to include a contradiction.

190. And if it be said, as if despising this argument [189] (perhaps for precaution, because of lack of reply), that if *per impossibile* intellection were alone, it would do the distinguishing by itself, and not nature or will, – this response is not sufficient, because however much certain things be *per impossibile* separated, if, with them separated, something belongs to one and not to the other, this cannot be except because of some formal distinction of the idea of this one from the idea of that one. Therefore if *per impossibile*, with these things separated, a distinction were to belong to intellection and not to nature, some distinction exists ‘between the idea of this and of that’ even when they are not separated; for, after white and white are *per impossibile* separated, you will not be able to have it that white be the cause of something without white being the cause of the same thing, because there is no distinction between white and white; hence, never would there would be a fallacy of accident here, ‘by intellection are these [attributes] distinguished, intellection is nature, therefore they are distinguished by nature’, unless the idea of intellection were extraneous to the idea of nature, insofar as they are compared to a third thing; therefore that extraneousness precedes some distinction of idea from that, insofar as they are compared to a third, and it precedes the distinction of the ideas between themselves.

II. To the Question

191. [Solution of the question] – To the question [n.157] I reply that between essential perfections there is not only a difference of idea,¹⁰⁷ that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object (for there is such a distinction between wise and wisdom, and assuredly a greater one between wisdom and truth), and there is not there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as was argued before, it is nowhere in intuitive cognition unless it be in the object intuitively known [n.187]. These two members also are proved by the reasons made against the preceding opinion [sc. of Henry, nn.177-178, 182-183, 185-190].

192. So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing and goodness in the thing from the nature of the thing – but wisdom in the thing is formally not goodness in the thing.

This is proved because, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom too in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever degree some perfection is understood to be (which ‘degree’ however is a degree of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of this degree, and so if it does not include it formally in general as it is in general, neither infinite as it is infinite.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Note by Scotus: “Every other opinion on this question, besides this one, seems to evacuate as it were all the difficulties of the first book about the productions and the persons, as is touched on in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.8].”

¹⁰⁸ Vatican editors: “i.e. if wisdom, as it is in general, does not formally include goodness in general, neither will wisdom as it is infinite formally include infinite goodness; and so on of other attributes.”

193. I make this clear because ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential idea, so that if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; and just as the definition of goodness in general does not have wisdom in itself, so neither infinite [goodness] infinite [wisdom]: there is then some formal non-identity of wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them if they were definable. Now a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but the quiddity of the thing: there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’ does not cause, by its collative act, the truth of this proposition, but it finds in the object the extremes from the combining of which a true act is made.

194. And this argument ‘about non formal identity’ [n.192] the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing that in divine reality there was some predication true by identity which yet would not be formal: thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in reality, but truth is not formally goodness.

195. The rule of Anselm, *Monologion* ch.15: “It is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better it than not it;” no relation of reason is of this sort [sc. a perfection simply, n.185], and nothing is unless it be altogether the same in the thing and in idea when relations of reason are removed; therefore nothing else is his rule than ‘God is God’.

196. On the contrary. In [*Monologion*] ch.16: “If it is asked what that nature is, what truer response is there than that it is justice?” Therefore anything at all is said in the ‘what’. A perfect quidditative concept is only one, or at any rate there is no formal distinction between ‘what’ and ‘what’. – Again, ch.17: “The nature in one way and in one consideration is whatever it is essentially.”

197. Response. ‘What’ by identity, not formally; proof of this gloss: ch.17 says: “justice signifies the same as other things, either all of them together or singly.” Here is not understood that it signifies the same ‘formally and first’, because then they would be synonyms; therefore it connotes, or [signifies] the same really not formally. Again, [the authority of] Damascene [n.198]. To the second [quote from Anselm, n.196]: he adds an example about man, who “not in one way or in one consideration is said to be these three: body, rational, man.” As to why, he posits two reasons: “in one respect he is body, in another he is rational;” the other reason: “a single one of these is not the whole this that is man.” By the opposite of these two is it said ‘in one way and in one consideration’.¹⁰⁹

198. This opinion [of Scotus, nn.193-194] is confirmed by the authority of Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.4 cited previously [n.158], and ch.9, where he himself means that, among all the names said of God, the most proper is ‘He who is’, because he says God is ‘a certain sea of infinite substance’; but the other names – as he said in ch.4 – state things that ‘circumstance nature’. This would not seem true unless there were some distinction on the part of the thing; for God is not ‘a sea of infinite substance’ because of this, that many relations of reason can be caused about of him – for thus can they be caused by an act of intellect about anything.

199. Note for the statement of Damascene, that ‘a sea of perfections’ can be understood in one way for what contains actually and formally in itself all perfections

¹⁰⁹ The Vatican editors note : “By opposition to ‘body’ and ‘rational’ (because in man they do not exist in one way or one consideration) that Anselm said on God’s behalf ‘in one way and one consideration’ [n.196], and not that it really be so.”

under their proper formal ideas: thus is nothing formally one a ‘sea’, because it is a contradiction that one formal idea contain so many ideas actually. In this way, then, nothing is a ‘sea’ unless it is identically one, that is: ‘God, wise, good, blessed’, and all the rest of this sort. Damascene is not taking ‘sea’ in this way.

200. In another way can be understood [sc. by ‘sea of perfections’] something formally one, containing all perfections in the most eminent way in which it is possible for them all to be contained in one; but this way is that they are not only contained identically, because of the formal infinity of the container (for thus any [perfection] contains them all), but that further they are contained virtually, as in their cause, – and further, in something as first cause containing them of itself, and as most universal, because containing them all. In this way ‘this’ essence is a ‘sea’, because in any multitude it is necessary to stand at something altogether first; in this [divine multitude] nothing is altogether first save ‘this’ essence, therefore it is not only formally infinite, but it virtually contains the others; and not only some (as perhaps the intellect contains wisdom and to understand, and the will love and to love), but all of them, and not containing them by another virtue of another, but by itself. Therefore it has infinity formally and primarily, namely as well from itself as in respect of everything, an infinity universally causal and virtually containing, – and thus is it a ‘sea’, containing them all in the way they can be contained eminently in some formally one thing. “All the rivers flow into the sea; they return whence they come” (*Ecclesiastes* 1.7).

201. Therefore this proposition ‘God is wise’ is more *per se* than this ‘the wise is good’. Others [sc. perfections other than the essence] have formal infinity, and if causal or virtual (on account of saving nearer or remoter order to the essence), yet not in respect of all do they have causal [infinity], nor in respect of some do they have it from themselves but from the essence. – All these [nn.199-201] are plain in the example about being and its properties (if they be posited the same, as is necessary [sc. for the purpose of the example]), provided infinity be avoided.

202. On the contrary: the truest unity is to be posited in God; formal is truer than identical only [sc. therefore formal is to be posited in God].

Response: it [formal unity] is posited, but not of anything at all in respect of anything at all. If the major [sc. formal is truer than identical unity] be thus taken, it is false of person and person, and the gloss would be: ‘truer is [the unity] that is possible’; but now formal identity of anything at all with anything at all is not possible, but only real. From this middle is argument made for the opposite, because every unity simply of perfection is to be posited there [sc. in God]; such is identical [unity], without formal, because it is simple and unlimited, but formal does not posit unlimitedness.

203. It [the opinion, n.198] is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2, where he proves that in divine reality ‘two persons are not something greater than one, because not something truer’. What consequence would this be? If it were only a distinction of reason between truth and wisdom and greatness, there would not seem to be an argument other than if ‘wisdom, therefore wise’ were proved, or conversely [n.191].

204. Why, too, do the doctors who hold the opposite opinion [to that of Scotus] fill up so many quartos proving one attribute from another if there were not between them save only a difference of relations of reason? For God would seem to be as perfectly known – as to every real concept – as he is known under one attribute just as if he were known under the idea of all attributes, because knowledge of several relations of reason

does not make more perfect knowledge, nor does it do anything for having more perfect real knowledge of anything.

205. Likewise, third: according to the aforesaid authority of Damascene [n.198], why do they [sc. those who hold the opposite opinion to Scotus] assign an order of attributes, as if the essence were the foundation and certain attributes were closer to the essence and certain closer to the emanations? If they be only relations of reason, what is the order by comparison to the emanations?

206. Likewise, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.10 n.3: “If you can concede God the Father to be simple and yet to be wise, good, etc.” (and he enumerates there many perfections), “how much more can one God be simple and yet a Trinity, so that the three persons not be parts of one God.” – He argues there that if in the same thing without composition or division into parts there can be many perfections simply, therefore much more can there be in the deity three persons without composition and division into parts. What argument would this be if the attributes were only to state relations of reason and the persons were to be distinguished really? For it does not follow: ‘relations of reason do not cause composition in anything, therefore neither do real relations’.

207. Also the same Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.3 n.5 says that all these predicates [as listed in n.206] are equal. But nothing is equal to itself. For what is it to say that something under one relation of reason is equal to itself under another relation of reason?

208. Hilary too in *On the Trinity* XII n.52, addressing God the Father, says as follows: “Of the Perfect God there is an absolute generation, who is also your Word and wisdom and truth, who is born in these names of eternal properties.” He says therefore that these properties are eternal, and in them is the Son born of the Father, that is: the Father, possessing these first, communicates them to the Son. But if they were only distinct in idea, they would not seem to be first in origin in the Father before the Son were produced. For whatever is there produced in being of reason by act of intellect seems to be produced by the whole Trinity (and so not to be in the Father as he precedes the Son in origin) as if necessarily preceding the origin.

209. Now this formal non-identity stands with the simplicity of God, because there must be this difference between essence and property, as was shown above in distinction 2, the last question [I d.2 nn.388-410] – and yet for this reason composition is not posited in a person. Likewise, this formal distinction is posited between two properties in the Father (as between unborn-ness and paternity), which, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, are not the same property, because it is not the case that ‘by that is he Father by which he is ungenerated’. If then in one person there could be two properties without composition, much more, or at least equally, can there be several essential perfections in God ‘not formally the same’ without composition, because the properties in the Father are not formally infinite, but the essential perfections are formally infinite, – therefore any is the same as any.

210. [Doubts] – Against this solution [nn.191-209] there are three doubts.

For first it seems that divine simplicity is not saved, because from the fact the essence is posited as foundation and these [attributes] as if circumstances of the essence [n.198] it seems that these are disposed as acts and forms in respect of the divine essence.

211. The second doubt is because Augustine (*On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9 ‘On Great Things’ and ch.2 n.3 ‘On Little Things’), when he denies the identity of paternity

and deity – for by saying ‘not Father by that by which God’ as also ‘not Word by that by which wisdom’, he concedes there the identity of greatness and goodness and of the essential perfections, because he says ‘great by that by which God’ etc. Therefore, just as he there denies identity, so he concedes it here; but he only denies there formal identity, so he concedes it here.

212. The third doubt is because just as goodness would not really be infinite unless it were really the same as wisdom, so it seems that the idea of goodness is not formally infinite unless it be formally the same as the idea of wisdom. Therefore, for the same reason for which you posit true identity between these, you should posit formal identity of idea with idea.

213. To these [doubts]. – To the first [n.210] I reply that form in creatures has something of imperfection in two ways, namely because it is a form informing something and because it is part of a composite, – and it has something that is not of imperfection, but is consequent to it [form] according to its essential idea, namely that it is that by which something is such. Example: wisdom in us is an accident, and this is a mark of imperfection – but that it is that by which something is wise, this is not a mark of imperfection but of the essential idea of wisdom. Now in divine reality nothing is a form according to that double idea of imperfection, because neither informing nor a part; yet there is wisdom there insofar as it is that by which what it is in is wise, and this not by any composition of wisdom with anything as a subject, nor as that wisdom is part of something composite, but by the true identity by which wisdom, because of its perfect infinity, is perfectly the same as whatever it is born with.

But you will object: how is something formally wise by wisdom if it is not the form of it?

214. I reply. The body is animate as it were denominatively, because soul is the form of it – man is called animate not as it were denominatively but essentially, because the soul is something of it as a part: so it is not required, then, that something be the form informing something for it be such by itself, because the form [sc. soul] is not a form informing the whole that however is formally said to be such through it. If therefore some form were the same as something by a truer identity than is the identity of it with the thing informed, or with the whole of which it is a part, that true identity would be enough for this, that it be such by such form; so it is in the matter at hand. – And then if you ask whether there could by first act be some abstraction of form, – I say that there is not there abstraction of form as informing or as part from whole, but there is abstraction of form insofar as by it something is of such precisely taken, without considering the identity of it with that which is such through itself.

215. To the second, which seems to have a difficulty from the words of Augustine [n.211], I say that in five ways is God by the same thing wise and great, and yet not thus by the same thing is he God and Father: in one way because wisdom and greatness are perfections of the same idea, that is, quidditative idea, because whatever is perfected by these perfections is perfected not as by ideas of the supposit but as by quidditative perfections, – but paternity and deity are not so of the same idea; also in another way are wisdom and goodness of the same idea, because they are perfections simply, – not thus paternity and deity; in the third way, because greatness is the same as deity in anything, – paternity not but only in one supposit; in the fourth way, because goodness and wisdom and the rest of this sort are the same as it were by mutual identity, because each is

formally infinite, on account of which infinity each is the same as the other, – but paternity and deity are not thus mutually the same, because one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite, and on account of this infinity is paternity the same as itself; and, from this [sc. the fourth] he is, fifth, good and wise by the same thing, ‘by the same thing’ – I say – by identity adequate according perfection, because each is infinite; not so does paternity have adequate identity with deity, because it is not infinite.

216. To the form [of the argument, n.211] then I concede that in the same way is he good and wise as he is not in the same way God and Father, because in the same way he is good and wise, namely in the same way in anything and in the same way as by mutual identity; but paternity and deity are not the same in any way. Likewise, in the same way – that is by perfection of the same idea – is he good and wise, because he is quidditatively good and wise; not so in the same way is he God and Father, because each ‘by which’ there is not an essential perfection of that of which it is, because although the quiddity of paternity remain there, yet that quiddity is not the quidditative idea simply of any supposit, but the personal idea of the same supposit.

217. To the third [n.212] I concede that the idea of wisdom is infinite, and the idea of goodness similarly, and therefore this idea is that one by identity, because the opposite does not stand with the infinity of the other extreme. Yet this idea is not formally that one: for it does not follow ‘it is truly the same as the other, therefore formally the same as the same’; for there is a true identity of *a* and *b* without the fact that *a* formally include the idea of the *b*.

III. To the Principal Argument

218. To the principal argument that is taken from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV [n.212], I respond that in the creature there is not any predication¹¹⁰ through identity that is not so formally,¹¹¹ and therefore never has a logic of true predication formally and by identity in creatures been handed down; in divine reality however there is true predication by identity, in the abstract, and yet it is not formal.

219. The reason for this difference is this – as I think – because, by conceiving something abstract with ultimate abstraction, a quiddity is conceived without relation to anything that is outside the proper idea of the quiddity; by thus therefore conceiving the extremes, there is no truth in uniting them unless precisely the quiddity of one extreme be the same precisely as the quiddity of the other extreme. But this does not happen in creatures, because there, when abstracting the relations that are in the same thing (to wit, the reality of genus and difference) and considering them very precisely, each is finite and neither is perfectly the same as the other; for they are not in another way the same as themselves save because of a third with which they are the same, and therefore if they are abstracted from the third there remains no cause of identity for them, and therefore no cause either of the truth of the proposition uniting the extremes. This proposition, then, is false ‘animality is rationality’, and conversely, and this in any predication whatever, because not only are the extremes not formally the same, but neither are they truly the

¹¹⁰ Thanks to Matt Wenneman for catching the misspelling ‘prediction’ for ‘predication’ in an earlier version of this translation.

¹¹¹ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: entity is unity or truth; if they be absolute properties of being, also the same with themselves.”

same; for this quiddity is precisely potential to that quiddity, and is not the same as it save because of an identity with a third from which they are abstracted; therefore the abstraction takes away the cause of the truth of the affirmative uniting them.

220. The opposite is the case in God, because by abstracting wisdom from whatever is outside the idea of wisdom, and abstracting goodness similarly from whatever is outside its reason formally, each quiddity remains, precisely taken, formally infinite, and from the fact that infinity is the idea of their identity – in such very precise abstraction – the idea of identity of the extremes remains. For they were not the same precisely because of their identity to a third thing from which they are abstracted, but because of the formal infinity of each.

221. And a sign that this be the idea of predication through identity is from this, that this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is innascibility’ (nor this proposition ‘paternity in divine reality is active inspiriting’), neither as true formally or as true by identity; but this proposition is conceded ‘paternity is deity’, and conversely. The reason seems to be that, by abstracting paternity and innascibility from the essence or supposit, neither is formally infinite and therefore neither includes in its thus abstracted idea the idea of its identity to another, and so neither, so abstracted, is truly predicated of another; but by abstracting however much deity and paternity, one of the extremes still remains formally infinite, which infinity is a sufficient idea of the identity of the extremes, and therefore the idea of identity remains, and consequently the idea of the truth of the affirmative composition. But in this proposition ‘deity is goodness’ infinity remains not only in one extreme but in both, and therefore there would be truth here because of the identity included virtually in each extreme.

222. From this, and from the response to the saying of Augustine adduced before in the second doubt [nn.215-216], what was supposed before in the question ‘about genus’ is clear, namely how there remain only two modes of predicating in divine reality [nn.130-131], –because although by identity the relations pass over into the essence, yet not thus as essential predicates do, because all essential predicates state rather quidditative perfections, but the personal idea does not state a quidditative perfection; and therefore all the essential predicates are reduced more to one mode of predicating among themselves than are the personal predicates reduced to a single mode of predicating with them, so that, according to this, it could be said that two modes of predicating remain in divine reality, not only because of the modes of conceiving the predicates, but in some way because of the reality of the things that are predicated.

Appendix
 [Reportatio IC d.8 p.1 q.3]
 Book One
 Eighth Distinction

First Part

Question Three

[Point D. See n.104]

Again [Rep. IC d.4 q.2], the Philosopher says this in *Metaphysics* 7.101034b21-22, for “just as the idea – that is the definition – is to the thing, so are the parts of the definition or of the idea to a part of the thing;” therefore, just as in a definition, there are several real parts, which one should not always set down as matter and form, but other realities, one of which is necessary in potency to another.

Again, by reason: the intellect, when conceiving a genus, has a concept of something which is in the thing from the nature of the thing, otherwise it would not conceive anything that might be said of man in the ‘what’; and I am not speaking here of the second intention of genus, but of that which is conceived objectively. Likewise, when conceiving a difference, I conceive something which is in the thing objectively. If therefore the genus or difference state the whole reality of the defined thing, genus would sufficiently define the whole, and if difference state the same reality of the defined thing, then – by joining the genus to define – the same thing would be said totally twice, which is one unacceptability, and the other, that the definition would not be first the same as the defined, which is false, because the quiddity of anything is the same as itself.

On the contrary: if everything finite is in a genus, when the personal properties in divine reality are not infinite, because they are not perfections simply, – therefore finite, because between the finite and the infinite there is no middle, – therefore they are in a genus.

I reply: they are not formally finite nor infinite. Not infinite because then one person would have some perfection which another would not have; nor are they formally finite, because then they would not be the same really as the divine essence, which is formally infinite. Hence, just as finite and infinite, properly speaking, are congruent in quantity of amount and in nothing else (*Physics* 1.2.185a33-b3), so these said transumptively only agree with something having a virtual quiddity of which are the entities said quidditatively, the intrinsic degrees of which are finite and infinite, and not the personal or individual hypostatic idea.

[Point E. See n.117]

Note [Rep. IA d.8 n.140] here for the intention of the Philosopher that something can be formally repugnant to the subject which is not repugnant to the property, although it be virtually repugnant to it. An example: it is formally repugnant to man to be in the genus of accident, but it is not formally repugnant to risible, which is a property of man; but infinity does thus belong *per se* to it [sc. some supposed line]: therefore although it be

repugnant to line, it is however not repugnant to straight as it is straight. And therefore, as to the idea of straight, a straight line is not well defined when it is said “whose middle does pass beyond the extremes” (*Topics* 6.11.148b23-32), because straight, whence it is straight, does not essentially include either middle or extremes, because if the straight were infinite, the idea of straight would still remain and yet it would have neither middle nor extremes. – This as to the intention of the Philosopher, why he takes exception to this definition of straight line.

Eighth Distinction

Second Part On the Immutability of God

Single Question *Whether only God is Immutable*

223. On the immutability of God, that the Master treats of in the second part of distinction 8 (which, however, seems it could be concluded from the simplicity of God, about which the question has already been raised [nn.1-26]), I ask whether God alone is immutable.

That he is not:

Because if he is immutable then he is disposed immutably to that to which he is immediately disposed; therefore that other is immutable.

Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely disposed to its effect, because if it sometimes act, sometimes not, this seems to be from its own mutability; for this cannot be posited because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. – Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily disposed, that is necessary.

224. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8: “Every creature is mutable,” “only God is immutable.”

225. And *I Timothy* 6.16: “Only he has immortality;” which Augustine expounds in *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.2 when he says that “true ‘immortality’ is immutability.”

I. God is Simply Immutable

226. Of this exclusive question that is asked about the affirmative part [negative part n.230] is proved by the Philosopher *Physics* 7.1.242a13-20, 242b18-10, through this that “everything that is moved is moved by another;” the proof of which is because “when a part rests, the whole rests,” and there is no proceeding to infinity in things moved by another, because then an infinite movable could be come to be from them which would be moved in a finite time (which is rejected in *Physics* 8.10.266a25-b6, and

before in distinction 2 question 1 in response to the final argument [I d.2 n.152]); therefore it is necessary to stop at some mover which is not moved by another, and consequently is altogether not moved.

227. The same conclusion is also proved by him in *Physics* 8.4.255b31-5.256a21 through a division of movers and things moved naturally or violently, and because a stand must ultimately be made at some mover which is not moved of itself ‘*per se* and first’, and ultimately also must a stand be made at something simply unmovable.

228. But these processes (which are the principal ones in two books, namely books 7 and 8 of the *Physics*) need a greater exposition for this purpose that the reasons be shown to be valid, and if perhaps they be valid, yet they have a diminished conclusion, as will be shown elsewhere [II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.10-15]; perhaps they entail nothing more save that the First thing is not moved as a body, or as a virtue in a body, in the way the soul is moved *per accidens* in the moved body.

229. Therefore, without dwelling now on making these reasons clear, I show briefly the [affirmative] part from the simplicity of God: for because God is perfectly simple (as has been proved from his infinity [nn.17-19]), therefore he cannot be changed to any form that may be received in himself; because too he is necessary existence (as has been proved from the primacy of his efficient causality in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.70]), therefore he cannot be changed from being to not-being or from not-being to being, which change is called ‘turning’ by Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.3. Therefore is God said to be simply immutable by any change, whether substantial or accidental,.

II. Nothing Other than God has Immutability

230. But the negative part of the exclusion, namely that nothing other than God has immutability, poses a greater difficulty: for on this point the theologians disagree with the philosophers, and vice versa.

231. To consider this it is first necessary to see what the intention of the philosophers was and what their motives and what the reasons be against them.

A. Of the Intention of the Philosophers 1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

232. As to the first point, specifically about the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna. It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence, but for the matter at hand [n.230] let three modes suffice. For something other than God – to wit an intelligence other than the first – can be posited in being or immutable and necessary, in three ways:¹¹² in one way, that of itself it be formally necessary to be, but from another causally; in a second way, that it be of itself formally necessary to be and on another dependently, such that because of essential order it would be a contradiction for the second to be without the first and not conversely, and likewise the third without the second and not conversely, – and this order is between more perfect and less perfect [*supply*: as with figures and numbers, *infra* n.245], not between cause and

¹¹² Note by Scotus: “Here Henry’s opinion, *Quodl.* VIII question 9, is held corruptly.” The Vatican editors are puzzled as to what Scotus means here, since Henry’s opinion, they say, while stated compendiously by Scotus, does not seem to be in any way a distortion.

caused; in the third way, that something have being formally possible of itself, from another also necessary to be, namely because that necessarily cause another.

233. Of these¹¹³ three the first way involves a contradiction, as they say [sc. Henry and his followers], and therefore the Philosopher did not posit it, because it does not seem likely that he posited contradictories; that it do involve a contradiction is plain, because what is caused by another is of itself non-being and is of itself possible (otherwise an impossible would be caused), but what is necessary to be is in no way a possible; therefore it is unacceptable to say that Aristotle posited this way about the separate substances, because of the contradiction included.

234. That he also denied the third way [n.232] is proved because it includes a contradiction.

235. This is also confirmed,¹¹⁴ because the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.41 (in the question of John the Grammarian) means that motion, since it is of itself possible, can be perpetuated by another, because it has being from another – but a possible substance cannot be perpetuated; therefore a perpetual substance cannot be from another.

236. Again,¹¹⁵ as the Commentator says *On the Heavens* I com.138, about the remark [from Aristotle] ‘It is impossible that the non-generable fall under corruption’: expounding it the Commentator says that “if some generable thing were found eternal, it would be possible that something possible or some possible nature might be transmuted into the necessary.”

237. Further,¹¹⁶ it is imputed [by Henry] to the Philosopher that he meant there (*On the Heavens*, *ibid.*) that any substance have its being from its nature – this always, this sometimes – so that this necessarily always is, this necessarily sometime is not; nor could it be otherwise unless one nature were changed into another, or that two contrary natures be at the same time in the same thing – as in the same book of *On the Heavens* both Aristotle and the Commentator deduce.

238. Again, from these – namely *On the Heavens* I and *Metaphysics* XII [235-236] – [Henry] shows that [Aristotle] denied the first way above [n.232], because to every substance necessary to be is attributed [the substance] of its intrinsic nature, and so nothing perpetual posits a caused thing unless moved in the heavens and, by that mediation, [posits] individuals which are not necessary (though their species be necessary) but generable and corruptible in becoming; and from the fact he posited some order among them, it is concluded [sc. by Henry] that this is according to the second way [n.232]. But in incorruptible things he said species are necessarily in one individual, but in corruptible things he said the species are necessarily in several and diverse individuals, such that the species are of themselves necessary, yet corruptible *per accidens*, just as he posited the elements to be as a whole incorruptible but according to parts corruptible [cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a23-b3, *On Generation and Corruption* 2.11.338a17-b19].

¹¹³ Before ‘these’ Scotus put the letter *a*, and then the following letters *b c d*, as also those coming afterwards, *e-e g f*, but without explanation why. The Vatican editors suggest the reason may be that Scotus intended to put things in a different order, as n.234 after n.238 and so on.

¹¹⁴ Before ‘confirmed’ Scotus put the letter *b*.

¹¹⁵ Before ‘again’ Scotus put the letter *c*.

¹¹⁶ Before ‘further’ Scotus put the letter *d*.

239. Against this opinion [nn.233-238], which imputes these things to Aristotle, an argument is given first [by Scotus himself] that he did not deny the first way [n.232].

This is seen from his intention in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b28-31: “Of eternal things the principles must be the truest,” because they are cause of truth for other things, – “but each is disposed to existence as it is to truth [*ibid.*];” now it is clear, according to him, that everything eternal is necessary, from *On the Heavens* 1.12.283b1-6 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8. Again nothing, *Metaphysics* 5.4.1015b6-11, prevents there being other causes for certain necessary things (ch. ‘*On the Necessary* – i.e. premises causing the conclusions of syllogisms]. If, however, of the idea of a caused thing there be a possibility repugnant to necessity (as the said opinion [of Henry] argues [nn.233, 235-236]), it would be a contradiction for some necessary thing to be a cause.

240. Again, *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11-23, proves the oneness of the universe from the oneness of the end, – therefore everything other than the end is for it as for an end; but of whatever there is a final cause, of it there is an efficient cause; therefore etc.

Proof of the last proposition: an end is not a cause save insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act and to give being. It moves, he says, as loved and desired (this is plain from the idea of end, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b25-27), for which end the agent acts, for which end – namely the end loved – the agent gives being to something else ordered to itself.

241. Again, the Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.37 concedes that there is there [in the motion of sempiternal things] cause and caused ‘as intellect is the cause of intellection’, and Aristotle says that [the first mover] moves as loved and desired. A bath, as it is in the mind, moves effectively, according to the Commentator; at any rate an object for understanding moves effectively; therefore also for existence, because it is imposed [by the Commentator] on the Philosopher that he posited each of those substances to be its own understanding.

242. Again, Avicenna [*Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb)] expressly posits the necessary ‘causally from another’. Therefore if in this he did not see a contradiction, why should it be denied by Aristotle, because of a contradiction that you posit there [n.233]?

243. Again, the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.2 says: “The celestial body does not need a virtue moving it only in place, but also a virtue bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence, etc.,” and later: “of the opinion of Aristotle some said that he does not assert a cause activating the whole, but only a moving cause, and that was very absurd.”

244. To these points reply is made by them [Henry and his followers] that “it turns out that those who posit a false foundation from likely reasons after a while contradict themselves from true reasons.”

On the contrary: you [Henry] have shown [n.233] that Aristotle denies the first way ‘because it seems to involve a contradiction’, and now you concede that he is contradicting himself;¹¹⁷ but it seems more reasonable not to impute contradictories to

¹¹⁷ Vatican editors: “Henry concedes this in this way: if Averroes used Aristotle’s likely reasons to prove the first mover is a moving cause only, without doubt he should have used some true reasons of Aristotle to prove that the same mover is also an agent cause; and thus Aristotle would openly contradict himself, but Averroes only per accidens.”

him, but that he is speaking consistently with a false antecedent¹¹⁸ when conceding the consequent.¹¹⁹

245. Again, that [Aristotle] did not posit the second way that you impute to him [n.238] appears because of the irrationality of that way; proof: for nothing depends on another in existing from which it does not have being, and so neither on another in persisting from which it does not get persistence, because from the same thing it has being and permanence. – Nor is it similar about figures and numbers [n.232], because there, although the prior not be the efficient cause of things posterior, it is yet the material cause, just as a part is – by potency – in the whole; but in the matter at hand no causality can be posited save that of the efficient or final cause, according to Aristotle [n.240].

246. Also, what is imputed to Aristotle about the necessity of the species in corruptible things ‘in diverse individuals’ [n.238] is not true save because he understood the necessity of the heaven’s motion and so the production of individuals when there is such and such nearness or proportion of the agent to the passive thing; now the necessity is a condition of existence: it does not therefore belong to species save in individuals. Nor is it similar of the element ‘according to whole and according to part’ [n.238], for an element according to the whole is a singular, existent of itself, and a principal part of the universe.¹²⁰

247. Again, if the ‘corruptible’ from an intrinsic cause sometimes necessarily is not, as is imputed to him [n.237], then it will be corrupted by itself without an external corrupting thing.

248. The third way [n.232] is also imputed to Avicenna, and is proved from his *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (92ra), where he says that “a caused thing, as far as it is of itself, there belongs to it that it not be but, as to its cause, there belongs to it that it be; but what belongs to it of itself – as in the intellect – is not in duration prior to that which belongs to it from another,” and this “among the wise is called ‘creation’, to give being to a thing after absolute non-being.”

249. Against him [Avicenna] it is argued [by Henry] that that way [n.248] includes a contradiction, because if the possible be posited not to be, it follows that not only is it false but also impossible – according to the Philosopher [*De Caelo* 1.12.281b2-18] – namely the cause does not necessarily cause and give being [sc. the opposite of which is posited by Avicenna, nn.248, 242].

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

250. On the intention of these philosophers, Aristotle and Avicenna. – I do not wish to impute to them things more absurd than they themselves say or than follow necessarily from their statements, and from their statements I wish to take the more reasonable understanding that I can take.

¹¹⁸ Vatican editors: “namely, that God acts necessarily,” n.251.

¹¹⁹ Vatican editors: “namely, that everything other than God is necessary and from him causally,” n.251.

¹²⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “That it is also imputed to [Aristotle] that no substance is from another* seems manifestly false in generable things. For generation is toward substance: therefore it receives by generation a being that before was not, and of that which is produced it [generation] is the efficient cause of what is produced; but nothing produces itself into existence.” *The Vatican editors note that what rather is imputed to Aristotle is that no necessary or perpetual substance is from another [n.235], and therefore Scotus corrects his assertion here by canceling this text.

251. I respond then that Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily disposed to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that anything else is disposed to him necessarily (which is as it were immediately compared to him), or not by a mediating motion, because from uniformity in the whole he posited de-formity in the parts of the movable, and that, by the mediating of motion, generable and corruptible things are de-formedly compared to God.

252. By holding this false foundation, Aristotle does not seem, in positing that God is a necessary cause, to contradict himself by positing a necessary caused thing (as he means in the *Metaphysics* 5, that of certain necessary things there is another cause, and in *Metaphysics* 2 that “of eternal things it is necessary that the principles are always the truest,” as was argued [n.239]), and so he posits not only a third way but also a first way [n.232].¹²¹

253. Also Avicenna seems immediately to contradict himself when positing the [caused thing] to be a possible [n.248], because then a necessary [cause] is not necessarily compared to it.

But there is argument for Avicenna’s part: if it is from another, then in the concept of its quiddity is not being of itself; therefore it is of itself possible to be and a non-being, just as humanity is not of itself either one or several. It is conceded of this mode of possibility, and this possibility namely is only that in the order of nature this is capable of this and is not it quidditatively.

254. From this is plain the response to the first argument made against Avicenna [n.249], as if he be contradicting himself, because [sc. from ‘of itself it is possible not to be’] does not follow ‘it is possible that it is not’, nor that ‘it can be posited [not to be]’ – just as neither ‘being is not one’ – and thus Aristotle would concede to be possible what is necessary from another, but that ‘potency prior to act is possible’ he rejects in *On the Heavens* [n.249].

255. Therefore Aristotle and Avicenna agree in what follows from one false principle – in which they agree – namely that God is necessarily disposed to whatever is outside him, to which immediately or by mediation of something immutable he is compared.¹²²

¹²¹ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Again, there is argument as follows: he [Aristotle] posited that the first mover is of infinite power; infinite power cannot immediately move the globe, because neither in time nor in the ‘now’; therefore he posited that it precisely moves mediately. But that can be understood in three ways, but none of these three ways [see footnote to n.290 at ☉] is possible unless it produce in being a proximate mover, because the other two modes are there [*ibid.*] rejected; therefore he intends to posit such a production.” Another note cancelled by Scotus: “This [sc. the previous paragraph in this footnote] also proves that Aristotle posited that all the intelligences are immediately produced by the first intelligence (against is Avicenna, *Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb-105ra)), because a cause of infinite power causes all infinite motion, and this mediately (and no cause other than the first is of infinite power, because any cause is conjoined to some sphere; therefore finite); therefore any motion whatever is from the first cause by a mediate mover and from its proper mover immediately moving it; therefore the first cause has produced that proximate mover. Thus too the intellect is produced from outside (*On the Generation of Animals* 2.3.736b27-29), because, although he did not posit that the first thing acts without second causes, together with a matter disposed to the effect of the first thing, the first thing, according to him, necessarily informs the matter, so that this informing is a single change (not two, as in positing creation and informing). Thus too in *On Good Fortune* [*Eudemian Ethics* 7.15.1248a22-b7] that a separate cause moves a man so disposed immediately to what is of advantage to him, etc.”

¹²² Note by Scotus: “And how do they both state the first way [sc. immediately]? – Avicenna in *Metaphysics* [footnote to n.252]. But whether Aristotle understood so about one only produced intelligence

256. To the things that were first adduced, to prove that Aristotle denied the first way [nn.233, 235-238].

To the first, that he tries to prove a contradiction [n.233], perhaps Aristotle would say that ‘possible objectively’ is not repugnant to ‘necessary’ if the producer necessarily produces; for it is not required that it could really not be such, but that in the order of nature it be pre-understood by understanding it not to be such [sc. it is possible in its nature but, because of its cause, it is necessary]. This is proved by the confirmation of the argument adduced by Henry [n.233], which is that from quasi subjective potency – according to him – the Son is generated in divine reality; for it is certain that that quasi subjective possibility does not prevent necessity: nor does the quasi objective potency of the Son, because the generator necessarily generates.

257. To what is adduced from *On the Heavens* – “unless one nature were to change into another” [n.237] – it can be said that substance has permanent being and so there is not given to it always new being and new being. Therefore from the causer, necessarily causing according to him [Aristotle], there is given to it a nature necessary formally, and thus if it were able not to be its nature would be changed.

258. Through the same is the response plain to the passage from *Metaphysics* 12 about motion [nn.235, 238], because since it is of itself possible, not only can it because of this be perpetual from another, because it is from another, but because along with this it always has new being, and so never the form that is necessity; but it necessarily always comes to be, because the whole movable thing is necessarily disposed uniformly to what gives it existence uniformly necessarily, according to them [Aristotle and Averroes] (and this necessarily uniform disposition of the movable to the mover is the cause that motion necessarily comes to be, although the motion never has existence formally necessary, – there is also here a necessity of inevitability in the motion without the necessity of immutability in the motion, but from the necessity of immutability in the causes of the motion), such that both authorities are hereby solved. But the permanent, if it is necessary, has at the same time a being that is formally necessary, and so, if it is corruptible, there will be a contradiction, – motion is not so. Or the argument of Aristotle against Plato (*On the Heavens* n.237) proceeds from the supposition of a necessary agent, and then I deduce as follows: if the heaven can be perpetual, and from an agent necessarily, then it will be necessarily perpetual; but to this ‘necessarily’ is repugnant this act ‘to corrupt’, therefore also the potency for this act, because anything to which the act is necessarily repugnant, to that same thing is necessarily repugnant the potency for such act, although not to anything contingent; therefore potency to corruption does not stand unless potency to opposites stand at the same time. And through this does that positing in being hold, for, from the positing in being of what is possible an impossibility does not follow – nor a new impossibility – for anything necessary.

B. Reasons for and against the True Intention of the Philosophers

1. Reasons for this Intention

[sc. whether Aristotle like Avicenna thought God was compared immediately to one intelligence only or to all] is doubtful; however he posited nothing else immediately from the first save intelligence, which if it did not produce, it would altogether not be a mover, because [thus] according to none of the three ways that are had there [see footnote to n.290 at ☉].”

259. For this conclusion, which has been said to be the intention of both, namely of Aristotle and Avicenna [nn.251-255], I argue as follows: in every difference of being necessity is a more perfect condition than contingency; proof, because necessity is more perfect in being in itself, therefore also in every difference of being; therefore also in this difference of being which is ‘cause’, necessity is more perfect than the most perfect contingency; therefore the cause necessarily causes.

260. A response is that necessity is a more perfect condition where it is possible; but it is impossible with the idea of cause as cause, because thus are we speaking and not of that which is a cause.¹²³ – Against this: in many divisions of being one of the dividers is perfect, the other imperfect, and the extremes that are perfect in diverse divisions are either necessarily concomitant or compatible with themselves. An example: if being be divided by finite and infinite, by necessary and possible, by potency and act, – act, necessity, and infinity are either necessarily concomitant or compatible with themselves. Therefore since in the division of being through cause and caused cause is the more perfect extreme, concomitant with it or able to stand with it will be whatever more perfectly divides being – and consequently necessity.

261. Further, if the first causer were to cause naturally and to cause necessarily, then it would give necessity to its caused; but no perfection is taken away by the caused because of a mode of causing of the causer that is equally perfect: but to cause voluntarily is not a mode of causing less perfect than to cause naturally, and so because of this which is ‘to cause voluntarily’, is not taken away necessarily any perfection of the effect; therefore a cause causing voluntarily can give necessity to the effect. – The reason is confirmed because if it were to cause naturally it could produce several differences of being, namely possible and necessary; therefore if a cause causing voluntarily could not cause save only a contingent being, it would seem to be an imperfect cause, because then its causality would not extend itself to as many effects as it would extend itself to if it were to cause naturally.

262. Further, some cause necessarily causes its effect, therefore the first cause necessary causes its caused. – The antecedent seems manifest because of the many natural causes that necessarily cause their effects. I prove the consequence because in essentially ordered things the ‘posterior’ cannot have necessity unless the ‘prior’ have necessary being; the connections of caused things to their causes are essentially ordered; therefore no such connection is necessary unless the connection that is of the first caused thing to its cause is necessary.

2. Reasons against this Intention

263. [Reasons of Henry of Ghent] – Against this conclusion, in which the philosophers commonly agree – that the first cause necessarily and naturally causes the first caused – there is argument as follows:¹²⁴ the first agent is in no way perfected by anything other than itself; a natural agent is in some way perfected by its production or product; therefore etc. – The minor is shown because a natural agent acts for an end,

¹²³ That is, we are speaking of causes as such, and causes as such include necessary and contingent causes; we are not speaking only of some particular (and necessary) cause.

¹²⁴ Note by Scotus: “Henry *Quodlibet* V question 4 makes two arguments, which here:...”

Physics 2.5.196b21-22; but nothing seems to act for an end by which it be in no way perfected.

264. But to this response is made according to the intention of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.5 (95ra), where he maintains that a perfect agent acts from liberality, that is, not expecting perfection from the product – just as the intention of liberality was expounded in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ (I d.2 n.234). It seems, then, that what is assumed should be denied, namely that ‘a natural agent is perfected by that which it produces’ [n.263], because this is not so save in imperfect natural agents. And when ‘acting first for an end’ is adduced [*ibid.*], it is not necessary according to the philosophers that a natural agent act because of something other than itself, but for itself as for an end – nor is it necessary that it be perfected by that end, but that it is naturally that end.

265. Another response is also got from Avicenna, that just as water is of itself cold, and a consequence is that it makes cold another than itself, so the first agent (if it be posited to be a natural agent, according to them) will of itself be perfect, but consequent to its perfection will be ‘to produce perfection in another’, such however that the production of perfection in another is not the goal of it, just as neither is it the goal of water to make things cold.

266. Reason is redirected [by Henry] against these responses [nn.264-265], because if water were not able to abide in its coldness without the fact it would make another cold, it would not be supremely perfect in coldness, because in some way it would depend on another in its coldness: so therefore here about the first cause in its own entity with respect to the entity of the first caused thing.

267. But this redirection is not very cogent, because if water could produce a coldness that stands by itself, Avicenna would say that however much it could not be cold in itself without making cold, there would not for this reason be a dependence in its coldness but a complete perfection of coldness, from which perfection it would necessarily produce either cold in another or a cold standing by itself; and thus would he posit the same of the first being with respect to production other things.

268. Finally, it seems that this reason [of Henry’s, n.263; see] could be made clear in this way: every natural agent is either perfected in its action in itself, or in its like, or in the whole, or through its own production the nature of it receives being in another.

For this appears inductively in everything:

For the intellect, acting naturally, is perfected by its own action. Fire, acting naturally, is perfected in its like, and its nature has being in another, in which that nature could be even when generating fire has been corrupted (and so there seems to be a necessity of generation in corruptible things, according to *On the Soul* 2.4.415b7 ‘generation is perpetual so that divine being may be preserved’). The sun generates a worm, which although it [the sun] not be perfected in itself, neither does its nature receive being in another, nevertheless it is perfected in its whole (insofar as the sun is part of the universe, of which universe some part is being produced), and the perfection of the whole seems in some way to be the perfection of a part. God the Father in naturally producing the Son, although he not be perfected in himself nor in a whole of which he may be a part (because of nothing is he part), yet his nature receives being in another supposit, or another supposit receives being of nature.

This divisive major [first paragraph of n.268] is plain, then, by induction, although it be difficult to assign a ‘because of which’ of this major; but if God were to produce a creature naturally, none of these things would happen: for neither would he be perfected in himself from such production, neither in a similar nor in a whole, nor would his nature receive being in a product; therefore neither is the creature naturally produced.

269. A second reason is applied against the philosophers [n.263], because a power respecting some object *per se* and essentially, does not necessarily have a respect to the things that do not have an essential but accidental order to that first thing,¹²⁵ because he who wills the end does not, because of this, necessarily will another to be whose being is not necessary for attaining or holding the end in itself; and the divine will first has a respect to the divine goodness, to which creatures have an accidental order, because neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it; therefore the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to those creatures.

270. Although this reason [n.269] in itself seem in some way evident, yet it seems to contradict certain statements of the one arguing [sc. Henry], because he posits that ‘the divine will, as it respects things in quidditative being, necessarily wills whatever it wills’, and yet things in quidditative being no more have an order to divine goodness than things in being of existence.

271. The reason also seems to have an objection, because just as the divine will has its own essence for first object, so also does the divine intellect; therefore the divine intellect too would respect accidentally whatever other than the divine essence it would respect for object, and so it would seem to follow that God would not necessarily know an intelligible other than himself, just as he does not necessarily will a willable other than himself.

272. The first¹²⁶ objection [n.270], because it is not against the truth but against him holding the opinion [Henry], I concede.¹²⁷

273. By excluding the second [n.271], I confirm the matter at hand [sc. against the philosophers] and the reason [n.269], because a will that is determined to the end is not determined to anything of what is for the end save insofar as by a practical syllogism is concluded from the end the necessity of that being for the end, namely either its necessity in ‘being’ or in ‘being had’ for the purpose that the end be had or acquired, – or the necessity of it in ‘being loved’, so that the end be loved or had. This we see in all wills that are of the end itself, because it is not on account of the end necessary that they are

¹²⁵ Note by Scotus: “Anything whatever other than God has an essential order to him (although not conversely), hence it seems that the major should be taken in this way: ‘a power that necessarily has a respect to some first object is disposed necessarily to nothing else unless that object be the idea of necessarily tending to the other’; then the minor is as follows: ‘the divine goodness is not an idea for the will of necessarily tending with efficacious volition to any other object, because neither is anything else necessary for attaining it [sc. divine goodness], nor too does it increase it or with it more quieten the will’; therefore etc. [cf. Scotus, Rep. IA d.8 n.90]

But the ‘because’ [the one following this note in n.269] is a proof about the volition of being well-pleased, as about efficacious [volition], – the confirmation about the practical syllogism, on which you rely [n.273], concludes similarly; therefore either deny the necessity of each volition of the creature, or seek another special middle term.” This whole note is marked by Scotus with a symbol like ¶. 4.

¹²⁶ Here in the margin Scotus put the letters: g f. See n.233 and footnote.

¹²⁷ Vatican editors: “sc. concede for the philosophers, that if God necessarily will things in quidditative being, then since the order is equal [according to Scotus] he would necessarily will also things in being of existence.”

determined with respect to some being for the end, if such being not be concluded through a practical syllogism to be in any of these ways [sc. those just mentioned above] necessary for the end. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not know anything other than itself to be necessary for the ultimate end, there is no need that his will be in any way at all, from the fact that it is necessarily of the end, necessarily of something other than the end.

274. As for the instance about the intellect [n.271], it is not similar, because the fact that the intellect has necessarily a respect to some object does not posit that object to be something in real entity other than the first object, because ‘to be known by the divine intellect’ does not posit that being known to be in itself but to be presented to the intellect or to be in the intellect in a presented way; not so being willed, rather it posits then (or subsequently) that it has another being from the will, and this when speaking of efficacious will, because something thus willed by God is at some time in effect. The divine intellect, therefore, is not related to intelligibles other than itself as the will is related to other willables, because the intellect can be necessarily of other intelligibles – nay of all of them – without this, that they have a being other than divine being (insofar as they are present to it), nor by this is there posited anything other than God formally necessary in real existence; but the will could not be necessarily of any other willable things unless these other things were at sometime necessary in some real being other than divine being.¹²⁸

275. [Scotus’ own reasons] – To these reasons of a certain doctor [Henry], in some way thus strengthened [nn.268, 273], I add other reasons.

And I argue first as follows: an absolute being, supremely necessary – as much as anything can be thought to be necessary – cannot not be, whatever else other than itself does not exist; God is supremely necessary, according to the afore-accepted understanding [sc. ‘as much as anything can be thought to be necessary’]; therefore, whatever else other than him does not exist, it does not because of this follow that he does not exist. But if he had a necessary relation to the first caused thing, when that caused thing does not exist he would not exist; therefore he does not have to it a necessary relation.

276. I prove the major because from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible, just as neither from the less false does the more false follow; and I prove this because, if the more false has a double reason for falsity and the less false only one, let us circumscribe from the more false that reason for falsity in which it exceeds the less false:

¹²⁸ Note by Scotus: “Therefore can [the divine will] be necessarily well pleased in something shown to it without willing it to be as the intellect necessarily understands it without understanding however it to be? I concede that it is similar on both sides, – and then when the minor is proved, namely that ‘neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it’ [n.269], the conclusion would hold equally against the willing of being well pleased as against efficacious willing; therefore the instance against him [sc. Henry] seems to be good, because he concedes that the divine will necessarily wills a thing in quidditative being [n.270], since his proof ‘from accidental order’ is equally there [n.269] conclusive.

Let then the reasoning be formed as before [see sign ¶. 4 in footnote to n.269], and the minor [*ibid.*] is proved by the remark about the practical syllogism; which proof concludes about efficacious willing (as is plain), but not about the willing of being well pleased; the proof, because it is concluded that the will, perfectly loving the first goodness, is well pleased in anything shown that participates it, just as in the intellect the first object is the reason for necessarily tending to the second, because it manifests it as a certain participation of it.”

while the other reason stands it will be false, and the less false will not be false, because the reason for the falsity of the less false has been circumscribed; therefore, on this supposition, the more false will be false and the less false will be true, and then from the true will follow the false, and from this also is it plain then that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible. But such a necessary thing as has been described [n.275] is more necessary than any necessary thing other than it, even according to every opinion of the philosophers; therefore from the non-being of any other thing – which non-being is less impossible – the non-being of this which is more impossible does not follow.

277. I prove the other assumption, namely that ‘if he had a necessary relation, etc.’ [n.275], because what has to something a necessary relation does not exist when that relation does not exist, – but when the other extreme does not exist, the relation does not exist; therefore when the extreme of the relation does not exist, the foundation does not exist.

278. Against this reason there is an instance, because ‘a principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed’ (*Physics* 2.9.200a20-22), and yet a principle seems of itself formally to be necessary: but a conclusion is not necessary save from the principle; therefore etc.

279. This instance is null, because the proof of the major stands, that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible [n.276]. But neither is it similar to the matter at hand, because the conclusion is only a certain partial truth of the principle (which principle has as it were total truth), just as a singular is as it were a certain partial truth in respect of the universal. Now in beings ‘a caused being’ is not as a certain ‘quasi-partial’ entity of a cause, but is altogether another thing, dependent on the entity of the cause. So although when the conclusion is destroyed the principle is destroyed, it will not be so of the entity in the cause and in the caused.

280. And for this, so that this point ‘about principle and conclusion’ be better understood, examples can be posited. First a conclusion of geometry, that the sides of a triangle thus constructed are equal seems to be only a certain particular of this universal ‘all lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal’, – and so in many other cases, the conclusion seems only a particular or a less universal, or of many things, from which it is at the same time inferred, just as if to this we join this universal ‘things equal to the same thing are equal among themselves’; and although the predicate belong first to the subject of the universal, that is adequately, yet it does not belong first with such primacy to the less universal subject. Nor, because of this primacy in the principle and non-primacy in the conclusion is there the sort of causality in the principle with respect to the conclusion as there is in beings of one being in respect of another, such that the ‘causality in the principle’ posit a truth formally other than the truth of the principle, which is the truth of the conclusion, just as in beings the entity of the cause is formally other than the entity of the caused. Now the primacy of predication is because of the primacy of the terms, and although special terms not be adequate to the predicates, yet the attribution of the predicate to those special terms particularly taken is included in the attribution of the same predicate to common terms universally taken; included, I say, as something of that truth.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: therefore there is no necessary propositional truth other than the truths of the first principles, which seems unacceptable; again it is against you who above adduce that ‘the conclusion has a caused necessary truth’ against them on behalf of Aristotle [nn.239, 252].”

281. Second I argue thus: something happens contingently in beings, therefore the first cause causes contingently.¹³⁰

282. The antecedent the philosophers¹³¹ concede. The consequence I prove in this way: if the first cause is necessarily disposed to the cause next to it, let that be *b*, – *b* therefore is necessarily moved by the first cause; but *b*, in the same way it is moved by the first cause, moves the one next to it, – therefore *b* by moving necessarily causes *c*, and *c* by moving *d*, and, by thus proceeding in all causes nothing will exist contingently if the first cause causes necessarily. – This reason was handled in distinction 2 question 1 ‘On the Infinity of God’, in the argument proving that God is formally intelligent [I d.2 n.149], and so there is no need here to dwell on it further.

283. Further, and it comes back to the same: something evil happens in the universe, therefore God does not cause necessarily.

284. The antecedent the philosophers concede. And I prove the consequence because what acts necessarily produces its effect necessarily in what is susceptible of it insofar as it can be produced in it; the effect of the First [being] is goodness and perfection; therefore, if it necessarily acts, it necessarily produces in anything at all as much goodness as the susceptible thing can receive. But what has as much goodness as it is capable of has no malice; therefore etc.

285. Although there could be a way out as to this argument about evil in nature – as was touched on in the aforementioned question in distinction 2 [n.282; *Ord.* I d.2 n.149] – however as to evil done contingently, namely that it is blamable, an evasion does not seem possible but that, if some such evil do come about which namely be blamable, and from this it follow that it happen contingently, the first cause does not cause necessarily, as this deduction shows.¹³²

286. Again, an agent acting necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, because just as it is not in its power to act and not act, so neither to act intensely or weakly; therefore if the first cause necessarily causes, it causes whatever it can cause: and it can of itself cause everything causable, as I will prove [n.288] – therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no second cause causes anything.¹³³

287. I prove this second consequence because a prior cause first naturally respects the caused before a later cause, from the first position, *On Causes* [of ps.-Aristotle = from

¹³⁰ Note by Scotus: “This reason and the two following [nn.283, 286] are not valid against the philosophers, but they are valid for us later in the matter of ‘future contingents’ [d.39, which however is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. Equivalent discussions can be found in the *Reportatio* and *Lectura*]; for if the first cause is omnipotent, then it does not will any possible necessarily; the consequence is proved by these three reasons [nn.281,283, 286].”

¹³¹ Note by Scotus: “Response: the antecedent is true precisely of what depends on our will as to coming to be; for there is nothing else they [the philosophers] can say happens contingently. – About our acts there is the same difficulty for them as for you, namely whether our will moves moved by the First – except that you can save contingency in its motion from the First, but they cannot, as is here argued” [nn.285, 287].

¹³² Vatican editors: “if evil happens contingently and is blameworthy, it is possible for it not to be done when it is done, because if it is necessary then it will not be blameworthy” [Lectura I d.8 n.258].

¹³³ Note by Scotus: “This reason and the following one ‘about what moves in no time’ [n.290] are solved later [footnote to n.290], where the intention of Aristotle is proved that [God] could only be the proximate cause of intelligence, and of motion and of other things he is called the ‘remote’ cause, to the extent he gives being to the first mover [sc. the first mover after God]; each reason then [nn.286, 290] proceeds badly against the Philosopher, as if [God] could have power for something besides the intelligence that he produces, one or all [of them]” [footnote to n. 255].

Proclus' *Elements of Theology*]; therefore in the prior moment, if it causes totally, then it causes all that which in the second moment ought to be caused by the second cause, and so in the second moment, in which the second cause should cause, no action of the second cause will be possible, because the total effect caused by the first cause is already pre-understood.

288. The assumption in the argument, namely that 'it could cause everything causable' [n.286], I prove because it has the power of any second cause whatever, the total power too that is in the second cause as to whatever of perfection of causality there is in any second cause,¹³⁴ as was deduced in the aforementioned question 'On Infinity' [n.282], in the first way, taken from efficiency [I d.2 n.120]; now there is not required along with the efficient cause any imperfection but only perfection, because to cause efficiently is a matter of perfection simply;¹³⁵ therefore the First, possessing in itself all the causality of a second cause, as to anything whatever of perfection, can immediately cause of itself everything causable just as also along with a second cause.

289. And if the final consequence, namely that second causes are deprived of their actions, is not held for unacceptable, I reduce it to a greater unacceptable, that [the first cause] will cause both everything and only one thing, such that everything will be only one thing, – because just as it will cause all causables on account of this, that it causes everything that it can cause, so too in any causation it will cause as much as it can cause and so what is most perfect, and so they will all be that single caused thing, then all things will be one.

290. Also through the same middle, 'from the necessity of causing and with the ultimate causation', it follows that it will move in non-time, or at any rate it will change the heavens in non-time, so that the heavens will be moved in non-time.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Note by Scotus: "I concede this, but eminently. The power of the second cause is also required formally as proximate, because it, as [cause] eminently, is only of a nature to be in a remote cause. – When is taken 'now there is not required along with the efficient cause, etc.' [sc. the next statement in the main text] is taken, I say that some formal perfection more imperfect is required eminently, such that the same perfection eminently had cannot be the proximate idea of producing. Nor yet is the per se imperfection in the proximate cause the idea of acting, but such perfection (which yet is an imperfection) is the idea of thus acting, namely for the proximate thing, – which is to act imperfectly; the other perfection, more eminent, is the idea of acting remotely, – which is more perfectly to act."

¹³⁵ Note by Scotus: "It is not true of 'to cause immediately', but is a mark of some sort of perfection, along with imperfection; but to cause first, and as a result mediately, is a mark of perfection."

¹³⁶ Note by Scotus: "In another way: it can be said to the unacceptability 'that the First will transfer the heaven in an instant' that this does not follow, because a body is not susceptible of transference in a 'now'; therefore any virtue whatever has no power on this. The is clear precisely about motion in a circle, because, if it go round in a 'now', any part of the moved thing is in the same place in which it was before, otherwise, if some part not return altogether to the same place and reach it afterwards – when the circular motion is complete –, then it goes round in time. So it follows that, if it go round in the 'now', in that 'now' any part comes to be in the same place it was in before, from which it follows that it altogether does not change, because it remains altogether in the same 'where' and place, both as to the whole and as to the parts. Therefore to go round in a 'now' is not to go round, nor to change at all.

This second reason well proves that, by not positing a conjoined mover, the First thing (even if it be of infinite power) cannot move the sphere round in a 'now', – but not in time either, on account of Aristotle's proof, because then a finite virtue or power would move it 'in an equal time' [*Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6]; from which it follows that an infinite power cannot immediately move the sphere round, and we see it moving round. So this seems to be Averroes' necessity [*Metaphysics* XII com.41] for positing a conjoined mover (that is an immediate and finite one), without which the First thing would move nothing

291. Nor is the response valid mentioned before, in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [nn.282, 288], because this infinite virtue has all the perfection of the efficient cause in itself that it has along with the second proximate cause, and so it follows that it can immediately cause *per se* all the effect in the heavens that it can cause along with the intelligence;¹³⁷ therefore it also causes, if it acts necessarily, whatever it can, – and further, if it causes it immediately, then it also causes change in non-time, because an infinite power acting according to the utmost of its power cannot act in time; and if so, then there is no generation and corruption in these inferior things, which [conclusions] are against the philosophers; therefore, those [premises] from which these [conclusions] follow are false according to the philosophers.

C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

292. To the question, as to the exposition of the negative part of it [sc. that nothing other than God is immutable, n.230], I reply: I concede the conclusions of these arguments [nn.275-291, 273, 268], although perhaps some of them would not convince the philosophers so that they could not reply, yet they are more probable than those adduced for the philosophers [nn.259-262], and some perhaps necessary.

293. I say however, as to this part, that nothing else is immutable when speaking of the change that is called ‘turning’ [n.229], because nothing else is formally necessary. For anything else whatever is mutable subjectively, save because of negative imperfection: for example an ultimate accident, which is capable of no perfection because of its imperfection (as it be a relation), is not mutable subjectively, because it cannot be

spherically, because it can only act mediately, on account of its perfection and the effect’s imperfection, between which a mediating proximate cause is necessarily required.

Against this. I ask what is it for the First to move mediately? Either because it has produced a proximate moving cause, to which it has, by giving being, given a finite moving power, – Or if the second thing exists of itself, the First gives it virtue or some influence by which it moves, – Or, third, the First and the second cause the same effect in a certain order without this that the second cause receive something from the first cause. If the third, it follows that a finite power without another second cause will move in an equal time with an infinite power moving with a second cause; if the second, it follows that the ‘influx’ is something else from the nature of the second cause; therefore if it be denied that the First has motion ‘for proximate effect’ against the third, and in no intelligence is there an accident against the second, let it be said that the first is of the mind of Aristotle, and that Avicenna expounds it, *Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb-105ra), ‘on the order of intelligences’. [Cf. *Lectura* I d.8 n.236: “Therefore Avicenna most beautifully and better among them all expounded the Philosopher in his *Metaphysics* IX, how many things can be produced without change in the First, positing that only one thing is produced by the First, and so on.”] And then the infinity of motion is reduced to the First, because the infinity of duration of the second cause is from the first always causing, just as the Son is always generated, – Now the First is of itself of infinite duration; but let succession be reduced to the finite virtue of the proximate mover, such that not on account of anything else is the first mover there save because giving being to the mover. Thus is well saved the first efficient cause and the final end (because loved for its own sake by the second mover), but not the first mover save a remote one, that is giving being to the mover.” The mark ☉ is put here by Scotus. See nn.252, 255.

¹³⁷ Note by Scotus: “Again, the second cause does not take away the first’s proper mode of its causing. – Response: the proper mode of its causing is to cause through the medium of a second cause, and not immediately; again, the primacy of adequation includes the whole order of the many things to which the cause extends itself (just as you say elsewhere [I d.28 q.3 n.11] about the primacy of the three persons to the essence, and about the other primacy of the first person to the same, so here), and then [the first cause] is in proximate potency to the second when the first is posited, and then the second acts as much as it can act.”

the subject of anything, this is because it is imperfect negatively, that is not capable of any perfection. But nothing other than God is because of its own perfection immutable, because if anything were such it would most of all be the first intelligence. But that intelligence is mutable from intellection to intellection; proof: for it can have intellection of any intelligible, because our intellect can have this, – but not a single [intellection] of everything, because then it would be infinite (from I d.2 nn.101, 125-129), nor an infinity at once of all intelligibles, because then an intellect having all of them at once in act distinctly would seem to be infinite; therefore it can have intellection of one intelligible after another intelligible and afterwards intellection of another intelligible; therefore it is mutable.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Argument

294. To the arguments set down for the opinion of the philosophers [sc. that something else besides God is immutable, n.223].

To what they argue about an ancient change of the First if it not be necessarily disposed to what is next to it [n.223], I reply that by an ancient will can a new effect come about without change of will. Just as I, by my same continued will whereby I wish something to be done, will then do it at the ‘when’ at which I will to do it, so God in eternity willed something other than himself to be at some time and then created it for the ‘when’ for which he willed it to be.

295. And if you object, according to Averroes *Physics* VIII com.4, that at any rate he will be awaiting the time if he do not at once put the effect into being when he wants it to be; –

296. – and beside this, according to the same [Averroes] elsewhere, what is indeterminate in contingency to either such indetermination posits that that which is so indeterminate cannot of itself proceed to act, as it seems; therefore if in God there is such contingency for causing, it does not seem he can of himself be determined to causing.

297. To the first [n.295] I reply. Something existing in time and being willing either wills with most efficacious volition, not having regard to a time for which it wills, – or wills it to be for some definite time. If in the first way, it would at once posit the willed thing in being if its will be perfectly potent. If in the second way, on the posit that its will were simply powerful, it would yet not put the thing at once into being but for then when it wants it to be; it would therefore await the time, because it is a being in time. – But, in applying this to God, imperfections must be taken away. For neither is his will impotent, nor does his will have being in time so as to await a time for which he may produce the thing willed: which thing indeed he does not will then necessarily to be when he wills, but wills it to be for a determinate time, which time however he does not wait for, because the operation of his will is not in time.

298. And when he [Averroes] speaks second ‘about the indeterminacy of a cause causing contingently’ [n.296], there was discussion elsewhere [I d.7 nn.20-21] about double indeterminacy, namely of passive power and of active unlimited power. God was not indeterminate to causing with the first indeterminacy but with the second, and this not to several disparate things (to each of which he is naturally determined) as the sun is disposed to its many effects it is capable of, but he is indeterminate to contradictories, to

either of which he could from his own liberty be determined. So too our will is indeterminate in this way virtually, by indetermination of active power to either contradictory and can of itself be determined to this one or that.

299. And if you ask why the divine will, then, will be more determined to one contradictory than to the other, I reply: 'it is a mark of someone uneducated to seek causes and demonstration of everything' (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13), 'for of a principle of demonstration there is not demonstration'. Now it is immediate that the will wills this, so that there is not any cause intermediate between these, just as it is immediate that heat is cause of heat (but here naturality, and there freedom), and so of this 'why the will wills' there is no cause save because will is will, just as of this 'why heat heats' there is no cause save because heat is heat, because there is no prior cause.

300. And if you say 'how can there be immediacy here, since there is contingency to either result?', there was discussion elsewhere in the question 'On the subject of theology' [*Prol.* n.169], that in contingent things there is some first thing which is immediate and yet contingent, because there is no stand at the necessary (for from the necessary the contingent does not follow), and so a stand must be made at this [proposition] 'the will of God wills this', which is contingent and yet immediate, because no other cause is prior to the idea of will, why it is of this and not of another. – By this is apparent the answer to what Avicenna adduces, that 'his action is in him by essence' and is not in him accidentally: it is true that his willing is his essence, yet it passes contingently over this object and that, as will be said below 'about future contingents' [I d.39, see footnote to n.281].

301. By this is plain the answer to the principal argument [n.223], because with God's necessity stands that what he is immediately disposed to is mutable, because 'immediately from the immutable' is mutable without change of the immutable, because the relation of the immutable to what is next to it is mutable; and therefore the extreme of the relation is contingent and mutable, although the foundation be immutable.

B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers

To the arguments posited for the philosophers [sc. that the first cause necessarily causes, nn.259-262].

To the first, about 'the things that divide being' [n.259], I say that 'necessary' is a more perfect condition (than 'possible') in every being for which the condition of necessity is possible; but it is not more perfect in that being for which it is not compossible, because a contradiction does not posit any perfection, and this is not from the idea of it but from the idea of the being to which it is repugnant. And so I say that necessity is repugnant in every respect to what is posterior, because, from the fact that every posterior is non-necessary, the first thing cannot have a necessary relation to any of them.

303. And when you say that 'all of the more perfect dividers of being are concomitant with each other' [n.260], I say that this is true of the dividers that state a perfection simply and for themselves (as are act, infinity, and the like), but not of those that state a respect to something posterior, because to have a necessary relation to something such is not a mark of perfection, because it does not stand with the perfect

necessity of that which is said to have such a relation; this is confirmed because such a relation is not formally infinite, although however infinity is the more noble extreme in the division of being.

304. To the other point, when it is said ‘if it were to cause naturally, it would cause necessarily and would then give necessity to the product etc.’ [n.261], I say that it does then follow that it would necessarily cause, just as from an antecedent including impossibles follows a consequent including impossibles: for in the antecedent, repugnant to ‘that which is to cause’ is the mode ‘naturally’, because ‘to cause’ states the production of what is diverse in essence and so contingent, ‘naturally’ states a necessary mode of causing and so in respect the necessary; and therefore a consequent follows including two opposites at the same time, by reason of the causation and the mode of causing. In this way is the first proposition true. – And when you add ‘no perfection is taken from the caused because of a more perfect mode of causing of the cause’, I concede it; nor does the mode of causing ‘voluntarily’ take any perfection from the causable possible for it, but it takes necessity from the causable (which is in itself a perfection, but impossible with the causable), and it gives the perfection to the caused compossible with it, just as ‘voluntarily’ in creation states a mode compossible with causation.

305. By this is apparent [the response] to the confirmation about the many producible differences of being [n.261]; I say that a causable being cannot have these several differences, necessary and possible, but every causable being is only possible; and therefore it is not a mark of perfection in a cause to be able to cause these several differences, because there is no power for the impossible, – likewise, if it were *per impossibile* to cause necessarily, it would also therefore necessarily not produce several differences of being, because it would only produce things necessary, not contingent.

306. To the final one [n.262] I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause naturally simply or necessarily simply cause, but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any [second cause] whatever depends on the relation of first cause to caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause co-causing the caused, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause does not cause save contingently, therefore the second simply contingently causes, because it depends on the causation of the first, which is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as is on their part, cannot not cause effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect – namely as far as is on their part – and not simply; just as fire, as far as is on its part, cannot not heat, yet it can absolutely not heat, God not cooperating, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50].

Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Generation of the Son in Divine Reality be Eternal

1. About the ninth distinction I ask whether the generation of the Son in divine reality be eternal.

Argument that it is not:

Because where the same thing is being and duration, if anything is principle of being, of duration too; but the Father is principle of the being of the Son, because principle “of the whole deity” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29; therefore he is principle of the duration of the Son.

2. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25: “it is a mark of imperfection in our word that it is formable before it be formed,” therefore it seems a mark of imperfection in a word that it exists in ‘being formed’; therefore this does not belong to the divine Word.

3. Further, if the generation of the Son always is eternal, then the Son is always being generated; therefore he is never generated, and so he is never Son. – These consequences are proved by Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.37: “What is always being born never has been born,” – further, “what never has been born is never son;” therefore if the Son is being always born, never is he Son.

4. To the opposite:

Ambrose *On the Faith* I ch.9 nn.59-60, and it is put in the text [sc. of the *Sentences*]: “If God first was and did afterwards generate, by accession of generation was he changed; may God avert this madness.” Therefore he always had the Son.

5. Likewise the authority of Hilary [*On the Trinity* XII n.21] in the text: “between to generate and to have generated there is no middle,” namely of duration. If therefore it is proper to the Father to have always generated, it is proper to the Son that he has always been generated.

I. Solution of the Question

6. To the question I say that yes, because generation is not there under the idea of change (as was said above in distinction 5 question 2 [d.5 n.87]), and therefore it does not have terms corresponding to the terms of generation-change, namely being after non-being (that is, differently disposed now than before, because of which terms eternity is repugnant to generation-change, because they cannot exist together; so there is one thing after another, and so not eternity); but there is only there generation-production in being of substance by way of nature.

7. From this I show that it is eternal, because a sufficient agent, that is, dependent on nothing and producing by way of nature, has production coeval with it – and also a perfect product – if it does not act by motion; the Father generating is such an agent; therefore he has generation coeval with him and also generated.

8. The major [n.7] is apparent, because that a producer were to precede its production, this could not be – as it seems – save because acting and not acting would either be in its power or because, although it were of itself determined to acting, yet it could be impeded through lack of something on which it would depend in acting. All these exclude what is posited in the major, namely to be a sufficient agent and to produce naturally; if too, without these posited, it were to precede its product, this would be because the product is produced through motion: therefore with these and motion

removed, not only is production coeval with it (namely with the producer), but the product too.

9. The minor [n.7] is apparent as to all the conditions, because the Father generates naturally, and he is altogether the first producer, – therefore dependent on nothing in producing; and his nature he in no way communicates through motion, because there can be no motion in that nature.

10. Through this reason [n.7] does the example of Augustine hold, *On the Trinity* VI ch.1 n.1, about fire and brightness, that ‘if fire were eternal, it would have a brightness coeval and coeternal with it’.

This example I make clear as follows: when in something the idea of the more common and less common come together, whatever in it follows *per se* the idea of the more common also follows it when it is found without the nature of the less common (this is apparent about all things common possessing their own properties, and about the inferiors of them); therefore if in a creature there come together the idea of what causes naturally and of what produces naturally, whatever follows the creature by reason of this more common thing, which is ‘to produce naturally’, also follows it when it is found without causation naturally. But that fire have a coeval brightness, this does not follow it precisely through this, that it is causing naturally, but through this, that it is producing naturally, because if, *per impossibile*, it were not causing it but producing it, so that there would be a brightness of the same nature as fire, still no less would coequality follow. So, where there is truly the idea of what produces naturally without the idea of what causes naturally, as in divine reality, there truly will it follow that the producer has a product naturally coeval with it.

11. This solution [nn.6-10] is also confirmed by taking that which of perfection is or is found scattered about in the generatings of diverse creatures, and leaving out those that are of imperfection: in the generatings of successive things, this is of perfection in them that while they are coming to be they are, and of imperfection in them is that they do not abide but only have being in the flow of part after part; in the generating of permanent things, this is of perfection that they abide, and of imperfection that they are not while they are coming to be (because this posits imperfection in the maker, that it is not a perfect maker, – likewise in the thing made, that it necessarily has being after non-being); in the indivisibles of successive things, this is of perfection that while they are coming to be they are and are wholes at the same time, but of imperfection that they suddenly pass away. By aggregating the perfections, there will be had ‘a generated’ that at the same time ‘will be generated’ and ‘will be’ and ‘permanently will be’, that is: the generated is being generated and is perfectly in a perfect standing ‘now’ (which is the ‘now’ of eternity), and this is what was proposed.

II. To the Principal Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.1] I say that ‘principle’ is said in many ways (as is clear in *Metaphysics* 5.1.1012b34-1013a23), and if it be taken in the same way, it can well be conceded that if it be a principle of anything, that it be a principle of that which is the same as itself. But ‘principle’ is not wont to be construed with this which is ‘of duration’ for principle of origin, but only for a principle that be as it were a term of the duration ‘from which’, just as an instant is said to be a principle of time: and whether this

be from the use of words or from the force of words, this would not be conceded ‘the Father is principle of duration of the Son’ without determination – but this would well be conceded ‘the Father is originative principle of the eternity of the Son’.

13. When, therefore, you argue through identity of being and of duration, because ‘whatever is principle of one, also is of the other’ [n.1], – I concede it if ‘principle’ be taken uniformly with respect to being and duration. But ‘principle’ is not construed with the ‘of duration’ in idea of the sort of principle in idea of which sort of principle it is construed with the ‘of being’, because in respect of being it is an originative principle, and therefore it does not follow, but there is a fallacy of equivocation or of amphiboly;¹³⁸ but for this purpose that the consequence hold, it is necessary to determine ‘principle’ in the consequent by this which is ‘originating’ and ‘original’, – as follows: ‘the Father is the original principle of the duration of the Son’, which I concede, as has been said [n.12].

14. To the second [n.2] I say that our word is doubly in a state of becoming: in one way in the becoming that is the proper generation of the word itself, in another way it is in the becoming which is the investigation preceding that generation (which investigation Augustine calls ‘revolving cogitation’). But that our word be in a state of becoming in this second way is of imperfection on the part of the word, because it posits novelty, and on the part of our intellect, because it posits imperfect causality, – and in this way the divine Word is not in a state of becoming; and therefore Augustine concedes that our word is formed by cogitation, so that it be formable first before formed in that previous investigation. But that our word be in becoming as to being begotten is not of imperfection in it; rather this is necessary for the *per se* idea of word (and it will be also in the fatherland), and so it is not of imperfection in the eternal Word that it is always in becoming, that is, being begotten without previous inquiring.

15. To the third [n.3] I say that Augustine seems to deny that the Son is always being born (in the aforementioned question [n.3]), although however Origen say the opposite (as the Master [Lombard] adduces in the text) on the verse of *Jeremiah* 11.9-10: “There is found...” [Origen *Homilies on Jeremiah* IX n.4], and also Gregory *Moralia* XXIX ch.19 n.36 on the verse of *Job* 38.21: “You knew when you would be born...?” – Can it be then that they are contradicting? – I reply. Gregory in the *Moralia* seems to be saying things with which these statements can be made to agree: “We cannot,” he says, “assert that he is always being born, lest he seem something imperfect.” ‘Lest,’ he says ‘he seem to be something imperfect’: he did not say ‘it is an imperfection if he be said to be always born’, but ‘imperfection seems to be signified’, – that is, this speaking does not signify that the generation is as perfect as is signified by this statement ‘he is always born’; for this ‘he is always born’ more expresses the truth than the ‘he is always being born’, although both be true.

16. To understand this one must know that verbs of any tense are said of God truly, whether they signify personal or essential acts. This is plain from Augustine [*On the Gospel of John* tr.99 nn.4-5] on *John* 16.13: “For he will not speak from himself but whatever he will hear he will speak.” ‘He will hear’, says Augustine about the Spirit,

¹³⁸ I.e. in the proposition ‘whatever is principle of being is principle of duration’, which seems to be a case of the general proposition ‘whatever is principle of one is principle of the other’, there is an equivocation in the term ‘principle’, or an amphiboly in ‘principle of...’, in the phrase ‘principle of being...principle of duration’. For ‘principle of being’ is not construed in the same way as ‘principle of duration’, since in the former it is construed as ‘originative principle’ and in the latter not so.

what indeed he has heard and hears, because that the Holy Spirit hears is that he proceeds from the Father and the Son; and, consequently, what ‘he will hear’ he has heard and hears, just as he knows and has known and will know. Therefore he himself [Augustine] wants the verbs of all tenses to be truly said of God, and it is apparent from what the Master [Lombard] adduces [I d.8 ch.1 n.80].

17. But what do these verbs of diverse tenses signify when they are said of God? – I reply. They can more properly be said to co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity than differences of time; nor yet that ‘now’ absolutely, because there would not then be variation of diverse modes of signifying time, but insofar as it [the ‘now’] coexists with the parts of time, as when is said: ‘God has generated’, there is co-signified the ‘now’ of eternity, so that the sense is, God has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as that ‘now’ was co-existent with the past, – ‘God generates’, this is, he has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as he coexists with the present. From this is it plain that, since the ‘now’ truly coexists with any difference at all of time, truly do we assert of God the differences of all tenses.

More expressly however – according to blessed Gregory – is signified the truth of divine generation by this statement ‘he is always born’ than by the statement ‘he is always being born’; because by the ‘is born’ is the nativity signified as perfect, by the ‘always’ is it signified as perfect with every difference or part of time, and thus not only is it signified to coexist with every part of time (as is signified by this statement ‘he is always being generated’), but it is also signified to coexist with every part of time under the idea of perfect, and in this does the truth of this procession seem to be most truly signified.

Tenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the Act and Mode of the Will

1. About the tenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is produced through act and mode of will.

That he is not:

Because nature is “a force implanted in things, procreating similars from similars” [John the German, *Gloss on the Decretum* p.1 d.1 ch.7], according to the common description of nature; the Holy Spirit is like the one producing; therefore he is produced by nature, and not by will.

2. Again, Averroes *Physics* VIII com.46 proposes that of one nature there is only one mode of communicating; therefore if the divine nature is communicated by act of nature, it will not be communicated by act of will.

3. Further, the will is an active power in creatures, so it is not a factive power; likewise in God: if it is an operative power it does not seem to be a productive power. – Proof of the consequence, because as the active and factive powers are disposed in creatures, so are the operative and productive in God. For just as the active has an immanent act and a presupposed object and the factive has a produced object and a

transeunt act, so in divine reality the act of the operative is immanent, and the act of the productive is not immanent, – but the operative presupposes an object, while the productive does not presuppose a term.

4. Again, nothing is produced by act of will unless it is pre-known, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. Therefore if the Holy Spirit be thus produced, he will be pre-known before being produced, and then he would be known by the Father and the Son by non-intuitive cognition, because knowledge had of him insofar as he is known before being produced does not seem to be intuitive, because intuitive knowledge is only of a thing as it is present in itself and existent; therefore it is unacceptable for the Holy Spirit to be known non-intuitively by the Father and the Son.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: the Holy Spirit has exited from the Father and the Son “not in some way born but in some way given;” to exit by way of given and gift belongs to the producer by act of will, from whose liberty it is to give or donate.

I. Solution of the Question

6. To the question I say that so [it is].

The proof, because in God there is will, – as has appeared from question 1 of distinction 2, and also from the question ‘On attributes’ in distinction 8 [I d.2 nn.75-88, d.8 nn.177-217].

7. It is plain too from this that God is blessed from his nature; but beatitude is not without will, or without act of will.

8. Also the will exists in him under the idea of productive principle, because productive principles, from the fact they do not of themselves state imperfection, are reduced to some single perfect thing, or to some perfect things in as much fewness as they can be reduced to; now they cannot all be reduced to one principle – productive or active – because that single thing would have the determinate mode of acting of one or other of them, namely of nature or will, because between these modes of producing there is not any middle mode; therefore these principles cannot be reduced to a greater fewness than to duality, namely of productive principle by way of nature and by way of will. And since the things at which as at things perfect this whole reduction of principles stops are simply perfect, both these principles under their proper idea will be posited in God as he is a producing principle [I d.2 nn.305-309].

9. And from these further: In whatever there is some principle that of its idea is a productive principle, it will be in it a principle of producing if it is in it without imperfection and not be understood to pre-have some product simply adequate; in God, as has been proved [d.8 nn.177-217], there is formally a will from the nature of the thing, and this under the idea of a productive principle free in respect of love, and it is plain it is there without imperfection; therefore in God there will be a principle of producing love, and this according to the proportion of his perfection, such that just as a created will is a principle of producing as much love as is the love it can love the object with (which is called adequate love), so this [divine] will is a principle of producing as much love as it is of a nature to love an infinite object with: but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is of a nature to be a principle of producing infinite love, – but nothing is infinite unless it be the divine essence itself, therefore that love is the

divine essence. Now produced love is not of a nature to be an inherent form, because nothing is such in divine reality; therefore it is *per se* subsistent, – and not the same subsistent as the producer, because nothing produces itself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore it is personally distinct: this person I call ‘the Holy Spirit’, because the Son is not thus produced (as is plain from d.6 nn.16, 20, 27) but by act of nature or intellect, – therefore etc.¹³⁹

II. Doubts

10. Here, however, there are three doubts.

First, how the will can be this principle of communicating nature, since it is not so in creatures.

11. Second, how the will could be a principle also of necessarily producing, and what necessity is necessarily required in this production.

12. Third, if production is necessary, how it is not by way of nature but distinct from it and free.

A. Response of Henry to the Two First Doubts

13. [To the first doubt] – As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry of Ghent, *Summa* q.1 a.60] that “nature in divine reality is said in four ways:

In one way nature is called the divine essence itself in which the three persons consist, – and it is called nature thus purely essentially.

14. In a second way nature is called the natural active principle, – and in this way nature is the productive force ‘of similar from similar’; and thus the power of generating actively in the Father is nature, and thus is it an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself said in the first way; for nature, which is the

¹³⁹ Note by Scotus: “Every perfect productive principle can be for some supposit perfectly having it a principle of producing (or thus: by every perfect productive principle can some supposit perfectly having it produce) a term adequate in comparison to the presented object; a perfect will having a perfect or first object actually presented to it is a perfect productive principle of as much love as such an object is by such a will to be loved by; therefore etc. But such a will is in a divine person, therefore some divine person can produce a love adequate to that. – This is sufficient here; hence here nothing about ‘prior’, but in distinction 11 – that ‘the Son inspirit’ – is that about ‘prior’ required [sc. there is no need to add here ‘prior to the term being produced’, as there is later in I d.11 q.1 n.2]. This minor of the first syllogism does not make assertion or denial of a second object [sc. a secondary or finite object], but of what is certain, namely about the first object. Thus are solved here all the doubts [nn.10-12], for from the minor is inferred that an infinite will, having an infinite object present, is a productive principle of infinite love, because by that much must an infinite object be loved (this is certain, whatever may hold of a secondary object, because it loves it with its whole effort if it is a right will), or in another way, because it can love with that much love, – this the minor says; therefore the will loves. This follows from what is had later [n.48] ‘about the necessity of the act with respect to the object’, because in the necessary what can be is. And thus is the first doubt [n.10] solved, how it is a principle of communicating nature. – The second doubt [n.11] is solved by adding to the minor ‘a perfect will infinite in respect of a present object necessarily to be loved by it is a necessary principle of producing as much love as such an object is by it to be loved by’; therefore the will with respect to a present infinite object is a principle necessarily productive of infinite love. As it has been proved that that object is necessarily to be loved by it and with as much love, this one minor [supra ‘This minor of the first syllogism...’] has everything, both ‘necessarily’ and ‘infinite’, in this: ‘communication of nature’, and in this: ‘inspiring of a divine person’.”

divine essence itself as it is under a paternal property determinate to act of generating, is the active power of generating, existing only in the Father. – And these two modes of nature are Hilary touches on in *On the Trinity* V n.37 when he says of the Son that ‘from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist’.

15. In a third way nature is called any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way which, although the force be free, yet can in this way be called nature, – and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing in divine nature naturally.

16. In a fourth way nature is called incommutable necessity concerning some act.”

17. As to the matter at hand, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting “as it is free and freely acting.” In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs “not elicitive but subjectively only,” in the second way it does not concur at all.

18. From these to the matter at hand it is said that “neither intellect nor will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a like in natural form to the very one producing), because then, in whatever they were, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a like in natural form to the very one producing, which is false in creatures. For they are only there [sc. in God] elicitive principles of natural acts as they exist in divine nature and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturalness for notional productions.

19. According to this, then, did we [sc. Henry] say in a certain question ‘About emanations in general’ that intellect and will as they are simply intellect and will – namely acting in intellectual and voluntary way – are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are to understand and to will), although this be passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are to generate and to spirate), and this ‘by the necessity of naturalness, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.’

20. To make this clear, one must know that [the principles] have this sort of naturalness from the divine nature (in which are intellect and will), but in different ways, – since the divine intellect has it by coinciding in idea of nature, which is the elicitive principal idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturalness is altogether first and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi so; because of which only by way of nature and by natural impulse does it elicit its notional act, so that more properly is the Father said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is rather understood to quasi-determine nature than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of that, as it were second.

21. But the will has its naturalness, not as by being coincident in idea of nature said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in it, so that this naturalness in the will is in no way precedent to the liberty of it (nor [sc. precedent is] the elicitive idea of the notional act, according to the second mode of nature, – for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it be consecutive and annexed to liberty: and this not as something by which the will elicits its notional act as principal, but as something by

which, assisting the will, the will itself – from the force which it has by the fact it is will and free – can elicit its notional act, which, without that assisting, it could in no way elicit.”

22. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that “there is a triple action of the will:

The first, which is elicited by the will as it is will simply without any naturality or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from choice of freedom (whether in God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.

23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will, immutable with the sole naturality of necessity¹⁴⁰ annexed to the action, as it is that which proceeds from choice of freedom and tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.

24. The third, which is elicited by the will not as it is will simply but as it is nature, naturality being annexed to it said in the second way [n.23, or n.21], as it is that which proceeds from the freedom of will or from the choice of will in God alone and tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to the love proceeding (by which it is incentively loved), although it tend in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone – by the idea by which it is free – an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love tending to the loved thing at the term, thus does there proceed from the naturality annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturality is annexed.”

B. Against the Response of Henry

25. Against these remarks.

First: as to what he posits about the assistance of nature for the will, so that the will by force of this assistance can communicate nature [n.21], I ask what is this assistance? It seems that it is not necessary for that communication, because once an agent supposit is had perfect and agreeable to action, and a perfect principle ‘by which’ of acting, there does not seem to be anything else necessary for acting; but for you the will alone is the principle ‘by which’ in respect of a notional act, and it is clear that the supposit is perfect and agreeable for action; therefore that assistance does not seem to be necessary for such production.¹⁴¹

26. Further, that a single necessity is posited in the will and a double one in spiration [n.24] seems to be against him and against the truth, because he posits that notional acts are founded on essential ones, and everyone commonly concedes that essential acts in some way precede notional acts. Now it does not seem that in what is founded there could be any necessity formally greater than in that on which it is founded, or that a double necessity will be in what is founded and a single one in the foundation;

¹⁴⁰ The Latin is ambiguous since the word ‘immutabilis’ (immutable) could be nominative (in the way it is taken here) or genitive and going with ‘necessitatis’ to give the sense: “...simply will with the sole naturality of immutable necessity, annexed to...” Readers may decide as they will.

¹⁴¹ See Appendix page..?? below.

proof, because then *per impossibile* or *per incompossibile* when one necessity is separated from the other (namely that which the founded thing had from the foundation), still the founded thing will remain necessary; but that on which it is founded will not remain necessary, because it had only that single necessity which is circumscribed in the foundation; therefore it could be – once the position [of a double necessity] is posited – that necessity is in the founded thing and not in that on which it is founded. This to the matter at hand, because if the act of spirating has necessity from the freedom of the will and – besides this – from the necessity of naturality annexed to the will, and if the act of simple love has only the one first necessity, then, with the first necessity circumscribed, all the necessity will be circumscribed that was in the foundation, and yet still there will remain the other necessity in the production, namely that which is from naturality.

27. Further, it seems that the whole naturality not be consequent to the act of will, because that belongs to the will – for him [Henry] – from the fact it is founded on the divine essence [n.21]; therefore, since the idea of the divine essence is prior to the idea of the will, whatever is consequent to the idea of the essence, or to the will by reason of the essence, will be consequent to it prior than that which is consequent to the will, as it is will, will be: and so it seems that the naturality in some way precede the liberty, and as a consequence it will impede liberty.

28. Further, against the opinion.

What argument would that be which he himself makes, ‘if the intellect and the will were principles of communicating the nature whence such powers are, then in creatures such powers would be principles of communicating nature’ [n.18], if there were altogether a different formal idea of intellect and will in God and in creatures?

29. Further, what is the necessity of distinguishing between the will that he posits as a principle of eliciting the act, and the nature that he posits to co-assist the eliciting will [n.21], if there is only between them a distinction of reason, as he seems elsewhere to think about the distinction of attributes in divine reality?

C. Scotus’ own Response

30. [To the first doubt; n.10] – I say otherwise that the will can be a principle of communicating nature, – and not will as commonly taken for created and uncreated will, but will whereby it is infinite; for infinity is the proper mode of the divine will, just as it is of any other essential perfection.

31. This is plain from the reason posited above, to the solution of the question [n.9], because the will is a principle of a love adequate to it, that is, of as much love as it is of a nature to love the object with; and it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is also productive of infinite love; whatever is infinite formally is the divine essence, – therefore the will is a principle of communicating the divine essence to produced love.

32. And if you inquire of me about the co-assistance of nature in some way, I say that there is no need to posit for the will, as it is a principle of communicating nature, that nature co-assists in some special mode of assisting (if nature could be a principle of communicating nature), unless were posited some lesser perfection of will than of nature; but there is no such imperfection, because simply is an infinite will as perfect as an infinite nature.

33. Against this [n.30] there is a threefold argument.

First as follows: infinity is of itself of the same idea in the intellect and the will; so there is no formal idea of distinct products that have to be distinguished by formal principles.

34. Again, I argue as follows: what does not belong to something – or what is repugnant to something – according to its absolute idea, does not belong to it either if it is infinite; for infinity does not give to an active virtue the idea of another active virtue, but gives to it intensity, both in itself and in its action; let be joined to it this minor: but to the action of the will, as it is such an active principle, does not belong – but is repugnant to it – the communicating of nature; therefore etc.

35. Further, whence does the will have infinity? If from itself, then everywhere, – if from the essence, then the will is infinite as having the assistance of nature or of essence, which the other opinion says [Henry's opinion, n.21].

36. To the first [n.33] I say that the two things in the act, namely liberty and infinity (which is a mode intrinsic to the thing), have two things corresponding in the principle 'by which', namely liberty and infinity, as its mode (look in the final Parisian collation);¹⁴² whence I do not say that infinity is the formal idea of spirating, but infinite will is, – nor in this do I state two formal principles, because 'infinite' is a mode intrinsic to both principles, namely free and non-free. – In another way can it be said that the will, whence it is will, is altogether simple (that is, not combinable with the nature of which it is the power, nor with its act); for from this it follows that it is productive of an act, because this belongs to it as it is will, – and further, the act is the same as the nature, and this whence it is altogether simple; therefore it is communicative of nature.

37. To the other [n.34]. If 'repugnance' be taken for the middle term, the major is true and the minor false, for the transcendent idea of will (which abstracts from finite and infinite) is not an idea of repugnance, but the limitation supervening on it. But if is taken for the middle term 'does not belong', I say that to an active infinite principle does not belong an action save of the infinite sort that, transcendent, belongs to it transcendent; but now, just as to a transcendent will it belongs transcendentally 'to will' so also to produce 'to will': therefore to an infinite will it belongs to produce infinite 'to will', no longer *per se* but concomitantly (infinite 'to will' is deity, but an angel's finite 'to will' is not an angel's essence). – Then to the minor I say that to communicate nature is not a transcendent action of the will in general, but to produce 'to will' proportionate to itself and the object is, – and therefore an infinite will produces the infinite, and consequently the nature.

38. To the third [n.35] the answer is plain in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.209-222], [that it has it] from what it is fundamentally – because from the essence, and from itself formally; I concede that the essence is required as foundation and as really the same, but this in its moment of nature – in which it is formally infinite – is the precise principle 'by which' (along with the object), as of operating, so of producing.

39. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt 'about necessity' [n.11], it is plain through the same [through the will whereby it is infinite, n.30], because a perfect productive principle can give to a perfect product all the perfection that is not repugnant to it; an infinite will is a perfect productive principle, therefore it can give to its product

¹⁴² *Paris Collat.* 20: "Whether everything intrinsic to God be altogether the same as the divine essence, after any consideration whatever of the intellect has been circumscribed."

the perfection fitting itself: now necessity is not repugnant to it (rather it necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite can be possible, non-necessary), therefore this principle, which is infinite will, will be a sufficient principle of giving necessity to this product. If it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then it is given, because to nothing which is not necessary can necessity of itself be given, – and further, if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, therefore also to the production; for the product takes being by production, – nothing can take necessary being through a non-necessary production.¹⁴³

40. This as it were *a posteriori* argument [n.39] seems to conclude necessity of the production from necessity of the product. If a reason be sought *a priori* or from the cause, what it is by which this will gives necessity to this production, I reply that neither does a will infinite of itself alone give necessity to the produced love, comparing it to any object whatever, nor does the loved object alone – which is the end –, compared to any will whatever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of love.

41. I prove the first [n.40], because the will is not a necessary principle of producing love of any object unless it be a necessary principle of loving that object; but an infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving an object save an infinite one, because then God would necessarily love any creature at all, nay also any lovable thing; therefore neither is it a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatever.¹⁴⁴

42. The second [n.40] was proved in distinction 1 ‘On enjoying’, that the will by reason of will in general does not tend necessarily to the end [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140].

43. And if you reply that the will can be considered as will or as nature [nn.19, 22-24], or as by comparing it to the end or to what is for the end: and as it is compared to the end it is nature, and thus is merely necessity, – this is refuted by both authority and reason.

44. The reason is because there are not of the same active power opposite modes of acting, and especially these ‘naturally’ and ‘freely’, which first distinguish active power; because if the will is compared to the end by way of nature and to ‘beings for the end’ by way of freedom, it will not be one active power with respect to these, and then no power will exist that chooses ‘a being for the end’ for the sake of the end: for no power chooses this because of that unless it will both extremes, just as no cognitive power knows a conclusion because of the principle unless with the same cognition it know both the principles and the conclusion, as the Philosopher argues in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b15-29, ‘About the common sense’.

¹⁴³ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: love for the creature is infinite in the divine will and yet contingent (and this is had here immediately after ‘I prove the first etc.’ [n.41]). Response (as there ‘It does not seem’ [see footnote to n.49] and here [see footnote to n.41]): that love is necessary, but it does not necessarily pass to the secondary object, on which it does not depend, but it does necessarily pass to the first object, on which it quasi-depend; it is also really infinite, from the will and from the first object. – On the contrary: at least as it passes to the second object it is contingent; therefore it will not in this way be infinite. Response: it is not necessarily of this, nor is it infinitely of this, – as the mode of the relation is noted on both sides as the mode of the act founding the opposite relation. – On the contrary: ‘as it passes to...it is contingent’ is denied, because contingency is present in the act under no mode or relation, although the relation is contingent. If this is understood in the antecedent, let it be consequently said.”

¹⁴⁴ An extended note is added here by Scotus. See appendix.

45. There is an authority from Augustine, *Handbook of the Faith* ch.105 n.28 (and it is placed by Master Lombard in II d.25 ch.4 n.218): “Neither is it not will – or not to be called free – by which we wish so to be blessed that not only do we not wish to be miserable but neither altogether can we wish it;” therefore he means to say that the will whereby we wish beatitude is free: no end does the will more necessarily respect than beatitude in general, therefore no end does it necessarily respect.

46. Again, this response [n.43] would posit that the Holy Spirit is not inspirited freely but by way of nature, because his principle would be will not as free but as nature.

47. Therefore I say [n.40] that the necessity of this production of adequate love – as also the necessity of the love by which what formally has will loves – is from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither without the other suffices for necessity.

48. Now these two [n.47] suffice in this way, because an infinite will cannot be not right; nor can it not be in act, because then it would be potential: therefore necessarily it is in right act. Now not every ‘to will’ is precisely right because it is from that will alone, as if nothing is to be willed of itself but only because it is willed by that will; for the divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is to be willed of itself: therefore that will is of necessity in right act of willing the object which is of itself to be rightly willed, and just as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love of that.

49. And then I say that neither the sole infinite will precisely (not determining the object of which it is), nor the sole infinite good (not determining which will it respects as it is object), is the total cause of necessarily loving, nor even of necessarily producing adequate love, but infinite will – having such an object that is of itself rightly to be loved perfectly present – is the necessary idea both of loving that good as of spirating love of that good;¹⁴⁵ and such a will, having such an object present, is principle of communicating divine nature, because it is a principle of producing produced infinite love; for such produced love is proportioned both to the power and to the object, – not thus when an infinite will respects a finite lovable good, because although there the act be infinite to the extent it is from the part of the divine will, yet it is not infinite to the extent it is from the part of the object.

50. But whether the will be a principle not only of loving an infinite good but a finite one, and of producing love of such a good, – and this either with the same production as to the thing by which the Holy Spirit is produced though different as to idea,

¹⁴⁵ Note by Scotus: “It does not seem that the will’s being right is to be co-assumed with this, which is that it is infinite, as if another one equally, because then an infinite will is not a sufficient ‘by which’ of communicating nature – even when having the object present – but an infinite right will is; again, if this rectitude is conformity to right reason, then reason would be the principle of the production of the Holy Spirit, at any rate as a rule, just as it is a rule of an act of willing. – Therefore in this way: an infinite will (adding altogether nothing there about a present object) is necessarily in act of willing, so that to no act of willing is it in potency of contradiction, because then it is composable; and it has for adequate object an infinite willable; therefore it wills it by a necessary act, – and thus of production further, as about necessary operation. The second proposition [the minor] is proved from the idea of a power that can have an object adequate to its capacity; therefore infinite object, and not as contained under the first object, because then it would depend on something finite in its operating and so would be cheapened. Secondly it [the minor] is proved from the idea of act, because an infinite volition does not depend on a finite one; therefore a finite thing is not the first object of it. Any volition that there is possible is infinite, because...” This note is here left incomplete; cf. added note to n.38 and the appendix after n.62.

or with an altogether different one or with none, – of this elsewhere [I dd.18, 27], because it has a like difficulty with the production of the Word, whether the divine intellect be the principle of producing the Word of the divine essence or a word of any other intelligible thing, and then either by a production the same as to the thing with the production of the Word, yet other in idea, or other both as to the thing and as to the idea.

51. [To the third doubt] – There remains the third doubt [n.12].

Where is said as follows, that nature acts by impression (as does the intellect), not the will. – Seek Henry.¹⁴⁶

52. On the contrary. This is false, and was rejected in distinctions 2 and 5 [I d.2 nn.283-289; d.5 nn.52-92]; again, it is not to the purpose, because it is asking about a distinction of the active principle in mode of acting (or of eliciting action), whether it act on something or not.

53. Another response [to the same doubt, n.12]. The word is formally of the knowledge of memory; the will, when eliciting, gives to the object the first gift (because it gives love and therein itself), nor is it from this reason gift, – whence neither something else similar to the object presented; therefore love is not generated, nor is the Holy Spirit image as the Son is.

54. This [n.53] indeed is true and about the image well, but how these principles can elicit is not saved, although some distinction be posited in the terms compared to the principles in being assimilated.

55. Third way [to solve the doubt, n.12]. That if there is some necessity as the act tends to the object, yet not as it is elicited by the power; or in another way: if, as it is in act as if already elicited, it is strengthened, yet it does not as quasi prior to the act elicit it.

56. In another way. On the part of the principle, as it quasi precedes the act, there is necessity for eliciting, nor is will repugnant to the necessary, because a perfect will can have the condition of a perfect elicitive principle.

57. Again, conversely, necessity does not take away liberty (because of what was now said [n.56]).

58. Again, to act necessarily is a condition of mode of operating, therefore it is not repugnant to the second of what divide the active principle, just as neither is the mode repugnant to that whose mode of positing it is; just as a double principle – nor is there another idea of distinction than this, this [sc. that the will is will, the intellect is intellect] – so a double fitting necessity, because this and this [sc. necessity of nature, necessity of will]; not every necessity, then, is natural necessity. – Taking ‘natural’ strictly, how is will nature? Another difficulty: if this is ‘freely’, because of identity of producer with produced?¹⁴⁷

III. To the Principal Arguments

59. To the arguments. To the first [n.1] I say that that definition of nature proves that the Holy Spirit is not produced as a ‘similar’ by the first rule and by the force of his

¹⁴⁶ See now *Rep.* IA d.10 nn.42, 49-50, 51-54.

¹⁴⁷ Editors’ note: “if this, which is ‘because of identity of producer with produced’, is or can be said ‘freely’?”

production,¹⁴⁸ and it is true that he is not the image of the Father as the Son is, who by force of his production proceeds as a similar to the Father.

60. To the second [n.2] a response has been made diffusely elsewhere, in distinction 2 question 4, in the question where the question was asked ‘whether there can be several productions in divine reality’ [I d.2 nn.327-344].

61. To the third [n.3] it must be said – as was said in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [*ibid.*] – that the accidental differences of power, namely active and passive, are not differences of productive power. For, generally, that is produced by such a principle of which there is such a productive principle, whether in that in which it is (if it is of a nature to receive it), or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, because nothing is of a nature to receive it, then it is produced as *per se* subsistent, if the productive power be perfect with respect to a *per se* subsistent; so it is in the matter at hand: the will by which the producer produces neither acts by producing in the supposit in which it is, nor does it make by producing in another, but it produces a term that *per se* stands, as a person, which is not received in anything subjectively. – But there is a response in another way in distinction 6 [I d.6 nn.10-15], where it is said that production is not formally intellection and how the intellect can be a principle not only of understanding but even of saying too.

62. To the final argument [n.4] I say that it is necessary for an act of loving – or for an act of love – that the thing loved is pre-known (this does blessed Augustine say, *On the Trinity* [n.4]), but it is not necessary that the love is pre-known, – to wit, if to me some honorable good is offered, it is not necessary that before I could have the act, namely an act of loving concerning that good, that namely I should pre-know that act; so in the matter at hand: the divine essence – the love of which is inspired – must be pre-known to the Father and to the Son so that they might spirate [sc. the Holy Spirit], but it is not necessary in the instant of origin to concede that the Holy Spirit – who is spirated love – be pre-known to the Father and to the Son, although in the instant of eternity always the whole Trinity be known to any person in the Trinity, because, by distinguishing between instants of origin, no distinction is made between duration and duration, but only [a distinction] by whom who is. In another way it could be said that, in the prior moment of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be spirated, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit, and intuitively, although not as existing in himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the idea of knowing intuitively any intelligible object whatever, – just as the Trinity knows the creature, and intuitively, before it be produced, because the Trinity’s own essence, which is intuited, is the idea of most perfectly knowing everything else, and, as a result, it is the idea of knowing intuitively anything at all knowable, even if none were existent in itself.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Note by Scotus: “The opinion of Godfrey [of Fontaines] (as it is contained here in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.5]) says that [the Holy Spirit is produced] by way of will ‘because he is produced on the supposition of another production’, but he is altogether uniform in reality with the Son, because he [Godfrey] posits no distinction of intellect and will save by comparison outwardly [d.8 nn.163-166], and so what in these two ‘words’, what solves [the difficulty] of the first book [sc. how the processions of Son and Holy Spirit differ]? Surely Thomas [Aquinas, *Sentences* I d.2 q1 a.3], surely Henry [solve the difficulty of] the whole [book] with a distinction through the divine intellect inwardly? What more [is needed] for productions?”

¹⁴⁹ See appendix point G.

Appendix

Scotus' extended annotation [to n.41] about a doubt how the will could be a necessary principle of producing.¹⁵⁰

A. On the contrary. The same thing is principle of 'producing' and of 'necessarily producing'; therefore if infinity of will – or rather, an infinite will – is not of itself a principle of necessarily producing, therefore not of absolutely producing, nor of communicating nature, because it cannot be communicated save necessarily; therefore in the solution of the question [n.9], and in the solution of the first doubt [n.31], it is necessary so to speak about the object as here in the solution of the second doubt [sc. that the object does not give necessity to the act of willing, n.40]; there is confirmation because even an infinite will is not a principle of producing love of a finite object, – otherwise either there will be many Holy Spirits, or one will be the love produced of every creature (which you deny, n.41), because then they would be necessarily loved. I concede, then, that the reason for the solution here [n.9], and likewise about the Word as to the intellect, and the whole reason that is set down above in distinction 2 question 6 [I d.2 nn.221, 226], only conclude by taking with the will here [about the Holy Spirit] and with the intellect there [about the Word], the productive principle, namely the object, without which it does not produce, just as neither does it operate.

B. In another way and better (immediately after 'It does not seem' footnote to n.49), because, by adding absolutely nothing to the idea of infinite will, the conclusion follows that it has a first object infinite and always present, nay always actually willed, and nothing else necessarily required for its act: and therefore it has no contingent act, although it contingently pass over some object on which the act does not depend (about this in distinctions 38 and 39).

C. If it be said to the 'I concede, then, that the reason, etc.' [paragraph A] that the will is not a principle of producing save as having an object present to it (which is a co-principle of producing), and cannot be a 'principle' having any object whatever but precisely as having a first object present to it and with that (and this either because before the presence of a secondary object it has an adequate production, because with the first object: and beyond the adequate one, it has no power for another; or, secondly, because an infinite principle does not require any finite coproducing thing: and a secondary object is finite; or, thirdly, because a principle necessarily productive does not have as co-productive that to which it does not have a necessary relation: the divine will does not necessarily have respect to a secondary object; or, fourthly, because in these the general supposition is true, namely that the will is a principle of producing, necessarily requiring a co-productive object, just as also does the intellect [this is valid in d.7 n.42]), – hence it was said in distinction 2 that perfect memory, which is a complete principle of saying, is

¹⁵⁰ Numbering of the paragraphs by letters is added here in the translation. No numbering of paragraphs is provided in the printed Latin text of this Appendix (unlike what is done in the main body of the Latin text).

the intellect having an object actually intelligible present to itself [I d.1 n.221]; so perfect will is will having a lovable object actually presented through intelligence [I d.1 n.226].

D. But as to what is added [in paragraph C] about the difference between the first object (that it is co-productive) and the second (that it is not co-productive), this is doubtful both in the case of the intellect and in the case of the will – nor does any cause that is assigned [paragraph C] seem sufficient: not the first, because either it is understood of a [production] adequate extensively and the question is begged, or intensively and the ‘but...beyond the adequate one’ is false (as is plain in operation, because beyond a thus adequate operation which is about the first object, it has power for an operation about a second object). Nor the second [cause; paragraph C], because I mean that the second object not be co-productive but the first be co-productive, not only of knowledge of itself – which is present formally – but of the second object, which is present in it virtually: so that, just as the divine memory contains precisely the first object formally and the second object is not in the memory save virtually (because in the first object) and yet the memory is the idea of the operating of intelligence about both, so that it be the idea of producing declarative knowledge of both – not indeed a knowledge proceeding from both but from the infinite only, yet declaring both through the object that is first formally and has the second in itself virtually (so also about spiration); again, [the second cause does not seem sufficient because] this will in first production does not require something co-productive save an infinite one: hence is therefore the imperfection of it proved if in the second production it were to require a finite co-productive principle? (response: although sometimes it co-act with a creature, yet never does it necessarily require it, – for its principiation would be imperfect; but the first instance stands, that ‘only the first object is co-productive of double word or love’ [sc. word and love of God and of creature]). The third [cause; paragraph C] does not prove, because just as will operates about an object to which it is related contingently – yet in respect of that operation the quasi-principle is only the first object, which has a respect contingently to the second – why can it not be so about production? Again, it is not conclusive about the word; again, the being well-pleased is necessary.

E. Note: In whatever there is a perfect productive principle, not preventable and not dependent from elsewhere, it can by it produce a term if it not be repugnant to the term to be produced by it, – and likewise it cannot by it produce a term if it be repugnant to the term to be produced by it; each of these seems to be an immediate major. Or thus: in whatever there is a perfect principle before the term be produced, it is not repugnant to the term to be produced by it,¹⁵¹ – and likewise, it cannot be produced by it if it is not in it before the term be produced; each seems to be an immediate minor. First conclusion: whatever there is a perfect productive principle in before the term be produced, it can by such principle produce the term; second conclusion: whatever there is not a principle in before the term be produced, it cannot produce the term.^{152 153}

¹⁵¹ Note by Scotus: “‘prior in duration’ is plain, the first minor; ‘prior in nature’ doubtful, also to the matter at hand; ‘before in origin’ does not make a difficulty for the matter at hand, because the minor of the third syllogism [paragraph H] is only about ‘prior in nature’, it is plain, – but by taking the first minor about prior in origin, there seems to be a begging of the question and the minor is the same as the conclusion. – This about ‘before’ is not cogent here [sc. in d.10], as is plain here [footnote to n.9], but it is valid in distinction 11 [I d.11 q.1 n.2] ‘About the Son’.”

¹⁵² Interpolation: “at the same time, therefore the Word does not speak itself, – nor later, therefore the Holy Spirit does not generate.”

F. Further as follows. Let the first conclusion [paragraph E] for the major and the minor be as follows: ‘perfect memory is a perfect productive principle of declarative knowledge of the object, both of shining back formally in the memory and virtually in the formal object’; therefore what has perfect memory can produce knowledge of this or of that, if it has it before knowledge of another be produced. Make a similar syllogism about perfect will and love.

G. Let the third syllogism (because the two first are counted as one and the two second as one) be as follows: let the last conclusion be for the major; let the minor be this: ‘the whole Trinity has perfect memory before declarative knowledge of the creature be produced’, from the first question of the second book [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15], because in the first instant of nature there is completed the whole origin simply of the persons, and knowledge of the creature is in the second moment of nature; therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative knowledge of a secondary object. Similarly about will and love.

H. The consequent [‘therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative etc.’] seems false, because either the Trinity produces it [declarative knowledge of the creature] in any person at all, and then in the Father there will be something produced, – or in determinate things produced, with whose productions these productions are consonant (to wit, knowledge of the creature in the Son and love in the Holy Spirit), and it follows that there be in the Son something from the Holy Spirit, and also that the Son produce something in himself and the Holy Spirit in himself. Therefore, by avoiding the inferred conclusion, one or other of the three minors must be denied. If the first [paragraph E], let the denial be of ‘before in nature’, because that stands in the same rank of origin (where however there is not production), or let a gloss be made that it is true if ‘before the first producible term be produced’ there be a productive principle in this, not if before the second, and the reason is because the second term is in the same degree of origin as the first: each response seems the same (at least it is conceded that the Word is declarative knowledge of the creature and the Holy Spirit is love of the creature, although not produced by the Trinity: to the contrary in distinction 18 ‘About gift’ and 27 ‘About the Word’ [I d.27 qq.1-3 n.24; d.18 was left blank in the *Ordinatio*]). If the second minor [paragraph F] about the secondary object be denied, the difficulty here treated of returns – above at ‘If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason,’ [paragraph C] – and then one must speak differently about will than about memory ‘because to the will the secondary object is actually presented through intelligence’ (response: it does not have of itself the idea of being lovable, as does the first). The third minor [paragraph G] only has force about ‘before’ (just as does the first minor [note 150 to paragraph E]): for it is plain that it is not true of the ‘before’ in origin; about ‘nature’ it is doubtful if there is only a difference of reason between the production of the Word declaring the first object and declaring the second object, because a difference of reason is not sufficient for order of nature.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Note by Scotus: ‘cannot produce the term’: not beforehand; because at the same time, therefore the Word does not say itself; because posterior, therefore the Holy Spirit does not generate.

¹⁵⁴ Interpolated text: “Note that what is said above, there ‘in whatever there is a productive principle’ etc., if be taken ‘prior in duration’ it is plain that the minor is false, if ‘nature’ doubtful and to the purpose, -- if ‘[prior] in origin’ it does not make a difficulty for the matter in hand, because the minor of the third syllogism is only about a prior in nature; but taking the first minor about prior in origin, it seems a *petitio* [sc. begging of the question], because the minor is the same as the conclusion. – This about ‘prior’ is not cogent here, as was said before above, but it is valid in d.11 ‘about the Son’ [note p.370-10-15???”

I. It should be noted for the three syllogisms posited above [paragraphs E-G] that, although the minor of the first be denied about ‘prior in another way than of origin’ in divine reality [paragraph H] and, *a*, by this seems to be excluded all force of arguing ‘whom from what’ (because ‘before in origin’ is the same as the conclusion), yet there still remains the difficulty about productive principle, which is touched on here above, at the beginning – namely about secondary object [paragraph C] – because either the major [paragraph E] (on which you altogether rely in the question about productions) will be false or it will be difficult for it not to be extended to a secondary object; but once, *b*, it is conceded that it be extended to it, then perishes that, *c*, in the first distinction of the second book ‘about the creature in intelligible being, that it be from the whole Trinity’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15] (because from what knowledge of the creature productively is, from the same is the creature as understood produced), there is lost, *d*, the point ‘about the relation of the secondary object to God’s knowing’ in the question about ideas [I d.35 q. un n.10], there perishes, *e*, that ‘about the relation of the Word and the Holy Spirit to creatures’ in distinctions 18 and 27 of the first book [same reference as before], there perishes, *f*, the fact that ‘the Holy Spirit not be necessarily love of the creature’ [I d.32 qq.1-2 n.14] (and it will be necessary to say that it be necessarily love of being well-pleased, although not love of existing), and then perishes that, *g*, in distinction 8 ‘against the philosophers, about the non-necessity of the creature’ [I d.8 n.274], – and then returns that, *h*, there ‘about being well-pleased’ [*ibid.*], the first argument in the first question of the second book stands [that if there were only one person, it could produce everything possible, II d.1 q.1 n.1], that about the respect of the first object is not valid [*ibid.* n.9], and the Holy Spirit will not as freely love the creature as does the Father (because love is from production), nor will the Word understand by virtue of memory as it is in himself, but as it is in the Father.

J. To these remarks. First to *a*: the principle which of its idea is of a nature to exit first in act of really producing, in real subsistence, proves that its productive principle is prior in origin, that is ‘without which not another’, and from this is proved that from him there is another (thus about the Holy Spirit, that he is from the Father and the Son, distinction 11 of the first book); likewise, the product that is of a nature to be produced in real subsistence before produced in another, is ‘without which there is no other’, – therefore ‘from which [there is] another’ (thus the three persons, in relation to creatures outwardly). I concede therefore that person taken in real subsistence (as it has everything, whatever order they possess in it) is really productive of a second person (likewise taken according to everything in it), yet in each is to distinguish what first is in it – by what namely it is a divine person – and what is as it were adventitious to a person as if already constituted, of which sort is everything comparing to a second object.

K. I concede *b* and *c* similarly, save that (according to what was said before in *a*) the three persons, in the being simply of divine person, precede in order of nature intellection of the creature, and, as a result, precede creature in intelligible being; this antecedent indeed is true (there, in the first distinction of the second book [same reference as before]), but the consequent is denied, ‘therefore creatures are produced by the Trinity in understood being’: the reason for denial is this, because just as operation about a second object cannot be different really (in whatever this is, essentially or subsistently) from operation about the first object, so neither production about the latter from production about the former; therefore it cannot be of another, really producing this way or that;

therefore only the Father says the word of creature, just as also the Word of his essence. A confirmation is because, just as this operative principle has one operation adequate to itself not only intensively but also extensively, that is, about everything that is virtually in it [operation], so insofar as it is productive it has one production adequate in both ways, because neither is repugnant to one product. A confirmation too is because knowledge, whether as operation or as product, can only be of the same first term, – not of others, save as they are secondary; therefore no knowledge can be produced which is immediately of some object as term (about this in distinction 36 [I d.36 q. un n.9]).

L. In another way. I concede *b* and *c* does not perish, because production of a second object in known being is not real production, just as neither does the term receive real being, – therefore it is diminished production, just as the product is diminished being; such production can exist, which is not production but quasi-production; of this sort is knowledge. Therefore the Father in himself, through the knowledge in which the second object is virtually, quasi-produces in himself that object while he actually knows it and, communicating the knowledge, he communicates it as quasi-producing the same object, because it is posterior to the person to whom it is communicated; therefore the Trinity quasi-produces the object, and so produces it in known being (because in that to be produced is to be quasi-produced), although only the Father really produces in the Son, by force of generation, and the Father and Son in the Holy Spirit communicate knowledge of this sort of object, – which knowledge (communicated in all of them) is quasi-production, and so diminished production. – In another way, more plainly: to be knowledge of a second object is to produce it in known being, just as to be it of the first object is to be of it as of quasi-producing knowledge, because the first object is quasi-presupposed and the second quasi-produced by it – in act – because it is knowledge of it; therefore, as really communicating knowledge as of a second object, it really communicates it as producing the secondary object, by the production that there can be, which is only diminished production.

M. Whether the Father or the Trinity produce a second object in known existence, *d* does not perish, because a [divine] idea is a second object, whether produced thus or so, or not produced but ‘quasi’. – And if someone say that idea is not thus really referred to God’s knowing, because an idea thus is nothing, – by parity of reasoning neither conversely does his knowing have any relation of reason to a second object, because [a second object] is altogether nothing, just as it neither founds nor terminates any relation.

N. Nor does *e* perish, because from whatever source a second object be produced (or quasi-produced), a divine person has perfect being, comparing intellect and will to the first object; however I concede that the Word from quasi-secondary production is really produced knowledge of the creature, just as the Father is quasi-secondarily unproduced knowledge of it, and so necessarily the Son, just as the Father, is knowledge of it – but this relation neither with ungeneration constitutes the Father, nor with generation the Son.

O. From this *f* [does not perish – i.e. repeat of the Holy Spirit and love what has just been said of the Son]; – or it can be asserted of being well-pleased; insofar as the ‘thing shown’ is shown to have goodness participated from the First; or in another way: just as the person of the Father necessarily has operation of the will, which operation is of some object necessarily, of some contingently, – so he produces a subsistent quasi-operation, which operation, necessarily produced, is of something necessarily and of something contingently; and just as this does not follow ‘the creature’s volition is the same as the

person of the Father's volition, therefore the Father necessarily has the creature's volition' (but there only follows 'therefore he necessarily has a volition that is of the creature'), so it does not follow 'the Father necessarily spirates the creature's volition' (in the sense of composition), although he necessarily spirates a 'volition' that is of the creature.

P. Note that above, where is said [paragraph A]: 'On the contrary. The same thing is principle', contradictory responses are seen: one, that together with infinite will it is necessary to take that it have an infinite object present, – the other, afterwards, that nothing is necessary to add about the object, but from infinite will is deduced an infinite object always actually present necessarily (and how it is deduced is contained outside, there 'Therefore thus' [footnote to n.49]).

Q. But this contradiction is thus removed: from the idea of power is deduced the condition of the first object and its presence, not by a 'proof-why' but by a 'proof-that'; for the idea of a power requires an object quasi-co-principle with respect to operation, so for having a complete 'proof-why' of necessary love it is necessary take it thus, 'infinite will, having an infinite object, actually presented through the intellect', –and thus is the first response understood; but of this whole 'proof-why', including the two co-principles (necessarily being co-principles of the act) the other part proves the other 'that', – and thus is understood the second response.

R. Nor does the proof 'So in this way' [footnote to n.49] conclude more: for the subject of the first proposition does not state the whole 'proof-why' with respect to the predicate, but one of the principles – from whose idea, however, is deduced that the remaining co-principle concurs not as to 'proof-why', but nature thus requires that to such a will correspond a proportionate co-principle, therefore an infinite one, and in a proportionate way, therefore always present; for example, according to Aristotle 'some cause simply necessary moves the heavens' [I d.8 n.251]; here in the subject there is a partial 'proof-why' of the predicate, but nature requires that to it there correspond a proportionate co-principle and in a proportionate way, – as a heaven necessary and necessarily present and movable; therefore the total 'proof-why' of this effect – namely of necessary motion – includes the active cause and the movable, but from the proper idea of one of them is concluded, by a 'proof-that', that the other concurs, and so the effect, but by a diminished 'proof-that'.

[Addition to n.25. From *Rep.IA d.10 n.9.*]

25. Further, when certain things are so disposed that according to 'prior' and 'posterior' they join together for some action, that which is 'prior' more principally concurs for the action; but essence, which is nature (insofar as they [Henry and his followers]) take 'nature' in the first mode; cf. d.10 n.21), in which the three divine persons consist, is prior to will; therefore if nature in this way concurs for the action, as assistant to will, it will necessarily be more principal in this production: therefore it includes a contradiction that it concur as assistant concomitant to the will and not prevenient, as they themselves say.

[Addition to n.62. From *Rep.IA d.10.*]

62. About the tenth distinction, where the Master [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.10 ch.2 nn.101-102] determines that it would be necessary to be if the divine will be the principle of spirating the Holy Spirit, – and because about this three things cause difficulty, namely the consubstantiality of the product, the necessity of the production, the apparent impossibility of liberty and necessity, therefore about these three points I ask three brief questions: the first is whether the divine will could be a *per se* principle of communicating the divine nature; second, whether it could *per se* be a principle of producing necessarily; third, whether in it in respect of the same production necessity and liberty be compatible with each. Fourth – the principal – whether the divine will be *per se* the principle of spirating the Holy Spirit.

To the first the argument is no: Averroes *Physics* 8 com.46, ‘Whether each thing’ [cf. I d.2 nn.212-214].

Also, the common description of nature is converted with it.

Also, an image is a principle in artificial things.

On the contrary: it is not less perfect than the memory.

As to the second the argument is no: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b4-11, a rational [power] is to opposites.

Also, opposite modes of being principle.

On the contrary: that which is perfect in production is not repugnant to the production of a perfective productive principle.

As to the third question the argument is no, thus: the necessity naturally of a principle determines necessarily; therefore a principle is from its nature necessarily determined; therefore by natural necessity.

Also, necessary dominion does not dominate [sc. cannot determine itself to this and its opposite], otherwise anything natural would be called free.

On the contrary: perfection in productive principle is not repugnant to a perfect productive principle.

To the fourth the argument, that no: as doing and making, so operation and production.

Also, it would be precognitive.

On the contrary: the Master [Lombard] *Sentences* I d.10 ch.2 n.102, through Jerome *On Psalm 14* [=Abelard, *Christian Theology* IV: ‘Hence there is this from Jerome on psalm XVII: ‘The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son but the love which the Father has in the Son and the Son in the Father.’’], and Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7, and Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17.