

The translation that follows is of the second controversy in the first volume of St. Robert Bellarmine's famous Disputations about Controversies of the Christian Faith against the Heretics of this Age, first published at Ingolstadt in 1581-1593 and republished several times thereafter. The translation is complete. The Latin text can be downloaded from Google books:

[http://books.google.com/books?id=vqJaa8h\\_teQC&pg=PP22&dq=bellarmini+controveriae&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5ZGvUcO9HtS44APBqoHgAg&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAjgU](http://books.google.com/books?id=vqJaa8h_teQC&pg=PP22&dq=bellarmini+controveriae&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5ZGvUcO9HtS44APBqoHgAg&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAjgU)

The third controversy in the first volume, about the Papacy, is not translated here. A translation has however been published by the Liberty Fund

<https://catalog.libertyfund.org/natural-law/on-temporal-and-spiritual-authority-paperback-detail.html>

and also by Mediatrix Press <http://mediatrixpress.com/?s=bellarmino> The translator of the Mediatrix Press edition, Ryan Grant, is already working on translating volume two and intends, it would appear, to translate all the volumes.

However, a complete translation of all the controversies from all four volumes has apparently just been published by Fr. Kenneth Baker S.J. *Controversies of the Catholic Faith*, Keep the Faith Inc., February 2016.

[https://www.amazon.com/Controversies-Catholic-Robert-Cardinal-Bellarmino/dp/0991226860/ref=as\\_li\\_ss\\_tl?ie=UTF8&qid=1470054230&sr=8-6&keywords=bellarmino+controversies&linkCode=sl1&tag=thecatthi-20&linkId=bf6094cd1baf18490929382fa5d1a053](https://www.amazon.com/Controversies-Catholic-Robert-Cardinal-Bellarmino/dp/0991226860/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ie=UTF8&qid=1470054230&sr=8-6&keywords=bellarmino+controversies&linkCode=sl1&tag=thecatthi-20&linkId=bf6094cd1baf18490929382fa5d1a053)

The second volume of Bellarmine's Controversies is on the Church, the third on grace, and the fourth on the sacraments, and each of these volumes, like the first, consists of several distinct controversies divided into multiple books and chapters.

Peter L P Simpson  
July 2016

Robert Bellarmine's *Disputations about Controversies of the  
Christian Faith*

Volume One

Second General Controversy: On Christ the Head of the Whole  
Church  
in Five Books

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END

## Book One: On the True Divinity of Christ

### *Chapter One: The Opinion of the New Samosatans is Expounded.*

The author of the new Samosatans was Michael Servetus who began to be known in the year 1532, on the evidence of Surius, and in the year 1555 he was burnt at the stake in Geneva. His followers are now mainly located in Transylvania, whose chiefs are George Blandrata, who is still alive, and Franciscus David who, since he denied that Christ should be invoked or that he has care of the Church, was condemned by the prince of Transylvania to perpetual imprisonment, but a little afterwards went mad and died after two years.

The opinion of the Servetians teaches three things and is put together from three ancient heresies.

First, it asserts that there is no personal distinction in God, which was formerly taught by Hermogenes, Praxeas, Noetus, and Sabellius. Augustine mentions them all in *Heresies*. And then it was also taught by Paul of Samosata and by Photinus, on the evidence of Hilary in his book on *Synods*.

Second, it asserts that Christ before his incarnation was nothing save in the mind of God by way of Idea, which was formerly taught by Ebion and Cerinthus and by Paul of Samosata and by Photinus.

Third it asserts that divinity was communicated to Christ by God, not through eternal generation but through unction of grace and indwelling, and therefore Christ can be called God but a created and temporal God, not an eternal one. This same thing was formerly taught by Nestorius.

In these matters indeed all the new Samosatans agree. They differ among themselves, however, over the invocation of Jesus Christ and are divided into three sects as it were. For Franciscus David and many of the Hungarian ministers teach that Christ is not to be invoked but only the Father who alone is true God and alone at this time takes care of the Church. The theses of Franciscus David on this matter are extant as well as his response to the reasons of Faustus Socinus who had confuted those theses. Faustus himself asserts that Christ can be invoked in prayers but yet he adds that it is a matter of greater perfection to go right to the Father.

Next George Brandrata in his theses and the Polish ministers in the judgment they issued on the case of Franciscus David, teach that Jesus Christ is not only to be invoked but even should be invoked, nor is it an imperfection to have recourse to him. This dissension has happened very opportunely, not only because, as St. Hilary says, war among the heretics is peace for the Church, but also because each side has begun to be reduced to remarkable difficulties. For those who teach that Christ is to be invoked bring forward more than fifty testimonies from Scripture which they show that their adversaries are in conflict with; but those who say he is not to be invoked demonstrate with very sure reasons that their adversaries are in conflict with themselves since they do not wish to invoke the saints, because the saints are not true Gods, and yet they do wish to invoke Christ whom they openly affirm is not true God.

### *Chapter Two: the Opinion of the New Arians is Explained*

As to the second, the opinion of Valentinus Gentilis and others, who were his companions or disciples, teaches three things.

First, that there are three eternal spirits, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, essentials different in number. So teaches Gentilis himself and it is reported by Benedict Aretius, and it was once the opinion of the Perati, as Theodoret reports. For they said that the Trinity was three Gods, three minds, etc. It was also the opinion of John Philoponus, as is reported by the Suda and by Nicephorus who also says that Philoponus lived at the time of the Emperor Phocas about the year 504.

The same thing was taught by a certain Gallus at the time of St. Anselm in the year 1090, against whom Anselm wrote his book on the Incarnation of the Word.

The same seems also to have been taught by Abbot Joachim in 1190, for he asserted that the three persons were not one thing or one essence in number but only by collection, the way many faithful are said to be one Church. The thing is plain from the Lateran Council under Innocent III. Add last to these the Luxemburgians, on the authority of Bernard, and add also Raymond Lull in the year 1260, who taught that the three persons were three essences.

Secondly, Gentilis and his companions taught that these three persons are not equal but that the Father is far superior to the others, so that he should be called the 'essen-cer' and the other two the 'essen-tes'. So Gentilis says that it is proper to the Father to be called the one and only God. Therefore the new Tritheists have already fallen away from Philoponus to Arius. For Arius was the first to teach that the Son was lesser than the Father, on the evidence of Epiphanius. Arius arose about the year 324, on the evidence of Theodoret.

Third they taught that the Son of God is not from nothing nor generated in time but from eternity, and from the substance of the Father. This opinion was that of the later Arians, for, as Augustine says, the later Arians conceded that the Son was eternal although Arius thought the opposite. Hence even Maximus, in Augustine, confesses that the Son is not from nothing but generated from the substance of the Father, according to the Council of Rimini. It will perhaps not be out of place to quote here some of the theses of Valentinus Gentilis so that the reader may more certainly know the opinion of the new Arians from their own words.

"Thesis six: The Father is not an hypostasis or person in the one God but, on the evidence of the Apostle, he is the one God from whom are all things. Only the Father is the one God, that is, without principle or origin. Thesis eight: Only the Father is from himself, that is, essenc-ed from no higher divinity, but is God of himself. Thesis nine: He who distinguishes the one God into three properties or persons is either engaging in sleight of hand or is necessarily dividing and cutting up the substance of the one God. God had the power of generating or propagating because he wanted to; and therefore he generated the Word before time and propagated the Spirit. Thesis eleven: The eternal substance of the Word has principle and origin from God, insofar as he is generated and distinct, not insofar as he is, for he is not created from nothing or made from any non-existent matter but generated from the immense substance of the supreme God. Thesis twenty: The generated differs in number from the substantial generator, not in power, opinion, or diversity of nature. Thesis twenty one: The one God and his Word are two intelligents of the same substance of nature, that is, two eternal consubstantial

spirits, distinct in fitting degree, order, and property. Thesis twenty two: There cannot be several spirits of the immense substance. Thesis twenty four: Only the Father is ungenerated spirit, author of the universe, and of immense substance; but the Son is the spirit ineffably generated from God, executor of the paternal will, and by the manner of his generation describable as generated. Thesis thirty three: The confusion of the three into one and the same spirit in number was the foundation and origin of all errors."

*Chapter Three: That God is One in Number is Proved from Scripture and the Fathers.*

The numerical unity of God is proved first from the Scriptures, in the law, *Deuteronomy* 4: "The Lord," says Moses, "is God himself and there is no other beside him." And a little later, "Know therefore today and think it in your heart that the Lord is God above and on earth below and there is no other." Ch.6, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." And ch.32: "See that I alone am and there is no other beside me." Nor can these words be referred to specific unity, for he who speaks in the Scriptures is not a universal God nor the species itself of God, but is a certain singular God, as is plain, since only singulars exist in reality and speak and act. But a singular God is saying falsely that he is one God alone and besides him there is no other if there are other individuals of the same species. For neither could Adam, after he generates children, truly say, 'I alone am man and beside me there is no other etc.'

The same is proved from the historical books, *I Kings* ch.2, "There is none holy as the Lord is, for neither is there another beside you," *III Kings* ch.8, "There is neither in heaven above nor on earth below a God like the God of Israel." But how does the God of Israel not have a similar if there are two other individuals in the same species?

The same is proved from *Psalms* 17, "Who is God besides the Lord, or who is God besides our God?" *Psalms* 82, "You alone are most high in all the earth," *Psalms* 85, "You are God alone."

The same from the wisdom books, *Wisdom* ch.12, "There is no other God than you." *Ecclesiastes* ch. 1, "The Most High is one."

The same is plain from *Matthew* ch.4, "You will worship the Lord your God and him only will you serve." Ch.12, "God is one and there is no other beside him." *John* ch.17, "That they may know that you alone are God." For the sense is, you have deity, which alone is true deity, therefore no other deity will be found.

Finally from *I Corinthians* ch.8, "We know that there is no God but one." Again *ibid.* "Our God is one." *Galatians* ch.5, "A mediator is not of one, but God is one." *Ephesians* ch.4, "One God and father of all." *I Timothy* ch.2, "One God and mediator of God and men." *Ibid.* ch.6, "Who alone is the mighty King of kings and Lord of lords."

So from these all and singly it is plainly gathered that God is one in number not one in species, and it can be understood from like passages. For we would not rightly say of some one man that he alone is true man and beside him there is no man, or that he is man and no other; the reason for which can only be that human nature is not in one individual alone but in many. But most rightly of the sun, for which there is only one individual, do we say that it alone is true sun, there is one sun in the world, besides it there is no sun, etc.

Secondly it is proved from the Fathers. And firstly all the Fathers everywhere say that God is one, as Justin, Augustine, and others. And of this there is no doubt; but because the heretics could reply that the Fathers, when they say that God is one, are speaking of specific unity, not numerical, therefore we will show from many places from the doctrine of the Fathers that God is one in number.

First if there were many divine individuals, as the heretics wish, then they could indeed be called one God, that is one in divine species, as Porphyry says that many men are one man, that is, one human species, and it could not be denied but that many Gods could also be spoken of, as we say rightly that Adam, Cain, and Abel are three men. But the Fathers always deny that the three persons are three Gods; therefore they mean that God is one in number.

That they do so deny is plain from Athanasius' creed, "God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Spirit; and yet not three Gods but one God." Cyril on *John*, "there is the same substance of deity, therefore we preach not three Gods but one." Basil wrote an oration against those who tell the slander that we say there are three Gods. Gregory of Nyssa wrote a book to Ablabius that one should not say three Gods. Augustine says, "Hold with the Catholic faith that the Father is not who the Son is, and the Son is not who the Father is. But God is Father and God is Son; however both together are not two Gods but one." And in the same place he says that the Arians did not dare to say there were two Gods, though they thought this; "But," he says, "although you do not deny that two Gods are worshipped by you, yet you do not dare to confess it. For you realized that Christian ears could not bear to hear that two Gods are to be worshipped." But why can Christian ears not bear it if there are truly two Gods in number? Ambrose, "God is in God, but there are not two Gods." And he often repeats that the divinity of the Father and Son is altogether the same, and he adds that nature itself proclaims that God is one as the world is one. Like things will be found in all the Fathers.

Secondly, the Fathers deny that number is found in Divinity, but they only admit number in personal properties. But certainly it would be false that Divinity cannot be numbered if Divinity were not one in number. Gregory of Nazianzen says, "These three are one if you regard Divinity; and the one is three if you have the idea of the properties." Fulgentius says, "Trinity is referred to the persons, unity to the nature." Certainly this Trinity is numerical, not specific, even according to the adversaries; therefore it is opposed to numerical unity. Athanasius in his creed, "But this is the Catholic faith, that we venerate Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity." And at once he explains that the Trinity is of the persons but Unity of the divinity. Basil says that all number is to be rejected from the essence of God. Where however note that when he says God is not one in number he means to say that God is not composite so as to contain in himself a true number consisting of many units. Gregory of Nyssa says, "To extend the number of Deities to a multitude is done only by those who labor under the error of a multitude of Gods." Ambrose, "Unity of power excludes quantity of number, because unity is not a number." Hormisdas says, "Although the idea of persons admits of number, yet unity does not admit a separation of essence." The Council of Toledo, "In the relations of persons number is seen, but in the substance of divinity is not understood anything that is numbered." Anastasius of Antioch says, "We assert a Trinity of persons not of essences, for we

glorify one God, not in number of persons, but in nature; for what is of God is altogether one in number." And later, "Therefore the Holy Trinity is in essence indeed one God, but in number a Trinity."

Third, the Fathers often say God is singular or that his nature is individual. Justin, proving "from the poets of the gentiles" that there is one God, says, "first Aeschylus pronounces a word about the singular God." And in the very title of his book on the *Monarchy of God* Justin sufficiently shows that he acknowledges one singular God. For monarchy cannot be said of the rule of many of the same species, but only of one singular. Again Athenagoras says, "But since reason and our profession celebrates God singular and one;" Gregory Nazianzen says, "the nature of the supreme God is individual." Augustine says, "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one because of the same individual nature." Ambrose says, "Since the Lord pours out rain from the Lord, acknowledge the unity of divinity; for unity of operation does not make for plural divinity."

Fourth the Fathers not seldom deny that God is one in species. Cyril, after saying that the Apostles are consubstantial among themselves and likewise that the Father and Son are, adds, "although the consubstantiality is not said in the same way of us and of the Father and the Son." But about us consubstantiality is said specifically truly and properly. Therefore it is not said specifically but numerically of the divine persons. Augustine asks whether the divine essence is genus or species, and he denies both; and that for two reasons.

The first reason is that although a genus, as animal, is divided into species, as man, horse, lion, and although a species, as man, is divided into individuals, as Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and all other singular men, yet one man and one animal are singular and cannot be divided into lower groupings; but the essence of God is said to be one essence, and God is said to be one God. Therefore God is not divided through several individuals.

The second reason is that three men are worth more than two and two than one, but three persons in God are not more than two persons or than one; therefore the three persons are not three Gods of the same species.

Third, the Fathers say that it is an ineffable mystery how three persons are one God; but if God were one in species, there would be no mystery. Gregory Nazianzen tries to show by many likenesses how a single and simple nature is common to three. Would there be any question if the divine nature was one in species? He says again, "But hold now to teaching Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity, whose division and union is plainly admirable." Augustine says, "the ineffable and exalted union of the Trinity shows one God, one Lord." Again elsewhere after long disputing how three persons are one essence and removing all likenesses he concludes, "if it cannot be grasped by the intellect, hold it by faith."

Sixth the Fathers, as Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose say that Sabellius belongs to the Jews and Arius to the pagans, but the Church holds a middle way, namely that it believes neither one person with the Jews nor many natures with the Gentiles. But the Church will not truly hold the middle if it multiplies the divine nature, for thus it will have nothing in common with the Jews and will plainly agree with the Gentiles, most of whom worship Gods of the same species, as Jove, Mars, Mercury etc.

Add that the Fathers teach that the Gentiles, although they worship many Gods in public practice, yet could have naturally recognized the one God, just as in fact the philosophers recognized one God, and to this extent were naturally Christians. But if the Fathers spoke of one God not in number but in species they would say nothing. For the vulgar crowd made the heavenly Gods to be not only of the same species but also of the same family. Hence comes that often repeated remark of Virgil, taken from Homer, "Father of Gods and men, etc."

This is plain first from the many and very clear testimonies of the old poets, from which Justin composed his book on the *Monarchy of God*, and he says in his *Apology* that Socrates and Plato were to this extent Christians. Athenagoras shows the same, also adducing many testimonies of the old pagans. Irenaeus says that all can naturally recognize that there is one God. Tertullian says that even the worshippers of idols, when they are in difficulty, raise their eyes to heaven and, forgetting the Gods, naturally call upon the one God. The same is taught by Cyprian, and by Arnobius who says, "Give a true judgment and he who observes all these things we see will doubt rather whether the other Gods exist than be driven to the God whom we all naturally know to exist either when we exclaim 'O God' or when we bring God to witness against the wicked and, as if he sees us, we raise our face to heaven." And elsewhere he says that many Greeks and Latins among the Gentiles rejected a multitude of Gods, and among these Cicero very effectively demonstrated in his book on the *Nature of the Gods* that there cannot be many Gods, so that there were not lacking some who thought that the book should be banned by senatorial decree. Lactantius says that there is no one who, if he consults reason, does not understand there is one God, and he proves it from Plato and from other philosophers. See similar things in Clement, Eusebius, Theodoret. Finally Orosius says that it is the common opinion of the wise that there is only one true God, but that the rest that are called Gods are nothing save servants and ministers of that one God; and the same is written by Prudentius in one of his hymns, "Consider the madnesses of bearded Plato, consider the hirsute Cynics, the cycles in twisting circles that Aristotle fancies and strings together. Although the doubtful labyrinth and surrounding error drives them all, although they themselves are wont to offer a cock or hen in sacrifice, so that the medical God may deign to give justice when they die, yet when they come to the norm of reason and art, their clouded sense and arguments of broken knots come to the conclusion that there is one God."

Third, the same is proved by reason. The first reason is that he is the supreme being, as is plain from *Exodus* ch.3, "I am who am." Therefore God is supremely one. For one is a property of being and therefore the more something is a being the more too is it one. Again, the more perfectly something has being the further it is from non-being, and therefore from division, which is the way to non-being; therefore God is one, not in species, but in number. For that unity is greatest which is not a unity with a second divisible thing.

The second reason is that God is his own being, as is plain from the same passage of *Exodus*, "I am who am." First because God, by the agreement of all, lacks all composition, and therefore in God being and essence are the same, therefore the nature of God is not multipliable or divisible into many individuals; for the proper being of one thing cannot be in any way divided so as to belong to many; but the

being of this God is the very essence of God, and so neither is the essence of God in any way divisible among many.

You will say that by this argument is only proved that the essence of this God cannot be multiplied, but not the essence of God in general.

I reply that it is also proved of the essence of God in general. Note therefore that being or existence is not something that can be abstracted from logical subordinates, as nature can, nor is it anything determinable by differences nor does it determine as a difference does. From which it follows that in creatures, where being and essence are not altogether the same, one of them can be multiplied without the other; for the common nature can be abstracted from singulars while the singulars each remain in their singular existence. But in God, where being and essence are altogether the same, as it is proper to this God to be this God, so is being God proper to him, nor can a common nature be abstracted.

Third, God is most high, as the Scriptures everywhere teach, as *Psalms* 82, "You alone are most high," and *Ecclesiastes* ch.1, "The most high is one." Therefore he is only one; for if there were several they would be equally high and so none would be above all; or one would be higher than the rest, and thus it alone would be the one true God.

Fourth, God is the final end of all things, *Proverbs* ch.16, "The most high made all things for himself," *Apocalypse* ch.1, "I am the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end." Therefore there is only one God. For if there were several Gods either they would all be related to one and this alone would be true God, or they would not be and then there would be no final end of all things.

Fifth, God is infinite in essence, power, wisdom, etc. Therefore he is one in number, for the infinite comprehends all things, *Psalms* 144, "And of his greatness there is no number."

Sixth, if there were several Gods either they are all without beginning or one is from another. The first is impossible because then there would be many disparate first principles and they would draw the world apart in different directions, at least because they would not necessarily agree in one and the same will, but one of them could will one thing and another another. Hence even the heathens called Jove the parent of the Gods. But if one of them is from another then either by creation or generation.

If by creation, then the second of the two is a creature. Therefore it is not God. And hence it is that the recent Arians and Tritheists do not say that the Son is created, since they want him to be God. Although in fact they are in conflict with themselves, since they make him uncreated God and yet want him to be a God other than the true God.

If by generation then either the whole substance is given or a part; if a part then God is divisible, if the whole then they have a deity the same in number.

Seventh, God is ruler of the world, *Wisdom* ch.14, "But you, Father, rule all things by your prudence." But simple monarchy is the best regime, when a good and wise prince can be found, as is plain from the consent of all; the same is taught by Christians, as by Justin, and Cyprian who proves that God is one by this argument, that monarchy is the best regime, and by Athanasius, Chrysostom, Gregory.

And by the Jews, as Philo, and by the Gentiles, as Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Homer, Isocrates, Nicocles, Herodotus, John Stobaeus who adduces many others. Therefore God is a monarch, that is, one and supreme Prince of all created things; and therefore the true God is one and sole.

And by these things must certain places of the Fathers be understood that otherwise seem rather hard. For Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and sometimes others compare the three divine persons to three men or three angels. But they mean to teach nothing other than that there are three true supposits or persons of the same nature. Further, that the identity of nature in the three persons is far greater than in three men or three angels those Fathers never deny though they do not always say it, and elsewhere they do say it, as we showed above.

#### *Chapter Four: the Divinity of the Son of God is Established*

As to the fourth point, one must prove that the Son of God is true God, and is therefore one God in number with the Father. For no one denies that the Father is true God, and the thing is plain from *John* ch.17, "so that they may know you the only true God."

Now this point must be very diligently proved, for it is denied at this time both by the new Arians and by the new Samosatans, and further by all the Jews and Mohamedans. We propose nine classes of arguments. First from the Old and New Testaments. Second from the Old Testament. Third from the New Testament. Fourth from the names of God. Fifth from the works. Sixth from the attributes. Seventh from the Fathers. Eighth from the Sibyls. Ninth from the miracles.

#### *First Class of Arguments: from both Testaments*

First we will bring forward testimonies that are contained in the Old Testament about the sole and true God of Israel and that are expounded in the New Testament of Christ; to which argument no solution can be made up. *Numbers* ch.21, Moses said, "the people say against the Lord and Moses, 'why have you led us out of Egypt etc.? Wherefore has the Lord sent fiery serpents among the people etc.?' " Here by the consent of all the true and supreme God, whom only the Jews knew, is being dealt with. But the Servetians and Gentilians hold as an axiom that the God of Israel is the true God and is the only Father. But in *I Corinthians* ch.10 Paul says that this very God is Christ, "Let us," he says, "not tempt Christ as some of them tempted him and were destroyed by serpents." Therefore it is necessary that Christ is true God and altogether one God with the Father.

The second place is *Exodus* ch.20 and the epistle of *Jude*. For in *Exodus* it is said, "I am the Lord your God, who led you out of the land of Egypt;" and *Deuteronomy* ch.32, "the Lord alone was his God, and there was no foreign God with him." But *Jude* says, "Jesus, in saving the people from Egypt, then secondly destroyed those who did not believe, but the angels etc." Bede on this place also noted this argument.

The third place is *Psalms* 67 where it is said of the God of Israel, "the chariot of God is a thousand times a thousand of presences, the Lord in them, in Sinai in the holy place, ascended on high, took captivity captive, received gives among men." And this Paul attributed to Christ *Ephesians* ch.4, "To each of us," he said, "is given

grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ, because of what is said: 'ascending on high he led captivity captive and gave gifts to men'."

The fourth and fifth place are *Psalm* 96, "All his angels worship the Lord," and *Psalm* 101, "You Lord founded the earth at the beginning, and the heavens are the works of your hand; they will perish but you will remain etc." Both places Paul applies to Christ in *Hebrews* ch.1, where he proves Christ is greater than the angels, because according to *Psalm* 96 the angels are held to worship Christ, and according to *Psalm* 101 Christ is said to be the creator of heaven and earth, which in no way belongs to angels.

The sixth place is *Isaiah* ch.6, "I saw the Lord sitting on a high and elevated throne and what was under him filled the temple. Seraphim were standing over him, six wings to one and six wings to another, with two they veiled his face and with two they veiled his feet, and with two they flew, and they called one to another, Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God of Sabaoth, the earth is full of his glory." And later, "And the Lord said to me, say to this people, blind their eyes and make their heart heavy etc." The majesty of the supreme God could not be more clearly described. And although the adversaries attribute this to the Father alone, yet *John* ch.11 expounds it of Christ. For after he has quoted the words of *Isaiah* ch.6, "He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, so that they should not see with their eyes etc." he subjoins, "These things Isaiah said when he saw his glory and spoke of him." Wherefore the same John in the *Apocalypse* ch.4 says he heard them exclaiming, "Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God Almighty, who was and who is to come." But who is to come but Christ?

The seventh place is *Isaiah* ch.8, "Sanctify the Lord of hosts, he is your fear, and he is your terror; and he will be to you for sanctification; but for a stone of offense and a rock of scandal to the two houses of Israel, for a snare and a ruin to the inhabitants of Israel, and many will offend and fall and be trodden down." Here most openly, even by the confession of all the Jews, is the supreme God and Lord of hosts called for some sanctification, for some a stone of offense, a rock of scandal, a snare and a ruin.

But this very thing is attributed to Christ by Luke, Peter, Paul, for in *Luke* ch.2 Simeon says of Christ, "he is set for the ruin and rise of many." And *Romans* ch.9, "What then shall we say? That the Gentiles who did not pursue justice have attained justice, but the justice that is of faith. But Israel by following the law of justice did not reach the law of justice. Why? Because not from faith, but as if were from works. For they offended on the stone of offense, as it is written: 'Behold I place in Zion a stone of offense and a rock of scandal.'" I *Peter* ch.2, "Honor to you who believe, but a stone of offense and a rock of scandal to those who do not believe."

The eighth place is *Isaiah* ch.40, "A voice crying in the wilderness, prepare the way of the Lord, make right in the desert the paths of our God." These things are said of the God of Israel by Isaiah. For the Jews did not call any other Lord and God absolutely their Lord and God but the one true God, and especially so did the Prophets and other holy men; and yet this voice is John who prepared the way of Christ, as is testified by all the Evangelists. Therefore Christ is the Lord and God of Israel, whom the adversaries make to be the Father alone.

The ninth place is from *Isaiah* ch.45, "I am God and there is no other, I have sworn on myself, because every nation will bow to me their knee." *Romans* ch.14, "We will all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, 'I live, says the Lord, because every nation will bow to me their knee.'" You see how, on the evidence of the Apostle, Christ is the God besides whom there is no other God.

The tenth place is *Isaiah* chs.41, 44, 48, "I am the first; I am the last." These things are said everywhere of the God of Israel. In *Apocalypse* ch.1, "I am the alpha and the omega." And later, "I am the first and the last and alive and was dead, etc."

The eleventh place is *Malachi* ch.1, "Behold I send my angel and he will prepare the way before my face." Here too the God of Israel speaks. For all the codices, Hebrew, Greek, Chaldee, Latin, have "before my face." And yet Christ himself in *Matthew* ch.11 says that this angel is John the Baptist, who prepared the way before the face of Christ. And in *Luke* ch.1 Zachariah says, "You will go before the face of the Lord to prepare his ways." What is clearer? Since for whom did John prepare the way but Christ?

But it will be worthwhile to see what the adversaries respond. For although they do not respond to them all, yet they have tried to reply to some. So the Transylvanians generally respond that what is said of God can be expounded of Christ, because God has communicated his deity to Christ. Then in particular:

To the first they reply that the sense is, Let us not tempt our Christ as they tempted their God. Or let us not tempt Christ in fact as they tempted the same Christ in figure. For in the same place it is said, "All things happened to them in figure."

To the second I have not seen a response.

To the third Franciscus David and Blandrata respond that those words ("ascending on high") are a prophecy about the future Christ, but this is not said of the God of Israel.

To the fourth Franciscus David and Blandrata respond that Christ is to be adored, because God has ordered it, not however as the most high but as the Son of the most high.

To the fifth the Transylvanian ministers and Franciscus David respond that those words ("and you Lord founded the earth at the beginning") should be understood of the Father alone, even for the Hebrews at the first; for Paul wished to show that Christ is the Son of the true God, and therefore he made an address to the Father by saying, "and you Lord etc." And they prove this because otherwise Paul would be in conflict first with the Apostles' Creed, where the Father alone is called creator of heaven and earth; second he would be in conflict with Christ, who very often calls his Father the creator of heaven and earth, *Matthew* ch.11, "I confess to you, Father of heaven and earth, etc."; third because he would be in conflict with himself, because he already said the world was made through the Son, therefore the Son did not make heaven but the Father did through the Son; fourth because he would ineptly compare the Son with the angels if the Son were the creator, since between creator and creature there is no comparison.

To the sixth, from *Isaiah* ch.6 and *John* ch.12, a certain Basil responds that this was a vision in figure. For no one has ever seen God as he is in himself, and therefore nothing is thereby proved.

To the ninth Franciscus David insinuates a solution when he says that every nation will bow the knee to Christ, not because the most high God speaks in *Isaiah* ch.45, but because God has exalted the man Christ and given him the name that is above every name, *Philippians* ch.2, that is, the name Jehovah, and that in the name of Jesus every knee should bend.

To the tenth from the words, "I am the first and the last," Franciscus David responds that the words are not taken in the same way when they are said of God in *Isaiah* ch.48 and when they are said of Christ in the *Apocalypse* ch.1. For in the *Apocalypse* they are understood of the man Christ, because of the words that follow "and I was dead etc." Therefore Christ is called first because he is exalted above all things; last because he is the completion of the works of God.

But all these things are easily refuted. And first the reason that what is said of the God of Israel in the Old Testament is said of Christ cannot be that the God of Israel communicated his divinity to Christ. For if, as they say, Christ did not exist before he was born of Mary, and thus God made Christ to be God in time, then what is said of God cannot be accommodated to Christ before that time. But Paul says in *I Corinthians* ch.10 that Christ was tempted by the Jews in the wilderness when they returned from Egypt.

Further, I ask how God gave divinity to Christ. For he did not give it by generating him from eternity. For that they deny, but he gave it, as they say, by indwelling and nourishing; but in this way God gives his divinity to angels and men, and yet what is said of God in the Scriptures cannot be expounded of them

Besides, the indwelling of God in Christ cannot make Christ God; otherwise even a royal palace would be a king. But unction does not give that true divinity, but a certain created participation, as is known; therefore what is said of the one and sole true God of Israel cannot be attributed to him who is only God by unction.

Nor is the solution of the first place valid, for Paul refers their tempting and ours to the same Christ; we cannot therefore distinguish and say that they tempted God and we Christ. And what they about figure is nothing. For the figures of the Old Testament are true histories literally, although they signify something else in addition, as is plain from the whole of chapter 10 of *Corinthians*. For the children of Israel are said to have fornicated and worshipped idols, and for that reason they were punished in various ways by God, and in all these things they bore the figure of the Christian people who will be likewise punished if they do like sins, but certainly and properly to the letter the Jews fornicated and worshipped idols and were punished; therefore also properly and to the letter one must understand that they tempted Christ. Add that the Transylvanians only flee to figures for this reason, that they not be compelled to admit that Christ existed before he was born of the Virgin.

But Paul in the same place very clearly says that along with Moses Christ (as God, namely, not as man) was present to the Jews in the wilderness. "They drank," he says, "of the spiritual rock that followed them; but that rock was Christ," that is, the Jews in the wilderness drank water from the rock, but it was not the material rock which of its own power provided drink, but it was some other invisible and spiritual rock that was always with them and accompanied them and provided all things for them; but that rock was Christ; and so do all expound, nor can any other sense be easily thought up.

The solution of the third place has no validity. For David too in *Psalms* 67 prophesies the future ascension of Christ; and yet he says of the same Christ there that he descended formerly on mount Sinai and passed with the people through the wilderness and other things that cannot fit someone who did not exist before his incarnation. Hence rightly do Jerome and Theodoret say when expounding this place that David wanted to signify that he who formerly descended on mount Sinai in the presence of the Jews is one and the same as he who afterwards ascended to heaven in the presence of the Apostles.

The solution of the fourth place is not solid, because we do not argue from adoration but from the fact that Paul said that what is clearly written in *Psalms* 96 of the God of Israel is written of Christ. For we do not reason that because Christ is commanded to be adored by the angels therefore he is true God (although this argument too is a good one and is used by St. Paul), but our argument is as follows: David says in *Psalms* 96 that the God of Israel should be adored by the angels; but Paul affirms that Christ is he who ought, by the sentence of David, to be adored by the angels; therefore David, on the evidence of Paul, asserts that Christ is the God of Israel.

The solution of the fifth place is a mere corruption of Scripture; for Paul does not make an address to the Father but cites various places about Christ, and this place among others, as is plain from the conjunctive particle 'and'. "To the angels he says, 'Who makes angels his spirits and his ministers a flame of fire', but to the Son he says, 'Your throne, God, is for ever and ever, and you Lord founded the earth at the beginning' etc."

But the reasonings of the Transylvanians are very slight, and it is a wonder they were not refuted by Peter Melius. To the first and second I say that the Father of Christ is creator, but not without his Word, since just as he is one God along with him so is he also one creator.

To the third I say that being creator and being him through whom God the Father creates are not in conflict. For the same Christ said in *John* ch.5, "My Father works and I work;" and yet he also says in *John* ch.14, "the Father who is in me himself does the works." Therefore both create, because both have omnipotence in themselves and the same omnipotence; but the Father is said to create through the Son and not the Son through the Father, because God created the world by his power and wisdom, but the Son is called the "power and wisdom of God" by Paul in *I Corinthians* ch.1, and "the arm of the Lord" from *Isaiah* ch.53.

The solution of the sixth place has no validity, because although *Isaiah* did not see the essence of God, yet the appearance that he did see represented the God of Israel; and since John says that Christ is shown in that appearance, it follows that Christ is the God of Israel.

The solution of the ninth place is no solution, because Paul in *Romans* ch.14 says not only that all things must bow to Christ, as he says in *Philippians* ch.2, but he adds that it is written down, and he cites the place of *Isaiah* where the God of Israel speaks about himself. From which it is very clearly plain that Christ is the very God of Israel. Nor is that an objection which is said in *Philippians* ch.2, "He gave him a name which is above every name," for according to the commentary of Ambrose God gave the Son a name above every name by eternal generation; according to all

others he gave to the man Christ after his resurrection a name above every name, that is, the name of the true God, not because he did not have it before but because he was not recognized; but God so glorified him that the whole world knew that that crucified man is true God.

And that this place should be understood of the manifestation of the name is plain, because Christ asked for it, *John* ch.17, "Father glorify me with the glory I had with you before the world came to be." Besides in *Philippians* ch.2 the point is explained when it is said, "And every tongue may confess etc." Lastly even before his death Christ is called the Son of the living God, *Matthew* ch.16 and *John* ch.11, and everywhere he is called Lord, *John* ch.13, "You call me Master and Lord, and you say well, for so I am." It was not the name then of Son of God or Lord that he acquired because of his death but the manifestation of it. See Cyril who excellently treats of this place.

The solution of the tenth place is like the preceding ones. For the words in the *Apocalypse* "I am the first and the last" should not for this reason be taken otherwise than in Isaiah, that it is said in the *Apocalypse* "and I was dead," but we contend this, that he who was dead in the form of man is also true God, eternal, first and last, in the form of God, as Isaiah said; for John looked back to the words of Isaiah.

Besides, Christ is called absolutely first and last, as the letters alpha and omega are absolutely first and last. But if Christ is only first among creatures and the completion of the works of God, he will not be simply first and last but only in a certain respect. For God alone is simply first beginning and last end of all things.

#### *Chapter Five: Second Class: from the Old Testament*

The first place is *Psalms* 2, which psalm is understood of Christ, both because Rabbi Solomon and the other Rabbis expound it of the Messiah, and also because it is understood of Christ in *Acts* chs.4 and 13 and *Hebrews* ch.1, and certainly Paul in *Hebrews* would not adduce from this psalm an argument against the Hebrews unless he knew the Hebrews were wont to understand this psalm of Christ. In this psalm therefore is said, "You are my Son, this day have I begotten you." And lest we think the Messiah is Son of God by adoption, the way even Israel is said to be God's first born, there is subjoined, "And now kings understand, be wise you who judge the earth, learn discipline etc." Note here that in the Hebrew source, which the adversaries always demand, it says "kiss the Son", that is, kiss the hand or foot of the Son in sign of submission. Nor is it an obstacle that the Septuagint translates "learn discipline", for it has respect to the sense not to the words; for then do we truly adore Christ when we receive his doctrine.

Note further in the following words "lest the Lord be angered" that in the Hebrew there is not 'Lord' but the words are referred to the Son, "lest the Son be greatly angered." From which we understand that the word 'Lord', added by the Septuagint, is to be referred to the Son; from which too is necessarily understood what follows, "Since his anger burns in a moment, blessed are all who trust in him."

Hence there is now an argument that the Messiah is the Son of God, to be adored by all kings; all will utterly perish against whom he is angered, and they will be blessed who trust in him; therefore the Messiah is true God. For only the true God

has the empire of life and death, I *Kings* ch.2. Again in the Scriptures it is everywhere said that one should trust in the sole true God, as *Jeremiah* ch.17, "Cursed is the man who trusts in man," and later, "Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord."

The second place is *Isaiah* ch.48, "Hear me, Jacob and Israel, whom I call. I am he, and I am first and I am last; my hand too founded the earth, my right hand measured the heavens." And later, "Come to me and hear this; I did not speak from the beginning in the dark; from the time before they came to be I was there, and now the Lord God has sent me, and his Spirit." It is certain that the one sent is not the Father, both because the Father does not have one from whom he could be sent, and also because the Son testifies that he was sent by the Father, *John* ch.8, and by the Holy Spirit, *Luke* ch.4. And yet we see that the one sent is the Lord God who made heaven and earth, and who is first and last.

Franciscus David responds to this place, which a certain Paul Thurius had raised in objection to him, and argues that the words, "and now the Lord God has sent me," were said by the prophet about himself, and this explanation was taken from Vatablus, and Vatablus took it from the Rabbis.

Franciscus David gives as proof of his opinion, first, that if this place were understood of Christ, Christ would have existed before the incarnation. But I *John* ch.4 says that it is the spirit of Antichrist who asserts that Christ was outside and before the flesh. Second, that Paul says in *Hebrews* ch.1 that God spoke last of all in the Son. In this place of *Isaiah* then it is not Christ who speaks; for he says he has spoken from the beginning. Third, the "I was there" is wont to be expounded by Catholics of mount Sinai. But in *Galatians* ch.3 it is said that the law was given on mount Sinai through angels, not through Christ. But these reasons prove nothing, and it is remarkable that Paul Thurius could not have refuted them.

To the first, John does not say that Christ did not exist before the flesh, but that he who denies the incarnation of Christ is Antichrist, as Ebion and Cherinthus did at the time, and as now the Transylvanians do. For these are the words of John, "Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that dissolves Christ is not of God, and this is Antichrist." But what is it to dissolve Christ save to divide the Word from the flesh and to say that the Son of God did not truly become Son of man but only dwelled in him as in a temple? And what is it for Jesus to have come in the flesh but that the Word of God has assumed true flesh in the unity of his hypostasis, and that, as thus made men, he came to men?

To the second, Paul does not deny that the Word of God spoke before his incarnation, but he only says that God spoke in the last time by corporal mouth and voice through the incarnate Son, who formerly spoke through the mouths of the prophets.

To the third I say that the law was given at Sinai by God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but by the ministry of angels. And that *Isaiah* is speaking literally of Christ is plain first from the Fathers; for we have in the first place the consent of the Fathers, Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, Cyril, Augustine.

Besides, the text itself proclaims it: "From the time before they were, I was there, and now the Lord God has sent me," in the Hebrew it says "from the time of

being this, I am there, and now the Lord God has sent me," that is, when they came to be, I was there; and the Septuagint translates as "even before the time of being this," that is, as Jerome translates, "before it came to be, I was there." But what is this "being this"? Some expound it of the heaven and earth, as Jerome does, and then the sense is, before they came to be, or, when the earth and heaven came to be, I was there. And this certainly cannot be true of the prophet.

Others understand by the 'this' the law given at Sinai; and this too is not true of the prophet in his own person, since he was born many centuries after the giving of the law, not to say after the creation of heaven and earth. So these two explanations favor us most of all.

Others expound it of this prophecy, and the sense is, when this prophecy came to be, I was there. But this is ridiculous; for who is not there when he speaks?

Some could expound it of the overthrow of Babylon by Cyrus, for Isaiah was speaking of this matter a little earlier; but Isaiah was not there, that is, in Babylon when this happened; rather Babylon was overthrown by Cyrus 200 years after the death of Isaiah; and yet here he is speaking of a thing already done when he says, 'when this came to be, or before this came to be'.

It remains only for them to say that the prophet suddenly changes person, and although he had said in the person of God 'before it came to be, I was there', now he says in his own person 'Now the Lord God has sent me'; but the copula 'and', which is in the Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, stands in the way. For the copula requires us to understand everything of the same subject. For he who said 'before it came to be, I was there' subjoins 'and now the Lord has sent me'. Otherwise, if it is permitted to change persons without reason, nothing certain could ever be gathered from the divine letters.

The third place is from *Isaiah* ch.35, "God himself will come and will save us; then he will open the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf will hear; then will the lame leap like a deer, and the tongues of the dumb will be loosed." It is plain this place is understood of Christ. First because the Lord in *Matthew* ch.11 responds to the disciples of John, "Go and tell John etc. the blind see, the deaf hear, the lame walk, etc."

Second, because God never did these signs through any prophet. For those who performed miracles in the time of the Old Testament are Moses, Joshua, Elijah, Elisha, and Isaiah himself. But none of them cured the blind, the deaf, the dumb, the lame, which are the signs Isaiah mentioned and that Christ everywhere did. Besides Isaiah is speaking of a future time; "God himself," he says, "will come etc.", but all those prophets who performed certain signs lived before the times of Isaiah. Hence the Lord says in *John* ch.15, "If I have not done the works that no other did etc."

Third, because the Fathers expound it thus, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Eusebius, Jerome, Cyril, Augustine, Athanasius. But that the Lord God, who is under discussion here, is the God of Israel is plain, because the prophet says absolutely that God himself will come, for the prophets never call Gods absolutely the Gods that are false and metaphorical; and above all the pronoun 'himself' indicates that the true God, and not some minister in his place, will come.

The fourth place is *Isaiah* ch.52, "The Lord says, 'my name is blasphemed continually all day, because of this my people will know my name in that day,

because, behold, I myself who was speaking am present.'” But it is certain that he who is speaking at the beginning is the Lord God, for he uses the ineffable name and complains that his name is blasphemed; and he names himself the God of Israel and calls the Jews his people; and then he says that he is the one who spoke through the prophets; all which things belong to the one true God.

But the proof that he is Christ is that he says, “I myself who was speaking am present.” For when, I ask, was he who spoke formerly through the prophets present so that he should speak through himself, if not when Christ was born? Hence rightly is this prophecy read on the night of the feast of the birth of the Lord, and everything that follows coheres remarkably therewith. For the prophet, as if he saw Christ already walking the mountains of Judea and evangelizing, at once subjoins, “How beautiful on the mountains are the feet of him who preaches peace, who preaches good?” Again, “they will see eye to eye.” And later, explaining the fruit of this coming, “the Lord has consoled his people, redeemed Jerusalem, prepared his holy arm in the eyes of all nations, and all the ends of the earth will see the salvation of our God.” And later, “The Lord will go before you, and the God of Israel will gather you.” Lastly, thus is it expounded by the Fathers, Tertullian, Eusebius, Ambrose, Jerome, Cyril.

The fifth place is *Isaiah* ch.45, “These things says the Lord, the labor of Egypt, the business of Ethiopia and Sabais, sublime men will pass over to you and will be yours; they will walk after you, they will march bound in manacles, and will adore you and will entreat you, ‘only in you is God and God is not without you. Truly you are a hidden God, God savior of Israel.’” These things are so manifestly said by the Lord God of his to be incarnated Son that Jerome writes on this place that there is no escape from the snares of this testimony. For although earlier it was speaking of Cyrus, yet because the words “God is not without you” do not agree with Cyrus, either these things are said of Cyrus as he is a reference to Christ or are said simply of Christ; nor can they be understood of the Father, since it is the Father himself who says about another person, “they will adore you and will entreat you.” And he subjoins the words of the entreaters, “only in you is God and God is not without you.” Add that it would not rightly be said to the Father ‘in you is God’. But all these things very correctly belong to Christ; for God is in him, since his humanity is as it were the temple of divinity; and without him there is no God, because he himself alone with the Father and Holy Spirit is true God.

The sixth place is *Baruch* ch.2, “He is our God, and another will not be compared with him; he has found out every way of discipline and given it to Jacob his beloved; after this he was seen on earth and conversed with men.” Here the God of Israel is very clearly being dealt with, who alone does not have a like, and who, after he gave discipline to Israel, that is, the law, on mount Sinai, was at length made man and seen on earth and conversed with men. And thus do the Fathers expound it, Cyprian, Eusebius, Ambrose, Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Basil, Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril, Theodoret.

To this place the adversaries make no reply, save that the book is apocryphal because it is not possessed in Hebrew. But certainly the authority of so many Fathers, who cite this book as sacred and canonical, is far greater than the authority of a few heretics who reject the same book.

The seventh place is *Zachariah* ch.2, "Thus says the Lord of hosts, after glory he sent me to the Gentile nations who despoiled you, for he who touches you touches the apple of my eye, because behold I raise my hand over them and they will be booty for those who served him, and you know that the Lord of hosts has sent me. Give praise and be glad, daughter of Zion, because behold I come and will dwell in the midst of you, says the Lord, and many nations will apply to the Lord in that day, and they will be to me for a people, and I will dwell in the midst of you; and you will know that the Lord of hosts has sent me to you." This place is very efficacious, as is noted by Eusebius, Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Theodoret, Rupert. For truly the Lord of hosts is sent by the Lord of hosts, and the thing is frequently repeated.

However Franciscus David replies that this place is not to the purpose, because it is a prophecy about the future, although the prophet speak in the past; for he is speaking of the conversion of the Gentiles, which happened after the ascension of Christ; and from this it cannot be proved that Christ existed before his incarnation.

Further, Franciscus David denies that what is written is that Jehovah sent me Jehovah.

But on the contrary, we do not put much force on the past or future, but on the fact that he who is said to have been sent by the Lord of hosts also calls himself the Lord of hosts. And since it is clear that there is only one Lord of hosts, it follows that Christ is one and the same God as the Lord of hosts, along with his Father, although they are distinct in person.

Now Franciscus David is impudent in denying that what is written is that Jehovah sent me Jehovah, for although it is not written in these words all at once, yet it is present in these words, though with others interposed that do not change the sense, as is plain.

The eighth place is *Zachariah* ch.3, "The Lord showed me Jesus the great priest standing before the angel of the Lord, and the devil was standing at his right hand to oppose him, and the Lord said to the devil, 'the Lord rebuke thee, Satan. The Lord who chose Jerusalem'." Here we very plainly see that the Lord, Adonai, says to the devil, 'the Lord rebuke thee', and from this it follows that the Lord, Adonai, is not one person but more. And that one of these persons is Christ is taught by Eusebius, Jerome, Theodoret, and Rupert. And Theodoret gives the reason that it is the Son rather than the Holy Spirit who says, 'the Lord rebuke thee', namely because Satan opposed Jesus the son of Josedech, who bore the figure of Christ. Hence, since that Jesus, son of Josedech, could not of himself resist Satan, the Son of God, who was to be called Jesus, rebukes Satan for him, and signified along with this rebuke that he, when he took flesh, would rebuke the devil, which he did in *Matthew* ch.4 when he says, "Be off, Satan."

Someone might reply that in this place the angel, before whom Jesus was standing, is called the Lord, and that it is the angel who said, 'the Lord rebuke thee', for such is the exposition of Benedict Arias Montanus; and his exposition can be confirmed, both because in the epistle of *Jude* this word to Satan, 'the Lord rebuke thee', is attributed to the angel Michael, and also because in the Scriptures the angels are frequently called by the name of the Lord, because they were his legates and bore his person, as is plain in *Genesis* ch.18, *Exodus* ch.3, *Jude* v.6 and elsewhere.

But on the contrary, for Jude is not speaking of this rebuke but of another that was given by the angel when he contended with the devil over the body of Moses.

Further, the angels are never called by the name of Adonai, but he is so called who spoke through the angels, who was true God; or at least an angel is called Adonai, not as angel, but as representing the Lord. But in this place either the Lord himself is speaking or an angel bearing the person of the Lord; yet in each case what is collected is that there are two persons, who are one Lord in number. For if the Lord were only one person the angel representing that person would not say, 'the Lord rebuke thee', but he himself would give the rebuke, as referring back to the person of the Lord.

The ninth place is *Zachariah* ch.12, "I will pour out on the house of David and on the inhabitants of Jerusalem a spirit of grace and of prayers, and they will look upon me whom they pierced." This place is understood of Christ pierced on the cross, and yet the God of Israel is speaking, who alone can pour out on men the spirit of grace and of prayers. There is no need to cite the testimony of the Fathers. For *John* ch.19 says, "This was fulfilled when Christ was crucified and pierced with a lance," and besides the thing itself proclaims it. For when, I ask, was God the author of grace pierced save when Christ, the true God and Lord of glory (as Paul says) was crucified? Or if this does not please, let the adversaries show where and when God the Father was pierced, so that he could truly say, "They will look upon me whom they pierced."

#### *Chapter Six: the Third Class: from the New Testament*

The first testimony is the confession of Peter from the revelation of God the Father, *Matthew* ch.16, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Note here that Peter asserts that Christ is the true and natural Son of God, for that is why he added 'living', because it is proper to living things to generate for themselves something alike in nature. And it is confirmed from other places, for in *John* ch.3 Christ is said to be "the only begotten Son," *Romans* ch.8 he is called "proper Son," *1 John* ch.5 he is called "true Son," *Colossians* ch.1 and *Hebrews* ch.1 he is called "natural" for he is called the image or the type of the paternal hypostasis, which does not belong to adoptive sons. Again in the same place he is called a Son such that with respect to him the angels are called servants, who however are otherwise adoptive Sons of God, and indeed chiefly so.

Next, Christ is accused of having preached that he was the Son of God, *John* 19, "For we have a law and according to the law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God." And it is certain that he was not accused of having made himself adoptive or metaphorical Son of God, for even the Jews say, "We have one Father, God," *John* ch.8. And yet Christ did not dilute this accusation but as it were admitted it, and in that confession he wished to die.

But if he is true, proper, only begotten, natural Son, then he is begotten of the substance of the Father; but he did not receive a part of the substance, because God is without parts, therefore he received the whole of it, therefore he is one God in number with the Father.

The Transylvanian ministers and Blandrata reply that Christ is true and proper Son of God because he was conceived from the Holy Spirit, and they prove it from *Luke* ch.1 where it is said, "The Holy Spirit will come upon you and the virtue of the Most High will overshadow you, and therefore the holy thing that is born from you will be called the Son of God."

But on the contrary, for even Adam, Eve, and all the angels were not born of the seed of man but are directly the work of God. How then is he called *only* begotten Son? Second if for this reason Christ is Son of God because he was conceived in the womb of a virgin by the work of the Holy Spirit, then he could be called the Son of the Holy Spirit; but Scripture never says this, nay on the contrary it says that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, *John* ch.15 and elsewhere. Third, this is not to be natural and true Son, for God did not generate Christ from his own substance in the womb of a virgin but from the substance alone of the Virgin; hence in *Hebrews* ch.7 Christ is said to be without father and without mother, that is, without father on earth and without mother in heaven, as all the Greeks and Latins expounded.

To the place of *Luke* ch.1 I say with Ambrose, Gregory, Bede, Bernard that the virtue of the Most High is the Word of God which descended into the womb of the Virgin, and there put on flesh, and therefore the Son of Mary is called the Son of the Most High. It can also be said that conception from the Holy Spirit is a sign, not a cause, that Christ is called Son of God. For it was fitting that if the Son of God wished to become Son of Man he should be born only from a virgin, and if a virgin were to give birth, she should give birth only to God, as St. Bernard rightly said.

Further, Jacob Palaeologus, who, although he was one of the chief doctors of the new Samosatans, at length at Rome, as we said above, was converted to the true faith, not only made no account of our argument but turned it back against us by means of this reasoning: any true Son of God cannot be true God; but Christ is true Son of God, therefore he is not true God.

And this syllogism (as I have often heard from him) he used to boast was a very firm demonstration, even though I said to him that the major proposition of the syllogism is so false that the contrary is most true. For as the true son of man is true man, the true son of a lion is true lion, and in all others in like manner, so too the true Son of God must be true God.

He used to reply that according to philosophy indeed a true son is of the same nature as his father, but not according to Scripture. For Scripture makes those to be true sons of God who are made by God his heirs, as is said of Christ in *Hebrews* ch.1; but he cannot be true God who is made heir by God.

You do not, prudent reader, expect a refutation of these ineptitudes. For what? Is not Seth the true son of Adam according to the Scriptures, and Isaac of Abraham, and Ruben of Jacob? And were they not of the same nature as their fathers? Next, does not Scripture openly say that a man is heir because he is son, not son because he is heir? *Romans* ch.8, "But if sons then heirs, and heirs indeed of God but co-heirs with Christ." And about Christ *Hebrews* ch.1 first says, "He spoke to us in his Son," then it adds, "whom he made heir of all things." Nor should you understand that he was made heir by temporal donation, but by eternal generation.

The second testimony is from *Luke* ch.1, "He will convert many sons of Israel to the Lord their God, and he will go before him in the spirit and virtue of Elijah." The Lord God of Israel is, by the judgment of all and especially by that of the heretics of this time, the sole true God. But the angel in this place calls Christ the Lord God of Israel. For thus is it interpreted by Irenaeus, Ambrose, Bede, Euthymius and others. Nor can it be otherwise understood; for the 'and he will go before him' can only be referred to the Lord God of Israel named just before. But it is clear that John went before Christ, not before God the Father. "The God of Israel," says Paul in *Acts* ch.13, "brought forth a savior, Jesus, after John before the face of his coming preached the baptism of penitence." The same is confirmed from the words, 'He will convert many sons of Israel to the Lord their God'. For John tried to convert men only to Christ, for him he assiduously preached. Hence *John* ch.1, "When John saw Jesus he said, 'Behold the lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world'." And immediately on those words Andrew, who was John's disciple, was converted to Christ and followed him.

The third testimony is *John* ch.5, "The Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only broke the Sabbath but also said God was his Father, making himself equal to God." If Christ preached that he was equal to God the Father, then he was true God, eternal and most high etc.

To this someone could say that Christ did not preach he was equal to God the Father, but that the Jews believed it; so the sense is that the Jews sought to kill him because in their opinion he not only broke the Sabbath but also made himself Son of God, making himself equal to God in their opinion.

But it matters little whether the Evangelist is referring to the opinion of the Jews or is expounding what it was. For as Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine and all others say on this place, the opinion of the Jews was true, and this the Evangelist narrates, namely that they well understood that Christ was preaching that he was equal to God. For if the opinion of the Jews were false, as Chrysostom rightly noted, certainly Christ or the Evangelist would have warned us against erring in so great a matter; just as when the Lord had said, *John* ch.2, that he would rebuild the temple in three days, the Evangelist expounded that he said this of the temple of his body. And *John* last chapter, when the disciples had concluded from the words of the Lord that John would not die, John himself adds, "Jesus did not say, he does not die, etc." But Christ not only did not correct the opinion of the Jews but even confirmed it, saying that he did the same works as his Father did, and that just as the Father raises up whom he will so also does the Son. See Cyril on the whole of this fifth chapter where he shows that Christ showed in many ways that he was equal to the Father.

The fourth testimony is *John* ch.10, "I and the Father are one." This testimony all the Fathers use against the Arians to prove that there is one essence of the Father and the Son.

The Transylvanians and Franciscus David respond that this place is understood of the concord of charity by which the Father and Son were one. And the first proof they give is the authority of Erasmus and Calvin; they could also add Arius and Eunomius. The second proof is *John* ch.17 where it is said of the Apostles, "that they may be one as we also are one."

But that this place is to be understood of the unity of essence I prove first with Basil and Chrysostom from the preceding words. For Christ, to prove his sheep will not perish, gives this argument, "No one can take them from my Father's hands, because he is greater than all." Therefore neither can anyone take my sheep from my hands. For I and the Father are one. Which argument proves nothing unless the 'we are one' signifies that the hand, that is, the power of the Father and Son, is one and the same; but if the power is the same certainly the essence is also the same. For in God there is no distinction between power and essence.

Second I prove it with Augustine and Chrysostom on the place, "Because when they heard this word the Jews took up stones to throw at him." Therefore they understood by the 'we are one' that Christ is preaching that he is truly God along with the Father; for they would not have wanted to stone him if they believed only that Christ was saying he was one with the Father in concord of will. But since the Jews so understood it and yet Christ did not correct their opinion, it is plain that they understood rightly.

Third, because Christ expounded what was meant by "I and the Father are one." For when the Jews wanted to stone him for this he said, "You say, 'you blaspheme' because I said I am the Son of God," therefore it is the same thing to say I and the Father are one and I am the Son of God. They are not therefore one with mere concord of will, which can exist between those who are not of the same family, but they are one the way father and son are one who have the same nature.

But the heretics object, especially Franciscus David and the Transylvanian ministers. For Christ seems in the following words to correct the opinion of the Jews and to declare that he is God by grace alone, for he says as follows, "In your law it is written, 'I said, ye are Gods'. If therefore he called them Gods to whom the word of God came, do you say to him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world 'you blaspheme' because I said I am the Son of God?"

I reply with Hilary that Christ wanted to say that if they can be called Gods who participate in deity by gift of grace, because the word of God came to them, and they are established by God as princes of others having received authority from him, how much more can I be called truly God, though I am a man, since the Father has sanctified me with a singular gift, that is, has made me holy of holies, uniting in my very conception the hypostasis of his Word with my human nature? But because the Jews said, "For blasphemy we stone you, because you, though a man, make yourself God." The Lord wished to show not only that he was God but that he, existing as a true man, was also true God. But he did it by explaining his outstanding and singular sanctification, not through created grace but through the grace of hypostatic union. But that his sanctification, by which he was true God, was indeed such, he proves from the works that are proper to the sole true God, for he says, "If I do not do the works of my Father, do not believe me." And later, "So that you may know that I am in the Father and the Father is in me." For this mutual indwelling cannot be understood without identity of nature. It could also be said, as Chrysostom indicates, that Christ responded in two ways to the Jews. First in this way, even if I was pure man I have not for this reason blasphemed by saying that I am the Son of God, since many who are lesser than I are called Gods in the Scriptures. Second, having now repelled the calumny, he showed from the works that he was true God. Valentinus

Gentilis argued for his error from this very place, as Calvin testifies. For the Lord does not say, "I and the Father are one personal being," but "we are one thing;" therefore they are of the same nature and divinity but are not one God in number; and he confirms it from *John* ch.17 where the Apostles are said to be one as the Father and the Son are one. Here the Apostles are said to be one and yet they differed in number.

I reply that Christ could not have said 'I and the Father are one personal being', because then he would have confused the persons. For it is one thing to say 'I and the Father are one thing, or one God, or one Spirit,' and another to say, 'I and the Father are one personal being'. For 'I and the Father are one thing' signifies that they are one being or one nature, which is not repugnant to plurality of persons. Likewise 'we are one God' signifies that they are one in deity, and this also is true, nor is it repugnant to distinction of persons; but 'we are one personal being' signifies that they are one hypostasis, and implies a contradiction.

But that this place is not for Gentilis but against him is plain. First because although absolutely and universally 'we are one thing' does not signify one in number but one in essence, whether those things are one in species or in number, yet in God it necessarily signifies one in number because, as was proved above, the deity is only one in number.

Second, the same is plain from the fact that, although Gentilis seems to say that the Father and Son are one in essence or species, yet he is compelled to confess that he is putting an essential difference between the Father and the Son, since he says in his writings that only the Father is immense, but the Son is circumscribed according to manner of generation.

To the place of *John* ch.17 Augustine responds that in the Scriptures never is 'they are one' said of things of diverse natures. For it is not said, 'so that the Apostles and God may be one', but 'so that they themselves might be one as the Father and Son are one'. And again, 'so that they may be one in God etc.' And yet this observation, although it is in some way true, does not seem necessary.

For although the Apostles were of the same nature among themselves, yet when it is said by Christ that they might be one, the 'one' does not signify unity of nature but unity of concord. Further, why could not a prayer be made in the same way that angels and men be one? And yet the angels differ in species from men. Finally, as is said I *Corinthians* ch.6 "He who adheres to God is one spirit with him," why could it not be said, 'he who adheres to God is one with him'? For one spirit is one thing; one thing and one are the same.

We can with Chrysostom and Cyril more easily say that Christ did not wish the Apostles to be altogether one as the divine persons are one, but he wanted the Apostles by the grace of God to be made one in concord of will, and in that way to imitate the divine persons who are naturally one in will and consent, and therefore also one in essence. For free agents cannot by nature will the same thing unless they have numerically the same nature.

Further, even if it does not absolutely follow from the fact that the Father and Son are called one that they are one in essence, yet in *John* ch.10 it would necessarily follow for the reason that is stated in the words there, as we have already showed.

The fifth testimony is *John* ch.14, "You believe in God, believe also in me." From this Augustine and the interpreters of this place deduce that Christ is the true God whom the Jews worshipped. For if he is not himself the true God he cannot claim for himself the faith that is due to God alone; nor should one be moved by the word 'also', as if Christ distinguishes himself from God and makes himself as it were a second God; for the word 'also' is added because of the human nature by which Christ is distinguished from God. The sense therefore is 'if you believe in God you should also believe in me whom you see here as man. For I am not only man but also the God in whom you believe'. In the same place is said, "If you knew me you would also know my Father." Again, "Philip, he who sees me sees the Father."

Cyril proves from this place that Christ is one God with the Father. For it cannot be true that Christ cannot be known without the Father being known unless there were one nature to both of them. Add that the Apostles well knew that Jesus was a good man, a wise prophet, Christ; and yet they hear, "If you knew me." And again, "Have I been so long time with you and you do not know me?" It remained then for them to know that he is true God and one with the Father. For the other things they already knew. Finally Philip said, "Lord, show us the Father and it suffices us." For the Apostles knew that nothing could suffice for men for beatitude without the knowledge of the true God, which true God they did not doubt to be the Father. Christ therefore, when he replies to Philip, "Philip, he who sees me sees the Father," would not have satisfied his question unless he had wished to signify that he was true God and one with the Father, and that in the knowledge of himself beatitude consists as in the knowledge of the Father.

Franciscus David replies that the man Christ was the image of God and therefore he who saw Christ saw God in his image.

On the contrary. For if Franciscus were to admit that Christ is the natural image of the Father and of the same essence, he would be speaking rightly; but he thinks that the visible and created form of Christ is the image of God. But such an image is very far distant from the original; for nothing created can be perfectly and expressly like God, as is said in *I Kings* ch.8, "There is none like you, God." And *Isaiah* ch.40, "What image will you put on him?" But he who sees such an image cannot say that he has seen the original; nay when we see images very like the things, we are not for that reason content, but we are on fire to see the thing itself. But Christ rebukes Philip for thinking that the Father is not sufficiently seen by him who sees the Son. From which it is plain that Christ as God is altogether the same form and beauty as the Father.

The sixth testimony is *John* ch.16, "Everything that my Father has is mine," therefore the Son has the essence of the Father. But lest anyone think this is understood of things outside God, in the way we say that what a man has is his wife's, and yet often the man has a wisdom that the wife does not have, the preceding words exclude this sense; for what precedes is "he will glorify me because he will take from what is mine." That then is common to the Father and Son which the Holy Spirit receives from each. But what does the Holy Spirit receive from the Son? Without doubt knowledge; for he says, "he will take from what is mine and will announce it to you." And above, "he will not speak of himself, but whatever he hears he will speak." The knowledge of the Father and the Son, then, is the same, but

knowledge and essence in God are the same, as even Aristotle recognized; therefore there is one essence to both persons. And thus do all Catholics expound this place, Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine and others.

The seventh testimony is *John* ch.20, "My Lord and my God." Which testimony is used as very effective by Augustine. And indeed it is certain that in this place Lord God signifies the true God of Israel, both because in the Greek there is the definite article, and because Thomas, an Israelite, knew no other Lord God than the God about whom was written in *Deuteronomy* ch.6, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God." Chrysostom adds that when Thomas said this he fulfilled *Psalms* 76, "I sought God with my hands and was not deceived." But there can be no doubt but that in this psalm the discussion is about the true God.

The Nestorians said that the words "my Lord and my God" are referred to the Father by exclamation of Thomas when he marvels at the resurrection of Christ. But this is sheer corruption of Scripture; for in the Greek there is not the 'Oh' that is a sign of someone exclaiming, but there is the definite article; besides in the Gospel there precede the words "Thomas replied to him and said, 'My Lord, and my God' etc." What does this 'said to him' signify? Did he not say it to Christ? For Thomas was speaking with Christ, not with the Father. In addition, it is certain that Thomas wanted by these words to confess what he had not sufficiently believed; and he had always believed that the Father was God, but about the divinity of the Son he had doubted not a little. Lastly, all commentaries refer these words to the divinity of Christ, even the commentary of Erasmus, which the Transylvanians make most of.

The eighth testimony is *Romans* ch.9, "From whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all blessed for ever." This place is understood by Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Origen, Oecumenius, and all others in this way, that Christ is called true God, since there is nothing over all save the supreme God.

Erasmus however tries in his notes on this place to break the argument, but with very flimsy conjectures. First he says the word 'God' is perhaps not in the text, because Cyprian and Hilary cite this place without the word 'God'. But Cyprian, the Aldians and Morelians have the word 'and God'; nor can it be lacking; for in this chapter Paul intends to call Christ God, and he adduces places of Scripture where he is called God.

Hilary does not cite the place complete; for he also omits 'according to the flesh', although he cites this place with the word 'God' elsewhere. Lastly, even when the word 'God' is taken away the argument remains, because if Christ is above all he is certainly God.

Second Erasmus says that the 'who is God over all' could be referred to the Father, that is, if a period is put after the words 'from whom is Christ according to the flesh', in the way he says that he read it in Chrysostom. But first in Chrysostom in the Greek I have found no period but a comma, as it is in all the Pauline codices, Greek and Latin. Next, could it be that because of one period in Chrysostom's commentary, which could have been left by a fly sitting on it or have crept in by the fault of the writer, all the codices, Greek and Latin, should be corrected?

Finally, if notwithstanding that period Chrysostom himself refers the words 'who is God over all' to the Son and if the same is done by all authors without

exception, what rashness is it to wish to invent now a new sense? For Erasmus has cited absolutely no one on his behalf, and we have, besides all the commentaries, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril, Gregory, Athanasius, Victorinus, Idacius, Cassianus.

As to what Erasmus notes in the same place, that Paul did not write 'who being' but 'being the', it is too frigid. For who does not know that the article is often put for the pronoun and has, when joined to a participle, the force of a relative? At least in *Matthew* ch.6 (to pass over other places) we read the 'Our Father' as 'the one in heaven' and not 'who art in heaven'.

The ninth testimony is contained in *Galatians* ch.1, "I make known the Gospel to you that has been preached by me, that it is not according to man; for I did not receive it nor learnt it from man but through the revelation of Jesus Christ." And at the beginning of the epistle, "Paul an Apostle, not by men nor through man, but through Jesus Christ and God the Father, etc." Here Blessed Paul opposes Christ to men, and therefore teaches that Christ is not mere man, as the Transylvanians wish, but is also God, as is God the Father; nor does he oppose him only to men but also to angels, and so to all creatures. For he adds, "If we or an angel from heaven preach to you any other Gospel than what we have preached to you, let him be anathema." Therefore Paul in this place very clearly separates Christ from all creatures and conjoins him, as it were on the other side, to God the Father, and teaches he is the creator God.

The tenth testimony is *Philippians* ch.2, "Who though he was in the form of God did not think equality with God something to be seized, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant." Here seems very clearly to be explained that Christ is true God, since he has the form, that is, the nature of God, and according to this there is no seizing but a nature equal to God the Father.

But the Arians and Transylvanians and Erasmus oppose this. However, so as to proceed clearly we must first explain what is meant by 'though he was in the form of God', and second what is meant by 'did not think equality with God something to be seized'.

On the first point Erasmus and Franciscus David contend that 'form' in this place signifies exterior works wherein the divinity shone forth, though they do not expound it in the same way. For Franciscus David means Christ is said to be in the form of God because he was a certain visible image in which the invisible God was seen. And that 'form' signifies external appearance he proves from *Deuteronomy* ch.4, "You heard the sound of the words, but you saw altogether no form."

But Erasmus means that Christ was in the form of God because he did such works exteriorly, so as plainly to show himself to be God. And that 'form' in this place signifies exterior works he proves first from the fact that the form of God is opposed to the form of servant which Christ is said to have taken up. But Christ did not take up the form of servant in substance, for he was always Son, not servant; but he took up the form of servant in exterior appearance, because he humbled himself and let himself be bound and scourged. He proves it secondly from the commentary of Ambrose.

But the common exposition of all others, ancient and recent, is that 'form of God' signifies the essence of God. And, to begin with, the opinion of Franciscus David

is mere corruption of the text; for, first, he has no one on his side, not even Erasmus; for Erasmus proves from this place the divinity of Christ. Further, Paul does not say that Christ is the form of God but that he is in the form of God.

Next, the opinion of Erasmus is openly false; for first the Greek word contained here (*morphe*) is never taken in Scripture for exterior form, or for work, as is plain if one runs through all the places. Nay, Chrysostom on this place says that it is never so taken even in other Greek writers. Indeed the word is sometimes taken by Aristotle for accidental form, although more often for substantial form, yet always for inherent and intrinsic form, never for exterior action.

As for what Franciscus alleges from *Deuteronomy* ch.4, it is not to the purpose; for in the Greek there is not 'form' but 'likeness', as in the Hebrew, and elsewhere wherever there is the word 'form' the Greek is not *morphe* but *eidos* or *typos* or something else.

Second, if to be in the form of God is to do divine works, namely miracles, then the Apostles too could be said to have been in the form of God, since they did very great miracles.

Third, form of God is opposed to form of servant in this place; but the form of a servant, although it is human nature, is not some work; for when Paul explains what it is to receive the form of servant he subjoins, "made in the likeness of man and found as man in habit." Therefore he received the form of a servant for this reason, that he appeared as man among men, like the rest even in exterior figure. For neither does habit in this place signify clothing but figure (as is plain from the Greek).

Nor does Erasmus' argument have any validity. For although Christ is Son, not servant, if we have regard to the hypostasis, yet by reason of human nature he is rightly called servant. For as he is called equal to and lesser than the Father because he is God and man, and immortal and mortal, creator and creature, so too he can be called Lord and servant, and so is he called by *Isaiah* ch.49. From which place Jerome teaches that Christ is rightly called servant by reason of his human nature. And the verse of *Isaiah* ch.42, "Behold my servant, I will take him up," is expounded by Matthew of Christ in *Matthew* ch.12, and the Hebrew word properly signifies servant. Nay, does not Christ in *John* ch.20 say, "I ascend to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God"?

Add finally that all interpreters of this place, with the exception of Ambrose, about whose commentaries there is no little doubt whether they are really his, understand by form of God essence of God; and besides by the interpreters it is thus understood, by Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Hilary, Cyril, Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose. Hence it is made more probable that the commentaries on the epistles are not by Ambrose, although whoever the author is and although he expounds it less probably, nevertheless he does not favor the heretics since he very clearly says that Christ is true God and equal to the Father.

Fifth, to the second part of this opinion, 'not something to be seized etc.' Franciscus David says that Christ is equal to the Father because God drew him up to his equality.

But this, in the first place, is against Scripture, *Isaiah* ch.42, "I am the Lord, I will not give my glory to another." And next it is impossible for a creature to become

equal to the creator since a creature is necessarily finite, temporal, etc. Hence Franciscus David, seeing that what he said before is not consistent, teaches that Christ is not equal to the Father in dignity, since Christ himself worships the Father; no, on the contrary, he is equal because he has omnipotence communicated to him by God.

But I ask of him how Christ has omnipotence, whether intrinsically, so that as man Christ is omnipotent, or extrinsically by indwelling, because he has the omnipotent God dwelling in him. If in the first way, the first difficulty returns, because if this man has infinite power intrinsically then he has infinite essence, therefore he is the one God who is also Father. If in the second way then Paul would be saying nothing. For in this way all the just are equal to God, because they have God dwelling in them.

Because this interpretation, therefore, does not square, the Transylvanian ministers say that Paul does not say that Christ is equal to God the Father but rather the contrary; for they want the sense to be this: he did not think it to be something seized, that is, he did not think he should do something to make himself equal to God. In this way Erasmus expounded the place and before him Maximus Arianus, in Augustine.

And they give as first proof that the adversative particle ('but') seems to show this. For if we read thus, 'Christ thought himself equal to the Father but emptied himself', what will the sense be? But if you say, 'Christ did not think equality something to be seized but on the contrary emptied himself', the sense will be very good.

Their second proof is from Tertullian who says, "although he remembered that he was God from God the Father, he never either compared or equated himself with God the Father."

But on the contrary. For first all the Fathers above cited say that Christ was equal to the Father, not by seizing it, but because he was so by nature. Second, the place itself so indicates, unless it is violently dragged about in another way. Third, because if to be in the form of God is to be in the essence of God, as we said above, Paul could not say that the Son, whom he had said was in the form of God, was not equal to the Father.

As to the point about the adversative particle, I reply that the word 'but' has a multiple sense. For sometimes it has the force of correcting, and in this way it is taken by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, for they, who rightly understand the Greek tongue, mean that 'but' is a mark of correcting, and the sense is as follows, that although Christ was in the form of God he thought being equal with God so much not to be a seizing that rather he did not hesitate to hide his divinity and in some way to lay aside the insignia of this equality, because he was certain that he could not lose it, since it was natural to him.

They posit an example about a king and a tyrant. For he who knows himself to be true and legitimate king, and does not in any way fear for himself, easily takes off the purple and puts on plebeian clothing, either to please himself or to be safer in battle or for some other reason. For he does not fear that his kingdom would perish because of a change of dress. But a tyrant, who has seized royal power, does not dare even for a short time to appear without the purple and the scepter, lest, if he

appear in plebeian clothing, he may not be acknowledged for king and may little by little lose his kingdom, etc.

The Latins accept that 'but' is adversative and is equivalent to the conjunction 'however', or 'but however'. So Augustine takes it who wants the sense to be, since he was in the form of God he did not think equality with God something to be seized, but yet he emptied himself etc., that is, although he was equal with God yet he did not shrink from the form of a servant.

So too the commentary of Ambrose: although he was equal to God, yet he did not defend his equality but emptied himself, that is, he did not wish, under the pretext of the equality with God which he naturally had, to refuse the humility of suffering and death.

To the place from Tertullian I say, first, that the book in question is not his but rather Novatian's, as Jerome asserts. Secondly I say that the opinion of this author is not against us, for he says that the Son refused to compare himself with the Father only because of the Father's authority of origin, not because of any difference of nature. For in the same place he clearly asserts that the Son was in the form of God because he was in the nature of God and was above all, as the Father is; and yet, because he is from the Father, and not contrariwise, he deferred always in some respect to the Father.

Nor is this the view of Tertullian alone, but of Hilary, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, who expound of the Son of God, not only as he is Son of man, but also as he is Son of God, the words "the Father is greater than I;" for they say that the Father is greater by reason of principle, and yet the Son, because of identity of nature, is not lesser.

The eleventh place is from I *John* ch.5, "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one; and there are three who give testimony on earth, the spirit, the water, and the blood." By which place St. John means to show that Christ is true God and true man; and for that reason he adduces divine and human testimonies; for neither when he says 'there are three who give testimony in heaven' does he mean by 'in heaven' a heavenly place but the quality of the testimony; otherwise even the angels are in heaven and have not seldom given testimony to Christ, and yet John posits that there are only three witnesses in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit.

Therefore by the witnesses who are in heaven are understood divine witnesses as distinct from human and created witnesses; and therefore too a little later he says, "If we accept the testimony of men, the testimony of God is greater." Just as, therefore, spirit, water, and blood are three earthly testimonies and proved the true humanity of Christ, namely when on the death of Christ the spirit flowed from his mouth and blood and water from his side; so too the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are three divine persons, and have given divine testimony of the true divinity of Christ, both often elsewhere and also in his baptism and transfiguration.

But Gregory Blandrata objects, first, that the words 'there are three who give testimony in heaven' are read by no author save Jerome, who had too little shame. Second, the spirit, water, and blood are not otherwise sad to be one than the Father, Word, and Holy Spirit are; and therefore, as the spirit, water, and blood are not one

in number, nay and not in species either, so neither are the Father, Word, and Holy Spirit one in number, or in species, but only by agreement of will.

I reply that Blandrata not only has too little shame but too much impudence when, imitating Erasmus, he says Jerome has too little shame; not only does Blandrata have too little shame, I say, but he is lacking in skill or is a liar when he says that only Jerome so read the passage. For it was so read by Hyginus, Cyprian, Idacius, Athanasius, Theophilus, the author of the dispute of the same Athanasius with Arius at the Council of Nicea, Fulgentius, Eugenius of Carthage.

But as to what concerns the words 'and these three are one', one must know that the words are not contained in many Latin codices where the discussion is about the spirit, water, and blood. For in the Louvain Bible there are noted in the margin fifteen manuscripts that do not have the words. Now the Greek codices do indeed have them but in different ways. For of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit they say 'and these three are one', but of the spirit, water, and blood they say 'and these three are in one', where you openly see that the spirit, water, and blood are not one, but only conspire in one testimony.

The twelfth place is *I John* ch.5, the last words, "So that we may be in his true Son, this is true God and life eternal." But the true God is one alone, *John* ch.17, "you the sole true God." From this the Transylvanians say that the name 'true God' is proper to the Father; therefore Christ is the same God who is Father.

To this place the Transylvanians, the new Sarmosatan, and Servetus say that Christ is true God but a temporal God, because he received true divinity from God; but we have refuted this elsewhere, for divinity cannot be united to a creature save hypostatically if that creature is to be called true God; for divinity cannot be united accidentally so as to inhere intrinsically, as is known, because then it would depend on the subject; nor can it be united essentially, as soul to body and any substantial form to its matter, because then it would be a part; but intrinsic union does not suffice for being denominated God.

But Servetus objects *Apocalypse* ch.5, "The lamb is worthy to receive virtue and divinity."

I reply that others read not 'divinity' but 'riches', as Primasius did, for in Greek it is 'wealth'. But the Vulgate reading has a very good sense. For by divinity we can understand the manifestation of divinity, not divinity itself. Erasmus in his note on this place wants the 'this is true God' to be referred to the Father in this way, 'so that we may be in his true Son', namely he, the Father of this Son, is true God. But he should have adduced at least one author who thus clearly explained the phrase. For why does the demonstrative 'this' not point to the proximate person rather than the remote one? Especially since in the Greek text before the 'this' the name Jesus Christ immediately precedes.

Next, the Fathers expound the demonstrative of the Son. Hilary, after citing this place, adds 'and since this is true Son of God for us and eternal life etc.' where what he cites, 'this is true God and eternal life' he expounds of the Son when he says he is eternal life. Jerome on *Isaiah* ch.95 'he will swear on God Amen,' says not only that the Father is God Amen, that is, true God, but also the Son, and he proves it from this place, 'this is true God and eternal life'. Augustine says, "And the Son is not only God but is true God, because John in his epistle very openly says, 'We know that the

Son of God has come and has given us understanding etc. This is true God etc.” Cyril, after adducing this place, says, “What will the heretics say to these words of Blessed John, in which very openly the Son is called true God? For if he is true God substantially, he is not this by participation, as creatures are; but he who is true God is by nature God.” Bede and Oecumenius expound this place likewise.

The Eunomians, being formerly convicted by the evidence of this testimony, admitted, as Gregory Nazianzen reports, that the Father was true God and that likewise the Son was true God, but equivocally, as the heavenly and earthly dog are equivocally called dogs, though each properly and truly.

But it is easy to refute this solution. For Eunomius is either speaking of perfect equivocation or of some analogy. If of perfect equivocation then the Father will not be more God or a prior God than the Son, just as Judas Iscariot is not more man, or a greater man, than Judas Thaddeus. Besides, there would then be several true Gods, as Judas Iscariot and Judas Thaddeus are several true men. But Scripture teaches that there is only one God. If of some analogy, either the Father or the Son will not be truly or properly or simply God, as a picture of a man is not simply and truly and properly a man, nor is the heavenly dog properly and truly a dog, but it is called so because it represents the earthly dog. But Christ is true God and likewise the Father, therefore the Son is not God by analogy alone.

The thirteenth place is *John* ch.1, “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God.” Again, “All things were made through him.” From this place three arguments are taken.

The first is taken from the name ‘Word’; for ‘Word’ or *logos* is the offspring or knowledge or concept of the mind. And although the concept of the mind is not in us called son, because it is an accident, yet its production is very similar to generation; for the thinking mind bears the office of father, but the object that of mother; the species is as it were the matter of generation which the mother supplies; and thence from the union of mind and object, through the mediation of the species, knowledge or word proceeds.

But one must note that in God, as even Aristotle teaches, knower, intellect, intellection, and intelligible species (with the exception, however, of the mutual relations of producer and produced) are the same. From which it follows that ‘the Word of God is necessarily the same as God’, that is, of the same substance and nature in number. But Christ is the Word of God, for “the Word was made flesh,” therefore Christ has the same nature in number as the Father.

The second argument is taken from the fact that the Word is called God. For in this place the Word of God, which is Christ, is expressly called God, and without doubt the same God as the Father also is. For John in almost the whole of this chapter is always repeating at the beginning of the sentence what he had put at the end of the preceding one. “In the beginning,” he says, “was the Word;” then he subjoins, “and the Word was with God.” Here you see the same name put at the end of the first sentence and the beginning of the second; in this way too, because in the second he had said “and the Word was with God,” in the third he says, “and God was the Word.” Here both he with whom was the Word and he who was the Word himself are said to be the same God. This very thing can be seen in the following, “In

him was life and the life was the light of men, and the light shines in the darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it etc.”

The third argument is in the words, “Everything was made through him.” For from this follows, as Augustine gathers, that the Word was not made and therefore is not a creature, and therefore is one God with the Father, for there is nothing save God and his creatures.

But the Transylvanian ministers respond to the first that the Word in this place signifies Christ the man, and he is called Word because he announced the words of God to us; and the proof they give is that when it is said, “the Word was made flesh,” there is in the Greek “he came to be,” which signifies he was or became, as is plain from similar places; for in this chapter it is said, “There was a man sent from God,” in the Greek, “there came to be.” Likewise in *Luke* ch.1, “There was in the days of Herod a priest,” and *Luke* last chapter, “Who was a prophet etc.” and everywhere there is in Greek “there came to be.” Therefore the sense is not that the Word was made man through incarnation, but that the Word, about which so many illustrious things are said, is nothing other than flesh, that is, a certain man; just as John is called a voice, not because he was voice incarnate, but because he was a man crying in the wilderness.

To the second Franciscus David and the Transylvanian ministers respond that Christ is rightly called God but not the same God as the Father; but when there is added, “and God was the Word,” if the name ‘God’ were taken in the same way it would signify that the Son is the Father.

But to the “everything was made through him,” they reply that it must be understood of the reparation made by Christ, which is also wont to be called a new creation, II *Corinthians* ch.5, “If then there is any new creature in Christ, the old has passed away, and behold all things are made new.” *Ephesians* ch.1, “To renew all things in Christ, both those in heaven and those on earth.” And ch.2, “We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus, in good works.” And *Psalms* 50, “Create a clean heart in me, O God.”

But they err. And first their opinion about the Word is similar to the error of Eunomius whom Cyril refuted. For Eunomius said that the Word, which is Christ, is not anything eternal in God, or anything subsistent, but it is something created; but it is called Word, because it was similar to, and as it were the image of, the internal word, and because he heard the words of God and announced them to us.

There is a refutation of both errors. First from the following words, because this Word, which was made flesh, was God and God the creator of all things; not therefore created. Second, because this Word was in the beginning with God, before the world came to be, nor is it ever said in Scripture to have been made. Third, because if Christ is the image of the eternal and internal Word, which is in God, John in ch.10 should not have said, “He who sees me sees the Father also,” but ‘he sees the Word also’. See the many things in Cyril on this place.

But to the argument about the Greek ‘came to be,’ I reply that this phrase is ambiguous and signifies both ‘to be’ and ‘to be made’; hence in *John* ch.3, “A marriage was made” (Greek ‘came to be’), and ch.1, “the world was made through him” (Greek ‘came to be through him’), and later, “the water made wine” (Greek ‘the water come to be wine’). But in this place it signifies ‘come to be’ not ‘is’; and it is

plain first from what was said; for if the Word was before the creation of the world, it was certainly before the flesh; for the flesh too is one of the creatures. It is not then that the Word is flesh but that it was later made to come to be flesh when it assumed flesh.

Second, because if John had wanted to signify 'be' and not 'come to be' he would not have said 'came to be' but 'was in being' or 'is in being', that is, he would not have said 'was' but 'is being' or 'was being'. For 'was' is said only of what now is not. But Christ is also flesh now.

Third, because the Greek Fathers, Chrysostom, Cyril, Theophylact, Euthymius, knew well the force of the Greek vocabulary, and yet they all expound 'was made' in the way it is also contained in the version of Erasmus and that is extant in the Vatabilis Bible, to which the adversaries are wont to attribute very great weight.

As to the second argument, we have already said that John in this chapter is wont very often to repeat the same thing twice, at the end of one sentence and the beginning of the next. So here therefore the name 'God' is put twice in the same signification, and the sense is "the Word was with God," that is, with the Father who is God; "and God was the Word," that is, and the same God was also the Word. Or, as others wish, who make 'God' the predicate and 'Word' subject, and the Word was the same God.

Nor is it an obstacle that in the "with God" the Greek has the definite article but in the "and God was the Word" there is no definite article before the name 'God'. From this Origen argued that the Father is greater than the Son. For, as Chrysostom notes, God when taken for the Father often does not have the definite article, as in this chapter, "there was a man sent by God," and later, "no one has seen God at any time etc.," and sometimes God, taken for the Son, does have the definite article, as in *I John* ch.5, "He is the true God," and *Titus* ch.2, "The coming of the glory of the great God."

But to the "all things were made through him," I say first that the explanation of the adversaries is so new that it came into the mind of none of the ancients, as is plain to anyone reading Origen, Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine, Theophylact, Bede, Rupert, Euthymius. I say second that Scripture should not be expounded metaphorically at will, but only then when Scripture itself gives the occasion; otherwise we could pervert all the Scriptures, and we could, with the same reason, say that in *Genesis* ch.1 not the creation of things but their renewal is described. Nor are the places adduced to the contrary an obstacle; for in them there is always open mention of renewal, as is plain to anyone who reads those places. But here is said simply, "all things were made through him and without him was not anything made." I say third that, although this place would bear both senses, yet the adversaries cannot prove that it should be expounded of renewal rather than of first creation. For the reasons they adduce have no validity.

Their first proof that creation is not being dealt with is that Christ was not then born when the world was created. But we deny that Christ was not then born of God the Father, although he was not born of his mother. But when the adversaries assume what they should prove, do they not beg the question?

Their second proof is that the Scriptures everywhere attribute the work of creation to the Father. But in fact they attribute it not to the Father alone but also to the Son. *Proverbs* ch.8, "I was with him putting all things together," and in this chapter 1 of *John*, "and the world was made through him."

Their third proof is that after John had said in this place, "all things were made through him and without him was not anything made," he at once restricts it saying, "that was made," as if he were to say that not everything absolutely was made through Christ but all those things only that pertained to his office, and that were made through him.

A restriction to these things would be ridiculous. For it would be as if he said, "all things were made through him that were made through him." But John does not say this but he says, "without him was not anything made that was made," that is, there is no thing that was made that was not made through him, which John added because of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be thought to be among the 'all things' that were made through the Word. Add that the reading is more probable which Augustine follows, that the words ("that was made") do not pertain to the preceding sentence but to the following one, in this fashion: "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made. What was made was in him life; and the life was the light of men." And by this reading is the argument of the adversaries plainly destroyed. Is then the common explanation of the Fathers to be abandoned for such slight and false reasonings?

I say fourth that this place is explained a little later, when it is said, "he was in the world and the world was made through him and the world did not know him." For we have that the world was made through Christ, which world did not know Christ. But if the making of the world were not creation but renewal it would be false to say "the world did not know him," since renewal is made through the faith and knowledge of Christ.

The adversaries most stubbornly respond that the sense is this: "he was in the world," that is, Christ man conversed as man among men, "and the world did not know him," that is, and men at that beginning did not know him, "and the world was made through him," that is, and yet he illumined men and made them new creatures.

But on the contrary. For in the first place the adversaries change the order of the words, for they want the world first not to know him and then to have been made. But the Evangelist says first, "the world was made through him," then he notes its ingratitude saying, "and the world did not know him."

Further the world in the Scriptures signifies either the substance of heaven and earth, as in *Ecclesiastes* ch.3, "he handed over the world to their disputation," or men who are impious lovers of the world, *John* ch.12, "the prince of this world will be thrown out," *John* ch.17, "I pray for them, not for the world." Therefore when it is said, "the world was made through him," either the substance of heaven and earth is signified, as all the Fathers expound, or the sense will be that men were made impious through Christ, which is an enormous blasphemy; for the world when taken as the impious was not made by Christ but destroyed by Christ, so as to make a new creation.

The fourteenth place is contained in *Colossians* ch.1, "In him were made all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions,

whether principalities or powers; all things were created through him and in him, and he himself is before all things, and all things stand together in him." This place is clearer than the previous one, for it explains what all those things are that Christ created and preserves, and they are said to be all things altogether, earthly and heavenly, up to the supreme angels. From which it follows that Christ is not a creature but true God.

However the Transylvanians and Franciscus David reply that in the whole of this chapter creation is said to be the spiritual reparation that was made through Christ. Their first proof is that thus did Procopius expound it. The second that Paul does not say that earth and heaven were made through Christ but the things that are in heaven and earth, that is, angels and men whom Christ is said to have created because he pacified them and reconciled them together among themselves.

But on the contrary. First all interpreters understand this place of the first creation. Hence the adversaries, when they went around all the libraries could only find one author, Procopius, a better orator than a theologian, and one who does not interpret this epistle, but by the by, when he was writing on *Genesis*, cited for his purpose one sentence from this epistle without regard to what preceded it or what followed it. And lest nevertheless they should glory they have found one colleague for their error, one must note that the same Procopius, in the preceding pages when expounding the words "let us make man in our image and likeness," very bitterly inveighs against those who deny that there are three persons of the same essence, and he even says a little later, "Christ put on flesh so that man, whom he had created, he might restore and cure." When therefore he says a little later that all things were made through Christ according to the Apostle in *Colossians* and expounds it as restored, he means to say that Christ restored what he had before created.

Second I prove it from the preceding words, for he had said that Christ was "the first born of every creature," that is, begotten by the Father before any creature was made, as Chrysostom rightly expounds it. Next the Apostle adds, as going to prove it, "for in him were made all things etc." But if 'make' signifies 'renew' Paul is proving nothing; for this inference does not hold, "he renewed all creatures," therefore he existed before all creatures; for how often do architects restore buildings that had been erected many years before they themselves were born? So in order for Paul rightly to prove that Christ is the first born before all creatures, the fact that he himself made all things should not be interpreted as that he renewed all things, but that he simply created them.

Third I prove it from the following words. For after Paul had said that all things were created through Christ, he subjoined other praises of Christ, saying that he is the head of the Church, and the first born of the dead, and through him all things were renewed, and through his cross peace was made between angels and men. Unless therefore we are to make Paul an inept babbler, who is always repeating the same things, we must admit that in the first part of the chapter he is dealing with creation and in the second with renewal.

Fourth I prove it from the context itself. For he says that all things were created through Christ, even thrones and dominions; but the angels were not renewed through Christ, because they were not made old through sin. They are

indeed said to have been set at peace with men, but to set at peace is not to make and create, nor can any example in Scripture be adduced.

Nor does the place of *Ephesians* ch.1 stand in the way, where all things are said “to be renewed through Christ, things in heaven and things on earth,” for the Greek word for ‘renew’ means to recapitulate and to bring back to the heights, and the sense is that God wanted to unite angels and men in the one head, Christ.

But if we also take the Latin word ‘to renew’ in its proper signification, the sense will be, God wished to renew in heavenly places through Christ, not the angels themselves, who did not need renewal, but the number of the angels that was lessened by the fall of the demons, as Augustine expounds, where he says that Christ did not die for the angels, and where he says that men would not have been going to need a mediator and his blood had Adam not sinned. But here the angels themselves are said to have been made and created through Christ, therefore true creation is being treated of and not renewal.

The fifteenth place is *Hebrews* ch.1 where it is said of the Son, “through whom he made also the world.” And later, “and you established the earth at the beginning, Lord, and the heavens are the works of your hands.” Here we have very clearly what the adversaries were demanding in the two previous places, namely that Christ made heaven and earth, and therefore he is not a creature but the one creator along with the Father.

The Transylvanian ministers and Franciscus David reply that by the world is understood a new world, that is, the reparation of the human race.

On the contrary. For when Paul explains in ch.11 what it means to make the world he says, “by faith we understand that the world was fitted together by the Word of God, so that visible things came to be from invisible.” Which certainly cannot be understood save of the first creation of the heavens. See ch.4 above.

#### *Chapter Seven: Fourth Class: from the Names of the True God*

The first divine name is God, from which no slight argument can be taken; for Scripture is wont to call only the true God God absolutely, as Irenaeus notes, “Neither the Lord, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the Apostles ever named him who was not God absolutely and definitively God unless he was true God... It has been manifestly shown that never did the prophets or the Apostles name another as God or call another Lord besides the true and sole God.”

And from this Erasmus notes that the Father is understood whenever God is named absolutely. But the saying of Erasmus is false, as will soon appear; but it pleased us to note his testimony to make it clear that, even by the testimony of an adversary, the term ‘God’ absolutely used agrees with the sole true God. And without the testimony of Irenaeus and Erasmus the thing itself proclaims it of itself. For since Scripture repeats nothing more often than that there is one God, how could Scripture not be repugnant with itself if it called God absolutely not only the true God but also something else? This name is already attributed absolutely to Christ, *Isaiah* ch.9, “His name will be called wonderful, God, mighty etc.” *John* ch.20 where Thomas says to Christ, “My Lord and my God.” *Acts* ch.20, “Attend to yourselves and the universal flock in which the Holy Spirit has made you bishops to rule the Church of God which he obtained by his own blood.” *Romans* ch.9, “Who is

above all things God." *Apocalypse* ch.4, "The Lord God omnipotent, who was, who is, and who is to come." I *John* ch.3, "In this we know the charity of God, because he laid down his life for us." How then is he not true God who so often in the Scriptures is pronounced God absolutely? And how, I ask, does the fact that Christ is so absolutely called God cohere with *Exodus* ch.20, "You will not have foreign Gods before me, etc." and I *Corinthians* ch.8, "For us there is one God," if Christ is not one God with the Father?

The second name, and indeed very proper to the true God, is Adonai, which the Greeks call the tetragrammaton; for thus do we read in *Exodus* ch.15, "Adonai is his name," which our translator translates as 'his name is omnipotent'. But in the Hebrew there is not properly 'omnipotent' but the ineffable name.

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#### *Chapter Seven: Fourth Class: from the Names of the True God*

The first divine name is God, from which no slight argument can be taken; for Scripture is wont to call only the true God God absolutely, as Irenaeus notes, "Neither the Lord, nor the Holy Spirit, nor the Apostles ever named him who was not God absolutely and definitively God unless he was true God... It has been manifestly shown that never did the prophets or the Apostles name another as God or call another Lord besides the true and sole God."

And from this Erasmus notes that the Father is understood whenever God is named absolutely. But the saying of Erasmus is false, as will soon appear; but it pleased us to note his testimony to make it clear that, even by the testimony of an adversary, the term 'God' absolutely used agrees with the sole true God. And without the testimony of Irenaeus and Erasmus the thing itself proclaims it of itself.

For since Scripture repeats nothing more often than that there is one God, how could Scripture not be repugnant with itself if it called God absolutely not only the true God but also something else? This name is already attributed absolutely to Christ, *Isaiah* ch.9, "His name will be called wonderful, God, mighty etc." *John* ch.20 where Thomas says to Christ, "My Lord and my God." *Acts* ch.20, "Attend to yourselves and the universal flock in which the Holy Spirit has made you bishops to rule the Church of God which he obtained by his own blood." *Romans* ch.9, "Who is above all things God." *Apocalypse* ch.4, "The Lord God omnipotent, who was, who is, and who is to come." I *John* ch.3, "In this we know the charity of God, because he laid down his life for us." How then is he not true God who so often in the Scriptures is pronounced God absolutely? And how, I ask, does the fact that Christ is so absolutely called God cohere with *Exodus* ch.20, "You will not have foreign Gods before me, etc." and I *Corinthians* ch.8, "For us there is one God," if Christ is not one God with the Father?

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#### *Chapter Eight: Fifth Class: from the Attributes*

The chief attributes of God are, first, eternity, *Genesis* ch.21, "He invoked there the name of God eternal," *Romans* ch.16, "according to the precept of the eternal God," *I Timothy* ch.6, "Who alone has immortality."

Second, immensity, *Psalms* 114, "Great Lord and most to be praised, and of his greatness there is no end," *Jeremiah* ch.23, "I fill heaven and earth."

Third, power, I *Timothy* ch.6, “who alone is powerful, etc.”

Fourth, wisdom, *Romans* ch.16, “to the only wise God.”

Fifth, goodness, *Luke* ch.18, “No one is good save God alone.”

Finally, sixth, majesty, worthy of supreme cult, *Deuteronomy* ch.6, *Matthew* ch.4, “You will adore the Lord your God and him only shall you serve.”

And almost all these the Transylvanian ministers attribute to the Father alone. If therefore we show that these belong to the Son, it will be proved that he is true God and one with the Father.

So, eternity is attributed to the Son in *Proverbs* ch.8, “I was ordained from eternity.” For here wisdom speaks, but not essential wisdom, which is altogether the same as the divine essence but is not generated, but this wisdom says, “I was brought forth before all the hills.” Nor is it created wisdom that is here speaking; for nothing created is from eternity. And besides this wisdom distinguishes itself from creatures by saying, “The Lord possessed me from the start, before he made anything from the beginning.” Therefore necessarily it is generated wisdom, that is, the Son, of whom I *Corinthians* ch.1 says, “Christ the virtue of God and the wisdom of God.”

To this place Franciscus David and Blandrata and the Transylvanian ministers respond that the book of *Proverbs* is not canonical; but this is crass ignorance. For about this book there has never been doubt, either by the Jews or by the Christians, as is plain from Jerome; but the adversaries have been deceived by the fact that *Wisdom* and *Ecclesiasticus* are not received by the Jews nor by the Lutherans; for they reckoned that there was the same nature to this book as to those, since all treat more or less the same argument and are wont to be attributed to the same Solomon.

In addition to this place we have another from *Micah* ch.5, “And thou Bethlehem Ephrata are least among the thousands of Judah; from you will go forth for me a leader to rule my people Israel, and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.” This place was understood about Christ also by the scribes among the Jews, *Matthew* ch.2.

Franciscus David replies that the days of eternity are called those first six days of the world, because of their continuous succession, and then Christ is said to go forth because then the promise about Christ was made to Adam.

But in the first place Jerome, Theodoret, Rupert, and all interpreters expound this place of the eternal generation of Christ; Vatablus himself as well, to whom the adversaries attribute much.

Further, without cause do they say that the days of eternity are those first days because of succession. For they can show it neither by authority nor example nor any reason. “From you will go forth” signifies true nativity and not some promise; so too in the words “and his going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” should true nativity be signified, for there is the same word in both places, in the Latin text as in the Hebrew.

Another place is *John* ch.1, “In the beginning was the Word.” For what is ‘in the beginning was the Word’ unless the Word did not begin but always was?

The Transylvanians reply that ‘in the beginning’ does not signify the beginning of the creation of things but of the renewal that was made through Christ.

Therefore they want the sense of this place to be 'In the beginning of the renewal of the Church the Word', that is, the man Christ was indeed in the world because he was already born of Mary, but he was with God because he was hidden from men and known to God alone until he was made manifest by John.

But the following words conflict with this explanation, "All things were made through him." And the words, "And the world was made through him." But we disputed about this place above.

Another place is *John* ch.8 where the Lord says, "Before Abraham was I am." This place is not valid against the Arians but is against the Samosatans and the Transylvanians who want Christ not to have been before Mary.

Hence Franciscus David replies that Christ was before Abraham but in type and figure and various promises of God about sending him. But Christ does not respond in this way to the thing; for the Jews said, "You are not yet fifty years old and you have seen Abraham?" The Lord responds, "Before Abraham was I am," that is, I saw Abraham because before he was born I am. But certainly if he was hidden in figures he did not see him.

In addition to these places there are certain others to which they respond nothing. One is *John* ch.17, "Glorify me with you Father with the glory that I had with you before the world was." But Scripture is wont to describe eternity through the 'before the world was' or 'before the foundation of the world', as is plain in *Ephesians* ch.1, "He chose us before the foundation of the world," and *John* ch.17, "You loved me before the foundation of the world," and I *Peter* ch.1, "Foreknown before the foundation of the world." Another is *Hebrews* ch.7, "Having neither beginning of days nor end of life." Another is *Hebrews* ch.13, "Jesus Christ today, yesterday, and for ever," that is, he always was, he always is, he always will be, which in *Apocalypse* chs.14 and 11 is very often repeated, "who was, who is, and who is to come." Lastly I *John* ch.5, "He is true God and life eternal." Certainly if Christ is life eternal he cannot both not have been and be himself eternal and therefore true God.

Immensity is attributed to the Son of God in *Baruch* ch.3, "He is great and has no end, high and immense." And a little later, "He is our God and another will not be compared with him." And a little later, "He was seen on earth and conversed with men." And from this place Augustine proves that the Son is immense.

Nor is it an obstacle that the prophet seems to be speaking of the great place of God and not of God himself, because there precede the words, "O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how huge the place of his possession." And immediately there follows, "He is great and has no end." For as Theodoret notes, the prophet is not speaking of a material place but of the spiritual place of the saints, which is the same God himself; nor of some definite possession, but of the infinite possession of good, which is God himself, otherwise it would be false that the possession of God is immense and has no end.

Another place is *John* ch.3, "No one has ascended to heaven save he who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven." If Christ (for he calls him Son of man) was in heaven when he was speaking on earth, therefore he was at the same time in heaven and on earth; but he was not then in body in heaven, since he would say that he will ascend to heaven; therefore there was another nature of

Christ, beside the human nature that was seen by mortal eyes, namely the divine nature, which is immense and fills heaven and earth at once.

Another place is *Matthew* ch.18, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." Who does not collect immensity from this? For in heaven and on earth and in all provinces and regions he must necessarily be at the same time he who is present wherever there are some gathered together in the name of Christ.

Power or rather omnipotence is attributed to the Son of God in the *Apocalypse* very often, ch.1, "I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end, says the Lord God, who was, who is, and who is to come, omnipotent;" ch.4, "Holy, holy, holy Lord God omnipotent, who was, who is, and who is to come;" ch.11, "We give thanks to you, Lord God omnipotent, who art, who was, and who art to come."

But the Arians object *John* ch.5, "The Son cannot do anything of himself save what he sees the Father doing."

I reply with Gregory Nazianzen and Ambrose that by these words is only signified that the Son's power is from the Father and is the same as the Father's power; for it is not said, 'the Son cannot do anything save what the Father commands or helps', but it says 'save what he sees the Father doing'. Therefore he immediately subjoins, "whatever the Father does, this does the Son likewise." Therefore each does all the same things, but the Son sees the Father doing, or is said to learn from the Father, because the knowledge of the Son is from the Father, not however by teaching but by generation. For it is the same thing for God to know and to be; and therefore it is the same thing for the Son of God to receive knowledge and to receive essence.

The Transylvanians object *Matthew* last chapter, "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth." For thence it seems to follow that Christ has a certain omnipotence not from eternity, nor from nature, but by gift of grace and from time.

I reply that these things are said of Christ insofar as he is man not insofar as he is God. For since he himself the same is both God and man, qua God he has omnipotence from eternity and from his nature; qua man he has received supreme power from God in time and by gift of grace. Or if you prefer to speak of Christ the man in the concrete, not of his humanity in the abstract, the man Christ received omnipotence from time but by gift of uncreated grace, namely of the hypostatic union, and therefore the man Christ was omnipotent and God not first after his resurrection but from his very conception. For what he says in *Matthew* ch.28 after the resurrection, "All power is given to me," he said before his passion in *John* ch.13, "Knowing that the Father gave all things into his hands."

Wisdom is attributed to the Son so often that wisdom is said by the theologians to be something appropriated to him, I *Corinthians* ch.1, "Christ the wisdom of God," *Colossians* ch.2, "In Christ are all the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God," *John* last chapter, "Lord, you know all things."

But the Arians object with the place of *Matthew* ch.24, "Of that day knows no man, neither the angels, nor the Son, but the Father only."

I reply that these things are said of Christ insofar as he is man, as the Fathers teach, Ambrose, Cyril, and others. Wherefore this place does not favor the Arians.

But as to how the man Christ may be said not to know that day we will expound in the question about the knowledge of the soul of Christ.

You will say that in this place only the Father is said to know, therefore the Son even as God is excluded.

I reply with Augustine that the word 'only' does not exclude the persons, who are of the same nature as the Father, but created things, unless the discussion is about an action that belongs to the Father by reason of his person, not by reason of his essence; since therefore knowledge belongs to the Father insofar as he is God not insofar as he is Father, for that reason the Son and Holy Spirit are not excluded when the Father alone is said to know something.

The Transylvanians object, for in *Romans* ch.12 it is said, "To the only wise God honor and glory through Jesus Christ," the 'to the only wise' seems to be said of the Father alone; for in this place the Father is very openly distinguished from the Son, since the words are added 'through Jesus Christ'.

Augustine replies that 'to the only wise' is said of the whole Trinity, to whom honor is given through Christ. For, since Christ is God and man, as God he receives honor with the Father and the Holy Spirit, as man he hands it over. But he handed it over when he preached the Trinity in the world, and commanded all nations to be baptized in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Goodness is attributed to the Son, *Wisdom* ch.7, "Wisdom is more mobile than all mobiles, and it reaches everywhere because of its purity, for it is the breath of the virtue of God and a certain sincere emanation of his omnipotent clarity, and nothing of iniquity arises in it. For it is the luster of eternal light and the mirror without spot of the majesty of God, and the image of his goodness, and since it is one it can do all things, etc." Again *Matthew* ch.20 Christ says, "Is your eye evil because I am good?"

How then (say the Arians and Transylvanians) does the Lord say *Luke* ch.18, "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone."

I reply with Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, and Chrysostom that Christ responded according to the mind of him who had said, "Good master, what must I do etc." For he did not think Christ was God etc. but was one of the Rabbis.

Majesty to be adored is attributed to Christ in *Hebrews* ch.1, "Let all his angels adore him." Where one must note that these words are quoted by Paul from *Psalms* 95, where the adoration of worship proper to God alone is being treated of, for there precedes, "Let all be confounded who adore statues and who glory in their images." And at once, "Adore him all his angels." Here idolatry is opposed to the cult of God.

Further Christ has a temple, which is a proper sign of worship, *Malachi* ch.3, "Then the Lord will come to his holy temple, and the angel of the temple whom you want."

Again the invocation of someone absent is, for the adversaries, the adoration of worship. But Christ is invoked, for in *John* ch.14 he himself says, "If you ask anything in my name, I will do it." On which place Augustine says, "thus he proceeded to the Father so that he might not turn away the needy but hear those who seek." And Cyril says, "Clearly he shows himself to be true God. For he says he will take up the prayers of his own and will give them everything they ask." Again Stephen in *Acts* ch.7 says, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." And *Acts* ch.9 Ananias says

to Christ, "He has power of binding all who invoke your name." And Paul II *Corinthians* ch.12, "Three times I asked the Lord and he said to me, 'my grace is sufficient for you'." In which place Christ is called Lord, as is plain from the following, "Gladly then," he says, "I will glory in my infirmities, so that the virtue of Christ may dwell in me." And in I *Corinthians* ch.1 and in almost all his epistles Paul thus greets the Christians, "Grace to you and peace from God our Father and our Lord Jesus Christ." Here grace and peace for the faithful are prayed for from God the Father and from God the Son.

But because the adversaries elude these places by the ambiguity of the Greek text, where the 'from the Lord Jesus Christ' can be read as 'of the Lord Jesus Christ' in this way, 'Grace and peace from God who is our Father, and who is also the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ'; therefore one must note the place in II *John* where is contained very clearly "Peace from God and from the Lord Jesus Christ," from which place the more obscure places of Paul should be expounded.

Finally almost all the prophets predicted that after the advent of the Messiah idolatry would be exterminated; but the Church always in the whole world has worshipped Christ with temples, altars, invocations, feast days; therefore either Christ is true God deserving of the cult of worship, or all the prophets were deceived. For if Christ is not true God there was never so signal an idol in the world, nor did idolatry so flourish, as after the advent of Christ; and yet the Holy Spirit exclaims in *Isaiah* ch.2, "The Lord alone will be raised up in that day, and the idols will be altogether trodden down," in *Zachariah* ch.13, "In that day the fount will be parent to the house of David and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, for absolution of the sinner and the defiled woman, and it will be in that day, says the Lord of hosts, that I will destroy the names of idols from the earth, and they will be no more remembered." See also *Isaiah* ch.31, *Ezekiel* chs.6 and 30, *Hosea* ch.10, and *Micah* ch.1.

The Transylvanians and Franciscus David and Blandrata reply to this point about adoration that Christ is to be adored both because God the Father has commanded it and because he has in himself the to be adored divinity.

But on the contrary, for if Christ is not true God, God the Father cannot command it without contradicting himself. For in *Deuteronomy* ch.6 he commanded to be written, "You will adore the Lord your God and him alone will you serve." And *Isaiah* ch.42, "I will not give my glory to another." How then would he command us to serve a creature and to share his glory with a creature?

Again, if Christ is God, but not supreme and most high God, then the cult of worship, which belongs only to the most high, is not due to him. And it is not enough that God dwells in Christ so that he can be adored; otherwise the whole world could be adored, and especially holy angels and men in whom God singularly dwells.

Because of these arguments Franciscus David, although he had often before taught that Christ was God and to be adored, not indeed as most high but as Son of the most high, yet afterward changed his opinion and taught that Christ is not to be called God nor is to be adored nor invoked, and he responded to all the places we cited above for the invocation of Christ.

But there is no need for us to tread down time in refuting him, for his arguments are either mere trifles or, if they have any force, make for something

against Blandrata, who wants Christ not to be true God and yet to be adored and invoked, but against us they effect nothing, for these are his chief arguments. If Christ is to be adored with divine cult and to be invoked as God, then we will have to say with the Papists that Christ is one God with the Father, and we will have to restore the Trinity which hitherto we have impugned. Again if Christ is not true God and yet can be invoked, then also the Holy Spirit, nay and Mary and the angels and the rest of the saints could be invoked. Why then have we hitherto accused the Papists of idolatry because they invoked the saints?

These arguments are very certain arguments against Blandrata and Faustus and other Antitrinitarians, who however, as they are manifestly convicted by Franciscus David and by his sectaries of fighting against themselves and against most clear reason, so do they on the contrary convict Franciscus David and his followers of perverting the Scriptures with incredible rashness.

But it is pleasing by way of example to put forward the response of Franciscus David to the testimony of *Acts* ch.7, "They stoned Stephen as he was invoking and saying, 'Lord Jesus, receive my spirit'." Franciscus David first replies that this example or deed is of Stephen, not a testimony of Scripture. But the example is of a man who, on the evidence of Scripture, "was full of faith and the Holy Spirit," *Acts* chs.6 and 7.

Secondly he replies that the 'Lord Jesus' is an invocation of the Father, for he wants the word 'Jesus' to be in the genitive case so that the sense is 'You Father, who art Lord of your Son Jesus, receive my spirit.'

But we have never read 'Lord Jesus' elsewhere in the sense that 'Jesus' is in the genitive case; but we read in the *Apocalypse* last chapter, in the vocative case, "even so come Lord Jesus." Besides in *Acts* ch.7 Stephen saw Jesus standing at the right hand of God when he says, "Lord Jesus receive my spirit;" therefore he invoked Jesus himself.

Franciscus David responds that the words of Stephen, "Behold I see the heavens opened," can have this sense, 'I so certainly believe Jesus has risen and is now in heaven as if now, with heaven opened, I saw Jesus himself'.

But Luke says, "Looking to heaven, he saw the glory of God and Jesus standing at the right hand of God," therefore he truly saw and did not merely so believe as if he had seen.

He replies thirdly that the words 'Lord Jesus' are directed to the Father, because the Father too can be called Lord Jesus, since it is proper to the Father to be Lord and to save. But what is this rashness to attribute the proper name of the Son to the Father? Is not this to confound the Father with the Son in the manner of Sabellius?

#### *Chapter Nine: Sixth Class: from the Works*

The works that belong to God alone are five: creation, preservation, salvation, foreknowledge of hidden things, performance of miracles.

The first work proper to God is creation, *Isaiah* ch.44, "I am the Lord who alone stretches out the heavens and establishes the earth, and there is none with me." *Job* ch.9, "Who alone stretches out the heavens." Hence by this work God wishes to be distinguished from non-true gods, *Psalms* 95, "The Gods of the Gentiles are

demons, but the Lord made the heavens." *Jeremiah* ch.10, "Let the Gods who did not make the heaven and the earth perish from the earth and from under heaven."

If we prove, then, that Christ made the heaven and the earth, it will be proved that he is the one true God along with the Father. But we have the many places explained above, namely *John* ch.1, "All things were made through him." *Ibid.*, "And the world was made through him." *Colossians* ch.1, "All things were created through him." *Hebrews* ch.1, "And you Lord founded the earth at the beginning, and the heavens are the works of your hands."

To these let us add *Proverbs* ch.8, "When he weighed out the foundations of the earth, when he strengthened the deeps with a fixed law and circuit, when he established the ether above etc., I was with him putting all things together." Which place cannot be understood of essential wisdom, as we taught above, because it is not begotten; but this wisdom says, "Before all the hills I was born;" nor of created wisdom, because that did not exist before the world. Nor can it be said the book is not canonical, as the Transylvanians say, because about this book neither Jews nor Christians ever doubted.

Again *John* ch.5, "Whatever the Father does, that does the Son likewise." But the Father daily creates the souls of men who are born, and he once created heaven and earth; therefore the Son too now creates souls, and he formerly created the whole world.

To this argument the Samosatans and Arians respond in diverse ways. The new Samosatans deny that Christ is creator, since he did not exist before his Virgin mother, but we have related and refuted what they say in response to the cited places. One thing I add against them. If Christ did not create heaven and earth, either he is not God or he should be exterminated from the world; for *Jeremiah* ch.10 says, "The Gods who did not make heaven and earth, let them perish from the earth and from under heaven." But the Samosatans do not deny that Christ is God, nor do they want him to be exterminated; therefore they should admit that he is creator.

The old Arians and Valentinus Gentilis, the renewer of Arianism, reply that the Father alone is principal author of heaven and earth, but the Son was the minister of the Father in creation. The Transylvanians too say that Christ is not eternal God, and that he did not do anything in the creation of the world; yet if something should be conceded to him, no more can be conceded than that he was as an instrument of the Father.

Their principal argument, which the Transylvanians also use, is that in Scripture the Father is often said to have made things through the Son, and to the Father the preposition 'from' is attributed and to the Son the preposition 'through', I *Corinthians* ch.8, "One God Father, from whom are all things, one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things." *John* ch.1, "All things were made through him." *Hebrews* ch.1, "Through him he made also the world." *Colossians* ch.1, "All things were created through him."

The Transylvanians also add the Council of Smyrna, which is received as orthodox by Hilary, and is explained in the book of Synods. For the Council asserts that the Son of God the Father ministered in the creation of the world. Again they add the testimony of Irenaeus, of Tertullian, of Eusebius, and of Luther, whom they

call the messenger of God: on the first chapter of *Genesis* where he calls Christ the instrument of God.

We must demonstrate, then, that the Son of God created the world, not as instrument, but as principal cause. And first this is plain from *Hebrews* ch.1, "And you Lord founded the earth at the beginning, and the heavens are the works of your hands." For that this is not to be understood by way of instrument I prove from the fact that this same thing is said by David of the God of Israel, whom the adversaries wish to be the Father, and who it is certain was not the instrument of creation.

Besides Paul in this chapter compares Christ with the angels, and says there is this difference, that the angels are ministers but Christ is not minister; for he says, "To which of the angels did he at any time say, 'Sit at my right hand'? Are they not all ministering spirits sent for ministry?"

Secondly I prove it from *Isaiah* ch.48, for he who says, "And now the Lord has sent me, and his Spirit," whom we showed above to be the Son in the first class of arguments, is the same who says, "Because of myself I will cause that I am not blasphemed, and my glory I will not give to another." But he who works because of himself is certainly not an instrument.

Third, from the *Apocalypse* ch.1, where the Son is called alpha and omega, beginning and end, and Lord omnipotent. For if he is beginning and end, as alpha and omega are in the alphabet, then certainly he is first beginning and ultimate end of all things; therefore he is not an instrument, for neither of these fits an instrument. Again, if he is omnipotent he is able to create the world as principal author; he ought not then to have been minister to another.

Fourth, by demonstration through resolution: if the Father creates through the Son, either the Father alone commands and the Son alone makes, or both make but the Father as first cause and the Son as second, or both do everything as first cause but the Father by his will and the Son as commanded by the Father; for it is not easy to assign another way in which the Son could concur with the Father in creation and yet not be equally principal with the Father; but none of these ways agrees with the truth, as will be plain from what we will soon say. Therefore the Son is equally principal creator with the Father.

The Arians indeed used to say that the Father per se made nothing but the Son made everything at the command of the Father, because creatures are not susceptible of divine action immediately and because it is unfitting for the supreme virtue to descend to these very little things, as Cyril reports.

But on the contrary. For in *Proverbs* ch.8 we read that the Father too made, "When he was preparing the heavens I was there." And *John* ch.5, "Whatever the Father does that the Son does likewise." Again, "My Father works and I work." And as to little things, *Matthew* ch.10, "One sparrow does not fall to the ground without your Father."

Besides, we never read that the Father commanded the Son; again, we do read that the Son made by commanding, for *Baruch* ch.3, about him who was seen on earth and conversed with men, says, "Who sends forth light and walks; calls that thing, and it obeys him with trembling; but the stars gave light on his guard; they were called, they spoke, we are present, and they shone on him in joy who made

them." And *Luke* ch8, "Who think ye that he is, that he commands the winds and the sea and they obey him?"

Nor is the reason of the Arians valid. For, as Athanasius and Cyril well refute it, the Son is either God or creature. If he is God then he could not, according to them, create immediately; if he is creature then he could not be created immediately by the Father, unless perhaps they want the Son to be something in between God and creature, which certainly is impossible. For either he is produced from nothing or from a created thing or from the very substance of God. If the first or second, then he is a creature. If the third, then he is God. So there is no middle position. So we have it that both Father and Son really worked in the creation of the world. And thus we have refuted the first way that we put in the argument.

Again, it cannot be said that both made but the Father a greater part and the Son a lesser part; for that conflicts with the Scripture of *Proverbs* ch.8, "I was with him putting all things together." And *John* ch.1, "All things were made through him." And *John* ch.5, "Whatever the Father does that the Son does likewise." Therefore both make the whole.

Again, it cannot be said that both made the whole but the Father is principal agent and the Son is instrument. For the Son either has power of creating in himself, in the way that the sun has power of illumining although it is God's instrument, or he does not have it but is like the shadow of Peter or the girdle of Paul in respect of the miracles that were done by them. If the second then the Son of God has nothing beyond other creatures.

And besides, what is it that Paul says I *Corinthians* ch.1, "Christ is the virtue of God"? And *Hebrews* ch.1, "Who carries all things by the word of his virtue"? He has then in himself the virtue of making what he makes. But the virtue of creating is infinite virtue; nor can it exist in an instrument but only in the supreme infinite artificer. Wherefore all the Fathers number Basilides and certain others among heretics because they said that the word was created through angels; see Irenaeus, Athanasius, Augustine, Cyril, Damascene. The Son then is principal creator.

You will say he has the virtue of creating but he is not principal, because the Father acts by his own judgment, the Son by another's. On the contrary, for *John* ch.5, "As the Father makes alive those whom he will, so the Son makes alive those whom he will." Again, the Holy Spirit acts freely and by his own will, I *Corinthians* ch.12, "He divides to all as he will." But the Holy Spirit is not greater than the Son, nay, according to the adversaries, he is lesser; therefore the Son too acts freely and as he wills.

Finally if the Son has the virtue of creating, either the same in number as the Father has or different. If the same then they are one Creator and there is one work, one will, one essence to both. If different then these passages of Scripture are false, I *Kings* ch.2, "None is strong as our God is," and *Exodus* ch.15, "Who is like you in strength, Lord?" For there is another equally strong, namely Christ.

To the argument about the preposition 'from' and 'through', I reply that the preposition 'from' is often attributed to the Father, 'through' to the Son, 'in' to the Holy Spirit; not because one person is instrument to another but to denote their properties. For as Basil teaches, to the Father is attributed 'from' to denote that he is principle without principle. For 'from' is the note of efficient causality. To the Son is

attributed 'through', which is the sign of intermediate cause, and the Son is principle from principle; for he has from the Father that he is principle. Hence the Son is said to act from the Father, "When the Spirit comes whom I will send you from the Father." Although it could also be said that the word 'through' is attributed to the Son because wisdom is appropriated to the Son, and God created all things through his wisdom and art, as Damascene teaches.

Finally, 'in' signifies containing and is attributed to the Holy Spirit who is the bond of Father and Son. However lest this diversity of prepositions should harm the faith, God provides against it in two ways.

First, by indicating that all these things belong to the same God. For *Romans* ch.11 says, "O the depth of the riches and the knowledge and wisdom of God etc., since from him, through him, and in him are all things." For all these things are said of one and the same God, as is plain from what precedes, "the knowledge of God, his judgments, his sense etc.", and from what follows, "to him be glory for ever." Either then they are said of the Father alone, and then it is plain that 'through' does not signify ministry, because it is attributed to the Father whom it is agreed is no one's minister. Or of the Son alone or of the Holy Spirit alone; and then the Son and Holy Spirit are not ministers because 'from' is attributed to them, which belongs to the principal author, as they themselves also confess. Or of all together, and then all are together one God. So admonish Ambrose, Basil, Augustine.

Second he provides by mixing up these prepositions, for sometimes 'through' is attributed to the Father, *I Corinthians* ch1, "God is faithful through whom you were called to the fellowship of his Son," *Galatians* ch.4, "But if Son then heir through God." Sometimes 'from' is attributed to the Son, as *John* ch.1, "From his fullness we have all received," *Colossians* ch.2, "From whom the whole body through joints etc.," *John* ch.16, "He will take from me." Ambrose and Basil also admonish about this.

To the Council of Smyrna I reply with Hilary that the Son is said to be minister, not because he is properly inferior or subject, but because he is from the Father. For he ministered not as slave to lord but as son to father, between whom, although there is no inequality of nature or dignity, there is yet in the Father the authority of principle that is not in the Son with respect to the Father. For a son is from the father, not conversely. But that this does not make a proper servitude is plain; because then all sons would be slaves.

Add that I do not know how much authority the Council of Smyrna has, for it seems to me rather to be tolerated than approved. Certainly no mention is made of it in the enumeration of the Catholic Councils.

To Irenaeus, Tertullian, Eusebius, Luther, I make the same response, although in the dogmas of Tertullian and Eusebius there is little authority and in those of Luther none, for all are manifestly heretics, but Tertullian and Eusebius were very learned, while Luther has more of verbosity than of solid doctrine.

The second work proper to God is the preservation of the whole world, which is as it were a certain creation, about which *Acts* ch.17 says, "In him we live and move and have our being." But this same thing belongs to the Son, *Hebrews* ch.1, "Who carries everything by the word of his virtue," and *Colossians* ch.1, "All things stand together in him," that is, as Chrysostom rightly expounds, the subsistence of

all things depends on the Son of God, so that if it is conserved by him and stands together in him lest it immediately perish, then the Son is true God.

The third work is salvation, *Isaiah* ch.43, "I am the Lord and there is no savior apart from me," and ch.45, "A just God and savior there is not beside me," and *Hosea* ch.13, "I am the Lord God and there is no savior besides me." But what agrees more with Christ than to save? *Matthew* ch.1, "You will call his name Jesus for he has saved his people." For the name 'Jesus' is taken from the Hebrew 'Jeshua' which signifies salvation.

And lest you say that he ministers salvation, hear Paul in *Hebrews* ch.1, "Who carries all things by the word of his virtue, making purgation of sins through himself." For although the 'through himself' is lacking among the Latins, yet it is in the Greek, and in the same place Paul compares Christ with the angels, and says they are servants and Christ is Lord. Again *Isaiah* ch.35, "God himself," that is, per se, not through legates, "will come and will save us." The Apostles said they were ministers, not co-ministers, of Christ, *I Corinthians* ch.4, "Let a man so judge of us as of ministers of Christ," and in his name they baptized, reconciled, did miracles, etc. so as to demonstrate that they were ministers of Christ.

The fourth work is prediction of the future and the examination of hearts, *Isaiah* ch.45, "Announce the things that will be, and we confess that you are gods," *III Kings* ch.8, "You alone know all the hearts of the sons of men," *Jeremiah* ch.17, "The heart of man is inscrutable, who may know it? I the Lord scrutinize the hearts and prove the bowels."

But all these things belong to Christ, *John* ch.13, "I have told you this before it happens, so that when it happens you may believe that I am," *I Peter* ch.1, "Scrutinizing in what or which time the Spirit of Christ was signifying in them, announcing beforehand the sufferings in Christ and his later glories," *John* ch.2, "He knew what was in man," and *Apocalypse* ch.2, "And all the Churches will know that I am he who scrutinizes the hearts and proves the bowels."

You will say that the prophets too predicted the future, and saw the thoughts of hearts, as is plain of Elijah. But on the contrary, for Paul in *Hebrews* ch.3 compares Christ with Moses, the supreme prophet, and says Moses was a servant and Christ was Lord. Again Christ speaks in the same way as the supreme God, in a way that none of the prophets dared to speak. For who ever says, "I am he who scrutinizes the bowels and the hearts" save the true and supreme God? Lastly if the Spirit of Christ illumined all the prophets, *I Peter* ch.1, how did Christ not know hidden things in a higher way than the prophets?

The fifth work is the performance of miracles, *Psalms* 71, "Who alone does miracles," *Psalms* 75, "You are God alone, doing miracles," and *Psalms* 135, "Who alone does great miracles." Which however is understood to be by his own authority; elsewhere even the holy Apostles and prophets did miracles but by invocation of God, as Hilary notes on this place.

But Christ did miracles by his own authority, as is plain, both because he commanded, *Mark* ch.4, "He said to the sea, peace, be still," and ch.4, "Dumb and mute spirit, I command you, go out of him," and also because he cured by his own will even when absent, as is plain of the Centurion's boy, *Matthew* ch.8, and of the son of the ruler, *John* ch.4, and finally because as true God of the whole of nature he

conceded even to others power for doing miracles, *Matthew* ch.10, and by invoking him the Apostles did miracles, as is plain from *Acts* ch.3, "In the name of Jesus Christ the Nazarene, arise and walk."

*Chapter Ten: Seventh Class: from the Fathers*

The Catholic truth must be proved from the doctrine of the Fathers, for although the adversaries attribute little or nothing to the Fathers, yet they think that the Fathers who were before the Council of Nicea are on their side, as Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Cyprian. Although they confess that others are against them, yet they cite the testimonies of Hilary, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Cyril, Jerome, and Augustine against us to show that the Fathers were various and were compelled to contradict themselves by the evidence of the truth; and in brief they try to undo our argument from the consent of the Fathers of all ages. Let us then produce the consenting witnesses of all ages and especially before the Council of Nicea.

From the first age, which extends up to 100 years of the Lord, we have Clement, Ignatius, Dionysius, Martial. Let Clement first come forth who says, *Const.* bk.8 ch.16, that the Father generated the Son without mediation before all things, which is to say that the Son was not made but necessarily and naturally proceeded from the Father. For as Basil teaches, nothing made is the immediate work of the artificer, because the work is the medium, and between God and creatures there is the medium of the will to create; for when God has been posited the creature is not immediately posited, but when God is posited immediately his Son is posited. Again, after having cited the 'Holy, holy, holy' he subjoins in explanation, "Holy God the Father, Holy Son, etc." And later he says to God, "To you all glory and honor and adoration, to the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit, both now and always and for all ages of ages." A like place to this from Clement is brought forward by Basil in his book on the *Holy Spirit* ch.29.

John, Blessed Dionysius the Areopagite, disciple of Blessed Paul, says in *Divine Names* ch.1, "Therefore in almost the whole theological tract we have seen the supreme divinity celebrated in holy way, as singular indeed and unique because of its simplicity and its indivisible unity, but as a Trinity because of the expression of super-essential fecundity in the three suppositives." And later he says that this supreme essence assumed human flesh in one of its hypostases. He has like things in his *Mystical Theology* ch.3.

St. Martial in epist.1 to the Burdegalenses ch.20 says, "Think there is nothing discrete in the divinity of the Trinity." And later, "And these, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are divided three in persons, but in divinity one undivided God." This epistle I suspect for many reasons not to be of the Martial who was disciple of Christ; but whosever it is, it has nothing for the adversaries and everything for us.

St. Ignatius, disciple of the Apostle John and martyr, in his epistle to the Philippians, "He says one should believe not in one three-named, nor in three incarnates, but in three of the same honor." And later, "But if he is God and man, why call the Lord unequal in glory, who is of invariable nature?" And later, "the 'if you are the Son of God' is a proof of ignorance. For if you had truly recognized him, you would have known that he can equally be the maker of all things and make what is not and change what is." In his epistle to the Philadelphians, "If anyone say God is

one and confess Christ Jesus but thinks the same is mere man, he is a serpent of this sort, teaching falsehood and error for the ruin of men, and he is of a sort to be poor in sense, Ebion by name.”

Note that this place properly opposes the new Ebionites, who make Christ to be mere man. For because in the Hebrew tongue ‘Ebion’ means poor, Ignatius elegantly calls the Ebionites poor in sense.

Again, the same in his epistle to the Antiochians, “Throw off,” he says, “every Gentile and Jewish error, so that you neither introduce a multitude of Gods nor under pretext of the one God deny Christ. For Moses the faithful servant of God when saying ‘the Lord your God is one God’ and preaching him to be one and sole God, immediately confessed our Lord saying, ‘the Lord rained on Sodom and Gomorrah fire and sulfur from the Lord’.” And later, “Everyone,” he says, “who announces one sole God and takes divinity from Christ is a devil and an enemy of all justice.” In his epistle to Polycarp, “Expect,” he says, “Christ the Son of God in time, who lacks all time, palpable and fleeing all touch, as being incorporeal.” All these things are expressly against the Transylvanians, who make Christ temporal and mere man. They are also against the new Tritheists and Arians, who although they confess Christ is eternal yet deny he is true God. From which also it can easily be collected how the places are to be understood that Valentinus Gentilis and the Transylvanians cite from Ignatius.

First they bring forward his epistle to the Magnesians, where it is said, “He announced one and sole true God, his Father.” Therefore, says the heretic, the Father alone is true God.

I reply that the ‘sole’ separates the Father of Christ from those who are not of the same substance with him. For the sense is that the Father of Christ is the God who is the one and sole true God, which same thing can be said of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. For since the true Divinity is only one, the Father is that God who is one and sole God, and the Son is that God who is one and sole God, and the Holy Spirit is that God who is one and sole God. Finally, Ignatius said nothing other than what Christ had said before to his Father, *John* ch.17, “that they may know you the sole true God.”

Second they bring forward the epistle to the Tharsians, where Ignatius says that Christ is the Son of the Creator, and is not he who is God above all but his Son.

I reply that Christ is so the Son of the Creator that he is also himself the same Creator, as the same Ignatius says in his epistle to the Philippians. The reason for this is that the Father by generating communicated his whole essence to the Son, and therefore also his whole power and wisdom, by which the world was created.

Further, the Father alone is called God above all by Ignatius because of the authority of principle, not because of diversity of nature. Otherwise he would be in conflict with Paul in *Romans* ch.9, and also with himself when he asserted in his epistle to the Philippians that the Father and the Son are of the same honor.

Third they bring forward the epistle to the Philippians where he expounds of the Father *Deuteronomy* ch.6, “The Lord your God is one Lord.” And later he introduces Christ speaking to Satan, “I know one, I know a sole, I am not against God, I confess his excellence.”

I reply that Ignatius wants to prove from the place in *Deuteronomy* ch.6 that the Father is one and not many Fathers; as he will also later teach that the Son is one and not many. So he proves it very well in this way, "The Lord God is one," *Deuteronomy* ch.6. Therefore there is only one God the Father. For if there were several Fathers, they could not be one Lord God. For now the Father and Son are one God, because one is from the other.

Further the Son confesses the excellence of the Father by reason of principle only; hence he at once subjoins, "I know the Father is the author of my generation." However the place here could be understood of Christ the man; for Christ the man addresses the devil and then all things are squared away; for Christ as man is truly lesser than the Father and can call the Father his God and his Lord, as he himself says *John* ch.20, "I ascend to my Father and your Father, my God and your God."

Fourth, they bring forward the final words of the epistle to the Antiochians, "Hail to God and Christ."

I reply that here Christ is distinguished from God by reason of humanity; for elsewhere in this epistle Ignatius calls the devil him who by pretext of the one God denies the divinity of Christ.

Lastly they bring forward the epistle to the Ephesians, "But our doctor is the sole true God, unbegotten and invisible etc."

I reply that this place is read variously; for some more ancient exemplars have it thus, "But our doctor is one sole true God, only begotten and invisible Father and begetter of the only begotten of all."

The other reading is in Theodoret *Dialogue* I where it is cited thus, "Our doctor is begotten from the unbegotten etc." Athanasius in his book on the Councils of Rimini and Seleucia cites this place in this way, "One is our doctor corporeal and spiritual, begotten and unbegotten, God in man etc." And he expounds unbegotten, that is, uncreated. Yet the first reading too does not conflict with our opinion. For after Ignatius had said, "But our doctor is sole true unbegotten God," he subjoined, "But we have also the doctor Jesus Christ, the Word only begotten before time." From this we understand that the exclusive word ('sole'), when Ignatius said "our doctor is the sole true unbegotten God," did not exclude the Son of God but rather created things, which are not of the same essence as the true unbegotten God

Of the second age up to the year 200 we have four other Fathers, Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria. Justin in his book on right explanation of faith, at the beginning, says, "There is truly one God of this universe, who is acknowledged in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, for since the Father generated the Son from his own substance, and produced the Spirit from the same substance, by very good right are the persons who have one and the same essence dignified with one and the same divinity." And later he proves that the Son and Spirit are not creatures but one God creator with the Father. In his apology to the Senate he says, "Further, his Son, who alone is properly called Son, existing and being born the Word together with him before creatures, since through him he first made and adorned all things." In his Apology to Antoninus, at the beginning, he says, "We profess ourselves to have no part in, and to be atheists about, the sort of gods who are believed in, but not about the most true God the Father of justice and chastity and the other virtues. But him and the Son who come from him and the

Prophetic Spirit we worship and adore, venerating them with reason and truth.” Here he opposes the cult of the Trinity to the cult of idols and false gods, and therefore he teaches that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are true God. In the same place near the middle he wants the words of *Exodus* ch.3, “I am who am” to be said by Christ. “By what was said to Moses from the bush, ‘I am the existing God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, God of your fathers, there is signified that those dead also exist and are men of Christ himself.”

He repeats the same at length in his Dialogue with Trypho where also, not far from the end, he teaches that the Father and Son are really two and yet of one essence. “That virtue can in no way be disjoined or separated from the Father.” And later, “That virtue, which the prophetic voice calls God, is not counted only in name, as the light of the sun is, but is also some being in number, as I explained above when I said that this virtue is generated from the Father, not by being cut off as a part from the essence of the Father in the manner that all other things when divided and cut are not the same as they were before they were cut.”

Form these things is solved the objection of Gentilis from Justin. For he objects that in the Dialogue with Trypho he says that Christ is a different God from the maker of the World. But Justin does not say this; he teaches only that he is different, that is, a different person, who is and is called God and Lord in addition to the Father, to whom the creation of the world is attributed; for those are his words and the sense is that he is another alongside the creator of the world, and he is called God. Again, that he who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and who is called and written as God, is other than him who made all things. And next he explains how he is other when he subjoins that he is other in number, not in mind, that is, in person, not in essence.

You will say that if Christ is distinguished from the maker of the world then he himself is not the creator of the world.

I reply that by maker of the world the Father is described, because to the Father power and creation are wont to be attributed. For elsewhere in his Apology to the Senate the same Justin very openly teaches that the Son is creator of the world.

Athenagoras in his Apology to Antoninus says, “The Son is the reason of God and word of the Father in form and effective power. For from him and through him all things were made, because the Father and Son are one, and because the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son.” And later, “The Son is the first offspring of the Father, not as something made. For from the beginning my God, eternally existing, had in himself reason and word.” And later, “Who then would not be astounded if he dare to call us atheists who say God is Father and God is Son and Holy Spirit, and demonstrate their virtue in union and their distinction in order?” And much later, “So that we recognize God and his Word and Holy Spirit in equal honor and power.”

St. Irenaeus bk.3 ch.6 says, “Neither then the Lord nor the Holy Spirit nor his Apostles ever named him who was not God definitively and absolutely God unless he was true God; nor did they call anyone Lord in his person save he who is Lord of all things, God the Father and his Son.” And later, “Truly then since the Father is Lord and the Son is truly Lord, rightly did the Holy Spirit signify them with the name of Lord.” Ch.8, “He indeed who made all things with his Word is justly called God and

sole Lord; but the things that are made are not perceptible words of the same, nor should they justly have that name which is the Creator's." Ch.12, "The Apostles announced that this is Christ, eternal Son of God, their King." Ch.16, "When it has been manifestly declared that they who were preachers of the truth and Apostles of freedom did not call God or name Lord anyone else but the sole true God the Father and his Word, who has the principality over all things, it will have been manifestly shown that the maker of heaven and earth, who spoke with Moses and gave him the dispensation of the law and convoked the Fathers, is confessed by them to be Lord God and none other is known by them." Ch.20, "All the contradiction of those is excluded who say, 'if then he is born, Christ did not exist before', for we have shown that the Son of God, existing always with the Father, did not then begin to be." Bk.4 ch.11, "Christ himself, then, along with the Father is God of the living, who both spoke to Moses and was made manifest to the Fathers."

But Gentilis and the Transylvanians object many things from Irenaeus. First from bk.1 ch.2 where he says the Church accepts the faith that is in one God Father omnipotent, who made heaven and earth, sea, and all that is in them, and in one Jesus Christ Son of God, incarnate for our salvation, and in the Holy Spirit etc. Here the one God omnipotent and creator is called Father, and Jesus Christ is called the Son of this one God creator. From which it seems to follow that Christ is not one God creator with the Father.

I reply that this word 'one' obtains on the part of God not on the part of the Father. For the sense is not that one Father, that is, the Father alone, is God creator, but that the Father is the one God who is one and sole creator of heaven and earth. But that it is not also said of the Son that he is the one God creator is done because Irenaeus is there reciting the Creed, and a Creed should be very brief and so what can be collected from what is said should not be repeated.

But it could also be understood that the Son is also the one God creator, both as Cyril teaches in explanation of the Nicene Creed that the Son is understood in the Father, and also because it was said there is only one God and yet faith in God is said to be faith in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Hence the same Irenaeus in the places we cited says that Christ is God and Lord creator, eternal, and yet he always repeats that there is only one God.

Secondly, they bring forward many places from bk.2, 3, 4, 5 where Irenaeus very often repeats that the God of Israel creator of heaven and earth is the Father of Christ and that Christ would have been a seducer if he had preached another God besides his Father, etc. For from this they deduce that Christ is not one God with the Father, since the Father and Son are distinct and are two, not one; and one of them is called God of Israel creator.

I reply that Irenaeus repeats these things so often because of the heresiarchs Valentinus and Marcion, who introduced another creator and God of Israel besides the Father of Christ. Besides, from the fact that the Father of Christ is called creator, and God of Israel, not only does it not follow that the Son is not that very creator and God of Israel, but rather it follows that he is. For just as man generates man and king king, so the creator generates creator and God God, with this difference, however, that because the divine nature is indivisible God generates the same God in number though distinct in person; but man generates only the same man in species.

Thirdly, they object that Irenaeus expounds of the Father, not of the Trinity, the words of *Deuteronomy* ch.6, "Hear O Israel, the Lord your God is one God." For thus does he say in bk.4 ch.2, "Christ confesses his Father whom also the law announced when it said, 'Hear O Israel, the Lord your God is one'."

I reply that Irenaeus is not saying that this place should be understood of the Father alone, nor do we understand it about the Trinity such that it is not also understood of any person separately. For the Trinity is not as the adversaries fancy, distinct from the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But what is said about any person separately is said also of all together and conversely, with the exception only of the personal properties.

Clement of Alexandria *Pedagogy* bk.1 ch.6, says, "But it was fitting that the Son, since he was God, learnt nothing. For neither was there anyone greater than the Son, but he who is sole master has neither master nor doctor. Will they not then even unwilling confess that a perfect Word is born from a perfect Father?" Bk.3 last chapter at the end, "We praise one Father and Son along with the Holy Spirit, who as one is all things, in whom are all things, through whom are all things, who is on all sides good, on all sides beautiful, on all sides fine, on all sides just, to whom glory now and for ever. Amen."

Finally Ruffinus testifies in his *Apology for Origen* that this Clement in all his writings celebrated one glory and majesty of three persons.

In the third age we have six Fathers, and first Origen. A disciple of Clement, Origen does indeed have in his writings very open blasphemies against the Son of God and the Holy Spirit, as is plain from Epiphanius and from Jerome. Yet it is very likely that these were inserted by Arians afterwards, as Ruffinus teaches. For there are also found in Origen's writings opinions altogether Catholic, and Athanasius cites Origen against the Arians and adds that the Arians could adduce none of the ancients for the error.

Besides Clement, the master of Origen, and Gregory Thaumaturgus, Origen's disciple, think most correctly about the Trinity; how then is it possible that Origen himself thought so badly? Origen then expounding *Romans* ch.9 says, "I marvel how some who read what the Apostle says, 'one God Father from whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things' can deny that the Son of God should be professed to be God lest they seem to say there are two Gods. And what will they make of this place of the Apostle, in which Christ is described openly as God above all? But they who think these things do not notice that just as he said the Lord Jesus Christ is not so one Lord that therefrom God the Father should be said not to be Lord, so too he said that God the Father is not so one God that the Son of God not be believed. But each is one God." Again, "But he who is above all has no one above him, for the Son is not after the Father but from the Father." Again later, "The nature of the Trinity is manifestly shown, and the one substance that is above all things." Thus Origen, and these things are certainly very clear.

St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, bishop of Neo-Caesarea, in his confession of faith says that the Word of God is the true Son of the true Father, God from God, invisible from invisible, eternal from eternal. And he adds, "Perfect Trinity, divided not at all in majesty, eternity, or rule." Again, "Neither anything serving, nor anything made, nor anything added is found in the Trinity."

St. Dionysius, Roman Bishop, produced very fine volumes, about which Athanasius says the following, "Further, from the volumes of Dionysius, Roman Bishop, written against those who asserted that the Son of God is a work or a creature, it is clearly shown that the heresy of the Arian rebels against Christ was damned by all, not first now, but long ago." Again the same Athanasius recites these words of Dionysius, Roman Bishop, "I hear there are among you certain masters of the divine word who profess an opinion which is diametrically opposed, so to say, to the opinions of Sabellius. For he with blasphemy says that the Son is the Father and the Father the Son. But these in some way establish three Gods when they divide the holy unity into three substances of different sorts. For it is necessary that the Word of God be united with the God of all, and to inhere in the same, and for the Holy Spirit to be present there; and for the Holy Trinity to be consummated and coalesce in one omnipotent God of all things as in the summit and prince. For the doctrine of the vain speaking Marcion has instituted a cutting and division of the Monarchy into three principalities, but it is an institution of the devil, not of the true disciples of Christ. For these plainly know that, as the Trinity is preached by the sacred letters, so they recognize that nowhere do the Old and New Testaments introduce the idea that there are three Gods."

In addition, "You will not less blame those who believe the Son of God is a work and think the Lord was made, since the sacred words attribute a fitting generation to him, not a formation or creation." And later, "The admirable and divine unity is not then to be divided into three deities, nor must its dignity and immense majesty be diminished with the name of creation." And later, "Thus then the divine Trinity and the profession of Monarchy will be able to be preserved." So Dionysius, who 1300 years ago condemned not only the Arians who were not yet born but also the Tritheists and Samosatans of our own time.

St. Dionysius, Alexandrian bishop, when he was accused before Dionysius the Roman Bishop that he had said the Son of God was a creature, wrote an apology in which he put these words among others, "Now," he says, "because he is the splendor of eternal light, he himself is in all ways eternal." And later, "In this way we stretch out the Unity, which is indivisible, into the Trinity, and we consummate the Trinity, which cannot be lessened, into the Unity; and yet we are accused as if we say that the Son is one of the number of things made and in no way consubstantial with his Father." And later, "I say it is a false charge they object against me, that I denied that Christ was consubstantial with God."

Tertullian Against Marcion bk.4, near the middle, says, "You believe everything was handed over to him by the Father, if Christ is of the creator, of whom are all things, and because he is not lesser than himself, the Creator has handed all things to the Son that he made through him." In his book Against Praxeas, "Since the very rule of faith passes from the many gods of the world to the one and true God, they, not understanding that the unity is to be believed indeed but with economy, are affrighted of the economy, number, disposition of the Trinity, and presume a vision of unity when the unity derives the Trinity from itself, and is not destroyed but administered by it etc."

Note that the economy of God is called by Tertullian the order and disposition of three persons. Later, "Behold I say the Father is one, the Son another,

the Holy Spirit another; any idiot or perverse person has taken this saying as if it indicated diversity and extends from the diversity a separation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But of necessity I say this, when they fawningly contend for the same Father and Son and Holy Spirit against the economy of the Monarchy, that the Son is not other than the Father by diversity but by distribution, not by division but by distinction, for the Father is not the same as the Son and the Son is other than another." And later, "But how you should take 'other' I have now professed by the name of person, not of substance, for distinction, not for diversity. Besides, everywhere I hold one substance in three cohering together." And later, "If one person both of God and the Lord were found in the Scriptures, certainly Christ would not be admitted to the name of God and Lord. For no one other than the one God is preached." And a little later, "Therefore I altogether do not say there are Gods or Lords, but I follow the Apostle so that if Father and Son are named equally I call God Father and Jesus Christ I name Lord. But I can say that Christ alone is God, as the same Apostle says, from whom is Christ, who is God above all blessed for all ages." And later, "And the name of Father is God omnipotent, most high, Lord of virtues, King of Israel, who is; these things we say also belong to the Son and in them the Son has come and in them he always acted, and thus did he manifest them in himself to men, 'all things of the Father,' he says, 'are mine,' why not also the name?" And later, "Which three are one, not one personal being, in the way it is said, 'I and the Father are one,' in unity of substance, not singularity of number."

From these quotations can the words be explained that are adduced to the contrary by Gentilis and the Transylvanians. First they object, from the book Against Hermogenes, not far from the beginning, "For," he says, "neither can the Father be before the son, nor a judge before the crime. But there was a time when both the crime and the Son were not, which made him who is Father judge and Lord."

I reply that these words sound badly, and should not be usurped; but they do not in Tertullian signify that the Son of God as God did not always exist. For in his book Against Praxeas he says, "The Word then was always in the Father, as he says, 'I am in the Father,' and always with God, as is written, 'And the Word was with God' and never separated from the Father, because 'I and the Father are one'." And in the page preceding he had said, "Before all things God alone was. But alone because there was nothing outside him. Yet not even then was he alone, for he had with him his reason."

The Son therefore, of whom Tertullian says in his book Against Hermogenes that he was not always, is not the Word of God but the Son by adoption, that is, any holy man or Angel; for Christ is not being dealt with here, but the creature participant in reason, which came from the outside, and denominated God in time as Father. Or if the Son is the Word of God, by the time when he was not is not understood a true time, but a certain priority of origin. For Tertullian here only intended to say that God could not be called Father until after he had a Son, but the first explanation is more solid and easier.

Second they object from the book Against Praxeas, "I acknowledge God the Son, I defend him as second from the Father."

I reply that he calls the Son second and the Holy Spirit third because of order of origin, not because of diverse degrees in essence. For in the book Against

Hermogenes he says, "Divinity does not have degrees, as being single." And in the book *Against Praxeas* he very often repeats that there is one substance to the Father and the Son. Hence in the same book, when he said that the Son was distinct from the Father, not in status but in degree, by degree he understands the order of persons.

Thirdly they object from the same place, "The Father is whole substance, the Son is a derivation and portion of the whole."

I reply that since Tertullian said that divinity does not have degrees, and it is evident that it is altogether indivisible, necessarily must these words be understood only of personal distinction, which in the whole book he is aiming at. But he calls the Son a portion and the Father the whole substance, because the Father is fount and principle of the other persons, and for that reason has a certain greater-ness, and in this way he explains himself, "The Son," he says, "is a derivation and portion of the whole, as he himself professes, that the Father is greater than I. Thus too the Father is other than the Son since he is greater than the Son; since there is one who generates and another who is generated; one who sends and another who is sent etc.," and yet before, when he was speaking of substance, he had said that the Son is not other than the Father.

Fourthly, they object from the same book, "The consequence will be," he says, "that we understand the invisible Father for the fullness of majesty, but we recognize the Son by way of derivation." Hence in the same place he teaches that in all the apparitions of God in the Old Testament always the Son was seen but the Father remained invisible.

I reply that in Tertullian the Father is called invisible and the Son visible, not because the nature of the Son is visible but of the Father invisible, but because the Father, as Tertullian and many others think, never appeared in corporeal form, but the Son many times in the Old Testament assumed visible forms for a time, and in the New assumed flesh. But when he says that the Son is visible by way of derivation, he is not speaking of the derivation of the Son from the Father by eternal generation but of derivation to us by assumption of visible form; and that it is so is plain.

First, because a little later Tertullian says, "We say the Son too by his name is invisible to the extent that the Word and the Spirit of God are now from the condition of substance, and because God is both Word and Spirit of God; but he was visible before the flesh in the way he says to Aaron and Mariam, 'But if there be prophets among you, I will be known to them in a vision'."

Secondly, because a little later he says of the Father what is said in I *Timothy* ch.1, "To the immortal king of the ages, to the only invisible God." But of the Son the contrary is said since it is clear he is mortal and seen, when he manifestly speaks of the Son according to his human form.

But there is this to be observed, that Tertullian everywhere takes occasion to prove that the Father is not the Son, which was the heresy of Praxeas. And since the Scriptures say that God was seen by Abraham, Jacob, Moses, Isaiah, and Christ as God was seen by the Apostles, Tertullian thence makes an argument that there are two persons in God, one unseen the other seen. And so that the argument may

better hold together, all the places where God is said to have appeared he expounds of the Son, and all the places where God cannot be seen he expounds of the Father.

And although this argument of his is not so solid, for the same divine person can be said to be visible and invisible – visible in created appearance, invisible in his essence and personality – yet we collect from this argument of his that his intention was not to deny the divinity of Christ but to assert his proper personality.

Fifthly, they object from his book *On the Trinity* that the one God of the Jews is the Father of Christ, and that nothing can be compared to God the Father, and that the Son does not snatch from the Father that which is one God.

I reply first that the book is not Tertullian's, as is plain, both because in this book the Sabellians are refuted by name who had not yet arisen at the time of Tertullian, and also because Blessed Jerome attributes this book to Novatian. Secondly I say that the places are not against us; for truly the one God of the Jews is the Father of Christ, nor did Christ snatch from the Father that he is the one God, because Christ is not some second God but the same God as the Father. Nor yet can anything be compared to the Father if you consider origin, since he is the principle of the other persons, not conversely; with which however there consists an equality in substance of the three persons.

St. Cyprian in his tract on the Vanity of Idols beyond the middle says, "One Lord of all is God, for neither can that sublimity have a colleague, since it alone holds all power." And later, "This our God, he is Christ." And To Quirinus bk.2 ch.6, he proves that Christ is God from the places of Scripture that by the consent of all speak about the one true God of Israel, as *Genesis* ch.35, "Make there an altar to the God who appeared to you when you fled from Esau." *Isaiah* ch.45, "In you is God and there is no other God besides you, for you are God, and we knew it not, God savior of Israel. Again *Romans* ch.9, "From whom is Christ, who is God above all, blessed for ever." From which it appears to Cyprian that Christ is the true God of Israel.

The Transylvanians allege from Cyprian in their favor bk.2 ch.6, one place in explanation of the Creed; here God the Father of Christ is called Creator, and that there is one God Father, one Lord Jesus Christ, one Holy Spirit.

I reply first that the explanation of the Creed is not from Cyprian but from Ruffinus; for there are refuted there by name Arius, Eunomius, and Photinus, who had not yet been born at the time of Cyprian. From which you have how great is the historical erudition of the Transylvanians, who have not yet learnt at what time their predecessors and parents existed.

Second, I say that the words the Transylvanians cite have a little later their express refutation. For the author says, "It is a Council of vanity that Paul of Samosata says and that his successor after him Photinus taught; who asserted that he was not born before the ages but thinks him made God from man. A Council of vanity it is that Arius and Eunomius taught, who want the Son not to be born from the substance of the Father but to be created from nothing, and that the Son of God has a beginning and is less than the Father etc." But certainly it can be said with greater reason that the council of vanity is the synagogue of the Transylvanians, who not only teach the same thing that Paul of Samosata formerly taught, but even allege for themselves the books in which they themselves are very openly refuted.

I say third that Christ is the Son of the Creator and therefore is himself also Creator and the same as the Father because he received in being begotten the whole essence of the Father etc. Nor does it harm our opinion that the Father is called one God, for the Son too is called one Lord and yet it is clear that the Father is also Lord.

From the fourth age we have first of all the general Synod of Nicea of 318 Fathers, which produced the Creed that is cited by Ruffinus and is again repeated in the Creed of Constantinople and explained by Athanasius and Cyril, and which almost all the Fathers mention with honor. In this Creed these things are said first of the Son, that he is true God, second that he is consubstantial with the Father, that is, of the same essence as he.

Third, that he is eternal. Fourth that he is immutable and without turning as is the Father. Fifth that he is begotten, not made. So the Fathers could not have more clearly refuted those who want the Son to be a creature.

About this creed the Transylvanians pronounced a remarkable judgment, for they say it is the Creed of Antichrist and that the words 'begotten not made' are the madnesses of Antichrist, since they are openly in conflict with Paul who says in *Romans* ch.1, "made from the seed of David," and *Galatians* ch.4, "made from a woman."

Now they say that in this Creed their opinion is contained when it is said that only the Father is one God Creator. For thus does the Creed begin, "We believe in one God, Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and in one Lord Jesus Christ the Son of God."

But in both cases they themselves are truly mad. For when the Creed says the Son is begotten not made it is speaking of Christ as he is God, for a little later it is said, 'and he was incarnate and made man'. Therefore the same Creed asserts that the Son is made and not made; made insofar as he is man, not made insofar as he is God. In this way too that Blessed Paul says he was made from a woman and from the seed of David, which concerns the human nature that he assumed in time, and in another place he says that he was not made from created matter, but begotten from the Father before all creatures.

Further the Father is said to be one God, as we have often said, in the way the Son is said to be one Lord, for as by this the Father is not excluded from the name of Lord so neither is the Son from the name of God, but in both cases the term 'one' holds on the part of the predicate, not the subject, that is, the sense is not that one Father is God, but that the Father is the God who is one God.

Besides the Council of Nicea we also have in the same century the Synod of Constantinople of 150 Fathers, which again asserts that the Son is of the same substance as the Father. We have further in this age many Fathers, Greek and Latin: for Athanasius wrote five very long sermons against the Arians, and he directed all his works besides in the same direction, Basil five books against Eunomius, Gregory Nazianzen five orations on Theology, Gregory of Nyssa also five books, that is, one on the Trinity and four following of almost the same argument. Cyril of Jerusalem wrote five catecheses on this matter. Epiphanius wrote accurately both against Paul of Samosata and against the Arians.

From the Latins Hilary wrote twelve books on the Trinity, Lucifer Caralitanus a book to Constantine on behalf of Athanasius, and a second that it is necessary to

die for the Son of God. Marius Victorinus four books against Arius, Gregory Beticus a book on the faith against the Arians, Saebadius a book against the Arians, Ambrose five books on the faith, Philaristus in his book on heresies briefly confutes Samosata and Arius.

From among the Fathers of the fourth age the adversaries object only Hilary and Ambrose, for Hilary says that only the Father is one God, although Christ too is God. Ambrose explains of the Father alone the words, "to the King of the world, the immortal, invisible, only God." And about the Father alone he says that the Lord said, "No one is good save God alone," and expounds of the Father alone, "Who alone is powerful King of kings etc."

I reply that Hilary says that only the Father is true God in a way, however, that he does not deny that the Son too is true God; because the Son is understood in the Father, who is of the same essence as the Father. The words that the Transylvanians cite from Hilary teach this, "But perhaps 'the sole true God' does not leave to Christ that he is God. It does not leave it surely if 'one God Father to Christ' does not leave to him that he is Lord; but if 'one God Father to Christ' does not take away his being Lord, so 'sole true God Father' does not take from Christ Jesus that he is true God." Where very openly St. Hilary confesses that Christ is God and one with the Father, just as he is one and true Lord along with the same Father.

To the place from Ambrose I object first to these commentaries that they are not certainly from Ambrose, but in on the Faith bk.2 he contends that the words "King of kings, immortal, invisible, good, powerful" belong also to the Son and not only to the Father.

Second I say that in these commentaries the author of them attributes those epithets to the Father alone, not because he alone has them but because he alone has them from himself. For he thus explains himself, "All these things," he says, "the Father has likewise and the Son from the Father." Only invisibility does he attribute to the Father alone because only the Father did not appear in visible form, but the Son did appear, as was said in the places from Tertullian. For the author here is following Tertullian.

And because the Transylvanians dare to say that Ambrose everywhere defends the eminence of the eternal Father, we note one or other place of his: "To you now almighty Father with tears I turn my words. I have promptly said that you indeed are inaccessible, incomprehensible, inestimable, but your Son I have not dared to say is lesser." And, "If I have said you are greater than the Son, as Arius asserts, I have judged impiously." And, "Rightly did he equal himself to God." Again, "Christ knowing that he was in the form of God showed himself equal to God." How great an impudence then it is to say that the eminence of the Father is everywhere preached by Ambrose, since he himself in expressive words dares to say that neither is the Father greater nor the Son lesser, and on the contrary everywhere asserts they are equal. But this is not the first nor will it be the last lie of the heretics.

Of the fifth age from the year 400 to 500 we have two general Synods, which again approved the Nicene Creed, namely the first Synod of Ephesus and the Synod of Chalcedon. In addition we have many Fathers who expressly wrote on behalf of the true divinity of Christ, namely from the Greeks Chrysostom left many things written very eloquently and learnedly that Christ is God, and in his commentaries;

Theophilus of Alexandria; Cyril produced seven books on the Trinity against the Arians and fourteen of his Thesaurus. In addition in his commentary on John he never omits an occasion to refute the Arians. Theodoret everywhere disputes against those who deny that Christ is true God.

From the Latins Gaudentius elegantly refutes the Arians; Jerome often rebukes and convicts them; Augustine wrote often against the Arians, and Ruffinus, Idacius Clarus, Cassianus, Prosper, Pope St. Leo, Bishop Cerealis.

From these Fathers the Transylvanians object Chrysostom first who says that the epithets, "To the King of the ages, immortal, invisible, etc." the Father has per se but the Son from the Father. From this they collect that the Son is made God, immortal King etc. by gift of grace.

But Chrysostom fights back against this when he says, "The Father himself has this by nature, but did we through grace ever have it as the Son does? Not at all. But he too has this by nature." And later, "When I hear Father King of the ages I do not take away Lordship from the Son. For these are common both to the Father and the Son."

Second they object Cyril, who expounds of the Father, not of the Trinity, *Isaiah* ch.44, "I am the first and the last."

I reply that Cyril in that place says the words belong to the Father but he does not deny they belong to the Son. Nay, explaining this place he says, "These are not said to cast down the Son from the Father, unless perhaps, as in the myths of the Gentiles, you believe there is war between Father and Son; but for casting down false gods first and last the Father calls himself eternal God, and along with himself he necessarily understands the Son." And elsewhere, "For since the Son himself is nature uncreated and Lord and creator of all etc."

Third they object Jerome whom they say long struggled against the truth, but when conquered by the clarity of Scripture confessed that the one God is the Father; for he says that *Ephesians* ch.4 "one God and Father of all" is to be understood of God the Father.

But Jerome in the same place refutes this calumny; for he says that the Son is not excluded when the Father is said to be one God, just as the Father is not excluded when the Son is said to be one Lord. "If," he says, "as the Arians reckon, God the Father is God alone, by the same consequence Jesus Christ will be Lord alone, and neither will the Father be Lord nor the Son God, but far be it that deity should not be in lordship, or lordship not in deity. There is one God and one Lord, because the Lordship of the Father and the Son is one divinity. Further, one faith is said, because we believe likewise in Father and Son and Holy Spirit."

Lastly they object Augustine when he says, "What do we do with that testimony of the Lord? For to the Father he was speaking and he had named the Father to whom he was speaking when he said, 'But this is eternal life, to know you the one true God'. We must see whether we are compelled to understand as if he wished to insinuate that the Father alone is true God, so that we should not understand God only to be the three all at once."

Here Augustine seems to say that we are compelled to assent that only the Father is true God. Hence the Transylvanians exultantly say that Augustine by

contradicting this truth corroborates it. So again he too, not bearing the most clear light, unwillingly confessed the truth.

But the wretched Transylvanians are deceived by equivocation. For this proposition, 'The Father alone is true God', can have a double sense; one is of this sort, that only the Father is true God, that is, no person is true God besides the Father; the other is the Father alone is true God, that is, the Father too, considered separately and alone, is still true God.

The first sense is Arian and the Transylvanians have seized on it; the second sense is Catholic and intended by Augustine, as is plain from the cited words. For he says that for this reason perhaps only the Father is called true God so that we should not think the name of 'only' fits the three all together, that is, cannot be attributed to the individual persons separately.

Besides in the same place Augustine by name excludes the Arians who denied that the Son was true God, and he concludes his disputation by saying, "Now the equality of the Trinity and the one and the same substance has been demonstrated as briefly as I could."

From the sixth age we have the fifth Synod which asserts three persons of one essence and declares anathema on Arius, Eunomius, etc. Also we have Fulgentius, Vigilius Tridentinus, John Maxentius.

Lastly we have Boethius Severinus whose book on the Trinity the Transylvanians assert is very openly mad and teaches Sabellianism because it says that there is repetition of the same thing but not diverse enumeration when the Father is called God, the Son called God, the Holy Spirit called God.

But they themselves are truly mad, under the spell of the devil. For Boethius does not say that there is repetition of the same person but of the same divinity, which we are necessarily compelled to say unless we wish along with the pagans to introduce many Gods.

From the seventh age we have the sixth general Synod; also Gregory the Great, Gregory of Tours, Isidore.

From the eighth age we have the seventh Synod and Bede; also John Damascene.

From the ninth age we have the eighth Synod, also Photius and Theophylact, Haymon, and Rabanus.

From the tenth age, which is the most obscure of all, we have Ambrose Ansbertus, and Radulphus Flaviacensis.

From the eleventh age we have St. Anslem, and Giselbert.

From the twelfth age we have Richard of St. Victor and St. Bernard.

From the thirteenth age we have the Lateran Council and many signal theologians together, as also in all following ages, who either added to the Sentences of Lombard or themselves produced summas of theology, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, etc.

From the fourteenth age we have the Council of Vienne, whence is extant a single Clementine about the Trinity and the Catholic faith.

From the fifteenth age we have the Council of Florence in its decree of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

From the sixteenth age we have the Council of Trent. The faith of the consubstantial holy Trinity, which is one true God, is therefore continuous from Apostolic times up to us, which is an argument of signal truth, for heresies have never endured for so long.

*Chapter Eleven: Eighth Class: from the Sibyls*

The Sibyls predicted many things more clearly than others of the prophets. Now the testimonies of the Sibyls are cited by Justin, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, Augustine and other ancients very frequently. Indeed Clement in *Stromatias* bk.6 says that the Apostle Paul exhorted the Gentiles to the reading of the Sibyls. There is extant a most celebrated poem of the Sibyl Erithrea, whose capital letters form this sentence, 'Jesus Christ Son of God Savior' and a cross, and they conclude thus: "One and eternal God, he is servant and the same Christ suffered for us, whom the poems point to." And above it there is said of Christ, who will come to judge, "Hence the unbeliever and the faithful will see God."

These poems can be read in the oration of Constantine the Great to the assembly of the saints, which is contained in Eusebius. In this oration Constantine also says that Cicero came upon these poems and put them into Latin. And although they are not found among the works of Cicero, yet in his book on divination Cicero affirms that he saw the poems of the Sibyl that produced in its initial letters a certain sentence. This type of poem is called in Greek an acrostic, and here Cicero sufficiently indicates that he had read these very poems, for there are no others extant that signify something in their capital letters.

Further, Lactantius and Augustine report these poems of the Sibyls about the divinity of Christ. "You fools did not recognize your God, but you crowned him with a thorny crown, and you mixed frightful gall." Again, "And they will beat God with impure hands."

Further in bk.6 of the Sibylline oracles near the end we read this, "When the Davidic house will bring forth a shoot, in whose hands is the whole world, the earth, the sea, the sky." And later, "For the sane knowledge of God flees from you etc.," "O happy wood, on which God himself hung etc." And bk.7, "You who are to be pitied did not know your God, whom once in Jordan the water washed etc." And in bk.8 are put the words of the Angel to Mary, "O Virgin, receive God in your chaste, undefiled womb."

*Chapter Twelve: Ninth Class: from the Divine Testimonies of Visions and Miracles*

The Holy Spirit, foreseeing that the Arian heresy was very often to be renewed and would much harm the Church, wanted there to be much witness that it was most truly a heresy.

First, therefore, in about fifty years before the rise of the heresy of Arius, the Virgin Mary appeared to Gregory Thaumaturgus, and with her St. John the Evangelist; and on the command of the Virgin John handed over to Gregory the confession of faith in which the Word is preached to be true God, eternal, invisible, uncreated, and consubstantial Trinity. Gregory of Nyssa reports this vision in his oration in praise of the same Thaumaturgus.

Secondly, a little before the Arian heresy, God revealed to St. Anthony, as Athanasius writes in his life of Anthony, those horrible evils that Arius was to bring into the Church. From which it came about that Anthony allowed no Arian to ascend his mountain, but expelled them as a sort of plague from the whole mountain.

Thirdly, about the same time, when already the first seeds of the Arian heresy had begun to appear, there appeared to St. Peter Martyr, Bishop of Alexandria, Christ in chains with his garment cut from the top to the bottom, and when St. Peter asked what this meant, he received the response that Arius did it because he has separated me from my people. Bede and Ado write this in the martyrologies.

Fourthly, Arius himself, when seized in the public latrines in Constantinople with a loosening of the bowels, poured out all his intestines together with his life. This is written by Athanasius and Ruffinus and Gaudentius and Epiphanius.

Athanasius adds that before this happened Arius had affirmed with an oath to Constantine that he held the Catholic faith; but from Constantine he heard, "If your faith is right, you have sworn well, but if it is impious and yet you swore, God will condemn you for your oath." Then, when Arius wanted to enter the Church by force, Athanasius writes that St. Alexander, Bishop of Constantinople, prayed to God that he would take him from this world if he permitted Arius to enter the Church, but that he would take Arius away if he spared his Church.

From which we understand that it was not by chance that Arius was done away with by a foul death but plainly by the singular providence of God, who for this reason wished to fulfill both the threat of the pious Prince and the prayer of the supreme Pontiff, "The Lord himself," says Athanasius, "offering himself as judge has condemned the Arian heresy."

Fifthly, when Lucius an Arian Bishop was persecuting the Catholics everywhere, the monks performed miracles with these words, "In the name of Jesus, whom Lucius persecutes, rise and walk," as Ruffinus writes.

Sixthly, St. Hilary, sent into exile by the Arians, freed a certain island from snakes by his sole command and presence, and later too raised a dead man to life, as Fortunatus writes in his life.

Seventhly, St. Martin, as Supitius writes, so vehemently resisted the Arians that he was beaten in public with rods and expelled from his fatherland, although in the meanwhile he daily shone with innumerable miracles.

Eighthly, St. Basil, when there was a question about a certain Church as to whether the Catholics should possess it or the Arians, offered them this condition, that the Church should be shut with very firm bolts and would belong to them who, praying according to their faith, should open it by their word alone without any external force being applied. Having accepted the condition the Arians first prayed a long time according to their faith and could effect nothing; next, when Basil together the Catholics was praying, the doors of the Church were opened with as much force as if the words had been roars of thunder. Amphilochius writes this in his life of Basil.

Ninthly, when Justina the Arian Empress, was persecuting the Catholics and Ambrose and his comrades, God revealed to the same Ambrose the incorrupt bodies of St. Gervase and St. Prothasius, and through them he cured a blind man and did

many other miracles. These things were done to the confusion of the Arians, as Augustine teaches, and the same is also plain from the fact that the Arians misrepresented those miracles as much as they could, as Ambrose testifies.

Tenthly Victor of Utica writes about the Vandal persecution that when the holy martyrs were being beaten for their Catholic faith by the Arians up to exposure of their bones, it often happened that on the following day they were by divine miracle seen to be made whole. The same author writes that a blind man was cured by St. Eugenius at the time that the Arians were troubling the Catholics most. He also writes that by the order of the Arian king some Catholics had their tongues wholly cut out, and yet they always talked very well as long as they lived. St. Gregory also records this miracle and says he spoke with a certain old Bishop who saw one of them speaking without a tongue.

Eleventh, the same Gregory narrates three miracles that happened in his time; the first happened in the city of Spoleto, for when an Arian Bishop wanted to enter the Church of St. Paul and to dedicate that Church to his own error, the Catholics in fear very carefully closed the Church and extinguished all the lamps; but when the Arian came up with his own flock to make a forced entrance, immediately all the doors at once opened of themselves with a great noise and all the lamps were lit by a light coming from heaven, but the Bishop and all affected by his error were struck with blindness so that they did not dare to enter, and in confusion they took the blinded bishop to his own home.

The second miracle happened at Rome. For when Blessed Gregory himself had, after introducing the relics of the saints, reconciled a certain Church that belonged to the Arians, the devil in horrible aspect came out from those who were his. Then a very bright cloud descended on the altar and at the same time an odor of great sweetness suffused the whole place, and all the lamps were divinely set aflame.

The third miracle was in Spain, where after Herminigildus the son of the king had been killed for his faith by his Arian father, burning lamps were seen about him by night, and a singing of angels was heard by many.

Twelfth, as Gregory of Tour writes, when in Africa a certain Cirola, patriarch of the Arians, was persecuting the Catholics, and at the same time three holy Bishops, Eugenius, Vindemialis, and Longinus, who were all besides the rest resisting him, shone with miracles, the heretic too wanted to perform a miracle, and so a certain man was counted out fifty gold pieces so as to feign himself blind; but when, as Cirola was passing along the way, the man feigning himself blind asked Cirola for help, Cirola came up and touched his eyes, commanding him to see in sign of the truth that he was preaching; but suddenly so great a burning seized the eyes of the wretch that he was compelled to press them with his hands lest they leap from his forehead; and then he exposed the trickery and after in a loud voice confessing the Catholic faith he was suddenly cured with the sign of the cross by St. Eugenius.

By these and other divine testimonies, then, it is sufficiently openly proved that the opinion of those who deny that the Son of God is true God is inimical to God. But now it is time for us to come to confirm the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which was the fifth part of the intended disputation.

*Chapter Thirteen: the Divinity of the Holy Spirit is Demonstrated*

As far as the fifth point is concerned, then, we must prove that the Holy Spirit is true God. Although the adversaries deny this, yet they do not labor over it much. For they contend for the excellence of the Father, but if that excellence has to be taken away because of conceding some other person to be equal to the Father, they believe it matters little whether that person is one or two. Therefore Valentinus Gentilis almost always said that there was no question about the Holy Spirit. But the Transylvaians deny indeed that the Holy Spirit is to be adored and to be called God, but they do not accurately prove it nor refute the contrary. Therefore we will be content to prove it from the classes of arguments by which we proved the divinity of the Son, but very briefly.

The first class is from the Old Testament, which could provide many places, but because we are eager for brevity let one place suffice. For thus does divine Scripture speak II *Kings* ch.23, "These are the last words that David said, 'The Spirit of the Lord has spoken through me, and his word declared through my mouth, the Lord of Israel spoke to me, the strong one of Israel, Lord of men.'" Here you openly see that he who is called the Spirit of the Lord is said to be the same God of Israel, from which it follows that he is true God.

The second class is from the New Testament, which provides also many places, but this one will be enough, where the Lord says to the Apostles *Matthew* last chapter, "Go and baptize all nations in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." For the Lord would not join the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son if he was a creature. Next, as St. Gregory Nazianzen reasons, how could the Holy Spirit regenerate us through baptism and make us sorts of Gods unless he was himself true God? For "The Lord will give grace and glory," says David in *Psalms* 83.

The third class from both Testaments together gives us a very clear testimony to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit. For he whom Isaiah calls the Lord of hosts and whom all confess to be true God, he, I say, is the one the Apostle says is the Holy Spirit. But let us hear the words of Scripture. *Isaiah* ch.6, "The Lord of hosts says to Isaiah, 'Go, tell this people, hearing hear and do not understand etc.'" *Acts* last chapter, "Well did the Holy Spirit speak through Isaiah saying, 'Go to this people and say to them, you will hear with your ear and not understand etc.'"

Further, all the prophets, when they explained their words to the people, did they not repeat in the same place, "Thus says the Lord God"? But II *Peter* ch.1 says, "The holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Spirit." Therefore the Lord God was the Holy Spirit. Wherefore Zachariah says *Luke* ch.1, "Blessed is the Lord God of Israel etc." and later, "As he spoke through the mouth of the saints who were his prophets." By which words Zachariah could not have more clearly expressed that the Holy Spirit is the Lord God of Israel, and these names the adversaries everywhere testify signify the true God.

The fourth class is from the names, and indeed from this class are taken three arguments, the first negative because nowhere in the Scriptures is the Holy Spirit called a creature or made; although however in many places are numbered all the chief creatures, as *Daniel* ch.3 in the song of the boys, *Psalms* 102 and 148 where all the creatures are stirred up to praise God, and by name the angels, the heavens, the

waters, men, beasts, but there is no mention of the Holy Spirit; thus too in *Colossians* ch.1 the most noble creatures are numbered, thrones, dominations, principalities, powers. And in I *Peter* ch.3, angels, powers, and virtues, so that Christ might be shown to be greater than them all. In these places the Holy Spirit too should altogether have been named if he were a creature and less than the Son of God as the adversaries teach. But we see the Holy Spirit named nowhere with creatures but always with the Father and the Son.

This argument is made by many Fathers, Justin, Basil, Epiphanius, Chrysostom.

The second argument is taken from the name of God, for the sole true God in Scripture is called God absolutely, as we showed above from Irenaeus. But the Holy Spirit is called God absolutely, *Acts* ch.5, "Ananias, why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit? You have not lied to men but to God." Behold the express name of God is attributed to the Holy Spirit, against the lie of the Transylvanians when they say that the Holy Spirit is nowhere expressly called God.

Third from the confession of the adversaries, for the Arians erased from the codices the words of *John* ch.4, "The Spirit is God," as Ambrose testifies. Therefore they thought that the Holy Spirit was called God in the Scriptures.

For if they thought the sense was 'God is Spirit,' that is, God is of a spiritual nature, why did they delete the words? But their erasure has hurt them more than the letter of God, if indeed those words of God are not necessarily to be understood of the person of the Holy Spirit; but the erasure cries out that the Arian heretics have been given over to a reprobate sense and are sinning against the Holy Spirit, since they preferred to destroy the sacred Scriptures than to set aside their errors.

The fifth class is based on the attributes that only God is immense and everywhere. But about the Holy Spirit we read in *Psalms* 138, "Whither will I go from your spirit?" and in *Wisdom* ch.1, "the Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world." Again only God is omnipotent, but about the Holy Spirit we read in *Wisdom* ch.7, "having all virtue." Again only God knows himself perfectly, but about the Holy Spirit we read I *Corinthians* ch.2, "No one knows what is in God save the Spirit of God." And again, "The Spirit examines all things even the deep things of God." Again, only God is good, but of the Holy Spirit we read in *Psalms* 142, "Your good Spirit leads me in the right way." Lastly only God has a temple, but of the Holy Spirit we read in I *Corinthians* ch.6, "Your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit." And so, "Carry and glorify God in your body." Which place is treated of by Augustine when he says *On the Trinity* bk.1 ch.6, "The Holy Spirit is not a creature, because to whom we exhibit our bodies as a temple, to him we necessarily owe that servitude by which only God is to be served, which in Greek is called latria," and elsewhere against Maximinus, "When you hear, 'do you not know that your bodies are the temple in you of the Holy Spirit?'" And in the same place, "Do you not know that your bodies are the members of Christ? Do not deny that the Holy Spirit is God, lest you make the members of the creator the temple of a creature."

The sixth class is from the works. First, creation is the work of God alone, and yet you read in *Job* ch.33, "The Spirit of God made me." And *Psalms* 33, "By the word of the Lord the heavens were formed, and by the Spirit of his mouth all their virtue." And *Psalms* 103, "Send forth your Spirit and they will be created."

Second, it belongs only to God to preserve, and yet you read in *Wisdom* ch.1, "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and this Spirit which contains all things etc."

Third, it belongs only to God to save and to justify, and yet you read in I *Corinthians* ch.6, "You are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God."

Fourth, it belongs only to God to predict the future and to examine the hearts, and yet you read in II *Peter* ch.1, "Holy men of God spoke inspired by the Holy Spirit," and *Wisdom* ch.1, "God is witness of the inward parts and true examiner of the heart, since the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world and he which contains all things has the science of the voice," that is, for this reason God examines the hearts because his Spirit is everywhere, penetrates all things, knows all the tongues of men, even the things in the innermost heart.

Fifth, it belongs only to God to do miracles, but Christ himself "expelled demons in the Spirit of God," *Matthew* ch.12, and Paul in I *Corinthians* ch.12, makes the author of the gift of tongues, of healing, etc. the Holy Spirit, and in *Hebrews* ch.2 he calls all the miracles done through the Apostles, "distributions of the Holy Spirit."

Sixth, it belongs only to God to rule the Church with absolute power. But the Holy Spirit governs the Church, which is the kingdom of Christ, plainly as absolute Lord and not less than the Father and Son. *Acts* ch.10, "The Spirit said to Peter, go to them not doubting, for I have sent them." *Acts* ch.13, "The Holy Spirit says, 'separate for me Saul and Barnabas for the work for which I have taken them'." *Ibid.*, "And they were sent by the Holy Spirit." *Acts* ch.15, "It has seemed to the Holy Spirit and to us to impose on you nothing beyond the work." *Acts* ch.16, "They were forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia." *Acts* ch.20, "Attend to yourselves and the whole flock in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as Bishops to rule the Church of God." I *Corinthians* ch.12, "All things works one and the same Spirit dividing to each as he will."

The seventh class will consist of the comparison of the Holy Spirit to Christ; for if we prove that the Holy Spirit is greater than Christ insofar as Christ is man, we will have proved also that the Holy Spirit is one God with the Father. For the adversaries wish nothing at all to be greater than Christ, whom they make mere man, besides God the Father.

That the Holy Spirit, then, is greater than the man Christ is proved by all the arguments by which the adversaries prove that God the Father is greater than Christ. The Father is greater than the man Christ, because he sent him, *John* ch.8. But the Holy Spirit sent Christ, for thus we read in *Isaiah* ch.48, "And now my Lord has sent me and his Spirit." The Father sanctified the Son, *John* ch.10, "Whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world." The Holy Spirit also sanctified him, *Isaiah* ch.51 and *Luke* ch.4, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me, he has sent me to preach good news to the poor."

Again, the Father worked the incarnation of the Son, *Romans* ch.8, "He sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh." The same thing is worked by the Holy Spirit, *Matthew* ch.1, "What is born in her is of the Holy Spirit." Again, the Son did miracles in the virtue of the Father, *John* ch.14, "The Father abiding in me, he does the works." And of the Spirit he says, *Matthew* ch.12, "If I in the Spirit of God cast out demons."

Again, the Father offered the Son to death, *Romans* ch.8, "He did not spare his own Son etc." The same is done by the Holy Spirit, *Hebrews* ch.9, "He offered himself through the Holy Spirit."

Lastly the Father raised up the Son, *Acts* ch.2. Paul says the same thing of the Spirit, *Romans* ch.8, "His Spirit, who raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in us."

Add that it is more serious to sin against the Holy Spirit than against the man Christ, *Matthew* ch.12. From which it plainly follows that the Spirit is greater than the humanity of Christ, and therefore he is true God.

The eighth class is from the Fathers. The Fathers cited speak for the divinity of Christ, and in the same places they almost all speak about the Holy Spirit, therefore it will be enough here to give the names of those who expressly write of the divinity of the sole Holy Spirit. Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Eustathius, Didymus, Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas.

The ninth class consists of the miracles, but because the miracles that were done to confirm the divinity of Christ do also confirm the divinity of the Holy Spirit, we repeat only the last miracle above mentioned. Thus therefore does Gregory of Tours write in *History of the Franks* bk.2 ch.3, "There were then at that time with St. Eugenius the very prudent and very holy Bishops Vindemialis and Longinus, equal in rank and not unequal in virtue. For St. Vindemialis is said at that time to have raised a dead man to life; Eugenius too expelled blindness not only from the visible eyes but also from minds. Which when the wicked Bishop of the Arians saw, he called a man to follow him who was deceived by the same error by which he himself was living, and said, 'I do not bear that these Bishops produce many signs among the people, and all follow them and neglect me. Acquiesce now in what I command, and taking fifty gold pieces sit in the square through which I must go, and putting your hands on your closed eyes as I go by, exclaim in great force along with the rest saying, 'you most blessed Cyrola, priest of our religion, I beg that you look at me and manifest your glory and virtue, so that I may merit to open my eyes and see the light I have lost'. He fulfilled these commands and sitting in the square as the heretic was going by with the saints of God, he, who was thinking to mock God, exclaims with great force saying, 'Hear me most blessed Cyrola, hear me holy priest of God, look on my blindness, may I experience the cures that the other blind have often deserved from you, that the leprous have experienced, that the dead too have sensed. I adjure you by the virtue itself that you have that you restore to me the longed for light, because I am struck with grave blindness'. For he, not knowing the truth, was speaking the truth, because greed had blinded him and he thought to mock through money the virtue of almighty God."

"Then the Bishop of the heretics turned himself a little and as if about to triumph in virtue, elated with vanity and pride, he placed his hand on the man's eyes and said, 'According to our faith by which we believe rightly, may your eyes be opened', and directly, as he shouted out this wickedness, his smile was turned to grief, and the Bishop's trick was laid open to public view, for so great a pain overwhelmed the man's eyes that he could scarcely hold them in with his fingers to stop them cracking."

“Then the wretch began to cry out and say, ‘Woe is me wretch, because I am seduced by an enemy of the divine law. Woe is me because I wanted to mock God through money, and I accepted fifty gold pieces to perpetrate this crime’. But to the Bishop he said, ‘Behold your gold, give me back my light, which by your trick I have lost, and I ask, most glorious Christians, not to despise my wretchedness, aid me quickly as I perish; for truly I know that God is not mocked’.”

“Then moved by the mercy of the holy God they say, ‘if you believe, all things are possible to him who believes’. But he shouted with a loud voice, ‘He who does not believe that Christ the Son of God and the Holy Spirit have equal substance and deity with God the Father, let him suffer what I suffer today’. And he added, ‘I believe in God the Father almighty, I believe in the Son of God, Jesus Christ, equal with the Father, I believe in the Holy Spirit, consubstantial with the Father and Son and coeternal’.”

“They hearing these things, and anticipating each other with mutual honor, a holy contention arose among them as to who should impose on his eyes the sign of the blessed cross, Vindemialis and Longinus beg Eugenius, but he on the contrary begs them to impose their hands on the blind man. Which when they had done and were holding their hands on his head, St. Eugenius, making the sign of the cross over his eyes, said, ‘In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit true God, whom we confess triune in one equality and omnipotence, may your eyes be opened’. And at once the pain was removed and he returned to his former health.” And let this be sufficient about the Holy Spirit.

Now let us come to the last part of our disputation, and briefly confute the arguments of the adversaries.

#### *Chapter Fourteen: the First Argument of the Heretics is Dissolved*

So the first objection of the Transylvanians is of this sort. Christ and the Apostles preached that Antichrist was going to come immediately after the death of Christ and was going to abolish the true faith of Christ; but we see that after the death of Christ a God three in persons and one in essence was adored in the whole world; therefore either the faith of the Trinity is the faith of Antichrist or certainly Christ and the Apostles lied.

They prove the proposition with these testimonies, *John* ch.5, “I have come in the name of my Father and you have not received me; if another comes in his own name, you will receive him.” Again, *John* ch.9, “I must work while it is day; the night comes when no one can work; as long as I am in the world I am the light of the world.” *Luke* ch.21, “See that you be not seduced, for many will come in my name saying that I am, and the time has come, do not go after them.”

See, they say, how Christ says the time of his abolition is near. *Acts* ch.20, “I know that after my decease ravening wolves will enter among you not sparing the flock.” *Colossians* ch.2, “See that no one deceive you by philosophy etc.” What greater philosophy than disputations about essence, hypostasis, relations? II *Thessalonians* ch.2, “The mystery of iniquity already works.” *John* ch.4, “Antichrist is now in the world; everyone who denies that Christ has come in the flesh is a seducer and Antichrist.” Here they note that it is not said that Christ has come *into* the flesh lest perhaps we should think that some divine person descended and assumed flesh; but

what is said is *in the flesh* so that we may understand that Christ is nothing other than flesh, that is, man. Finally in the epistle of *Jude* the impious who denied God and Christ are said already in his time to have entered in.

I reply that the astuteness of the devil is remarkable who tries to twist against us an argument of Catholics taken from antiquity and the agreement of the whole world. But it will be easy to dissolve this first objection. For it is clear that the proposition on which the whole argument rests is very false. For if immediately from the death of Christ the true faith was to be totally abolished, why did Christ come, why did he labor? Why did he wish to die? To do nothing? But this would have been foolish, and could not have fallen within the supreme wisdom.

Next, if it was altogether about to be, what need was there to forewarn us to beware of seducers who could in no way be impeded from perverting the whole world? Lastly where were those promises of *Daniel* ch.2 and *Luke* ch.1, "Of his kingdom there will be no end"? And that of Christ *Matthew* ch.16, "The gates of hell will not prevail against it"? And *Matthew* last chapter, "I will be with you unto the end of the world"? Where also would those promises be that testify that all nations will believe in Christ? *Genesis* ch.22, "In your seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." *Psalms* 2, "I will give you the nations for your inheritance, and the ends of the earth for your possession." *Psalms* 71, "All kings will adore him, all nations will serve him." For all these things are necessarily false if the kingdom of Christ was to be destroyed when it had scarcely arisen.

Nor do the testimonies adduced by the adversaries prove anything. To the first place I say that there it is not said that Antichrist will come at once, nor that the faith of Christ is to be totally abolished, but that Antichrist will come at his own time, namely near the end of the world; and he will come in his own name, not in the name of the Father. But our Christ, whom all the world worships, has a Father, acknowledges the Father, and comes in the name of the Father.

Lastly, Christ is there speaking only to the Jews, for when the Evangelist had said, "Therefore the Jews sought to kill him," he subjoins, "So Jesus said to them etc." But the Jews did not receive our Christ, but they oppose him with all their strength; nor do they believe that their Messiah will be God and man but pure man. He then of whom Christ is speaking is not our Christ true God whom the nations have received, but he is Antichrist whom the Jews will at some time receive for Messiah; and thus is the place expounded by all interpreters, as Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril, and the rest.

To the second place I say that there by 'night' is not understood a time that was and is from the ascension of Christ, as if the day will only be the time that Christ is bodily living in the world, and then there was always to be night. For if so it was, then after his ascension no one could have worked and therefore no one could be converted and believe. "For this is the work of God," *John* ch.6, "to believe in him whom he sent." But if no one can believe, why do the Transylvanian ministers labor so much to persuade us of their faith?

Therefore Christ calls there day the whole time of this life, and the course of all centuries to the end of the world when it will be licit to work wholesomely; but night is the time of future life. "Because there will be neither work nor reason in hell," says Wisdom in *Ecclesiastes* ch.9. Nor is it an obstacle that "As long as I am in

the world I am the light of the world." For Christ even now is in the world, because *Matthew* last chapter says, "Behold I am with you until the end of the world." And truly he is now in the world, because he is present now to all through grace, and he shines on the just and the impious; but after the judgment he will no longer be in the world, because he will not shine on the impious. Hence *Isaiah* ch.55, "Seek the Lord while he may be found; call upon him while he is near." And David in *Psalms* 90, "Today if you hear his voice, harden not your hearts." And this explanation indeed is that of Augustine and Chrysostom on this place.

To the third it could be said with Cajetan that "the time has come" is not asserted by Christ but is reported as the word of the seducers who would say that the day of judgment is already coming in. Hence Paul warns II *Thessalonians* ch.2, "Do not be afraid, as if the day of the Lord were at hand etc."

I say further that Christ does indeed assert that the time has come, not indeed of judgment or of Antichrist or of the abolition of his faith, but of many seducers who would usurp to themselves the name of Christ, for such was Simon Magus at the time of the Apostles, and after him Menander, for each said he was Christ, on the evidence of Irenaeus, and Josephus mentions many who in his time seduced the Jews and preached themselves, as if they were the saviors of Israel.

To the fourth I say that Paul is speaking of the heretics, who were to come forth not long afterwards in Asia, for thus he speaks, "From you yourself (he was speaking to the Asians) will arise men speaking perverse things to lead disciples away after them." But there is no doubt that this was fulfilled in Montanus and his disciples and in other Asiatic heretics. See Eusebius etc.

To the fifth I say that Paul is speaking to men of that time, because the scholastics who dispute of the Trinity were not yet born. Besides philosophy does not teach one God in three persons; for such sublime mysteries could never be investigated or proved by natural light alone, and our doctors do not dispute philosophically to show the Trinity but to solve the sophisms of the philosophers. Paul then is speaking of the philosophy of the heathen who were then vigorous, who denied the resurrection and promised a blessed life without Christ.

To the rest I say that the Apostles predicted the heretics who were a little after those times, as the Ebionites, Marcionists and others, whom they also call Antichrists, not because they were that outstanding Antichrist who will come at the end of the world, but because they were his precursors and like him in opposing Christ; just as there is one supreme and outstanding Christ and yet all the prophets and kings are called Christs in the Old Testament, according to the verse, "Do not touch my Christs," *Psalms* 104. And this is the mystery of iniquity that began in the time of Paul, because then began the heresy of Simon Magus and the like.

#### *Chapter Fifteen: the Second Argument is Solved*

The second objection of the Transylvanians is in their explanation of *John* ch.2. In the time of the Apostles, Ebion and Cerinthus taught that the eternal Christ descended into the man Jesus, as Irenaeus says, and it is not true what is commonly said, that the Ebionites taught Christ was pure man. Therefore they are the true Ebionites who make Christ to be composed of two natures.

I reply that this too was a remarkable art of the devil, whereby the heresy of Ebion, which the Transylvanians truly follow, is attributed to us. I say then that the true heresy of Ebion was that the Son of Mary was pure man, but at the age of 30 another person descended on him and lived in him, whom Ebion said was Christ; and in this way Jesus was united with Christ through conjoining and indwelling, which is the same as the Transylvanians teach.

And to prove their lie we bring forward the testimony of the ancients who say that Ebion asserted that the Son of Mary was pure man. Ignatius to the Philadelphians says, "He who says Jesus is pure man is a serpent, poor in mind, by the name of Ebion." Irenaeus says, "According to no opinion of the heretics was the Word made flesh," and also he says that according to Ebion and Cerinthus Jesus was born pure man, but then Christ descended on him in the form of a dove, to dwell in him. And also he says, "That the Word, which was always, was made flesh is excluded by the contradiction of the heretics, who say that if he was born then he did not exist before."

Tertullian says, "This opinion could fit Ebion, who made Jesus to be pure man," and also, "Cerinthus contends that Christ is only man without divinity." Eusebius says that some of the Ebionites make Christ the son of Joseph, some only of the Virgin, but all agree in this that he did not exist before Mary.

Jerome says that St. John was compelled by the Bishops of Asia to write his Gospel and to declare the eternal generation of Christ because of the Ebionites, who were then teaching that Christ was pure man. Augustine says, "The Ebionites teach that Christ is only man." The same is contained in John Cassianus and some others.

#### *Chapter Sixteen: the Third Argument is Solved*

The third objection is that the name of God is not a name of essence but of dignity and command, as is plain, because in the Scriptures princes and judges are called Gods; but the Father of Christ has supreme command over all absolutely, even over Christ himself; Christ has command over all except the Father; therefore the Father is supreme God simply but Christ is supreme God after the Father. For *John* ch14 Christ says, "The Father is greater than I," and *John* ch.6, "I have come down from heaven not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me." And *I Corinthians* ch.15 Paul says that Christ is subject to the Father, but to Christ all things except the Father who subjects all things to him.

I reply that the name of God, if we have regard to the etymology, does not signify command but providence. For in Greek 'theos' is derived from 'theasthai', that is, 'to see', or from 'thein', that is, to run, because he runs to the aid of all, as Damascene says, unless the reason of Theodoret is more pleasing, who says that this name was invented by those who thought the stars to be Gods, and because the stars are forever running, so they named God runner. But in Hebrew the primary name of God is Adonai, that is, 'to be', and Elohim which comes from a word meaning 'to swear', because by God oaths are sworn; but wherever the etymology is taken from, it is certain that this name was not imposed to signify command alone but the supreme and most outstanding thing, otherwise God would not be eternal, since from eternity there was nothing that God could have command over.

Further, it is false too that the Son of God, insofar as he is God, is subject to the Father, or that he is a lesser prince than the Father. For, as God he is subject to none but is Lord of all things altogether that are outside him, just as is the Father, since he is equal to the Father, *John* ch.10 and *Philippians* ch.2.

To the first place from *John* ch.14, then, many of the ancients replied that the Father is said to be greater than the Son by reason of principle, not by reason of nature; for a certain authority is noted in the fact that the Father is principle of the Son, not contrariwise. So Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, Hilary.

This solution is not altogether to be rejected; however we are not compelled to follow it, since we can more easily and probably expound it of the Son by reason of his human nature; for thus is it expounded by Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine, Gaudentius.

Add that Chrysostom and Cyril and Augustine also mentioned the first exposition and they preferred this second one, and for two reasons. First, because if the Father were for this reason to be called greater than the Son because he is his author, then both the Father and Son should also be said to be greater than the Holy Spirit for the same reason; but we read this nowhere. Again the Lord says, "I go to the Father because the Father is greater than I;" therefore the Son is lesser in the nature in which he goes to the Father, but he did not go as God but as man.

Add the testimony of the Athanasian Creed where we thus read of the Son of God, "Equal to the Father according to divinity, less than the Father according to humanity."

To the second place the same can be replied; for Christ came to do the will of his Father, not his own will, namely insofar as he had as man a human will subject to the divine will which he himself had as God. But you will say that the Lord descended from heaven to do the will of the Father, but he did not descend as man from heaven, for as man he was not ever in heaven; therefore he descended as God; therefore as God he is less than the Father.

I reply that the descent of the Son of God is nothing other than his emptying and assumption of the form of a servant, therefore he himself the Son of God, who descended from heaven, was obedient to the Father, but he obeyed not according to the Form of God that he had in heaven, but according to the form of servant that by descending he assumed on earth.

In reply to the third place, "Then also the Son himself will be subject, etc." there were not lacking those who said that Christ's being subject to God after the day of judgment signifies that the human nature of Christ will then be converted into God and altogether absorbed by divinity. So Augustine reports. But this is so absurd that it does not need refutation, for the contrary follows from Paul's opinion, for subjection argues distinction. Gregory of Nyssa and Chrysostom and Cyril say that the Apostle is speaking of the Church or of Christ as he is in his members, so that the sense is that then it will happen that the whole body of Christ, that is, the whole Church is seen to be subjected to God with no member a rebel or stubborn.

But what Paul says, that Christ will be subject to the Father to whom the Father has subjected all things, seems repugnant to this explanation, for he is Son in his own person. Ambrose, Oecumenius, and Theophylact take this opinion of Paul about the Son of God absolutely, but want the subjection to mean not service but

agreement with the Father and procession of the Son from the Father; so that the Son is said to be subject because he is from the Father and not conversely.

But there is no need to be reduced to these difficulties; for we can with Ambrose, Augustine, Theodoret, Primasius, Sedulius, and others on this place expound it of the human nature of Christ, which is truly subject to God. But why does he say, "Then the Son himself will be subject"? Does Christ the man begin only then to be subject to his Father? Was he not more subject when he was obedient unto death?

I reply that the 'then' has a certain emphasis; for the sense is that even then, in that glory, Christ as man will be subject to God. All the Greeks note that Paul is writing to the Corinthians who had a little before left behind the fables of the gentiles that taught the Gods were wont to fight among themselves, and that Father Saturn was expelled from this kingdom by his Son Jove.

Since therefore Paul had said that Christ will empty all principality and power, so that the Corinthians should not think that, according to the fables, the Father too was to be reduced to order by Christ, in the way Saturn was by his son Jove, therefore he adds that all must be subject to Christ besides him who subjects all things to him; and not only this but also Christ himself, even then in that triumph after he has done so great things, will be subject to his Father.

*Chapter Seventeen: the Fourth Argument is Solved*

The fourth objection is that only the Father is the one true God, as the Lord himself says *John* ch.17, "to know you the true God." And Paul I *Corinthians* ch.8, "For us there is one God the Father." And I *Timothy* ch.2, "One God, one mediator between God and men." If therefore the Father is one sole true God it certainly follows that the Son is not true God.

They confirm this argument with these sophisms, that Christ is the sole Son of the true God, therefore he who does not have Christ as Son is not the one true God; but the Trinity does not have Christ as Son, therefore the Trinity is not the one true God.

Further, Christ is the mediator of the one true God; therefore he who does not have a mediator is not the one true God; but the Trinity does not have a mediator but only the Father, otherwise the same would be mediator of itself; therefore the Trinity is not the true God but only the Father. And the confirmation is that because Christ does not teach invocation of the Trinity but of his Father, and the prayers of the Church were formerly all directed to the Father, about which there is a decree of the Council of Carthage, for which there is no other reason than that only the Father has a mediator.

I reply to the first place in two ways. First with Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine on this place, and Ambrose, that the word 'sole' is not restricted to the Father but is extended also to the Son. For it is said, "and whom you sent, Jesus Christ," so that there is this order of words, 'to know you and him whom you sent Jesus Christ the sole true God'. And Chrysostom brings forward a like place from I *Corinthians* ch.9, "Do I alone and Barnabas have this power?" where 'alone' does not exclude Barnabas but includes him.

Second and more easily I say with Hilary that only the Father is here called true God but yet in the Father is also understood the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are persons of the same essence as the Father, so that the 'only' excludes just creatures; but what is added "and whom you sent Jesus Christ" is said of Christ as he is man. Therefore the sense here is, "This is life eternal," that is, this in the world is the way and reason for reaching eternal life, that men know by faith you the sole true God, that is, you the Father who are the God who alone has true divinity; and further that they know one mediator of God and men, whom you sent Jesus Christ.

To the second I say the same. The "one God" excludes false Gods, not the Son, just as what follows "one Lord Jesus" excludes false Lords, not the Father.

To the third I say that the one God in this place signifies the Trinity from which Christ as mediator, that is, as man, is distinguished; for that is why Paul added, "the man Christ Jesus."

To the first sophism, the first consequence is denied. For similar to this is, Peter is the son of one true man; therefore he who does not have Peter for son is not true man; for although deity is not something universal, as humanity is, yet it is in several suppositis, and therefore it has the force of a universal.

To the second I deny the assumption. The Trinity does not have a mediator; for Christ is the mediator as man, not as God, and he is mediator not only of the Father and of the Holy Spirit but also of himself insofar as he himself is God. But there will be a special discussion of this matter in the last book.

To the third, about the use of praying, I confess that for the most part the prayers of the Church are directed to the Father, because in this way the prayer is more suitably ended with 'through Jesus Christ your Son'. However in the Father we invoke all three persons as Tertullian teaches from the conclusion of prayers, 'who lives and reigns with you in the unity of the Holy Spirit, God'.

But it is false that Christ wanted only the Father to be invoked; for *John* ch.14 Christ says, "If you ask anything in my name I will do it." And *Matthew* last chapter when he commands all nations to be baptized "in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit," what else does he command than that the Trinity be invoked? And in the Greek liturgies of Basil and Chrysostom and also in our Latin liturgy the Trinity is not seldom invoked; in the litanies too has now long been received in the Church the formula of praying, "Holy Trinity one God have mercy on us" (although Luther and Calvin along with the new Arians refuse it).

Further, Dionysius says, "Superessential Trinity direct us." And Nazianzen, "O Holy Trinity and long suffering (for you are long suffering as long as you tolerate those who divide you), receive also those etc." And, "Hail O Trinity, my meditation and my glory, I would that you would serve these, serve those etc." Marius Victorinus says, "Give pardon for sins, provide eternal life, bestow peace and glory, O Blessed Trinity. Free us, save us, justify us, O Blessed Trinity." Augustine, "Lord my God, God Trinity, whatever I have said in these books about you, may yours also know; if anything about myself, may you forgive and yours. Amen."

#### *Chapter Eighteen: the Fifth Argument is Solved*

The fifth objection is that the Evangelists and Apostles always inculcate that the true Christ was born of a Virgin, suffered, died; they knew no other than him; otherwise

Matthew, Mark, and Luke would not have begun from the nativity but would have narrated other things done by Christ before the flesh, and John would not have said, "This was the beginning of the signs of Jesus," *John* ch.2, if Christ had existed from eternity. Further, *Acts* ch.2, Peter says, "Let all the house of Israel most certainly know that God has made this Jesus whom you crucified Lord and Christ." But Christ eternal God could not have been made Lord and Christ, could not have been from eternity, and therefore he is not true God, because he would always have been that, therefore he can be true Christ. This argument is not seldom repeated by the Transylvanians.

We can add to confirm this error (so that the truth may more shine forth from the solution) the testimonies that the old Arians brought forward. So they indeed acknowledged that Christ existed before his incarnation, but they proved he was a creature from *Proverbs* ch.8 in the Septuagint, "The Lord created me at the beginning of his ways." *Ecclesiastes* ch.24, "Then said to me the creator of all, and who created me, and rested in my tabernacle." *John* ch.1, "He who comes after me was made before me." *Colossians* ch.1, "The first born of all creatures." But the first born is similar to his brothers in nature, *Hebrews* ch.1, "Having been made so much greater than the angels as he inherited a name more excellent than theirs etc." And here his nativity from the Father is being treated of, as all teach. *Hebrews* ch.3, "Consider the High Priest of our confession, Jesus Christ, who is faithful to him who made him"

I reply to the argument of the Transylvanians that we too do not recognize a Christ other than him who was born, suffered, and died. For Christ is one not many; yet we believe this one to be twice born according to two natures.

As to the fact that the Evangelists do not mention any other Christ before the flesh, I say that the Evangelists had proposed to themselves to describe the advent of the Messiah and the things he did, that is, the advent of the incarnate God, his life, doctrine, death, resurrection etc.; so it was not necessary for them to begin higher. And yet lest we should think the Word did not exist before the flesh, the Evangelist John began thus, "In the beginning was the Word etc." and in his first epistle he began, "What was from the beginning which we saw etc." and in the *Apocalypse* ch.1, "Who is, who was, and who is to come."

To the place from *Acts* ch.1 I reply with Cyril that Christ was made Lord by the Father by reason of his humanity, in the way that he could also be said to be made God; for that was done through the incarnation, so that the man Jesus is God and Lord, not by participation and grace, but by union of Word and flesh.

It could also be said, as the same Cyril notes, that the "he made" is put for "he declared", as in *Philippians* ch.1, "He gave him a name that is above every name."

To *Proverbs* ch.8, "The Lord has created me," the Fathers replied in many ways. The first response is reported by Athanasius from Dionysius of Rome, that the Greek verb in this place does not signify 'make' but 'pre-make', so that the sense is that the Lord in the beginning pre-made me before all the works he was to make.

The second response is from Athanasius and Cyril who say that the Scriptures promiscuously use the verbs of making, creating, generating. For in *Deuteronomy* ch.32 is said, "You have abandoned the God who generated you." And yet in *Genesis* chs.1 and 2 we read that "God made man"; therefore one should elicit

the sense of Scripture not from the verb alone of 'created' or 'generated' but from the context. And because the Son is said here to have been created before God made anything, it is plain that 'created' is said for 'generated'.

The third response is from the same Athanasius and Nazianzen and Cyril and Augustine, who admonish that in this same chapter is written, "Before all the hills I was born;" and therefore that here both natures of Christ are explained, his divine nature when it is said "I was born" and the human when it is said "he created me."

The fourth response is from Basil, Epiphanius, Jerome, who advise us to return to the Hebrew fount; since in Hebrew there is not 'he created' but 'he possessed', by which word true generation is wont to be explained, as in *Genesis* ch.4, "She possessed a man through God," said Eve when she bore Cain, that is, through generation; and perhaps thus too the Septuagint translated it but the codex has been mutilated by one letter so that it says 'created' and not 'possessed'.

The fifth response is very fine, and serves also for the following testimony from *Ecclesiastes* ch.14, where it cannot be denied but that 'he created' is written; but there is this explanation from a certain Eastern Catholic Council, and the same is read in St. Thomas Aquinas.

We say then that the production of the Son of God is now called generation, now creation, because it cannot be expressed perfectly by any word; for generation signifies production in the same substance but with a certain change in the generator; creation signifies production of another substance, but without change of the creator.

Further, the Son of God is produced such that he receives the substance of the generator, and for that reason he can be said to be generated, but he receives it without mutation or alteration of the producer, and for that reason he can be said to be created. Both then are said so that from each is taken what belongs to perfection and what belongs to imperfection is omitted.

To *John* ch1, "He was made before me," I say that signified by these words is not that Christ was produced before John, but he is preferred and put before John, as if John had said, 'he who comes after me is greater than me'. So Ambrose explains it and all interpreters, as Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril, Theophylact, and it is collected from the text; for he speaks thus, "He was made before me because he is prior to me," that is, he preceded me in dignity, because he was eternal, and I temporal.

To the "first born of all creatures" Cyril replies that Christ is called first born as man, just as he is said to be only born as God. He also adds that Christ can also be called first born as he is God, because he is cause that others are made Sons of God. For that is called first which is cause of others.

But simpler and more literal seems to be the commentary of Ambrose and Chrysostom, who teach that the Son is called the first born of all creatures because he is born before any creature was made, which is more clearly said in *Ecclesiasticus* ch.21, "I came forth from the mouth of the most high, first born before all creatures." For if he came forth before all creatures he is himself not a creature.

*Hebrews* ch.1 "Having been made so much better than the angels" is expounded by Chrysostom and Theophylact as 'declared', and rightly, for here his state attained after the resurrection is being dealt with, for Paul says, "Making purgation of sins he sits at the right hand of majesty in the heights, having been

made so much better than the angels etc.," that is, he was exalted after his passion and declared as much more excellent than all angels as the glory of the Son is distant from the condition of a servant.

It can also be said with Cyril that "having been made better" signifies more honored or of more estimation, in the way we say we make of more or greater value an honest man than a rich man, an angel than a man, etc.

To the last the response is plain. For Christ is not said to be simply made in *Hebrews* ch.3 but made high priest; which indeed is most true if it is understood, as it should be understood, about Christ as he is man and not as he is God.

#### *Chapter Nineteen: the Sixth Argument is Solved*

The final objection is that "it is better to give than to receive," as the Lord says on the evidence of the Apostle *Acts* ch.20, and the same thing can be proved by reason; for to give belongs to someone rich and perfect, to receive belongs to someone needy and imperfect; but the Father gives and the Son receives. For the Father gave power to the Son, *Matthew* last chapter, "All power is given to me etc." He gave life, *John* ch.1, "He gave him to have life in himself." He gave wisdom, *ibid.*, "The Father loves the Son and shows him all things," and *John* ch.15, "Whatever I have heard from my Father I have made know to you." Finally whatever the Son has he has from the Father. *Matthew* ch.11, "All things are handed over to me by my Father;" the Father and Son then are not equal, and much less are they one God.

Nor will he make satisfaction who responds that the Father does indeed give the Son everything but naturally and necessarily and not freely and gratuitously; and then that it is only more blessed to give than to receive when someone gives freely. For even he who naturally gives is more perfect than he who receives, as is plain of form and matter, of heaven and earth, and the like.

The Arians used to add that all things indeed that the Son had he has from the Father, but that he does not have all things absolutely that the Father has. For *Matthew* ch.10 the Son says, "To sit at my right hand or left is not mine to give but for whom it has been prepared by my Father."

I reply that it is only then more blessed to give than to receive when he who receives is in potency to receiving, and therefore is needy and imperfect. Further, the Son of God so receives life that yet he was never not living; he so receives power and wisdom that he was never weak or ignorant, for all these things he received in being born; but he was born from eternity and was born perfect. Augustine says, "it is more blessed to give than to receive, but in this life where there is need and abundance is better than it." See Augustine and Chrysostom where they explain that the Father demonstrates to the Son not by teaching but by generating, and the Son hears the Father not by learning but by being born. But the Father is said to demonstrate and the Son to hear because the Father by communicating his essence communicates his knowledge.

To the confirmation from *Matthew* ch.10 I say with Jerome, Chrysostom, and Cyril that Christ wanted to say that it is not mine, who am just and wise, to give to you the first seats, because you are my friends and akin to me, but to those who will merit them, for to such the Father has destined them from eternity; and he did not destine them without the Son and Holy Spirit.

But you will say they did merit them, for the Lord says, "Can you drink the cup etc.," and when they reply, "We can," he says, "My cup indeed you will drink, but to sit etc."

I reply that by drinking the cup they merited the kingdom but not for that reason the first seats. For that everything is absolutely common to Father and Son is plain from *John* ch.16, "All that the Father has is mine," and ch.17, "All yours are mine."

*Chapter Twenty: the Objections against the Divinity of the Holy Spirit are Solved*

The Transylvanians bring almost nothing else against the divinity of the Holy Spirit than that he is nowhere called God in Scripture, or Lord, which was also the argument of the old Arians, on the evidence of Nazianzen. But it is easy to reply, for it is in fact false that he is not called God, since in *Acts* ch.5 we read, "Ananias why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit? You have lied not to men but to God." And I *Corinthians* ch.6, "Your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit," and a little later, "Glorify, then, and carry God in your body." And besides, although the name God were not contained in Scripture, should it not be enough if it is evidently shown from works proper to God alone that the Holy Spirit is God? What of the fact that Scripture nowhere says that the Holy Spirit is a creature, and yet the adversaries boldly call the Holy Spirit a creature?

The old Arians used to object certain places from Scripture which however were easily explained by the Fathers. First they objected *Amos* ch.4, "I strengthen the thunder and create the spirit." But Basil responds that in that place the wind is called spirit, not the Holy Spirit, in the way that in *Psalms* 148 the spirit of storms is spoken of. In the same way do all the interpreters of the prophet expound him, as Jerome, Theodoret, Rupert.

Second they used to object *Romans* ch.8, "The Spirit himself asks for you with groanings that cannot be uttered." Augustine replies in these words, "Understand," he says, "the locution; you will avoid blasphemy, for it is said that he intercedes with groanings so that we should understand he makes us intercede with groanings. Next in another place the Apostle, when he says, 'exclaiming Abba, Father' he says in a different place, 'in whom we exclaim Abba, Father' and expounds what it is to exclaim Abba, Father, by saying that in whom we exclaim is Abba, Father; and by this, what is it to exclaim save to call on him who knows?" So Augustine. Chrysostom too says that by the Holy Spirit exclaiming is to be understood the gift of prayer by which the soul exclaims and groans.

Third they objected *Joel* ch.2, "I will pour out of my Spirit," *John* ch.15, "When the Spirit of truth comes, whom I will send you from the Father etc." For, as Augustine reports, the Arians used to teach that he who is sent is lesser than him by whom he is sent; and since they read that the Son was sent by the Father, but the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son, they thence collected that the Son is lesser than the Father and the Holy Spirit lesser than both.

But Augustine replies that sending by way of command signifies the excellence of the sender, but not just any sending.

Further the Son and the Holy Spirit are not sent according to command but are only said to be sent, because the Son proceeds from the Father and the Holy

Spirit from the Father and the Son, and both Son and Holy Spirit began to be from time in a new way, and indeed in a manifest way and visible in creatures. For the Son appeared in the flesh and the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove, and again elsewhere in tongues of fire.

Therefore this visible manifestation of an invisible person, proceeding from another, is called sending in the Scriptures. But this sending in no way harms the divinity of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, as Augustine collects from this, that each is sent to the place where before he was in invisible majesty. For of the Son it is said *John* ch.1, "He was in the world and the world knew him not," and later, "he came to his own," and of the Holy Spirit in *Psalms* 138, "Where will I go from your Spirit?"

Fourth they used to object *John* ch.1, "All things were made through him." Chrysostom replies that the Evangelist for that reason at once added, "And without him was not anything made that was made," so as to exclude the objection of the Arians, and so that we would understand that not all the things that are were made through the Word but only all the things that were made. But Cyril and Augustine read, "And without him was made nothing. What was made in him was life etc." And they reply to the Arians that John without doubt is speaking only of creatures, when he says, "All things were made through him." For otherwise it would be necessary for the Father to be made through the Word if all things that are were made through the Word.

They used to object last a reasoning of this sort. There are two ways of acting, by nature and by art; now by nature sons are born, by art artifacts are made; but only the Word was produced from God by way of nature, since he is the only begotten Son; therefore the Holy Spirit proceeded from art, therefore he is an artifact.

We reply that the way of acting by nature is twofold in things that are endowed with mind and intelligence, one by intellect and one by will. For the intellect naturally produces the notion and the will naturally produces love. But there is this difference between God and creatures, that he by understanding and loving produces a substance, but creatures produce accidents, from which it comes about that the Son and Holy Spirit are true hypostases; but the concept of our mind and the love of our will cannot be hypostases. But of these matters we will say more in the following book, if the Lord deign to give us help.

## Book Two: On his Personal Distinction from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and on the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son

### *Chapter One: On the Distinction of Persons in the Same Essence*

Hitherto we have shown that the one true God is not the Father only but also the Son and Holy Spirit. Now we must show that these three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are truly three and distinct suppositis, and not three names or three beings of reason. This question needs to be disputed because of the same adversaries, namely the Arians and new Samosatans.

For Valentinus Gentilis and his followers, although they confess with Arius Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be three and distinct in fact, yet they do not recognize in very God himself an intrinsic distinction, so that the same essence must be in the three; and therefore they refuse to call the Father the first person; rather they say the first person is a sophistical person and, which is more horrible, diabolic, as is plain from the history of Benedict Aretius about Gentilis; and therefore they also mock these names, essence, person, relation, property etc.

Further the Transylvanians also recognize that the Father is distinct from Christ, since they make Christ pure man, yet they recognize no distinction in God before the incarnation, as is plain where they say that the Word and Holy Spirit that are read of in the Scriptures of the Old Testament are powers or virtues of the Father, not distinct from him in person, relation, or property. Hence also they mock all these names in their whole work.

Therefore we will first discourse of these names and show that they are deduced from the Scriptures and the most ancient Fathers. Second we will prove that the three are really distinct, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, although they are one God, as we showed in the previous book. Third we will solve the chief difficulties about this ineffable mystery, in which we believe and teach one God in number to be in fact three distinct persons. Fourth we will dispute in particular of the distinction of the Son from the Father, because of those who say the Son is *autotheos* (God from himself). Fifth we will dispute of the distinction of the same Son from the Holy Spirit, or which is the same, about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son.

### *Chapter Two: On the Terms that we Use in Explaining this Mystery*

As to the first, the names are these, essence, consubstantial, hypostasis, substance, person, property, relation, notion, circumincession, trinity. About these terms two things must be said. First what the Transylvanians say generally in reproof must be refuted. Next explanation must be given of each of the names in order.

They therefore say that these names, although they are profane, yet are retained by us for five reasons. First because they are useful for attacking heretics. Second because the Fathers use them. Third, not so that we may say something, but so that we may not keep silent. Fourth because they are useful for explaining the mysteries of Scripture. Fifth because, although they are not contained in Scripture, yet their seeds and equivalents are. Next all these reasons that they have proposed for themselves they refute.

To the first they reply that evil is not to be done so that good may come, and besides heretics who are not overcome by the Scriptures can much less be overcome by these names. But they do not rightly expound the opinion of Catholics, for Catholics do not say that the heretics are attacked by these words but that they are damned and excluded from the Church by them; for because of new heresies we are compelled to invent new words, so that we may be clearly distinguished from them, and so that Catholics may know what they ought to believe. See Augustine on *John* where he shows that profane novelties in words should be avoided, but not those new names that are established against new heresies.

To the second they reply that therefore all the errors of the Fathers will have to be accepted. But we deny the consequence. For the Fathers never err altogether at once, even if some of them err sometimes; but we follow them when they teach something together, not when they defend their own and individual opinions with others contradicting them. An example is Blessed Cyprian whom we do not follow when he teaches that baptism is not valid when done by a heretic. For we know that in this matter other doctors did not agree with Cyprian; and yet we follow Cyprian when he teaches that Christ is true God, because all the Fathers teach the same thing in complete agreement.

To the third they reply that it is foolish to say that you are saying nothing. But they have not understood the words of Augustine when he says that three 'persons' are spoken of in God so as to say something and not keep silent. For Augustine wished to say that no name sufficiently explains what those three are, yet they are called persons, not to explain perfectly the force and nature of the divine persons, but so that we may not be altogether mute when we are asked 'three what?'

To the fourth they reply that those names are exotic and very obscure, and so are useless for explaining the mysteries of faith. But this is false, as we will demonstrate shortly when we discuss them one by one. Certainly things cannot be called exotic that have for so many centuries been in common use in the whole Catholic Church.

To the fifth they deny that synonyms and equivalents are found in the Scriptures. But this is a lie as we will soon make plain.

### *Chapter Three: On the Terms Essence and Homoousion or Consubstantial*

So the first term is essence, or in Greek *ousia*, which is found in *Luke* ch.15, for when the younger son asks his father for his portion of the substance the Greek is *ousia*, where *ousia* signifies the father's wealth. What is the wealth of God but his divinity, which is supreme and infinite good? But because in this place the nature of God is not expressly called *ousia*, rightly can Epiphanius say, "The name essence is not found in the Old and New Testaments in a bare way; but its sense and signification is contained everywhere."

Therefore although this term is not contained in Scripture, yet its synonyms are. For *Romans* ch.1, says of God, "Also his eternal virtue and divinity." The Greek for divinity is *theiotes* but what is *theiotes* but the *ousia* of God? Again *Philippians* ch.2 has *morphe* of God or *form* of God, and certainly form is not less philosophical than essence. Also II *Peter* ch.1 has, "partakers of the divine *nature*" or Greek *physeos*, but nature and essence are altogether the same.

Lastly this name of essence is contained in its root; for essence is said from *esse* or to be, and is the abstract of the name that in the concrete is called being or *ens*. Forther being or to be are said of God in Scripture, *Exodus* ch.3, "I am who I am has sent me to you." If therefore God is called being according to the Scriptures why can his nature not be called essence?

To this the Transylvanians respond in a ridiculous way. For they say God can be called being but not essence, because if someone were to call some man humanity, he would be laughed at by everyone. But they do not notice that God is most simple and therefore names both abstract and concrete can be said of him, for in Scripture he is called true God and truth, wise and wisdom, just and justice; why then can he not in the same way be called being and essence? Yet we do not contend in this place that God can be called essence, but rather that the sole name of essence, by which the nature of God is explained, is not alien to Scripture, nor should it be repudiated as absurd.

From this name is made in Greek *homoousion* or consubstantial, that is, of the same essence, which name the old and new Arians most of all hated, both because it was outside the Scriptures and because it seemed to them to be new. And yet they themselves used names that were newer and that are not found in any Scripture, such as are *heteroousion*, that is, of another essence, and *homoiousion*, that is, of like essence.

But the first calumny the Fathers refuted in two ways. First they showed that this name is not to be rejected for the reason that it is not in the Scriptures, since it is clear that the sense of this name is found there, when the Lord says *John* ch.10, "I and the Father are one." Thus does Augustine respond. Secondly the Fathers tried to show that this name is not alien to the Scriptures.

And first Ambrose proves it is not alien because Scripture uses similar words. For in *Luke* ch.6 and *Deuteronomy* chs.7, 14, 26, the Greek words *epiousion* and *hyperousion* are used, which are plainly similar to *homoousion*, as also the Latin has *supersubstantial* and *consubstantial*. Cyril proves that *homoousion* is not altogether outside Scripture when he deduces it from *ousia*, and deduces *ousia* from *ontos* and alleges *Exodus* ch3, "I am the one who is, or who is *on*."

The second calumny about the novelty of this name was openly refuted by the Fathers, and they showed that it was not invented in the Nicene Council, as the Arians formerly bruited about, but was in the use of the Fathers even before. For Dionysius of Alexandria, as Ambrose reports, says he used this name because, although it is not found in Scripture, yet it is conform to the things said in Scripture about the Father and the Son. And the same is said again by Athanasius, that the Arians wrongly complained of this name as if it were new, and he proves it is not new from Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria, and also from Theognotus and Origen. He also says that the Nicene Council did not establish anything new but used the words that their ancestors had used.

Theodoret also proves that this word is not new also from the testimony of Eusebius of Caesarea who, although he favored the Arians, confessed that the ancient and illustrious Fathers used this name.

Ambrose writes that the Fathers in the Nicene Council took the occasion for using this name from the words in a letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia, an Arian

heretic, who wrote, "If we say the Son of God is true and uncreated, we begin to confess that he is *homousion* with the Father." Ambrose says, "When this letter was read in the Nicene Council the Fathers put the word in their tract on faith, because they saw it was formidable to the heretics." See then how impudently the Arians complained that that name was new which they themselves were using before. By which is also refuted the lie of the Transylvanians, who say that in the Nicene Council a second God was introduced coessential with the Father, and he was therefore a recent God and unknown to the Fathers.

But there are two things to note here about this name. The first is that this name not only displeased the Arians but also some Catholics, because the Fathers of the Council of Antioch expressively denied, against Paul of Samosata, that the Son was *homousion* with the Father, and this Council happened before the birth of the heresy of Arius.

To this Athanasius first objects the authority of Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria, who were older than the Council of Antioch and said that the Son was *homousion* with the Father. He then conciliated all of them by saying that the Antiochian Fathers denied that the Son was *homousion* with the Father in the way the Samosatans took it and did not deny it simply. For the Samosatan took this word in a corporeal sense, the way a man is consubstantial with a man, so that there were two substances of the same species.

St. Hilary also talks of this matter, "The Samosatan confessed *homousion* badly, but have the Arians denied it in any better way? Eighty Bishops formerly rejected it, but 318 recently accepted it. The former disapproved of it against a heretic; did not the latter approve of it against a heretic, if by approving and disapproving each established one thing? Why do we overturn what has been well established?"

One should note, secondly, that this name seems to have been divinely found out, since it destroys at once the contrary heresies of Arius and Sabellius. For, as Athanasius and Basil say, *homousion* is not said of things that in some way have a like essence, but of things of which one is from the other and receives from him the same essence. Sabellius confessed that the Father and Son have the same essence but denied one was from the other. The Arians confessed that the Son was from the Father but denied he received the same essence.

Hence Athanasius says that all the Arians tolerated other names besides this one, because they could draw all the others to their own sense, and therefore the Nicene Council in its Creed, after it had said that the Son was God from God, true God from true God, begotten not made, and born of the nature of the Father, noted that all these could be eluded by the astuteness of the Arians, and therefore they added the words *homousion* with the Father.

Epiphanius too advises that *synousion* is different from *homousion*. For the first can be accepted even by Sabellius, but not the second. For *synousion* signifies unity without distinction, but *homousion* signifies unity with distinction and procession from another.

Lastly Ambrose says, "Rightly do we say the Son is *homousion* with the Father, because by that word is signified both the distinction of persons and the unity of nature."

This can be illustrated from the pre-categories of Aristotle, where he calls synonyms what we call univocals, and homonyms what we call equivocals. For as a univocal name is altogether one in name and signification, so *synousion* signifies something altogether one without distinction, and as an equivocal name is one in name but multiple in signification, so *homoousion* is one in essence and distinct in persons.

*Chapter Four: On the Terms Hypostasis and Substance*

Hypostasis signifies a first substance which we universally call a supposit, and in the case of intelligent nature a person. It is distinguished from essence because essence is signified by way of the total form existing in another; but hypostasis is signified by way of the whole which is not in another but exists in and through itself.

From this it follows that hypostasis does not add to essence any degree of nature or act but only a way of being. For if the essence exist in itself and not in another, as a part in a whole or as a form in a subject, then it is called hypostasis. From this it again follows that essence is communicable but hypostasis incommunicable; for it is contradictory for what exists in itself to exist in another. For to exist in another is not to exist in itself, from which last point it follows that hypostasis adds above essence some property, that is, something, or some mode, by reason of which it is made incommunicable.

All these things are deduced from Basil, from Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, and Cyril, and Theodoret.

For although these Fathers do not seem to posit any difference between essence and supposit other than that between species and individual, as between man and Peter, yet the same Fathers very openly profess (as we showed above, bk.1 ch.3) that God is thus one in number, not in species, so that the three divine hypostases cannot be called three divine individuals by reason of nature, as if they were three individual deities, but only three by reason of hypostatic property.

This term, then, although it seem suspect to some, as that which could be drawn to signify substance, that is, essence, as is plain from Jerome, Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, Marius Victorinus, yet it is altogether to be received, and there can safely be said to be three hypostases in God.

And it is proved first from *Hebrews* ch.1 where the Apostle says of the Son, "Who since he is the splendor of glory and the figure of its substance," that is in Greek, the 'character' of his 'hypostasis', where the name hypostasis, although understood by some to be essence, as Epiphanius seems to expound it, is yet more rightly taken by others for the paternal person, as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, and also Basil and Gregory of Nyssa; for the Son is not the image of the essence but of the person; for he is the image of him whose Son he is, for image is distinguished from exemplar, as the thing produced from the thing producing.

But Franciscus David comes up in opposition, when he wishes to show that Paul did not posit person in God, and he adduces other places of the same epistle where the name hypostasis is not taken for person or supposit, as *Hebrews* ch.8, "We are made partakers of Christ, if however we retain the beginning of his substance up

to the end.” In the Greek the word for substance is *hypostasis*. And *Hebrews* ch.11, “Faith is the substance (Greek *hypostasis*) of things hoped for.”

I reply that these places are in our favor. For in these places is explained that the name ‘hypostasis’ in general signifies the foundation or basis that sustains other things, and that itself subsists through itself. For it is the way that the Apostle in II *Corinthians* chs.9 and 11 calls the foundation of glory in Greek ‘hypostasis of boasting’. But from this the name was transferred and accommodated to faith, because faith is the foundation of justice and not only exists through itself but also gives substance to things hoped for; for what we hope for does not exist in itself, but by faith it seems somehow to exist.

From this too it is accommodated to supposit or person, which is the foundation of nature and all that is consequent to nature, for everything exists in the person and the person exists through itself. When therefore the Son is called the image of the paternal hypostasis, in that place hypostasis cannot signify other than the person of the Father, which, because it exists through itself, and in it the essence and all the attributes and the relations too subsist, can for that reason be called the foundation and basis.

Secondly there is proof from the use of the Church and the Fathers, for Dionysius calls the three persons three hypostases. The same is done by Justin and Athanasius, and by all the Greek Fathers and the fifth Council, and Hilary, and Augustine.

Lastly Nazianzen reports that Athanasius demonstrated that the Greeks think altogether the same thing when they assert there are three hypostases in God as the Latins do when they say there are three divine persons, and that without cause the Latins were sometimes offended by that phrase of the Greeks, since in fact there was no disagreement.

Nor is the Council of Sardis in conflict with this, where we read that it was a mark of the heretics to assert three hypostases while of the Catholics to assert only one. For the Council explains there its opinion, affirming that there is one hypostasis in God if hypostasis is taken for essence, as the heretics are accustomed to do. [Note: Bellarmine then quotes the full Greek text.]

The Transylvanians object the authority of Nicephorus, who says the following of the names *hypostasis* and *ousia*. First, that the first to make mention of these names in dispute about God was Hosius of Cordoba, whom Constantine had sent to Alexandria to calm the tumults raised up by the Arians. Secondly, that the Nicene Council did not wish to touch this question of the difference of essence and subsistence, as unworthy of being dealt with. Third, that the Council of Alexandria, celebrated a little after the Nicene, established that these names were not said of God since the name of substance and subsistence is not in Scripture. Fourth, the name of hypostasis is not found among the old philosophers and is barbarous. Fifth, from the invention of this distinction many trifles have been brought into the Church, and in brief he openly blames the use of these words.

I reply that Nicephorus took what he said from Socrates and Sozomen, which authors do not blame so much the names themselves as the new question about the distinction of them. Therefore although perhaps Hosius was the first to discourse of this distinction, yet he was not the first to think up these names, since they are

found in Dionysius and Justin in the places cited, and the name hypostasis in Paul himself; and about the name of *homoousion* we have already shown that it is very ancient because it comes from *ousia*.

Further, the Nicene Council, although it did not explain the difference between essence and subsistence, yet it did not shrink from these words, as is plain from its Creed, for in it are the names *ousia* and *hypostasis*.

And the Council of Alexandria did not prohibit the use of these terms absolutely but only took away unnecessary contentions, from which is openly collected what the same authors report, that it was established in the same Council that the Catholics should use these terms in disputation against Sabellians, lest through poverty of words they should seem to agree with the Sabellians.

But as to what Socrates and Nicephorus add, that the term *hypostasis* is barbarous and almost unknown to philosophers, and as to Nicephorus calling disputes about these words trifles, they are not of much importance; for this very term was not unknown to the philosophers, as is plain from Budé who cites Aristotle and Themistius, namely the most noble philosophers, who not rarely use this term. And even if no philosophers used this term, should it not be enough for us that it was used by Paul, the Nicene Council, and all the Greek Fathers?

But that disputes about *ousia* and *hypostasis* are not trifles is plain from Basil, who says that from ignorance of this distinction the error of many about the knowledge of God was born; and besides, if these were trifles, why did Justin, Cyril, Basil, Nyssa, Theodoret, Damascene and others dispute so much and so seriously about this matter?

Now the name of substance is ambiguous; for sometimes it signifies *hypostasis* and sometimes essence, wherefore it can strictly be said that there are three substances in God as Hilary concedes. When he explains the faith of the Council of Antioch, he says that three substances are not badly talked of if substance is taken, not for *ousia*, but for *hypostasis*, especially because the vulgate translator used this term in *Hebrews* chs. 1, 3, 11. Yet absolutely it must be denied that there are three substances in God, and one substance must be asserted, because the common use of the Latins takes substance for essence; for in the category of substance Aristotle always talks of *ousia*, which we call substance.

Further, Tertullian always says there is one substance in God; Jerome too, and Augustine and Ruffinus say there is one substance and deny there are three. Lastly the Lateran Council under Innocent III and the second Council of Toledo define one substance in God.

#### *Chapter Five: On the Other Terms*

About the name of person, the opinion of Valla is well known, who asserts that person signifies a quality. For we say that someone acts the person of a king etc. etc. and he adds that if person is taken for substance then there is no more person in God than in a brute; and lastly he says that theologians posit persons in God, and they are three qualities.

But Valla is acting badly the person of a theologian, for person is in God, in whom however there is no quality, or if it please to call those things in God by the name of quality that are signified by way of quality, then not three but infinite divine

persons are to be counted, or one alone is to be established. For those things that can in some way be called qualities in God are distinguished not really but by reason alone; wherefore if personal properties in God are properties, there will be one person really and many in reason. If this please Valla he will very clearly act the person of the Sabellians.

Although, therefore, we know that the name of persons is often taken for quality, and for the mask of actors, yet we are not ignorant that it is also taken for first substance by Scripture and the Fathers. For in the Scriptures we everywhere read that God is no acceptor of persons, as *Acts* ch.10, *Romans* ch.1, and elsewhere, in which places person signifies the very human hypostasis. For as Augustine explains, there is acceptance of persons then in the distribution of rewards when he who distributes does not regard the merits of the men but the men themselves, that is, he attributes more to one than to another, not because he deserves more but because he loves the person more.

Further Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called three persons by Tertullian, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Nazianzen.

And so that Valla not glory that he has at least honestly acted the person of grammarian, let even Cicero come forward who often uses the name of person in this our signification, when he says that the attributes of things are one thing and of persons another, and again considers person in God and in man. Also Valerius Maximus calls any man a person. And in Justinian's *Institutes*, which are very latinate, person is put in this signification.

What of the fact that even the grammarians themselves, when they distinguish three persons in the declension of a verb, the first and the second and the third, do not understand by the name of person a quality but certain things distinct among themselves?

Property, relation, notion are not names from Scripture though they are collected from Scripture by evident consequence. For if the Son is "only begotten," *John* ch.1, then it is proper to him to be Son and therefore filiation is a property. And if "one is God the Father," *I Corinthians* ch.8, then it is proper to the Father to be Father, and paternity will be a property. And if "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son," *John* ch.14, such procession will be his property.

The name of properties is used by Hilary and Basil and Nazianzen and Augustine and Cyril and all others.

By like reason, if Christ is true Son of the true Father, *I John* ch.5, certainly there will be a true relation between Father and Son; for it cannot be imagined how he is true Son who has no true relation to the Father. This name is used by the same Fathers, especially Nazianzen and Augustine.

Lastly if the Father is distinguished from the Son according to the Scriptures, why cannot paternity be called a notion of the Father, that is, a name by which the Father is known to be distinct from the other persons? This name is used by Basil, Augustine, and is taken from them by the Scholastics, who number five notions, unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration; of which only four are called properties, namely unbegottenness, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, four again are relation, paternity, filiation, active and passive spiration. To dispute about these more fully does not belong to this place.

Circumincession, or in Greek *perichoresis*, is said to be that intimate and perfect indwelling of one person in another and conversely, of which it is said in *John* ch14, "I am in the Father and the Father is in me." This singular mystery is discussed by Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine who thus finally concludes, "They are each in each, and all in each, and each in all, and all in all, and all are one. He who sees this either in part or in a mirror and in a mystery rejoices in knowing God and as God, and gives honor and thanks. But he who does not see tends through piety to seeing, not through blindness (as now the Transylvanians do) to calumination. Since God is one and yet a Trinity, then from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things is not to be taken confusedly; nor to many Gods but to himself is glory for ever." The term *perichoresis* is used by Damascene and from him the Scholastics are accustomed to call it circumincession.

Trinity, in Greek *trias*, is also not expressly contained in Scripture, yet it is deduced evidently from *Matthew* last chapter, "Baptize all nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." And I *John* ch.5, "There are three that give testimony in heaven, Father, Word, and Holy Spirit." And this name is used by all the Fathers, even the most ancient, as Dionysius the Areopagite; also by Justin, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Tertullian, Cyprian, and all later ones.

But it is to be observed that Trinity does not signify the unity of three, as Valentinus Gentilis has thought, but simply a triple of persons, as is plain both from the Greek *trias* and from the sentence of the Athanasian Creed, "We venerate Trinity in Unity." For how absurd it would be to say, "We venerate a Unity of Three in Unity."

Next, if the term Trinity expressly signified Unity, how would the Fathers not be blamed who oppose Unity to Trinity, and say a Unity in essence is considered a Trinity in persons, and again that in Trinity a number is discerned, in the essence something numbered is not found? Fulgentius says, "Trinity is referred to the persons, Unity to the nature." The eleventh Council of Toledo, "In the relations of persons number is seen; in the substance of divinity something numbered is not seen." Which is explained at length by Isidore.

St. Thomas Aquinas, although he says that Trinity seems said as if it were a unity of three if one considers the sound of the term, yet he affirms that this is not properly signified by this term, but only the number of three persons.

It is also to be observed that Genebrard does not rightly attribute to Calvin that he said the essence is not comprehended in the persons. For it is clear that Valentinus Gentilis had said the Trinity is a unity of three and he had declared the three to be Essence, Son and Holy Spirit; by which words he had put the essence in place of the first person and numbered it along with the other two. For these are the words of Gentilis, "Three run together in the Trinity, Essence, which is called the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And this is the true Trinity, which is a unity of Three, not of four; whatever Lord Calvin says about the word."

But this madness is refuted by Calvin who says that essence is not comprehended in the Trinity, as if it were one of the number of the three, but it is included in all three, which indeed is very true, and would that Calvin had always erred thus.

*Chapter Six: The Distinction of Persons is Shown*

As to the second, we must prove that in God one and simple there are truly found three really distinct things that we call persons or hypostases; in which real distinction of three are founded all that we have already dealt with, that is, persons, properties, relations, etc. Master Peter Lombard and many others assert an argument that Scripture joins the plural name of God with a singular verb, as *Genesis* ch.1, "In the beginning Gods has created," *Psalms* 36, "The Lords is going to laugh at him." But I do not think the argument is very solid. For Scripture's custom seems to be to put the names of illustrious persons in the plural although the verbs retain the singular number. Which custom we Italians in part imitate when we say to serious men not 'thou' but 'you', although we are addressing one and not many.

And lest what I say seem redolent of Rabbinism, from which I desire to be far removed, I will proffer reasons for my opinion. I am moved then by these reasons. First because I see in Scripture this same thing happening when the talk is about men or false Gods, as *Exodus* ch.20, "There is not to be for you false Gods," *Genesis* ch.24, "His Lords has placed his hand on the thigh of Abraham," *Exodus* ch.21, "If his Lords has given him a wife." But certainly if there were any mystery hidden here, plural nouns would not thus everywhere be joined with singular verbs.

Second because if these words had a plural signification, it would be licit to say there are several true Gods. For who would find fault if we follow Scripture in this? For why, I ask, is it licit in Hebrew to call the divine persons Gods and the same thing is not licit in Latin?

You will say that Scripture does not put the name of God in the plural save by joining it with a singular verb.

I reply that this is not true, for *II Kings* ch.7 where we read, "What nation is like the people of Israel, because of whom Gods have come to redeem etc." And you will find many like ones elsewhere.

Third because the Septuagint and Jerome never translate 'Gods', nor would anyone dare so to translate. Which is an argument that the names do not have a plural signification in these places but a singular one.

Fourth, because if the name of God in Hebrew has a plural signification wherever it is found in the plural number, there would be a very open and very frequent contradiction in the words of divine Scripture. For we very often read that there is only one God, and we also very frequently read there is only one Gods. But it is not credible that God wanted with these apparent contradictions to perturb his people and give occasion for blasphemy to adversaries.

Therefore, omitting these things, the first argument and indeed demonstration is as follows: He who receives being from another is necessarily distinct really from that other; for it cannot be that someone is produced from himself; but the Son receives being from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both; therefore Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are really distinct from each other.

Again, in God nothing can be imagined to be inherent or not subsisting, because in God there is no accident or composition. Therefore these three, since they are really distinct, are three subsistents and therefore three hypostases or persons.

The assumption of the first argument is to be proved from Scripture; for the rest are per se evident; and that the Son indeed has his own being from the Father is proved first from *Proverbs* ch.8, "The Lord possessed me," that is, acquired me through generation; for this is signified by the Hebrew word. And lest they say this is understood of Christ the man generated before the hills in predestination or prediction, it is said in the same place, "I was with him putting all things together." For he who only had being in predestination could not have created the World with the Father, for what has being only in predestination does not exist but will exist in the future; but what does not exist cannot work. Therefore the Son of God, who with the Father put all things together, already existed at the beginning of the world, and yet he had received being from the Father.

Further, *Ecclesiastes* ch.24 says, "Wisdom first born before every creature." Again *John* ch.5, "He gave the Son to have life in himself." Nor can it be said that this is to be understood of Christ the man; for it is opposed to, "As the Father has life in himself so he gave also to the Son to have life in himself." Where we are taught that life was given to the Son by the Father, not in the way creatures have life, but in the way the Father himself has it. Again *Colossians* ch.1 says, "The first born Son of God etc., his image." But each of these names necessarily includes distinction and procession; nor can it be understood of Christ the man, because in the same place it is said of this first born, "In him and through him all things were made." Again *Hebrews* ch.1 the Son is called the splendor and figure of the paternal hypostasis, all which things say procession. And lest these be drawn toward humanity, there is added in the same place, "Through whom he also made the world."

Lastly I *John* ch.5 we read, "So that we may be in his true Son." Certainly the true Son is truly born from the Father, and lest they say this pertains only to the man Christ, there is added, "This is true God and life eternal." Therefore about the Son the thing is very certain that he has being from the Father and therefore is really distinct from the Father.

About the Holy Spirit this will be proved later in the proper question. In the meantime let this suffice from *John* ch.15, "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father." For here the Holy Spirit is expressly said to proceed from the Father and therefore is distinct from him; he is also said to be sent by the Son and therefore he is also distinct from him; for sending in divine reality cannot be understood save according to procession as was said above and as will also be said later.

The second argument is taken from the term 'other'. For Scripture calls the Father other than the Son, and the Holy Spirit other than both. Which indeed indicates an open and in fact real distinction. In *John* ch.5 the Son speaking of the Father says, "He is another who gives witness about me." And *John* ch.14 about the Holy Spirit he says, "I will give you another Paraclete." But we would not say about one person, Marcus is one, Tullius is another, Cicero another; nor about the same, the orator is one, the consul another, the commander another.

However one must observe with Fulgentius that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are said to be one, and another, and another; not one thing, and another thing, and another thing. For 'other thing' signifies a distinction in essence, 'other' a

distinction in person. Wherefore *John* ch.10 Christ says, "I and the Father are one thing," we are not another thing.

The third argument is taken from certain words denoting distinction, as 'with' 'by' 'in'. And *Proverbs* ch.8, "I was with him putting all things together." *John* ch.1, "And the Word was by God." *Ibid.*, "The only begotten who is in the bosom of the Father." *John* ch.14, "I am in the Father and the Father is in me." *Matthew* last chapter, "Baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." *Isaiah* ch.48, "The Lord God has sent me and his Spirit." And *Ephesians* ch.2, "Through him (the Son) we have access to the Father in one Spirit." For if the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were only names and not things, they would be altogether synonyms, in the way that Marcus Tullius Cicero are. And who would say that Marcus was with Tullius or by Tullius or in Tullius? Or Marcus and Tullius did this? Or through Marcus we have access to Tullius in Cicero?

They will say that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not names only, but the Father is true God and the Word and Holy Spirit are virtues or attributes of God the Father, distinct from him in reason not in reality.

But neither could sentences of this sort be truly said of virtues or attributes. For who would say that wisdom is by the intellect? Or wisdom with intellect did this? Or the man and his hand did this? One must confess then that either Scripture is speaking ineptly or there is a true distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The fourth argument is taken from the fact that Scripture introduces God speaking in plural number or speaking of God as if of another person. *Genesis* ch.1, "God said, let us make man in our own image." *Genesis* ch.3, "Behold Adam has become like one of us." *Genesis* ch.11, "Come, let us go down and confound their tongue." *Genesis* ch.19, "The Lord rained from the Lord." *Hosea* ch.1, "The Lord says, I will save them in the Lord their God." *Zachariah*, ch.3, "The Lord said to Satan, may the Lord rebuke you, O Satan."

And although the Rabbins elude all these by saying that they are figures of speech etc. etc. and it is difficult to convict them, yet among Catholics these things have their own authority because the Fathers everywhere use these arguments. And the Council of Smyrna declares anathema on those who explain the places cited from *Genesis* otherwise.

Further we have other places in the New Testament that can in no way be eluded. *John* ch.10, "I and the Father are one." And *John* ch.14, "We will come to him and make our abode with him." For one and the same person who has several names or offices cannot truly say, by reason of those names and offices, that we will make or we will come. For to make and to come belong to persons, not names or offices; and who would not laugh if they read Cicero saying 'I and Tullius will come'?

The fifth argument is taken from the fact that Scripture often when speaking of God uses the triple number. *Exodus* ch.3, "I am, who am, who has sent me to you." *Ibid.*, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob." *Numbers* ch.6, "Thus shall you bless the children of Israel, May the Lord bless you and keep you; may the Lord show his face to you and have pity on you; may the Lord turn his face to you and give you peace." *Deuteronomy* ch.6, "The Lord God is one Lord." *Psalms* 66, "May God bless us, our God, may God bless us, and let all the ends of the earth fear

him." *Psalm* 135, "Confess to the Lord for he is good, confess to the God of Gods, confess to the Lord of Lords." *Isaiah* ch.6, "Holy, Holy, Holy Lord God."

Here one must note with Theodoret that God in the Old Testament did not wish to propose the mystery of the Trinity expressly, because the Jews were incapable, and because they had recently come out of Egypt where many Gods were worshipped, and were to enter into the land of Canaan where too many Gods were believed in, so that they should not think that three Gods were also being proposed to them for worship; however God wished to adumbrate this mystery, and that in many ways, so that when it was preached in the New Testament it would not seem altogether new or repugnant to the Old Testament.

The sixth argument is from the double and triple numbers that are expressed in Scripture. *John* ch.8, "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true. I am one who gives testimony of myself, and my Father who sent me gives testimony about me," where he openly makes himself and the Father two witnesses. And *John* ch.15 about the Holy Spirit he adds, "He will give testimony about me." And thus there are three. And I *John* ch.5, "There are three that give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit."

Lastly can be added natural congruences that do not demonstrate the faith but do show, once the faith is supposed, that what we assert is not against reason; these congruences I will not pursue at length but will be content only to have indicated them, lest we seem to locate the foundation of our faith in these sorts of reasons.

So the first is that it is a mark of the supreme and infinite good to communicate itself supremely and infinitely; but God did not communicate himself supremely and infinitely in the production of creatures.

The second is that perfect beatitude comprehends all goods; and one and indeed a signal good is the consort of equal persons.

The third is that to generate a similar to oneself is a perfection which should not be absent from God who is in all ways perfect.

The fourth is that it is better for God to have produced something from eternity than to have been idle.

The fifth is that there is found one nature in a hypostasis as in any angel; many in many, as in many angels; many in one as in man, where two natures, soul and flesh, one spiritual the other corporeal, come together in one human hypostasis; therefore it is credible that there is also one nature, that is, the divine in several hypostases, that is, in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

The sixth reason is taken from the traces that God in some way impressed on creatures; Augustine discourses of these traces.

So, all things do thus aspire to the number three so that they all seem plainly to exclaim that their author is a Trinity that made all things in weight and number and measure. First then only three properties are common to all things, one, true, good. Next the whole universe of things is distributed into three parts, for whatever is is spiritual or corporeal or mixed of both.

Spiritual things are divided in three hierarchies; individual hierarchies in three orders; but the individual angelic spirits do not relate as much the trace as the image of the Trinity, since they are endowed with three faculties, memory,

intelligence, will; and in them from the mind is born knowledge, from knowledge proceeds love.

Further in corporeal things there are found almost innumerable traces of the Trinity; but to pursue them seems to be overly long and little necessary in this place. Now let us come to dissolve the arguments of the adversaries.

*Chapter Seven: the First Argument against the Distinction of Persons in the Same Essence is Dissolved*

The first argument is from Valentinus Gentilis: he who does not generate or is not generated or does not proceed is not true God; but the one God in essence does not generate, is not generated, and does not proceed; therefore the one God in essence is not true God; but the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are for you true God; therefore they are not one God in essence. The proposition of the first syllogism is proved thus: no one is God besides the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but the Father generates, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit proceeds; therefore he who does not generate, is not generated, and does not proceed is not true God. The assumption of the same first syllogism is proved in this way: God in essence is nothing other than the very essence that is common to the three; but the commentators on the Sentences [of Lombard] say that the essence does not generate, is not generated, and does not proceed.

To this argument John Wigandus could not respond save by denying that the essence does not generate, is not generated, and does not proceed, whatever the commentators on the Sentences said; and he asserts the following demonstration, as he himself thinks it. The Son of God is generated according to the Scriptures, and the Son of God is a certain living essence, not a figment, according to the Scriptures; therefore the essence according to the Scriptures is generated, and therefore too it generates. With which argument, as with one blow, he has, he adds, lain all the commentators on the Sentences prostrate. Let the woman, that is, reason be silent in the Church.

But assuredly Wigandus has not solved the argument but has fallen into a very grave error; for if the essence generates and is generated, then there are two essences; for one and the same thing cannot be understood to be produced by itself; and lest he say that this is not in accord with the Scriptures, let him realize that we do not otherwise prove from the Scriptures that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are really distinct save because one is produced by another.

Rightly then does the Lateran Council define that the essence does not generate and is not generated. Nor does the argument of Wigandus prove anything, but labors under the fallacy of the accident; for although the Son includes the essence, yet he is distinct from it by reason because of the relation that Son says in addition to essence; and insofar as he is distinct from it, it belongs to him to be generated, which does not belong to the essence; in the way that the Father includes the same essence but is distinguished from it by reason because of the relation of paternity which Father has in addition to essence, and therefore the Father is said to generate but not the essence. There would be a similar fallacy if you said, Man is a species, Peter is a man, therefore Peter is a species; or, Peter is an individual, Peter is man, therefore man is an individual.

As to the principal argument, the proposition can be distinguished: for when it is said that he who does not generate or is not generated or does not proceed is not true God, if the term 'God' is taken for a divine person in general then the proposition is true, for he who does not generate or is not generated or does not proceed is not a divine person; but then if in the assumption is understood by 'one God in essence' the essence itself, the assumption too is true, but thence is only concluded that the essence is not a person formally, but there is not concluded that the essence is not true God.

If however 'one God' is taken in the assumption the way the words sound, that is, for the persons in general, then the assumption is false. For it is true to say that one God in essence generates, is generated, proceeds. For that one God is Father, who generates, Son, who is generated, and Holy Spirit, who proceeds. But if the term 'God' is taken in the proposition for deity, as it can be taken, because in God person is not distinct from nature, then the proposition is false, as is plain, and the proof does not conclude. For the essence is not God besides the three persons, and yet it does not generate nor is generated nor proceeds, because it is distinct by reason from the persons, to whom properly it belongs to generate, be generated, and to proceed.

*Chapter Eight: the Second Argument is Dissolved*

The second argument is from the Transylvanians. If the three persons are one in essence, there will be a quaternity in God, not a Trinity; for, to begin with, essence, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are four names and they are not synonyms; therefore they signify four things. Next, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three, but the essence is not one of them. For the essence is not Father because it did not generate, is not Son because it is not a generated thing, is not the Holy Spirit because it did not proceed; therefore it is some fourth thing.

Further, the essence is the source of the persons; for from it the relations emanate, and so too the persons, which are constituted by relations; but a source and its streams are really distinct; therefore the essence is really distinct from the three persons; so it makes with them a fourth number.

Further, the Papists in their Creed put a comma after the words, "I believe in one God," lest they be compelled to say, "I believe in one God Father;" therefore they distinguish God from Father; but later they also distinguish Father from Son, and Son from Holy Spirit; therefore they are four.

Further, the Papists say that the three persons reside in one God, and that the one God manifests himself in the three persons; but who is this God? Certainly not the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit. For none of these has manifested itself in three persons nor do the three persons reside in any of these; therefore God is some fourth thing.

I reply that we do not establish a quaternity in God, nay rather we pronounce anathema on those who worship a quaternity in place of the Trinity. Nor do the proposed arguments move us at all. For we reply to the first reason that the names are not synonyms and yet they do not signify four things, but one thing only, if one is speaking of an absolute thing; or three only if of relatives; this is what Augustine seems to indicate when he says, "The thing that we enjoy is the Father

and Son and Holy Spirit, and the same Trinity is some one supreme thing.” But more openly Anselm teaches that the three persons are three things and one thing; three relative things and one absolute thing. Nor is it unusual for many non-synonymous names to signify one thing, though in diverse way.

You will say that if these names signify one absolute thing and three relative things, then they signify four things.

I reply that the consequence is null; for the absolute thing is not distinct really, but only by reason, from the three relatives. Therefore in God there is a unity of essence, and there is a Trinity of persons, but there is no quarternity.

To the second I say that the essence is the three, and the three are the essence. But that the essence does not generate and that the Father does generate does not prove a real distinction, but one of reason only. For even man and humanity are one thing, and yet man generates and humanity does not generate.

To the third I say that the essence is not the source of the persons or of the relations; for the persons are produced by persons, but the relations are not produced but are per se consequent to the production of the suppositis. Nay, Augustine speaks in the contrary way when he says that the Father is principle of the whole Divinity; where however he does not wish to say that the Divinity is produced, but that the Father is the principle of all the divine persons; since he produces the Son through generation and the Holy Spirit through spiration; but he himself is generated or spirated by no person.

You will say that filiation is produced at the same time as the Son, but it cannot be produced by the Father, because it is opposed to paternity, therefore it is produced and burgeons from the essence that is in the Son.

I reply that the relations can be said to burgeon from the essence, not because they are produced by it but because they are because of the essence and not contrariwise; for the things that are consequent to some essence in creatures are produced effectively by that which produces the essence, but they are said to burgeon from the essence because they are given by the agent because of it. Hence if any essence is not produced, as the divine essence is not, neither are the properties produced, but yet they will be said to burgeon from the essence since they are because of it.

Note however that the relations are said to burgeon or flow from the essence, not as they are formally relations, but as they are properties constitutive of the persons, for as they are relations they burgeon from the persons, if the name of burgeoning is in any way to be admitted in God.

To the fourth argument about the Creed I say that the argument militates against Benedict Aretius the Zwinglian. For he in his history of the punishment of Valentinus Gentilis, since he was unable to respond to the argument of Gentilis which proved that only the Father is the one God, because in the Creed is said ‘I believe in one God Father’, begged for the help of a comma, which he said was to be inserted between ‘God’ and ‘Father’.

For the rest, the Catholic Catechisms do not have that comma, and the old Fathers, when expounding the Creed, always read ‘one God Father’, as Irenaeus, Cyril, Ruffinus and others. Although even if we were to distinguish ‘God’ from ‘Father’ by an inserted comma, not for that reason would a quarternity be

introduced; for there 'God' would be distinguished from 'Father' to signify that by the name of 'God' is not comprehended the Father alone but also the Son and Holy Spirit. But that the way the Father is called one God in the Creed is not repugnant to the divinity of the Son was explained not seldom above; especially since in the same Creed the Son is called our only Lord, yet no one denies that the Father is also our only Lord.

To the fifth I reply that when we say God has manifested himself in the three persons, we wish to say that God is three persons, and that this has been divinely revealed to us.

When they ask, who is that God? Is he Father or Son? I reply that he is Divinity or Trinity, or he is Father and Son and Holy Spirit; for whichever of these is given in reply, it will be most rightly given; by parity of reason those who say, if any of the Catholics however do thus say, that the three persons reside in one God, they wish to signify nothing other than that the three persons are of one deity, or one essence, or one nature, and, since the thing is plain, there should be no controversy about words, as Augustine well advises.

#### *Chapter Nine: the Third Argument is Dissolved*

The third argument. The Father is unbegotten and the Son begotten; therefore they are not one God, otherwise one God will be begotten and not begotten, which implies a contradiction.

Again the generable and the ingenerable differ more than in genus, just as do the corruptible and incorruptible; therefore the Father and Son differ more than in genus.

Again, begotten and unbegotten are either accidents or substances. If the first, then there are accidents in God; if the second, then the Father and the Son differ in substance.

I reply to the first reason that if both propositions are affirmative both are true and there is no contradiction. For 'God is begotten' and 'God is unbegotten' are not contradictory, because in the first proposition God is taken for the Son and in the second for the Father. But if one of them is negative in this way, God is begotten and God is not begotten, or thus, 'God generates' and 'God does not generate' are contradictories, but the first is true and the second is false. The reason is that the name 'God' is taken absolutely for the persons indistinctly, but when it is said that God generates or that God is begotten the subject 'God', by reason of the notional predicate, is restricted to one definite person. And thus it is true that God generates, because the name 'God' is restricted to the Father. But when it is negative the subject is not restricted through the predicate, because then nothing is asserted but only denied. So when it is said, God does not generate, or God is not begotten, the sense is that no divine person generates and no person is begotten, which are false.

To the second I reply that the generable through change differs in genus from the ingenerable, for such a generable is by its own nature corruptible. But the generable without change and alteration does not necessarily differ from the ingenerable. But one can easily reply that the generable and ingenerable only differ in genus when the nature of what is generable is produced through generation; but not when it is communicated to one by another; further the Son is said to be

begotten not because his nature itself is begotten or produced, but because the Son has received it from the Father through generation.

So the Son is not distinguished from the Father by nature but only as to the mode of having the nature. Just as Adam was produced from no man, Eve from Adam alone, Cain from Adam and Eve, and yet they were all three of the same specific nature; this example is adduced by Justin, Nazianzen, Damascene.

To the third I say that begotten and unbegotten are neither substances nor accidents; for unbegotten is the negation of procession but begotten states a relation, as paternity too and active and passive spiration are relations. Thus does Augustine reply, where he elegantly turns the argument back on the Arians; for when it is said, "I and the Father are one," Augustine says, "Are the Father and Son one in substance or in accident? If the first then Father and Son are of the same substance, if the second then there are accidents in God."

But you will say that if begotten and unbegotten do not pertain to the essence and substance of God, how are they not accidents of it.

I reply with Augustine in the same place that nothing can be an accident in God; for every accident states composition and change. Hence one must concede that it is proper, natural, and necessary simply for God to be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and therefore one person is unbegotten, one begotten, and one proceeding; however these are natural and necessary to God such that they are not properly and formally of his essence, in the way that in created things it is natural and necessary for animal to be rational or irrational, and yet neither is of the essence of animal, while on the contrary animal is of the essence of both, that is, of man and of brute.

So thus the divine essence is essentially included in the relations; for nothing is in God which is not essentially God, otherwise it would be essentially a creature; however on the contrary the relation itself is not included essentially in the essence, nor yet is it an accident of it, as was said. Rather, this is seen more clearly in our proposition, for paternity, filiation, and spiration are relations; but relation in its formal notion abstracts from substance and accident.

#### *Chapter Ten: the Fourth Argument is Dissolved*

The fourth argument. That which can generate is the supreme perfection in a living thing; but the Father has this perfection and the Son does not have it; the Son then is not equal to the Father. Therefore the Father and Son are not of the same nature. And what follows from this is that there are not several persons of the same essence in God; and here is a confirmation, that to be produced states intrinsic dependence on another and being posterior to that by which it is produced, if not in time certainly in nature; but the true God is a being independent of itself and necessary and posterior to no thing; therefore the Son is not true God etc.

I reply that to generate states perfection but it is not lacking to the Son. For there is in the Son all the perfection of active generation, although active generation itself is not in the Son because there is no need; for every perfection that generation has it has from the essence, but the Son has the whole essence; and this will be more easily understood by him who has observed that just as the principle 'by which' of active generation is the divine essence, and therefore active generation is of infinite perfection, so the term 'in which' of passive generation is the divine essence, and

therefore it too is of infinite perfection, nay it is altogether of the same infinite perfection.

You will say if the term 'in which' of divine generation is the essence, then the essence is at least generated by accident.

I reply that the consequence is null; for nature in creatures, which is the term 'in which', is per accidens generated, because the same nature as that which is in a father is not communicated to a son but another new one, because unless it is produced it does not exist, and therefore it is produced so that it can be communicated. But the divine essence one in number is in the Father and is communicated to the Son; therefore by generation it is not produced.

To the confirmation I reply that in creatures a son depends on a father, because he receives a nature other in number from the one the father has; but in divine reality there is not this sort of dependence, because the same nature that is of itself simply independent is communicated from the Father to the Son, and that naturally and necessarily. Hence there is only a mutual relation of the Father to the Son, but without any dependence in being.

By parity of reasoning one must deny that everything produced is necessarily posterior. For only production per se requires an order between producer and produced, but not priority save per accidens in creatures where a new nature is deduced from non-being to being. But between the divine persons there cannot be any priority and posteriority, since these persons have nothing save essence and relation, and since the essence is one and the same in all the relations also require that they be together in nature.

#### *Chapter Eleven: the Fifth Argument is Dissolved*

The fifth argument. When the Son is generated either he was or he was not. If he was why was he generated? If he was not, then at some time the Son did not exist, therefore he is not true God, therefore there are not several persons of the same essence.

Again, the Son is either always being generated or is always generated, or was at some time being generated and at some time was generated; if he is always being generated, he will never attain the term and ultimate perfection; if he was always generated, how did he reach the end without being in process? if he was at some time being generated and at some time was generated, then he is not always in the same way but has changed. All these things are absurd in God; therefore several persons should not be asserted in God.

Again, the Son existed before in the Father either in act or in potency or in no way; if in act then he existed before he was being generated; if in potency then there is passive potency in God; if in no way then he was made from nothing.

I reply to the first reason with Basil that the Son did not exist before he was generated, yet he did exist when he was generated; nor does it follow that he was generated in vain. For that would come to be in vain, nay could not come to be, which was before it came to be. But what is when it comes to be does not come to be in vain; certainly in created things the moments of time both are when they come to be and come to be when they are. Nor does it even follow that the Son did not

always exist if he was not before he was generated; for he was always generated, and so he always was.

To the second Calvin responds that the Son was once generated and is not now being generated; for he says that it is stupid to imagine a continual act of generating in God; but certainly Calvin is in conflict with Augustine who says, "The Father is always generating the Son and the Son is always being born." And he asserts a very good reason, that if the Father at some time generated and afterwards stopped, then at some time too he began to generate, and beforehand he was not generating, therefore the Son is not eternal. However the same Augustine and Gregory say better that the Son is said to have been always born than that he is always being born; for even if the act of generating and being born always lasts, yet it is also always perfect and consummate.

To the argument, then, I say that in divine generation there is whatever there is of perfection in the process and in the term of generation, with imperfection removed. In the process, which is expressed by the word 'is being born', there is found the perfection of the act itself of being born, and the imperfection of lacking the end; in the term, which is expressed by the word 'has been born', there is found the perfection of the thing produced but there is lacking the perfection of the act of being born. So in God there is always nativity but perfect nativity; for the Son of God is always being born but is perfect. And this is to have always been born.

To the third I reply that a thing can be said to be in potency in two ways. In one way in the active power of the agent, and this properly belongs to suppositis that are produced; in the other way in the passive power of the matter, and this belongs to the form; for the supposit is not drawn from the potency of the matter but the form is.

So if you now consider the supposit itself of the Son, he pre-existed in the active power of the Father, and this posits no imperfection in God; for passive potency states imperfection, but active perfection does not. If you look at the form of the Son, that is, at his essence, which Paul *Philippians* ch.2 calls the form of God, it pre-existed in act in the Father, not in potency, because it is common to both.

To the argument when it is said that if he pre-existed in act then he was before he came to be, I reply that the form was not made but communicated; nor is it absurd, nay necessary, that what must be communicated should pre-exist. But all these things that sound of priority are to be understood according to our mode of understanding; for as concerns the thing, there is no priority, but the Father always actually generated and generates the Son.

### *Chapter Twelve: the Sixth Argument is Dissolved*

The sixth argument. Person in God is either finite or infinite; if infinite then there is only one; if finite then there should be infinite persons, to respond to the infinity of the essence.

Further, the multiplication of suppositis is necessary either for the conservation of the species or so that one supposit may be perfected by another. But God, since he is eternal, does not need conservation; nor does he need perfection since he is most perfect.

Lastly, person as person either states perfection or does not. If it states perfection then a perfection is in one person that is not in another; and since it is not an accident, a substantial perfection will be in one person and not in another. But if person as person does not state perfection, then the human person will be more perfect than the divine; for it is certain that the human person states perfection.

I reply that a divine person as such is infinite and therefore states supreme perfection.

But to the argument I reply that there cannot be thence collected that there is only one person but only this, that therefore there is one perfection of all the persons; for there is one and the same infinite perfection in all the persons, but not in the same way. For in the Father the perfection is paternity, in the Son filiation, etc.

To the second I say that suppositis are multiplied in divine reality, not for the conservation of the species, nor for the perfecting of one by another, but because this is required by the nature of an intelligent thing that has two modes of producing something within itself, namely cognition and love. Which is also the reason that there are only three persons and not more or fewer; for one person has to be the producer not produced; another the produced through cognition; another the produced through love.

To the third I say that all the persons state the same perfection but in different ways.

You may perhaps ask whether that way, that is, whether that relation, states perfection. I say that relation taken in general does not state perfection, since it abstracts from real being and from being of reason; yet real relation does state perfection, and divine relation infinite perfection; however one divine relation does not state one perfection and another a different one, but all state the same perfection, which is the divine essence.

### *Chapter Thirteen: the Seventh Argument is Dissolved*

The seventh argument. The divine intellect and will are the same, and likewise intellection and volition; therefore word and love too, that is, the Son and Holy Spirit are the same. For from one thing only one thing proceeds.

Further, the thinker in God and intellection are the same, and likewise the lover and love; therefore Father and Son are not distinct from each other or from the Holy Spirit.

Finally, the Son either understands or does not; if he understands then he produces knowledge or a word etc., and if he does not understand then the word is not God, for he cannot be God who understands nothing.

The same can be said of the Holy Spirit. For if he loves he produces love, therefore he produces either himself or another; if he does not love he is not God, for God cannot lack the act of will.

I reply to the first reason that a lesser distinction is required in principles than in terms, as is plain from the fact that one God has created so many kinds of things, and our mind brings forth so many concepts, and one trunk produces so many branches; from this it results that a distinction of reason between intellect and will is sufficient for them to have really distinct terms.

To the second I say that thence is only proved that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one in essence. For in God the thinker, or rather the sayer, and the word are the same, save for the relation of producer and produced; and the lover and love are the same, save for the relation of producer of love and love produced.

To the third I say that the Son understands and yet does not produce knowledge, and that the Holy Spirit loves and yet does not produce love; for one must observe that to understand and to produce knowledge, as also to love and to produce love, are the same really but distinct in reason. For to understand and to love state an order to the object, that is, to the thing that is understood and loved; but to produce knowledge and love states an order to the thing produced, that is, to knowledge itself and to love; in this way too knowledge and word are the same but are distinct in reason. For knowledge states an order to the object, but word to the sayer. So now the Father is a thinker with both orders, and therefore he is also producer; the Son is a thinker but with the first order and not with the second, because he has an opposite order. Hence he himself is not a sayer or producer of a word.

By parity of reason the Father is knowledge but is not word; the Son is knowledge and word, because he has the order of the produced that the Father does not have. Hence St. Augustine says, "The Father and the Son know each other, but the former by begetting and the latter by being begotten." Likewise the Holy Spirit understands and is knowledge itself, but without the relations of producer and produced. I say the same about love. For the Father and Son love with the relation of producer of love; the Holy Spirit loves but with the relation of produced love.

#### *Chapter Fourteen: the Eighth Argument is Dissolved*

The eighth argument. In God there is nothing but essence and relation; but neither of these generates or is generated; therefore nothing in God generates and nothing is generated; therefore there are not in God several persons.

Again, the true Son should be generated like the generator; but the Word is not like the generator but the object, as has been noted; therefore the Word of God is not true Son of God, and so he is not of the same essence as God.

Again, the Holy Spirit is produced either like God the Father in essence or unlike; but not like because he would be the Son and then the Word would not be the only begotten Son; therefore unlike, therefore he is not true God, therefore the three persons are not one true God.

I reply to the first reason that neither essence nor relation taken separately generate or are generated, but what is constituted from both. Therefore what is constituted of essence and paternity generates, and what is constituted of essence and filiation is generated, in the way that even in creatures neither the essence nor the substance generates; rather the person itself is what generates, the essence is the principle by which it generates, subsistence is the condition without which it does not generate.

To the first confirmation, which was of this sort: the Word is not like the thinker but like the thing thought, therefore it is not the Son of the thinker. I reply that God by thinking himself produces the Word, and therefore the thing thought, which the Word is like, is God himself who produces the Word.

But, you will say, the Word is not like God as he thinks but as he is intellect, and God does not generate as intellect but as thinking, and so the Word is not like the generator and so is not Son either. Further, the Son is like the Father either in essence or in property; but not in essence because he is the same in essence; nor in property because in this he is unlike; therefore etc.

I reply that the Father must produce the Son like him in essence, not like him in relation of producer, because the Father does not produce himself but his Son, and so the Word must not be like the Father as the Father is sayer but as the Father has such a nature as by saying he expresses.

To the point added, however, that the Son is the same as the Father in essence, so he is not alike, I reply that he is the same and alike; for insofar as each has the essence they are the same in essence; but insofar as they are a distinct two and agree in the essence, they are alike in essence. Hence when the Arians wanted to say the Son was 'of like substance' with the Father and not 'of the same substance', the Fathers replied that 'same substance' should be said and 'like substance' denied. See Hilary on the Synod.

To the last reason, which was about the Holy Spirit, I reply that the Holy Spirit is produced alike in essence to the Father and the Son, and yet he is not the Son, the reason for which is not quite so certain. For Scripture teaches the thing but is silent about the cause, and not in this matter alone but in many other things too, so as always to exercise us and have us as humble disciples. See Athanasius, Nazianzen, Basil, Damascene, Augustine, who teach that the thing is higher than we can perfectly understand. However Augustine did think out two reasons, which can in some say satisfy the mind of the questioner. For he says that the Holy Spirit is not the Son for this reason, that he does not proceed as born but as given. But he adds that for this reason too he cannot be called Son, because he proceeds from two and they cannot be called two Fathers, nor one be called Father and the other Mother.

Blessed Thomas Aquinas seems to have explained the thing more clearly, for he says that the Word of God is the Son of God because, since he proceeds through act of intellect, he proceeds as a certain likeness and image of the producer, and that by force of the production itself. For a thing is not truly understood unless knowledge or a word is produced that is the likeness of the very thing that is thought.

But the same Thomas teaches that the Holy Spirit is not Son of God because, although he is like the Father and Son, he does not proceed as like by force of the production, since he proceeds through act of love; but love is not of its nature a likeness of the thing loved but a sort of impulse to the thing loved.

#### *Chapter Fifteen: the Ninth Argument is Dissolved*

The ninth argument. Either substance belongs to the intrinsic idea of the essence or it does not. If it does, then the essence is incommunicable, or, if it is communicated, subsistence is also communicated, and then either the persons have another proper subsistence besides the one they receive with the essence, or they do not; if they do, then there will be four subsistences and so four persons; if they do not, then there will be only one subsistence and so only one person. But if subsistence does not belong to the idea of the essence, then the essence is not simply infinite since it does

not contain every perfection, and further, the divine persons will be composed of essence and subsistence, which is most absurd.

I reply that here a most difficult question is being touched on, and one on which the Fathers seem to be discordant. For Blessed Augustine says that it is one thing in God to be Father and another thing to be God; but in the same place he teaches that to be God subsists, is said in relation to itself not to another, and so is absolute and common to the three.

Next he adds that there is one subsisting in God in just the way there is one wise knowing; and as there are not in God three wisdoms, so neither are there three substances; and he also says that person is something absolute and that it is not one thing to be a person and another thing to be God, even though to be God and to be Father are different. Here Augustine seems to distinguish subsistence from relation and to assert one subsistence but many relations.

Again, Anselm says that the divine persons subsist and are wise and live through their wisdom, their essence, and their life; and Boethius says, "He subsists by the fact he does not need another in order to be; wherefore what the Greeks call *ousia* we call subsistence." Richard [of St. Victor] has like things, as does also Blessed Thomas himself when he says that the relations possess from the essence the fact that they subsist, and not contrariwise the essence from the relations, which point he often repeats elsewhere; and in another place he clearly says that the subsistence is one just as the essence is.

The same can also be proved by reason: for to subsist is proper to substance, not to relation; therefore essence does not have this from relation but from itself. And further, if it had it from relation, one could not explain how there is true generation in God; for relation follows generation, since it is founded on it; but a subsistent supposit precedes generation, since nothing can act unless it is a supposit; how then could the Father generate if he had subsistent being only through relation and did not have it until after generation?

But on the other side John Damascene says, "The Word of God, by the fact that he subsists per se, is distinguished from that by which he has subsistence." Here he sufficiently clearly posits several subsistences. Again, the sixth general Synod commanded the letter of Sophronius to be read and accepted it, and in this letter is twice repeated that the Trinity is countable in personal subsistences.

Further in the Athanasian Creed and among all the Greeks there is said to be one hypostasis of the Father and another of the Son; but certainly several hypostases cannot be said to be unless there are several subsistences, just as for this reason we cannot say there are several Gods because there are not several deities; for substantive concretes are not multiplied unless the forms are multiplied.

Again, if there are not three subsistences how are the three persons really distinct? For a real distinction cannot have place where there are not distinct existences or subsistences; but it is certain that the divine persons are not distinguished by existences.

Again, if there are not several subsistences how will it stand that the incarnation happened in the hypostasis of the Son alone?

Finally, if in God along with one subsistence there are several persons, because of the multiplication alone of opposite relations, why are there not also in

Christ many persons because of the multiplication of opposite natures, that is, of creating nature and created nature?

Add that Blessed Thomas Aquinas says that the relations bring with them and do not presuppose hypostases, and that with the relations removed from the essence the hypostases do not remain.

In order then to settle so great a dispute, it seems we must say that the divine subsistence is partly one and partly many, partly absolute and partly relative, partly common to the three and partly proper to each, and lastly partly belong to the idea of the essence and partly do not. In order to understand this some things must first be noted.

First indeed, from St. Thomas, is that subsistence has two functions, one to constitute the supposit and make it exist in itself, that is, not depend on another; two to distinguish it from other supposits; and these two functions are very different from each other. For one can be before the other, as is plain in Adam, who, when he was alone, had being in himself but was not distinguished from others. Again something distinguishes which does not constitute, as is plain of active spiration in God.

Note second that it is one thing to speak of subsistence with respect to essence, and another to do so with respect to persons, for if we speak of the essence it is not constituted by relation nor does it receive from it subsistence, but has subsistence intrinsically in itself. Accordingly, if we separate in our mind the relations from the essence, the essence will be existent in itself and distinct from all other essences, although it will not have in itself distinct persons.

Note third that it is certain the relations have their distinction from relation and so subsistence too, as regards the second office; for the divine persons should be distinguished by the least distinction, as Blessed Cyril teaches; but the least distinction is through relation, and this very thing is taught everywhere by the Fathers and the Councils, which say that only relation makes distinction and number in God.

But as to whence the divine persons have subsistence as regards the first office is not so clearly expressed by the Fathers, yet we say with St. Thomas that the persons have their whole subsistence from relation, but not in the same way. For relation includes essence and adds a respect, since it is something to something; and indeed insofar as it includes essence it constitutes and gives to the person being in itself; but insofar as it states a respect it distinguishes, and so the relation itself or the subsistence partly belongs to the idea of the essence and indicates something absolute, and partly does not. That this is the opinion of St. Thomas will not be denied by any who have carefully perused his works, for he himself everywhere teaches that relation constitutes and distinguishes the persons, but that it constitutes as it is identified with the essence and distinguishes as it is a relation.

You will say that if relation does not constitute the hypostasis as relation but as essence, then the essence itself constitutes and not the relation.

I reply that it seems to be the same thing for the essence to constitute and for the relation as it is essence to constitute; however it is better said that relation as it is essence constitutes than that the essence simply does so, because the same thing should be the constituting and the distinguishing principle, although it not do both

under the same idea. But it is clear that relation is a distinct principle, so relation should also constitute; but yet it does this as it includes the essence or, which is the same, as it is identified with the essence; and through this all the arguments on both sides cease.

To the first argument, that then the essence is incommunicable, I reply by denying the consequence; for the essence is not communicated such that what existed in itself begins to exist in another. For it always exists in itself and never in another, since it is most simple, and to subsist belongs to its idea, but in such a way that what is in itself in one way is in itself also in another way. Therefore the essence of the Father is in itself but with the relation of producer, and the essence of the Son is in itself but with the relation of produced, etc.

To the other argument, that the persons either first have a subsistence besides that of the essence or they do not, I reply that the individual persons only have individual subsistences, but these are partly of the idea of the essence and partly not, as was said.

To the argument for the other side, that then the essence will not be simply infinite, I reply by denying the consequence; for the essence contains intrinsically whatever subsistence has of perfection; for, as we said above, the relations do not state any other perfection than what the essence itself states.

To the argument that therefore the person will be composite, I reply by denying the consequence. For the subsistence of the Father, insofar as it is distinct from the essence, is a pure respect to another, and therefore it does not have an order to the essence itself but only to the term.

To the argument that is wont to seem insoluble, that the constitution of the supposit precedes generation, and generation precedes relation, therefore the supposit is not constituted by the relation, I reply that the constitution of the supposit precedes generation but that the distinction of the supposit follows after generation, and therefore we say that relation as such, which follows generation, distinguishes the supposit but does not constitute it; but relation as it is identified with the essence and precedes generation, according to our way of understanding, constitutes the supposit.

You will say that relation even as it is identified with the essence, if it is a relation, requires some foundation; otherwise there will be no reason why it is paternity rather than some other kind of relation; but no foundation for paternity can be imagined besides generation, and so paternity can in no way precede generation and constitute the supposit.

I reply that relations which are accidents always require a foundation, namely so that a reason may be had why such a relation inheres in such a subject; but relations that are the essence itself of the subject require no foundation. For as no one asks why man is a rational animal, because that is his essence, so one should not ask why the first person is subsistent paternity, because this is its essence; and yet we assign a foundation, namely generation, why this first person is formally Father and is distinct from the Son.

But you will say that St. Thomas says that when the relations are removed the hypostases in God do not remain. Therefore subsistence belongs in no way to the idea of the essence.

I reply that Blessed Thomas means to say that distinct hypostases do not remain; for he at once adds that hypostasis also signifies something distinct.

*Chapter Sixteen: the Tenth Argument is Dissolved*

The tenth argument. Relation, as it is distinct from essence, distinguishes the persons; but relation as it is distinct from essence exists not really but in the mind; for relation does not add a reality to essence but a reason only, otherwise there would be in God something really distinct from essence, therefore the persons are not distinct really but in reason only.

Further, either the total reality that is in the Father is also in the Son or it is not; if it is then Father and Son are not really distinct; if it is not then some reality is in the Father that is not in the Son, and since thing, one, true, and good are convertible, some unity, truth, and goodness will be in the Father that is not in the Son.

I reply that the respect that relation adds to essence distinguishes the persons, but the respect is not only in the mind but also real; and as it is real it distinguishes, for the persons are really distinct, even if all operation of the intellect were to cease.

Wherefore I reply to the proposition that the persons are distinguished by the relations, not insofar as the relations are in some way distinct from the essence, but insofar as the relations are real, or insofar as they are the same in reality as the essence and are distinct from it in reason.

To the confirmation I say that the whole absolute reality that is in the Father is also in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, but not the whole relative reality; for Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are truly three real entities but relative ones.

To the proof, when it is said that one, true, and good are convertible etc., I reply that the three entities are also three trues and three goods if these names are taken adjectivally, that is, there are three that have truth and goodness, but there are not three truths or goodnesses in them, but one. And the reason is that relation states perfection, not as it is to another, but as it is something to another. But in God that something of relation is identified with the essence, and therefore relation in God does not state any other perfection than essence itself, which is one.

And hence it is that when we say there are three entities in God, or three things, or three subsistences, or three persons, we always add or implicitly understand that they are relatives, and we never multiply or count absolutes, because only relation is of the nature to assert a true distinction without a multiplication of perfections; for relation, by reason of its being relation 'to', contains opposition and therefore distinction, and yet by reason of the 'to' it does not state a perfection, and insofar as it states a perfection it is identical with the essence. See Anselm, who says that the Father and Son can be called two things, provided that by 'things' is understood relations and not substances, and the eleventh Council of Toledo which says that in relations number is discerned, but in the substance of divinity there is not found anything that may be numbered. For where true number is admitted, there necessarily several entities are admitted.

*Chapter Seventeen: the Eleventh Argument is Dissolved*

The eleventh argument. The actions of intelligence and will are immanent and therefore sterile, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 9 text 16. Therefore they do not produce anything. But if the Son and the Holy Spirit are not produced by intellect and will, they are not in any way produced. For it cannot easily be explained in what other way they may be produced, and why only two persons are produced and why one is wont to be called Word and the other Love.

I reply that immanent actions, and therefore acts of intelligence and will, which we can call intellection and loving, produce nothing that remains after the action; however they do produce something internal to the action itself, which can be called by the very name of the action. For the term action can be taken in two ways; in one way for the bare and sole action, which pertains properly to the category of action; in another way for the action conjoined with some quality, which is as it were the term of it. In this way we speak of making hot, although however it is not a simple action in the category of action but includes some acquired heat.

So intellection, therefore, and loving are not bare actions but include also something by way of quality, which is as it were the term of the action. Otherwise if intellection were bare action, how would the thinker become by intellection like the thing thought? Is not the likeness founded in the form or the quality? Wherefore the Philosopher does not say that by immanent actions nothing at all is produced, but that nothing is produced which remains after the action in the way that by transient actions some work is produced that is really distinct from the action and that continues after the action.

The Word then is produced by intellection and Love is produced by loving, and these indeed in us are accidents but in God substance, since in God to understand is his very being, though it is not in us. Wherefore the holy Fathers everywhere affirm that God the Father generated his Word from eternity, since from eternity he was wise. But they would not say this if they did not believe that by act of intellect the Word of God was produced. See Athanasius, Basil, Nazianzen, Cyril, Ambrose, Augustine.

Nor seldom too the Fathers expressively teach that God the Word is produced by intellection, as Basil, Cyril, Theodoret, Damascene. Finally Augustine calls the Son wisdom and the Holy Spirit love, and the eleventh Council of Toledo calls the Holy Spirit charity.

#### *Chapter Eighteen: the Twelfth Argument is Dissolved*

The twelfth argument. This mystery destroys three principles that are naturally known. First the principle 'Everything either is or is not'; for paternity is the same really as the essence, the essence is the same really as filiation, therefore paternity is the same really as filiation, and yet it is not the same really as filiation if it is really distinct from it, therefore etc.

Second the principle 'things that are the same as a third thing are the same as each other'; for paternity and filiation are the same thing as the essence, and yet they are not the same thing as each other.

Third the expository syllogism, for when it is said 'this essence is the Father, this essence is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father' the conclusion seems well drawn, and yet it is false if the faith is true.

I reply to the first by denying the first consequence, because essence is disposed by way of a common term, for although it is singular yet it truly is in three suppositis. Therefore in predications it performs the office of a universal, as St. Thomas noted.

In the way then that this syllogism is not valid: 'man is the same really as animal, animal is the same really as horse, therefore man is the same really as horse', so neither is this syllogism valid: 'paternity is the same really as the essence, the essence is the same really as filiation, therefore paternity is the same really as filiation'.

To the second I say that the maxim is not true universally, but only when things are the same as a third adequately, as in mathematics where if two lines are equal to a third they will universally be equal to each other, because in this case there is complete adequation.

But if you say man and horse are the same really as animal, therefore they are the same really as each other, the inference is not valid, because man and animal are not the same thing adequately; so too essence and paternity are not the same adequately, because essence extends itself to more things; nor is it true that the maxim is the foundation of the whole of human discourse if certain limitations are not added, otherwise in vain would there be so many figures and moods of syllogism in which is explained how two extremes should be joined to the middle so that it can be concluded that they are also joined to each other.

Add that even if the maxim were universally true in finite things, it should not for that reason be true in the infinite God; for if the rational soul, because it is spiritual, is in many parts of the body that are really distinct, then neither is this syllogism valid: 'the hand and foot are the same in place as the soul, therefore they are the same in place as each other'; how much more will God, then, because he is infinite Spirit, be able to be at the same time in several suppositis?

To the third I deny that the syllogism is expository, for this essence is disposed by way of common term, as was said. Wherefore just as this is not valid: 'some man is Peter, some man is Paul, therefore Paul is Peter', so this one is not valid: 'this essence is the Father, this essence is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father'.

But hitherto we have discoursed in general of the distinction of the Trinity. Now let us discourse in particular of the distinction of Father and Son, which was the fourth part of the proposed disputation.

#### *Chapter Nineteen: whether the Son is God from Himself*

There is a new heresy which I do not know is really or only verbally so. For Genebrardus expressly refutes a heresy that they call the heresy of the autotheans, that is, of those who say Christ is God from himself, not from the Father, and Genebrardus attributes this heresy to Calvin and Beza and suspects that Franciscus Stancarus was the first author. William Lindanus too and Peter Canisius attribute the same error to Calvin.

From this error it openly follows that either the Son is not distinct from the Father, which is the error of Sabellius, or that he is distinct in nature and is not the

Son of God but some other principle, which error is close to that of the Manichaeans. I will say therefore what I think of this whole matter.

First I have been able to find no such thing in Stancarus, though I confess I have not read all his works but only those he wrote on the Trinity and the mediator. I reckon that Calvin, as far as his way of speaking is concerned, without doubt erred and gave occasion for being accused of what he has been accused of. For he writes, "Sometimes ecclesiastical writers say that the Father is the principle of the Son, sometimes that he has divinity and essence from himself." And again, "Therefore when we speak simply of the Son without respect to the Father, well and properly we assert that the Son is from himself." And again speaking of the Son, "How will the creator, who gives being to all things, not be from himself but borrow his essence from elsewhere?" And the same Calvin asserts that the Son is God from himself, and that he is improperly and harshly said in the Creed to be God from God, light from light.

But although all this is so, yet when I examine the thing and carefully consider the sentences of Calvin, I dare not easily pronounce that he was in this error, for he teaches that the Son is from himself with respect to essence, not with respect to person, and he seems to want to say that the person is begotten from the Father but that the essence is not begotten nor produced but is from itself, so that if you remove from the person of the Son his relation to the Father, the essence alone will remain which is from itself.

But why I believe Calvin thought this I will briefly explain, not so much to defend or excuse him, who has rendered himself by so many heresies unworthy not only of defense but also of communion with Catholics, as to show that there is no need to delay over this question since it is not a question in reality.

First, Calvin confesses that one nature in number is in three distinct persons, and there he says the Son is begotten from the Father. But certainly it is not intelligible how the Son is from the Father and has the same nature as the Father and does not have it from the Father. For neither can the Son be said to be relation alone, but something subsistent in divine nature.

Further, he openly says that the essence is communicated to the Son by the Father. "If in the essence there is division let them reply whether he communicated it to the Son? This could not be in part, because it would be impious to fabricate half a God. Add that in this way they would foully cut up God's essence. It remains that the essence is whole and completely common to Father and Son." He also says that the Son is generated wisdom, and that the Father is the fount of Deity.

Lastly those who assert the Son has essence from himself err for the reason that they are compelled either to make the Son unbegotten and the same person with the Father, or to multiply essences, or certainly to distinguish the essence really from the person and so to introduce a quaternity.

But Calvin asserts the Son is begotten from the Father and posits one essence in number in the three persons, and teaches that the essence of the Father is communicated to the Son. Lastly he does not distinguish the essence really from the persons but only by reason.

Second, I prove the point from the reason that impelled Calvin to this opinion. For the reason was that Valentinus Gentilis was continually saying that only

the Father was God from himself and understood by this that only the Father truly has the divine and uncreated essence; but the Son and Holy Spirit have another essence produced by the Father, and so as to essence they are not God from themselves. Calvin therefore, wanting to oppose Valentinus, asserted the contrary, namely that the Son was God from himself as to essence, that is, in the sense in which it was denied by Valentinus.

Third, I prove it from the doctrine of his disciples. For Beza says that the Son is from the Father through ineffable communication of the whole essence from eternity, and yet he too with his master makes Christ God from himself.

Again Josias Simler, a follower of Calvin, defends the self being of the Son and thus explains his and Calvin's opinion, "We do not deny that the Son has essence from God the Father, but we deny the essence is generated." And this opinion I do not see why it should not be called Catholic.

It remains for us to show that Calvin's way of speaking, who says that the Son has essence from himself, is simply to be rejected and that one should speak in the contrary way. First then this way of speaking conflicts with the word of God, for we read in *John* ch.5, "The Father has given the Son to have life in himself." And *John* ch.6, "I live because of the Father." But if the Father gave life to the Son certainly he gave essence too. For to be and to live are the same thing for God. Again *Matthew* ch.11, "All things have been handed over to me by my Father." Why not essence too? *John* ch.7, "I know him because I am from him." And ch.8, "As the Father taught me so speak I in the world, and what I heard from my Father etc." But it cannot be understood how the Father gave the Son knowledge without giving essence, as we taught from Augustine above.

It conflicts second with the Councils. For almost all Councils after Nicea have accepted the Nicene Creed with the words 'God from God, light from light'. And certainly the pride of Calvin is intolerable who blamed this way of speaking that all the first Councils approved.

Nor is Calvin unlike the Arians in this respect. For in the Council of Aquileia St. Ambrose could never force two Arian heretics to say that the Son was true God from true God, for they always replied that the Son was truly only begotten, Son of the true God and the like, but never that he was true God from true God, even had they been perhaps asked a hundred times. And in the Council of Lausanne Calvin could never be forced to confess that the Son was God from God, as Peter Carolus reports who was there.

It conflicts third with the doctrine of the Fathers. For Gregory Thaumaturgus in his creed says that the Son is God from God. And before him Justin says "The Father has essence without birth, the Son by birth." Epiphanius calls the Son God from God. Hilary says, "The Son has nothing that is not born," that is, "He has everything because of birth." Augustine says, "Whatever the Son is he is from him whose Son he is, therefore we call the Lord Jesus God from God, light from light."

It conflicts fourth with reason and with Calvin's own opinion. For if he himself asserts that the Father communicated essence to the Son how can it truly be said that the Son has essence from himself? Again, if he says the Son is produced by the Father how can essence and life in the Son be denied to be from the Father? For neither is the Son called property merely but a complete hypostasis.

Add that his reasons have no validity. For first Calvin says that he is moved by the authority of the Fathers who sometimes say the Son is from himself. Now he cites Augustine and Cyril who say the Father and the Son are one principle. From this it seems to follow that both Father and Son lack a principle and are therefore from themselves. He also cites Augustine who says the Son is called Son in relation to the Father but God in relation to himself, as the Father is called Father in relation to the Son but God in relation to himself.

But these arguments prove nothing. For we say the Father and Son are one principle with respect to creatures, and with this it yet coheres that the Father is principle without principle and the Son principle from principle, as the same Augustine explains, when he says the Son is principle but from principle, just as he is God from God, light from light.

Neither is it the same thing for the Son to be God to himself and God from himself. For the first signifies that the name God is not relative and yet belongs to the Son, and this Augustine says and says truly, because although the Son is relative, yet he is a relative and divine subsistent and therefore includes essence which is absolute. But that the Son is God from himself signifies that the Son of God is not the Son of God but unbegotten, which Augustine never said, but Calvin falsely attributes it to him.

The second reason of Calvin is that if the Son did not have essence from himself he would be God precariously, nay titular God, and in reality like creatures, which receive their being from elsewhere.

I reply that this argument is conclusive against Gentilis who for this reason said the Son does not have essence from himself, because he thought he has a certain created essence from the Father. But the conclusions have no validity against us, for although we say the Son has essence from the Father yet we say he has it through necessary and natural communication, and therefore he is not precariously but naturally God. Again we say that he receives from the Father the same essence as the Father has, and so he is not titular but true and real God.

The third reason is that the Son is called Jehovah as the Father is, and this name signifies that he is as it were the fount of being and therefore he is from himself as to essence.

I reply that this argument too is conclusive against Gentilis, because if the Son is fount of being then he does not have essence derived from another essence, but has that one essence on which all essences depend; yet just as he is said to be God from God and principle from principle, so he can be said to be fount of being from fount of being, as Blessed Augustine says, "The Son is God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, essence from essence; and yet Father and Son are one God, one light, one wisdom, one essence." Here however is to be observed that Augustine took abstract names for concretes when he said essence from essence, wisdom from wisdom.

One should add here that both Father and Son can be called God from himself but in a way other than Valentinus and Calvin do. For if God from himself means what they think, then neither Father nor Son can be called God from himself, for the Son is not God from himself but from the Father, and the Father is not God from

himself but from nothing. For to be from himself is to be produced from himself, but the Father is simply unbegotten and unproduced.

Nor is the form of speaking of Lactantius to be approved, who says that God is procreated from himself. But God from himself can signify him who is himself God, that is, most truly God, in the way we say, this is truth itself. Again we say brother himself, that is proper or genuine brother, etc., and in this sense Epiphanius calls the Son of God complete himself, God himself, that is truly perfect and truly God.

*Chapter Twenty: On the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son*

The final part of the disputation about the distinction of persons remains, in which must be explained the distinction and procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. This controversy must necessarily be treated of, first because of the Armenians, Greeks, Ruthenians, and Moscans and others who still persist in error, and second because of the new Arians. For Valentinus Gentilis wants the Father alone to be the origin of essence for the Son and Holy Spirit.

And since the Greeks not only do not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son but also complain that the Latins added to the Creed the words 'and from the Son' without their consent, three things must be dealt with. First the origin of this heresy and schism and the time of the making of the addition. Second whether the Holy Spirit does proceed from the Son. Third whether the Latins could and should have added those words to the Creed.

See on this whole matter Master Lombard with the Doctors, St. Anselm, St. Thomas, Richard Armachanus, Gennadius, Hugo Etherianus, Bessarion, and the Council of Florence.

*Chapter Twenty One: On the Origin of this Heresy*

The first author of this heresy seems to have been Theodoret (who however afterwards in the Council of Chalcedon was reconciled to the Church by the work of Pope St. Leo and restored to his see from which he had been expelled), along with others who favored Nestorius about the year 430 AD. For what was asserted in the prolegomena to the Fifth Synod by a certain Justinian, bishop of Sicily, that Macedonius taught the Holy Spirit was spirated by the Father alone, is not in any way probable. For Macedonius agreed with the Arians about the Holy Spirit, as Augustine testifies. But the Arians said the Holy Spirit was a creature of the Son, as Basil testifies when he says the Arians were accustomed to prove from this that the Son was lesser than the Father because the Father created a certain small God, which is the Son; and the Son could not create a God, neither great nor small, but produced the Holy Spirit who is in no way God.

Add that the Second Council was convened against Macedonius and yet put in the Creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; but perhaps we have an incorrect text of the relevant letter and instead of 'Macedonius spirates the Holy Spirit from the Father alone' one should read 'For Macedonius separated the Holy Spirit from the Father only', because he wanted him to be an artifact of the Son alone.

So there are extant refutations of the anathemas of St. Cyril produced by Theodoret, in which Theodoret says the Holy Spirit is neither from the Son nor through the Son but from the Father alone.

Because however the Nestorians had said this by the by and there was another issue that was then being seriously dealt with, it does not seem that this error then planted its roots deeper. For none are found who treat again of this thing until the year 767. But in this year Ado of Vienne writes that there was a great Council celebrated at Gentilly, and a dispute was conducted in the presence of King Pipin, father of Charlemagne, between the Romans and the Greeks about the Trinity and images. And there does not seem that any other dispute about the Trinity could have been dealt with between the Greeks and Latins than about the procession of the Holy Spirit; for there is and was no other dispute about the Trinity between the Greeks and Latins.

Then after about 100 years at the time of Nicholas I who was Pope in 860, the Greeks began more openly to contend with the Latins on this matter. For at that time Theophylact flourished who blames the Latins by name because they believe the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. And John Damascene who lived at that time says the Greeks translated the dialogues of St. Gregory into Greek and erased the words 'and from the Son'.

Further, after another 200 years, that is, in 1054 at the time of Leo IX a complete schism began, such that before only seeds seem to have been cast about. For in this year, during the reign of Constantine X who was called Monomachus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Michael by name, desiring to become in fact universal Patriarch, the name of which dignity had long been usurped to themselves by his predecessors, began to promulgate that the Roman Pontiff and all the Latins were excommunicated because they had added something to the Creed against the decree of the Council of Ephesus; and now that the Roman Bishop had been expelled from his see, the primacy of the Church rightly belonged to himself, who was first after the Roman. Nor did the Greeks then do this thing only, but also all the Churches of the Latins that were then under their sway were ordered closed. The Emperor also set up a reward for those who would write something against the Latins.

That these things are so can be learnt from the letter of Pope Leo IX to the Emperor Constantine and Patriarch Michael, and also from Anselm who wrote on the Holy Spirit against the Greeks in this century. Also from Sigbert and St. Antoninus. So much about the origin of the schism.

But when the addition of 'and from the Son' was made to the creed is not clearly certain. Antoninus says that it was objected to Nicholas I by the Greeks that he had added to the creed, but this is not found in the old histories, and further in the Council of Florence Andrew, the Bishop of Colossae, who protected the part of the Latins, asserts that the Greeks did not object this against Nicholas although they sought all occasions to harm him. Finally it is certain that the addition is much older.

The same Andrew says that at the time of the Sixth Synod, that is, after 600, this addition was made by the Roman Pontiff in a large Council of Latin Fathers because of certain disagreements that had arisen in Gaul and Spain.

And although we cannot certainly know the year or the Pontiff, yet it seems that it was done at this time. For in the eighth Council of Toledo the creed with this

addition is recited. But this Council was celebrated about the year 653 and before this time the Creed of Constantinople is not found with such an addition. For in the third Council of Toledo, celebrated in the year 589, the creed is read without any addition.

A sign too of this is the question that was dealt with between the Greeks and Latins in the Council of Gentilly. For because the Latin Church had already begun to use the Creed with the addition, the Greeks moved the question. Another sign of this is that in the seventh General Synod the same Creed is recited with the addition.

Now as to what some say, that the words were added in the Council of Rome by Pope Damasus, at the very same time that the first Council of Constantinople was celebrated, which two Councils make one general Council, I do not see how this can rightly be defended. There is extant indeed in the works of St. Jerome a creed under the name of Damasus in which these words are found, but we are not asking who put it in his own creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but who added it to the Creed of Constantinople. Now that it was not Damasus we prove with these arguments, for if it was so, why is no mention of the fact found either in the acts of the Councils or the histories? How would Theodoret, a clearly learned man, who put into his history the letters of the Council to Damasus and of Damasus to the Council, have been ignorant of this addition? For that he was ignorant of such addition is collected from the fact that he so boldly writes that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Why too did Pope Leo III order the Creed of Constantinople to be written on a bronze tablet without the addition (as Peter Lombard reports)? Did Leo perhaps not know the acts of his predecessor? Or did he rather want to define the contrary? Why did the third Council of Toledo recite the creed without any addition if the addition had obtained its place in the Creed so long before? Why finally did the Greeks not move the question before the year 600? And by what color did they dare to say the Latins had sinned against the canons of the third Council by the addition of those words if the words had been added in the second Council? Let what we said above stand therefore, that the addition was made after the year 600.

*Chapter Twenty Two: It is Shown from the Scriptures that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Son*

Now therefore that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son must first be demonstrated from the Scriptures. The Lord says *John* ch.16, "Everything the Father has is mine," and *John* ch.17, "All that is yours is mine." From these words an argument can thus be drawn: whatever the Father has the Son has too, except only the relation of paternity, as Augustine expounds; but the Father has the being of principle of the Holy Spirit, therefore the Son has it too. Hence Augustine says, "The Son is altogether what the Father is, but is not the Father, because he is Son and the other is Father." Here Augustine, following the words of our Lord, teaches that the Son is altogether the same as the Father excepting only the relation of paternity.

From this it manifestly follows that the Son is also spirator of the Holy Spirit, for this is not to be Father and yet the Father has that he is spirator.

Next if the Father and Son did not have all things common, except opposite relation, they would be distinguished by more than relation, and so would be

distinguished by substance, for the Father as spirator is not relative to the Son; therefore if as spirator he is distinguished from the Son he is distinguished by spiration, not as it is a relation, but as it is a form subsisting in the Father; therefore the Father and Son would differ in substance, which is the Arian heresy.

Second it is proved from the words of the same chapter, "He will glorify me, because he will take of mine and will announce it to you." What, I ask, will the Holy Spirit take from the Son but knowledge? For a little before he said, "He will not speak from himself but what he hears he will speak," and these words are expounded of knowledge by Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustine, Theophylact, and Euthymius. But how can the Holy Spirit take knowledge from the Son except by taking essence from him? For if anything else is said the Holy Spirit will become a creature.

Two solutions are suggested by Theophylact and Euthymius. First they say the Holy Spirit takes from the knowledge of the Son, because he will teach nothing contrary to what the Son teaches. They then add that the 'from me' signifies from my treasure, which is the Father; and if the Son were to speak, the Holy Spirit would take it from where I, the Son, take it.

But the first solution certainly does not square, for the Son says not only that he will take of mine but also says he will not speak from himself, where he openly indicates that the knowledge of the Holy Spirit is not in him from himself but from the Father and Son.

The second solution also does not square, for the treasure of knowledge in God is not the person of the Father precisely as person but as divine essence, which is common to the Father and the Son, for both treasure and knowledge signify an absolute perfection, which without doubt is the essence itself. Wherefore Blessed Paul says of the Son, *Colossians* ch.2, "In Christ Jesus are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God." The Holy Spirit therefore, when he takes from this treasure, necessarily takes it from something common to the Father and Son and so he does not take it more from one than the other; hence Didymus and Cyril on this place confess that from this is deduced that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

But you will ask why he said he will take 'from mine' and not my essence or wisdom? And why does he say in the future tense 'he will take' and not rather in the past tense 'he took'?

I reply that he said 'from mine' because when the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son he does not take all that is in the Son, for he does not take filiation but essence, from which and from filiation the Son is constituted according to our way of conceiving. And this the Lord himself indicated when he says, "All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take from mine," that is, he will take what is common to me and the Father and not what is proper to each.

But as to why he said it in the future tense the reason is that the taking is eternal and contains virtually in itself all times, and to all times is accommodated, and hence Augustine says on this place, "He will be, he was, he is. He will be because he will never cease to be; he was because he never ceased to be; he is because he always is." Therefore since all times are contained in eternity, and all propositions about eternal things are true, whatever time we express them in, Scripture expresses various times as the thing being treated of requires. But in this place the

Holy Spirit is described as legate from the Father and Son to be sent to the Apostles; but legates are wont then to be instructed when they are sent, and so he says, "whatever he will hear, he will take from mine."

Third it is proved from the same text, where we read, "If I do not go away the paraclete will not come to you; but if go away, I will send him to you." And ch.15, "when the paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father." But all sending is by command, the way servants are sent by lords, or by counsel, the way they are said to be sent who are instructed by the wiser; just as when the sick are sent by a doctor to take medicine, or as by natural production, the way trees are said to send forth roots, flowers, etc.

Now it is certain that the Holy Spirit cannot be sent as a servant, or as ignorant by someone more powerful or wiser; for it is agreed between us and the Greeks that the Holy Spirit is God, therefore his sending will be understood according to production. And this same thing is confirmed by Augustine who says that the Son is sent and that the Son is born, that the Holy Spirit is sent and that the Holy Spirit proceeds.

The Greeks reply that the sending of the Holy Spirit through or by the Son does not signify procession as to internal substance, but external sending to creatures through the bestowal of gifts; and since the Son too gives grace, faith, hope, charity to men, therefore he is said to give or to send the Holy Spirit, namely because he gives gifts that are said to be the Holy Spirit's.

But at least when the Holy Spirit is said to be given or sent, not only are created gifts given, but he is also truly given and sent along with those gifts, and to assert the contrary is a manifest error. For *Romans* ch.1 says, "The love of God is spread abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit because he is given to us." You see the Holy Spirit and his gifts openly distinguished, and both are given. Again *I Corinthians* ch.6, "Your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit whom you have in you." And later, "Carry God in your body." But certainly the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not God neither is a temple owed to them. And *I John* ch.4, "He who remains in love remains in God and God in him." Therefore not only does love remain in us, which is not God, but God himself truly remains.

Lastly what is said in *John* ch.16, "If I do not go the paraclete will not come, but if I go I will send him to you," and ch.14, "But I will give you the paraclete etc.," is only very absurdly expounded of the gifts. For the gifts do not come nor are sent nor can they be conferred with Christ as one paraclete with another.

Add to this the authority of the Fathers, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Cyril, who all say that the God himself the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son.

Add lastly a most manifest reason, for if the Holy Spirit were said to be sent by the Son for the reason that the Son is author of the gifts, then the Father too could be said to be sent by the Son, nay Father and Son by the Holy Spirit, because each person is author of all the gifts.

Again, if the Holy Spirit's being sent by the Son were his gifts' being sent, then also when we read that the Son is sent into the world by the Father, they who do not believe this could reply that the Son is not truly sent but some created gift is, and thus the mystery of the incarnation would be emptied out.

Perhaps they will say that the Holy Spirit does indeed come to us but he is said to be sent by the Son because the Son was the cause by his merits that the Holy Spirit would come to us. But in this way it could be said that the Father is sent by the Son, for by his merits he was also the cause that the Father came to us, according to *John* ch.14, "If anyone loves me and keeps my word, my Father will love him and we will come to him." By parity of reason, if they say that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son because the Son consents that he come, in the same way I will say that the Father is sent by the Son and by the Holy Spirit.

Nor is it an obstacle that in *Isaiah* chs.48 and 61 the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, from whom however he does not proceed. For the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit as he is man, in which form the Son is truly from the Holy Spirit as from the active cause, as is plain in *Luke* ch.4, "The Holy Spirit is upon because he has anointed me and sent me to preach the good news to the poor." The Holy Spirit has sent the Son, then, according to the form that he has upon him and has anointed him. Since this is so, either one must delete from the Gospel those words of Christ about the Holy Spirit, "I will send him," or one must certainly concede that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son by internal and eternal production of his hypostasis.

But as to why the Son says in the future tense, "I will send", although however the procession is eternal, can easily be explained; for sending involves a double relation, one to him who sends and the other to him to whom he sends. As to the first relation, sending is eternal and can be verified for all time, but as to the second it is temporal. For the Holy Spirit is sent to men when he begins to be in them in a new way, that is, by knowledge and love, that is, when he begins to be known and loved through the gifts infused by him. Since therefore this sending as to the term to which was future, but as to the term from which always was, it both is and will be; therefore is it said 'I will send', for thus it is a true proposition as to the whole idea of sending.

Fourth there is proof from *John* ch.20, "He breathed on them and said, receive the Holy Spirit." For by this ceremony, as Augustine expounds and Cyril, Christ wished to signify that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself. Theophylact indeed, when writing on *John*, mocks this argument, but how well let him see himself, for he can himself give no cause for this ceremony. And besides Augustine and Cyril, who use this argument, are more learned and more holy and more ancient than he is. Nor do I doubt but that he himself is to be mocked by the Latins if he wants to mock Augustine, and by the Greeks if he wants to mock Cyril.

Fifth there is proof from *Romans* ch.8, "If anyone does not have the spirit of Christ, he is none of his." And *Galatians* ch.4, "Since you are sons of God, God has sent the spirit of his Son into your hearts crying Abba, Father." For why is the Holy Spirit the Spirit of the Son? Certainly not because he is his servant, or because he is his brother, but because he is spirated by him, in the way that he is also said to be the spirit of the Father, *Romans* ch.8, "If his Spirit who raised Jesus from the dead," and *Matthew* ch.19, "The Spirit of your Father speaks in you." They will say perhaps that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son because he proceeds together with him from the Father, or because he is like him, or for some other reason, but not because he is spirated by the Son.

But if it is so, why cannot Christ for the same reason be called the Son or Word of the Holy Spirit, which however we never read? Nor can it be replied that the Son has relation to the Father and to the sayer; for the Holy Spirit too has relation to the Spirator. Just as therefore the Holy Spirit, although he not be spirated by the Son, can be called the Spirit of the Son because he is alike in essence and proceeds from the Father along with him, so too the Son, although he not be generated by the Holy Spirit, will be able to be called the Son of the Holy Spirit, because he is alike him in essence and proceeds from the Father along with him. And this argument was made so much of by St. Augustine that he was content with this argument alone to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

*Chapter Twenty Three: the Same is Proved by the Testimonies of the Councils*

I for my part cannot sufficiently wonder with what boldness Jeremias, who calls himself Ecumenical Patriarch, dared to write recently in his censure of the confession of the Lutherans that it was defined by the Synod of Nicea and all subsequent general Councils that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. For thus does he say, "The Nicene Synod and the other Synods agreeing with it, all decreed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father himself alone." But if this is not a lie I do not see what could ever be called a lie.

And lest perhaps we suspect there is some recondite canon in which such a decree is contained, the same Jeremias subjoins, "That indeed this is the sacred and incorrupt confession of the Christian faith, the sacred Creed, I say, explains this in the most expressive words thus, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. This opinion was confirmed by 318 Fathers filled with God, first in the Nicene Synod, then in the Council of Constantinople by 150 Fathers; again the remaining five universal Synods, adding nothing, taking away nothing, but agreeing together clearly with one Holy Spirit, signed to it."

Let us then consult the Nicene Creed, and let us see whether it teaches in very expressive words that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. The whole Nicene Creed is cited by Cyril among the Greeks, by Ruffinus among the Latins, but nothing else is read in that Creed about the Holy Spirit than this opinion 'and [I believe] in the Holy Spirit'. Now Nazianzen testifies that the Nicene Synod did not hand on the perfect doctrine about the Holy Spirit for the reason that the question about the Holy Spirit had not arisen. Let Jeremias see in which Nicene Creed he has read that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone.

Further the Council of Constantinople added the words, 'who proceeds from the Father'; but it does not say in very expressive words, as Jeremias says, 'who proceeds from the Father alone', for the word 'alone' is an addition of Jeremias, not a word proper to the Council. But as to why the Council did not add 'and from the Son' but thought it enough to say, 'who proceeds from the Father' the reason is most certain, because at the time there was no doubt that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son, for the heretics conceded it, as is plain from Basil, but there was doubt about the Father, from whom the heretics said that the Holy Spirit was wholly alien as being a creature of the Son alone. Therefore the Council, to bring a remedy to the disease, added to the Creed what was necessary.

Omitting these things, then, let us bring forward the Councils that testify the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. First the Council celebrated at Alexandria, from which Council Cyril writes a letter to Nestorius in which are these words, "The Spirit is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is truth, and so he proceeds from him likewise as from the Father." This letter was read in the Council of Ephesus and was approved both by the Council of Ephesus itself and by the fourth Synod, and by the fifth Synod and by the sixth and seventh Synods.

We have therefore five general Councils celebrated among the Greeks which receive the most open and clear opinion that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as from the Father. What then do they now seek? What do they demand? What is it that again in the seventh Council the Creed is read with this addition (and from the Son), and yet the Council was for the most part of Greeks?

The Greeks indeed in the Council of Florence said that in their own codices it is not so contained, yet the Latins demanded the most ancient example and where there was no trace of corruption, and they cited besides an old historical witness of this thing, and it is certain that it was never the custom of the Latins to corrupt books but of the Greeks.

But you will object that, if in this Council the Creed had been received with this phrase (and from the Son), how St. John Damascene, who lived at the time of this Council, would have so openly denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

I reply that it is probable Damascene died before the seventh Council, for he flourished most in the time of Leo II, and the Synod was celebrated 48 years after the death of Leo. Hence he himself in his works does not cite the Councils save up to the sixth. Next even if he did reach the time of the seventh Synod, yet without doubt he wrote about the Holy Spirit before then.

But besides these Greek Councils there are also extant very many Councils celebrated among the Latins. And first there was a Council celebrated at Bari by the Greeks and the Latins together at the time of Urban II, a little after the schism began, in the year 1090, where Anselm convicted the Greeks with the most evident reasons. Anselm himself records this council in his book on the Holy Spirit and the whole matter is more fully narrated by the author of Anselm's life.

The second is the Lateran Council under Innocent III in the year 1215, where also it is defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and there were Greeks at the Council and they consented.

The third is the Council of Lyons under Gregory X in 1273 where the Greeks were present and, with everyone agreeing, the Creed was sung with the addition 'and from the Son', thrice in Greek and thrice in Latin. The definition of this Council is extant.

The fourth is the Council of Florence, in the year 1438, where again the same thing was defined after very long disputations, with the Greeks and Latins agreeing.

Add the first, third, fourth, eighth, and ninth Councils of Toledo which were all celebrated before the separation of the Greeks, namely before the year 700. From these is apparent not only the opinion of the Church but also the stubbornness and fickleness of the Greeks who, having been so often defeated in disputes, always returned to their vomit.

*Chapter Twenty Four: the Same is Proved from the Latin Fathers*

We will proffer now the testimonies of the Latin Fathers who flourished in doctrine and sanctity before the schism and strife of the Greeks, and not to receive these testimonies is too great a rashness, both because there is no reason for the Greeks to be received and not the Latins if they are of the same antiquity, erudition, and sanctity; and also because we see the Council of Ephesus alleged for proof of the Ecclesiastical dogma both Latins and Greeks, namely the Latins Felix, Julius, Cyprian, Ambrose, and the Greeks Basil, Nyssa, Nazianzen, Athanasius, as Vincent of Lerins testifies. Also it is agreed that the fifth, sixth, and seventh Synods equally adduced the testimonies of Greeks and Latins, which also Basil did and Augustine, for both proffer the testimonies of Greeks equally with Latins.

Who are then the new Greeks who think nothing of the holy Latin Fathers, even the most ancient and most approved? Do they not see that in this way they are accusing the most ancient Church of schism, or teaching rather that the Greeks were never united with the Latins? But at least the acts of the seven general Councils testify otherwise, where we see a supreme agreement between Latins and Greeks. But these new doctors have departed very far from the doctrine and morals of the old Church.

The first then of the Latins is Tertullian who says, "I draw the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son." To this place the Greeks reply that they do not deny the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son but from the Son. For, as Bessarion teaches, the Greeks admit the 'through the Son' but expound it in three ways. First that 'through the Son' is added to note the relation to the Father, second to note the consubstantiality of Father and Son, third because 'through' is wont to be taken for 'with', and they cite some poet or other.

But the first and second evasions are very frigid. For it would be licit to say in the same way that the Son proceeds from the spirator through the Holy Spirit, for thus we would signify the relation of the Father as spirator to the Holy Spirit, and the consubstantiality of the Father and Holy Spirit. Next, what need is there that when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father the relation of the Father to the Son, or the consubstantiality of the Father and Son, be indicated at the same time?

The third too is not sufficient. First because the same absurdity would follow, namely that the Son could be said to proceed from the Father through the Holy Spirit. Second, whatever may be true of that poet, in the Scriptures and the Fathers, nay even in the common way of speaking, 'through' signifies cause and is even often taken for 'from', as Basil teaches. For we read in *Genesis* ch.4, "I have possessed a man through God," that is, from God. Again *John* ch.1, "All things were made through him." And *Colossians* ch.1, "All things were created through him." And *Hebrews* ch.1, "Through whom he also made the world."

For if in these places 'through' signified 'with', the sense would be that the Son was made or created by God together with creatures themselves, which certainly not even the Greeks would admit unless they prefer to be mad with the Arians than be rightly wise with the Catholic Church. It is plain then that for the Spirit to be produced through the Son is according to the Scriptures nothing other

than for him to proceed or be produced by or from the Son. But let us proceed to others.

Second is Blessed Cyprian who says, "The Holy Spirit proceeding by the Father is by the Father and the Son moved fourfold, a benign maker embracing his work, etc." and he is speaking of the Holy Spirit when at the beginning of the world he moves over the waters and forms the four elements.

Third is Blessed Hilary who says, "About the Holy Spirit neither is it necessary to be silent nor is it necessary to speak. But for the sake of those who do not know we cannot be silent. Now to say of him that one must confess he is from Father and Son as authors is not necessary, and indeed I think there is no need to deal with whether he is."

Fourth is Blessed Ambrose, whom certainly the Greeks should not reject, since they see him alleged as a holy doctor in the third Synod. He says, "All that is the Father's the Son has, because he says, 'All that the Father has is mine', and what he received through unity of nature from him through the same unity the Holy Spirit received, as the Lord himself says of his Spirit saying, 'Therefore I said that he will take of mine'."

Fifth Blessed Jerome says, "The Holy Spirit, when he is sent by the Father is sent by the Son; and in different places he is called the Spirit of God the Father and of Christ." And, "The Spirit comes from the Father and because of community of nature is sent by the Son."

Sixth Ruffinus says, "The Holy Spirit who proceeds from both and sanctifies all things."

Seventh St. Augustine says, "Someone may perhaps ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son." And later, "Why should we not believe that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son since he is also the Spirit of the Son?"

Eighth Blessed Prosper says, "The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son."

Ninth Blessed Leo, "There is one who generates; another who is generated; another who proceeds from both." And this is that Leo the Great whom in the fourth Synod 630 Bishops, almost all Oriental, extolled with the greatest praise, and about whom they repeated again and again that as Leo believes so also do we believe.

Tenth Blessed Fulgentius says, "It is proper to the Holy Spirit that he alone proceeds from the Father and the Son."

Eleventh Idacius Clarus says, "If they have said to you, 'Show whence the Holy Spirit draws his origin', reply that the certain and manifest origin of the Holy Spirit is the Father and the Son."

Twelfth Boethius says, "We should thus believe: the Son is from the Father, the Holy Spirit is from both, etc."

Thirteenth Pope Hormisdas says, "It is proper to the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Father and Son under one substance of deity."

Fourteenth Blessed Pope Gregory produced a creed that reads as follows, "I believe in the Holy Spirit, neither generated nor ungenerated, but eternal proceeding from the Father and Son," and elsewhere, "The Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son." It is a wonder why the Greeks allow Gregory to be in their calendar and honor him as a saint, since they execrate his opinion as a heresy.

Let fifteenth and last from the Latins be the venerable Bede, for I have decided to cite only those who flourished before the rise of the schism. Bede then speaks as follows, "the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son." In his collections from Augustine on Paul's epistles he brings in a long disputation of Augustine in which is proved that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son. But now let us come to the Greeks.

*Chapter Twenty Five: the Same is Proved from the Greek Fathers*

From the Greeks let the first be St. Gregory Thaumaturgus who in a divinely received confession of faith speaks thus, "One Holy Spirit having origin and existence from God, who appeared through the Son, perfect image of perfect Son." In this passage one should not start a discussion about the word 'through' nor about the verb 'appeared', for we showed above that the word 'through' signifies cause or productive principle; and from the fact that the Son sent the Holy Spirit to creatures there is evidently collected that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son from eternity.

But one should note the 'image of the Son', for although the Holy Spirit is not as properly the image of the Son as the Son is the image of the Father, because he does not proceed by force of likeness, yet he could not be called in any way the image of the Son unless he proceeded from him and was like him in essence. For image states the relation of produced to producer, and without this relation no likeness is sufficient. Hence a brother is not said to be the image of a brother even if he is very like him; nor is one egg the image of another although because of likeness one egg may scarcely be distinguished from the other. For likeness is not sufficient but it is required that one proceed from the other, which is not found in eggs and brothers. Since therefore St. Gregory said the Holy Spirit was the image of the Son, without doubt he reckoned that he truly proceeds from the Son.

You will say it is not required that the exemplar be the active cause of the image, but it is enough if it be exemplar, as is plain in statues.

I reply that in artificial things an exemplar is not active cause, but in natural production it is. For it necessarily coincides with the active principle, as is plain in all things. For all things that naturally act produce their effects through likeness of their proper form. Wherefore since the Holy Spirit is not freely but naturally produced, the same thing is active principle and exemplar with respect to it.

The second of the Greeks is Blessed Athanasius who says in his Creed, "The Holy Spirit is not made nor created nor generated by the Father and the Son, but proceeds."

To this testimony two things can be said. First that this creed is not really from Athanasius, but this is easily refuted, both from Nazianzen where he says in praise of Athanasius that he composed a most perfect confession of faith that the whole West and East venerate, and also from Augustine who by name cites Athanasius Bishop of Alexandria and adduces a complete section of this creed, and he uses whole sentences from it, with the name of Athanasius, as if it were very well known in the Church.

Secondly it could be said that the words 'and the Son' were added by the Latins. But this cannot be said, both because these words are found even in the Greek creeds, and because in the fourth Council of Toledo a confession is recited

that is almost literally taken from this creed, and there we read 'from the Father and the Son', and this Council was celebrated about 633 and so before the schism of the Greeks.

The second place from Athanasius when he says, "For we do not introduce three principles or three Fathers, as the Marcionists, since we do not introduce in comparison three suns, but one sun and its splendor and the light proceeding from both." You see here very clearly that there are three, the sun, the splendor, and the light proceeding from both. Nor do I think it can be doubted but that Athanasius understood the Father by the sun, the Son by the splendor, the Holy Spirit by the light. What, I ask, could be replied to this?

The third place also from Athanasius, when he says, "But it is impossible for the Holy Spirit to be numbered in the glory of the Trinity if he did not emanate from God through the Son, but was made by way of creature by God, as they think."

Note that Athanasius did not say 'from the Father through the Son', lest the more recent Greeks say the Son is put there to denote relation; but he said 'from God through the Son'. Nor can these words be referred to sending to creatures, since this emanation is opposed to creation.

The fourth place is in the very long letter to Serapion where Athanasius proves against the Macedonians that in no way can it be defended that the Holy Spirit is a creature if the Son is not a creature. And this is the argument of the whole letter.

Now he proves it with this reason, which he puts in various ways in almost the whole letter: the sort of order and union between the Holy Spirit and the Son is the same as that between the Son and the Father; but the Son, because he is from God the Father, is God as the Father is; therefore likewise the Holy Spirit, who is from God the Son, will be God like the Son; or if he is not God then the Son will not be God, nay and not the Father either. "Since therefore the Spirit has the sort of order and nature to the Son as the Son has to the Father, how can it be borne that he who says the Spirit is a creature does not necessarily think the same thing also of the Son? For if the Spirit is a creature of the Son, the consequence is that they say the Word of the Father is also a creature." Here it is so certain that Athanasius believed the Holy Spirit was produced by the Son that from it as from a very firm and well known principle he proves what was in doubt, namely that the Holy Spirit is God.

They can reply that only the order of the Spirit to the Son and of the Son to the Father consists in this, that as the Father sends the Son to creatures, so the Son sends the Spirit. But this cannot be said unless along with the sending to creatures we understand a true procession as to being. For otherwise the argument of Athanasius would have no validity, in the way that this argument has no validity: God sends the angels, therefore either the angels are not creatures or God is a creature. For this argument has no validity for the reason that the angels are so sent by God to creatures that the sending does not include eternal procession of angels from the substance itself of God. If then the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son to creatures and does not proceed substantially from the Son as from the Father, then he is not sent otherwise than as the angels are sent; and for this reason it cannot thence be collected that he is God or that the Son is not God, which however Athanasius does collect.

Next if Athanasius is speaking of sending to creatures he would not say, "For if the Holy Spirit is a creature of the Son etc.," for those words signify production not sending; but Athanasius is contending that the Holy Spirit is produced by the Son but is not created from nothing.

Besides, after one page Athanasius says, "He is also the image of the Son and is called his Spirit." And later, "But if the Son, because he is from God and Father, is proper to his substance, the Spirit too, because he is said to be from God, must necessarily be proper to the Son in substance."

Certainly Athanasius, when he says the Spirit is from God, understands from God the Son, otherwise he would not well conclude that for this reason he is proper to the Son as the Son is for this reason proper to the Father, because he is from the Father. There are also two other letters where Athanasius says the same things in different words.

The third Greek Father is St. Basil, whom the Greeks put before almost all the others. So he says in bk.2 against Eunomius, "Now this is obscure to all, that no operation of the Son is separated from the Father, nor is there anything in reality which is present to the Son and alien to the Father. For all that is mine, he says, is yours and yours mine. How then does he attribute the cause of the Spirit to the only begotten alone?"

Basil at least, when proving that not only is the Son the cause of the Spirit but the Father too, because everything the Son has the Father has, is at the same time teaching, nay is assuming as established, that the cause of the Spirit (as the Greeks say) is the Son. Nor can this cause be referred to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. For Basil is writing against Eunomius, who was not disputing about the gifts but about the substance of the Holy Spirit, and he wanted the Son alone to be truly the cause of the Holy Spirit.

There is a second place from Basil, where he says, "Why is it necessary that if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, he is also third in nature? For the reason of piety hands on that in dignity he is second from the Son, since from him he has being and depends altogether on that cause; but that he is third in nature we say neither from the holy Scriptures nor is it possible to collect it from what has been said."

This place the Greeks said in the Council of Florence had been corrupted, and was not contained in all the Greek codices but only in some. And indeed in the Greek text edited at Basel in 1551 the words ('since from him he has being etc.') are lacking, and in these the whole force of the reason is placed. However the Latins responded at the Council of Florence that the Greek codex had rather been corrupted by the Greeks, and they showed a very ancient codex written before the year 600 where everything was found that we have quoted.

But besides we evidently collect from what follows that those words should be in the text, or at least their sense. For thus does Basil continue, "For in the way the Son is second from the Father in order, since he is from him, and in dignity, since the Father is the origin and cause of his being, though he is in no way second in nature, since in both there is one deity, so the Holy Spirit, although he is second from the Son in order and dignity, yet it does not follow from this that he is of an alien nature." And all this is in the Greek to the letter.

Perpend, I beg, the reasoning of Basil. He says the Spirit is second from the Son in order and dignity but not in nature. And he proves that as the Son is second from the Father because he has essence from him, so too the Spirit is second from the Son, where unless there is added, or is understood, what is in our codices, namely that the Spirit has being from the Son as the Son has being from the Father, Basil's reason would conclude nothing, nor could it in any way prove that the Holy Spirit is second from the Son as the Son is second from the Father.

The third place is in bk.5 against Eunomius, that the Holy Spirit is true and natural image of God and Christ, for that is the title, and it sufficiently indicates that the Holy Spirit has being from the Father and Son. For, as we said above, that which is not produced by the exemplar is not a true and natural image.

The fourth place is in the same book where we thus read in the title itself, "That as the Son is related to the Father, so too is the Spirit related to the Son." And he at once continues, "Wherefore the Son is the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit is the Word of the Son." But how can the Spirit be said to be the Word of the Son if he does not proceed from him? And how is the Spirit related to the Son as the Son to the Father if the Son proceeds from the Father indeed but the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son?

The fifth place is in the same book where this question is proposed, "Why is the Spirit not the Son of the Son?"

And Basil responds, "He is not for this reason said not to be of the Son that he is not from God through the Son, but lest we should suspect the Trinity is multiplied to infinity." For if the Spirit were called the Son of the Son, the consequence would seem to be that he himself had another Son, and so on.

But certain things here must be observed, and first the title itself of the question is an argument for our truth; for if the Spirit were from the Father alone, certainly there would be no question why he should not be called Son of the Son; just as no one asks why brother is not called son of brother, since the thing is so clear that not even a suspicion could arise from it, so when it is seriously asked why the Spirit is not called Son of the Son, it is a sign that it is a thing confessed by all that the Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Note second that this question gave a lot of trouble both to Basil and to Athanasius in their letters to Serapion, for both seem to suffer great difficulties; and this itself is a huge argument for our truth. For they could have said in one word that the Spirit is not called Son because he is not from him, and yet they never said this, but they say that this is an inscrutable mystery and it should be enough for us to know in these matters that it is so and not to ask why and how etc.

Note third that the response of Basil ('not because he is not from God through the Son') is again an argument for us. For if the 'through' does not signify cause but 'with' were put in its place, as the Greeks wish, Basil would have said nothing. For if the Spirit were from God through the Son, that is, with the Son, no one could have suspected that he was the Son of the Son, but would have suspected rather that he was the brother of the Son.

Note lastly that the response of Basil has this sense, that the Spirit is from the Son but in another mode of production than generation, and so he is not called Son etc.

The sixth place is in the book on the Holy Spirit where Basil says, "As the Son is related to the Father, so is the Spirit related to the Son." But what is the relation between Father and Son save that of producer to produced? For the Father and Son are the same save for the fact that the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son; therefore also between the Son and the Holy Spirit the only distinction is that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and not the Son from the Holy Spirit.

Let the fourth Greek Father be Gregory of Nyssa who will provide us with three testimonies. One is cited by Gennadius, "The Holy Spirit is further shown to be said from the Father and from the Son etc." But this place, says Gennadius, has been removed from several codices by the Greeks, and is not truly found in the exemplars that are now extant.

The second testimony is adduced by Bessarion from bk.1 against Eunomius, and these books do not yet exist in Latin. "The Spirit is conjoined with the Father in that each is uncreated; he is again distinguished from him by the fact he is not himself Father; but he is conjoined with the Son both in that each is uncreated and in that each has his substance from the first principle; he is distinguished by his property, which is that he is not produced as only begotten from the Father, and that he is manifested through the Son himself." Note here first that the 'through' cannot be taken as 'with', because, insofar as he proceeds with the Son from the Father, the Spirit is not distinguished from the Son, but is conjoined with him, but here the question is about the distinction. Note second that the 'manifested' cannot be taken only for the pouring out of temporal gifts, for here the distinction of the persons is being dealt with; but the persons were distinct by their properties before any external sending of the Holy Spirit.

The third testimony is contained in the book to Ablabius, that one should not say there are three Gods, where, since Gregory had taught that there is one very simple nature to God, he subjoins that the persons are not thereby confused but are distinguished by this, that one is from another. "Through the fact alone that we apprehend that one is distinguished from the other, namely by the fact we believe that it is one thing to be cause and another to be from a cause and to be from what is from a cause, we do not deny the difference that is considered in the cause and the caused. But we again consider another difference, for it is one thing to be from the first without break and without a medium, and another to be from that which is immediately and without break."

Note first that from the first words 'through the fact alone' is collected evidently that the Son is cause or principle of the Holy Spirit. For Gregory says that the three persons are only distinguished by this, that one is cause of another. For hence it follows that if the Son is not cause of the Holy Spirit, the Son and Holy Spirit are not distinct. For the Greeks will not say that the Holy Spirit is cause of the Son, and neither will they say that the Spirit is not distinguished from the Son, lest they worship a Duality for a Trinity. Therefore they are compelled to confess, if they have faith in Gregory, that the Son is cause of the Holy Spirit.

Note second that in the words 'one thing to be cause and another to be from a cause and to be from what is from a cause' three properties of the three persons are noted. For the Father is cause, the Son is from a cause, and the Holy Spirit is from that which is from a cause, that is, from the Son.

Note third in the words 'But we again consider another difference' is not proposed another difference specifically diverse from the earlier, for then Gregory would be in conflict with himself when he said that by this alone the persons are distinguished, that one is cause of another; but he calls another difference that same difference as proposed in another way. Now it is this: that the Son is immediately from the Father alone, but the Spirit is mediately from the Father alone and immediately from the Son, which however must be understood in a sane way. For the Spirit is from the Father mediately and immediately; mediately insofar as he is from the Son who is from the Father, and immediately insofar as the Father produces the Spirit not only through the Son but also through himself. So the difference consists in this, that the Son is in no way mediately from the Father but only immediately; but the Spirit is in some way mediately from the Father.

The fifth Greek Father is St. Gregory Nazianzen who asks what is lacking to the Holy Spirit that he is not Son. He replies, "Nothing, we say, for neither is anything lacking to God, but the difference of their manifestation, so to say, and of their mutual relation has also created diverse names for them etc." In this place Gregory gives this cause why the Spirit is not called Son, because they have diverse, nay, opposed and mutual relations; but certainly there cannot be mutual relations between the Son and Holy Spirit save because one spirates and the other is spirated, for neither is the Son, qua Son, relative to the Holy Spirit, but the Son qua spirator is related to the Holy Spirit.

Nor can it be replied that the Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished through diverse relations with respect to the Father but not with respect to each other; for Gregory has clearly said that the Spirit is not the Son, that is, is distinct from the Son, because of the relation they have to each other, that is, because of mutual relation.

Besides a little later he writes that in the same way nothing is lacking to the Son why he is not Father, and yet he is not Father, namely because they have opposed relations. And a little later he sets down the example of Adam, Eve, and Seth, of whom Adam is from no man, Eve from a man alone, Seth from both. "What," he says, "was Adam? A work of God. What was Eve? A part of the work. What was Seth? A seed from both." Since therefore Gregory has compared the three divine persons with these three human beings, who does not see from the opinion of Gregory that the Son is from the Father and the Spirit from the Father and the Son?

The sixth Greek Father is Cyril of Jerusalem, who says, "There is one only and the same Holy Spirit who comes and subsists, who is everywhere with the Father and Son, not because he is formed from the mouth and lips by the speaking of the Father and Son, or is breathed out or diffused into the air, but a very substantial speaking and working, etc." Here Cyril would not say that the Spirit is not formed in corporeal mode by the mouth of the Father and Son unless he thought he was in some way spirated by the Father and Son. For it was enough to say that he is not formed by the mouth of the Father. Cyril means therefore that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and Son and proceeds from both, but in a spiritual and ineffable way.

The seventh Greek is John Chrysostom, who says, "He is the Spirit proceeding from the Father and Son who divides his own gifts to each as he will." And again, "We say the Holy Spirit is coequal with the Father and Son and proceeds from the

Father and Son." And again, "Behold that not the Father alone but the Son too sends the Spirit." And lest the Greeks say that Chrysostom is speaking of the temporal sending of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the same Chrysostom says when he explains elsewhere why the Spirit is said to be sent by the Son, "Further he shows the difference of the persons when he sets down two etc." So if sending is expressed to signify the distinction of the persons, then truly the person himself is sent, not the gifts only, and since the distinction of the persons is eternal, this sending necessarily includes eternal emanation.

Lastly Gennadius in his apology for the Latins adduces another place from Chrysostom, "Christ came to us, gave to us the Spirit coming down from him, and took up our body."

The eighth Greek Father is Epiphanius on the heresy of the Arians, "But neither is the Holy Spirit equal with other spirits, since there is one Spirit of God, the Spirit proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son; but these want him to be a creature from a creature etc." In this place the 'receiving from the Son' can signify nothing other than proceeding from the Son through eternal emanation. For Epiphanius opposes the 'to receive from the Son' to creation. For he teaches that the Spirit is not created by the Son, as the heretics said, but received subsistence from the Son in another way than through creation. Hence a little later he again says, "And since the Son is not foreign to the Father but is generated from him, the Holy Spirit too is not foreign. But the Son indeed is begotten only begotten without beginning, without time, but the Holy Spirit is neither begotten nor created, but proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son." And later, "All things are created by God, but only the Son is begotten of God, and only the Holy Spirit proceeded from God and received from the Son; but all the rest are created and did not proceed from the Father nor receive from the Son." And later, "By which he shows that the Holy Spirit is fount from fount, from Father and the only begotten."

Again in Anchor., "The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of God and the Spirit of the Father and the Spirit of the Son, not according to any composition as body and soul are in us, but he is a third name in the middle of the Father and the Son from the Father and the Son." And, "But if Christ is believed to be from the Father, God from God, and the Spirit from Christ or from both." And, "The Son is life from life, but the Holy Spirit from both." And, "He calls him Son who is from himself, but the Holy Spirit from both." And, "Hear, O good man, that the Father is Father of true Son, total light, and Son of true Father, light from light, not as an artifact or only in the name of a creature, and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of truth, a third light from Father and Son." And later, "The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is alone the light of truth."

The ninth Greek Father is Dydimus of Alexandria, how says, "He will not speak of himself, that is, not without my and the Father's choice, because he is inseparable from mine and the Father's will, because he is not from himself but from the Father and from me. For the fact that he subsists and speaks is his from the Father and from me." And later, "The Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of truth and the Spirit of wisdom, cannot hear from the Son speaking what he does not know, since he is that which is brought forward by the Son, that is, proceeding from truth,

comforter emanating from comforter." And later, "Neither is there any substance to the Holy Spirit besides what is given him by the Son."

The tenth Greek Father is Cyril of Alexandria, who says, "But since he is consubstantial with the Son and proceeds through him, having all his virtue, therefore he says, 'Because he will take of mine'." And later, "For since he naturally proceeds through the Son, as proper to him, along with all things that he absolutely has he is said to receive that they are of himself."

Note that the Spirit proceeds through the Son with all things that he absolutely has. For what else does that signify than that divine essence and all the absolute perfections are communicated to the Holy Spirit through procession from the Son. And later he says, "Coming forth from the substance of God the Father, he is poured out on the saints through the consubstantial Word, from whom he is according to emission for being and subsisting." Could St. Cyril have said more clearly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son? For we understand by procession from the Son that the Holy Spirit has being and subsisting from the Son, which Cyril affirms in expressive words. Again he says, "He proceeds from the Father through the Son." Again he says, "And therefore he calls the Holy Spirit likewise Lord, as existing naturally from the Son and in the Son." And later, "Thus we understand that the Son of God is naturally from and in the Father himself. But we believe the Holy Spirit is naturally and substantially from the Son just as he proceeds from the Father." Again he says, "The Spirit is proper to him, and in him, and from him, as he is surely understood to be from God himself and the Father."

The eleventh Greek Father is Simeon Metaphrastes, of whom honorable mention is made in the Council of Florence. He says, "My Christ ascends into heaven and returns to his paternal seat, and he sends the Holy Spirit who proceeds from him."

The twelfth is Anastasius, of whom mention is made with honor in the sixth Synod. He speaks thus, "The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the mouth of God; for the mouth is the Son of the Father." Here he sufficiently clearly indicates that the Holy Spirit thus proceeds from the Son, who is called the mouth of God, just as the spirit of our mouth is breathed from our mouth. And Anastasius says later, "So as to teach that there is one essence both of him who receives and of him from whom he receives, of him from whom he proceeds." Here by 'him who receives' the essence he understands the Spirit, and by 'him from whom he receives' he understands the Son, by 'him from whom he proceeds' he understands the Father.

But if the Spirit receives essence from the Son, what else do we require? For there should be no question about the word 'proceeds', since there is agreement about the thing. Hence he subjoins in the same place, "For neither does he proceed from what is of a foreign essence, or receive anything from what is consubstantial with him." And later he says, "Again the Spirit himself, and from him he proceeds and by him he is sent, not from the Father alone but also the Son." And later, "When the Lord indeed declares that the Holy Spirit comes from him and when he breathes him on the disciples, he said, 'receive the Holy Spirit'."

The thirteenth is Tharasius in a letter to the patriarchs of the East read at the seventh Synod, who says "We believe in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father through the Son."

The fourteenth is Maximus, a most learned man and a saint, who says, "The Holy Spirit, as he is according to the essence of God and the Father, so also is he according to the essence of the Son, as proceeding essentially from the Father through the ineffably born Son." Bessarion cites this place.

The fifteenth is John Damascene, who says, "The Son is the image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit of the Son." But an image at least has essence from the exemplar. And later, "God the Holy Spirit is between the unbegotten and the begotten, and is conjoined to the Father through the Son." We have then fifteen Latin witnesses and fifteen Greek ones, who before the rise of our disagreement taught that the Holy Spirit is produced or spirated by the Father and the Son, so that now the obstinacy of the Greeks should seem clearly intolerable.

*Chapter Twenty Six: the Same is Confirmed by Reason*

See the many reasons in St. Thomas' works. The principle reason of St. Thomas is as follows: if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinct from him; but this is against the faith, because then there would be a duality and not a Trinity. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

The proposition of this argument is thus proved: All distinction in God is born from relations of origin; but if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son there would not be between them a relation of origin; therefore if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would not be distinct from the Son.

The proposition of this argument is proved again thus: for in God there is nothing but essence and relation, or but absolute and relative; but the essence and everything absolute is common; therefore only relation distinguishes. Hence in the eleventh Council of Toledo it is said that number is discerned only in the relations; therefore every distinction takes its rise from relations; for where there is no distinction, neither can there be number. Further, if all absolutes were not common to the three persons, the three persons would not be one thing as the Lateran Council teaches. Again we could not defend the simplicity of God nor could we show that no perfection is in one person that is not in another; so one should not doubt but that relation alone distinguishes the Trinity.

Again, not any relation suffices for making a distinction; for relations that are not opposite do not distinguish, as is plain, because in one Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, and yet these relations do not distinguish two persons; therefore relations must be opposite in order to distinguish.

Again not any opposites distinguish, but they must be real; for the relation of identity states opposition but does not distinguish, because it does not state a real opposition; again relations that are opposite and real are founded either on quantity, as equality, or on quality, as likeness, or on action, as paternity and filiation; but in God there are no real relations founded on quantity or quality; therefore only relations founded on action remain, which are called relations of origin, and these can distinguish persons.

The proof of the assumption is that in God there is indeed equality and likeness, but because the foundation of these is the essence alone, which is one in number, therefore these are relations of reason and not real relations. For there cannot be real relations where there are not proximate foundations really distinct.

And if equality and likeness in God were real relations, as Scotus wishes, yet there cannot thence be taken a distinction of persons. For Scotus thinks that, for relations to be real, there are not required distinct foundations but that a distinction of relations suffices, and since Father and Son are real extremes, therefore he thinks that equality and likeness are real relations.

Therefore, according to this opinion, the persons are not distinct because they are equal or like in a real relation of equality and likeness, but on the contrary, they are for this reason equal or like by a real relation because they are distinct persons. So only relations of origin distinguish, and hence it follows, as has already been proved, that either the Holy Spirit takes his origin from the Son and is referred to him by a relation of origin, which is to proceed from him, or he certainly is not distinct from him, which not even the Greeks have ever taught.

But against this reason there is a very troublesome objection, for it does not seem true that only opposite relations are really distinct in God. For paternity and active spiration are really distinct and yet are not opposed. Likewise filiation and active spiration.

Some reply that paternity is distinct from passive spiration because it is identified with active spiration, which is opposed to passive.

But on the contrary. For then active spiration could not be in the Son since it is identified with paternity which is opposed to filiation; and likewise the essence could not be in the Son or the Holy Spirit, because it is identified with paternity which is really distinct from filiation and passive spiration.

Others reply that paternity and passive spiration are distinct because they are in distinct suppositis.

But neither is this sufficient; for active spiration too is in different suppositis, namely in Father and Son, and yet it is one and the same in both. And is not the essence itself in three suppositis really distinct, and yet it is one and the same in all? And further the suppositis themselves, namely Father and Holy Spirit, are not properly opposed, and so not every distinction arises from opposition.

Others reply that paternity and passive spiration are opposed virtually, because the foundation of paternity is in the production of knowledge, and passive spiration is in the production of love, which productions are opposed, since they include relations of origin; for love is born of knowledge.

But on the contrary. For love does not arise from knowledge as by efficient cause, for the intellect proposes only the object to the will, but no real distinction is necessarily posited between object and act, as is plain in God, where the essence is the object of knowledge and love and is not distinguished from knowledge and love.

I reply therefore that paternity is not opposed to passive spiration and yet is distinguished from it by the reason of some opposite relation. For one must observe that, when two relations are opposed, not only are the relations distinguished but also, because of them, the relative suppositis are also distinguished. And so not only are active and passive spiration distinguished, but also spirator and spirated are distinguished, and consequently, because these relatives are subsistent persons, the properties constitutive of these persons are distinguished, otherwise one would be the other.

Since therefore paternity is constitutive of the spirating person, it is necessarily distinguished from passive spiration, which is constitutive of the spirated person, otherwise the Holy Spirit would proceed from himself. For he proceeds from the Father and would himself be the Father if paternity and passive spiration were not distinguished.

I say the same about filiation, which is distinguished from passive spiration because filiation constitutes the person of the Son and so of the spirator if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; but passive spiration constitutes the person of the spirated. Now spirator and spirated are opposites. Therefore some things are distinguished in God that are not opposed relatively, but the reason for the distinction is always some relative opposition, which, if it were taken away, no distinction would remain.

You will say that if the Spirit did not proceed from the Father but only from the Son, there would be no relative opposition between the Father and the Spirit and yet he would be distinguished from him; for otherwise the Spirit would be the Father, and would thus produce his author, namely the Son.

I reply that in no way can active spiration be taken from the Father unless it is also taken from the Son, for, if the Son spirates the Holy Spirit, by that fact too the Father spirates at least mediately, and so he is mediately opposed to the Holy Spirit; but if active spiration were taken from the Son it would not necessarily be taken from the Father, but then the Son would not be distinguished from the Holy Spirit. But if we imagine it taken from both, the procession itself of the Holy Spirit would be taken away too, and so the Holy Spirit himself would be taken away.

There is another objection against our same reason, that to be generated and to be spirated are two modes of production that are plainly impossible, and on them are founded impossible relations even if they are in no way opposed, as is plain, because nothing can be produced twice and be produced in two ways; and the same is evidenced by examples, for no one can generate a son by nature and produce the same by art and make it that son and statue are the same, even if these are not in any way opposed.

Add also the authority of St. Anselm, who says, "Since it is still not clear whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, another cause of their distinction must be assigned, and this is that the Son is produced by being born and the Spirit by proceeding."

I reply that things that in creatures are many and divided are one and simple in God, provided opposition not prevent it. Hence if the Holy Spirit did not actively proceed from the Son, then without doubt to be generated and to be spirated would not be two modes but really one, which however could be distinguished by reason. For as intellect and will and understanding and willing are the same in God, word and love could also be the same if one of them did not really proceed from the other, and as it is not repugnant for one person to be sayer and lover, or Father and spirator, so it is not repugnant for one person to be word and love, Son and Holy Spirit.

Add that there is also not lacking an example in creatures; for to generate and to teach are formally very diverse, and likewise the relations of father and son differ very much from the relations of teacher and disciple, and yet one and the same can

be father and teacher with respect to the same, who will be his son and his disciple. But when we do not see this, as in the example of son and statue, it happens because of the multiplication and distinction of the matter, not because of the impossibility of the relations.

The reason therefore of St. Thomas is very solid and deduced from the foundations of the faith; and besides it is the common teaching of the Fathers, which assuredly Scotus did not advert to. For Nazianzen only acknowledges distinction because of relations of origin. Nyssa only says that the persons are distinguished in God by being cause and caused, which is the same as the preceding opinion. Augustine only says that the persons are distinguished by this, that one is related to the other. Boethius says "relation multiplies the Trinity." Anselm says all things are one where opposition of relations does not stand in the way. Richard says the distinction of persons is born of the number of producers, because one person produces and is not produced; another produces and is produced; a third is produced and does not produce.

From these it is easy to reply to the place cited from Anselm. For Anselm is expounding the things in which we agree with the Greeks, one of which is that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit because one receives being from being born and the other from proceeding. But then he shows that these two modes cannot be distinct unless the Holy Spirit is from the Son, because all things are one where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way.

It remains then for us briefly to propound and confute the arguments of the Greeks.

#### *Chapter Twenty Seven: the Arguments of the Greeks are Solved*

The first argument they take from the words of *John* ch.15, "When the paraclete comes whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father." For since the Lord so expressively said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and does not add 'and from the Son', it seems rashness to assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

I reply with Augustine that only the Father is named, not so as to exclude the Son, but because the Father is the principal author of the Holy Spirit, for the Son has from the Father that he spirates.

But there is proof that the Son is not excluded even if he is not named. First from other similar places. For *Matthew* ch.16 says, "Flesh and blood have not revealed it to you, but my Father who is in heaven;" and yet that revelation was made by all the persons. And of the Holy Spirit *John* ch.15, "He will teach you all things," and yet the Father and the Son too teach us all things.

Second when it is said, "who proceeds from the Father", it cannot be understood that he proceeds from the Father as he is Father formally, because then the Spirit would be the Son, therefore from the Father as he has essence in common with the Son; therefore he also proceeds from the Son.

Third, as Anselm acutely reasons, if it were said, 'No one produces the Holy Spirit save the Father alone', the Son would still not be excluded; as is clear from a like sentence, for *Matthew* ch.11 says, "No one knows the Son but the Father," and yet the Son himself and the Holy Spirit, who are of the same nature, are not excluded

from knowledge of the Son. And in the same place is added, "Neither does anyone know the Father save the Son and him to whom the Son wishes to reveal him." Yet neither are the Father and the Spirit excluded from knowledge of the Father, even if the Son reveals nothing to them. Therefore in the same way, if it were said, 'no one produces the Holy Spirit save the Father', the Son would not be excluded from that production. How much less, then, is he excluded by the sentence, 'the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father'? For here there is no exclusion, no negation.

The second argument the Greeks take from the fact that in the Council of Ephesus the Creed of the Nestorians was read and the book of Theodoret against the anathemas of Cyril, and in both was read expressly that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and yet the Fathers of the Council were silent, so they seem to have approved.

I reply first by turning back the argument, for in the same Council of Ephesus and later in the fourth and fifth Synods the letter of Cyril was read with the anathemas against Nestorius, in which is twice contained that the Spirit has his being from the Son, and yet the Fathers did not contradict, so they approved.

Second, Theodoret not only says that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son but also that he does not proceed through the Son, which however the Greeks now assert, therefore if the Council approved by its silence that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, which seems to be against us, they also approved that he does not proceed through the Son, which is against them.

I say finally that the Council of Ephesus, although it then did not wish to dispute this question expressly, because it had convened for other business, yet it sufficiently clearly indicated its opinion, since it approved with complete agreement the whole doctrine of Cyril, and damned the contrary doctrine of the Nestorians and Theodoret; and the same was done by the fourth and fifth Synod; nay also by the sixth and seventh, and briefly by all the following Synods.

The third argument they take from the Fathers, and first they adduce Dionysius the Areopagite, who says, "The Father is the sole fount of the supersubstantial deity."

I reply that this is true because the Father does not have divinity from elsewhere. Hence others compare the Father to the fount who gives and does not receive, the Son to a river that receives and gives, the Holy Spirit to a lake that receives and does not give water to another. But although for this reason the Father alone is said to be the fount, because he does not receive from elsewhere, yet for another reason the Son too is called a fount by Epiphanius, but fount from fount, as God from God, because he receives the same essence as the Father has.

Second they bring forward Basil who says, "The Son has with the Father no communion according to a proper notion." Therefore he does not join with the Father in spiration, which is some notion. Besides he says in the same place that the proper notion of the Holy Spirit is that he is known through the Son and with the Son, has subsistence from the Father.

I reply to the first that Basil is not speaking of any notion, but of the notion that is a property, as is plain from his words. He means to say, therefore, that the Son by reason of filiation, which is his only proper notion, does not join with the Father or Holy Spirit.

To the second I say that the place is for us if it is well understood; for when he says that the Holy Spirit is known through the Son and with the Son, he does not mean to say that the Holy Spirit is known from the preaching and teaching of the Son, but that he is known through the Son and with the Son as a relative through its correlative. For a little before he had said that the Holy Spirit depends on the Son and that one cannot be thought without the other, which is proper to relatives.

Besides he discourses in that place about the intimate and eternal distinction of the persons; but an eternal distinction should not be taken from our temporal knowledge, otherwise before our knowledge there would not have been distinct persons. But if the Son and Holy Spirit are relatives, it is necessary that they are relatives for the reason either that the Son is the Son of the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit is Father, which no one says; or that the Holy Spirit is spirated by the Son and the Son is spirator of the Holy Spirit, which the Catholic Church says. Nor is it an obstacle that Basil says the Holy Spirit subsists from the Father, for he attributes that to the Father as to principal author, just as the Lord himself said, “[the Holy Spirit] who proceeds from the Father.”

Third they bring forward Nazianzen who in an oration to Bishops who had come from Egypt says, “Everything the Father has the Son also has, except causality.” For from this it seems to follow that the Son is not cause of the Holy Spirit but only the Father is.

I reply that Nazianzen is speaking of causality with respect to the Son himself, which is a property of the Father, as if he had said, ‘All things the Father has the Son has save for being Father’. But what of the fact that in the same place Nazianzen openly insinuates that the Spirit is from the Son? For as he compared the Son with the Father as product with producer, so later he compares the Spirit with the Son, “Everything the Son has the Spirit has, except filiation etc.,” that is, except the property of that person, from whom he himself is produced.

Fourth they adduce Damascene who says, “We say the Spirit is through the Son, we do not say he is from the Son.” Blessed Thomas rejects Damascene as one who followed Theodoret, but that does not seem true, for Theodoret expressively denied the Spirit was from the Son or through the Son, but Damascene denies he is from the Son but not that he is through the Son.

I reply then with Bessarion and Gennadius that Damascene did not deny the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as far as the thing is concerned, since he said that the Spirit is the image of the Son and is through the Son, but he thought it safer to say through the Son than from the Son as to mode of speaking because of the heresy of Macedonius and Eunomius, who said that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son as from primary, nay, even sole cause. In this way we say, after the heresy of Nestorius, that Mary is not Christ-bearer but God-bearer, not because she is not Christ-bearer but lest it be thought she is only Christ-bearer and not God-bearer. So just as because of the heresy of Macedonius the Spirit was rightly said to be from the Father through the Son, so because of the error of the Greeks he is now said to be from the Father and from the Son.

Fifth they adduce, as Master Lombard testifies, Pope Leo III who for the guarding of the faith ordered the Creed of Constantinople without the addition ‘from the Son’ to be written on a bronze tablet and put on the altar after the body of St.

Paul. But this Pontiff lived about 800, at which time the addition had already been made; therefore the Pontiff took it away.

I reply that the Pontiff did this with devoted effort, to preserve the memory of the Creed of Constantinople as it was, and so that all would understand that the creed was not condemned nor is contrary to ours. For the Church has several creeds, the Apostles', the Nicene, the Athanasian, the Constantinopolitan without any addition and the same with addition, which are all one and the same although one may be clearer and more explicit than another. Further the Church receives and honors all the Creeds, and just as when the Nicene creed was made the Apostles' Creed was not abrogated, and just as the Nicene Creed was not abrogated when the Creed of Constantinople was made, so too when our Creed was made the Creed of Constantinople should not be abrogated. Therefore with very prudent counsel did the Supreme Pontiff order the Creed of Constantinople to be preserved with honor in the Church, lest the Greeks should think that it had been reprobated by us.

Sixth they adduce Theophylact who says, "Assuredly the Latins badly expound this, and understanding it less rightly say that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son."

I reply that Theophylact lived at the time of the schism, and therefore his authority is not received, otherwise we too could have brought forward many others, as Bernard, Rupert, Richard, Thomas, Bonaventure, and other more recent saints.

Finally they bring forward reasons. The first is from Theophylact in the cited place. The Holy Spirit is one and therefore has one principle, not two, and proceeds by one spiration not two.

I reply that this reason, which yet is chief among the Greeks, has no validity. For although the Father and Son are two spirators yet they spirate with a single spiration, and they are one principle of the Holy Spirit. For nothing is multiplied in God save opposite relation; but the spiration by which the Father spirates is not opposed to the spiration by which the Son spirates; and certainly if the argument were conclusive it would also make the Son not to be creator of the world, for the world is one, so it has one principle and is produced by one action, so if two persons cannot be one principle nor create by one action, then the Son did not create the world but only the Father; just as therefore the Father and Son, nay the Holy Spirit too, are one principle of the world and create with one action, because they have one essence, so too Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit and spirate with one spiration, because they have one spirative power.

The second reason is that the Father is sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, so he does not require the help of the Son.

I reply that the Father is also sufficient principle of creation and yet notwithstanding all the persons create, because they have the same power and essence. For the Son does not spirate because the Father needs help, but because Father and Son have the same spirative power.

Add that the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily from the two, because otherwise he would not be a third person but would coincide with the third, as was shown. So the world is necessarily produced by the three with the necessity of the

producer not of the product, but the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily by the two with the necessity of the producers and of the product.

The third reason is that if the Spirit proceeds from the Son then the Father is more like the Son than the Holy Spirit is, for the Son spirates with the Father but the Spirit does not generate with the Father.

I reply that if the Spirit proceeds only from the Father, the Son will be more like the Spirit than like the Father; for the Son proceeds with the Spirit and does not produce with the Father. But neither of these arguments is conclusive, for likeness is considered on the part of the essence not on the part of relations.

*Chapter Twenty Nine: It is Shown that the Addition of 'and from the Son' was Rightly Made*

It remains to show that the Latins could have and should have explained the Creed by adding the words 'and from the Son', and first I will show that they should have explained the Creed, and then that the Latins could have done it without the Greeks.

That, therefore, they should have explained the Creed is proved by the fact that it is necessary for salvation not to believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father; therefore once the heresy arose that the Spirit does proceed only from the Father a remedy should have been provided by explanation that should take away occasions for error.

The proof of the antecedent is that Athanasius in his Creed, when he had put 'from the Father and the Son' says, "This is the Catholic Faith which unless one keeps whole and inviolate one will perish for eternity." And in his letter to Serapion he says, "As to what the Apostle commands, to avoid a heretic after one or two corrections, even if you seem them flying through the air with Elijah, and with Peter and Moses treading the sea with feet dry, unless they profess that the Holy Spirit is God existing essentially from God the Son, and the Son too is naturally generated God existing essentially from God the Father as we profess, you are not to receive them." See the like from Cyril and Epiphanius in St. Thomas' work against the Greeks.

Further it is proved from the Council of Florence where this is contained, "We define that this truth is to be believed and taken up by all Christians, that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son."

Next by reason. For to believe the Spirit is not from the Son is, as we have demonstrated, an error against the Scriptures, therefore it must necessarily be avoided. One should also note in this place that it was not always necessary not to believe that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son. For before the question arose and was defined, it was enough to believe that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, in which was also included that he proceeded from the Son; nor was there need to ask whether he proceeded from the Son or not, for we are not held to know everything, but we are nevertheless held never positively to hold errors.

Therefore after the question was moved and many began to err, it was necessary to apply a remedy, and this too the Council of Florence defined in these words, "We define the explanation of these words ('and from the Son') for the sake of declaring the truth, and when necessity is then present it is licit and rational for it to be added to the Creed."

Let us come then to the second part, and let us demonstrate that this explanation could have been done by the Latins without the consent of the Greeks.

First, the Roman Pope is pastor and teacher of the whole Church, as the Greeks confessed in the Council of Florence, and it is plain from *John* last chapter, "Feed my sheep;" therefore he can even without a Council define matters of the faith when he teaches *ex cathedra*; otherwise the whole Church could err which is held to follow him, and to define things of faith pertains to him who cannot err.

Second, even if the Pope were not pastor of the whole Church, nor could define controversies of the faith without a Council, yet not for that reason is a Council of Greeks and Latins required, but it is enough that there be a Council of some Bishops convoked by the Roman Pontiff himself. For he is (at a minimum) Bishop of the first see and without him Councils do not have strength and with him they have it, as Gelasius teaches at length in his volume about the bond of anathema. For the firmness of Councils does not arise from the multitude and diversity of Bishops but from its connection with the see of Peter, to whom it was said, "I have prayed for you that your faith fail not," *Luke* ch.22. This is also witnessed to by examples.

For the Council of Rimini had 600 Bishops, party Greek and partly Latin, and yet because the Roman Bishop dissented, it has always been held to be erroneous by both Greeks and Latins. On the other hand, the second Council of 150 Greek Bishops, where no Latin was present, has always been held in honor because it was confirmed by the Pontiff Damasus, and by it the Council of Rimini was condemned. We see therefore that the strength of Councils is from the see of Peter.

Third even if the Pope were not the head of the whole Church, nor Bishop of the first see, but a Patriarch no greater than the rest, the Greeks could still not complain because of the addition. For the question is either about the faith or about the rite, that is, either the Greeks refuse this addition because it is false and against the faith, or because, though it is true, yet it does not please them that it is in the Creed.

If it is a question of rite then certainly, just as there are many other diverse rites between the Greeks and Latins and not for that reason should a schism be made, so too this rite can be tolerated without schism. Besides, one Bishop can institute a rite in his Church without the consent of others; how much more the whole nation of the Latins together?

But if it is question of the faith, provincial or national Councils cannot indeed so define something that it should at once be accepted by all; yet they can define and others should not complain but examine if the thing has been well defined; but if not, to call a greater Council. For we see that this was very often done in the Church.

The heresy of Paul of Samosata was condemned by the Council of Antioch composed of a few Bishops, nor did many more others in the whole world complain, but held it as valid, as is plain from Eusebius. The heresy of Macedonius was condemned by the Council of Constantinople where there were no Latins present; nor did the Latins complain but approved; the heresy of Pelagius was condemned by provincial Councils, at Milevis and Carthage, nor did anyone make a schism for the reason that he had not been called to them. The heresy of Nestorius was condemned by the Council of Ephesus before the Latins were present whom Pope Celestine was

sending, and yet the Latins did not complain but wanted to know what had been done and when they knew it they approved it. And there are infinite examples of this sort.

The Greeks therefore cannot complain that a question was defined without them; especially since after the definition they were called to general Councils, not once or twice but rather often, and again the question was proposed and discussed in their presence.

If you ask why, although the Greeks did not necessarily need to be called at the beginning, yet when they could be called why were they not called at the beginning?

I reply first that it is not certain they were not called, as is said in the Council of Florence, for as we do not know in which Council the addition was made, so we do not know whether the Greeks were there or not. But if they were not called, there was a reason. First because it was not necessary, since the question was easy. For as Augustine replies to the Pelagians when they asked for a general Council, not every heresy is such that all the provinces should be put to trouble because of it. And certainly such is the controversy about the Holy Spirit. Although general Councils were held, they were held to satisfy the Greeks, not because the difficulty of the thing required it. Second because the necessity was urgent and required speed because of contentions that had arise in Gaul and Spain. Nor could Bishops be so quickly called together from remote regions. Third, because it was useless. For at that time there were almost no learned men in Greece. These three reasons are given by Bonaventure

*Chapter Twenty Nine: the Objections of the Greeks are Solved*

But it is necessary to dissolve their arguments. The first is of this sort: the third general Synod prohibited all change to the Creed, for these words are contained at the end of the Council: "The holy Synod has decreed that it is licit for no one to bring forward another faith, or to write or expound one other than has been defined by the holy Fathers gathered at the city of Nicea in the Holy Spirit. But those who have dared to compose another faith, or to hand or give it over to those who want to be converted to the knowledge of the truth, whether from the Gentiles or the Jews or even from any heresy, they, if they were Bishops or clerics, are Bishops alien to the Episcopate and clerics alien to the clergy, but if they were laymen, they are anathematized."

Catholics reply that by this decree explanation or change of the Creed is not prohibited as to words, but what is prohibited is corruption by addition or subtraction that gives a contrary sense; and this is proved in many ways.

First the words of Paul in *Galatians* ch.1 are also understood in this way, when he anathematizes those who teach other than he has taught; for he himself taught many other things afterwards, and John afterwards wrote a whole Gospel where there are many things that are not found in Paul; so Paul does not prohibit doctrine to be added, but something being added contrary to what was before.

Second, if the Council of Ephesus were speaking of any change to the Creed, the Creed of Constantinople, where is found '[the Holy Spirit] proceeding from the Father' would already have been abrogated; for the Creed of Constantinople added

to the Nicene creed also the words 'proceeding from the Father', and yet the Greeks have always used this Creed and not the Nicene.

Third, in the Council of Chalcedon, where many of the Bishops seem to have been present who were at the Council of Ephesus, the Bishops, when the faith had to be written down, cried that there should be added to the Creed, 'holy Mary is God-bearer', and a new Creed was written in which many things were changed, added, taken away from the words of the Creeds of Nicea and Constantinople, and at the end is added the prohibition, "The holy Synod has decreed etc.," as it is in the Council of Ephesus. From this the explanation of the decree is evidently clear, unless we say that the fourth Council is in conflict with the third, and that all the Bishops of the fourth Council are excommunicated, which no one has hitherto said.

Add too that the Greeks were formerly not ignorant that the Latins were of this opinion. For Homisdas in his letter to the Emperor Justin expressively writes that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son." Again they were not ignorant that the addition had been made, and yet for about 300 years they were silent, nor did they start a schism, as is plain, because the addition was made about the year 600 and after that there were, by the common consent of the Greeks and Latins, three general Councils celebrated, the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and finally after that it came into their mind to object to us the Ephesus decree; why did they not object it before save because they knew it did nothing against us?

The Greeks reply that the Council of Ephesus prohibited every change to the Creed, both in thing and in words.

As to what we object about the Creed of Constantinople, that it added to the Nicene, they reply that the Council of Ephesus took the Creed of Nicea and of Constantinople to be one and the same, and prohibited change in the Nicene Creed, as was explained by the Synod of Constantinople.

As to what we object about the Council of Chalcedon they reply that the Council of Chalcedon produced indeed another confession of faith but did not compose another Creed which should be used in the Church and given to those who were to be catechized. And it was of such a Creed that the Council of Ephesus was speaking. For the occasion of this decree was that many were writing creeds and giving them to the uneducated and were sometimes mixing in errors.

But Catholics object on the contrary that if the Creed of Nicea and of Constantinople are taken to be the same, because they agree in the thing, the same can be said of other Creeds which agree in the thing.

Besides from the fact that the Council of Chalcedon did not compose a Creed that was to be used in the Church and yet it added the clause that no one should write another Creed and give it to those who were being catechized, Catholics collect that this prohibition should not be understood of change in the Creed as to words but as to things. This is a common and solid solution, but perhaps the mouths of the Greeks could be silenced in another way.

For even if the Council of Ephesus spoke about the words of the Creed and did not wish anything to be in any way added or taken away, this prohibition would extend only to individual Bishops or clerics or laymen and not to a Council of Bishops. For the words of the canon make mention of these persons, namely Bishops, clerics, and laymen. But it is clear that Councils do not consist of clerics and

laymen but only of Bishops, and the occasion for writing this canon confirms the same. For the canon was written because at that time many had begun to write their own Creeds, and not only Bishops or clerics but also laymen.

Next how credible is it that the Synod of Ephesus wanted to prescribe a rule to the Supreme Pontiff or to a general Synod? Did those Bishops not know that it could not give a law to its superior or equal? Since therefore the phrase 'and from the Son' was not added to the creed by any particular Bishop or cleric or layman, but by the Supreme Pastor of the whole Church, and three general Councils approved it, it cannot then be doubted that it was done rightly.

But again some object that even if it was licit for the Latins to explain the Creed by the addition, yet it does not seem they should have added the explanation to the Creed. For if everything that is defined as regard the Creed were to be added to the Creed, many other things would have to be added, as that the Virgin is God-bearer, that the body of Christ is truly in the Eucharist although he has ascended to heaven, etc.

I reply that not everything should be put in the Creed; yet this phrase was rightly added for two reasons. First because after the rise of a heresy the Creed without this phrase was giving occasion for error. Second because the phrase could easily be added without addition of a new article or a notable change to the Creed; and these reasons do not hold in the case of other additions. Yet we do not deny that some other phrase could be added for greater explanation, if it seemed expedient to the Supreme Pontiff or to a Council of the world.

*Chapter Thirty: the Disputation is Concluded with a Divine Testimony*

At the end of the whole disputation it has been pleasing now to note a divine judgment or testimony. For God has shown in many ways after the rise of the schism who is in error, the Greeks or the Latins. For up to the time of the schism Greece flourished with learned and holy men, so that all the general Councils were celebrated among the Greeks; but after the schism for almost 800 years they have had no Council, no holy man famous for miracles, very few learned men. But the Latins at this time have had twelve general Councils and innumerable particular ones. Again in each age there have been men very famous for miracles, new orders of religious, many learned men.

Besides at this time the faith of the Latins has been propagated by the accession of the Indians of the East and of the new world in the West; the faith of the Greeks gets smaller by the day. The Greeks have been convicted in Councils, they have been converted to our faith four or five times, and perhaps even more often, and they have always returned to their vomit.

The Latins have always in disputations remained superior in the same faith and doctrine; lastly among the Latins very powerful kingdoms and empires still flourish, but the empire of the Greeks has been overthrown by the Turks, the enemies of Christ; and it has been almost destroyed, and all of them live in very wretched servitude, and are compelled to carry the very heavy yoke of captivity.

And so that they may understand that the cause of their fall is their stubbornness in error about the procession of the Holy Spirit, Constantinople was taken, the Emperor killed, and the empire wholly extinguished by the Turks on the

very feast of the Holy Spirit. For as Gerard Mercator proves in his Chronology, in the year 1452 on the 26<sup>th</sup> day of May Muhammed ordered his army to the final attack and on the following day he took Constantinople. But in that year the feast of Pentecost was on the 28<sup>th</sup> of May, as is plain from the bronze number and the dominical letter by which movable feasts are examined. For the bronze number is 8 and the dominical letter is A. Therefore many compare the Greek Church to the kingdom of Samaria, which separated itself from the true temple and was at length carried off into perpetual captivity.

## Book Three: On the Incarnation of Christ

### *Chapter One: On the Errors of this Time about the Incarnation*

There are at this time two kinds of people who err about the incarnation; for some openly and directly attack this mystery; others do so obscurely and as it were obliquely. To the first kind belong the Anabaptists and Svenckfeldians. The Anabaptists expressively teach that Christ did not have true flesh assumed from a virgin. John Cochlaeus testifies in his book on the errors of the Monasterian Anabaptists that this is one of their chief articles.

Further, Memnon, one of the standard bearers of the Anabaptists, teaches that the body of Christ was carried down from heaven from the substance of the Father into the womb of a virgin.

Michael Servetus, himself too one of the Anabaptists, teaches that the flesh of Christ is divine and heavenly, generated from the essence of the Father.

Gaspar Svenckfeld too in his book on the divine majesty of the humanity of Christ, teaches that the humanity of Christ after the ascension is not creaturely but super-creaturely, and that Christ himself is, even by reason of his humanity, true God.

Lastly Peter Canisius testifies that in the year 1571 the Anabaptists were publicly compelled to dispute this question, whether Christ assumed flesh from a virgin or from elsewhere; that the thing took place in the realm of the Count Palatine near Heidelberg.

To the second kind belong at this time almost all the Lutherans, who teach two things, and from them it follows that they are either Eutychians or Nestorians, or a monstrous mixture of both heresies. They teach first that the flesh of Christ has the attributes of divinity and in particular the attribute of omnipresence. Second they teach that the hypostatic union consists in the communication of divine attributes to the flesh and the humanity itself. And if indeed they want these attributes to be conjoined essentially to humanity, the humanity will make one thing with the divinity, which is the heresy of Eutyches. But if they want them to be conjoined accidentally, then there will be distinct persons to God and man, and one person will be in the other through indwelling and per accidens, which is openly Nestorian. But we will come to refutation later; now we are explaining the opinions only.

The author of this error seems to be Jacob Faber Stapulensis, for thus does he write, "The body of Christ, that is, assumed humanity, fills heaven and earth, for it is wherever the word is because the Word was made flesh, and therefore the Word is never without the flesh." And elsewhere, "Since the Son is in the Father and in all the saints who are in heaven and on earth, is he also corporally so? Why not? But without mode, unless you say in a divine and incomprehensible mode, which should be called as much mode as not mode."

Him Luther at first followed, who although he everywhere boasts he believes there is one person in Christ and two natures, yet his doctrine is other. For he says, "We believe that Jesus Christ is in his humanity located above all creatures and fills

all things." And later, "And he has all things in his hand and is present wherever you wish." Again he says the right hand of God is everywhere.

Lastly he assumes the body of Christ to be at the right of God, and as he himself says "Not in the smallest finger or nail of the right hand, but in the whole," and thence he concludes that the body of Christ is necessarily everywhere. Again he says in his book on the Lord's Eucharistic feast that he clearly proves Christ's body is really present in the feast because it is everywhere. And he says he proves it is everywhere because it is in the right hand of God, which is everywhere, and in the same text he sets down three ways of being in a place.

First locally, that is, circumscribed by place; and he does not mean that in this way Christ's flesh is everywhere.

Second spiritually or by penetration, and this he says belongs to the glorious body, but neither in this way does he say Christ's flesh is everywhere.

Third a heavenly and divine way by hypostatic union, and in this way he attributes ubiquity to Christ's flesh, and he says, "You necessarily have to place Christ's flesh, which is one person with God, very far outside creatures, and as far as God himself is outside creatures etc." In these words he seems altogether to mean that Christ's flesh is not a creature but God, since he wants it to be very far distant from creatures and yet to be everywhere. For thence is collected that it is not distant from creatures by distance in space, since it is everywhere, but in dignity and excellence, and therefore is really God; and in the same place he rebukes the Zwinglians because they attributed the passion of Christ to his humanity alone and not also his divinity.

But certainly if Christ's flesh is not a creature and the deity suffered, something completely one seems to be made from both natures, and Luther repeats this in his book on the Councils, namely that the Zwinglians erred when they say Christ's divinity could not suffer, where (as I have said elsewhere) he defends Nestorius and Eutyches from error save in way of speaking.

John Brentius has so enriched this doctrine that he is thought to be the author of Ubiquity, although however it is not true but he is following Luther. First then Brentius expressly hands on that Christ's flesh is everywhere by reason of the hypostatic union, and he proves it in many ways, whose arguments we will solve later. He also asserts that Christ's body was also invisibly in heaven before the passion and now too is not in any definite place in heaven but everywhere.

Lastly he places the hypostatic union in the fact that the Son of God poured all his goods and properties into the Son of Mary, and here a Nestorian is distinguishing the Son of God from the Son of Mary and a Eutychian is attributing to the flesh all the divine attributes. He says, "And Peter's humanity is only in one place, but divinity, because it is filled and sustained, pours itself out everywhere, and since for this cause Peter and God, or the Son of God, who is in Peter, are two distinct hypostases or persons, how is it also not the case that for the same cause the Son of Mary and the Son of God, who is in the Son of Mary, become two persons?" Here he puts this difference alone between the union of God with Christ and with Peter, that God does not have Peter everywhere united to himself, and therefore he is distinguished from him in person; but Christ he has everywhere united to himself and so is not distinguished from him in person.

But you will note in this place and in the following words of Brentius these Nestorian phrases, 'the Son of God is in the Son of Mary,' and 'the Son of God assumed the Son of man'. For thus Brentius continues, "When God or the Son of God is said to have assumed or united man to himself or the Son of man in his person, there is not only signified that God exists in his substance or essence in man and confers some of his gifts on man (for thus can it be said that God has united to himself in person not only the seed of Abraham or a son of the Virgin, but also any man, nay any creature), but there is properly signified that God so unites and joins himself to man that he confers on him all his majesty, and does not adorn him with one or other gift or even with many, but with infinite gifts and so with all, I say all, celestial and divine gifts." And later, "Since the Son of God has conferred his omnipotence on the Son of man, so that he has that communion with the Son of man, and since omnipresence depends on omnipotence, it cannot be denied that he conferred omnipresence." And later when explaining what 'the Word was made flesh' means he says, "This is such that the Son of God so fills the Son of Mary that he communicates to him all his power, wisdom, felicity, and presence; for unless this is the opinion, there will be no difference between Christ and other men." And these things he very often repeats, where you certainly see that the hypostatic union is nothing other than the effusion of God's gifts and attributes into the human nature of Christ.

Matthias Illyricus on *Acts* ch.3, "whom heaven must receive," contends that Christ the man is not in heaven as in a place but rather heaven is in Christ, since he himself is everywhere. And in the same place he wants Christ on the day of ascension to have ascended to the clouds and not to have gone further in that visible and locally circumscribed form of body but to have vanished in some way, so that now he is nowhere in that viewable form but is everywhere in invisible majesty; but what else is this than openly to destroy the true flesh of Christ?

Martin Chemnitz wants to seem very cautious and has made everything marvelously involved; he does not dare to say absolutely that Christ's flesh is everywhere but he says it is where Christ wants it to be and it can be everywhere if he wants; but either he is in conflict with himself or he is saying what the others say. For at the beginning of his book he sets down the chief places of Scripture for the majesty of Christ and among others the place from *Matthew* last chapter, "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth." And he explains it in this way: all power is given to me, that is, omnipotence in heaven and on earth, that is, omnipresence.

Then Chemnitz has these words, "This union is so tight, individual, insoluble, and inseparable, that the divine nature of the Word neither wants nor can nor should be outside this union with the flesh, but to be thought, sought for, and grasped in the tightest union." And he repeats this several times.

But if the divine nature cannot be thought or understood without the flesh, necessarily one of them has being of essence from the other and therefore they will be one nature. In the same place he says that by the hypostatic union all divine gifts are communicated to the flesh or the humanity. And later he says that besides the infused and created gifts, there are communicated to the assumed nature also the attributes proper to divinity, and therefore omnipotence and omnipresence.

Lastly he says that Christ's humanity is not only in the Eucharistic feast but also outside it in the Church really present to the faithful, and he adds that even everything outside the Church is subject to Christ's humanity and that Christ's humanity dominates all things and rules all things, not, as being absent from things, through vicars, in the way kings govern provinces through others, but it has all things present; and is this not to be everywhere?

Like things are taught by John Wigandus and Nicholas Senneccerus, and John Timan, pastor at Bremen, adduces in his book many testimonies from significant Lutherans that Christ's body is everywhere.

Andreas Musculus, on the evidence of Staphylus, contends that the divinity of Christ suffered on the cross, and he proves it with many testimonies from Luther.

Again Jacob Andreas Smidel, superintendent at Wittemberg and a significant Brentian, in theses disputed at Tübingen did not recognize any hypostatic union at all save by communication of gifts and that an accidental one. He says, "Nothing else of God is to be imagined or made up in Christ than is in all other creatures as regards the substance, the presence of divinity, which is discerned as an energy in creatures, because it does and operates different things in different creatures; so in Christ everything is contained, so that there is nothing outside him and in man through the man Christ he does all things in everything." And again, "But in this real fullness by the communication of the whole divinity, the human nature is not mixed with the divine or plainly abolished, but what is of the divine nature in essence is communicated to the human nature in its own way per accidens." And again, "This community of properties is to be defined as hypostatic union."

Lastly the Gospel Harmony of 1580 seems to have this aim chiefly, to establish Ubiquity and destroy the mystery of the incarnation. For in one of the articles you have that the right arm of God is everywhere and to it the humanity of Christ has been raised, and in another article that, from the very conception of Christ, that man was assumed into God and exalted to the right hand of God, so that Christ not only as God but also as man has power for all things, knows all things, is present to all creatures. But Christ did not show all these things until after his resurrection when he put off the form of a servant. Then prolix proofs are given for all these statements.

But one must observe that the Saxon Churches have thrice changed their opinion. For at the beginning, when Luther was teaching, they defended Ubiquity along with him. Then after Luther's death when Melancthon was ruling, they began to attack Ubiquity against Illyricus and Brentius. For Melancthon openly condemns Ubiquity and wants Christ to be in a certain place of heaven as to the flesh but everywhere as to divinity. And in a letter to the Count Palatine of 1559 he says, "Others have thought up Ubiquity." And he adds, "These things are all monstrous, being unknown to learned antiquity."

Hence too in 1561 they celebrated the Synod of Dresden, where all the superintendents of the Duchy of Saxony, along with the doctors of the academies of Leipzig and Wittemberg, convened and agreed and established that the Ubiquity of the body of Christ was a horrible profanation of all the articles of the creed and a renewal of all heresies. "The chief chapter of our faith and Church," they say, "namely the article about the two natures in Christ, has been horribly depraved by

the fiction of the real and physical communication of properties in those natures, and on the contrary the heresies already long ago condemned of the Marcionites, the Valentinians, the Manichaeans, the Samosatensians, the Sabellians, the Arians, the Nestorians, the Eutychians, the Monothelites have been brought back and renewed, as has been sufficiently clearly demonstrated." And later, "This fictitious physical communication, which began first to be introduced in our time with the Ubiquity of the body of Christ, and which was unknown from the beginning up to now in the universal Orthodox Church and the whole Christian world, and is even now rejected by the Pontificalists themselves and very sharply attacked." And later, "This fictitious Ubiquity has in a horrible way corrupted almost all the articles of faith about Christ, and chiefly destroys and overthrows the distinction between the divine and human natures in Christ." So their words, and they even gloried that in Saxony the same faith was always unmovable and that there was agreement in doctrine.

But ten years did not flow by before a new harmony was produced from the same Wittemberg and Leipzig and the rest of the surrounding places, in which that so greatly condemned Ubiquity was received as an article of faith, for thus does the harmony of 1570 say, "In truth he fills all things and, being everywhere present, not only as God but also as man, he dominates from sea to sea." Therefore they are rejecting the Council of Dresden, gathered in the Holy Spirit, as impious, and do they still not see how plainly they are being deceived by Satan?

This Ubiquity was written against by the Scholastics and besides them by Bishop Claudius Sanctesius, Gilbert Genebrardus, and before them by another Catholic in certain theses about the majesty of Christ edited at Ingolstadt in 1574. Among our adversaries Henry Bulger wrote against it, Peter Martyrus, and Theodore Beza in a book against Brentius and another against Smidelinus.

### *Chapter Two: the Heresy of Eutyches is Explained*

Now we must demonstrate that there are two natures in Christ, but first the heresy of Eutyches must be explained, who is held to be the standard bearer of the heresy that we are now refuting. One needs to know then that the heresy of Eutyches was that in Christ after the incarnation there was and is only one nature. For he did not think that one could otherwise defend against Nestorius that there is one Christ and not two.

Then he said that the one nature was made from divinity and flesh by conversion of the divinity into flesh, because it is written in *John* ch.1, "And the Word became flesh;" for one to become the other is for it to be turned into the other, just as when 'water was made wine' the water was converted into wine, and now when the bread by consecration becomes the flesh of Christ the bread is converted into the flesh of Christ.

Third he asserted that the divinity of the Word was born, suffered, died, and was buried, which error indeed arises from the former error. For if divinity was turned into flesh and flesh is certainly said to have been born, to have suffered and died, and been buried, then divinity must be said to have been born, to have suffered and died and been buried, for divinity is not so imagined to have turned into flesh

that it ceased to be divinity, in the way that water when changed into wine ceases to be water.

The reason for this error was that he thought he could only refute Nestorius, who denied that Christ was born and suffered as God, if the divinity of Christ were shown to have been born and to have died.

Fourth he asserted that the flesh of Christ was not of the same nature as ours, nor was the Word converted into true flesh, but into a certain apparent and imaginary flesh; so that the Word rather pretended to be man and to be born and die than really to do so.

The reason for this is that it seems unworthy for God to be true flesh and truly to have been born, suffered, and died.

And thus this heresy at length fell back into the heresy of Valentinus, Manicheus, and others, who denied the true humanity of Christ; and this pattern was followed among the Lutherans by Gaspar Svenckfeld and Andreas Musculus, if we believe Staphylus in his book on the agreement of the disciples of Luther.

But one must note that this heresy had arisen before the times of Eutyches and that Eutyches was not so much the first author as the chief propagator of the heresy. For the same was taught by Apollinaris, as is evidenced by Epiphanius, Augustine, Vincent of Lerins. The same heresy is also condemned without name of author by Athanasius, Ambrose, Cyril, who were all dead when Eutyches arose.

Further the Catholic faith has always recognized in Christ after the incarnation two whole and perfect natures, divine and human, which indeed without any confusion or mixing subsist in the one person of the Word, and again that the divine nature was not born and did not suffer, but only the human, and lastly that that human nature was of the same species as ours, and all this can be proved by the testimonies of Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers.

### *Chapter Three: the Heresy of Eutyches is Refuted*

First, then, that there are two natures in Christ is evidenced against the first error of Eutyches by the words of the Lord *John* ch.3, "No one has ascended to heaven save he who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven." Certainly he who was speaking and seeing and calling himself the Son of man was, according to the nature by which he was speaking and seeing and saying that he was Son of man, not then in heaven but only on earth, that is, in the house of Nicodemus; nor was he God but man, because God cannot be heard, seen, touched with corporeal senses. Nor had he descended from heaven but was born on earth of a woman, and yet this same person asserts he has descended from heaven and was also at the time when he was speaking on earth saying that he was in heaven; therefore Christ had a second nature beside the human one, according to which he could be in heaven when in his human nature he was on earth.

The same is proved from the words of the Lord *John* chs.5, 10, 24, for *John* ch.5 says, "He not only broke the Sabbath but also said God was his Father, making himself equal with God," and *John* ch.10 says, "I and the Father are one." Hence the Pharisees rightly collected that by these words Christ wanted to assert that he was God. But *John* ch.24 says, "My Father is greater than I." But it cannot in any way be

that in one and the same nature he was equal to the Father, nay one with him, and yet less than the Father.

Besides, *John* ch.8 the Lord says, "Before Abraham was I am." But he is the same as was born in the days of Augustus Caesar, *Luke* ch.2, and was 30 years old in the fifteenth year of Tiberius, *Luke* ch.3. But it cannot be that he existed in the same respect before and after Abraham. In *John* ch.20 after Thomas had seen and perhaps touched the Lord's scars he exclaimed, "My Lord and my God." But certainly what he had seen and touched was not God but flesh, and yet he confesses him God and Lord whose flesh he had seen, so he was God and man, as also St. Peter openly teaches *Acts* ch.2, "Exalted then to the right hand of God he has poured out this gift which you see and hear." For to be exalted belongs not to God but the creature, to pour out the Holy Spirit belongs not to the creature but God.

Again, Paul speaks thus to the Bishops, *Acts* ch.20, "The Holy Spirit has set you to rule the Church of God which he acquired with his own blood." But God as God has no blood; for God is a spirit and he who has blood as such is not God; therefore he who is God and poured out his blood necessarily has two natures. *Romans* ch.9 St. Paul says, "Of whom are the Fathers, from whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is God above all blessed for ever." Here the Apostle says that Christ is from the Jews as parents according to the flesh, and yet at the same time he is God above all, namely according to his divinity.

Lastly the same Paul in *Philippians* ch.2 asserts that Christ "when he was in the form of God took on the form of a servant." Explaining these words St. Vigilius says, "It is a wonder that some fear to speak of two natures when Paul speaks of two forms."

But that the natures are not mixed nor the divinity turned into humanity, contrary to the second error, is proved because Scripture exclaims that God is immortal and incorruptible, as *Malachi* ch.3, "I am the Lord and do not change." *Numbers* ch.23, "God is not as the son of man, that he should change." *James* ch.1, "In whom there is no change." I *Timothy* ch.1, "To the King of the ages, immortal, invisible etc.," and ch.6, "Who alone has immortality etc."

That divinity was not born, or suffered, or died, as the third error asserted, is collected from what has been said; for he who is immutable and immortal cannot be born in time or die in any way in that respect in which he is immortal and immutable; and it is also collected from the fact that when the Scriptures teach that Christ was born in time, suffered, and died, they add 'according to the flesh'; by this phrase they clearly indicate that Christ was not born or suffered or died according to divinity. *Romans* ch.1, "Who was made from the seed of David according to the flesh," and ch.9, "From whom is Christ according to the flesh." I *Peter* ch.1, "Dead indeed in the flesh etc.," and ch.4, "Christ then suffered in the flesh etc."

Add lastly, to the confusion of the those Lutherans who do not fear to attribute passion to the Deity, some very clear testimonies of the illustrious doctors of the Church. Epiphanius says, "For neither because the only begotten suffered in the flesh did he take up suffering into his Deity." And later, "But the Lord himself came and, taking passibility in himself, truly suffered, while his Deity was foreign to suffering." You read similar in Anconatus.

Athanasius in his letter to Epictetus says, "Which infernal person belched forth these things so as to say the body born of Mary was consubstantial with the divinity of the Word? Or who is so impious as either to say in words or think in his heart that the Deity itself was circumcised?" And Cyril in his letter to Nestorius says, "We say that he suffered and rose, not because God the Word suffered in his nature, for God is outside sufferance, but because the body that was made proper to him suffered."

St. Anastasius on the passion and impassibility of Christ says, "We confess that Christ was passible according to the word of the most wise Paul, but not in other respects according to divine nature, since neither do we say that he was impassible according to his humanity." And later, "It is God indeed who suffers, while the divinity receives into itself nothing of external passion."

John Damascene, "When we speak of the Divinity, we do not say of it the things that are proper to humanity, for we do not say that Deity is passible." St. Ambrose on *Luke* ch.48, "Nor did the death belong to the divinity but to him as he was man." The second Council of Spain says, "It is foolish to apply the passion of the cross to the divine nature, but only to the creatable and human nature, for only the flesh felt the death of the cross."

St. Augustine on heresies says, "There is a heresy that says the divinity in Christ was in pain when his flesh was nailed on the cross." St. Leo epistle 10 says, "Inviolable nature was united to passible nature, so that, as was fitting for our remedy, one and the same mediator of God and man, Christ Jesus, could die in one way and not die in another." Blessed Vigilius says, "One and the same Son of God died in the form of a servant and did not die in the form of God."

But that the flesh of Christ was of the same species as ours, against the fourth error, and that Christ not in pretense but really was born, suffered, died can be proved without effort; for to begin with *Matthew* ch.1 and *Luke* ch.2 say that the Blessed Virgin gave birth to her first born son; but how could the Virgin have Christ as Son if Christ's flesh was not true flesh conceived from the flesh of the Virgin? Again Paul says *Hebrews* ch.2, "Because the children participated in flesh and blood he too participated in the same things." What, I ask, is it to participate in the same things, save in flesh and blood of the same nature?

And then should not the Gospels and epistles of the Apostles be convicted of many lies since they call Christ everywhere man and Son of man, affirm that he had a mother and relatives, that he was hungry, ate, walked, was tired, finally suffered, died, rose again? For none of these can be truly affirmed of a phantasm.

Nor do the Scriptures call Christ man only before the resurrection but also after it. For *Acts* ch.7, "Stephen says, 'I see the heavens open and the Son of man standing at the right hand of God'." And Paul *Acts* ch.17, "God has established a day on which he will judge the world in the man whom he has defined etc."

Next if Christ did not really die nor really rose, then he did not really redeem us, and we are still in our sins, as the Apostle says I *Corinthians* ch.15. Lastly *Luke* ch.24, when the disciples suspected it was a phantom or a spirit they were seeing, not a true man, the Lord says, "Touch and see, because a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see I have." And thus from the Scriptures.

Now the same can be proved from the Councils. For to begin with the Council of Chalcedon was celebrated against this heresy, and it was the greatest of all the Councils, namely of 630 Bishops; and when the faith of Eutyches and Dioscorus was read, in which was contained that there were two natures to Christ before the incarnation but afterwards one nature was made from both, the Council exclaimed, "Anathema on him who said this, anathema on those who said this." Afterwards they set down in the Creed as follows, "We confess that in the last days the only begotten Son of God is to be acknowledged unconfusedly, immutably, undividedly, inseparably in two natures, and that the difference of the natures was never taken away because of the union."

The same was established later in the fifth and sixth Councils, in the Lateran Council against the Monothelites celebrated by Martin I, in the sixth and ninth Councils of Toledo, in the second Council of Spain, and in many others.

The same can be confirmed from the Fathers, but Theodoret, Leo, Vigilius, Gelasius and the second Council of Spain have relieved us of the labor. For Theodoret in the dialogues in which he refutes this error adduces at length the testimonies of almost all the old Fathers who were before him. The same was done by St. Leo, Blessed Vigilius, Gelasius, and the second Council of Spain, and these testimonies have seemed to us sufficient.

*Chapter Four: the Arguments are Solved that were Formerly made against what has been Demonstrated in the Previous Chapter*

It remains to solve the arguments of the adversaries. And first comes the authority of the Fathers and Councils. For in the Council of Chalcedon, after the letter of Cyril to John of Antioch was read, Bishop Eustachius asserted that Cyril had written that it is not necessary to understand two natures in the mystery of the incarnation, but the one nature of God incarnated. And in the Lateran Council under Martin I an anathema was declared against those who do not confess that the nature of the Word was incarnated.

The same thing is admitted by Damascene from Athanasius and Cyril. Nazianzen too says the flesh was deified, which seems to be the same as to say that divinity was incarnated.

I reply that it can be said that the nature of the Word was incarnated if it is understood in a sane way, as the fifth Council and Damascene explain in the places noted, namely that it was incarnated not by conversion into flesh but by union with the flesh in the one hypostasis of the Word. However the words cited in the Council of Chalcedon by Eustachius as if they were Cyril's are likely not Cyril's but had been then put in his works by heretics. For the Catholics in the Council protested when they heard the words saying they seemed to be from the heretic Dioscorus rather than Cyril

Further, as to what Nazianzen says about the flesh being deified through the incarnation, the sense is that flesh was made to be of God through union with the Word, not made to be God by conversion to divinity.

The second argument is that if there are two natures in Christ then there will be two Christs as in the heresy of Nestorius, and therefore God will not be a Trinity

but a quaternity. For if the Father and Son are called one God because of one essence, why will Christ not be two because of two essences?

I reply that concrete nouns are never multiplied unless the supposita are multiplied, and if they are substantives they also require a multiplication of forms, otherwise they cannot be asserted save in the singular, for he who has two arts is not said to be two artisans but one artisan, and he who has several cloaks is not said to be many cloaked people but one.

Since therefore in Christ there is only one suppositum there cannot be said to be several Christs or Lords or Sons but one. On the other hand Father and Son are said to be one God because of unity of form. For since the two things are required, if one of them is lacking a unity is made, which is privation of division; but the reason for all these things is chiefly our custom of speaking.

Further the name 'Christ' does not signify nature but person, and so as Nazianzen warns, just as we say that in the Trinity there is one person and another person because of the number of persons but there is not one thing and another thing because of the unity of the nature; so in Christ we say that after the incarnation there was one thing and another thing because of the number of the natures but not one thing and another thing because of the unity of the person.

Nor does it follow that there is a quaternity in God after the incarnation, because the Trinity in God is of persons not of natures; but the incarnation does not increase the number of persons. And besides nothing is added by the incarnation to God, who is most perfect, nor can he be increased or decreased; but much of good is added to human nature, as Athanasius rightly teaches when solving this argument.

The third argument is *John* ch.1, where it is not said that the Word received flesh but that the Word "became flesh", in the way that in *John* ch.2 water "became wine" at the wedding banquet; but the water became wine by conversion of one to the other, so that there were not two natures afterwards but one; therefore in the same way the Word became flesh by conversion of the Word to flesh, and although before the union there were two natures, of the Word and of flesh, yet after the union there was one nature.

Theodoret correctly responds to this argument in his dialogue called 'Immutable', and he brings forward Scriptures that testify not only that the Word became flesh but also that flesh was assumed by the Word. For in *Philippians* ch.2 we read, "Although he was in the form of God, he emptied himself and took on the form of a servant." And *Hebrews* ch.2, "He never took hold of the angels, but the seed of Abraham he took hold of. And *John* ch.1, after the Evangelist had said "the Word became flesh," lest we should think it was done by conversion, he at once adds, "and dwelt among us," that is, the Word became flesh because it assumed our flesh and began to dwell in it.

Therefore the phrase "the Word became flesh" should not be understood in the same way that water became wine or bread became flesh, but in the way that Aaron was made Chief Priest by God and David was made king. For we do not understand that Aaron was changed into High Priest or David into king, but that they began to be what they were not before without loss of what they were before; also in the way it is said in *Galatians* ch.3, "Christ became accursed for us." This

place is adduced in explanation of this sentence by Athanasius, Nazianzen, Chrysostom, and Ambrose.

The fourth argument is that if divinity did not suffer and die, the heresy of Nestorius will be true, who said only man suffered and died.

I reply that the consequence is not good, for actions and passions are of persons not natures. Therefore Christ God suffered and died but in the form of a servant, not in the form of God; for Paul says, "The Lord of glory was crucified," I *Corinthians* ch.2, but in what nature he suffered is explained by Peter when he says, "Christ then suffered in the flesh, and you be armed with the same knowledge," I *Peter* ch.4.

The fifth argument is that it seems unworthy of divinity that it should be said to be converted into true flesh, so that it remained confined in a woman's womb, hung dead on a cross; and therefore not really but in pretense the Word was made flesh.

I reply that the antecedent is very true and thence is rightly collected that neither truly nor in pretense was divinity converted into flesh. But it was not unworthy of God that according to assumed human form he remained confined in the Virgin's womb and hung dead on the cross; and so it does not follow that the Word should not truly but in pretense have been made flesh.

#### *Chapter Five: the Heresy of Nestorius is Explained*

The second controversy to be treated of here is with the Nestorians, which is the third part of the proposed disputation. One needs to know then that Cerinthus formerly separated Jesus from Christ and wanted Jesus to be pure man, born of Mary and Joseph, but Christ to be Son of God who at the time of the baptism descended in the form of a dove on Jesus, as Irenaeus reports.

This heresy was later again stirred up by certain Pelagians who, as Cassian writes, taught that pure man was born of Mary and that he was at the age of 30 made Christ by his merits, and after the passion, again by his merits, was made God, and that other men are able in the same way to live well by their own strength and come to beatitude as Christ did.

A little later the same heresy began to be taught by Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, and with him by his priest Anastasius, and by Theodorus Bishop of Mopsuestia and by certain others. For they taught that the Blessed Virgin brought forth a pure man who had not only a human nature but also a human person, and therefore Blessed Mary is not bearer of God but bearer of Christ; and that the nativity, passion, resurrection, and ascension of Christ are to be attributed to the man alone.

But they added that the Son of God was afterwards united to the Son of man in many ways, not indeed substantially by communication of hypostasis, but accidentally. First by indwelling, because the Word dwelt in the man Christ as in his temple, according to *John* 2, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up." And so they said *Isaiah* ch.7 was cautiously written, "his name will be called Emmanuel," that is, will not be called God but God with us, that is, dwelling in us, according to *John* ch.1, "and dwelt among us."

Second by union of will and love, because the Son of man was always most joined with the will of God. Theodorus added a likeness that is reported in the fifth Synod, for as man and woman are two persons and yet are called one flesh in Scripture because of conjugal union, so too the Son of God and the Son of man are two persons and yet can be called one Christ because of spiritual conjunction.

Third by operation, because Christ the man was the instrument that the Word used in those admirable works that were done by Christ.

Fourth by participation, because the Word imparted his name and dignity to the man, so that he might be called God and Son of God and be adored by all creatures, not because of himself but because of him by whom he was assumed, in the way that the images of saints are sometimes called by their names and because of them are also honored and adored.

That this was the heresy of Nestorius can be understood from the exposition of faith that he himself produced and it is contained now in the works of Cyril. Again from the history of Evagrius in whose seventh book Evagrius records that Nestorius died wretchedly, his tongue already completely gnawed away by worms. Again from the breviary of Liberatus and from Theodoret in his book on heretics. For Theodoret at the beginning wrote on behalf of Nestorius against St. Cyril, and for that reason his writings were anathematized in the fifth Synod; however he afterwards recovered his right mind and was reconciled to the Church at the Council of Chalcedon, and therefore he put Nestorius among the heretics.

This heresy is not obscurely favored, at least in way of speaking, by Luther and Calvin. For the former says "Certain of the unskilled make Christ the man omnipotent." However Luther often taught the opposite, so that he seems to me more a Eutychian than a Nestorian. This fact was seen and noted by Beza, for at the end of his book against the theses of Jacob Andree he recites this opinion of Luther and adds that the sins of Germany and the whole world brought it about that Luther did not persevere in that confession.

But Calvin when disputing in the Institutes of Christ as he is a certain divine person speaks thus: "I am not yet touching on the person of the Mediator." And, "I reply that he is the Son of God, because he is the Word begotten by the Father before all ages, for our discussion is not yet about the person of the mediator." And, "For from the fact that Christ was manifested in the flesh he is called Son of God; not only as he is begotten of the Father before all ages was he the eternal Word, but because he took up the person and office of mediator." Here Calvin seems continually to distinguish two persons in Christ, one of the Son of God and the second of the mediator.

Nor does it seem he can be excused as if he is understanding by the name of person of the mediator not a substance but a quality, in the way we are wont to say that someone has taken up the person of judge or advocate. For in the same place he says, "I call person subsistence." And in the whole chapter he uses the name of person to designate the incommunicable substance. So at least he cannot be excused from vicious equivocation.

But this heresy is very clearly favored by Brentius who very often repeats that the Son of God is in the Son of Mary, and by Smidelinus, and by Theodore Beza.

*Chapter Six: the Heresy of Nestorius is Refuted*

But let us briefly refute this heresy, and let us demonstrate that there is one person in Christ and that not pure man but God the Word himself was, according to the flesh, born of a Virgin, suffered on the cross, and died. And first all the testimonies that we brought forward against the new Samosatans and new Arians in the first book to prove Christ is true God have no less force against Nestorius than against the new Samosatans and Arians.

Further, the New Testament is full of testimonies, *Matthew* ch.16, "Whom do you say the Son of man is? Peter replied, 'You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.'" Here Blessed Peter openly confesses that the Son of man is the Son of the Living God. *Luke* ch.1, "And therefore the holy thing born of you will be called Son of God." He himself, therefore, who was born of the Virgin, and not someone else, is truly called and is the Son of God. Again *John* ch.1, "And the Word was made flesh." For as we said above against the Eutychians the true sense of these words is that the Word was made flesh, that is, God was made man, as we say David was made king; as therefore David and King are not two persons but one, although the forms are diverse, human nature and royal dignity, so too there is one person of the Word and the flesh, although the forms or natures are two and diverse, divinity of the Word and flesh of the man.

Similar is *John* ch.3, "No one has ascended to heaven but he who came down from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven." For this place is not easily explained otherwise than as Chrysostom, Augustine, Cyril, Nazianzen expounded it, namely that the Lord asserts the same to be Son of man and Son of God; for otherwise it would be false that the Son of man came down from heaven, and false that then, when he was speaking on earth, he was at the same time in heaven.

Again *John* ch.10, "I and the Father are one," and these words certainly cannot belong to a human person; and therefore the man Christ who was then speaking was not only the temple of the Word but the Word himself. And ch.9 the Lord says about the blind man just made able to see, "Do you believe in the Son of God? He replied, Who is he Lord that I might believe in him? Jesus said to him, You have both seen him and he is the one who is speaking to you. And he said, I believe, Lord, and falling down he worshipped him." Surely the Lord could not have more openly demonstrated that there was one person to the Son of God and the Son of man. For the very one whom the cured blind man saw, heard, adored, we see to be called Son of God.

And *John* ch.20 Thomas said to the Lord whom he saw, "My Lord and my God." This place was wonderfully corrupted by Theodore of Mopsuestia, as is plain from the fifth Synod; for he said that Thomas did not say about Christ 'My Lord and my God' but, being astonished at the miracle of the resurrection, he glorified God and, raising his eyes to heaven, said to God the Father 'My Lord and my God'.

But beside the fact that all the saints expound otherwise, John himself as well in the same place, foreseeing the heresy of Nestorius, nay writing against Cerinthus who was laboring under the same heresy, he at once adds, "But all these things are written that you may believe that Jesus Christ is Son of God," that is, that you do not divide Christ into two persons, into the Son of God and the Son of man, but that you should believe that Jesus the Son of Mary is the same Christ Son of God.

Further, John does not say that Thomas said 'My Lord and my God', but he says that Thomas replied to him, said to him, that is, to Christ, 'My Lord and my God'. Nor is there in the Greek text the mark 'Oh' of exclamation or admiration, but the article designating a simple confession of truth. But on this place we said many things above in bk.1 ch.6.

Now the Apostle in *Romans* ch.8 says, "Who did not spare his own Son but handed him over for us." What is clearer? And in ch.9, "From whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is above all God blessed for ever, Amen." The man Christ, therefore, who was Son of Abraham according to the flesh, was not the temple or instrument of God but true God himself above all blessed for ever. *Philippians* ch.2, "Who though he was in the form of God did not think equality with God something to be snatched at, but emptied himself taking the form of a servant." And later, "He humbled himself, being made obedient unto death." I *Corinthians* ch.2, "For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." And these are plainly very clear, for we have from them that the Word himself who is with the Father in the form of God and is most truly called Lord of glory, him, I say, took the form of man and in it was truly crucified and died.

Again the same Apostle, when he says I *Corinthians* ch.8, "One Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things," by the "through whom are all things" he signifies the same as *John* did in the words of his ch.1, "All things were made through him." These words are by the consent of all understood of the Word of God.

Therefore the Apostle meant to say that one and the same Jesus Christ was born of Mary and is the Son of God through whom all things were made. And in *Hebrews* ch.1 very clearly, "In many forms and many ways God formerly spoke to the Fathers in the Prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us in his Son whom he has made heir of all things, through whom also he made the world." Here, when he says that God spoke to us in his Son, he is speaking of the man Christ, and yet about the same man he says that through him also was the world made. And in ch.2, "For it fitted him, because of whom and through whom are all things, to be made perfect through suffering." And later, "Because therefore the children communicated in flesh and blood, he to himself participated in the same, so that through death he might destroy him who had the power of death." Here he says that he because of whom and through whom are all things is true God, who is the beginning and end of all things, had to die for us and, so that he could die as we die, he participated in flesh and blood in the way that we participate, that is, he was made truly man as we are.

Further, John in his first epistle teaches almost nothing else than that there is one person of the God and man in Christ; ch.1 he says, "What was from the beginning, what we heard, what we saw with our eyes, etc." so he says that he say with his corporeal eyes the Word that was from the beginning, which could not be true save by reason of unity of person; and ch.2, "Who is a liar but he who denies that Jesus is Christ," that is, who divides the Savior into two, as Cerinthus and Nestorius do. And ch.4, "In this we know the charity of God, since he laid down his life for us." What is it that God laid down his life for us but that God died for us? It is not the case then that the immortal Son of God is one and the Son of Mary another, who bore death, but one and the same who as Son of God was always immortal and

as Son of Mary was at some time mortal. And ch.4, "Every spirit that denies Jesus is not of God, and this is Antichrist." And later, "Whoever then will confess that Jesus is Son of God, God remains in him." And ch.5, "Who is he who overcomes the world but he who believes that Jesus is Son of God."

To all these things the Nestorians reply that they do not deny that Jesus is Son of God and God and is one only and not two, but by unity of indwelling, of will, of operation, of participation, as we said above, not by unity of person. But Cerinthus also confessed the same things about Christ, and yet John says that he destroys Jesus, and does not confess that Jesus is Son of God.

Further, all the things that the Nestorians attribute to Christ belong also to other holy men. For that God lives in holy men as in temples is said in I *Corinthians* ch.3, "Do you not know that you are the temple of God?" and ch.6, "Or do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you? Glorify and carry God in your body."

That also by union of will the saints are one with God no less than man and wife through carnal union, which Theodore of Mopsuestia attributed to Christ as a great dignity, is contained in I *Corinthians* ch.6, "He who joins himself to a harlot," says Paul, "is made one body, for they will be two in one flesh. But he who joins himself to God is one spirit," what is clearer?

But that through holy men God operates as through instruments is contained in *Romans* ch.15, "I do not dare say anything of the things that Christ has not done through me in word and deeds, in virtue of signs and prodigies, in virtue of the Holy Spirit etc." I *Corinthians* ch.12, "There are divisions of works, but the same God who works all in all."

Finally that holy men are Sons and God by participation and grace is contained in *Psalms* 81, "I said you are Gods, and if they are all excelling." And *Galatians* ch.4, "Since you are Sons of God, God has sent the spirit of his Son into your hearts etc." Therefore everything that Nestorius attributes to Christ is found in other saints.

But it is certain that Christ is God and Son of God in a way far other than we are, since the Apostle says that it is a great mystery of piety that God appeared in the flesh, I *Timothy* ch.3.

There is proof second from all the Creeds. For in the Creed of the Apostles we read, "And in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, who was conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary etc." Here he who is the only Son of God is said to be born of the Virgin Mary. The same is contained in the Creeds of Nicea and of Constantinople. But in the Athanasian Creed there is added more expressly, "Who although he is God and man is yet not two but one Christ, one altogether not by confusion of substance but by unity of person."

There is proof third from the Councils. For to begin with in the third Council, the first of Ephesus, nothing else was defined than that there is one person in Christ not two. And a letter was received from Cyril to Nestorius with 12 chapters or anathemas that Cyril had put forward in the provincial Council of Alexandria before the Council of Ephesus met. Hence these 12 chapters were thereafter held to be as of the General Council of Ephesus, as is plain from the Roman Council under Martin I.

In the first chapter then you thus read, "If anyone does not confess that God is truly Emmanuel and that therefore the holy Virgin is bearer of God, let him be anathema."

In the second chapter thus, "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father united in substance and one is Christ with his own flesh, namely that the same is God and man at once, let him be anathema."

Next in the Council of Chalcedon too the acts of the Council of Ephesus were approved against Nestorius and again a definition was given, "With the property of both natures preserved and coming together in one person and substance, not distributed or divided into two persons, but one and the same only begotten Son we acknowledge to be God the Word." Again in the fifth Synod, "If anyone says that the union of the Word of God with man was made according to grace, or operation, or dignity, or equality of honor, or authority, or relation, or affect, or virtue..." And later, "and does not confess that the unity of the Word of God with the flesh was made according to composition or subsistence, let him be anathema." And again, "If anyone tries to introduce two subsistences in the mystery of Christ, or two persons, etc., let him be anathema." And again, "If anyone says that the glorious ever Virgin Mary is abusively and not truly the bearer of God, let him be anathema."

The same is contained in the Lateran Council under Martin I, "If anyone does not confess with the holy Fathers that properly and in truth, from two natures substantially united without confusion and without division, one and the same is Lord and God Jesus Christ, let him be condemned." Again in the sixth general Council, the second Council of Spain, the sixth Council of Toledo.

There is proof fourth from the Fathers. And in the first place Blessed Cyril and John Cassian of set purpose refuted this heresy. Cyril does so in almost all his works, where he also adduces many testimonies of the ancients in his own behalf. Cassian wrote against Nestorius at the command of St. Leo and recites many testimonies from the Greek and Latin Fathers.

Besides what they adduce we can add certain others. St. Ignatius to the Ephesians says, "The Son of God who was born before the world, was himself carried in her womb by Mary according to the disposition of God from the seed of David and by the Holy Spirit."

Blessed Justin Martyr in his book on right confession of faith says, "One is the Son who died and raised up what was dead. So when you hear contrary things of the one Son, attribute what is said to the natures; if something great and divine let it be attributed to the divine nature, if something little and human, to the human. For thus you will avoid the discrepancy of the words since each nature receives what it is its own; and you will confess from the Scriptures that one Son preceded all ages and is new."

St. Irenaeus against heresies proves by many testimonies of Scripture that one and the same Jesus is Son of Mary and Word of God the Father. Athanasius to Epictetus says, "Of the only Son of Mary it is written, 'The Word became flesh'. In which is shown that the Word was made for the rest of the saints, for the sake of prophesying, but from Mary the Word himself, having assumed flesh, came forth a man." And later, "Not that we separate the Son from the Word, but because we

recognize the same through whom all things were made and through whom we are freed.”

Gregory Nazianzen to Chelidonius, “If someone believes that the Virgin Mary was not bearer of God, let him also be separated from God. If anyone introduces two Sons, one indeed from God the Father but the second from the mother, and that they are not one and the same, he has fallen from the filial adoption that is promised to those who rightly believe. If anyone does not adore the crucified one, let him be anathema, and let him be numbered with the killers of God.”

Basil to Eunomius, expounding the verse, “the Lord has created me,” says “We must take ‘he generated the Word’ about God the Son; but ‘he created’ about him who took on the form of a servant. But in all these we do not say two, God per se and man per se. For he was one, but think according to the understanding of each nature.”

Damascene says, “The hypostasis of the Word is the hypostasis of both natures and permits neither to be insubsistent.”

Now from the Latins St. Cyprian against the Jews says, “But since he was Son of God from the beginning, he had to be according to the flesh generated again etc.” and later that man and God Christ is made of both kinds, so that he might be mediator between us and the Father.

Hilary on the Trinity, “One only begotten God put in the form of a little human being grows in the womb of the holy Virgin, he who contains all things and in whom are all things comes forth by the law of human birth etc.”

Ambrose on the incarnation says, “Since God was always eternal he took up the sacraments of the incarnation not as divided but as one, because each is one and one is in each, that is, either in divinity or in body. For he is not one from the Father and another from the Virgin, etc.”

Jerome on Matthew says, “That he ascends alone to pray do not refer to him who from five loaves satisfied thousands of men, but to him who hearing of the death of John departed into solitude, not that we separate the person of the Lord but we show how his works are divided between God and man.” And in his letter to Eustochius he says, “The Son of God was made Son of man for our salvation, waits nine months in the womb to be born, and he in whose fist the world is contained, is contained in the narrowness of the crib.”

Augustine in his *Enchiridion* says, “Therefore Christ Jesus Son of God is God and man, God because he is the Word of God, but man because in the unity of the person there came to the Word rational soul and flesh.” And later, “For what did human nature merit in the man Christ that it should be singularly assumed into the unity of the person of the only Son of God?” He says like things elsewhere.

Lastly Blessed Leo repeats nothing more frequently in his sermons and letters, but especially to the Emperor Leo where he says, “Nestorius is anathematized, therefore, who believed the Blessed Virgin Mary to be bearer not of God but of man alone, so as to make one person for the flesh and another for the deity.”

*Chapter Seven: the Arguments of the Adversaries are Solved*

It remains to solve the arguments of the Nestorians, which for the most part are sophisms. The first argument is *John* ch.2 where the Lord says, "Destroy this temple," so since he is speaking of his humanity Christ the God and Christ the man are two persons. For he did not say, 'Destroy me', and therefore the temple and he who dwells in the temple cannot be the same. This argument is made by Theodoret in his rejection of the second anathema of Cyril and he afterwards often repeats it.

I reply that by this argument can rightly be proved that there are two natures in Christ but not two persons. For our spirit too is said to dwell in our body as in its tabernacle, because the nature of the spirit and the nature of the body are different, and yet it is one person who consists of spirit and body. In *Job* ch.4 men are said to inhabit clay bodies, and II *Corinthians* ch.5 the Apostle says, "If the earthly house of this our habitation," and, "We who are in this tabernacle groan heavily," and II *Peter* ch.1, "Swift is the putting off of my tabernacle." Therefore rightly does Chrysostom on *John* ch.1 "and dwelt among us" collect that there are two natures in Christ, and not rightly does Theodoret collect that there are two persons.

The second argument is the Apostle saying of Christ *Philippians* ch.2 "He was made in the likeness of men and was found in habit as a man." Christ the God then was not man but was like men because of the putting on of humanity, in the way that a king dressed in peasant clothing would not be a peasant but like a peasant. Wherefore Theodoret (who, as we said above, at one point followed the party of Nestorius) writes on this place that Paul meant to say that the Word did not become man but put on man.

I reply with Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius on this place that Christ was not man but like man in the sense in which man is taken here; for when Paul says that Christ was made in the likeness of men and was found in habit as a man, he is taking the word 'man' as it ordinarily signifies a pure man, conceived of the seed of a man, born in sin, subject to sins. For such Christ seemed to be but was not, and this sense Paul uses when he says *Galatians* ch.1 that he did not learn the Gospel "from man but from Christ." Here he without doubt understands by man pure man, otherwise he would not say 'but from Christ' as if Christ were not a man, since the same Paul had said, "There is one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus," I *Timothy* ch.2.

Further, Chrysostom indicates also another explanation, that is followed by Haymo and St. Thomas, that the 'in the likeness of men' signifies likeness in the human species, and the sense is that Christ was made true man and so like the rest in species. With this explanation sufficiently agrees what preceded it, "taking the form of a servant." For the form of a servant is human nature, as we showed above. But the word 'habit' in this place does not signify clothing but external figure, as Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius expound. For the Greek word means shape and not clothing. So the sense is that Christ by the external figure of his body seemed to be one of the crowd of men, although however he was a certain individual and divine man, or that by his external figure he showed himself to be true man.

Because however Augustine, Cyril, Haymo, and Thomas understand by 'habit' here clothing, it could be replied to the argument that humanity is called the clothing of the Word, not because the Word is not truly and substantially man, but because of the likeness that exists between clothing and humanity. For as men are

known by their clothing, so God is known through his humanity; and as when we put on clothes they are fitted to the figure of the body and thus clothing changes but not man, so too when the Word was made flesh humanity was changed while the Word remained immutable.

Therefore because of these and other likenesses of the same sort humanity can be called the clothing of the Word, although in other respects the Word truly and substantially became man.

A third argument is *Hebrews* ch.7 where the Son of God Christ is said "to be without mother and without genealogy," therefore the Son of Mary is one person, since he has a mother and a genealogy, and the Son of God is another, since he lacks both.

Cassian rightly responds that the argument can be turned back against the adversaries. For in the same place the Apostle says about the one said to be without mother and without genealogy that he is also said to be without father; therefore if this place is understood of the Son of God, it follows that the Son of God does not have a Father, which is against Nestorius who distinguishes the Son of God the Father from the Son of the Virgin Mary. Next Cassian says that the Apostle meant to explain the two nativities of Christ, one without a mother, namely the divine, and one without a Father, namely the human.

The fourth argument is that the name of God, when stated absolutely, does not signify God united to man but God alone; but Mary did not give birth to God alone but to God united to man; so Mary should not be called bearer of God. This argument of Nestorius is written down by Theodoret in his book on heretical fables.

I reply that the name of God, when absolutely stated, does indeed not signify God united to man, but neither does it exclude it from its signification; therefore the consequence of the argument is a bad one. But that the name of God, absolutely according to the Scriptures, could be attributed to him who is born of the Virgin is proved by the fact that the name is attributed to him who died; for it belongs to the same person to be born and to die. In *Acts* ch.20 Paul says, "Take care to yourselves and the whole flock in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as Bishops to rule the Church of God, which he acquired with his own blood." And I *John* ch.3, "In this we know the love of God, that he laid down his life for us."

The fifth argument is that the Son of Mary said, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" *Matthew* ch.27, and "Father, save me from this hour," *John* ch.12. And he needed an angel to console him, *Luke* ch.22. But these do not belong to the Son of God, so the Son of God and the Son of Mary were not the same.

Cyril replies in defense of his fourth anathema against Theodoret that all these things do belong to the Son of God according to his human form, just as the contrary things belong to him according to his form of God, for he is true God and true man.

The sixth argument is that no one can give birth to what precedes them, but God precedes Mary, so Mary could not give birth to God, so she is not to be called bearer of God.

This argument is refuted at length by Cassian on the incarnation, but I reply in brief that no one can give birth to someone older in the respect in which he is older. So Mary gave birth to Christ the God, not in his divinity, which preceded her,

but in his humanity, which came after her. Nor is it surprising if we do not have examples because this mystery is unique.

The seventh argument is that the Son should be of the same substance as the parents, but Christ the God is not of the same substance as Mary, since he is eternal and omnipotent God, which in no way belongs to Mary.

This argument too is refuted at length by Cassian, but the sum is that the Son should be of the same substance as the parents according to the nature that he receives from them, or insofar as he is their Son. But Christ the God did not receive divine nature but human nature from Mary, nor is he her Son save insofar as he is man, and therefore it is enough if he is of the same substance as his mother as he is man, in the same way that he is of the same substance as the Father as he is God.

The eighth argument is that Christ is called man the God bearer by Basil on *Psalm 59*.

I reply that Basil does not say that Christ is man the God bearer, as Theodoret falsely quotes in his rejection of the fifth anathema, but that the flesh of Christ is, that is, the flesh is bearer of God. Now there is no little difference between 'man' and 'flesh', for man signifies the person, as does also God, but flesh signifies nature, or rather part of human nature, and not person. Therefore man the God bearer is not rightly said of Christ, in whom there are not two persons, man and God, but flesh the God bearer is rightly said, because there are here two natures, flesh and deity, and one is as it were the domicile and seat of the other.

Add that St. Ignatius in almost all his individual letters signs himself God bearer. But who believes that that saintly man wanted to assume to himself a title of Christ?

But if anywhere in the Fathers (as I have however not been able to find) Christ is called man the God bearer, it should be piously explained, so that the sense would be that Christ by reason of his humanity is the temple and seat of divinity, in the way that St. Augustine, when in his *Enchiridion* and book on *Predestination* and elsewhere he often says the Son of God assumed man, understands by the name of man humanity.

#### *Chapter Eight: In what the Hypostatic Union of Two Natures Properly Consists is Explained*

There follows now the fourth part of our disputation, in which the definition of incarnation must be explained so that we may see what it properly means to be united hypostatically.

Brentius and Smidelinus cited above mean that the human and divine nature being united hypostatically in Christ is nothing other than that all the attributes or properties of divinity are communicated to the humanity of Christ; but they are communicated not per se but per accidens. For the recently published *Harmony* explains that it does not happen through created or infused gifts, nor such that the divine attributes become natural properties of humanity, but because divinity dwells as it were in his own proper body in the humanity of Christ, and shines in it with all its majesty, power, wisdom, justice etc., and in it and through it does all its works.

So they want the union to be such as is between a principal agent and an instrument. Hence too both Brentius and Smidelinus want to distinguish Christ from other men only by energy, because God does everything through Christ that he does some of through others. This opinion is very false and openly Nestorian, or worse than Nestorian.

Now the true opinion is that for God and man to be hypostatically united is nothing other than human nature not to have its own subsistence but to be assumed by the eternal Word to the very subsistence of the Word. To make this more easily understood one must note that several things can be united in three ways.

The first way is essentially, namely when one essence is made from several things, in the way that matter and form, genus and difference are united. And the union of the incarnation was not done in this way, as is plain, both because there would be one nature in Christ and it neither divine nor human but some third thing, and also because an essential union is never made save from imperfect natures, or if from imperfect natures by corruption or some conversion; but in Christ the natures are perfect and complete.

The second way is accidentally, as when accidents are joined to a subject, or when substance is joined to substance, but from the joining only an accidental form arises, as when a house is made from stones and wood; and in this way too the hypostatic union was not done, because God, as is known, cannot be an accident or the subject of accidents.

The third way is substantially, as when what would otherwise exist of itself is drawn to the being of another supposit and depends on it as part of it, and the incarnation was done in this way. And although there is no completely similar example, yet some are given by the doctors that somehow explain the thing.

One is about soul and body which Justin uses in his book on right confession of faith, Athanasius in his Creed, and Augustine in his letter to Volusianus. For the rational soul apart from the body per se subsists, and the body too, before it is animated, per se subsists, and yet when they are united there is only one subsistence to both. But this example is very deficient, both because body and soul are imperfect natures, and because they make one nature, and because neither draws the other to its own subsistence but each depends on a third subsistence, which is of the whole composite. But in this mystery the Word is in itself perfectly subsistent and draws human nature to itself.

The second example is about burning iron, and it is used by Basil and by Damascene and by Origen, because burning iron is some one thing and yet has the properties of iron and fire etc.

This likeness is very pleasing to Brentius and Chemnitz and other adversaries, and yet it the most deficient of all. For in burning iron the heat is sustained by the iron, not conversely, and yet they want the heat to refer to God and the iron to man. Also, heat is not a substance but an accident. Again, there is no communicating of properties, for the heat is not called iron nor the iron heat. Lastly the heat is drawn to the subsistence of the iron and not conversely.

The third is about a man in whom there are two accidental forms, as the art of medicine and of jurisprudence. For there is one supposit and yet it receives various appellations and does various works and the properties are communicated.

For he is called and can truly be called both doctor and jurist, and the doctor tries cases and the jurist cures diseases etc.

This likeness is used by Augustine in letter 99 where he says that this proposition 'God is dead' is similar to 'the Philosopher is dead', for as philosophy is not capable of death and yet the Philosopher can be said to be dead when the man has perished who was the Philosopher, so too, although divinity cannot be said to die, yet God can truly be said to be dead because the man is dead who was also God. The same likeness is approved in preference to the rest by Duns Scotus, but the likeness is deficient because these forms are accidental ones and therefore they are not drawn to the subsistence of the man, which is the chief thing to consider in this case.

The fourth likeness is from Blessed Thomas and Blessed Bonaventure who compare this mystery to a tree into which is grafted a branch of another species. Let a pear tree be for example into which an apple tree is grafted, then certainly the pear tree is the first substance and so the true supposit, nor does it depend on the grafted branch of the apple tree, and after the grafting it sustains the branch which otherwise would exist of itself, and it is now called a pear tree and an apple tree, and it produces pears and apples, and the pear tree can be called an apple tree and conversely, and if the branch perhaps dries up and then revives, not for that reason is the pear tree changed, but the whole change is in that branch.

Thus the divine Word, like a great tree, took up the little branch of human nature that was grafted in its trunk in a marvelous way by the celestial farmer, and thence the Word was God and man and did divine and human works, nor did the Word depend on the humanity but the humanity on the Word. And although a little later the humanity is in some way dried up by passion and death, and although later it flourished by resurrection, no change is made in the Word but the whole change is of the humanity.

However this likeness is deficient in two respects. For the branch is not a perfect tree but a part of a tree, for it does not have roots, a trunk, and the rest. And before it is grafted in it exists per se, but human nature, which we have compared to the grafted branch, is both a perfect nature and never had its own subsistence; but if some branch were by divine virtue produced and grafted at the same time, the likeness would be deficient only in one respect.

Since therefore all the likenesses in some way fail of the truth, therefore did St. Bernard and Damascene compare the mystery of the incarnation to the mystery of the Trinity, so that they might illustrate by one singular thing another equally singular thing; for as it is singular that there are three perfect hypostases in God with one and very simple nature, so it is singular that there are in Christ three natures, Deity, soul, and flesh with one very simple hypostasis. Now the three natures in Christ, deity, soul, and flesh, lest the thing seem novel, are distinguished and counted up by Augustine in bk.17 on the Trinity.

Having thus explained the examples, we must demonstrate that things are so, that is, that the hypostatic union consists in communication of the subsistence of the Word, not in communication of the attributes of deity.

And first from what has been said. For we showed from the Scriptures that in Christ there is one person and two natures, and this cannot be true unless there is

only one subsistence in Christ; for if there were two there would be two persons, since a person is a per se existing intellectual nature. But if in Christ there is only one subsistence, then either the Word communicated it to humanity or conversely humanity communicated it to the Word. But humanity did not communicate its subsistence to the Word, as all confess, therefore the Word communicated its subsistence to humanity, and thus was the hypostatic union made.

Second, the same can be proved from the very grave testimonies of the Councils that are received even by the adversaries. In the letter of the Council of Alexandria with twelve anathemas, that was received and approved in the Synods of Ephesus and Chalcedon, the second anathema reads as follows, "If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father was united to the flesh in subsistence, let him be anathema." And the third, "If anyone divides the subsistences in Christ after union, let him be anathema." And the fourth, "If anyone divides into two persons or subsistences the terms that are said of Christ in the Gospel and Apostolic writings, let him be anathema."

Add that in his apology to the East, in defense of the fourth anathema, Cyril adduces for himself these words of St. Julius, the Roman Pontiff, "The Son of God was incarnate of the Virgin, who also dwelt among men, not working his energy in a man, for in the Prophets and Apostles is this, perfect God in the flesh etc." You see an opinion in expressive words contrary to the Brentian. And in his other apology against Theodoret the same Cyril set down these words of Theodoret against the second anathema, "Union in subsistence we do not in any way know." Here too you see the open confession of a heretic.

Again in the Council of Chalcedon the Fathers say, "preserving the propriety of each nature and their coming together in one person and subsistence, we recognize the only begotten Son and God the Word." In this place you will note that the properties of the natures are not mixed, and so the endowments of one nature are not communicated to the other but subsistence alone is communicated.

Again in the fifth Synod you have the following, "If anyone says that the union was made in grace or operation or dignity or equality of honor or relation or affect or virtue," and later, "and not that the union of Word with flesh was made in composition, that is, in subsistence, let him be anathema." And later, "The holy Church of God confesses union in composition, that is in subsistence." What is clearer against Brentius and his followers who introduce union made in grace and operation and dignity? The same Council says, "If anyone tries to introduce in the mystery of Christ two subsistences or persons, and says the person is one in dignity and honor and adoration and does not confess that the Word is substantially united to the flesh and therefore is one subsistence, let him be anathema."

Again in the Lateran Council under Martin I, "If anyone does not according to the holy Fathers confess that Christ is one and the same Lord and God properly and truly from two natures and in two natures substantially united without confusion and without division, let him be condemned." And later, "If anyone does not according to the holy Fathers confess that properly and truly in composition, that is, in subsistence, a union of natures from which one Christ exists without confusion and division is recognized in him, let him be condemned."

Again in the sixth Synod in the letter to Agatho received by the whole Council it is said, "They do not unite through a union that is known to be made through subsistence but they blaspheme and join through affect as if there were two subsistences etc." and later, where you see in expressive words that they are condemned as blasphemers who explain the hypostatic union otherwise than by subsistence.

Third it is proved by argument, and this one of the Council of Toledo, "Only the Son of God was incarnate," therefore the union was made through communication of what is proper to the Son and not of what is common to the other persons; but only the subsistence of the Son is proper to the Son and all the essential attributes are common to all three persons; so the hypostatic union is made by communication of subsistence alone.

This reason plainly gives the conjunct that either what we say is true, or that the whole Trinity was incarnate if the definition of Brentius and Smidelinus is true; for the attributes of omnipotence, omnipresence, omnijustice, by communication in which they want the incarnation to be done, are common to the whole Trinity.

Fourth the eternal Father communicated to the Son all his attributes most perfectly, and more perfectly than the Brentians want them to be communicated by the Son of God to the Son of man; and yet because the Father did not communicate his own subsistence to the Son, Father and Son are not united hypostatically but are rather hypostatically distinct; therefore the hypostatic union does not consist in communication of attributes but of subsistence only.

This reason too either plainly proves that Father and Son are one hypostasis if the definition of Brentius and Smidelinus is true, or they should admit, willy nilly, that the hypostatic union does not consist in the communication of attributes.

They will say perhaps that subsistence is communicated with the other attributes. But to begin with their words suggest otherwise. For Brentius, when he tries to show that the hypostatic union properly is that by which Christ is distinguished from pure men, speaks as follows, "Therefore the difference between Christ and Peter is not simply to be taken from the indwelling of the Son of God but from the communication of his properties; for although the Son of God fills Peter with his essence as he does also the man Christ, he does not communicate to Peter all his properties but only some. He vivifies Peter, conserves him in life, gives Peter power to cast out demons, nay to raise the dead. In the meantime, however, he does not make him omnipotent, omniscient, omniscient, omnijust, and omnipresent; but the Son of man he adorns with all his gifts, not some alone." And later, "He shows that he is made capable of all God's properties without exception, and unless he had this capacity there would be no difference between Christ and other men, nor could the Word become flesh."

The theses of Smidelinus and the book of Harmony are similar, where I do not see mention made of subsistence but only of essential attributes.

Besides, however it be with subsistence, at least they want the communication of all attributes to be so required for the idea of hypostatic union that where such communication is lacking there is no hypostatic union, and where there is there is. For Brentius asserts that if Peter were omnipotent and omnipresent he would also be united hypostatically with God. But once this is

posited, the reasons just given are necessarily conclusive, namely that it follows the whole Trinity is incarnate and the Father and Son are one hypostasis.

Further, two other absurdities follow, and against the faith, which can make a fifth and sixth argument. First the body of Christ in the triduum of his death was not united hypostatically with the Word. For a dead body is not capable of omnipotence, omniscience, omnijustice. Second, Christ the man was not always God. For Christ merited some gifts for himself, as the glory of the body and the exaltation of his name, nay and ascension to heaven and sitting at the right hand of God. For *Luke* last chapter says, "It was necessary for Christ to suffer and so enter into his glory." And *Philippians* ch.2, "He was made obedient to death etc. Because of which God exalted him." And *Hebrews* ch.2, "For we see Jesus because of his passion crowned with glory and honor." And if the communication of all the gifts is required for constituting the hypostatic union, then Christ merited for himself some at least of what belongs to the hypostatic union, and so he existed before he was united; for he who is not cannot merit. Therefore he was not always hypostatically united, which is the Pelagian heresy.

Seventh, if the hypostatic union required communication of all properties and attributes, such a union would be impossible; for many things are proper to God that imply a contradiction if communicated to a creature, such as is being uncreated, being pure act, being an infinite being, and the like.

There are some too that, whether they could be communicated or not, were certainly not communicated to the humanity of Christ, as to lack a beginning of time, to create heaven and earth and angels, and the other things that were done before that humanity.

There are also some that, although they were conferred on the humanity of Christ, were not conferred before the resurrection, as to be impassible, to be immortal, and yet the hypostatic union was before the resurrection.

Nor is there any validity to the reply of those who say that Christ at the time of his emptying should have hid his majesty. For he did not hide those gifts but really did not have them, unless they say Christ's body was always immortal and impassible, which is another heresy, see Evagrius' history.

Eighth, they themselves confess that these gifts belong per accidens to the humanity of Christ, as is plain from thesis 22 of Smidelinus, but the hypostatic union is not accidental but substantial, as is plain from the cited Councils, and especially the fifth where this is expressly said.

Again, because then the man Christ would be Son of God by grace not by nature; which is certainly opposed to the opinion of all the Fathers.

Again, man could not truly be called God or God man. For this accidental union is not by the inherence of the gifts, as they say and rightly say, because they are speaking of uncreated gifts which are the essence of God, but by an extrinsic conjunction such as exists between principal agent and instrument, as between ship and sailor. For they teach that the union of God and man consists in this, that God does everything through this man.

But this sort of union is not enough for communicating names and properties; for a sailor is not called a ship, nor a ship a sailor. Christ the man, then, cannot be called God nor can Christ the God be called man; and we will say the same

thing about the properties, for as a sailor cannot be said to be without sense and reason, which are properties of a ship, and a ship cannot be said to be endowed with sense and reason, which are properties of a sailor, so too Christ the God cannot be said to be crucified and dead, which properly belong to a man, nor can Christ the man be called omnipotent and creator of heaven and earth, which properly belong to God.

Finally, if the hypostatic union were only this accidental communication of gifts, we too would also be hypostatically united with God, although less tightly, for that Christ has more gifts and we fewer does not change the species.

Add that they have no argument of any moment; the chief is what Brentius objects and very often repeats, that unless it were so there would be no distinction between the union of God with the humanity of Christ and the union of the same God with St. Peter and other men, since God sustains them all and is intimate to all through his essence, presence, and power, and there is only the difference that God operates everything through the man Christ alone.

But this is very easily solved, for the difference consists in this, that the humanity of Christ does not have its own subsistence but exists in the Word as the arm in the body; but other men have their own subsistence and one distinct from that which is in the Word of God. Hence God sustains Peter in one way and the flesh of Christ in another. For he is said to sustain Peter because he conserves him with his essence and subsistence, as when someone holds a stick in his hand; but the humanity of Christ is sustained by the Word of God in the way that he sustains the parts intimately conjoined and united with him.

*Chapter Nine: the Question is Posed whether from the Hypostatic Union there Follows a Real Communication of Divine Attributes, and in particular of Immensity or Ubiquity*  
Now that we have shown that the hypostatic union does not consist in the communication of all the divine attributes, it remains for us to treat of whether it at least follows from that union that all the attributes, or some and specifically omnipresence, are communicated to the humanity of Christ.

And Chemnitz indeed teaches in his book on the two natures that this communication is not of the essence of the hypostatic union, in which he disagrees with Brentius and Smidelinus, but that nevertheless such communication, and in fact a real one, does follow on the hypostatic union, so that the human nature truly becomes omnipotent and omnipresent etc.

The like is contained in Wigandus in his book on this matter, save that he says some properties are not communicated save verbally, as to be creator of heaven and earth, because then the Son of God will not be man, but the remaining properties, and specifically ubiquity, are really communicated.

The same is also taught by Nicholas Seneccerus who in a letter to theologians at Wittemberg in 1571 damns this proposition as blasphemy, "Human nature in Christ is not omnipotent." He also teaches that infinite gifts were really given to Christ's humanity from the hypostatic union. And he adds these words, in which he seems altogether to confound the properties of the natures, "As to what concerns power, we say with Paul that if we have known Christ according to the flesh we do not know him now. For with the cessation of the infirmity of his flesh we

know nothing in him now save the virtue of divinity.” And later, “By the fact that something was before or is or remains of a double substance, it is made to be of one virtue.”

Lastly all the Lutherans cited above at the beginning of this book defend this real communication, although they do not agree whether it is of the essence of the hypostatic union or only follows it.

But Catholic doctrine teaches two things. First, from the hypostatic union there have come in Christ’s humanity many created and infused gifts, as most excellent grace, very great wisdom, singular power, and others of that kind, which however are not attributes of deity save by a certain participation, in the way that even we participate in God’s attributes through created qualities, although less perfectly than Christ’s humanity participates them.

Nor does the communication of properties consist in these gifts, for the communication of properties is mutual but the communication of the gifts is not mutual, for nothing is added to deity.

Second from the hypostatic union there does follow a communication of properties, which communication is not real with respect to the natures themselves, as if Divinity itself were made passible and humanity made really omnipotent, as the Lutherans mean, nor is it merely verbal, as Beza means and Peter Martyr. It is indeed however real but with respect to the hypostasis of both natures, and not with respect to the natures themselves, as the Fathers expressly teach, Ambrose, Augustine, Cyril, Damascene, who teaches that for the properties to be communicated is nothing other than for the properties of both natures to be applied to the common hypostasis, and so to the natures of it in the concrete, because concrete names can be taken for the supposit although formally they signify the natures.

Therefore we rightly say that God was born of a Virgin, suffered, died etc., because God is taken for any divine supposit and so for the supposit of the second person, which is at the same time divine and human. But this supposit is truly and really God and truly and really man, and so truly and really was born of a Virgin, suffered, died etc.

By the same reason we rightly say that Christ the man is omnipotent, eternal, everywhere etc., because man in the concrete stands for the human supposit. But in Christ the divine and human supposit is one, and since it is divine it is consequently omnipotent, eternal, and everywhere etc. All these things can easily be proved, but for the sake of perspicuity we will first deal with the properties in general and second in particular with ubiquity.

*Chapter Ten: From the Hypostatic Union there did not Flow a Real Communication of Properties with respect to the Natures*

Therefore that the attributes or the properties of one nature are not really communicated to the other nature from the force of the hypostatic union is taught first by the sacred Councils. For in the Council of Chalcedon we read, “Preserving the propriety of each nature and bringing them together in one person etc.” And the same is contained in the sixth Council, in the Council of Pope Martin, and in St. Leo’s letter to Flavianus.

Further, in the sixth Council and the Council of Pope Martin it is defined against the monothelites that there exist in Christ not only two natures with their properties but also two wills and operations without confusion.

Lastly in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was recited at the sixth Synod and approved by the whole Council, we read that in Christ all things are double, that is, natures, properties, wills, operations, with the sole exception of subsistence, which is one; and there is added in the same place that two unconfused natures are collected from the natural properties of the same natures. From this it follows that the properties too remain unconfused and distinct.

From these we collect that the opinion of the adversaries is in many ways erroneous. For first if things proper to one nature are truly and really communicated to the other nature, and vice versa, then the properties do not remain distinct and unconfused. For how do they remain distinct if human nature has divine and divine nature has human properties? Again, if they are communicated then they are no longer proper but common. For how is that proper which has been made common? Again the properties of these natures are for the most part impossible, as to be created and uncreated, to be finite and infinite, to be everywhere and not everywhere, so if the divine receives human properties it is compelled to lose its own, and if the human receives divine it is compelled to lose its own. How then will the incarnation be done with preservation of the properties?

Rightly then did St. Augustine in his sermon on time speak thus, "We also execrate likewise the blasphemy of those who try to assert in a new sense that from the time of received flesh everything that was of divinity has denigrated into man, and again that everything that was of humanity has been transfused into God, so that we may defeat what no heresy has ever dared to say, that by this confusion each substance is emptied out, that is, the substance of deity and of humanity, and, losing its proper status, is changed into something else."

The adversaries try to make reply here, and first Brentius says that the Council of Chalcedon only speaks of essential properties, which cannot be taken away without abolition of the essence, but is not speaking of accidental ones, as being in place, being corruptible, etc.

But this solution says something to the third consequence and nothing to the first and second. Besides it does not satisfy the third. For being of finite power and majesty and virtue are properties inseparable from a creature. For the contrary ones argue infinite essence and so to attribute to humanity, which is a creature and finite, infinite power and infinite majesty, so that it is not only in the whole world but could actually fill infinite worlds, as deity can, is plainly to take away from humanity its essential properties. But this they themselves say, for they want the humanity of Christ to be truly omnipotent and everywhere in the way that God is, who is indeed not only in the whole world but can also actually fill infinite worlds.

Besides, from this it further follows that there are two omnipotent, immense, and infinite things in the world, namely God and Christ's humanity. But this is against the creed of Athanasius and all the Scriptures. Nor can they reply that there is one omnipotence, infinity, and immensity to those two natures, just as there is one to the three divine persons. For the omnipotence, infinity, and immensity of God is nothing other than his essence, so there cannot be the same immensity and

omnipotence to deity and Christ's humanity unless there is the same essence to both natures, just as there is the same essence to the three persons. And thus we keep coming back to confounding the natures in Christ.

The authors of the Harmony and Chemnitz teach to begin with that the properties of humanity are not in reality communicated to divinity, and so the divine nature remains unharmed. Next they add that the divine properties are in reality communicated to humanity but not taken from God, and the properties are not mixed because the divine properties never become natural and essential properties of humanity but are only communicated by grace, just as from the conjunction of soul and body the properties of the body do not become those of the soul but are only communicated to the body because the soul dwells in it, doing everything in it and through it.

Chemnitz adds the likeness of the burning iron, which, as we said above, Origen also used and Basil, and by this likeness Chemnitz thinks is very openly explained how this communication happens with preservation of the properties of both natures.

But neither is this solution sufficient, first because if the human properties are not attributed to divinity the result is not a mutual communication of properties, which is against all the ancients and especially Damascene. What of the fact that by this reason they are compelled to depart from their own Luther who openly taught that what is said of the passion of the Lord is to be attributed to divinity?

Second it is not true that God does altogether everything through the flesh. For the immanent actions at least, as the divine understanding and willing, were not and are not done through the flesh. Again the raising of the flesh of Christ from the dead was not done through the flesh but the spirit of God, *Romans* ch.8.

Third not all the attributes of God consist in external action, as is plain of simplicity, infinity, wisdom, power, goodness; so even if God does all external works through the flesh, not for that reason has he communicated his attributes to it.

Further, even if deity were to do altogether everything through humanity and all the attributes were to consist in action, still it could not be said that humanity is omnipotent, omnisapient, omnijust etc. For the epithets of the principal cause do not belong to the instrument, otherwise when someone writes learnedly and wisely the pen would be called learned and wise.

Lastly the likeness of soul and body is against them. For the soul does not communicate to the body its true properties, nor the body to the soul. For the body does not understand, discourse, deliberate, which are proper to the soul, nor on the contrary does the soul run, sit, get hungry or thirsty, which are proper to the body. And besides the soul is whole in the head and yet whole in the foot where the head is not, and conversely.

The likeness too of the burning iron does nothing to help Chemnitz; nay it plainly shows he is unskilled. For Chemnitz says that the fire communicates to the iron its own force of burning and illuming not by informing it but by the union whereby the iron is penetrated in every part by fire, and he adds that the iron still retains its properties, that is, natural hardness, blackness, coldness, although they do not appear.

But assuredly he who says this is without sense. For apart from miracles and magic tricks, heat and cold and hardness and softness and whiteness and blackness, if they do not appear and are not sensed, are not. But who ever sees blackness in burning iron? Who senses cold? Who would say there is hardness in a thing that bends like wax?

But, says Chemnitz, if fire is removed, blackness, cold, hardness will appear, so they were also there before.

I reply that when fire is removed from the iron the heat slowly departs and the whiteness is carried off, which were not only produced but also preserved in the iron by the fire. So when cold and blackness again exist in the iron, what was hidden does not appear but what was absent returns.

Further what a paradox it is that fire penetrate the whole iron not through the produced heat but through the iron itself, and that the iron illumine and burn, not by heat received from the fire, but by its very self which is in the fire? For in this way the substance of fire will without any miracle penetrate another substance, which glorious bodies do not do without a miracle. And besides, however much the iron is penetrated by the fire, certainly it will never be true to say that iron burns or illumines unless the iron itself is affected by the qualities inherent in it of heat and light, but it will be necessary to say that the fire, which is in the iron, burns and illumines.

Add that in burning iron is not seen the communication of properties that is seen in the incarnation; for we do not say that iron is fire and fire is iron in the way we say that God is man and man is God.

Nor is it an obstacle that the Fathers use this likeness, for they do not wish to show the communication of properties by this likeness, nor the whole mystery of the incarnation, but one of its conditions, namely how by the incarnation the divinity is not harmed and humanity is much perfected. For as fire in iron does not go black nor gets cold nor is consumed by rust, so etc. And this about the attributes in general.

*Chapter Eleven: the Ubiquity of the Humanity of Christ is Refuted because it Conflicts with the Scriptures*

Now we must dispute specifically about ubiquity, or rather ubiquity itself must be got rid of. First then this ubiquity conflicts with express Scriptures that say Christ the man, by reason of his humanity, was not in a certain place and so was not always everywhere. *John* ch.11, "Lazarus is dead and I am glad for your sake that I was not there, so that you may believe." *John* ch.6, "When the crowd saw that Jesus was not there." *Matthew* last chapter, "He is not here but has risen."

But they reply to these that what is signified by these testimonies is that Christ was not everywhere by location, but not that he was not everywhere in some divine way. And even in the Eucharistic feast the body of Christ is not present by location and yet, because he is really there, none of the Lutherans would dare to say absolutely that the body of Christ is not there, that is, in the feast. Again, God is not in the world by location, and yet it would be intolerable to say that God is not in heaven and on earth. So in the same way, if Christ's humanity is truly everywhere, in whatever way he is there, what the Scriptures say, "he is not here; I was not there,"

will be false absolutely. But the Scriptures cannot be false; therefore the opinion of the adversaries is false.

Further, the soul of Christ was not in hell by location but spiritually, and yet he was not always there; for he was not left in hell, *Acts* ch.2. Therefore he is really not everywhere, not only by place but also in any other way.

Second, this opinion is in conflict with the Scriptures that say God is everywhere so that in this way they can distinguish him from creatures. *Jeremiah* ch.23, "I fill heaven and earth," and elsewhere. And *Psalms* 138, "Whither will I go from your Spirit, and whither will I flee your face?" Hence the Fathers from this attribute of God prove that the Holy Spirit is true God, not a creature, because it is written *Wisdom* ch.1, "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world." See Ambrose, Jerome, Cassiodorus, Cyril, Basil, Didymus, Fulgentius, Vigilus, Athanasius, Sabellius Augustus.

They reply that it is proper to God to be everywhere per se, yet this same thing belongs to the humanity of Christ per accidens, by reason of union with God.

But this is not enough. For to be everywhere per accidens can be understood in two ways. First that Christ's humanity is truly not everywhere but is said to be everywhere because it is joined with the Word which is everywhere. Second that it is really everywhere but has this not from its own nature but by the grace of God, which is an accident with respect to the human essence.

If they understand it in the first way they are not speaking properly and they do not have what they intend. They are not speaking properly because that which is not itself such but is joined with something that is such cannot be absolutely said to be such. Otherwise the body could be called spirit because it is joined with the soul, which is spirit, and the eye would be in the feet because it is joined with the soul that is in the feet.

Nor do they have what they intend, for they want to establish from ubiquity the true presence of Christ in the Eucharistic feast, but from this accidental ubiquity it does not follow that Christ's body is really in the feast but it only follows that it is joined with deity which is present in the feast.

If they take it in the second way, as without doubt they do take it, then they plainly destroy the argument of the Fathers for the Holy Spirit. For the Arians say that the Holy Spirit is indeed everywhere but per accidens, and so he is not true God but a creature. Since therefore the Fathers did rightly prove from ubiquity that the Holy Spirit is God, it manifestly follows that to be truly everywhere belongs to God alone, and is not communicated to any creature by grace.

You will say that surely the body of Christ, as it is at the same time in so many places sacramentally, so it could also be in the whole world. Could not God convert the whole world into bread and the bread into his body? And yet not for this reason could the body of Christ be God.

I reply that this could indeed be done but yet this is not to be everywhere in the way God is and in the way Brentians understand about the body of Christ. For God is in the world such that he is not contained by the world but is of so great immensity that he could fill infinite worlds, and this we do not attribute to the body of Christ, which is finite.

Third ubiquity conflicts with the testimonies by which the Fathers prove that there are two natures in Christ. For the chief place is *John* ch.3, "No one has ascended to heaven but he who came down from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven." From this place many of the Fathers deduce that Christ is God and man, because when he was in his body only on earth he yet said he was in heaven, namely by deity. So Augustine, Chrysostom, Cyril, Theophylact, Bede, Nazianzen, Hilary, and others.

But if the opinion of the Ubiquitists were true this argument would conclude nothing. For the Eutychians, taught by the Ubiquitists, would say that then also in the flesh Christ was in heaven, and on earth, and everywhere.

Besides the Fathers prove Christ is God and man from the places where Christ went on a journey and changed locations, now in a ship, now on foot, now also on an ass, although however as God he was everywhere and could not be in motion. See Blessed Ambrose, Athanasius.

But according to the Ubiquitists all these things prove nothing. For if Christ's flesh was everywhere then certainly it could not be in motion, save metaphorically, as God is sometimes said to come down from heaven to earth because he appears to men, not where he was not, but where he was not seen. For to move properly from place to place is to leave one place and acquire another, but he who is everywhere cannot leave one nor acquire another.

Nor is what they say valid, that the body of Christ was everywhere invisibly but in a certain place visibly, and in this second way he could move. For he cannot be in the same place visibly and invisibly at the same time, because then he would be twice in the same place and then his body would have a twin; next surely it involves a contradiction for the same thing to be seen and not seen in the same place.

Next motion proper cannot be understood without acquisition of a new place, therefore Christ, if he was everywhere, could not truly move but only apparently. And therefore as from the metaphorical motion of God it is not proved that God is a creature, so from the motion of Christ, which could only be metaphorical, it could not rightly be collected that Christ was a man. And this is confirmed by the responses of the adversaries, who when they want to show that the motion of the body of Christ does not conflict with ubiquity, prove that it can also be said of God. *Genesis* ch.11, "Let us go down and confound their tongues." And *Genesis* ch.9, "I will go down and see etc." For thus does Brentius reason. They themselves confess then that Christ's humanity is not moved from place to place otherwise than as God could move.

*Chapter Twelve: the Ubiquity of the Body of Christ is Refuted because it Conflicts with the Apostles' Creed*

Next ubiquity conflicts with the articles of the Creed about Christ's conception, nativity, death, burial, descent to hell, resurrection, ascension, advent to judgment.

And first with conception, for faith has it that the flesh of Christ was in the womb of Mary alone.

But according to the Ubiquitists right from conception the flesh was in the wombs of all women, nay and of men too, and so this praise is common to all, "Blessed the womb that bore you," *Luke* ch.11.

Again the faith teaches that Christ's body, after the ninth month, came forth from the womb into the light and thus was truly born. But according to the Ubiquitists before the ninth month, nay on the first day of conception, he was outside the womb, and after the tenth month was still in the womb, nay never came out of it.

They will say he did come out because he was locally in the womb and not outside the womb, and afterwards he was locally outside the womb and not in the womb.

But on the contrary, because this being locally seems to be nothing other than a certain appearance, just as when God, who is everywhere, appears in a certain place. For if truly from the conception of Christ the flesh was present to every place, it could not truly go anywhere but only show itself (as we said above) where before it was not. Therefore the nativity was not true but apparent, as the Manichees used to say.

Again faith requires that in the death of Christ the body and soul were separated and the body indeed lay in the tomb and the soul descended to hell. But according to the Ubiquitists the soul was also in the tomb with the body and the flesh was in hell with the soul.

And lest we labor much in our proof, the authors of the Harmony say they believe that after Christ's burial the whole person God and man descended to hell. But certainly if the man descended to hell, his soul did not descend alone.

Again faith hands on that Christ's body after three days returned to life from death, and went out of the closed tomb and went in to the disciples with the doors closed, which are noted by the Evangelists as miracles. But according to the Ubiquitists Christ never left the tomb nor went in to the disciples but only manifested himself outside the tomb, although he remained there invisibly, and nor was wonderful in any way what John writes about the coming in of Christ to the disciples with the doors closed, since he did not really enter with the doors closed but only made himself visible in a place where he was invisible. And yet Brentius urges these miracles against the Zwinglians and the same are asserted in the Harmony.

Lastly faith has it that Christ ascended to heaven and will come thence again to judgment; but according to the Ubiquitists he neither ascends nor descends.

They will reply to this about the ascension to heaven in the article of the Creed that the name of heaven is taken figuratively, not properly, and only signifies the glory, reign, and majesty of God, but not any definite place. And Illyricus proves it first from the words of Peter *Acts* ch.3, "Who heaven must receive." For if the statement were about a place what should have been said is, "Who should be received in heaven."

Second he proves it from the Creed itself, for what is meant by "He ascended to heaven" is explained by the following words, "He sits at the right hand of the Father." But these words are metaphorical, for the Father does not properly have a right hand or a left, so the ascension to heaven too should be taken metaphorically.

Third if Christ truly ascended to this bodily heaven, he should have permitted, nay commanded, his disciples to see how he ascended to the highest heaven and, by ascending, broke through the stars and the celestial spheres, so that

they could give witness of it to the whole world, which however was not done. And he adds, in his own way, boxing shadows and yet triumphing, "Surely this is clearly an invincible demonstration against their localizing of Christ confined in heaven."

Now Brentius proves the same, first because Christ is said to have ascended above all the heavens, *Ephesians* ch.6, "He ascended above all the heavens," *Hebrews* ch.4, "He penetrated the heavens." Therefore, says Brentius, he did not stop in any of them. *Hebrews* ch.7, "Made higher than the heavens." So Christ is not in heaven as in a place.

Second because if he was in the bodily heaven he should be in the Antarctic pole. For he ought to be in a quiet place otherwise he would be in a bad way in that perpetual moving about, and only the poles are motionless; therefore he should be in one of the poles and rest at a point; but the Antarctic pole is superior according to Aristotle and the Arctic inferior; therefore Christ is to be placed in the Antarctic pole. And the confirmation is that if he were in the bodily heaven, where would he retreat to when the heaven is destroyed? Thus to be sure does it please the sons of darkness to play and joke about the mysteries of Christ.

Third he proves elsewhere that Christ ascended to the heaven from which he descended, *John* ch.3, "No one has ascended to heaven save he who came down from heaven etc." But he did not descend from the bodily heaven, so he did not ascend to the bodily heaven; but just as he is metaphorically said to have descended when "he emptied himself", so he is metaphorically said to have ascended when "God exalted him and gave him a name that is above every name."

But Catholics believe that Christ ascended to the true bodily heaven, or remains within the heaven itself, as St. Augustine seems to think in his letter to Dardanus, where he says that Christ is everywhere as God is, and is in some part of heaven, because of the mode of a true body, whether he remains above or whether outside all heavens, so that he touches the surface of the highest heaven with his feet, as Blessed Thomas wishes. For these things are not certain, nor do they need necessarily to be known, nay even St. Augustine warns that it is over curious and vain to search into them.

This is certain, that Christ's body is now visible and palpable and occupies as much space as the bulk of his body and is in this bodily heaven, whether it is inside, as one is said to be in a house, or above, as one is said to be on the roof. And the proof is, first, that Christ ascended to the heaven where the seat of God is, but that heaven is bodily, as is plain from *Psalms* 114, "The heaven of heaven to the Lord, but the earth he has given to the sons of men," where since heaven is opposed to earth and earth is properly taken to be this bodily earth that we walk on, certainly heaven too should be taken properly, *Isaiah* ch.66, "The heaven is my seat, but the earth is my footstool." Again *Matthew* ch.5, "Do not swear by heaven because it is the throne of God, nor by earth because it is his footstool." And ch.6, "Our Father who art in heaven." And later, "Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven." You see that wherever the heaven is called the seat of God it is opposed to the earth that we inhabit. This antithesis very openly teaches that the bodily heaven which we see above us is the seat of God, and that therefore to this heaven Christ ascended.

Second the same is proved from the history of the ascension which is so described in the Scriptures that it cannot in any way be overturned through tropes,

unless someone wishes to be plainly impudent. *Acts* ch.1, "As they were looking," says Luke, "he was raised up and clouds took him from their sight." As to this point there is no place for a trope, for the Apostles saw him going up to the clouds, which seem to be bodily, unless they make Christ a magician.

But that the term and end of this true movement was not the clouds is plain from *Luke* ch.24, "And it happened that as he blessed them he departed from them and was borne to heaven." But that Christ truly reached where he was going is evidenced by *Mark* ch.16, "And the Lord Jesus," he says, "after speaking to them was assumed into heaven and sits at the right hand of God." And thus do the Evangelists narrate the beginning, progress, and end of the ascension. But the beginning was true and proper, not metaphorical, not imaginary, so the progress and end were true and proper; therefore truly and properly Christ ascended to heaven.

Third it is proved from the descent from heaven to judgment; for he will come to judgment from the heaven to which he ascended, as *Acts* ch.1 "So will he come as you see him going to heaven." *Matthew* ch.24, "Then the sign of the Son of man will appear in heaven." I *Thessalonians* ch.4, "The Lord himself in the command and voice of an archangel and in the trump of God will descend from heaven." And I *Thessalonians* ch.1, "In the revealing of the Lord Jesus from heaven."

But it is certain the Lord will not descend from heaven metaphorically so that to descend from heaven is to leave Glory, Reign, Majesty, but rather then he will most appear in majesty and great power, so the heaven he will descend from is not the kingdom or majesty but a certain place; therefore he ascended to some place too.

Fourth it is proved from the place of the saints. For Christ is there where the holy men and will be. *John* ch.14, "In my Father's house are many mansions, if not so I would have told you, because I go to prepare a place for you, and if I go I will prepare you a place; I will come again and receive you to myself so that where I am you may be too." But the saints will not be everywhere but in a certain place and if in a certain place then the most noble, that is, in heaven, so Christ as man is and will be in that place.

Lastly this is the opinion of all the saints, and especially of Augustine in his letter to Damasus where he advises him to reflect on the Creed and to believe simply that Christ the man after the true resurrection truly ascended to heaven and is now there in a certain place. And he writes elsewhere that although the heathen marvel how Christ's body could be in heaven, it must be thus truly believed. Nor do the arguments to the contrary prove anything.

To the first of Illyricus I say that the sentence of Peter is altogether ambiguous both in Greek and Latin, but however it is expounded what he wants does not follow. For if we read 'who heaven must receive' so that the sense is that heaven must receive Christ as a place receives the placed thing, the sentence is for us.

But if the sense is that Christ must receive heaven then too it will not be against us. For in order for Christ to receive heaven it need not be that Christ is diffused through the whole heaven, but it is enough that he be in some part of heaven, just as a king is said to receive a kingdom or a royal palace or a royal throne

when he begins to be in the kingdom or palace or on the throne, even if he is not really present to the whole kingdom, throne, or palace.

The first explanation however is more agreeable to the text; for it is said, "who heaven must receive up to the times of the restitution of all things," where is not indicated the acceptance of the possession of a kingdom, which happens in a moment, but remaining in a place, which lasts a long time, and this is how it is explained by Oecumenius. It is also more conform to other places which say Christ was assumed or raised to heaven, *Mark* last chapter, *Acts* ch.1, or proceeded to heaven, *I Peter* ch.3.

To the second reason I deny that to ascend to heaven and to sit at the right hand of God are the same thing; for in a Creed nothing should be repeated since it is a very brief compendium. But what it is to sit at the right hand of God we will speak of later.

To the third I say that there was no need for the Apostles to see Christ penetrating all the heavens; for if we do not have their testimony about this thing we have the testimony of the angels, who in *Acts* ch.1 openly indicated that Jesus was assumed into heaven and will descend in the same form to judgment; nay it was more fitting that they did not see the end of the ascension, both so that they not think it an illusion, since human sight cannot naturally reach it, and so that faith should have a place even in these things, just as also they did not see Christ incarnated, born, rise, nay nor die except John, and yet they were the future preachers and first and chief witnesses of all the mysteries of the Christian faith.

To the first reason of Brentius I say that thereby the opinion of St. Thomas is proved, namely that Christ's body is above the sphere of the first heaven, but not that his body is nowhere visible. Although not even the opinion of St. Thomas is clearly proved from these places, for one could reply that Christ ascended above all the heavens and being made higher than the heavens he penetrated all the heavens, which is at the supreme part of the last heaven, and so he has under his feet the supreme heaven in its proximate part. The place from *Hebrews* ch.4 favors the opinion of Augustine, for Paul is there alluding to the Aaronic High Priest who penetrated each year to the interior of the veil and the holy of holies, but did not go further. So the Lord too, as heavenly High Priest, penetrated to the intimate recesses of the highest heaven but did not go further, nor did he stay outside the heaven.

To the second I say that the words of Brentius are otiose not to say blasphemous, since they turn a divine mystery into a joke. But lest even jokes cause damage, we reply that Christ's body is not reduced to the confines of the Antarctic pole but is in what part he wishes; nor is there danger of agitation, since the empyrean heaven is posited as at rest by everyone; nor is it going to perish, although the inferior heavens are in some way to be changed. But all these things surpass the mode of understanding in this life. It is enough with Augustine to know that glorious bodies will have a state and motion as they wish, but altogether decent.

To the third I say that Christ ascended to the heaven from which he descended. Further he descended from the true heaven although the descent was metaphorical; nor yet does it thence follow that the ascent should be expounded metaphorically if the descent was metaphorical; for the descent was of the

uncreated Word, spiritual and immense, the ascent was of the corporeal flesh, created and finite.

*Chapter Thirteen: Ubiquity is Refuted because it Conflicts with the Presence of the Lord's Body in the Eucharist*

Third, ubiquity conflicts with the sacrament of the Eucharist, for establishing which it was thought out. For if the flesh of Christ is everywhere we certainly do not need the Eucharist, and in vain do we go to temples, in vain do we recite the words of the Eucharistic feast, in vain do we prepare for it, since we have at home in bread and wine and all other foods the body of Christ.

Luther in his book, that the word of Christ 'this is my body' still stand firm, objects to himself this argument in these words, "If the body of Christ is in all places I will devour, I will bolt it down in all inns, plates, cups, etc." But he replies to himself, "Listen you pig, fanatical dog, or whatever stupid ass you are, even if the body of Christ is in all places yet you do not at once devour and bolt it down." And later, "I leave you in your pig sty or in your dung heap." The sum of his response is that although it is everywhere it cannot everywhere be taken in. And he gives the example of rays of the sun which reach us everywhere and yet if one wants to enclose them in a box and carry them off, one will not be able to.

But this solution is of no value. For if the body of Christ is everywhere it cannot be separated from anything, and therefore it is impossible that I should have bread on the table or in my hand or mouth or stomach and not have the body of Christ in the same place. Nor does the likeness with the rays have value, because the rays are not everywhere in this way but cannot penetrate non-transparent bodies.

John Brentius replies a little differently or rather explains the opinion of Luther. For he says the body of Christ is everywhere personally but in the feast is also there definitively, that is, from the definition and decree of God by consecration, which way of being adds only efficacy, for in the Eucharist it is taken up efficaciously and nowhere else.

This solution openly embraces Calvinism, for Brentius is compelled to say that nothing is taken up in the feast which is not had outside the feast save the efficacy of the body of Christ, and therefore in the feast the body of Christ is not really taken up but only a certain energy of it.

And although Brentius would not say it yet it follows evidently from ubiquity. For just as God, because he is everywhere, cannot be in motion neither per se nor per accidens, and therefore no one eating bread can be said to be truly eating God, although God is in the bread, for I truly eat bread because bread really passes into my mouth and from the mouth to the stomach, but God does not so pass, who is at the same time in the hand, the mouth, the stomach, and everywhere; so, although the body of Christ is everywhere he cannot truly be eaten with the bread because he cannot really pass with the bread from the hand to the mouth, from the mouth to the stomach, because he cannot be in motion since he is everywhere; therefore in the feast the body of Christ is only present and only eaten by energy and not real taking up.

You see how the Lutherans and Brentians favor the Calvinists even as they oppose them, and yet Brentius in his Testament execrates the sacramentarians and does not allow any place for them in the Church.

*Chapter Fourteen: Ubiquity is Refuted by the Testimonies of the Fathers*

Finally ubiquity conflicts with all the Fathers. St. Ambrose says, "For God does not pass from place to place, who is always everywhere. But as he is man, who himself walks, he is him who goes and elsewhere says, Arise let us go. In that part then he goes and comes which is common to us."

Cyril of Jerusalem, "For because he is not now present in the flesh, do not from that think that he is not now present by the medium of the spirit, hearing what is said about him and seeing what you think and examining the reins and heart."

Chrysostom on *John* ch.3 'The Son of man who is in heaven' says, "He is not speaking of the flesh but names himself from the highest substance."

Ruffinus on the Creed says, "He ascends then to heaven, not to where the Word was not before, since he was always in heaven, but to where the Word made flesh was not before."

Augustine on *John* says, "But whom the man leaves, God does not leave, nor Christ man and God. So he departed by the fact he was man, he remained by the fact he was God. He departed by that which was in one place, he remained by that which was in every place." And to Dardanus he says, "It does not follow that what is in God is everywhere as God is; for about us the most true Scripture says that in him we live and move and have our being, nor yet are we everywhere as he is; but that man is in one way in God since God is in another way in that man, in a certain proper and singular way. For the one person is God and man, and each is one Christ, who is everywhere by the fact he is God but in heaven by the fact he is man."

Cyril of Alexandria on *John* says, "The disciples thought that the absence of Christ, as he is man I say (for God is everywhere), would be cause of many disadvantages for them since he who could rescue them from all evils would not be present; but they needed to consider him not only in the flesh but also in deity which, although not seen by the eyes, is yet always present in supreme power; nor is there anything that can prevent him filling all things and doing what he wills. For the divine nature is not in place or circumscribed dimensions; wherefore since Christ is truly God and man, they needed to understand that he would always be with them in the ineffable power of God, though absent in the flesh."

Theodoret in his second dialogue says, "So the Lord's body rose indeed free of corruption and death, impassible, immortal, glorified with divine glory and celestial powers; yet it is body and is circumscribed as it was before." In his third dialogue he says, "But after the resurrection he was seen circumscribed and having hands and feet and the other parts of the body, and was able to be touched, to be seen, and was possessed of wounds and scars just as before the resurrection. So one of two things must be said, either that these parts are attributed to the divine nature, if the body was turned into the nature of divinity and had these parts, or that the body remained in the limits of its own nature."

Leo on the ascension says, "By his ascension he who was further away in humanity began in an ineffable way to be more present in divinity."

Gregory on the ascension says, "He returned to the place where he was, and went back to the place where he remained, because although he ascended into heaven by humanity he contained by his divinity both earth and heaven."

Vigilius against Eutyches says, "But he is with us and is not with us; because those he left and departed from in his humanity he did not leave or desert in his divinity. For in the form of servant, that he took from us into heaven, he is absent from us, but in the form of God, which did not depart from us, he is present to us." And again, "If there is one nature of Word and flesh, how is the flesh not found everywhere since the Word is everywhere? For when the flesh was on earth it was not indeed in heaven, and now that it is in heaven it is not indeed on earth."

Fulgentius to Trasimundus says, "He one and the same in his human substance was absent from heaven when he was on earth and he left earth when he ascended to heaven; but in his divine and immense substance he neither left heaven when he came down from heaven nor left earth when he ascended to heaven."

To these testimonies Chemnitz replies with many things. First, that the ancients are speaking against the Manichees and Eutychians who wanted the humanity of Christ to be converted to the immense and unlocalized divinity. Second, that the Fathers wanted to say that Christ's humanity was not everywhere in its natural properties. Third, that the Fathers wanted Christ's humanity in its visible form not to be diffused everywhere, nor to exist now on earth in place, and circumscribed, and perceptible.

But all these points are slight. For as to the first it is true that the Fathers are speaking against the Eutychians, but they refute them with the argument that since Christ's flesh is not everywhere the way divinity is, the natures must be distinct, so that those deny the foundation of the Fathers and assert Christ's flesh is everywhere are in open conflict with the Fathers, and so are refuted by the Fathers.

The second solution is very weak. For the Fathers are not disputing about the natural properties of the flesh but are simply denying it is everywhere. Nay Augustine to Dardanus is expressly speaking of what belongs to the flesh, not of itself, but from its unity with the Word, and he is very clearly saying that it does not follow that if the Word is everywhere then the flesh united thereto is also everywhere.

The third solution too is not solid, both because no one could doubt whether Christ's flesh was diffused visibly everywhere, and because the Fathers do not oppose visible flesh to invisible flesh, but flesh to deity, and they say that Christ by deity is everywhere but not everywhere by flesh.

#### *Chapter Fifteen: the Arguments of the Heretics are Refuted*

But now the arguments of the adversaries must be refuted that are taken partly from the Scriptures, partly from the testimonies of the Fathers and scholastics.

The first and chief argument they take is from 'on the right hand of God', for Christ as man is exalted to the right hand of God the Father, *Matthew* ch.26, *Acts* ch.2, *Ephesians* ch.1, *Colossians* ch.3, *I Peter* ch.3, *Hebrews* ch.1, and elsewhere; but the right hand of God is everywhere, for it is not a corporeal right hand that could be put in a certain place; so Christ as man is not in any certain place but everywhere.

I reply and say three things. First if the right hand of God is taken in a gross way, as Luther does in his book that the Lord's words 'This is my body' still stand, where he proves that Christ's flesh is everywhere because it is at the right hand of God and not in a little finger or any nail of that hand, then I say that the consequence is null. For it is also said that "the souls of the just are in the hand of God," *Wisdom* ch.3 and without doubt they are not at the tip of his finger or a nail of the hand but in the whole hand. And by like reason the hand of God is everywhere and yet not for that reason are the souls of the just everywhere; the reason for this is that the hand of the Lord is not everywhere by extension, as if it had a part here and a part there, but is whole here and whole there.

Second I say that by the right hand of God many understand eternal beatitude, but not majesty or divine power. Thus does Jerome explain it, and Augustine, and they mean not only that Christ sits at the right hand of God but that all the elect will sit at the right hand of God, according to *Ephesians* ch.2, "he has made us sit in the heavens in Christ." And in *Matthew* ch.25 it is said the sheep will be at the right hand.

And this opinion can be confirmed from the fact that among the ancients to sit at the right hand was less honorific than to sit at the left hand, as Antonius Nebrissensis notes and proves with many testimonies in explaining fifty places of Scripture. Hence too on the leaden seals of the Pontiffs and in many pictures Peter is put on the left hand, although it is nevertheless clear that the first place was always bestowed on Peter.

If then Christ, as lesser and inferior, sits at the right hand, that sitting should not be referred to the divine majesty, wherein the Son is equal to the Father, but to the human glory and beatitude that belongs to Christ as he is less than the Father; and according to this exposition the argument of the heretics has no validity. For to be in this way at the right hand of God does not require ubiquity but only beatitude, which even he can have who is attached to the smallest corner of the world alone.

Third I say that it is more probable that by the right hand of God, at which Christ sits, should be understood divine glory, power, and majesty, so that the sense of the article of the Creed, that Christ sits at the right hand of the Father, is that he reigns, judges, governs all things with the same power and honor along with the Father; thus at the right hand is taken simply for at his side, that is, for equal place and not greater or lesser; for in *Psalms* 109, just as the Son is said to be at the right hand of the Father so later the Father is said to be at the right hand of the Son, "The Lord at your right hand has broken kings in the day of his wrath." From this it is plain that right hand signifies equality.

Further, almost all the Fathers expound it in this way, Athanasius, Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Cyril of Alexandria, Damascene, Leo, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Ambrose.

Next the same is indicated by the Scriptures, for in *Matthew* ch.22 Christ adduces the place from *Psalms* 109, "The Lord said to my Lord, sit at my right hand," to prove his divinity and his true equality with the Father. And this testimony of the psalm is adduced by Paul to prove Christ's divinity when he says *Hebrews* ch.1, "He sits at the right hand of majesty in the highest, being made as much better than the

angels as he has inherited a name superior to theirs; for to which of the angels did he say at any time, sit at my right hand?"

Nor is anything proved against this opinion by what Augustine adduces from *Ephesians* ch.2, "he made us sit together etc." For the sense is not that all will sit at the right hand of God in their proper persons but in Christ, as Paul says. For because we are of the same species and nature as that man who is at the right hand of God, we are said to sit through him at the right hand of God. For elsewhere Scripture attributes sitting at the right hand of the Father to Christ alone.

But according to this exposition the argument of the heretics seems to have some validity. For the sitting at the right hand of the Father that signifies power and majesty has been given to the humanity of Christ, as is plain from *Acts* ch.2, "Exalted therefore at the right hand of God etc." and *Ephesians* ch.2, "he made him sit at his right hand." For it does not belong to deity to be exalted or to be set at the right hand; Ruffinus too says that it was given to the humanity to be drawn up to the right hand of God, and Blessed Leo on the ascension says that Christ's humanity was drawn to the throne of the Father and to share his glory. Theodoret too says that 'sit at my right hand' is said to the humanity. For the Word did not need the Father's command to sit. Since this is so, it seems it cannot now be denied that the humanity was endowed with divine majesty and so is also everywhere.

I reply that this sitting was given to the humanity but not to it in itself but in the supposit. For what was brought about was not that humanity in itself sit at the right hand of God but that it be the humanity of the person who sits at the right hand of God, just as what was brought about by the incarnation was not that humanity be God but that it be the humanity of God, and so one can say in the concrete that this man is God and sits at the right hand of the Father. A likeness is added about the purple robe of a king. For when a king puts on the purple and sits on his throne, he draws the purple to that throne, not so that the purple is said to sit or reign but so that it be said to be the robe of someone who sits and reigns. But although this was done at the incarnation, yet Christ is said to sit at the right hand of God after the ascension because then the glory and majesty of this man was first perfectly made known, as is said in *Philippians* ch.2.

But that things are so can easily be proved. For although according to this explanation equality of honor and power is understood by the right hand, humanity is not and cannot be equal to God. For when the Lord says *John* ch.14, "The Father is greater than I," he without doubt understands it by reason of his humanity. And in *I Corinthians* ch.15 the Apostle writes too that after the day of judgment the Son will be subject to him "who has subjected all things to him." But this subjection, as we said above, cannot be rightly understood save by reason of humanity.

Lastly if humanity is a creature does it not involve a contradiction that it be or be said to be equal to the creator?

But they reply that the humanity of Christ is not altogether equal to God and yet he sits at God's right hand. For he does indeed have the power and majesty of God, which is to sit at the right hand of God; and yet because he does not have it from himself, as God does, but has it from God, therefore he cannot in all respects be equal with God.

But this is easily refuted. For to have something from another does not cause inequality; for the Son of God has everything from the Father and yet he is truly and properly equal to him. They reply that the Son has it naturally and the humanity has it by grace. On the contrary. For to have it by grace is not to have the majesty itself but a certain participation in it, which does not suffice for the sitting that we are speaking of.

Lastly, the humanity is either truly equal with God or it is not; if it is then this is false, “the Father is greater than I,” and “the Son will be subject to him who has subjected all things to him;” if it is not then Christ’s humanity does not sit at the right hand of God in this third way but only in the second way; and ubiquity is not collected from this second way, as we proved a little earlier.

*Chapter Sixteen: Other Objections taken from the Word of God are Solved*

The adversaries take a second argument from two places, for in Paul’s Epistle to the *Philippians 2* we read that Christ is in the glory of God the Father; and what the glory of God the Father is is described in *Isaiah 40*, where it is said of God, “Who holds the earth in his hand and measures the heavens with his palm.” And in *Philippians 2*, “The heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain him.” And *Jeremiah 23*, “I fill the heaven and the earth.” Therefore Jesus Christ holds the earth in his hand and measures the heavens with his palm, and fills the heaven and the earth; but that means he is everywhere.

I reply as before, that the glory of God the Father has been given to the humanity of Christ, not in the humanity itself, but in the supposit; that is, that it is by the grace of union that Christ’s humanity received the fact of belonging by nature to the Son of God, and therefore the man Christ is in the glory of the Father and holds the earth in his hand and fills the heaven and the earth.

The third argument is from *Matthew 11*, “All things have been given to me by my Father;” and the last chapter of *Matthew*, “All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth.” In this place ‘all power’ indicates omnipotence in and omnipresence on earth; therefore Christ governs everything by being truly present to everything.

Brentius and Kemnitz add *Psalms 8*, “Thou has subjected all things under his feet,” and *John 13*, “The Father has given all things into my hands.” And thence they cleverly conclude that therefore Christ as man touches all things with his feet and hands. And lest perhaps the reply be made that omnipotence and omnipresence, being infinite things, cannot be communicated to a finite creature, they reply secondly that to Christ “has been given the power of forgiving sins on earth,” *Matthew 9*, and this power is infinite; for who can forgive sins but God alone?

I reply that the first two quotations can be understood in two ways: first of the divine power that the Son of God received from the Father through eternal generation, and then these places are not to the purpose; second of the divine power that the human nature received through the hypostatic union, and then the response is the same as to the previous arguments. Third, the last quotation can be understood of the power conferred on Christ’s humanity over all creatures, which power is however not absolutely omnipotence, nor does it require omnipresence. For in those words is only indicated that Christ’s humanity presides over all

creatures and has right over them all; from which it does not follow that he can do whatever God can do or that he is everywhere; for why cannot he have right over something absent? Do we not see this ordinarily among men, so that a king has right over his whole kingdom and yet his presence occupies but a small corner of a house or of a single room?

To the first confirmation [from Brentius and Kemnitz] I say that marvelous is the perversity and impudence of the just who find figures where they are not necessary and will not allow them where they are necessary. For what is better known or more usual than to understand power by 'hands'? For what else does *Psalms* 94 mean, "In his hand are all the boundaries of the earth"? And *John* 10, "And no one will take them out of my hand"? Again, what is better known or more usual than to describe the attribute of lordship by 'subjection under the feet'? Add that even if the words of *Psalms* 8 are understood especially of Christ, yet they can be understood also of the first creation of man that is described in *Genesis*; and yet it is clear that Adam did not touch the whole world with his feet, although it is said of him, "Thou has subjected all things under his feet." Unless perhaps we turn to Jewish fables. For Rabbi Solomon on *Deuteronomy* 3 writes that Adam was of such height that he touched the heavens with his head.

To the second confirmation I reply that if those words prove anything, then one can conclude too that other men are everywhere. For in *John* 20 Christ gave to the disciples the power of forgiving sins. And therefore, if he who can forgive sins in any way can be everywhere, then the Apostles and their successors could be everywhere. I say therefore that to forgive sins by one's own authority is a feature of infinite power, but to forgive them as the instrument of another does not require infinite power, as needs to be noticed. Christ then as God was already forgiving sins by his own authority; but Christ as man was forgiving them as the instrument of divinity.

The fourth argument is *Matthew* 18, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." And *Matthew* 28, "I am with you even unto the end of the world."

I reply that these words are said of Christ as he is present to his followers by grace and aid, for which bodily presence is not required, as is plain. For Christ is certainly not present to those gathered together in the name of other gods in the way in which he is present to those gathered together in his name; so from these quotations not only does it not follow that he is everywhere but rather it follows that he is not everywhere.

The fifth argument is *John* 5, "The Son makes alive whom he will." And again, "The Father judges no one but has given all judgment to the Son, so that all may honor the Son as they honor the Father." For from these quotations we have it that three divine properties are conferred on the Son, namely power of judging, power of making alive, and majesty deserving of supreme honor. But the same reasoning holds for all other properties; therefore all are to be attributed to him; therefore omnipotence and omnipresence are to be attributed to him too. And lest it be replied that these are given to the Son as he is God, there is added in the same place, "He has given power to the Son to pass judgment, because he is the Son of man." And Brentius confirms the point from Cyril *On the Incarnation* chs.7 and 28, where Cyril

says that the Word communicated to his flesh the works of his majesty; and like things are found in Leo's *Epistle 83* to the monks of Palestine.

I reply that the quotation can be understood in three ways. First that everything here said to have been given to Christ by the Father be understood to have been given to the Word by eternal generation. For thus does Chrysostom understand this place, where he says that the words "because he is the Son of man" must be joined with the following ones and not with the preceding ones, so that we should not read that God gave Christ power to pass judgment because he is the Son of man, but rather, "Because he is the Son of man, do not marvel at this," that is, 'do not marvel if I, though I am a Son of man, have nevertheless said that I have the power of making alive and of judging and must be honored as the Father is; for I am not only Son of man but also Son of God.'

In a second way the quotation can be understood in this fashion, that all those things are signified to have been given to the humanity, not in itself, but in the supposit, and that too by the grace of union (as we said above about 'sitting on the right hand of God'). Augustine and Cyril seem to take the words in this way, and from their explanation it does not follow that Christ's humanity has the divine attributes formally in itself, but only that the humanity is the nature of a supposit that does have those attributes.

In a third way the place can be understood in the sense that the question is about the power of judging, not in any way whatever, but externally and perceptibly; and this power has indeed been given to Christ because he is the Son of man. For because the judge of men in the external forum should be seen by those who are to be judged, therefore God the Father, who is invisible, will not judge but will give judgment to the Son, who has become visible by assuming flesh.

To the confirmation [by Brentius] I say that Leo and Cyril in those places explain the sharing of properties in the way we explained above, such that the sharing is real in respect of the supposit but verbal in respect of the natures.

For in the same places Leo and Cyril teach that this sharing is mutual, so that the human nature also shared its passions with the Word, and yet they assert there that the nature of the divine Word is altogether impassible.

The sixth argument is *Colossians 2*, "In Christ dwells all the fullness of the divinity bodily." And again, "In him are hidden all the treasures of the knowledge and the wisdom of God." But if all the fullness of divinity has been communicated to Christ's humanity, certainly omnipotence and omnipresence have been communicated as well.

I reply that it is one thing for the fullness of divinity and the treasures of wisdom to be communicated to the humanity, which Paul did not say, and another for divinity and the treasures of knowledge to dwell and be hidden in Christ's humanity, which Paul did say. For the first signifies that Christ's humanity is God, but the second does not signify this; just as a house is not said to be a man, or to have the attributes of man formally, because someone lives in the house; therefore Paul only intended to say that divinity dwells in Christ's humanity bodily, that is, not as a shadow, the way it does in Angels and Prophets who bear the person of God, but really, such that the man was truly God and that the humanity was truly the humanity of God.

The seventh argument is *Ephesians 6*, “He ascended above all the heavens so that he might fill all things.” Oecumenius expounds this as follows, that because Christ had before filled all things by his divinity, he descended and ascended so that he might also fill all things by his flesh; and here it seems that Oecumenius means that Christ filled all things by his bodily presence the way he had before filled all things by his divinity. Again Theophylact says on the same place that descent and ascent were not an impediment to Christ, no doubt because he was able to be everywhere.

I reply first that the words “so that he might fill all things” can be understood of the fulfillment of the prophecies. For the descent and ascent were foretold by the Prophets, and though the adversaries may ridicule this explanation, yet they still cannot refute it. Second I say that the words can be understood of filling places, but in the sense of the effects of Christ. For Christ wanted to fill all things with his glory, and to work miracles in all things. Third the words can be understood of filling places successively, taking places in the sense of kinds of places, as if someone is said to have been in the whole of Europe because he was in all the provinces of Europe, although he was not in all the cities or houses of Europe. For in this way was Christ on the earth, walked on the sea, was in the air on the cross, was under the earth in hell. Therefore he had to ascend to heaven so that he might illumine and fill all places by his presence.

Indeed, this very place manifestly teaches that Christ did not fill things by the presence of his flesh; for descending and ascending are repugnant to filling; he should rather have diffused himself than descended and ascended if he wanted to fill all things at the same time; nay, neither was there need for him to descend or ascend, or even to diffuse himself, if he was always everywhere.

Nor do Oecumenius and Theophylact teach the contrary. For Oecumenius only says that “Christ’s flesh filled all things,” which is understood in the sense that he was able to do so, not all at once, but successively by going over all places. And Theophylact did not say that Christ’s descent was not impeded such as to prevent him ascending at the same, nor that it was not impeded such as to prevent him ascending afterwards. For Theophylact is exhorting to humility, and is showing that the more one here humbles oneself the more will one there be exalted, as happened with Christ. So these two authors are falsely cited here by the authors of the Harmony.

*Chapter Seventeen: The Argument taken from the Incarnation itself is Solved*

The eighth argument is that by the Incarnation has been brought about that one person is God and man; but a person is an individual substance, so one part of a person cannot in any way be divorced from the other; so wherever the one is the other is too. There is confirmation. First from the council of Chalcedon act 5 and the sixth Council act 17 and Leo’s *Epistle 83* to the monks of Palestine, where we have it that the incarnation came from two undivided natures inseparably and without confusion; therefore where one is the other is too. Otherwise how are they undivided and inseparably one, if one is in heaven and the other is on the earth? Confirmation also comes from Damascene 3.3, who not only says that the natures in Christ are inseparably united, but also without distance from each other; therefore

one is never at a distance from the other; but how can one never be at a distance from the other if one is not where the other is? A final confirmation is that if the flesh of Christ is not everywhere with the Word, the consequence is that the Word is in one place man and in another place not man, which is surely most absurd.

I reply that when individual substance is stated in the definition of person, the sort of individuality meant is not that where one part of the person is the other is as well; for that is plainly false. For our hands and feet and other members occupy different places and yet they make one person. A person, then, is said to be an individual substance because it is one subsistent thing, undivided in itself in idea of subsistence and divided from all others; and Christ God and man is of this sort.

To the first and second confirmations I say that inseparable union without distance does not require that one be wherever the other is, but only that they be together somewhere; for if they are nowhere together then they would truly be distant from each other. The globular body of the sun exists as an example. It is inseparably united without distance from its sphere, and yet the sphere of the sun embraces the whole of the lower sphere, and is in the West and the East at the same time, which does not belong to the globular body of the sun.

The objection is made that the sun is not united to its sphere in its totality but only as to a part, but the humanity is united to the whole of the Word.

I reply that the humanity is indeed united to the whole of the Word, because the Word is indivisible; yet not for this reason is the humanity equal to the Word's greatness. Therefore, just as a star, because it is smaller in quantity of mass than its sphere, cannot be at the same time wherever its sphere is, so the humanity of Christ, because it is lesser than the Word in amount of virtue, cannot be wherever the Word is, even though it is not separated nor distant from the Word.

To the final confirmation I say that the proposition 'the Word is somewhere that the humanity is not' is false if it means that the Word anywhere has left the humanity behind. For although the Word is somewhere that the humanity is not, yet even there the Word is man, because the Word there existing sustains the humanity as its own and proper humanity, although the humanity exists elsewhere. Just as the rational soul existing in the foot is united together with the head and informs the head, although the head is not where the feet are.

*Chapter Eighteen: The Argument taken from the testimony of the Fathers is Solved*

The ninth argument is from the Fathers. And first the adversaries bring forward Chrysostom *Homily 7 on Hebrews* who speaks thus on Christ, "Why do you say that unless he entered heaven he will not appear before God, who is everywhere and fills everything?"

I reply that the solution is in the following words, "You see," says Chrysostom, "that all these things belong to the flesh." In these words he teaches that Christ, who as God is everywhere, yet ought to have entered heaven in his flesh, so that he might appear before the face of God on our behalf, because he was not in heaven in the flesh before he ascended.

Second they bring forward Cyril in *Epistle 1 to Successus*, where he says, "Existing as the proper body of God, as I said, he transcends all human things." Again in ch.32 of his book on *John*, when explaining the division of Christ's vestments into

four parts and the tunic remaining undivided, he says that this signifies that Christ's flesh is indivisibly communicated to all men, who are in the four parts of the world. "The only begotten, passing over part by part to individual men, and sanctifying their souls and bodies by his flesh, is undividedly and integrally present in all of them, since what is one everywhere is in no way divided." And Theophylact has the same in almost the same words on *John* 19.

I reply that in the first testimony Cyril only asserts that the Lord's body transcends all human things in dignity, but it does not therefrom follow that he is everywhere. Yet since Brentius took care to have these words printed in capital letters, as if an insoluble argument was contained in these few words, a more accurate response must be made.

So, from these two quotations is only collected how Cyril understands that Christ's body transcended all human things. First from his preceding words, for Cyril deduced this judgment from the words of Paul *II Corinthians* 5, "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet we do not know him thus now." Here Paul means to say that Christ does not now have a passible body, subject to hunger, thirst, injury, and death, as he says in *I Corinthians* 15, "Flesh and blood will not possess the kingdom of God." And in *Hebrews* 15, "Who in the days of his flesh by prayers and supplications etc." For elsewhere the same Paul says, *I Timothy* 2, that Christ is man even now, and he shows extensively in *I Corinthians* 15 that Christ's body has truly risen. This too, then, is what Cyril means, that Christ's body has transcended all human things, that is, all human sufferings.

The same appears, second, from Cyril's following words for, when explaining what 'transcending above all human things' means, he says that Christ's body has become incorruptible and vivifying and illumined with ineffable glory; but Cyril does not add that it has become immensely great and existent everywhere.

As concerns the other testimony, Cyril and Theophylact are in this place discussing the Eucharist, as is plain from their following words where they set down the figure of the paschal lamb. They did not intend by this to signify that Christ's flesh is absolutely everywhere but that it is everywhere that there are people who communicate in it. For it is possible that the communion be distributed in every part of the world at the same time. But what the difference is between this ubiquity and the ubiquity the heretics posit was shown by us above in our second argument, namely that Christ's being everywhere that there are consecrated hosts is not his being everywhere absolutely or in an infinite number of places at once; nor does it require his immense greatness. But being everywhere that the Word is is being everywhere absolutely, and is, or can be, being in an infinite number of places at once; and this plainly does require divine greatness.

Third the adversaries bring forward Ambrose in his book 7 ch.47 on *Luke* 10, the verse, "If anyone ask you..." where Ambrose says, "When do you return, Lord, save in the Day of Judgment? For although you are always everywhere and, standing in the middle of us, are not seen by us, yet there will be a time when all flesh will see you returning." Such are his words, where he seems to say that Christ is invisibly everywhere in the form in which he will be seen by everyone on the Day of Judgment. But that form is human form.

I reply that the same Christ, who is everywhere in the form of God, will return in human form and will be seen the same, and not be seen by reason of two natures or forms.

Fourth they bring forward Jerome in his book *Against Vigilantius*, where Jerome says that the lamb of God, that is, Christ, is everywhere. Again in *Epistle 148* to Marcella, where Marcella poses a question about whether Christ, in the forty days after his resurrection, was only in some place, that is on earth, or whether he hiddenly ascended to heaven and descended from heaven several times. Jerome replies that there was no need for the Son of God to ascend and descend often, since he is always everywhere. In this response Jerome either taught that Christ's body was always everywhere or was certainly an extraordinary deceiver, for he was asked a question about Christ's body, not his divinity.

I reply to the first quotation that it has its solution in the same place, and that therefore Brentius' impudence is remarkable in putting forward quotations of this sort only to deceive the unwary. For these are Jerome's words, "If the lamb is everywhere, then the saints must be believed to be everywhere." Such are his words. But it is certain that the saints are not everywhere at the same time but successively, that is, they are able to move to the places they want. Why then do we not understand in the same way the lamb's being everywhere, that is, that he is able at once to be wherever he wants?

To the second quotation I say that when Jerome says the Son of God is everywhere, he is speaking only of the deity, as his words testify, "It is foolish to think that the power of him whom the heavens do not contain is limited by the smallness of one little body. And yet he who was everywhere was wholly in the son of man. The divine nature, indeed, and the Word of God cannot be cut up into pieces nor divided by locations; but since he is everywhere he is whole everywhere." Here you see Jerome assert that the divine power is not limited by the smallness of the one little body of Christ; and therefore the deity spreads further than the flesh of Christ. Again you see Jerome say that God's nature and God's Word, that is, God's Son, who is indivisible deity though he fills all things, is everywhere as God and at the same time wholly in Christ the man.

But, the adversaries say, Marcella did not ask a question about the deity but about the humanity, nor could she have been ignorant that the deity is everywhere.

I reply that Marcella posed a question about the Lord, and because the Lord has two natures Jerome rightly responded that the Lord as to one nature is always everywhere. Nor is it incredible that Marcella, or he in whose name she posed the question, had supposed that the Word of God did not exist outside his humanity. For we see a similar question posed also to Augustine by Volusianus, namely whether the Word of God had left heaven and had reduced himself within the narrow limits of one little body (see Augustine's third letter). Certainly Jerome is trying in his whole response to take away this supposition, so that it not be believed that God was reduced within the narrow limits of one little body.

Fifth they bring forward Augustine, *Sermon 14* on the words of the Apostle. "He sits in heaven," says Augustine, "who walks on earth; he was in heaven, because Christ is everywhere, and the same Christ – both Son of God and Son of Man."

I reply that all these things are said of the person, not of the human nature. Hence a little later, when Augustine speaks of Christ living on earth before his passion, he says, "Because of unity of person the Son of God was on earth; because of the same unity the Son of Man is in heaven." You see that Augustine does not say the humanity is in heaven and the deity on earth, but he says that Son of Man is in heaven, that is, the person, and that the Son or God is on earth, that is, the same person, because that person is everywhere.

Sixth they bring forward Gelasius in his book *On the Two Natures*, who says, "What must be eschewed in speech and hearing is either that the man now ceases to be God, if the humanity alone and no longer the deity persists there, or that God consequently ceases to be man, if the divinity alone and no longer the conjoined humanity remains there."

I reply that the 'there' does not signify place but Christ, or the mystery of the Incarnation. For Gelasius means to say that if in Christ there is only divinity or only humanity, then Christ will no longer be God and man. And the thing is plain from his following words, "It will be seen that the mind shudders to say, but necessity compels it not to keep silent, that the divinity is changeable in both ways if either it is changed into flesh or the condition of humanity is transfused into deity, such that its special property should cease to be."

*Chapter Nineteen: The Argument taken from the teaching of the Scholastics is Solved*

The tenth argument is from the Scholastics. Brentius contends that this ubiquity of his is the doctrine not only of the ancient Fathers but also of the chief Scholastics. First he brings forward Master Lombard who, in *Sentences* 3 d.22, says, "Christ is whole wherever he is, but not as a whole." What is meant by being whole everywhere but not as a whole is expounded, says Brentius, by Thomas in *ST IIIa* q.52 a.3, where Thomas teaches that Christ is whole everywhere but not in his totality because he is not circumscribed by any place.

Brentius adds Bonaventure *Commentary on the Sentences* 3 d.22 q.2 where Bonaventure says, "When it is said that this man is everywhere, the pronoun 'this' can be demonstrative of the person of Christ or of a singular instance of man. If of the person of Christ then without doubt this man is everywhere; if of a singular instance of man it is still true, but not by propriety of nature; rather by communication of proper features, for what belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace."

Lastly he cites the *Compendium of Theological Truth* 1.17, where it is said, "Although the body of Christ is not everywhere, since it is a creature, nor can be equated with the Creator in this respect, yet it is whole in diverse consecrated hosts in many places, and is so because of the union of the flesh with the Word." But this reasoning, says Brentius, proves that Christ's body is everywhere, for nowhere is there no personal union of the flesh with the Word. So either the *Compendium* is in conflict with itself or, when it says that Christ's body is not everywhere, it means the body is not everywhere because of itself but by the grace of God.

I reply that all the Scholastics have expressly taught the opposite, so that from here too the impudence of Brentius is not a little evidenced. First, when Master Lombard says, "The whole Christ everywhere but not as a whole," he explains his

meaning in the same place in these words, “the words ‘as a whole’ refer to the nature, the word ‘whole’ to the person.” Therefore the whole Christ is everywhere because the whole divine person is everywhere; but the whole of Christ is not everywhere, because one of his natures is not everywhere.

Further when Thomas says in the place cited that the whole Christ is everywhere but not in his totality because not circumscribed by place, he is not expounding the Master, nor is he speaking of the body of Christ but of the divine person. Hence in the body of the article Thomas says that during the Triduum of his death, Christ’s soul was in hell, his body was in the tomb, his divinity was everywhere. And in the *Contra Gentes* 4.49 he says, “Because the Word does not get subsistence from the human nature but rather gives it to the human nature, nothing prevents the Word being everywhere although the human nature assumed by the Word is not everywhere.” And in his *Commentary on the Sentences* 3 d.22 q.1 a.1 Thomas says, “I reply by saying that the human nature is not everywhere.”

Now as to Bonaventure, he speaks so clearly on 3 d.22 q.2 that he could not speak clearer. For upon posing the question whether Christ is everywhere man, he replies in these words, “This question can be about the thing and about the word; if it is about the thing than it can plainly be said that the humanity of Christ neither was nor is wherever his divinity is, since the deity is immensely great and uncircumscribed, not delimiting any place for itself; but since the humanity is created and finite, it does delimit a place for itself as far as it itself is concerned, though sacramentally it is in many places.” Such are his words.

When therefore Bonaventure afterwards adds that the Son of Man is everywhere by communication of proper features, because to the Son of Man there belongs by grace what belongs to the Son of God by nature, he is not speaking of the thing but of the mode of speaking. For because by the grace of union (for of this grace is Bonaventure speaking, not of any created grace) it has been brought about that one person is God and man, therefore rightly is it said that the Son of Man is everywhere, namely because the person who is the Son of Man is everywhere.

Finally as to the *Compendium of Theology*, when it says that Christ’s body is in many places sacramentally because of its union with the Word, it does not mean to say that the formal and immediate reason for Christ’s body being in many places is its union with the Word, for then it would be quite openly in conflict with itself, and ought to concede that Christ’s body even outside the sacrament is in many places, nay even was so from its very conception; but the *Compendium* means to say that the man Christ can put his body in many places because of its union with the Word; for because that man is God therefore can he do it. For we, who are only men, can be put in many places by God, if he wished; but we cannot put ourselves in many places.

And next, whatever may be the case with this *Compendium*, it is certain that all the Scholastic Doctors, Albert, Durandus, Scotus, Gabriel, and the rest who commented on *Sentences* 3 d.22, taught this very thing in eloquent words and in full accord. For all of them say that the question is not about the thing, since it is certain that the flesh of Christ is not everywhere; but they are laying down three rules about the way of speaking.

The first rule is that when the question is asked whether Christ the man is everywhere, if 'man' is the subject of the proposition then one must absolutely concede that he is everywhere, because the word 'man' stands for the supposit. So this proposition is true simply: the man Christ is everywhere.

The second rule is, if 'man' is the predicate and the adverb 'everywhere' is said as going with the subject, then likewise the proposition must be conceded. So when I say 'Christ is everywhere man,' I say the truth if the 'everywhere' goes with the subject; for then the sense is 'Christ who is everywhere is man.'

The third rule is, if 'man' is the predicate and 'everywhere' goes with the predicate, then the proposition is false. For when I say, 'Christ is man everywhere', if the 'everywhere' is conjoining the subject with the predicate, then it means that Christ has humanity present with him in every place, which is false.

*Chapter Twenty: The final Objection taken from Natural Reason is Solved*

The final argument of Brentius is that Christ the man is without doubt supremely happy, supremely beautiful, supremely blessed; therefore he is present everywhere. For being circumscribed in place and walking from place to place are not marks of divine excellence but of bodily weakness; not marks of heavenly majesty but of earthly smallness; not marks of spiritual beauty but of bodily deformity.

I reply that, as St. Augustine says *On the Trinity* 13.5, "he is blessed who has whatever he wants and wants nothing bad." Now beauty is proportion of members with pleasingness of color, as the same Augustine has it, *City of God* 22.13. From these statements it follows that for God, who is immensely great by nature, happiness and beauty necessarily require that he be everywhere, since if he were not so he would not have whatever he wants, or would want something bad. But for man, who is of a finite and bodily nature and has organs of movement, it is bad and ugly if he could not move and if he so filled everything that the clear form and figure of his limbs perished. The argument of Brentius therefore is so remarkable that it plainly achieves the opposite of what it should achieve.

But I cannot in this place pass over those words of Brentius ('For being circumscribed in place and walking from place to place are not marks of divine excellence but of bodily weakness; not marks of heavenly majesty but of earthly smallness; not marks of spiritual beauty but of bodily deformity'). For what else do these words smell of than sheer Eutychianism? For if you take from Christ's humanity its being bodily, earthly, and fleshly, as Brentius does, and if you give it divine excellence, heavenly majesty, and spiritual beauty, as Brentius does, do you not manifestly change the humanity into deity and altogether dissolve the mystery of the Incarnation? This surely is what Satan was aiming for from the beginning when he stirred up Luther, so that little by little, by the censuring of indulgences, purgatory, and the like, he should finally bring things to the point that Christ himself and the supreme mysteries of our faith should be impiously denied. But of this enough. For we must come now to the final disputations about Christ.

## Book Four: On the Soul of Christ

*Chapter One: The first Controversy, about the Knowledge of Christ's Soul, is set forth*

To this point we have discussed Christ's divinity and incarnation; now we will proceed to explain Christ's his soul – not indeed as to everything that theologians are wont to dispute about it but only those that are called into doubt by the heretics of this time.

There are, therefore, two controversies at this time about Christ's soul: one about its perfection, the other about its descent into hell. Let us speak then about the first.

The ancient heresy of the Agnoists, according to Themistius the Deacon (as Blessed Liberatus reports in his *Breviary* ch.19 and Gregory in his *Epistles* 8.42), was that Christ did not know the Day of Judgment. But they did not attribute this ignorance to Christ's divinity but to his soul, as is clear from their argument. For they inferred that, since the Word assumed corruptible flesh so as by his death to free us from death, therefore he assumed also our ignorance, that is, an ignorant human mind, so as to free us from ignorance.

This heresy is followed by almost all the heretics of this age, who assert that Christ's soul learnt little by little things of which he was truly ignorant, and that he even did things that needed to be corrected; and although they do not dare call them sins, yet they truly were sins if they needed correction.

Martin Luther in his talk about the birth of the Lord, when treating of *Mark* 13 'Of that day', says "An inopportune story do those tell who say that the Son did not know, that is, did not wish to know. What need is there of such commentaries? Christ was true man, and so like anyone purely human, though holy, he did not think, say, will, understand everything at all times." And he adds later, "For just as he did not see, hear, and feel everything at all times, so neither did he always know everything in his heart, but he said and taught as much as he knew at the time." Luther has the like words in his homily for the first Sunday after Epiphany, when explaining the Scripture, 'He advanced in wisdom and grace.'

Zwingli too in his confession to Charles V article 1 says that Christ's wisdom increased little by little.

Bucerus on *Matthew* 24 says, "As therefore he took upon himself all the other parts of human weakness, being made like men in all things but sin, so he took upon himself human knowledge and ignorance, that is, he took upon himself a human reason and mind, which advanced through periods of time, growing or diminishing; and so not surprisingly he is said not to know things; and thus, in another place, it is reported that he advanced in wisdom, age, and grace."

Calvin on *Matthew* 24 says, "Further he would be three or four times as mad who reluctantly subjected himself to an ignorance that not even the Son of God himself refused to undergo for our sake." He says similar things on *Matthew* 2 and uses the same arguments the Agnoists did. Theodore Beza in his book against Andreas Jacobi on the two natures of Christ did not deny the charge when it was objected to him that he had attributed ignorance to Christ's soul, but replied that he was following Luther and Calvin.

Again Calvin on *Matthew 26* says that “Christ’s prayer in the Garden was an interrupted wish.” And later he says, “Christ was struck with fear and straitened by grief, so that it was necessary for him to vacillate, as it were, between rival wishes amid the violent flux of temptations. This is the reason why, having prayed against death, he throws a bridle on himself and, subjecting himself to his Father’s command, rebukes and withdraws the wish he had suddenly let slip.” Note the words ‘suddenly let slip’ and again ‘rebukes and recalls’. Later Calvin says, “We see how Christ at once restrains his affection and compels himself to proceed maturely in orderly manner.” And in the same place, “This prayer of Christ’s was not carefully thought through, but the force and impetus of grief made him blurt it out suddenly, to which at once correction was applied; the same vehemence took from him his present recollection of the heavenly decree.” Thus the words of Calvin, who is not afraid to attribute to Christ not only ignorance but also forgetfulness and sin.

They place the foundation of their opinion on five places of Scripture.

The first is *Hebrews 2* and 4, “He ought to have been made like his brothers in all things but sin.”

The second is *Luke 2*, “The child grew and was strengthened in spirit, filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was upon him.”

The third is in the same place, “Jesus advanced in wisdom, age, and grace.”

The fourth is *Mark 13*, “Of that day knoweth no man, neither the angels nor the Son, but the Father only.”

The fifth is *Matthew 26*, “If it be possible, let this cup pass from me, but not what I will but what thou wilt.” For it seems that the Lord recalls and corrects his former prayer. And, besides, the Lord either knew that it was possible for the cup to pass from him, or knew that it was not possible, or he did not know whether it was possible or impossible. If he did not know then he was ignorant. If he knew it was possible, why did he doubt? If he knew it was impossible, why did he ask? Finally, did he not come to die for the human race? Why then did he pray against death?

But the common opinion of Catholics has always been that Christ’s soul was, from its very creation, full of knowledge and grace, so that he did not learn later anything he did not know before, nor did he do or could he do any action that needed correction. So do all the theologians teach along with Master Lombard on *Sentences 3 d.13*, and so also all the Fathers, as we will soon see.

### *Chapter Two: The Truth is proved from the Scriptures*

We must then in a few words prove that Christ’s soul was, from its very creation, most full of wisdom and grace. We will try to prove it by testimonies from the Scriptures, by the teaching of the Fathers, and by arguments taken from reason itself.

We have, in the first place, the testimony of *Isaiah 11*, “A branch will go out from the root of Jesse and a flower will rise from his root, and the Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom etc.” Everyone understands this place altogether of Christ. The same sense is given by the places where Christ is said to be anointed by the holy Spirit of God, as *Psalms 44*, “The Lord thy God has anointed thee etc.,” and *Isaiah 61*, “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me,”

and *Acts* 4, “They came together against your holy Son Jesus, whom you anointed,” and *Acts* 10, “The Lord anointed him with the Holy Spirit and with power.”

But these citations contain a twofold difficulty. First that in none of them is it said that this anointing happened at Christ’s conception, but it rather seems to have happened at the age of 30, when the Holy Spirit descended upon him in the form of a dove, as St. Jerome seems to indicate in his commentary on *Isaiah* 61.

The second difficulty is that even if it is agreed that Christ was at his conception anointed with the Holy Spirit and filled with all gifts, yet he could still afterwards have increased in wisdom and grace. For *Luke* 1 says of John, “And he will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother’s womb,” and yet everyone admits that John was afterwards increased with many gifts.

I reply to the first difficulty that this anointing could only have happened at the conception itself. First, because the words of *Isaiah* have this meaning, “A branch will go out from the root of Jesse and a flower will rise from his root, and the Spirit of the Lord will rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom;” for *Isaiah* joins the descent of the Holy Spirit with all fullness of gifts on Christ with Christ’s conception from the Virgin (for what else is the flowering branch than the conceiving Virgin, since fruit on the tree signifies birth, and flower signifies conception?). Therefore the Holy Spirit descended on the flower itself, that is, on the man Christ not yet born but conceived, and filled him with wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, and piety.

Second, because if the Lord Jesus had finally been anointed at the age of 30, the Angel would not have said to the shepherds, *Luke* 2, “Today is born to you a Savior, who is Christ the Lord.” For what is ‘Christ’ but ‘anointed’? He was already then anointed and was rightly able, when being born from the Virgin, to be called Christ.

Third, because in *John* 1 we read, “And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us (and we saw his glory, glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father), full of and grace and truth.” The word ‘full of grace’, since it is the nominative of the masculine gender in the Greek text, must be joined with ‘Word’, *logos* in Greek, so that the sense is that the Word made flesh was full of grace and truth. So here too the fullness of grace is joined with the Incarnation.

Fourth, because if the anointing was done at a time other than conception, we must above all say it was at the age of 30, when the Holy Spirit descended on him. But it did not happen then. For, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 15.26, it is most absurd to say that Christ received the Holy Spirit at the age of 30, since his precursor, John, received the Holy Spirit in his mother’s womb. And besides in *Luke* 2 Christ is said, while yet an infant, to be full or to be filled with wisdom, which was the grace of God in him. He did not therefore wait until the age of 30 for the spirit of wisdom and grace.

Nor is it an objection that Jerome says on *Isaiah* 61 that the anointing of Christ was completed at the age of 30. For Jerome meant to say that Christ, who was anointed invisibly at his conception, was then anointed visibly in baptism, that is, his anointing, which he had already before received, was then made manifest by an exterior sign.

To the second difficulty I reply that although John and other men were filled at the beginning in such a way that they could yet advance further, still Christ was not able to advance, because he received grace at the beginning without measure while others received it with measure. For about Christ *John* 1 says, "Of his fullness have we all received." For God does not give his spirit by measure, that is, does not give so to his Son. About others *Ephesians* 4 says, "To each of us grace has been given according to the measure of Christ." Hence in the last chapter of *John* it is said, "Lord, you know all things," and in *Colossians* 2, "In whom are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God."

*Chapter Three: The Same is proved from the Teaching of the Fathers*

We come now to the testimony of the Fathers. Eusebius *Demonstratio Evangelica* 10, last chapter, when expounding the words from *Psalms* 21, 'You are my God from my mother's womb,' concludes that Christ's soul in the Virgin's womb had most perfect knowledge and firmness, nay that he also saw God, to which knowledge nothing can be added. Eusebius says, "When I was still hidden in the side of the womb of her who carried me I saw you my God etc." And earlier, "I was thought to be imperfect and without the use of reason as other human infants are, but I was not so, although my body was as other men's were."

Ambrose *On the Faith* 5.8 presents the opinion of some who said that Christ knew everything as God but not as man, because it is written, 'He advanced in wisdom etc.' He then refutes it saying, "Let others say this; I however much more think that the Son, to the extent he conversed with men and acted as a man and assumed flesh, assumed our affections so that our ignorance should say he did not know, but not that he was ignorant of anything etc." And Gregory Nazianzen, *Speech on Basil* a little from the middle, says, "He advanced in wisdom, not so as to receive any increase, since he was from the beginning absolute Lord in wisdom and grace, but so that these might appear little by little to men who were ignorant of the fact."

Jerome on *Isaiah* 11 says that on Christ conceived of Mary the Holy Spirit descended not in part as he did on other holy men, "But, according to the Gospel of the Nazarenes, the whole fount of the Holy Spirit descended on him." And on *Jeremiah* 31, on the verse, 'A woman shall encompass a man. Without the seed of man, without coitus,' Jerome says, "A woman will encompass a man in the lap of her womb, who will seem indeed to advance in wisdom and years according to increase in age in cries and infancy, but will be a perfect man contained, for the accustomed length of months, in the Virgin's womb."

Athanasius in *Sermon 4* against the Arians, after the middle, simply denies that Christ increased in wisdom. "Is that man like the crowd of men, or is he God clothed in humanity and flesh? But if he is a man of the crowd let it be that he take increase along with the condition of other men. But the Samosatans opinion is of that sort, which you favor with so much energy and resource." But Athanasius is speaking above all of Christ as he is God, since he denies that he advanced, but allows advance only as to external demonstration of wisdom, and simply denies that Christ grew with internal increase in any way. It is sufficiently plain that he is speaking also of Christ as he was man.

Augustine *On Merit and Remission of Sin* 2.29 says, "I would in no way believe that this ignorance was in that infant in whom the Word was made flesh so as to dwell among us; nor would I in any way suppose that infirmity of soul to be in the Christ child which we see in other children." And later, "But because there was the likeness of sinful flesh in him, he wanted, having taken his beginning in infancy, to undergo the changes of age." Here Augustine concedes to Christ only to have advanced and to have suffered change in age but not in gifts of the soul. And in *On the Trinity* 15.26 he judges it most absurd that Christ received the Holy Spirit at a time other than his conception.

Cyril in *Thesaurus* 20.7 openly says that nothing was added to Christ, even though we read that he advanced in wisdom and in grace. And in his book on *John* 17, he says, "The fact that men wondered at him more and more as the days passed was rather their opinion about Jesus than the growing of perfect grace in him." Gregory *Epistles* 8.42 praises Eulogius who had written against the Agnoists, and also himself briefly refutes their error. Sophronius too in his epistle to Sergius, which was read at the Sixth Council, act 11, condemns Themistius the author of the Agnoists.

Bede in his homily on the first Sunday after Epiphany says, "According to the nature of man, he advanced in wisdom, not by himself being wiser with time (he who remained, from the first hour of his conception, full of the wisdom of the Spirit), but by ministering the same wisdom, which he had in its fullness, to others in passage of time." And Damascene 3.22 says, "Those who say he advanced in wisdom and grace, and received therefrom increase and addition, do not worship the union in the hypostasis etc."

Bernard in his second homily on 'He was sent' says, "Whether lying hid in the womb, or crying in the crib, or now a young lad in the temple, or now complete of age teaching among the people, assuredly he was equally full of the Holy Spirit, nor was there an hour of his age when the fullness he received at his conception was in any way diminished or in any way added to." See also Anselm *Why God Man* 1 and Theophylact on *Luke* 2.

#### *Chapter Four: The Same is proved by Reason*

Lastly we add arguments taken from reason. First, it is not in any way credible that the Word should personally become man and not, in the very Incarnation, pour on the humanity all the gifts it was capable of. For if he made the soul, his own proper soul, so that it should truly be called and be the soul of God, how is it likely that he did not immediately make it most wise? For it is absurd that the soul of wisdom was at any time not wise; and this is what Damascene stresses when he says that they do not believe in the Incarnation who believe that the soul advanced little by little.

The second reason is that wisdom and grace were natural to the man Christ, as Augustine teaches in *Enchiridion* 40 – not indeed that they were not infused into the soul by God, but because they flowed into Christ from an intrinsic principle and by way of nature. Since Christ himself filled himself with grace and wisdom, that is, these gifts flowed from one nature of Christ into the other, therefore did Christ not receive wisdom and grace after the Incarnation but in the Incarnation; for these gifts

are called natural for this reason, that they flowed immediately and most abundantly.

The third reason is that the man Christ began in the Incarnation to be God, so he ought then to have been filled with all gifts. For a son is heir to all his father's goods, and Christ did not have to wait for succession after the Father's death, as is known. And this reason seems to be that of Cyril in book 1 on *John* 17, when he says that God gave Christ all wisdom and grace because he was his Son. But to others he gave certain of the gifts, because they were servants, just as Abraham also is written to have done in *Genesis* 25, when he gave, while still living, all his possessions to Isaac, but showered gifts on the sons of his concubines.

The fourth reason is that the man Christ in the Incarnation became head not only of men but also of angels, as all agree; so he needed then to have been filled with wisdom, grace, and even blessedness itself. For it was not fitting that the head should be less adorned and less wise than the members.

The fifth reason is that Adam was created most wise, as is gathered from the fact that, as soon as he was created, he gave names to all the animals, *Genesis* 2; therefore much more should the second Adam have been made most wise in his very conception.

*Chapter Five: The Arguments of the Adversaries are Solved*

To the reasoning of the Agnoists and the Calvinists, which Blessed Gregory sets down but does not solve saying he will solve them at another time, my reply is that Christ in the Incarnation received two things from our condition. First he took our complete nature with all the things that belong to its perfection; for, as the *Athanasian Creed* says, "Christ is perfect God and perfect man." Second he took certain of the defects consequent to our corrupted nature, as death, hunger, thirst, etc. but not all of the defects. For he did not take sin, the tinder of sin, ignorance; and the reason is that, since these defects do not pertain to the essence or perfection of the assumed nature, he needed only to take those of this sort of defects that conduced to the goal of the Incarnation, which was the salvation of men. Now by suffering and dying he was able to gain merit with God, for patience is a virtue; but sin, the tinder of sin, and ignorance were not useful for saving men but injurious rather. For sin cannot be taken away by sin as death was killed by death.

When Scripture teaches, then, that Christ ought to have been made like his brothers in all things but sin (*Hebrews* 2 and 4), one should not therefrom conclude that he should have been made like us in ignorance, which is not a sin, and yet is in us. For when exception is made of sin in the words 'all things but sin', not only are sins understood to be excepted but also all the defects that were not useful for redemption. And when it is said 'made like his brothers in all things', by the term 'all' is understood all things that belong to the perfection of nature and conduce to redemption. Otherwise, if all things had to be in Christ that are in us, he ought not to have been conceived by the Holy Spirit, nor born of a Virgin, nor have been filled with wisdom in infancy, nor to have lacked rebellion in the lower part of his soul; nay too he ought to have been afflicted with fever, gout, and other diseases.

Add too that the sentence, as they cite it, is nowhere found. For in *Hebrews* 2 we read, "He ought to have been made like his brothers in all things," but the

addition “except sin” is not found. And the sense is: he ought to have been made like them in all things that belong to nature. In *Hebrews 4* we read, “He was tempted in all things like as we are, yet without sin.” And the sense is that Christ was tempted in all ways, that is, he experienced all evils that men are wont to suffer, in body, in soul, in honor, in faculties, in friends and relations; and yet none of these temptations ever led him to sin.

But now to the next testimony of Scripture, whose whole force rests on the Greek word for ‘filled’.

I reply first that the word has sometimes a redundant meaning, because it is the same as ‘full’, and our Vulgate translator has followed this meaning and translated it as *plenus* (‘full’).

I say second that if we read the Greek word as a passive, ‘he was made full’, the sense is that the wisdom both uncreated and created that was in him began daily to fill his bodily organs and to move and fit them for doing more excellent works. This sense is indicated by Athanasius in *Sermon 4* against the Arians, and it fits well with the text. For the child increased in body and was strengthened in spirit, not by coming to him from without but as it was present in him, so that he might do more perfect works; and likewise he was filled with wisdom, not by learning it from elsewhere, but by that which was in him diffusing itself through, and taking possession of, his limbs and all his senses. Hence the following words are, “And the grace of God was in him,” and these words do not say that he acquired grace but that grace was in him, fostering and directing him. Just as spirit, then, and wisdom filled that little body at its conception as a little temple, so when the temple afterwards grew, spirit in a way extended itself and filled the whole.

Third, the same can also be said as to his being filled with wisdom acquired through his own experience; for although he was not theoretically ignorant of anything, since he had infused knowledge of all things, yet he was practically ignorant of all the things that he had not experienced, in the way Paul says that he learnt obedience through the things that he suffered, *Hebrews 5*. And this seems to be the exposition of Blessed Ambrose in his book on the *Sacrament of the Incarnate Lord 7* when he says that Christ had a perfected human nature from the beginning and yet he advanced in human sense.

There remains the third testimony of Scripture, from *Luke 2*, that Jesus “advanced in wisdom, age, and grace.” But it is the certain and common exposition of the Fathers above cited, Gregory Nazianzen, Cyril, Damascene, Theophylact, Bede, Anselm, Bernard, and others, that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace in the opinion of men, to whom he opened his wisdom more daily, in the way that the sun, the more it ascends toward the center of the sky, the more is it said to advance in light and color – not because it makes itself brighter and hotter, but because its power appears more.

Damascene adds in the cited place that, just as a bishop is said to advance in his church by his preaching when the people advance, and a teacher is said to advance in the schools when he makes his hearers more learned, so too can Christ be said to advance because he made others advance.

But Calvin has an objection, for *Luke* says that Christ advanced before God and men, but he did not advance in the opinion of God nor make God advance.

I reply that the words 'before God and men' must be conjoined with advance in grace and not with advance in wisdom and age. For that someone has advanced in wisdom or in age before God and men is something we say by custom, for wisdom and age are absolute things and do not depend on someone else. But in the most correct sense we say that someone advances in grace before others, to whom he becomes daily more pleasing.

Christ, therefore, is said to have advanced in grace before God and men because he was daily more loved by men and daily more received signs of the benevolence of God, which is the same as to say that he increased daily in the external signs of benevolence from God and men, the way it is said of Samuel in *I Kings 2* that "the boy advanced and grew and was pleasing to both God and men."

Besides he was advancing in wisdom before men in the sense that, as was said, he was, by multiplying works of wisdom, making others advance and was himself also appearing daily more wise. Besides, second, he was, by works full of wisdom and grace that he was producing, truly advancing in wisdom and grace before God and men, because he was doing deeds most worthy and most deserving of merit in the judgment of God and men.

Now about the fourth testimony of Scripture the Fathers have varying opinions. Ambrose *On Faith* 5.8 and Jerome on *Matthew 24* suspect that the words "nor the Son" were added by the Arians on the ground that they are not found in all the Greek codices. However, since they are found in *Mark 13* in all the codices, a different reply must be made.

The first exposition given by Gregory is in *Epistles* 4.42 to Eulogius, where he approves Eulogius' opinion that Christ is said not to know that day, not in his own person, but in the person of the Church. For many things that are said of Christ are understood of the body and not of the head. But against this can be objected that then the Lord should not have said "neither the angels nor the Son," for since the angels are contained in the body of Christ, which is the Church, it was enough to say that the Son did not know. And perhaps for this reason Gregory added two other expositions, namely because the first did not seem altogether satisfactory.

Gregory's second exposition in the same place, and also of Ambrose on *Luke 17*, of Gregory Nazianzen *Oration 4 on Theology*, of Cyril in *Thesaurus* 9.4, is that the man Christ is said not to know the day because he did not know it as man, that is, with human wisdom, but by divine revelation or infusion. But this too does not plainly seem to be satisfactory. For the Apostles wanted to learn the day from Christ, and he responded that he did not know, and that also for that reason he could not teach them. But if he knew it by divine revelation he was certainly able to tell them.

The third exposition is that of Epiphanius in his *Ancoratus* and of Chrysostom in his *Homily on the Trinity* vol.3 and of Bernard in his book on *The Twelve Degrees of Humility*, that Christ is said not to know because he did not know practically, the way that Adam before his sin was said not to know good and evil. But the Father is said to know because he knows perfectly, since he has given all judgment to the Son and he himself in a way has already judged. But neither does this seem to be very apposite. For the Apostles did not want to know practically but theoretically, and so it is not to the purpose whether the Lord did or did not know that day practically.

The last exposition therefore is that of the same St. Gregory in the cited place, and also of Ambrose *On Faith* 5.8, of Jerome, Chrysostom, Theophylact on *Matthew* 24, of Basil in *Epistle 4* to Eunomius, and of Augustine *On Genesis* 1, *Against the Manichees* 22, and *On the Trinity* 12, that the Son is said not to know because he did not know it for telling others and because he was making them not to know. This exposition is indeed to the purpose of the citation. For the Lord wants to give the reason that he is not telling them the day, and he says the reason is that he does not know, that is, that he has not learnt it from the Father so as to reveal it to others but to keep it secret to himself.

Further, Scripture speaks like this in many places, as *Genesis* 22, "Now I know that you fear God," that is, now I have shown to you and to others how much you worship me. And *John* 15, "I have called you friends because everything I have heard from my Father I have told you." And yet he did not tell them everything simply, for in *John* 16 he says, "I have many things still to tell you but you cannot bear them now." Therefore he had told them everything he had heard from the Father to tell them. So therefore in this place he says he only knows the things he knows for telling them.

But Calvin objects to the contrary that when Christ says that no one knows, neither the angels nor the Son, if the 'nor the Son' is understood to mean that the Son knows indeed but not for telling others, then it could also be said of the angels that they know but not for telling others. Further it could also be objected that when we say the Son does not know for telling others, it has to be understood as meaning either that he does not know for telling anyone or that he does not know for telling the Apostles. If the first it is false that the Son does not know for telling others, for he said it to the Holy Spirit. If the second then the exception 'but the Father only' is false, for the Father too did not know it for telling to the Apostles.

I reply to the first objection that we get from the Lord's words that neither the angels nor the Son know for telling others. But whether the angels know in some other way is not here explained. However we do know from elsewhere that Christ knows, both because he has been made judge and because "in him are all the treasures of the knowledge and wisdom of God," *Colossians* 2. But about the angels we believe that they do not know in any way, both because this knowledge was not necessary for them, and also because we do not read anywhere that the angels know everything.

To the second objection I say that the Son does not know for telling anyone at all, but I understand this of the Son as he is man, and he did not in this way make the Holy Spirit know. But the Father alone is said to know because he made the man Christ to know, as Augustine says *On Genesis* 1.22 against the Manichees; and what belongs to the Father belongs also to the other divine Persons, who are of the same nature. So it is as if he had said that no one knows but God only.

To the last testimony from Scripture I say that it is an impious blasphemy to say that Christ prayed without the Spirit, or that he corrected or recalled his prayer. For it is written of him, "Who did no sin," *1 Peter* 7, and "Who knew no sin," *2 Corinthians* 5. And the Fathers everywhere teach that Christ not only did not sin but also could not sin. See Athanasius *Oration* 2 against the Arians, Cyril book 10 on *John* 11, and Augustine in *Enchiridion* 26, 40, and others.

But the Scripture says that Christ said, "Father, if it be possible." So either he knew whether it was possible or he did not know. But if he did not know then he was ignorant of something. If he knew it was possible why does he speak in doubt? If he knew it was impossible why does he ask? Besides, when he says, "Take this cup from me," he seems to be going against right reason and the Father's will, for he had come for this purpose, to suffer. Finally when he adds, "Not my will but thine be done," he seems openly to be correcting what he had previously asked for.

I reply that the 'if it be possible' means 'if it please thee.' For Christ knew that nothing was impossible for God, but he asks whether it is possible according to God's good will; and the fact is plain from the other Evangelists. For what *Matthew* 26 says, "if it be possible," *Mark* 14 says, "All things are possible to you," and *Luke* 22 says, "Father, if thou wilt, take this cup from me etc." Now he says, 'if thou wilt', not because he does not know that his Father does not will, but to show that the natural desire of his will, to escape death, was joined with complete submission to the will of his Father. For it is as if he were to say, 'I will that what I will should not come to pass,' that is, 'I will with my deliberate will, which has regard to the object with all its circumstances, that what I will with my natural will, which has regard only to the object considered in itself, not happen.' Nor are these wills contrary, for they are not about the same thing considered in the same way. And besides the one is rather a velleity than a will.

You will ask why Christ in praying wanted to give expression to his natural will, which he knew was not to be fulfilled. I reply with Chrysostom on this place, that he did so in order to show that he was true man and truly in pain and truly suffered and died. For if, after he did so often give expression to natural desires, there have still been many heretics who deny the true flesh and passion of Christ, what would happen if he had never displayed such desire?

Besides he wanted to give expression to his natural will so as to teach us not to take it badly when we do not obtain from God what we ask for. For Christ in this prayer was partly heard and partly not heard. He was heard as to what he absolutely asked for, according to *John* 11, "I know that you always hear me," but he was not heard as to what he asked with natural desire, according to *Psalms* 22, "I will cry all the day and you will not hear."

#### *Chapter Six: The Second Question is posed, which is about the Descent into Hell*

The second question asked is whether and how Christ descended into Hell. And to begin with everyone agrees that Christ in some way descended into hell, for the Scriptures frequently teach it, as *Acts* 2, "You will not leave my soul in hell," and *Ephesians* 4, "He descended into the lower parts of the earth." And further in the *Apostles' Creed* we read, "He descended into hell."

But one must note that this phrase was formerly not in the *Creed* in all Churches. For Irenaeus 1.2, Origen at the beginning of *On Principles* and Tertullian at the beginning of *Against Praxeas* and of *Veiling Virgins* expound the rule of faith handed on from the Apostles and do not mention this article, but pass from the burial to the resurrection. Again Augustine in *On Faith and Creed* and *Creed for Catechumens* does not mention this part, though he expounds the whole *Creed* five times.

Ruffinus in his exposition does read and explain this phrase but warns that it is not in the *Creed* of the Roman Church, nor in the East, though it is implicitly contained in the article about the burial, for just as the body descended to the place of bodies so the soul to the place of souls. Further Cyril in his *Catechism* 4 & 14 and Chrysostom in his second homily on the *Creed* read and expound this phrase, and at that time it was held everywhere. And thus too does one read in Luther's greater and lesser *Catechism*, and in that of Calvin, Brentius, and others. The Centuriatores also read it, *Cent.* 1.2, and Peter Martyr in his book on the *Creed*. Indeed Calvin in *Institutes* 2.16.8 says this article must be held to be among the chief.

Similarly this phrase is not in the *Nicene Creed* but it is in the *Athanasian Creed*, and since these Creeds are not in conflict with each other, it is certain that this phrase must at least implicitly be present. Hence Anselm in his book on the *Procession of the Holy Spirit* says this phrase is not in the *Nicene Creed* and yet is received by common consent in all the Churches of East and West.

The whole question concerns rather the explanation of this phrase, and I find four expositions among the Adversaries, which must be discussed in order.

*Chapter Seven: That to Descend into Hell is not to be totally Destroyed*

The first opinion is that to descend into hell is to perish and be utterly destroyed. Brentius in his *Catechism* of 1551 says that to descend into hell is to perish utterly, and on *Acts* 2 he introduces Christ saying, "I will descend into hell, I will feel the pains of hell, and I will seem to have plainly perished."

Again, Calvin, wishing in his *Psychopannychia* to prove that the souls of the just after departing the body do not sleep, that is, are not extinguished, as certain of the Anabaptists say (whom he refutes in his whole book), proves it from the soul of Christ which, after separation from the body, was not extinguished nor absorbed by death but remained immortal. And he says this is indicated by the words of *Acts* 2, "You will not leave my soul in hell." "These words," he says, "give most sure evidence that Christ, even as he is man, could not have been extinguished by death. True death was separation of soul and body. Moreover the soul never lost its life, which, having been commended to the Father, was incapable of not being saved. The words of Peter's address mean this when he affirms that it was impossible for Christ to have been held by death, in order that the Scripture might be fulfilled, 'Since you will not leave my soul in hell.' For his soul was upheld with divine virtue so as not to fall into ruin, and his body was preserved in the tomb for the resurrection, etc."

Calvin in this place certainly seems to understand by hell the complete extinction of the soul. For he proves that Christ's soul was not extinguished by the death of the body because his soul was not absorbed by hell. What then for Calvin is 'being absorbed by hell' but the soul being utterly extinguished? But a little later he says this more clearly, for he says, "We have another argument for the immortality of Christ's soul when he made Jonah's three day confinement in the belly of the whale a sign of his own death. The belly was death, so he kept his soul safe in death." And later he proves it from the sacrifice of Isaac. "What," he says, "is Isaac's not being dead but that Christ kept what was proper to man, that is, the soul, immortal? The ram, however, an irrational animal, which in this passage is substituted to die, is the body."

This opinion does not need refuting, for it is the foundation of atheism. For if Christ preserved his soul immortal in the death of the body because he was upheld by divinity, then other men, who are not upheld by divinity, are altogether extinguished in death. The human soul then is not immortal.

They will say perhaps that the pious are not extinguished by death, because Christ conquered death for himself and for them. So at least all the impious are utterly extinguished, and this is what descending into hell means. Calvin denies this at the end of his book where he asserts that even the impious live after death, though in punishment. But this does not well cohere with what he said earlier; for either his proof is not good that Christ's soul remained immortal because, as joined to divinity, it was not permitted to fall into hell; or certainly it follows that the souls of the impious, which do fall into hell, are plainly extinguished. Besides St. Peter in *Acts 2* did not say that Christ's soul was not in hell but that it was not left there a long time. And do we not read in the *Creed*, "He descended into hell"? Therefore if to descend into hell is to die, then even Christ's soul died, although afterwards it was raised up. And this is precisely what the Anabaptists mean. Therefore Calvin's opinion destroys itself and opens up the way to atheism.

*Chapter Eight: Christ did not suffer the Punishment of the Damned*

The second opinion comes from the same Calvin in *Institutes 2.16.8-12*, in the *Little Catechism*, in *Psychopannychia*, and in the *Harmony of the Gospels* on *Matthew 27*, where he teaches that Christ is said to have descended into hell because he suffered the pains of damned souls.

But so as the more easily to understand this, certain things need to be noted. The first thing to observe is that, for Calvin, there is no subterranean place for the impious, nor purgatory, not even the limbo of the Fathers. For in *Institutes 2.16.9* he says that all these things are children's fables, and we will treat of this a little later. In *Institutes 3* last chapter and *Psychopannychia* he teaches that the punishment of the damned is nothing other than the terror and anguish of a conscience aware that God is angry and hostile to it.

Note second that Christ, according to Calvin, descended into hell because he apprehended God as angered and hostile to him for our sake, and because, from fear of losing his own salvation, he suffered incredible anguish of soul, the sort that he who knew he was going to perish for ever would suffer. Hence too in *Institutes 2.16.10* Calvin affirms that Christ spoke words of despair, "He bore the dreadful torments in his soul of a man damned and lost." And in section 11 he says that Christ was not sure of his salvation. "So Christ," he says, "praying with tears and loud cries was heard for his fear, not that he should be immune from death, but that he would not be swallowed up by it as a sinner, for he was bearing our person thither. And certainly, no more terrible abyss can be imagined than to feel yourself abandoned and alienated from God, and not to be heard when you call upon him, as if he had himself conspired in your death." And later, "So by his coming to blows with the power of the Devil, with the horror of death, with the pains of hell, it is brought about that he brings back victory from them." And in section 12 he says, "Here certain worthless fellows, though being unlearned yet compelled more by malice than ignorance, cry out that I am doing atrocious injury to Christ, since it is not at all

fitting that he feared for the salvation of his soul etc.” Again, in his *Harmony* when explaining *Matthew 27* he says that Christ did not indeed despair but did speak words of despair when he says, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’”

Note third that, according to Calvin, Christ began to dwell in hell at the hour when he began to be sorrowful in the garden and to pray. He then descended more deeply when he cried on the cross, “My God, my God...” Finally he descended most deeply when he appeared before the judgment seat of God as guilty of eternal death, and suffered the most severe sentence of the angered God. Thus does Calvin teach in *Institutes 2.16.12*. “If anyone,” he says, “now asks whether Christ then descended to hell when he prayed against death, I reply that this was the beginning, and therefrom can be inferred how dire and horrible were the pains he suffered when he knew he was standing before the judgment seat of God for our sake.” These are his words. And although he does not openly say that Christ was a long time in hell, yet he insinuates that he was there up to the resurrection.

Note fourth that Calvin attributes to this infernal punishment almost all our redemption so that, without this descent into hell, Christ’s death on the cross would have been without any worth. For so does he speak in *Institutes 2.16.10*. “Nothing,” he says, “was achieved if Christ had died with only a bodily death. But the price was worth it as soon as he felt the severity of the divine revenge.” And later, “Hence too he had to struggle with clenched fists against the hosts of the infernal regions and against the horror of eternal death.” Similar things he repeats and more fully on *Matthew 27*.

This is Calvin’s opinion, which Melanchthon and Brentius also seem in part to follow. For Melanchthon in places in his chapter on the Son twice says that Christ most severely struggled with the temptation of despair. Brentius on *Acts 2* says that Christ suffered the pains of hell. And in his book on the *Majesty of Christ*, in the second part where he deals with the Ascension, teaches almost nothing else than that hell is not a definite place but the state of the damned. Indeed he adds that hell is wherever the impious are who are assailed by their eternal damnation. And hence has proceeded that incredible blasphemy of a certain apostate, spoken of by John Cochlaeus in his *Acts of Luther* and by Laurentius Surius in his *History* for the year 1527, who asserted that Christ despaired and was damned; and perhaps for punishment of this sin Calvin despaired on his death and cursed the day he began to write books, as we read in his life ch.22. “Invoking the demons,” the author writes, “he died in wretchedness, cursing, swearing, blaspheming. They bear witness of this who ministered to the man on his deathbed until his final breath. Nay this too, that he detested and cursed the day and the hour when he first devoted himself to study and writings.” So says Jerome Hermes Bolsec, a doctor of Lyons, who wrote the life of Calvin.

Refutation of this new and unheard of impiety: First, because the Scriptures attribute all our salvation to the blood and bodily death of Christ and recognize no further punishment after bodily death: *Philippians 2*, “He humbled himself and was made obedient unto death, death on a cross, for which cause God highly exalted him.”

You see here no mention is made of hell, but all is attributed to obedience unto death, and the exaltation is at once superadded. Again *Psalms 21* and *Isaiah 53*

describe one by one all the sufferings of Christ and no mention is made of hell. In *Matthew 20*, *Mark 10*, *Luke 18* the Lord foretells his passion to the Apostles, and names scourging, spitting, cross, death, and immediately adds, "And on the third day he will rise again." And when, I ask, did he leave the pains of the damned and the torments of hell? *Romans 5*, "He commends his charity toward us in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." *Hebrews 9*, "By his own blood he entered once into the holy of holies, having found redemption." *I Peter 1*, "You were redeemed not with corruptible things, gold or silver, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb pure and without spot." *I John 1*, "His blood cleanses us from all sin." Finally *Revelation 5*, "The saints shout out in heaven, 'Thou hast redeemed us, Lord God, with your blood, etc.'"

See therefore how true is what Calvin says, that Christ did nothing by his mortal death but by the pains of hell, when the Scriptures everywhere teach that we are redeemed by the death of Christ but do not even mention the pains of hell. For we will show a little later that the places Calvin adduces in his behalf achieve nothing for his purpose.

The second proof is from the circumstances of the passion of Christ. For if Christ, from the prayer in the garden up to his resurrection, was in hell, and apprehended God as angered and his adversary and was unsure of his salvation, how did he so boldly say to Caiaphas, "In a little while you will see the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven," and again to Pilate, "My kingdom is not of this world"? Again, how does he pray to his Father for those who crucified him? How does he promise paradise to the thief? How does he commend his soul to the Father? Certainly these are not signs of doubt about the goodwill of the Father, much less of despair or fear for his own salvation.

The third proof is that if we were redeemed by the pains in hell of Christ, figurative symbols should have preceded them, and some sacrament too should exist in memory of so great a benefit. Again the Church should celebrate the memory of this benefit, the way it celebrates the memory of the Lord's birth, passion, death, and resurrection. Again Christ should be pictured in the fires of hell in the middle of the damned the way he is wont to be pictured on the cross between two thieves. But we see nothing such being done, nor we do we read of it ever having been done. Therefore either the Church has always been ungrateful or what Calvin teaches is figments.

Fourth all the Fathers who describe the descent of Christ into hell describe it as the descent of a triumphant victor not of a guilty convict; nor do they in any way indicate that Christ suffered anything in hell. Cyril in *Catechism 14* says, "Death was terrified seeing someone new descending into hell not bound by the chains there. For what reason, O gates of hell, were you affrighted on seeing him? What unaccustomed fear seized you?"

Ambrose in *The Paschal Mystery 4* says, "When Christ, untouched by sin, descended into the depths of Tartarus, he broke the bars and gates of hell, broke the domination of death, and called back to life from the jaws of the devil souls enchained by sin, and thus was a divine triumph inscribed in eternal characters." Similar things are contained in Hilary *On the Trinity 10*, in Augustine *Epistle 99* to Evodius, in Chrysostom, Eusebius, Emissenus, and others in their homilies on Easter.

Far then from the teaching of the Fathers is the opinion of Calvin, which sends Christ down into hell not as a victor but as a guilty convict.

Fifth, Calvin's foundation is false, namely that to be in hell is nothing other than to fear an angry God. For this is the heresy that was condemned in Origen, as Jerome testifies in his epistle to Avitus. Besides it would thence follow that many living here are already in hell and are damned, which is certainly contrary to the state of this life. For how many are there found in this life who are certainly persuaded that God is angry with them? How many are beginning to despair of eternal salvation? Are they then all already living in hell? What else is this but to deny hell altogether and to fortify the way to atheism? We will show lastly a little later that the true hell is a place beneath the earth.

Sixth, if Christ gave voice to words of despair, he certainly seems to have sinned most gravely; how then could he by sin have redeemed us from sin?

Calvin replies that Christ gave voice to words of despair and feared for his salvation as to the sense of his flesh, but that he was never deprived of faith and hope in God, which raised him up against temptations of despair. For although Christ said, "why have you abandoned me?", which are words of despair, yet he also said, "My God, my God," which are words of faith and hope. For these are Calvin's words on *Matthew 27*, "But it seems absurd that words of despair fell from the mouth of Christ. The solution is easy, that although his fleshly senses apprehended death, yet his faith remained fixed in his heart." And later, "This is made sufficiently plain from the two parts of his complaint, for before he gives voice to despair he prefaces that he is fleeing to God, as to his own God." And later Calvin says, "Christ struggled with despair but was not overcome by it."

But to the contrary: First, Christ truly bore the state of the damned according to Calvin. For these are his words *Institutes* 2.16.10, "He bore the atrocious torments in soul of a damned and lost man." And in the same place he says, "The prophet shows him going to the place of criminals as surety for them, and as altogether submissive in the manner of a guilty convict so that, deprived of independence, he might pay all the penalties that were demanded of them, with this exception only, that he could not be detained by the pains of death." And in his little *Catechism*, when expounding this article, he says that the difference between the damned and Christ is that they perpetually, but he for a brief time, underwent punishment.

But the punishment of the damned essentially includes the despair of salvation, just as felicity includes the certitude of a salvation never to be lost. Now hope cannot stand along with despair; therefore either Christ simply despaired or he did really bear the punishment of the damned, and so, according to Calvin, did not really free them.

Besides, when Christ voiced words of despair, as Calvin says on *Matthew 27*, he voiced them either deliberately or not deliberately. If the former then he truly despaired and sinned. If the latter then there was disorder of passions in Christ, since fear was able to anticipate his reason and extort from him a cry of desperation against his will. But this is against Calvin himself who in *Institutes* 2.15.12 says that Christ's nature was perfect and there was no disorder of passions in him.

Further, how can it even be thought that in one and the same sentence the first part was deliberate and the second not deliberate? For in the sentence, "My

God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" the words 'My God' are words of faith and are deliberate according to Calvin; how then can the following, 'Why have you abandoned me', be words of despair and not deliberate? Was Christ so imperfect and fickle that he could not speak four continuous words in faith? "But," says Calvin, "pain forced them out of him." Was he not in pain, then, when he said, 'My God'? So why were these words too not forced out of him?

Add too that the same Calvin in his commentary on *Psalm 22* says that the words 'My God' are a correction of the words 'Why have you abandoned me?' But whoever heard of a correction that preceded the error? Should not a correction follow the error? Those words then did not fall from Christ without deliberation, and therefore Christ deliberately despaired, if he despaired at all. Let Calvin be daring, then, and let him add to his other perverse dogmas this one too, and let him attribute to the Lamb of God, who bore the sins of the world, not only sin but the greatest sin.

Finally, in Calvin's opinion, Christ doubted of his own salvation when he descended into hell, as we showed above from *Institutes 2.16.12*. But the same Calvin in *Institutes 3.2.16* says that to doubt of one's salvation is a sin against the virtue of faith; therefore Christ sinned against faith. Calvin replies that in Christ there was no deliberate doubt but it was sent to him from the devil by way of temptation. For thus did he himself reply in *Institutes 3.2.17* about the faithful who suffer with faith the temptations of doubt.

But the same Calvin *Institutes 3.2.18* asserts that these doubts, although they do not extinguish faith, yet arise from imperfection of faith which, when it does not completely fill and hold us, also does not perfectly cure us of all sickness of faithlessness; therefore he is at least compelled to attribute imperfect faith and the sickness of faithlessness to Christ, since he attributes to Christ doubt about his own salvation. Behold therefore how well Calvin fights for the glory of Christ when he not only does not attribute to him blessedness, as Catholics do, but does not even attribute to him perfect faith, as Lutherans do. But let us look at his arguments.

His first argument he takes from *Isaiah 53*, where Christ is said to be stricken by God; for Calvin thence deduces that Christ underwent the anger and hostility of God against him.

I reply first that Christ is said to have been stricken by the Father, not because the Father hated him, but because he permitted him to be killed for our sake, as the Apostle explains in *Romans 8*, "Who did not spare his own Son but handed him over for us all," in the way that Abraham, when he intended to kill his son in obedience to God, did not hate his son nor did his son think he was hated by him, but understood that it was done to show obedience to God, without any anger or hatred toward himself. I say second that the striking of Christ by God is, by Jerome and all other expositors, referred only to mortal death and not to the pains of gehenna, of which none of the ancients dreamed when it was a question of Christ's passion. I say third that it is a figment of Calvin's to suppose that all who are struck by God's anger suffer the pains of hell. For how often does God scourge the impious in this world, who yet are not said to be in hell?

Calvin's second argument is again from *Isaiah 53*, "The correction of our peace is upon him." Therefore Christ must have paid all the punishment that our

sins merited. But our sins merit not only the death of the body but also the punishment of gehenna; so Christ underwent the punishment of gehenna too, as surely otherwise he would be Redeemer only of the body.

I reply that if this argument proved anything then the Lord ought to have remained in hell for eternity and to have suffered an almost infinite number of pains. For we merited eternal damnation, and we who merited this are almost infinite in number. As Calvin then is compelled to admit, one temporal punishment of Christ was able to satisfy for many eternal ones. So do we say, that Christ's bodily death was able to satisfy for the death of all souls. For the price paid by Christ for our redemption should not be weighed by the multitude or quality or duration of the punishments, but by the dignity of the person who suffered them and by the charity with which he bore them. Nor does it follow that he is Redeemer only of bodies, both because Christ suffered in spirit and body, and also because one punishment of his body was of infinite worth.

Calvin takes his third argument from the sadness and fear what the Lord suffered in the garden, *Matthew 26*. For if he had feared only bodily death he would have been weaker than many who are purely men who bravely undergo death. Certainly many martyrs rejoiced in their sufferings, and not only martyrs but even robbers themselves frequently die with great steadiness. The more fearful indeed tremble, but they never suffer themselves to be so overcome and dejected that they sweat blood; but Christ was horror-struck, collapsed, sweated blood, needed an angel's comfort, and prayed at any rate a long time in agony. Either then he was weaker than most men or he did not only fear bodily death as others do but danger to his soul too.

I reply that the Holy Fathers expounded this fear of Christ in various ways, but none of them insinuated by even the smallest word that this fear of Christ was for the salvation of his own soul. Hilary in canon 31 on *Matthew* says that Christ feared nothing for himself but for his disciples whom he foresaw would deny him. But when he said, 'Remove this cup from me', he meant to say, Remove it from me to others, that is, make it be that, as I drink it quickly, so my disciples may drink it quickly too. Jerome on *Matthew 26* says that Christ was in sorrow for the people of the Jews, whom he saw would most gravely sin that night; and therefore he said Remove this cup from me, that is, make them not kill me. But certain others, as Ambrose on *Luke 12* and Chrysostom on *Matthew 16* say that Christ with natural affection dreaded bodily death.

Now to Calvin's argument I reply that if Christ had been unable not to be afraid and was constrained to fear, he would deservedly seem to be weaker than many men are. But it is not so, for he feared because he wished to; if others do not fear, it is either because God infuses a greater consolation than the pain, or because the devil dulls the senses of those who are bound to him, or because they avert their mind from thought of pains and turn it elsewhere, though these last are very rare.

But Christ, in order for his redemption to be abundant, wanted to undergo also the pain of grief and fear; and so he did not dull his senses, nor did he allow joy from the higher part of his spirit to redound to the lower part, nor did he avert his thought from approaching death, but rather he fixed his mind of set purpose on all the impending torments, which was without doubt a mark of great courage and

charity. For, as the Evangelist says, *Matthew 26*, “He took Peter, James, and John, and then began to be sorrowful etc.” Why did he then begin to weep because he then wanted to? For he knew even before that he was going to die, since he predicted this to his disciples and instituted the sacrament in memory of his passion; and yet he not only did not fear but even consoled his fearful disciples, as is plain from *John 14 & 15*. Hence too, after he finished praying, he no longer feared because he no longer wished to, but ran with alacrity to meet those seeking him out for death, and during the whole course of his passion he showed no sign of fear. Hence it is too that in *John 11* we read that he was troubled, on which place Augustine writes in tract 49 on *John* saying, “There should be no doubt that he is troubled not by weakness of spirit but by power.” See the whole sermon where he says many things most clearly on this matter.

Calvin’s fourth argument is from *Matthew 27*, when Christ cries out, “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?” For Christ does not seem to have been able to break out with these words unless he had apprehended God as angered and hostile toward him.

I reply that no mention is made here of God’s anger toward his Son but only of dereliction; for the deity abandoned the humanity in its pain, and although he was able to snatch it from the pain he refused to do so, that the sacrifice by which the world was to be redeemed might be made perfect. But the Lord wished to cry out in this way so that we might understand that he bore most grievous pains, and did not bear them by his own guilt, for that is what is signified by ‘Why?’, as if to say, ‘the cause of this punishment is not in me.’

Calvin’s fifth argument is from *Acts 2*, “Whom God raised having loosed the pains of hell, because it was impossible for him to be held by it.” For if Christ did not bear the pains of hell how could he be loosed from them? For who is loosed from chains by which he was never bound?

I reply, first, that in the Greek is read ‘having loosed the pains of death’, and the sense, according to Chrysostom and Oecumenius, is that God, by the resurrection of Christ, loosed death itself from pains, for death was as it were suffering pain, since it was detaining Christ whom it was unable to hold. But perhaps the fuller sense is as if we were to say that Christ by his resurrection destroyed and dissolved death with all the pains that accompany it. For he rose immortal and impassible.

Now the fact that Calvin wants to understand by the pains of death the pains that the curse and anger of God is bringing forth, which is the origin of death and so the pains of the damned, stretches the words for too much. For if it is because the anger of God was the cause of death that the pains, which Christ was suffering in death, were from God’s anger and could be called the pains of the damned, then by the same reasoning all who die, even martyrs, would have God as enemy and would suffer the pains of gehenna. The anger, then, of God is the remote and general cause of death, but the proximate and particular cause is very often the kindness and special grace of God, as Augustine says, *City of God* 13.6 and elsewhere. David himself also sings in *Psalms* 115, “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints.” And John heard a voice from heaven saying to him, *Revelation* 14, “Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord.” Finally Paul, *Philippians* 1, says death is gain to him.

I say second that the words ‘the pains of hell’ are contained in our Latin edition, which reading is perhaps to be preferred to the Greek. For Irenaeus 3.12 read ‘the pains of the lower world’, and Augustine *Epistle* 99 to Evodius and others read likewise. Also, as Augustine says, the sense can be double. One sense (‘having loosed the pains of hell’) is that the effects of hell were annulled. For Christ loosed the pains of hell, not by which he was held, but so that he was not held. “In the way,” says Augustine, “that the snares of hunters can be loosed so that they do not hold, not because they did hold.” The other reading (‘he was loosed from the pains of hell’) is that he was loosed from the pains by which he could not be held but by which others, whom he knew were to be set free, were held. Here Augustine not only rightly explains this place but also by open confession asserts the opposite of what Calvin aimed to prove.

Calvin’s sixth argument is from *Hebrews* 5, “In the days of his flesh, offering prayers and supplications with loud cries and tears to him who could save him from death, he was heard from his reverence.” For Calvin maintains that the words ‘from his reverence’ must be understood as ‘he was heard away from his fear’, as if to say that Christ did not pray so as not to die but so as not to be swallowed up as a sinner, that is, so as not to be damned for eternity, and ‘away from’ this fear of losing eternal salvation he was freed through his Father’s hearing him.

But Calvin is obliged to show that ‘reverence’ can be taken for ‘fear of punishment’, for it means piety and reverence, and therefore reverential fear. For on *Luke* 2, where we read of Simeon that he was a man of fear, Calvin himself reads ‘pious’, and expounds it of true piety, and yet the Greek word is ‘reverence’.

Beza too in his annotation on the same place writes thus, “‘Reverence’ signifies not any sort of fear but a fear conjoined rather with reverence than with trepidation of spirit.” And if it is so, why do Calvin and Beza try to accommodate the same word to the fear of eternal death, something conjoined with the greatest trepidation?

But Beza stresses that the particle ‘from’, which the text has, cannot be taken for the particle ‘in proportion to’ or ‘because of’ but for ‘out of’ or ‘away from’. And, because it seems absurd that Christ wanted to be freed from piety and religion, therefore Beza reckons it must be translated as away from fear, namely fear of death or damnation. But we assuredly will more easily show that the particle ‘from’ with the genitive [in the Greek] signifies the same as ‘because of’ with the accusative [in the Greek], which, by universal consent, means ‘on account of’, than Beza could show that ‘reverence’ is taken for fear of punishment. For in *Matthew* 13.44, *Luke* 24.41, *Acts* 11.14 we read ‘from joy’, that is, ‘because of joy’, and in *Luke* 22.45 we read ‘from pain’, that is, ‘because of pain’, and in *2 Maccabees* 5.21 we read ‘from pride’, that is, ‘because of pride’, as is explained there by other words, ‘from the swelling of his heart’, that is, ‘because of the choice of his heart.’

Wherefore Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius on this place explain the word ‘reverence’ of the veneration that was due to Christ, so that the sense is, ‘He was heard because he merited to be heard, since he was most worthy of all honor and reverence’, or, ‘He was heard because of the reverence’ with which the Father himself attended him. And, assuredly, the adversaries cannot deny that Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius understood Greek speech.

What of the fact that Erasmus too in his annotations on the same place teaches that by 'reverence' must be understood 'piety'? And although we do not know for certain what prayer it was that Paul is dealing with in this place, yet it is probable that it was the one Our Lord poured out in the garden when his passion was imminent. And he was heard in that prayer, because he prayed absolutely, namely that the will of God be done in his death, or that he should be freed from death by the resurrection.

Calvin takes his seventh argument from Hilary who, in *On the Trinity* book 2, says, "The cross, death, hell is our life." And in book 3 says, "The Son of God is in hell, but man is borne to heaven." And in book 4 he says that by Christ's descent into hell we obtained the doing away of death. And at the end of the book he says, "Taking away death in hell."

I reply that the impudence of Calvin in citing Hilary is astonishing since it is clear that Hilary scarcely acknowledges pains in Christ. Certainly these theologians labor much to show that the pains of Christ are not altogether denied by Hilary.

Besides in *On the Trinity* book 10 Hilary expressly refutes Calvin's heresy and teaches that Christ could not in any way have feared the pains of hell, "With Lazarus happy in the bosom of Abraham, would Christ fear hell's chaos? These ideas are silly and ridiculous." And later he says of Christ, "Are you to be believed to be fearing hell's chaos, and the tormenting flames, and the whole abyss of avenging punishments, when you say to the thief, 'This day you shall be with me in paradise?'" And later, "The Lord promises him the communion soon of Paradise, and do you conclude that Christ is under penal terror in hell?" The words of Hilary, who only does not name Calvin when he is refuting someone or other's error.

When Hilary says, therefore, that Christ's hell is our life and that death is killed in hell, he means to say that Christ descended to the place of hell so as to snatch the saints from it, and then to block up the place so that none who believe in him and love him should any more descend into it.

#### *Chapter Nine: The Third Error about the Descent of Christ into Hell is set forth*

The third explanation follows, which is that of Bucerus on *Matthew 27* and of Beza on *Acts 2*. They say that in the Scriptures the grave is understood by the name of hell; hence that Christ descended into hell means nothing other than that he was buried.

Calvin partly follows this opinion and partly refutes it. For in *Psalms 15*, where we read, "You will not leave my soul in hell," he translates, "You will not leave my soul in the grave." And in *Institutes 2.16.9* he says with Bucerus it is a fable that there is a subterranean place of souls and that Christ descended into it. Yet he disagrees in this, that the descent of Christ into hell, which is put in the Creed, he does not want to be the burial but, as we have already refuted, a descent to the punishment of the damned.

If anyone asks Calvin and Beza where the souls of the just were before the death of Christ, they reply that they were in heaven, though they did not see God, nor will they see him until the Day of Judgment. Thus does Calvin say in *Psychopannychia* and Beza in his book against Brentius on the *Majesty of Christ*, in the second part, where he discusses the ascension.

So, for the refutation of this opinion, three things need to be proved. First that hell is a subterranean place distinct from the grave. Second that souls before the death of Christ were not in heaven but in subterranean hell, and hence that Christ, who descended to the place of souls, descended to the subterranean hell. Third that Christ's soul descended directly to a hell different from the grave.

*Chapter Ten: Hell is a Subterranean Place distinct from the Grave*

As to the first point, it can be known from the name of hell, which the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Scriptures use, where hell is. There is no doubt that the Latin name of hell is distinct from the name of grave, and since it signifies something below us and since below us is nothing other than the center of the earth, then necessarily the place of hell is understood to be deep subterranean places. But our adversaries care little about the Latin name, because the Scriptures were written only in Hebrew and Greek.

The Greek name that we have in *Matthew 11*, *Luke 16*, *Acts 2*, and wherever the Latin has 'hell', is Hades, and Theodore Beza asserts on *Acts 2* that this name is ordinarily taken for the grave, but sometimes in the poets for the place of the damned. But this impudence is too open. For, setting aside that in Greek the grave is called 'taphos' not Hades, and hence poems that are accustomed to be written on graves are, even by the Latins, called *epi-taphs*, certainly in *Matthew 11*, when the Lord says of Capharnaum, "And will you, Capharnaum, be exalted to heaven? You will go down to hell [Hades]," the word 'Hades' cannot be taken for the grave. For the antithesis would be ridiculous, since heaven is many thousands of stades distant from the surface of the earth, where Capharnaum was, and the grave is only a few arm's lengths away. But the Lord means to say that the city will go down as low as it seemed to be exalted on high. In *Luke 16*, when the rich courtier was in torments in hell, the word 'Hades' cannot be interpreted of the grave, unless one wants to say that souls are in graves along with bodies.

Add too that Chrysostom in his homilies on Lazarus always understands gehenna by the hell where the rich man was. Besides Lucian in his dialogue on mourning says that Hades is a place deep beneath the earth. Plato in *Republic 2* says, "We will give account in Hades," that is, we will render an account of our deeds in hell. But it is certain that accounts are not rendered in the grave. Finally Henry Stephanus in his large *Thesaurus* says, indulging Beza (as it seems), that the word 'Hades' can be taken for hell but that he could find no author who had spoken thus, although he nevertheless cited many for the meaning of hell.

Now the Hebrew word that is contained in many places of the Old Testament is, contends Beza, always taken for the grave, but this is false. For the word signifies 'abyss', and it is ordinarily taken for the subterranean place of souls and very rarely or never taken for the grave. And first I prove it from *Genesis 37*, "I will go down in sorrow to my son in hell." Here the Hebrew word cannot be taken for the grave, because Jacob says he will go to his son, whom he thought to be dead and devoured by wild beasts and hence to lack a grave.

Again *Numbers 16*, "They went down alive into hell covered with earth." These words are understood of the place of the damned by Epiphanius in *Ancoratus*, some distance from the middle, and by Jerome on *Ephesians 4* and Bede on *Numbers*

16. And certainly Epiphanius and Jerome were men most learned in Hebrew, and the Hebrew word in that place is the one for abyss. Again *Psalms* 138, "If I ascend to heaven you are there; if I go down to hell you are present." Here are opposed to the surface of the earth, where David then was, the two most distant places, the highest heaven and the deepest hell. But the grave is not two palms' length away from the surface of the earth. Often too marble tombs rest on the surface of the earth. Again in *Isaiah* 14 it is said to the king of Babylon, and to the devil in his figure, "You have said, 'I will rise up to heaven etc.', but you will be thrust down into hell, into the depth of the lake." Here, as far as it concerns the devil, hell cannot signify the grave because the devil is not in a grave, as is known; as far as it concerns the king of Babylon, hell too cannot signify the grave, both because the antithesis would be destroyed and because in the same place the king is said not to have a grave.

Add here the consensus of almost all those who were able to pass judgment on this matter. For the translators of the *Septuagint* always translate the said Hebrew word as 'Hades', never as 'grave'. The Chaldean version translates it as 'gehenna'. Rabbi David on *Psalms* 8 translates as 'Let the impious be turned back to hell'. Also Rabbi David and Rabbi Abenezra translate *Psalms* 138 as 'If I go down to hell you are present'. And Rabbi Levi on *Proverbs* 15 and *Job* 26 expounds the Hebrew word of the subterranean place of souls.

The same is again confirmed by Calvin himself, the teacher of Beza; for Calvin in *Psychopannychia* says that the Hebrew word is sometimes taken for grave but for the most part for the state of the damned.

What too of the fact that Beza very beautifully refutes himself? For he wrote two books, which are usually combined in the same volume, one against Sebastian Castalion about his own and Castalion's translation of the *New Testament*, the other against Brentius about the omnipresence of Christ's flesh. In the first book, dealing with that place in *Acts* 2, "You will not leave my soul in hell," Beza says that they who do not understand the grave by hell are wearing blinkers in broad daylight. And when the place from *Luke* 16 (about the rich man and Lazarus) was objected to him, he said there too that by hell is meant the grave. And when Christ says that the rich man was in torment, Beza expounds that Christ spoke figuratively – as if he were putting the rich man's grave for us in the middle of flames, wherein was contained not so much a corpse as a living man, although however in fact there was nothing in the grave but an inanimate body – and that to expound the Scripture about a place other than the grave is, he says, to imagine Orcus and Erebus with the fables of the poets.

But in his book against Brentius he assumes now the opposite figure and says that they are wearing blinkers in broad daylight who do not conclude from the story of Lazarus and the rich man, in *Luke* 16, that there is a true place of hell where the damned are tormented. And in the same place he defends Bullinger who had proved from *Numbers* 16 that hell is a true subterranean place, although however the Hebrew word is the same there. Again in the same place he cites *Psalms* 138, "If I go down into hell you are present," to prove hell against Brentius and yet the same Hebrew word is there too. In short, he fights no less sharply for a true bodily, physically located, subterranean hell in order to contradict Brentius, than he fights

elsewhere to destroy a true physically located hell or to turn it into the grave in order to oppose us.

Second I prove that hell is other than the grave from the name 'abyss'. For in *Luke* 8 the demons ask Christ not to send them into the abyss; it is certain that the abyss is a deep pit and hence below the surface of the earth. Again, it is certain that it is not the grave, for graves are not prepared for demons. Finally it is certain that the abyss is not something spiritual spread out everywhere, as Brentius maintains, for the demons asked not to be sent into the abyss. What remains then but that the abyss is a very deep subterranean pit?

Third I prove it from *Revelation* 5 where we read that no one was found to open the book, "neither in heaven, nor on the earth, nor under the earth." And later, "All creatures in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth gave praise to God." And *Philippians* 2, "That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, those on earth, and those in the lower regions." In these places the term 'under the earth' signifies nothing else than subterranean. But certainly it is not corpses in tombs that cannot open the book, or that praise God and bow the knee in the name of Jesus; therefore it is spirits who are said to be under the earth, because they live in subterranean places.

Fourth I prove it from the Fathers. Ireneaus 5, near the end, says that Christ descended to the lower parts of the earth where souls were. Tertullian in *Apology* 45 calls hell the subterranean storehouse of hidden fire. Cyril in his book *On Right Faith* to Theodosius calls the hell where souls were a subterranean hole. Arnobius *Against the Nations* 2 says, "You dare to laugh at us when we speak of gehenna and of certain unspeakable fires etc." And later he says about Plato, "He did not inappropriately suspect that those souls were cast into burning rivers with balls of flames and muddy pits of earth." Ambrose on *Ephesians* 5 says that Christ descended into the heart of the earth to preach to the dead in hell. The same is said by Gregory of Nyssa in his first oration on the Lord's resurrection. Jerome on *Isaiah* 14 says, "We assert that hell is under the earth." Augustine *Retractions* 2.4.24 says, "I think I should have said more about hell, that it is under the earth, than to give an account of why it is believed or said to be under the earth, as if this were not the case." Gregory *Dialogue* 4.41, Bede book 3 on *Job* 7, Primasius on *Revelation* 7, and Damascene 3 last chapter, all define hell to be under the earth.

Let, finally, natural reason be added as well, since it is agreeable to reason that the place of demons and of impious and reprobate men should be at the furthest distance from the place where we doubt not that angels and blessed men will for ever be. But the place of the blessed (even on the testimony of our adversaries) is heaven, and from heaven nothing is further away than the center of the earth.

#### *Chapter Eleven: The Souls of the Pious were not in Heaven before Christ's Ascension*

As to the second point, that the souls of the pious were not in heaven before Christ's ascension, the proof is, first, that their opinion is altogether unheard of in the Church of God, which should surely suffice for refutation. Further, in *Genesis* 17 Jacob says, "I will go down to my son in hell." Jacob was pious, Joseph too was pious, and yet that neither ascended to heaven but descended to hell is made clear by Scripture.

Again in *Luke* 16, when the rich man was in hell, he saw the soul of Lazarus from afar in the bosom of Abraham, and he heard that there was a great gulf between those places, for this is what 'chasma' signifies. From this it is clear that nothing solid was placed between the place of the damned and the bosom of Abraham, but that both souls were in the same abyss, although at much distance from each other. Again *I Kings* 28 the soul of Samuel when it appeared to Saul was seen to ascend from the earth.

And although there are not lacking those who deny it was the true soul of Samuel, yet the common opinion is more common, more probable, and safer. For it is what is taught by Josephus in *Antiquities* 6.11, by Justin in his *Dialogue with Trypho*, by Basil in *Epistle* 80 to Eustachius, by Ambrose on *Luke* 1, by Jerome on *Isaiah* 7, by Augustine on *Care for the Dead* 15, and by more recent writers, Lyranus, Abulensis, Denys the Carthusian, Cajetan on the same place. And the fact is sufficiently clearly proved from the text of the divine Scripture, which says "When the woman had seen Samuel," and, "Samuel said to Saul," and, "Then Saul understood that it was Samuel." The Scripture would surely not say 'Saul understood' but 'he believed' or 'he thought' if it was not true.

Further in *Ecclesiasticus* 46 there is placed among the praises of Samuel that he prophesied when dead and told the king what was going to happen. But what praise for Samuel would there be if not he but some demon appearing in his form had predicted the future? It does, however, seem incredible that the soul of so great a prophet should have been subject to the incantations of the Pythoness. Indeed it is true, and for that reason Samuel's apparition preceded her incantation and its effect. This can be understood from the woman's confusion; she was troubled when she saw that Samuel appeared before he was summoned.

Further the same is clear from *I Peter* 3, "He preached to the souls that were in prison who were sometime unbelieving, when they were expecting the patience of God in the days of Noah as he was abuilding the Ark." Here the souls are said to have been in prison, so they were not in heaven; for it is ridiculous to say that souls in heaven were confined in prison, since heaven is the seat of God. Nor is it an objection that here the spirits of the impious seem to be in question, for Calvin allows that the spirits of the just are being dealt with. But we will deal with this place a little later.

Again *Zachariah* 9, "And you, by the blood of the Covenant, have brought out those bound in the pit where there was no water." This place is expounded by Jerome and Rupert in their commentaries of Christ's descent into hell. And from this is surely proved that the souls of the saints before Christ's death were not in heaven, as Calvin and Beza maintain. For neither can it be that heaven is signified by the pit: either the Lord led his saints out of heaven, or there some who were bound in heaven.

As for what Calvin says in *Institutes* 2.16.9, that the pit called without water by Zacharia is the depth of the Babylonian captivity whence the Jews were liberated, it has no probability. For in the previous words there is a prophecy about Christ, "Exult, daughter of Zion! Behold your king comes for you etc." The Evangelists expound this of Christ's entry into Jerusalem, *Matthew* 21, *John* 12. Hence there is an apostrophe to Christ himself, 'And you, by the blood of the Covenant'. How do these

things cohere if the Babylonian captivity is being dealt with? And further, in what blood of the Covenant were the Jews liberated from Babylon?

Further the Fathers by common consent teach this: Irenaeus 5 near the end, Tertullian *Against Marcion* 4, Origen on *Romans* 5, Cyril *Catechism* 4, Cyril in his other book *On Right Faith to Queens* on the final parts of *Matthew*, Hilary *On the Trinity* 10, Basil on *Psalms* 38, Athanasius in *Epistle to Epictetus*, Epiphanius *Heresies* 46, Ambrose *On Faith* 3.3, Jerome on *Zachariah* 9 and *Ecclesiastes* 3, Primasius on *Revelation* 5, Gregory *Moralia* 21, the Council of Toledo 4.1. Finally Augustine, although he seem, in *Epistle* 99, to hesitate whether the bosom of Abraham, where the souls of the Fathers formerly were, was in hell or somewhere else, yet in *City of God* 10.15 affirms it was in hell, as all the other Fathers taught, whose words we will relate in the next chapter.

*Chapter Twelve: That Christ truly descended into Hell is shown from the Scriptures*  
As to the third point, I prove from the Scriptures that Christ truly descended into hell.

The first place, which however is not proof but probable evidence, is contained in the words of *Psalms* 107, "He has ground down the gates of bronze, and has broken the iron bars." For this place was understood of Christ's descent into hell by Hilary *Psalms* 138, Ambrose *The Mystery of the Pasch* and others, though in a mystical sense, for in the literal sense the passage certainly treats of the liberation from Egypt.

The second place is *Ecclesiasticus* 24 where the Wisdom of God says, "I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth, and I will look on all those who sleep, and I will enlighten all those who hope in the Lord." This place is not convincing to the heretics, both because they do not accept this book and because these words are also lacking in the Greek text, although it has its authority among Catholics.

The third place is taken from *Matthew* 12, "As John was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, so will the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth." Calvin in *Psychopannychia* maintains that the belly of the whale was a figure of the death that held Christ for three days. But Christ says that the belly of the whale is like the heart of the earth, and the heart of the earth is not death but some place under the earth.

Others say that the grave can be called the heart of the earth, but the likeness is opposed. For the heart is the deepest place of an animal, but the grave is near the surface of the earth and Christ's grave seems to have been above the earth, for it was a memorial cut out from stone and standing on the earth. Again, as Jonah was alive in the belly of the whale so something living should have been in the heart of the earth, but in the grave was a dead body. The heart of the earth then is not the grave but a hell much deeper than a grave, where Christ's living soul stayed three days. Further, Jerome on *Jonah* 2 says, "As the heart is in the middle of an animal, so hell is said to be in the middle of the earth." This place was explained in the same way by Irenaeus 5 near the end, by Tertullian *On the Soul* 31, Gregory of Nyssa *Oration* 1 on the on the resurrection, Ambrose on *Ephesians* 4.

The fourth place is *Acts* 2, "You will not leave my soul in hell." Beza translates, "you will not leave my soul in the grave," and in his defense of this translation

against Sebastian Castalio he says, "Here no one, unless he is going blind in broad daylight, can doubt that the body and the tomb are being dealt with." And when a little later he gives the reason why he thus translated 'soul' as 'corpse' and 'hell' as 'grave', he says, "I did not do it rashly, since we see that this place is especially twisted by the Papists to establish the existence of their Limbo, and from it the ancients too thought up the descent of Christ's soul to hell."

It seems that Beza was pleased by the decree of the Rabbis, referred to by Rabbi Salomon on *II Kings 21*, that it is good to change something in the law so as to have God publicly sanctified. But we have the propriety of the words especially on our side. For in the Greek text of *Acts 2* the word 'psyche' properly signifies the soul and 'Hades' properly designates hell; and this needs no proof. Let all the dictionaries be consulted.

Beza replies that although 'psyche' properly signifies the soul, yet it can be taken for the body in three ways. First, because soul is taken for life, and life with respect to the body seems no less destroyed in the grave than the body; second, because by 'soul' the whole man can be understood, and it is the same thing to say 'you will not leave my soul' and 'you will not leave me'. Again, the whole can be understood by the part, and so it is the same to say, 'you will not leave me' and 'you will not leave my corpse'. Third, because the Greek and Hebrew words for soul mean the same, and further the Hebrew word is found to be taken in Scripture for the body. In *Leviticus 12.1, 11*, where we read not to be defiled in soul, the Law prohibits corpses to be touched and it calls corpses souls.

But these subtleties are of no worth; for even if the body can be understood for soul, yet not for this reason would it at once be proved that this exposition must be given for the place in question. Besides the soul is here distinguished from the flesh when a little later it is said that his soul was not left in hell nor did his flesh see corruption, for so it is in the Greek; therefore soul in this place cannot be taken for flesh. Besides the word Hades (as we showed above) always signifies hell, never the grave, but Christ's body was not in hell, so his soul was there. Further, this exposition about soul and hell is given by Ambrose *Sermon 74* on martyrs, Jerome on *Psalms 15*, Augustine *Epistle 99* to Evodius, Bede on *Acts 2* and others.

To Beza's first argument I reply that even if soul can be taken for life, because it gives life to the body, yet it is never taken for corpse, since there is loss of life in a corpse. Nor can we say that life is in the grave, since the body is there without life; for neither should contraries be stated together.

To the second argument I say that grammar does not allow the dialectical reasoning: part is taken for whole, and whole for part, therefore part for part. For words are conventional and depend on the use of the speakers, and use allows synecdoche, whereby we put part for whole and the opposite, but does not allow part put for part. For who would tolerate it if we were to say that a man sees with his feet because foot is put for man and man for eye?

To the third I say that there is a great difference between the Hebrew and Greek words for soul. For the Hebrew word is a very general one and signifies non-figuratively the soul, the animal, nay even the body, as is plain from many places of Scripture. Hence it is also almost always joined with a substantive ('spirit') or an adjective ('living') that is proper to the whole composite: *Genesis 1*, "Let the waters

produce the reptile with living soul," again, "Let the earth produce the living soul," again, "He was made into a living soul." In these places it would be vain to add the adjective 'living' unless the Hebrew word that the translator renders as 'soul' signified something indifferent as to living and non-living. Therefore, in *Numbers* 23 Balaam says, "Let my soul die the death of the just," and in *Numbers* 31 all the souls of the female sex from the booty of Midian were thirty two thousand; but the human soul cannot die nor does it have a sex; so in these places the soul does not signify one part of man but the whole man, or certainly the body itself.

Again *Genesis* 37, "Let us not kill his soul." Here 'soul' is not taken for the soul properly speaking, nor figuratively for the man (for the possessive 'his' is against it), but properly for the flesh itself. In *Numbers* 19 the corpse is called the dead remains of a man's soul. But the Greek and the Latin words for soul are not so general that they can be taken non-figuratively for the whole animal. Therefore in the passage from *Leviticus* part is not put for part, that is, soul for body, but a word that ordinarily signifies the body is, or at least whole is put for part, that is, 'living' for 'body'. But in *Acts* 2 is put the Greek word, which signifies the soul alone.

Further too, the Hebrew word, when it is opposed to flesh, cannot be taken for flesh, as in *Leviticus* 17, "The soul of the flesh is in the blood." Now in *Acts* 2 soul is opposed to flesh when it is said "neither was his soul left in hell, nor did his flesh see corruption," so in this place Beza's interpretation, when he wants corpse to be understood for soul, can in no way be tolerated.

The fifth place is *Romans* 10, "Do not say in your heart, 'Who will descend into the abyss?' that is, to call Christ back from the dead." Therefore Christ was in the abyss after death. Nor can the state of the damned be understood by the name of 'abyss', for according to Calvin Christ was still alive there, but here the discussion is about the place where he was when he was dead. Nor can the grave be understood; for abyss means a very deep pit, and the grave is not of this sort. Besides it was easy to descend into the grave, but here it is set down as a thing impossible for a living man to descend into the abyss.

Finally in this place the abyss is opposed to heaven, just as the surface of the earth is in the middle between the abyss and heaven, for the passage begins, "Who will ascend into heaven?, that is, to bring Christ down." And immediately there follows by antithesis, "Who will descend into the abyss?, that is, to call Christ back from the dead." Therefore Christ was in the abyss after his death and before his resurrection, and the abyss is very far distant from heaven, that is, in the deepest parts of the earth.

The sixth place is *Ephesians* 4, "He who ascended is also he who descended into the lower parts of the earth." Beza responds to this in his note on the place that the lower parts of the earth are the grave. Augustinus Marloratus understands descent into this earth, as if it said, 'he descended into this earth down here'.

But we, to begin with, have Jerome, Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Theophylact with us, who expound it of the lower parts below which there is nothing. Second we have the propriety of the words. For the lower part of the earth does not mean the whole earth but one part of it, and that part lower than the others; therefore it does not signify the surface of the earth, which is the upper part, nor even Christ's grave, which was even on top of the earth. Third, what follows makes for us, "so that he

might fulfill all things," for Christ wanted to descend to the true hell, as he had descended to earth, so that he might by his presence visit all the parts of his kingdom, which is in three parts, according to *Philippians 2*, "So that at the name of Jesus ever knee should bow, in heaven, on the earth, and in hell." Here the Greek, as we said, has 'below the earth', and corpses in graves cannot thereby be understood, for although they are under the earth yet they cannot bow the knee at the name of Jesus, that is, show honor to him. There are then some spirits in the subterranean places, and to those places Christ descended, so that he might show himself King and Lord of the whole world.

*Chapter Thirteen: A very Obscure Place in St. Peter's First Letter, chapters 3 and 4, is explained*

To the testimonies of Scripture by which Christ's descent to hell is proved belongs also this place of St. Peter, "Christ died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, to offer us to God, having died indeed in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, wherein also he came and preached to the spirits that were in prison, who were sometime unbelieving when they awaited the patience of God in the days of Noah," *1 Peter 3*. To this place another from chapter 4 needs to be joined, "Therefore the Gospel was preached also to the dead, that they may be judged indeed according to man in the flesh but live according to God in the spirit." But to make this place understood, which has always been held to be most obscure, three expositions must be discussed.

The first exposition is that of St. Augustine in *Epistle 99* to Evodius, whom Bede follows. Augustine's exposition is that by spirits in chains is understood men who were at the time of Noah, whose souls were in a mortal body as in chains, for the body is as it were the chains of the soul; and he says that Christ preached to those men, who however were unbelieving, not according to his humanity, which he had not yet assumed, but according to deity, through internal inspiration or the tongue of Noah. So Augustine does not hold that this place pertains to hell.

I would not reject this exposition if it altogether pleased Augustine himself; but he himself confesses that he has not understood this place, and he asks that a reason be sought out how this place could pertain to hell. With Augustine himself, then, not only permitting but even desiring, let us briefly refute this first exposition. First, this opinion does not please because the common opinion of the Fathers is contrary. For Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 6 before the middle, Athanasius *Letter to Epictetus* and in his book *On the Incarnation*, which begins, "The manner of a pious man," Epiphanius *Heresies* 77, Cyril *On Right Faith to Theodosius* and book 12 on *John 36*, Hilary on *Psalms 118*, on the verse, "My eyes have failed me, saying in your eloquence, When will you console me?", Ambrose on *Romans 10*, Ruffinus in his exposition of the *Creed*, and Oecumenius on this place of *Peter* expound it of Christ's descent into hell, where they reckoned that the spirits of the dead dwelt.

Besides, Justin in *Dialogue with Trypho* and Irenaeus 3.23 cite certain words of *Isaiah*, not now found, very similar to these words of St. Peter, so that it is credible that Peter accepted them. Now these are the words, "The holy Lord remembered Israel for their dead, who slept in the earth of burial, and he went down to preach the Gospel of salvation that was from him, that he might save them."

Second the opinion [of Augustine] is not given approval, because Christ went in the spirit to preach to spirits. For this is what the word 'wherein' refers to, namely, that he came in the spirit etc., but 'spirit', which is here distinguished from flesh, does not seem it can signify anything other than the soul; therefore not in divinity only but in soul too the Lord went to preach to the spirits.

St. Augustine say the reason he was moved to not understanding Christ's soul by this spirit is that when it is said, "made alive in the spirit," if spirit were to signify the soul, it would follow that Christ's soul was at some time dead, for nothing is made alive save what was dead. He himself maintains therefore that the sense is that Christ was dead in the flesh because he died according to the flesh and was made alive in the spirit, because he was raised from the dead by virtue of the spirit of God.

But this reasoning is not conclusive, for in many places of Scripture that is said to be made alive which is not killed: *I Kings 27*, "David did not make the man and the woman alive," that is, he did not leave them alive; and *II Kings 8* says, "David extended two ropes over Moab, one to kill and one to make alive," that is, he determined how many of the Moabites he wanted to be kill, how many to be saved. And *Acts 7*, "He afflicted our fathers to expose their infants, so that they might not be made alive," that is, so that they should not live but all be killed to a man. St. Peter then meant to say that Christ in the passion was dead in the flesh but made alive in the spirit, because his flesh remained dead but his soul could not be killed but remained alive and working and bringing triumph from hell.

Third, Augustine's opinion does not please because the words, "he came and preached," will be taken properly if they are understood of the soul, for he truly came to a place where he was not; but if they are understood of the divinity they can only be taken improperly. Besides the word in Greek is 'advanced', that is, 'proceeded', which same word is repeated a little later when it is said he proceeded to heaven etc.; but if in this second place it is taken properly, then it is so taken also in the first.

Fourth, because by the spirits who were in chains it does not seem that living men can be understood, unless St. Peter is deliberately going out of his way to be obscure and to speak improperly; and certainly, when we have a proper and easy sense, one is not permitted to imagine it is figurative. Add the fact that when speaking of the same spirits in ch.4 Peter says, "Therefore the Gospel was preached also to the dead." And although Augustine wanted to understand by the dead those dead in sins who were yet living in their bodies, yet the preceding sentence seems to stand in the way, for it says, "Giving account to him who is ready to judge the living and the dead, therefore the Gospel was preached..." But when we say that Christ is judge of the living and the dead, we understand it literally, because he will judge those who are alive and those who are truly and properly dead, as the same Augustine teaches in *Enchiridion* 55. Therefore Christ preached to those truly dead, that is, he descended to the true hell.

Fifth, if this place is understood of a preaching done in the days of Noah, it does not appear why this narration was inserted here. For how is this coherent: Christ in his passion was dead in the flesh, remained alive in the spirit, therefore God formerly preached to men through Noah? But if we understand it of the descent

into hell, everything coheres. For Peter, wanting to show that Christ in his passion and death remained alive as to his soul, proves that his soul at that time proceeded into hell and preached to the spirits in prison.

But Augustine objects that there seems to be no reason why he should preach only to those who were unbelieving at the time of Noah, since so many others were in hell. Again, because it seems very absurd that Christ preached in hell. For it seems to follow from this that the Church should be set up also in hell, so that souls might be converted and reconciled there. Now, that this absurdity follows from our opinion is proved by Augustine on the ground that the bosom of Abraham, where all the just were, does not seem it was in hell but very remote from hell, since there was a great gulf between the rich man dwelling in hell and Lazarus inhabiting the bosom of Abraham; therefore if this place be understood of the descent into hell, then Christ preached only to sinners; but he did not preach in vain nor without fruit; therefore he converted some. But this must in no way be asserted; therefore it is better not to understand this place of the descent into hell. And this is the greatest difficulty that compelled Augustine to depart from the common opinion, for he feared to be compelled to admit the conversion and reconciliation of damned spirits.

I reply that Augustine's first objection can be turned back. For there appears also no reason why Peter should say that Christ preached in the days of Noah rather than in the days of Abraham and of the other Patriarchs, or even of all other men.

I say further that Christ preached in hell to all the good spirits, but that mention was made by name expressly of those who were unbelieving in the days of Noah because about them there was greater doubt whether they were saved or not, since they had been punished by God and drowned in the waters of the flood. So Peter is indicating here that there were also some of the unbelievers who did penance even at the end of their life, and although they perished in body, yet they were saved in soul, which is also said by Jerome in his *Hebrew Questions on Genesis* when treating of chapter 6, "My spirit will not remain on men etc." Here Jerome says that God punished many of them temporally in the waters of the flood so that he might not have to punish them eternally in gehenna. And this sense seems also to be given in the words of *I Peter 4*, "Therefore the Gospel was preached also to the dead, that they may be judged indeed according to man in the flesh but live according to God in the spirit," that is, so that they may be judged as men externally in the flesh, for their bodies were killed in the waters, yet should live according to God in the spirit, that is, that their souls might be safe with God.

To the second objection I say that Augustine himself afterwards recognized that the bosom of Abraham was in hell, as is plain from his tractate on *Psalms* 85 and from *City of God* 20.15, and this opinion is that of all the Fathers and the whole Church. I say therefore that Christ's preaching in hell was not to convert the faithless, but was only to announce great joy to pious souls, to whom he announced that redemption was complete, so that they might understand that they were now to be liberated from thence and would also, in his time, take back their bodies. And these things we say in exposition of St. Augustine, whom we have refuted following his mind, not his words.

The second exposition is that of Beza in his notes on this text, where his exposition is that Christ in the spirit, that is, in his divinity, came and preached to

the spirits in prison, that is, to spirits who are now in the prison of hell, but at the time when he was preaching to them they were not in prison but in the body, namely when Noah was building the Ark. This exposition is so boasted of by Beza in the defense of his translation against Castalio, that he says because of it a crown and gratitude were given him by many in their letters.

But this exposition does not differ from St. Augustine's save in three respects. First, that Augustine put forward his as doubtful and to be held until a better one was not found; Beza wants his to be most certain. Second, that Augustine preserved the text as he found it written by his predecessors; Beza has the audacity to change it, and where we have, "who were in prison," he wants it to read, "who are in prison." And although in the Greek there is no verb, yet all the Latins have hitherto read 'were', and the Greeks whom we cited expound it as 'were' and not as 'are'. For indeed they wanted those spirits to be freed by Christ from prison, and it could not at the time of Peter truly be said of those spirits that they were then in prison. Third, that Augustine understood by prison the mortal body, and Beza understands hell by it, which favors our view. So the opinion of Beza, insofar as it differs from that of St. Augustine, does not need refutation because it favors us, and insofar as it agrees with St. Augustine's, it has already been refuted.

Beza's arguments too are all easily refuted by the words. First he objects that Christ is said to have come in the spirit. I reply that we have already shown that in this place spirit means soul. Second he objects that mention is made only of the unbelieving, who would have benefited nothing from the descent into hell. I reply that we have already said that they were at some time unbelieving but later turned to God and died piously. Third he objects that nothing here is said about the liberation of souls. I reply that Christ's preaching was nothing else than the preaching of liberation. Fourth he objects that it is absurd to preach to the dead who cannot be converted. I reply that he did not preach so that the impious might convert but that the souls of the pious might rejoice.

The third exposition is that of Calvin *Institutes* 2.16.9 and *Psychopannychia*, where he says that, in Peter's opinion, Christ preached to both the good and the bad spirits of the dead, not that Christ came to them by the presence of his soul, but that he brought it about that they felt the effect of his passion and death, and that the good indeed received joy and the bad grief.

And because someone could ask how the souls of the pious could be said to be in prison since, for Calvin, they were always in heaven, he replies that the words 'in prison' should be translated as 'in a watchtower'; for the Greek word means both a prison and also vigil, observation, keeping watch. So the souls of the pious are said to have been in a watchtower because they were in continuous expectation of the passion of Christ. He adds further that it can also be said that they were in prison, because they were looking for the light from afar as if under a cloud and shadows, so that their waiting could be called a prison.

This explanation Calvin says is of such sort that he is openly confident it will persuade all who are good. But he was a false prophet, for he did not even persuade Beza, his neighbor and the one closest to him and his successor. For Calvin understands efficacy by spirit and Beza divinity; Calvin understands heavenly watchtower by prison and Beza a guard in hell; Calvin understands the souls of the

pious by the spirits in prison and Beza the souls of the damned; Calvin wants this to have happened at the death of Christ and Beza at the time of Noah. Either then Beza was not good or Calvin did not persuade all who were good.

But setting these things aside, Calvin's exposition can easily be refuted. For first by spirit cannot be understood efficacy but soul, both because here a distinction is drawn with flesh, as with the other part of the same composite substance, and because here Christ is said to have proceeded in the spirit and preached, where the 'proceeded' indicates change of person from place to place.

Second it is false that the Greek word means watchtower in the sense Calvin means; for the Greek word properly means guarding from a verb meaning 'to guard', 'to observe' etc., and from this it is transferred to mean everything that pertains to guarding and protecting, such as are prisons, keeping watch, vigil, etc.; but it cannot mean simple expectation or vigil which do not refer to keeping guard; nor will Calvin easily find any example in good authors for this watchtower of his.

As to his saying that expectation under shadows can be called a prison, it is ridiculous. For in this sense we would all be in prison while waiting during the night for day. And besides, the souls of the pious, even if they were foreseeing Christ very obscurely, were yet seeing many other things clearly and were absolutely in the light. Nay rather, how in Calvin's opinion could they be said to be in darkness or in prison if they were in heaven? For who can grasp darkness and prison being in heaven?

Third, Calvin's opinion destroys itself, for he says two things. First, that the spirits in prison are the souls of the pious awaiting Christ, and to them Christ announced joy. Second, he says that Christ terrified the souls of the impious by his preaching, and that this is indicated by the words, "who were sometime unbelieving when the ark was abuilding." But Peter is speaking of the same people, for he says, "he came and preached to the spirits who were in prison that were sometime unbelieving etc." And the word in Greek is 'unbelieving', or 'disobedient' or 'not believing'. So the spirits in prison ought sometime to have been disobedient, and if these are the spirits of the impious, then necessarily either the spirits of the impious were in the heavenly watchtower or the Greek word means, not watchtower, but prison.

Finally add that this opinion is singular and contrary to all the ancients. Let the opinion of the Fathers remain, then, which teaches that Christ in the prison of hell preached to the holy Fathers.

#### *Chapter Fourteen: The Tradition of the Fathers about the Descent into Hell is introduced*

Now we will briefly confirm from the tradition of the Fathers what we have proved from the Scriptures. And first we have the *Apostles' Creed*, received by the heretics, where, after statement of the burial, is contained the words "He descended into hell." So the burial and the descent into hell are not one and the same thing. Nor can it be said that the latter sentence is a repetition of the former. For the *Creed* is a very brief compendium of the faith, where any repetition would have been an extreme fault. Nor can the latter sentence be an explication of the former, because the known would then be explained by the unknown.

In addition to the *Creed* we have two Councils. For Toledo 4.1 says, “He descended into hell, so as to draw out the souls detained there.” And in the Lateran Council under Innocent II chapter 1 it says, “He descended into hell, he rose from the dead, he ascended into heaven; but he descended in soul, rose in body, ascended equally in both.”

Further, all the Fathers teach this. Thaddeus, the disciple of the Lord, says in Eusebius *Histories* 1 last chapter, “He descended into hell, he broke down the wall that no one in the world had broken down; he descended indeed alone, but he ascended with a great multitude.” These words cannot be understood of the grave, for the body did not break down the wall from the grave, nor did it ascend from it with a multitude. Thaddeus therefore is speaking of the descent into hell, whence a multitude of holy Fathers ascended with Christ.

Ignatius in his *Epistle* to the Trallians says, “Truly, not in men’s opinions, was he crucified and died, when those in heaven, those on earth, and those detained under the earth saw it.” Again, “He descended into hell alone, but he returned with a multitude.” Justin in his *Dialogue with Trypho* complains that the testimony of *Jeremiah* was erased by the Jews when Jeremiah said that the Lord descended into hell so as to free his dead.

Irenaeus 5 at the end says, “The Lord kept the law of the dead, so that he might be the first born from the dead, and he remained until the third day in the lower parts of the earth etc.” And lest they say that here it is a question of the grave, he adds, “Since the Lord was absent in the midst of the shadows of death, where the souls of the dead were etc.” Clement *Stromateis* 6 says, “The Lord preached to those who were in hell.” And certainly the body in the grave did not preach.

Origen *Homily* 15 on *Genesis* says, “The only begotten son, for the salvation of the world, went down into hell, and thence recalled the first made man. For what he said to the thief, ‘This day you will be with me in paradise’, was not said to him alone but also to all the saints, for whom Christ had descended into hell.” See the same *Against Celsus* 2 and book 5 on *Romans*.

Eusebius *Demonstration of the Gospel* 4.12 says, “Unto death and unto the very dead the laws of charity called him, so that he might call back the souls of those too who were dead before.” Cyril of Jerusalem *Fourth Catechesis*, after speaking about the grave, adds, “He descended into hell, so that he might thence liberate the just.” See also his *Fourteenth Catechism*.

Athanasius in his *On the Incarnation*, which begins “The manner of a pious man” beyond the middle says, “You believe the soul is the interior of a man, since it is both evident from the first molding and shown in the second dissolution, for this is plain not only in us but also in the body of Christ, when his body was not carried beyond the grave and his soul penetrated to hell, places separated by a huge distance – the grave indeed receiving what was bodily, but hell what was incorporeal etc.” And later he teaches that Christ descended into hell to free souls.

Basil on *Psalms* 44, expounding the words, ‘myrrh and aloes and cassia’, says, “Myrrh, therefore, because of the passion, breathes forth the fragrance of Christ; but oil of myrrh because he remained not immobile or inactive or unoccupied for three nights, and he descended into hell for the sake of the dispensation concerning the resurrection, so that he might fill the universe with himself.” And on *Psalms* 48, when

expounding the words, "God will redeem my soul from the hand of hell," he says, "The Lord's descent into hell is clearly prophesied, to redeem his own soul along with others so that it not remain there."

Gregory of Nyssa in *Oration 1* on Christ's Resurrection, before the middle, says, "Do you wish to know something about the time of the three days? It is enough only to have learnt that although the Lord, the omnipotent wisdom, was for so little space of time in the heart of the earth, which is the dwelling place of that mind (the devil), yet he was able to trick and mock the great mind that lives there." And later he calls the subterranean places the heart of the earth, where is the seat of the devil.

Gregory Nazianzen in *Oration 2* on the Pasch, not far from the end, says, "If he descends into hell, descend with him, learn also those mysteries that Christ signaled there etc." In the same place he poses, and does not solve, a question whether Christ led everyone out of hell or only some.

Epiphanius in *Ancoratus* before the middle, p.340, says, "He is called free among the dead." 'Free' means that hell did not get empire over him, but of his own will he descended into hell with his soul. See also *Heresy 46*, which is that of Tatian, where he says that Christ descended to hell so as to free the soul of Adam and other Fathers. Chrysostom *Homily 2* on the *Creed*, after giving exposition about the burial, adds, "He descended into hell so that there too he should not be lacking a miracle."

Cyril *On Right Faith to Theodosius*, about the middle, says, "The soul, having obtained conjunction and union with the Word, descended indeed to hell with divine virtue, and using his power he appeared also to the spirits that were there, and said to the shackled, Come forth and be revealed also to those who are in darkness." Again, "As the Only Begotten conversed in the flesh with those who were still in the flesh, so he preached to the souls in hell, having the soul, in which he was, united to him." See also his book 12.36 on *John*.

Theodoret on *Psalms 15*, on the verse "You will not leave my soul in hell," says that Arius and Apollinaris are clearly refuted who said Christ did not assume a soul. Damascene 3 last chapter says, "He descended into hell in his deified soul, so that as the sun of justice had risen for those who were on earth, so also the light might shine on those who were in darkness under the earth and sitting in the shadow of death."

Among the Latins Tertullian in *On the Soul 31* says, "We do not believe hell to be an empty cavern or some bilge-water of the world in the open air, but a trench in the earth, of great extent with hidden deeps in its entrails, since we read that Christ passed three days in the heart of the earth, that is, in its inmost and internal recesses, open from the earth and enclosed within it, and yet removed from its lower abysses." And ch.32, "If Christ descended to the lower parts of the earth, so as to make the Patriarchs and Prophets there possess him, you have also to believe a subterranean region of hell."

The martyr Hippolytus in his *Oration* about Antichrist at the beginning says, "His blessed passion on the cross, his burial, his descent into hell, and redemption of souls etc." Cyprian in his *Sermon* on the anointing of the chrism, at the end, says, "The King suffered this too, to be killed in life and, descending into hell, he brought captivity back, captive from of old." Similar things are contained in the following sermon.

Hilary on *Psalm* 138, on the verse “If I go down into hell you are present,” says, “This is the law of human necessity, that when bodies are buried souls descend into hell, which descent the Lord, to complete his true humanity, did not refuse.” And *On the Trinity* 10 beyond the middle says, “Will it be said that his body, which lay in the grave, descended into hell?”

Philastrius *On Heresies*, chapter on the descent into hell, says that they are in error who think that when Christ descended into hell he freed the souls of the poets, and philosophers, and other infidels, and he adds, “For if they had believed he was God, and had not spread about the base names of gods and goddesses, they would have merited pardon on Christ’s descent into hell.”

Gaudentius *Tractate* 6 on *Exodus* says, “On the night when the Son of God, leaving his deceased body on the cross, passed over to the lower Egypt, so as to visit the souls in hell etc.”

Prudentius in *Hymn* 9 ‘Today’, “Not but what he kindly enters Tartarus itself, lest hell should be without part in salvation; the broken door yields etc.” And *Hymn* 1, “Hence it is we all believe, when in the time of quiet the cock exulting crows, Christ returned from hell.”

Ambrose *On Faith* 3.3 says, “He is free who did not know the bonds of death, not having been seized by hell; but he is without helper who, not by messenger, nor by ambassador, but as Lord himself by himself saved his people.” See also *On the Mystery of the Pasch* 4, and on *Romans* 10 and *Ephesians* 4.

Jerome on *Ephesians* 4 says, “The lower parts of the earth, which are accepted as hell, to which Our Lord and Savior descended, so that as victor he might lead with him to heaven the souls of the saints who were held enclosed there.”

Ruffinus in his explication of the *Creed* says, “But John too says, ‘Are you he who is to come (doubtless to hell), or do we wait for another?’” And later, “He returned victor, then, from the dead, taking the spoils of hell with him, for he brought out those who were held by death.”

Augustine *Epistle* 57 to Dardanus q.1 says, “Nor on that day was the man Christ Jesus going to be in heaven, but in hell in his soul, and in the grave in his body.” *Epistle* 99, “Who but an infidel, therefore, would deny that Christ was in hell?” And lest we should understand the grave by hell he adds later, “That in soul he was in hell is openly declared by Scripture.” *Tractate* 78 on *John*, “Who was not left in hell? Christ Jesus, but in his soul only. Who lay in the grave to rise on the third day? Christ Jesus, but in his flesh only.” See also *City of God* 17 11, 20.15, and on *Psalm* 85.

Leo in *Sermon* 1 on the resurrection of the Lord says, “The resurrection of the Savior suffered neither his soul to stay long in hell nor his body to stay long in the grave.” Fulgentius in book 3 to Trasimundus chapter 23, “And this flesh, however, the divinity did not desert in death, just as neither did it leave the soul in hell.” And chapter 35, “He knew that he, God the assumer of the whole man, was wholly with his flesh in the grave, wholly with his soul in hell.”

The martyr Vigilus, book 2 *Against Eutyches*, says, “On that day the flesh was not in paradise, nor in hell, but lay soulless in the grave, and the soul for three days was in hell, not in the grave.”

The Subdeacon Arator, in book one chapter 2, when treating of the *Acts of the Apostles*, says, “He was resplendent among the frightened shades, seeking the pallid

kingdom to put sorrows to flight, whom trembling Chaos with its own light could not darken. Hell then fears to exist etc.”

Gregory *Moralia* 13.10, “Once our maker and redeemer, penetrating into the fortresses of hell, brought out from thence the souls of his elect, he does not suffer us to go there, hence he has by descending already freed others.” See also ch.21 and his exposition on the Psalm ‘*De Profundis*’. Bede book 3 on *Job* 7 says, “I think the Lord said this because at the end of the age he was going to descend into hell for the redemption of man, where, because of the power of the one descending, he is said to have walked about, for it was impossible that he should be held as one guilty of sin by infernal chains.”

We have therefore the consensus of the Fathers, who flourished at least 800 years before us, and certainly, if we do not prefer them to a few rather recent heretics, we are very stupid.

#### *Chapter Fifteen: Christ properly and in fact descended into Hell*

The fourth error is that of Durandus on *Sentences* 3 d.22 q.3, where he teaches that Christ’s soul descended into hell not in its substance but in certain effects, because, namely, he beatified and illumined the holy Fathers who were in limbo. Something of this sort about the going of Christ to the souls of the holy Fathers by efficacy, not by essence, was taught by Calvin, as was indicated in the above distinction.

But there is much difference between Calvin’s and Durandus’ opinion. First, Calvin does not call it a descent into hell but imagines another descent through the pains of hell borne by Christ; but Durandus does want Christ to have descended in this way into hell. Second, Calvin denies that hell is real, and especially the limbo of the Fathers; Durandus recognizes both places in the cited passage. Third, Calvin places the souls of the saints in heaven, even before Christ’s coming; Durandus says they were in limbo. Fourth, Calvin denies that the souls of the saints are beatified by Christ; Durandus admits it. Fifth, Calvin maintains that his opinion is most certain; but Durandus says that it is not to be stubbornly asserted that Christ’s soul did not descend in essence into hell, indeed that perhaps he did descend, but that it is not clear, although it is clear that he descended in effect.

In this alone, then, did Durandus err, that he does not reckon one should necessarily believe Christ’s soul was really in its essence in hell. And indeed there is proof that this opinion is erroneous.

First because the Scriptures, the Councils, and the Fathers cited say with eloquence that Christ’s soul descended into hell and that his flesh remained in the grave. But it is certain that the flesh really and properly, not figuratively, and per se not by its effect, remained in the grave.

Second, if Christ was by effect in hell, not only his soul but his flesh would have been in hell, for the cause of that effect was the flesh as well. Nor does Durandus give satisfaction on this point when he replies that the chief cause was the soul. For the chief cause was the composite, that is, the whole man, who suffered and merited. Further, let it be that the soul was the chief cause, yet the flesh and blood too were the cause, otherwise it would not truly be said in *I John* 1 that, “his flesh cleanses us;” therefore it could truly be said that Christ’s flesh and blood descended into hell, which is contrary to Scripture and the Fathers.

Third, if in effect only Christ descended into hell, then at that time Christ's soul was in many places at once, in hell, in earthly paradise, on earth, in heaven. For without doubt Christ's death has some effect in all these places, illumining the souls of the Fathers in limbo, rejoicing the angels in heaven, consoling Enoch and Elijah in paradise, effecting compunction among men on earth. Why then in the *Creed* is mention made only of the descent into hell? Why do all the Fathers preach that Christ was in hell during the three days and do not say that he was in heaven and on earth, nay they expressly deny it?

Fourth, Christ's soul was in the heart of the earth for three days. But the effect was done in a moment. Again Christ's soul returned on the third day, namely when he rose, for then he returned from the lower parts to the higher ones. And he never returned in effect, because the effect remains always. Or if he returned when his business was done, then certainly he returned on the very day on which he died; for the Lord dispelled the darkness of hell at once after his death and illumined the Fathers with the divine vision. Therefore one of two things, it seems, must be conceded, that either the Lord never returned from hell or that he returned on the very first day; but both conflict with the *Creed* of the faith, and with the Scriptures themselves, and with the confession of the Fathers.

Finally, it follows on Durandus' founding premise that Christ in no way descended into hell. For his founding premise is that souls cannot be in a place save by operation, and again that they cannot operate save in their own body, of which they are the form; from this it follows that separated souls cannot properly and simply be in a place.

And because someone could say that therefore the souls of the impious are not in hell, or that the souls of the pious were not in limbo nor now in heaven, Durandus adds that the souls were once in limbo by designation, because they were designated for that place when they had received their bodies, if Christ had not redeemed them; just in the way that Consuls designated for the following year were not said to be nor were Consuls but were only future Consuls. But from this further follows that Christ in no way descended into hell, for he descended to the place of souls, but the souls were indeed going to be in hell, though in fact they were then nowhere. Therefore Christ never descended, and so he did not descend to hell either.

But Durandus objects, first, that souls are in a bodily place only by the operation that they exercise in that place; but souls can do nothing save in their body and through their body, so when they lack the body they are nowhere.

I reply, that, the opinion is not improbable of those who teach that both angels and souls are in place in their essence, which essence, since it is a certain thing and finite, is necessarily present to one place and not to another, unless it change from place to place.

I say, second, that according to Blessed Thomas, souls indeed cannot naturally be applied to a definite place save by operation, and this opinion is expressly that of Gregory of Nyssa *On the Soul* 11, and that they cannot operate outside their body, though they can supernaturally do both, as the same Blessed Thomas confesses *ST Ia q.117*, and Blessed Augustine *On the Cure of Souls* 16. Therefore on the command of God a separated soul can move bodies and appear and

speak and operate in the way that angels operate, as is plain of the soul of Samuel *I Kings* 28, of the soul of Moses *Matthew* 17, of the soul of St. Felix which, on the witness of Blessed Augustine in the cited place, openly appeared to many, and of the soul of Paschasius which St. German saw ministering in the colors in the baths at Puteoli, on the witness of St. Gregory *Dialogue* 4.40. And many like things can be related which in no way can be denied.

Also a soul, on the command of God, can be doing nothing on bodies and be yet bound to a certain place, even if we do not understand the way in which it is done, as Augustine teaches *City of God* 21.10; for neither do we perfectly understand how our soul, which is an immortal spirit, is united so intimately to a mortal body that they become one thing, and yet we all believe it.

Durand's second objection is that Christ's soul was said to descend into hell so that it might beatify the souls of the saints; but the souls of the saints were beatified in the same instant in which Christ died, and the soul of Christ could not be in hell at the same instant, because it would have been in two places at once; therefore it did not descend by a true motion but metaphorically, that is, in effect.

I reply that it is inappropriate to bring the mysteries of the faith into doubt with these subtleties. For, first, whence does Durandus have it that the souls must necessarily have been beatified in the same indivisible instant in which Christ died? For even if the price of redemption was then paid, and just souls ought soon to have been beatified, yet that 'soon' could be a certain very short time, which was required for the soul of Christ to become present to the souls of the Fathers. For even though the presence of Christ's soul was not necessary for the Fathers to be illumined with the divine vision, yet it seems it was fitting that Christ's soul be present when it happened; nor was there a danger that those holy souls, which had patiently waited many centuries of years, would take badly a delay of a very short and plainly imperceptible time. Next, Christ did not descend into hell only because of the beatification of souls, for he could have done it without descending, but also so that he should remain in the place of souls for the three days that his body lay in the place of bodies, and for other reasons too.

Durandus' third objection is that during those three days Christ's soul was with the thief in paradise, according to *Luke* 23, "Today you will be with me in paradise." Now it was not in paradise as to place, as is known, but as to effect, because Christ's blessed soul beatified the thief's soul as well; so, by parity of reasoning, when it is said that he was at the same time in hell one should understand it of hell not as to place but as to effect; or if he was in hell and in paradise as to place, then he was in two places at once.

I reply, first, that paradise is taken here metaphorically but hell properly. For paradise properly signifies an orchard. Hence in *Ecclesiastes* 1 Solomon says, "I made me gardens and orchards," and the Hebrew word is that for paradise; but the name 'hell' properly designates the lower place.

Second, since all the Fathers teach that Christ's soul during the three days was in hell where the other souls were – nay the same is witnessed by the Scriptures, the Councils, and the *Creed* – this must in no way be denied to a Christian man, whether the name 'paradise' is taken metaphorically, which is very much in

agreement with reason, or even properly. For it was not impossible for God to bring it about that Christ's soul was in two places at once.

Having disposed of these things, then, as if by way of appendix, we will explain some brief questions about this descent of Christ into hell that are accustomed to be dealt with among Catholics.

*Chapter Sixteen: Certain Doubts are solved*

The first doubt: To what places of hell did Christ descend? Blessed Thomas *ST IIIa* q.52 a.2 teaches that Christ descended in his real presence only to the limbo of the Fathers, but by effect to all the parts of hell. For he reproveth the damned for their unbelief, and to those who were being purged he gave hope of glory.

But it is certainly probable that Christ's soul descended to all the places of hell. First, because of the verse in *Ecclesiasticus* 14, "I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth, I will look on all those who sleep." For as to what Blessed Thomas replies, that this is understood of penetration in effect, does not seem to satisfy. For in this way we could say with Durandus that Christ descended to no place otherwise than by effect, since Scripture does not distinguish the places.

Second, because Augustine *Epistle* 99 says that Christ descended to the parts of hell where there were pains and torments. And Fulgentius book 3 to Trasimundus chapter 30 says that Christ descended to hell where the souls of sinners were accustomed to be tortured. Cyril of Jerusalem *Catechesis* 4, Ambrose *Mystery of the Pasch*, Eusebius Emisenus in his *Oration* on the Pasch, and other Fathers, when they describe the terror of gehenna and of the demons upon the descent of Christ, indicate openly that Christ manifested his presence to them. Indeed, Gregory of Nyssa in *Oration* 1 on the resurrection clearly says that the heart of the earth, whither Christ descended, was the seat of that great mind which is called the devil.

Further, the other Cyril in book 12 chapter 36 on *John* and other Fathers say that Christ descended to the lower parts of the earth so as to be lord of the living and the dead, that is, so as to take possession, as it were, of his whole kingdom. But the damned, as those who are by his command kept in chains and torments, also belong to his kingdom.

The second doubt: Whether being in hell was of any pain to Christ. Blessed Thomas *ST IIIa* q.52 aa.1 & 3 seems to say that being in hell as to his soul and in the grave as to his body was of some pain to Christ. For he says that Christ wanted to be there so as to take our sins on himself. Cajetan on *Acts* 2 says that the sorrows of death remained in Christ up to the resurrection, by reason of the penalties that are left over from death, which are principally three. First that the soul remains separated which would be in better state when conjoined. Second that the soul stays in a place not agreeable to it, that is, in hell. Third, that the body remains in the grave, and this he says is indicated by the words of Peter, "having loosed the pains of death."

But Bonaventure on *Sentences* 3 d.22 q.4 says that Christ's soul, while it was in hell, was in a place of punishment but without punishment, and his way of speaking seems to me more in conformity with the Fathers. Therefore, although the fact that the soul remains separated can be called a punishment or penalty or rather a lesser perfection, yet I would not dare to call punishment or penalty the staying of

Christ's soul in hell and his body in the grave; for the souls that are in hell as in prison receive punishment from it, nor can they depart when they want. But Christ was free in hell and liberator of others, as all the Fathers exclaim. But if a king visits the prison so as to free some, it is not called punishment but worthiness and humility. By parity of reasoning, to be in the grave is not punishment, nor simply bad for the body, nay it is a good for the dead body. But it is bad for the body to be corrupted and to putrefy in the grave, and Christ's body was in the grave but without corruption.

Hence Fulgentius book 3 chapter 30 to Trasimundus says that Christ ought, for the full effect of redemption, to have descended with his soul to the place of torments, but not to have suffered any torments; and to have descended with his body to the place of corruption but not to have suffered corruption, just as he had received a human nature similar to our sinful nature but received it without sin. Nor does the reasoning of Cajetan from the place of Peter in *Acts 2* prove anything. For as we showed above against Calvin, the pains of death are said to be what accompany and precede death not what follow it.

But Cajetan objects that the verse, "You will not leave my soul in hell," signify that it was a boon to Christ's soul that he was freed from that place, therefore it was a punishment to remain there.

I reply that it was a boon to Christ's soul that it was quickly conjoined to the body, just as separation was an evil for it, and in this way liberation from hell was a boon to it, not by reason of place but by reason of separation from the body. And this is perhaps what Blessed Thomas also meant to say, namely that it was a punishment for Christ to be in hell and in the grave only by reason of separation. For his argument proves nothing else, namely that he ought to undergo our punishments. For if this reasoning is adduced to prove that Christ ought to have truly died and therefore to have suffered separation of soul from body, it does conclude rightly. But if someone wanted to prove from it that Christ ought to have been in hell as in a wretched and penal place, he will effect nothing, or effect more than we would wish. For, according to this reasoning, Christ's soul ought to have been in hell as in a prison, and his flesh ought to have corrupted in the grave, for this is our punishment.

The third doubt: What did Christ's descent into hell bring to the souls of the just? Blessed Augustine in *Epistle 99* to Evodius seems to think that those souls were blessed before and that Christ's descent brought nothing to them. He says, "I have not yet found anything that Christ, when he descended into hell, brought to the just in the bosom of Abraham, from whom in the beatific presence of his divinity I see he never departed."

I reply, with the common opinion of Catholics, that Christ brought two great goods to them. First, essential blessedness. Second exit from the prison and conveyance into heaven, the first of which he immediately provided them, and the second not long after.

About the first we have the witness of *Ecclesiasticus 24*, "I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth; I will illumine all those who hope in the Lord." Again *Luke 23*, "Today you will be with me in paradise." This statement, says Origen in his *Homily on Genesis 15*, was said not only to the thief but also to all the just who were

in hell. Again there is the consensus of the Scholastics on *Sentences* 2 d.22. Finally we will show in book 1 on the cult of the saints, in the proper discussion, that after Christ's passion he at once admitted the souls of the saints to the vision of God. About the second benefit we have the consensus of the Fathers above cited.

So the place from Augustine Blessed Thomas replies *ST* IIIa q.52 a.5 ad 1, that Augustine did not mean to say that he did not find anything in an absolute sense that Christ brought to the just when he descended into hell, but something as to the pains of hell, which he loosed; so the sense is that Christ descended to loose the pains of hell, but the just were not in pain, so as to loosing them from pains Christ brought nothing.

Perhaps we will say better that when Augustine was writing that letter he did not yet know where the bosom of Abraham was, and he leaned toward the view that it is was not in hell; and so, while this doubt remained, he rightly said that he could not yet understand what Christ brought to the just by descending into hell. For, as we said, Christ brought two benefits to the souls of the just: the beatific vision and bringing them out of the prison of hell. By reason of the first there was no need of the descent, since divinity is what properly beatifies and it is everywhere. And this is what Augustine says in that place when he asserts that beatifying wisdom in its divinity was never absent from the souls of the just. For he does not mean to say that those souls were always blessed, but that there was no need of Christ to move for them to be beatified, since beatifying wisdom is everywhere. By reason of the second there was also no need of Christ's descent to hell if those souls were not in hell.

Fourth doubt: Whether, besides the souls of the just who were in the bosom of Abraham, any others were liberated.

I reply that no souls were freed of those damned to gehenna. For Philastrius in *Heresies*, chapter on the descent into hell, and Augustine in *Heresies* 79 say that it is a heresy if anyone asserts that any of the impious in hell were converted and saved when Christ preached. Besides a contradiction seems to be implied in saying that some were damned to eternal punishment and yet were afterwards saved. For eternal damnation includes the certainty of the punishment never ending; but how can they be certain that they are to be punished without end who may sometime be freed?

Add the place from *Ecclesiasticus* 24, "Illuming all those who hope in the Lord." For it is hence deduced that none of those were illumined who were damned to eternal punishment, since they without doubt were not hoping in the Lord. Add further the verse of *John* 9, "The night comes wherein no man can work." And *II Corinthians* 5, "We will all stand before the judgment seat of Christ, so that to each may be given what was proper to the body." And *Galatians* 6, "What a man sows that will he also reap. While we have time let us do good." For all these passages openly indicate that there is no place for penance and reconciliation after this life. Add lastly the consensus of theologians on *Sentences* 3 d.22.

Therefore the story is to be numbered among fables that Nicetas, in his comment on Gregory of Nazianzen's second oration on the Pasch, says circulated in the histories of the Fathers. For he says that to a certain Christian, who was attacking with curses the memory of Plato as impious and damned, Plato appeared

to him at rest and said, "I do not deny that I was a sinner, but when Christ descended into hell no one came to the faith before me." This is indeed a fable, but what Nicetas says in the same place is to be believed, that Chrysostom affirmed that no one in hell was freed by Christ's descent to that place save those who were worthy of salvation when he descended.

The same reasoning holds of the souls of infants who died in original sin; for it is credible that none of them were saved. Therefore what Clement of Alexandria says in *Stromateis* 6 is not probable, that when Christ preached in hell there were not lacking some who believed and did penance.

About the souls in purgatory there can be greater doubt. For from *Ecclesiasticus* 24, "I will illumine all who hope in the Lord," it can be gathered that all the pious souls were then beatified. Further, Augustine *Epistle* 99 to Evodius and in book 12 on *Genesis* 33 openly says that some were loosed by Christ from the pains of hell, and he explains that he is not speaking of the holy souls that were in the bosom of Abraham, nor of impious souls, which he reckons very absurd were converted when Christ descended into hell. Therefore it remains that he is speaking about the souls that were still paying the pains of purgatory. Again Gregory *Moralia* 12.20 says that all the elect were freed.

But Blessed Thomas *ST* IIIa q.52 a.8 teaches that the souls in purgatory were not freed simply by the descent of Christ into hell; for Christ did not bring anything to them that he had not merited in his passion, and Christ's passion did not have a temporal but an eternal effect, for it is always equally efficacious. Therefore Christ then liberated only those who had the sort of disposition that those have who are liberated now. However Blessed Thomas adds that there are two ways in which it could have happened that some were then liberated. First if they had fulfilled their time in purgatory. Second if by a special devotion to Christ's passion they had in this life merited to be then liberated when Christ descended to that place. And in this way should St. Augustine be expounded, who says that they were liberated whom the Lord knew were to be liberated.

To the place from *Ecclesiasticus* and from Gregory it could be said that Christ liberated all the elect when he descended into hell, but not all together; for some he liberated at once, and others afterwards, namely when their purgation was finished; but yet he did give to all that they should not remain in limbo waiting for blessedness. However it would not be an error if someone were to say that many others, or even all of them, were then liberated from purgatory by a special grace, because the Lord is not bound by the sacraments or our merits.

## Book Five: On Christ as Mediator and his Merit

### *Chapter One: Brief Explanation about which Nature Christ is Mediator in*

Two disputations about Christ remain: one, according to which nature Christ was mediator; two, whether Christ the Mediator merited, by his works and labors, something only for us or also for himself. To the explanation of these questions this last book, or rather booklet, has been dedicated.

To begin, then, with the former question, the thing to be explained at the start is what a mediator properly is. We call him a mediator who places himself between those who disagree, or who certainly are not joined together, so as to bring them to agreement or to join them by a new compact. But this happens in two ways: first by some substantial mediation, and second by operation.

Christ can be said to be Mediator in the first way insofar as his personality conjoined the divine and human nature with a new and marvelous compact. And although the Fathers often speak of this mediation, yet it is not the mediation that we are now disputing of. For there is no need to inquire what nature this mediation took place in. For it did not take place in either nature, but in the personality which connects the two natures. Further, this mediation is not between natures that disagree. For Christ's humanity was never contrary to his divinity. Rather, we are speaking of the mediation whereby the innocent Christ reconciled sinners to the Father.

Setting aside, then, this substantial mediation, the mediation that consists in work can happen in four ways.

First, by distinguishing and judging the cause, in the way arbitrators can be called mediators. And this first way is attributed to Christ by *Ambrose* on *I Timothy* 2; for *Ambrose* says that Christ, made arbitrator by God, judged that peace could be made if God first forgave and men then remained in the faith of God.

Second, by bringing back from this side and that the agreements and conditions of each party, in the way all messengers between parties are called mediators. And in this way does the name mediator seem it needs to be taken when *Moses* says *Deuteronomy* 5, "I was the middle and go-between of God and you at that time," and *Galatians* 3, "The law was given through angels in the hands of a mediator," that is, *Moses*. And this way too belongs to Christ, who announced God's will and laws to men. And for this reason is it said in *Malachi* 3, "The angel of the testament," and *Hebrews* 9 and 12, "the mediator of the new testament," where *Paul* alludes to *Moses* who was the mediator of the old testament.

Third, by praying to and supplicating one part on behalf of the other part. This too belongs to Christ who in *Romans* 8 is said "to intercede for us," and who in *I John* 2 is called, "our advocate."

Fourth, by giving payment and satisfaction to one part on behalf of the other part. And this way of mediation most properly belongs to Christ, who in the whole Scripture is described as a victim for sin. So *I Timothy* 2, after the Apostle had said, "There is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus," he then added the cause saying, "who gave himself a redemption for many." And so too in *Romans* 8 and *I John* 2, when Christ is called advocate and interceder to God for us, he is not

said to be the one advocate and intercessor, because others too intercede for us; nor was Christ himself the only mediator by way of arbitrator or intervening messenger, but Moses was as well. But Christ alone gave payment for us and reconciled us to God by his own blood.

So the three prior ways of mediation are common to Christ along with others, but the fourth belongs properly to Christ alone. Our question here, however, where we are investigating the nature in which the office of mediator belongs to Christ, can be understood in all these ways.

Now it is a common opinion of Catholics that indeed the Mediator himself or the principle (as the theologians say) that worked the works of mediation was not God alone or man alone but both together, that is, the Incarnate Word or the God made man. The principle, however, *by* which the Mediator did works, was the human and not the divine nature. For although it was the Incarnate God who prayed, suffered, obeyed, made satisfaction, yet he did all these things in the form of a servant, not in the form of God. And this is the opinion of Master Lombard in *Sentences* 3 d.19 near the end, of St. Bonaventure on the same place, article 2 last question, and of the rest of the theologians on that place, and also of St. Thomas *ST* IIIa q.26 a.2.

In conflict with this opinion there are at this time two errors contrary to each other, one of which turns toward Nestorianism and the other toward Eutychianism. We will, with God's help, refute both in few words.

*Chapter Two: The Error of Stancar about the Mediator is refuted*

The former error is that of Stancar, who attributed the office of Mediator to the man Christ in such a way that the divine supposit did not seem in any way to be required, and at least not as the principle 'which' of any work. Francis Stancar does indeed seem in many places to think correctly. For in his book *On the Trinity and the Mediator* against the men of Zurich, and in another book of the same argument against Calvin, and in the *Pinczow Exam*, and in another little book about the word 'Only', he very often repeats that the person of Christ consists of two natures, divine and human; and in his book against Zurich, near the end, he professes that he follows the doctrine of the Master of the *Sentences* and the Scholastics, and about the Master he speaks so honorifically that he prefers him to all the sectaries. "One Peter Lombard is worth more," he says, "than a hundred Luthers, two hundred Melanchthons, three hundred Bullingers, four hundred Peter Martyrs, and five hundred Calvins, all of whom, if they were ground in one mortar, would not yield an ounce of true theology." Yet words are also read in his books that are suspect and sound badly.

For in his book *On the Trinity and the Mediator*, in refutation of the first letter of Zurich, he says that the dignity of Christ's prayers came not from the Son alone, but from the whole Trinity ordaining and accepting them. Here he seems sufficiently clearly not to attribute infinite dignity to the works of Christ because of the dignity of the supposit but because of divine acceptance. But he would certainly not do this if he reckoned that the works of the Mediator were not the works of a human but of a divine supposit. And in the same book, in confuting the second letter, he says that in Christ in the abstract the human nature is mediator, conciliator, peacemaker.

Here he seems to attribute the whole work to the nature itself, as if it existed of itself and acted by itself, especially since in the same book he had before said that the one work of Mediator could not be attributed to the person.

And in his book *On the Office of Mediator and High Priest* he says, "Priest and sacrifice are the man Christ, not the God Christ, that is, Christ as he is man, not as he is God." These words can be drawn to a good sense, yet simply they do not sound well; and above all because, when he explains them a little later, he says that in Christ are three names, spirit, soul, and body, and that by reason of spirit Christ is priest, and by reason of soul and body he is victim. Here he never makes any mention of the divine supposit that is operating. Finally in the *Pinczow Exam* he says, "The word 'mediator' is taken first for the humanity of Christ carrying out the office of mediator; but second it is taken for the person of Christ himself, who is God and man."

Add to this that Frederick Staphylus in his book on the succession and agreement of the disciples of Luther, and William Lindanus in his second *Dialogue of Dubitantius* affirm that the Stancarians teach that Christ is justifier only in his humanity, namely because they reckon that we are formally justified by the justice of Christ, or by his obedience imputed to us, and that the obedience and justice of Christ are the work of the humanity alone.

Finally Peter Canisius, in the preface to book one of his *Corruptions of the Word of God* writes that when the Stancarians are asked why they suppose two united natures in Christ, they are accustomed to reply that the human nature sustained by the divine nature could suffer everything that it was necessary to suffer.

This opinion, whether it is Stancar's or not (for I do not dare to affirm where I am not certain), most clearly turns aside to Nestorianism. For in word it confesses one person in Christ but in reality it posits two, and plainly undoes the mystery of redemption. For if the human nature alone did the works of satisfaction, then the human nature per se existed, and so there was a supposit distinct from the divine supposit, for to act belongs to supposits. There were, then, two supposits in Christ, which is the very heresy itself of Nestorius.

Further, this opinion is repugnant to Scripture and the Fathers. For the chief work of the Mediator was Christ's passion. But this is attributed to the Lord and God himself, and so it must belong to him, at least by reason of supposit. Or is not God said in *Acts* 20 to have "acquired the Church by his own blood"? And is he not called in *I Corinthians* 3 "the crucified Lord of glory"? And in *Philippians* 2 is it not said "He who was in the form of God equal to the Father humbled himself and was made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross"?

The Fathers in addition, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and others on *I Timothy* 2, and again Hilary *On the Trinity* 9, not far from the beginning, Epiphanius in *Ancoratus*, before the middle, Cyril *Thesaurus* 12.10 and *On the Trinity* 1, before the middle, Augustine *City of God* 9.17, and Fulgentius *On the Faith to Peter* 2 say that Christ is for this reason called the one Mediator by Paul, that he alone is truly in the middle between God and man, since he had the nature of both. Here the Fathers mean to show that Christ could not have been an efficacious Mediator unless he who carried out the office of Mediator was a

divine person. But he could not have been a divine person unless he had a divine nature; therefore they say that the single and true Mediator ought to have been God and man.

Besides these places there are certain other very clear ones: Basil on the verse of *Psalms* 48, "Brother does not redeem, man will not redeem," says, "If a man cannot redeem us, he who has redeemed us is not man, lest you should think that our Lord, for the reason he came to us in the likeness of sinful flesh, was only a man."

Gregory Nazianzen in *Oration 2* on the Pasch, near the end, says, "We needed God to assume flesh and undergo death so that we might live."

Cyril *On Right Faith to Queens* says, "Christ's death is confessedly salvific, but if he were not God how could he himself and alone suffice to be the price? But he alone, having died for all, does suffice, because he is above all."

Augustine in his *Homily* on the sheep chapter 12 says, "Man is not Mediator apart from deity; God is not Mediator apart from humanity. Behold the Mediator: divinity without humanity is not Mediator, but between divinity alone and humanity alone is the human divinity and divine humanity of Christ." Here Augustine does indeed speak improperly when he uses the abstract name for the concrete, yet he very clearly expresses what we mean, namely that he who exercised the office of Mediator was not pure man. And in *Enchiridion* 108 he says, "For neither would we be liberated by him, the one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, unless he were also God." Leo *Sermon 1* on the birthday of the Lord says, "Unless he were true God, he would not bring remedy; unless he were true man, he would not give example."

Add lastly that if a human person made satisfaction for us he did not make satisfaction with the strictness of justice, and therefore the Incarnation was not necessary. Nor do Stancar's reasons prove anything against us but only against the Calvinists. His chief reason is that in the *Epistle* of Agatho, which was read in the Sixth Synod act 4, a personal work in Christ is denied and a natural work asserted, that is, the works of Christ are attributed to the natures, not to the person. But the solution is easy. For Agatho does not mean to deny that the works of Christ are the works of the person, and of one and the same person, but he means to say that there is not just one work in Christ according to the one person of the worker, but that there are two works according to the two natures by which the one person operates.

For works are multiplied with the multiplication of the formal principle. Just as there are also three in the Trinity who work and yet they have one work, because there is one formal principle, namely the one nature.

### *Chapter Three: The Errors of the Calvinists and Lutherans about the Mediator are refuted from the Scriptures*

The other error, contrary to the previous one, belongs to those who contend that Christ exercises his office of Mediator according to both natures, divine and human. So Calvin openly teaches in the two epistles to the Poles, the same also do the ministers of the men of Zurich, Henry Bullinger and Peter Martyr, and others again in the two epistles to the Poles. It is expressly taught by Josiah Simler in his book against Stancar, where he defends the epistles of the men of Zurich attacked by

Stancar. Martin Chemnitz also thinks the same, for in his book on the two natures he reports among absurd opinions that Christ is Mediator according to his human nature alone. Melancthon has the same in *Places*, the chapter about the Son, where he says that the deity of the Son was obedient to the Father. The *Book of Concord* also has the same, pages 556, 645, 736.

And lest they be thought to mean that Christ is Mediator in both natures by reason of the supposit, not by reason of formal principle, one must note that what their opinion is can be clearly gathered from two things in particular.

First, from the fact they confess that they dissent in this matter from the Master of the *Sentences* and from the Scholastics. Now the Master and the Scholastics eloquently teach that Christ is Mediator in his human nature, not in his divine nature, though the Mediator himself is and should be God and man.

Second, it is gathered from the fact they distinguish between the works of the Mediator, and they maintain that some belong to the humanity as to the thing and to the divinity as to the effect, as suffering and dying; others they maintain belong to the divinity alone, as enlightening minds, remitting sins etc. Nay even offering sacrifice they attribute to the divine nature, but being victim to the human nature. For Stancar testifies in his book *On the Trinity and the Mediator* that in a public colloquium Stanislaus Sarnicius, whom Calvin calls a faithful servant of Christ in his letter to the Poles, commanded that this be written down, "He is High Priest by the divine nature, but sacrifice by the human nature." This error introduces partly Arianism and partly Eutychianism.

We must prove, therefore, that Christ was Mediator only in his human nature – if, as we said, the discussion is about the formal principle and not about the supposit itself. And first we have from the Scriptures this place of Paul in *I Timothy* 2, "One God and one Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ." Why, I ask, did he add 'man' if not to express the nature in which Christ was Mediator? Augustine noted this in *On Original Sin* 2.38 and *Sermon* 11 on the words of the Apostle.

Besides, the Apostle here distinguishes the Mediator from God. He says, "One God and one Mediator of God and men." Therefore Christ is not Mediator in his divine nature but only in his human nature, by which nature Christ is distinguished from God.

But the adversaries reply that here the distinction is made on the part of the person. For by 'one God' is understood the Father, from whom the Son is distinguished as to person. Otherwise, they say, a quaternity would follow if the Mediator were distinguished from the whole Trinity. Hence Calvin in his second epistle to the Poles laughs at these expositions: 'One God', that is, 'the Trinity', and 'You believe in God', that is, 'in the Trinity'. And assuredly by this very fact do Calvin and the Calvinists vehemently confirm Arianism. For the Arians desire that wherever 'One God' is read, or simply 'God', the Father be understood, not the Trinity.

Besides, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact note on this place that by the 'One God' the Son is not excluded but the gods of the nations. So they understood by 'One God' not the Father but the Trinity. Again Augustine in his talk on *Psalms* 1, when explaining these very words, says that 'One God' signifies the Trinity and that Christ is the Mediator between the Trinity and sinful men. For thus Augustine

speaks, “What is it to be Mediator between God and men – not between Father and men but between God and men? What is God? Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Who are men? Sinners, the impious, mortals. Between the Trinity and the weakness and iniquity of men a man is made Mediator who is not iniquitous but yet is weak.” He repeats the same in his commentary on *Galatians* 3, and, following Augustine, Bede and Anselm teach the same in their commentary on *I Timothy* 2.

Reason itself also manifestly bears witness to the fact. For not only was the Father hostile to us because of our sins and needing to be placated by the Mediator, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit were. The whole Trinity therefore needed to be reconciled to men by the Mediator. Therefore, when Paul says, “One God and one Mediator of God and men,” he is necessarily signifying by ‘One God’ the whole Trinity. Hence Calvin, when he rejects this exposition, is rejecting Augustine, Bede, Anselm, all the Greek Fathers, and reason itself. Nor for that reason does a quaternity follow, for the same Christ, because of his two natures, is both numbered among the persons of the Trinity, to whom satisfaction is owed, and is himself at the same time the one who satisfies. For he himself as he is man is Mediator to himself as he is God.

*Chapter Four: The same Error is refuted from the Fathers*

Let the testimony of the Fathers now be added. And first Cyril, in his *Defense of the Twelve Chapters against the Orientals*, proposes this objection against the tenth chapter, “If God the Word is priest, to whom or what sort of God does he offer his ministry?” Then he responds as follows, “When he became man he was called High Priest, not to offer sacrifice to a greater God, but to himself and the Father.” And later, “When you hear that he is called Priest because of his humanity, are you ashamed? Then how are not filled with wonder that he did not perform the manner of sacrifice according to the custom of priests, but rather to himself and the Father, as I said?”

Here Cyril not only says openly that Christ is High Priest because of his humanity, but even compels us to assert the corresponding negative, that is, that he is not High Priest according to his divinity, when he says that he offered the sacrifice to himself and to the Father. For it is not possible for one and the same, as same, to offer and receive sacrifice; but he receives the sacrifice as God; therefore he does not offer it as God; therefore he offers it only as man. The same Cyril in book 11 on *John* 7 says, “Insofar as he is Son and God along with the Father he bestows goods on us; but insofar as he is Mediator and High Priest he brings our prayers to the Father.”

Chrysostom on *Hebrews* 9, when explaining the verse, “Therefore he is Mediator of the New Testament etc.,” says, “What is a mediator? A mediator is not lord of that of which he is mediator but is even some other thing.” But who would say that Christ as God is not Lord? Therefore Chrysostom holds that Christ is Mediator only in the form of servant.

Now the gloss of Josiah Simler is ridiculous, for he says that the deity of Christ is pure Lord, but by reason of the self-emptying it is not Lord. But self-emptying does not belong to the divine nature but to the person of the Son, who is said to have emptied himself because he took on the form of a servant, yet without

loss of the form of God. But to say that the deity of the Son is not Lord is to say that it is not true deity but created nature, as the Arians maintain.

Augustine in *Confessions* 10.43 says, "To the extent he is man, to that extent he is Mediator; to the extent he is Word he is not in the middle because he is equal to God, and God with God, and one God with the Father and Holy Spirit." Again in *Epistle* 59 to Paulinus he says, "Through the Mediator, not God, which the Word always was, but the man Jesus Christ." And *On the Trinity* 1.7 he says, "Christ in the form of God is equal to the Father; in the form of servant he is Mediator of God and men." In *Agreement of the Evangelists* 3 he says, "Christ as man is made King and Priest, so that there might be a Mediator of God and men to intercede for us, the man Christ Jesus." *City of God* 10.20, "Hence the true Mediator, insofar as, by taking the form of a servant, he is made Mediator of God and men, receives the sacrifice when in the form of God along with the Father, with whom he is one God; but he preferred to be the sacrifice in the form of a servant." *Against Faustus* 16.15, "Christ is unlike men because he is God; he is like men because he is man the Mediator of God and men." *On Original Sin* 2.28, "He is not an intermediate by the fact that he is equal to the Father, for by this he is as distant from us as the Father is. And how will there be an intermediate where there is the same distance? Therefore the Apostle does not say 'Christ Jesus' but 'the man Christ Jesus'. Therefore he is Mediator by that by which he is man: inferior to the Father because he is closer to us, superior to us because he is nearer to the Father. This is more clearly said as follows: inferior to the Father because in the form of a servant, superior to us because without blemish of sin." Again on *Psalm* 29, "Between the Trinity and the weakness and iniquity of men, a man without iniquity but yet weak is made Mediator."

Finally (so that we may have witness from all ten volumes of Augustine), in *Tractate* 82 on *John* he says, "Mediator of God and men, not as he is God, but as he is the man Jesus Christ." And *Sermon* 11 on the words of the Apostle, "One God and one Mediator of God and men," he says, "Paul does not say 'Christ Jesus' lest you should think him called so as he is the Word, but he adds 'man', 'Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus'." Fulgentius *On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ* 13, "Here in human nature he is made Mediator of God and men."

#### *Chapter Five: The same Error is refuted with Reasons*

Let most efficacious reasons finally be added. The first reason is from the definition and condition of a mediator. A mediator must be a middle, that is, distant from both of the parts that are opposed in some way. For if it were the same as one part, it could not be thought, nay not even imagined, how it is a mediator. Further, this definition agrees with Christ as he is a just man, but not as he is God. For as man he is distant from God; as just he agrees with God; and, conversely, as man he agrees with other men, as just he is distant from other men, for all are by nature born as children of wrath. But Christ as God is not in any way distant from God, that is, not in nature, or justice, or in any other way; therefore not as God but as a just man is he Mediator between God and sinful men. And this is what Augustine says on *Psalm* 29, "Between the Trinity and the weakness and iniquity of men the Mediator is a man without iniquity but weak."

The second reason is that if Christ is Mediator in each nature, or in both natures taken together, then not in both at once, for Christ taken in both natures at once is distant indeed from other men and also from the Father and the Holy Spirit, but not distant from God the Son, either in person or nature; and yet even from the Son he must be distant, since he is also himself an offended part, to placate whom there is need of a Mediator.

Nor is the reply of Josiah Simler valid, who says that Christ as God is a Mediator for himself. For Christ indeed as man is Mediator of himself as God. But that one and the same is as he is God Mediator of himself as he is God involves a most open contradiction. For it follows therefrom that Christ is distant and not distant from himself considered under the same idea and in the same way. Therefore Christ in both natures taken at once cannot be Mediator. But that Christ is not Mediator in each nature taken separately is plain, because not in the divine nature taken separately, since it is the offended part and in it Christ is not distant from God. It remains then that he is Mediator only in the human nature.

The third reason is that if Christ were in any way Mediator in his divine nature, all three persons would be mediators. For since the divine nature is common to the three persons, whatever belongs to one person in respect of it belongs to all three. Hence the maxim among the Fathers: "The works of the Trinity are undivided." Further, that it is absurd for all three persons to be mediators does not seem to need proof. For if the whole Trinity is Mediator of whom will it be Mediator? Is there some other God above the Trinity with whom the Trinity itself might fulfill the office of mediator?

Josiah Simler replies that the works of the Trinity are undivided in such a way that nevertheless different things are often attributed as proper to different persons. He gives two examples: one, in the internal activities, for only the Father generates, only the Son is generated, even though the works of the Trinity are undivided; a second in external activities, for in the Baptism of Christ, *Matthew 3*, the Father alone said, "This is my beloved Son," and only the Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove. The like is read in *Matthew 17*, about the voice and the cloud in the Transfiguration. And Simler confirms it from the testimonies of Augustine in *Sermon 11* on the words of the Lord, and of Leo in his *Sermon* on the Transfiguration and his *Sermon 2 & 3* on Pentecost.

But these are too cold. For to generate and be generated in divine reality are not essential actions, which are common to the three persons, but are called notional acts, which posit nothing proper in the persons besides relation. For 'to generate' is to understand the divine reality with the relation of producing knowledge. And in fact 'to understand' is itself common to the three and only relation is proper to the generator; but the actions of the Mediator are external actions and so, if they belong to Christ as he is God, belong to the other persons, who are the same God as Christ.

Nor even is Simler's second example valid. For in the Baptism of Christ the voice that was heard was formed by the whole Trinity but to signify the Father alone, just as the dove too was formed by the whole Trinity to represent the Holy Spirit alone. Therefore the true and real action whereby these things were done was common, and only the representation was proper to one person. And this do the

Fathers cited by Simler teach. And the same Augustine says more clearly in *On the Trinity* 2.10, "The person of the Father is shown also in the voice when the dove descended upon the one baptized; not that the voice could have been made without the work of the Son and Holy Spirit, since the Trinity operates inseparably, but because the voice was made to show the person of the Father alone." Since, therefore, we are not disputing what the works of the Mediator signify but by whom they were done, Josiah ought to concede that the actions of the Mediator are common to the whole Trinity. Therefore it will be permitted to say that the Father intercedes for us, sweats blood for us, and other things of the kind, which manifestly belong to the heresy of the Patripassionists.

The fourth reason is that the proper office of the Mediator is to sacrifice and, by sacrificing, to satisfy, as is clear from *Hebrews* 7-9 and from the confession of our adversaries. But to sacrifice cannot belong to Christ in his divinity but only in his humanity; since to make the divinity the priest of the son is most open Arianism. For every priest is less than he of whom he is the priest; for a priest's office is to minister. Therefore Ambrose *On the Faith* 3.5 says, "The same is priest, the same is also victim and priesthood, and yet sacrifice is an office of the human nature." And later, "Let no one, then, ascribe a right of divinity where he sees an order of human condition."

Jerome on *Psalms* 109, on the verse, "The Lord has sworn etc. You are a priest for ever," says, "He did not swear to him who was born before the morning light, but to him who after the morning light was born of a Virgin." Fulgentius *On the Faith to Peter* 2 says, "As man Christ was made King and High Priest." Finally in a sermon of the Arians proposition 33, in Augustine volume 6, is contained the words that the Son is minister and priest of his Father; therefore Christ as God did not sacrifice, save in the opinion of the Arians.

The same can be said of the other offices of Christ the Mediator, as that "he intercedes for us," *Romans* 8, that "he is our advocate," *I John* 2, that "he gave himself as redemption for us," *I Timothy* 2. All these things are proof of a lower nature. Christ as God, then, cannot be Mediator, unless as God he is less than the Father and serves the Father as minister.

The fifth reason is that, if the proper operation of Mediator belongs to Christ by reason of both natures, there follows a confusion of operations and so of natures in Christ, which is the heresy of the Monothelites and Eutychians condemned at the Sixth Synod act.17. For when, at the Sixth Synod, one operation of Christ is rejected, the rejection is not of one operation in respect of God as principal agent and of man as instrument. For it is certain that many operations of this sort are found in Christ. For such were all the miracles that were done by God the Word through the flesh as instrument. But the rejection is of one operation in respect of God and man as principal and proper cause. For that cause is proper and principal that acts from its own virtue, which it has from its proper form and essence.

And, in order to illustrate the fact with examples, when Christ cured fevers by putting his hands on the sick, the imposition of hands was the proper and principal operation of the humanity, because it had this from its proper form; but the expulsion of the fever was the proper and principal operation of the deity, because the hands of Christ did not have this from their proper form but only as applied to

this work by God. But to say that the imposing of hands was the proper operation of the deity, or that the expelling of the fever was the proper operation of the humanity, and therefore that the imposing of hands and the expelling of fever was only one operation, is to confuse operations and natures, and this heresy was condemned in that Sixth Council.

Now to sacrifice, then, which is the office of the Mediator, is proper to Christ as he is man. For it belongs to him in his human form, as is plain, because it belongs also to those who are purely men; therefore, if this same thing belongs to Christ as he is God, the same operation will belong to both natures as to proper and principal cause, unless they hold that the deity is the instrument of the humanity, than which nothing absurder can be thought. So by this opinion the heresy of the Eutychians and Monothelites is introduced, condemned with much labor long ago and almost extinct.

Josiah Simler responds that to sacrifice, although it is one work, is not altogether the same action in the deity and the humanity. For the substance of the work is proper to the humanity but the efficacy and dignity of the work is proper to the deity.

On the contrary. If it were so, then the deity could not be called pontiff and priest, as however Sarnicius called it, nor could it be denominated as sacrificing; just as neither is God said to sleep or walk because he gives us efficacy for sleeping or walking. Besides, the efficacy and dignity of Christ's sacrifice is not any physical action, or any real inflow or efficient causality of the deity into the work. For then the efficacy, and so the sacrifice, would no more belong to the Son than to the Father and the Holy Spirit, for every operation is common that belongs to the persons in the essence.

Whence, therefore, you will ask, does Christ's sacrifice get its infinite efficacy and dignity? It gets it from the fact it is the sacrifice of a divine person, though done in human nature, just as also the same work done by a king and by a private person differs greatly as to worth by reason of the dignity of the ones working, and yet the royal majesty infuses into the work nothing physical or real. For no reason can it, therefore, be conceded that to sacrifice is an action of both natures, unless one wants to fall into the heresy of the Monothelites already long ago condemned and exploded.

*Chapter Six: The Adversaries' Arguments taken from the Scriptures are solved*

But the adversaries object, first, the words of the Lord in *John 8*, "I lay down my soul." This, says Calvin in his *Epistle to the Poles*, is said by the Mediator, but not by him as man but as God. For no one has authority over life and death but God.

I reply that to lay down one's soul belongs not to God but to man, although the power of laying it down and taking it up at will is given by God to man. For what is laying down one's soul but to die? And what is to take up one's soul but to rise again? But to die and to rise belong certainly to man and not to God. And thus do the holy Fathers expound these words.

Augustine in *Tractate 47* takes soul for the substance itself of the soul, and asks to whom it belongs to lay down the soul, whether to the Word, or the flesh, or the soul itself. And he replies not to the Word, because the Word never laid down

the soul; nor to the soul, because the soul cannot be separated from itself; but to the flesh, which at one time lost the soul, at another time received it. "The flesh," he says, "lays down its soul, and the flesh again takes it up, not however the flesh by its own power, but by the power of the one inhabiting the flesh." And *Against Maximinus* 3.14, "That which even you thought should be brought to mind, which he speaks most manifestly as man, 'I have the power to lay down my soul' etc." Chrysostom too often repeats as to this place that Christ said these things in his humanity. Therefore let Calvin see what authors he is following when he attributes laying down the soul and taking it up again to the divinity.

But they bring forward the verse of *II Corinthians* 5, "But all things are from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ." And later, "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself." And later, "We fulfill, then, an embassy for Christ, as if God were exhorting you through us; we beseech you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God." And the verse of *Colossians* 1, "Making peace by the blood of his cross, whether they are on earth or whether in heaven." But to reconcile, to exhort, to make peace, are actions of the Mediator. Therefore Christ as God was Mediator.

I reply first that to reconcile, to exhort, and to make peace do not always belong to a mediator. For it belongs to a mediator to reconcile someone to another. But if someone by himself reconciles an enemy to himself, he is not called a mediator. So every mediator reconciles, but not everyone who reconciles is at once a mediator. I add further that it is one thing to reconcile through a mediator and another to be a mediator. For it is possible for one of the disagreeing parties to procure a mediator and reconciliation through him, and yet that party will not be a mediator. Thus therefore did God reconcile us to himself, but through a mediator whom he sent us.

Lastly they bring forward the verse of *Hebrews* 4, "We have a High Priest who passes through the heavens." Again from *Hebrews* 7, "Without father, without mother, without genealogy." For to pass through the heavens cannot belong to someone who is purely a man, nor is any priest without father and without mother save Christ God and man; for he as God lacks a mother, and as man lacks a father. Therefore Christ is priest, and so Mediator, according to both natures. Therefore Athanasius in his book *The Humanity of Christ*, and Cyril in his *Epistle to Nestorius* 10 confess that the Word himself is priest.

I reply that all these things rightly prove that the person of our High Priest is divine, which is something we most gladly confess. For Jesus is truly High Priest, who passed through the heavens, and who is without father and without mother, and at the same time has father and mother, is God; but he did not as God pass through the heavens; nor does he as man lack a mother or have a father; and again he is as God High Priest. For the virtue, indeed, by which Christ passed through the heavens was from God, yet that he passes through the heavens, since it is to move in place, cannot belong to Christ in the form of God, which is unchangeable, but only in the form of man.

By parity of reasoning Christ the God lacks a father, but as man; he lacks a mother, but as God. Yet he has a father, because he is God from God; and he has a mother, because he is Son of Man. Finally God the Word, as Athanasius and Cyril

rightly teach, is Priest, but in the form of man, as the same Cyril testifies in his *Apology*.

*Chapter Seven: The Testimonies of the Fathers are explained that the Adversaries put forward*

In the second place the adversaries put forward testimonies from the Fathers. And first they give in objection Dionysius the Areopagite, who in his *Epistle* to Gaius says that Christ exercised "a theandric activity," that is, a manly operation of God. And the same is contained in *Divine Names 2*.

I reply that this opinion of Dionysius can be understood in three ways.

First, if one understand by God's manly operation a single operation proper to both natures, as our adversaries seem to maintain, then he is manifestly in error. For in the Sixth Synod act.8 the Monothelite heretic Makarios advanced this opinion of Dionysius in this sense, to strengthen his heresy.

Second, the name of God's manly operation can be given to some work of Christ, where actions of deity and humanity come together, but distinct and really two actions. This opinion is true and intended by the author. And in this way it is expounded by Sophronius in his remarkable oration that was read in the Sixth Synod act.11, where he distinguishes three kinds of works of Christ: some purely divine, as to create and conserve all creatures; some purely human, as to eat and drink; some partly divine and partly human, as to walk on water. For to walk belonged to man, but to give solidity to water belonged to God. And these actions are called *theandric*, that is, divinely human works, of which sort were all the miracles, but not all the works of Christ; further such theandric works are not works of the Mediator as he is Mediator, namely to sacrifice and to pray. For all these are human.

A third understanding of this theandric operation can be advanced from Damascene 3.19, when he teaches that every action of Christ can be called theandric by reason of the supposit doing them. For always the God man operates, not bare God or bare man. In this way too does Damascene seem to expound what St. Leo says in *Epistle 10*, that each nature does in communion with the other what is proper to it. For he means this 'in communion with the other' to be as if the statement was, 'when the union with the other in the same supposit remains'. And in this understanding the authority of Dionysius is not to the purpose.

Second the adversaries give in objection Irenaeus 3.20, who says, "It was necessary for the Mediator of God and men to bring both to friendship and concord through his family relation to both, and to make God receive man, and man give himself to God." Again the adversaries bring forward like words from Epiphanius in *Ancoratus* before the middle, and from Theophylact on *I Timothy 2*, who say that the Mediator of God and men ought to have had both natures in himself so as to lead God and men to friendship.

I reply that all of these are speaking of substantial mediation, which was brought about in Christ himself by the Incarnation, and which was necessary for mediation through operation. For unless Christ were God man he would not be a divine supposit working in human nature, and therefore the works of the Mediator would not be of infinite worth. Therefore Christ, as to mediation through operation,

is formally Mediator by humanity alone; yet, in order to be Mediator and to be able to redeem the whole world from the rigor of justice, he ought to have a divine supposit in addition to the form of humanity, and he could not have a divine supposit in human nature unless there was in him a substantial mediation of two natures.

Third they bring in objection Augustine *Enchiridion* 108, who says, "For neither would we be freed by one Mediator of God and men unless he were also God." Again *On the Consensus of the Evangelists* 1.35, "Therefore Christ is called Mediator of God and men between immortal God and mortal man, God and man reconciling man to God, remaining what he was, made to be what he was not." Again *Homily on the sheep* 12, "Man is not Mediator apart from divinity." Again, "Divine humanity and human divinity is mediator." Again *City of God* 9.15, "A Mediator must be looked for who is not only man but also God."

I reply that Augustine is speaking of the person, who needed to give dignity to the work. The thing is plain both from the places we have cited and from *City of God* 9.15 cited by the adversaries. For after Augustine had said that the Mediator had to be God and man, he adds, "Nor yet is he Mediator on this account, because the Word, and indeed the Word most immortal and most blessed, is far from mortal miseries; but he is Mediator by the fact he is man."

#### *Chapter Eight: The Arguments taken from Reason are solved*

Lastly they make objection with reasons. To renew hearts and give the Holy Spirit are works of the Mediator, for Augustine teaches in *Enchiridion* 33 that we receive the Holy Spirit through the Mediator and yet it is certain that to give the Holy Spirit and to renew hearts belong to God alone. Again, to teach is a work of the Mediator, and yet Augustine in *On the Master* affirms that only God is the true Master who teaches man science. Christ as God, therefore, is Mediator.

I reply that to give the Holy Spirit by way of merit is proper to the Mediator, but this way of giving the Spirit does not belong to God formally but to man; but to give the Holy Spirit and to renew hearts as efficient cause and as author of the gift does not belong to the Mediator but to him with whom the Mediator intercedes, that is, to God the Father and Son and Holy Spirit. And it is plain that, since the gift of the Holy Spirit and all enlightenment are given by the whole Trinity, then, if this sort of giving belonged to the Mediator, the whole Trinity would be Mediator.

By the same reasoning, to preach belongs principally to God, that is, to the Trinity; to teach by way of instrument belongs to man; Christ then, as God, is the true principal Doctor and Master; the same Christ, as man, Mediator of God and men, was Doctor as instrument of divinity, but a conjoined and singular instrument, not a separate and common one, of the sort the Apostles and Prophets were.

The second reason is Calvin's, in his *Epistle to the Poles*: Christ was head of angels and men, even before Adam's fall, in the still uncorrupted state of things, *Colossians* 1, "Firstborn of every creature;" therefore Christ was also Mediator before the fall of the first man, but Christ was not then man; therefore he was, as God, head and Mediator of men and angels.

Add too that Chrysostom, Augustine, and Jerome in their commentaries on *Galatians* 3, when expounding the verse, "The law was ordained through angels in

the hand of a mediator," maintain that the law was given through Christ as mediator, and that Paul is speaking of this in this place; indeed also, Jerome goes further and says that by this Mediator not only was the law given but the world was created as well. But it is clear that Christ was not man when the law was given to the Hebrews, and much more clearly so when the world was created; so it necessarily follows that he was Mediator in the form of God.

I reply that Christ as God, even before the fall of angels and men, was their head, though not Christ alone but also the Father and the Holy Spirit. But that Christ was Mediator of angels, or even of men before sin, is false; otherwise we would make the Father and Holy Spirit also to be Mediators. For, in the first place, the Scripture does indeed make Christ head of all angels and men, *Ephesians 1* and *Colossians 1*, but it never makes Christ Mediator of the angels. For Paul in *I Timothy 1*, when speaking of the Mediator, says in eloquent words that "Christ is Mediator of God and men."

Therefore what Calvin says of Christ as Mediator before the sin of Adam is expressly against Augustine, and seems to be manifest Arianism. For Calvin does not make Christ Mediator before the Incarnation for this reason, that he reckons grace was given to the angels and the first man because of the Incarnation and its foreseen merits, which none of the Catholics seem to have thought (whose opinion I am not now discussing), but that he thinks the eternal Word, by which he was God before the Incarnation, performed the office of Mediator between the Father and angels, and even men in the state of innocence. But not without suspicion of Arianism is this said. For a mediator qua mediator, since he must sacrifice, supplicate, intercede, is necessarily less than God whom he sacrifices to, supplicates, and intercedes with. So if Christ while he was still not man was Mediator, then certainly he was less than God the Father when still not man, but he was then nothing but God; therefore the Son as God was less than the Father.

Nor do Calvin's words seem distant from this heresy when he says in *Institutes 2.12.4*, "I confess that in the first order of creation and in the uncorrupted state of nature, he was appointed head of angels and men. For this reason Paul calls him the firstborn of every creature." These are his words. He does indeed make the Son alone, even before the Incarnation, head of men and angels. For he makes him head who is the firstborn of every creature. But the Son alone is the firstborn of every creature, and if the Son alone was head of men and angels, then the Son infused something into angels and men that the Father did not infuse. The works of the Trinity then were not undivided; therefore there is not one nature and essence of the Trinity.

Next, what do these words mean, "The Son as God was appointed head of angels and men"? By whom, I ask, was he appointed? Surely by the Father? Therefore the Son is the minister and as it were the vicar of the Father, even before he was man. And what else were the Arians maintaining?

Nor is Calvin helped by the place from the Apostle in *Colossians 1*. For when the Apostle says that Christ is the firstborn of all creatures, either he is speaking of Christ in the form of a servant or, as Chrysostom expounds, he is speaking of Christ in the form of God and not making him a firstborn brother of all creatures, but signifying that he was born of the Father before any creature was made, according

to the verse of *Proverbs* 8, “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before anything was made from the beginning.” But we said much about these matters in the first book.

Now, as to what concerns the Fathers who say that Christ as mediator gave the law to the Hebrews or created the world, I reply that the Fathers are speaking of mediator materially and not formally; for they do not say that Christ was mediator in creating the world on in giving the law, but they say that Christ the mediator, that is, the person that will afterwards be mediator, is true God and author of the world and of the law and of all things. Hence Chrysostom expressly says that Christ was author of the law and so could have abrogated it, from which it follows that he made the law not as mediator but as primary author; for neither is a mediator an author, nor can he who is not an author abrogate the law. And Augustine on the same place says that Christ is indeed mediator, but he mediates between the whole Trinity and sinful men, from which again follows that he was not properly mediator when there were no sinful men.

*Chapter Nine: It is shown that Christ also merited something for Himself*

A final question remains, namely whether by his works and labors Christ not only acquired grace and glory for all of us but also acquired something for himself. Now indeed the theologians and doctors in Master Lombard *Sentences* 3 d.18 agree among themselves and teach with one consent that, besides the goods that he produced for us by his labors, Christ also merited glory of body and exaltation of name for himself.

Calvin fights against this in *Institutes* 2.17.6. “To ask,” he says, “whether he merited for himself, as Lombard and the Scholastics do, is no less curious a stupidity than, when they assert this same thing, a rash definition. For what need was there for the one Son of God to descend so as to acquire something new for himself? And when God expounds his counsel he removes all doubt, for the Father is not said to have consulted the utility of the Son in the Son’s merits, but handed him over to death, and did not spare him, because he loved the world. And to be noted are the Prophetic words, ‘A child is born for us’, and again, ‘Exult Sion, behold your King comes to you’. Otherwise too the confirmation of the love commended by Paul would be cold, that Christ underwent death for his enemies. Hence we also gather that he had no reason for himself, and he clearly affirms it when he says, “I sanctify myself for them.” In addition he who transfers fruit of his sanctity to others testifies that he acquires nothing. And this is certainly most worthy of being observed, that in order to dedicate his whole self to our salvation he in some way forgot himself.” Calvin’s words. And later he says, “By what merits could a man have been able to attain to being judge of the world, head of angels, and gain possession of God’s supreme empire?”

However these things do not in any way impede the truth. We say therefore that Christ merited for himself all the things that he received after his passion. The proof is first from express Scriptures: *Philippians* 2, “He humbled himself, being made obedient unto death, death on a cross, because of which also God has exalted him and given him a name etc.” and *Hebrews* 2, “We see Jesus crowned with glory and honor because of the passion of his death.”

Calvin responds that by these testimonies is only signified that Christ had glory after his passion, but that the one was not the cause of the other, as when it is said in *Luke* final chapter, "It was necessary for Christ to suffer and so enter into his glory."

But, to begin with, even this place can signify cause. For it is as if it said: he had to conquer, thus he had to triumph. Next these places are not altogether alike. For *Philippians 2* and *Hebrews 2* have the preposition 'because of', which preposition is wont everywhere to signify cause. Next the adverb 'also' in the words, "because of which also God has exalted him," openly indicate cause. For the sense is that Christ obeyed God and God in turn honored him; just as in *Matthew 16* after Peter's confession the Lord says to him, "Also I say to you, that you are Peter etc.," where Jerome says "A true confession received a reward."

Finally all the Fathers expounded it thus. Chrysostom *Homily 7* on *Philippians* says, "Christ gave extreme obedience, because of which also he received supreme honor etc." Here Chrysostom exhorts to obedience and humility, which exhortation would be very cold if the 'because of' did not state cause.

Ambrose on *Philippians 2* says, "What and how much the humility merited is here shown etc." Augustine *Tractate 104* on *John*, treating of this place, says, "Humility merits celebrity; celebrity is the reward of humility; but this was done in the form of a servant." See also Cyril *Thesaurus 3.2*, Basil *Against Eunomius 4*, Augustine *Against Maximinus 2.5* and *3.2*, Theophyact, Oecumenius, Primasius, Bede, Anselm, and others on the places cited. For all gather from them that Christ merited by humility glory not only for us but also for himself. And certainly it is much safer to follow so many Fathers, Greek and Latin, in the explication of the Scriptures than these new Doctors, who do not seem wise to themselves unless they contradict everybody. Besides there is also a fittingness of reason, for it is better, other things being equal, to have something by merit than without merit.

If you say, why then did Christ not have grace and knowledge and glory of soul by merit? Blessed Thomas replies, *ST IIIa q.19 a.3*, that Christ ought to have everything in the best way; but some goods are so excellent that it is better never to lack them than to acquire them by merit; because the lack of these things for a time detracts more from someone's perfection than the dignity of meriting adds to it; and yet no one can merit them unless at some time he lacks them. And of such sort are grace, glory, knowledge, and especially hypostatic union, all of which Christ had from the beginning. But glory of body and exaltation of name are lesser than is the glory of meriting them, and so it was better to lack them for a time and to acquire them by merit than to lack the dignity of meriting.

#### *Chapter Ten: Calvin's Arguments are solved*

Nor are Calvin's arguments much to be feared. For when he says, "What need was there for the one Son of God to descend so as to acquire something new for himself?"

I reply that the Son of God needed nothing, nor did he descend to acquire anything for himself. For he who descended was God, not man, nay this very descending was for him to become man and to empty himself. But after he had descended and had received the form of a servant, he acquired something for himself in the form he had assumed, not in the form in which he had descended.

Further, the fact that something was lacking to him in the form of a servant before the resurrection, who can doubt?

You will say that the glory of the body follows per se from the glory of the soul, and that an accessory does not fall under merit.

I reply that, in the first place, the glory of the body does not seem to be absolutely an accessory, for it follows from the glory of the soul according to God's determination and the congruence of merits. For God wanted the glory of the soul to redound to the body, because the glory of the soul is acquired by acts of the soul that are exercised in the body, and therefore both the glory of the soul and the glory of the body fall under merit.

Next, what prevents that which is accessory from falling under merit? For although it is already due by reason of that to which it is accessory, yet it can also fall under merit so that it may be due by some other title. Therefore, although we may confess that glory of body was due to Christ even if he had not labored for it, yet, because what is due in one way can be due also in another, therefore God wanted the glory of the body to be due to Christ also by right of reward and recompense.

Calvin's second argument was taken from the places where Christ is said to have labored for us unto death, *Romans* 8, "He did not spare his own Son but handed him over for us," *Isaiah* 9, "A child is born for us," *Zachariah* 9, "Behold your King comes to you," *John* 17, "I sanctify myself for them."

I reply first that in none of these places is it read that Christ labored for us alone, and that therefore all these places effect nothing other than that Christ's labors profited us, which we in no way deny. I then add that in these places no mention is made of Christ's own glory as if, because we were the cause without which he would not have suffered, he had labored for us alone. For if Adam had stood in the innocence in which he was made, without any doubt God's Son would not have suffered; perhaps also he would not have assumed flesh, as also Calvin himself teaches, *Institutes* 2.13.4.

But now Calvin's third argument was that the confirmation of the love commended by Paul, *Romans* 5, would be cold, that Christ underwent death for his enemies.

But I reply that his own merit does not at all prevent the ardor of God's charity toward men from being shown. For, in the first place, the Scriptures extoll as much as possible the charity of God the Father, who could gain nothing, *John* 3, "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son etc.," *Romans* 8, "He did not spare his own Son etc."

Next too the very great charity of Christ appears if you regard his divine person, to which nothing of utility accrues; and this Paul proposes to us in *II Corinthians* 8. "You know," he says, "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who for us was made poor although he was rich." And *Philippians* 2, "Although he was in the form of God, he emptied himself etc."

Lastly too the very great charity of Christ the man appears, because he was able through other acts, without passion and death, to merit glory of body for himself and exaltation of name, and yet he willed to die, and to die for his enemies, so that his redemption might be full. But that Christ was not, as Calvin says,

altogether forgetful of himself is plain from the words of *John 17*, "Glorify me, Father, with the glory that I had with you etc." Here Christ claims of God the glory of the resurrection and exaltation of name, as St. Augustine expounds on this place.

The last argument was by what merits could a man have been able to attain to being judge of the world, head of angels, and gain possession of God's supreme empire, and that the majesty should reside in him of which not the thousandth part could be attained by all the virtues of men and angels?

The solution is easy. For we do not teach that by his merits Christ attained to be head of angels and to possess God's supreme empire and for the majesty of God to reside in him. For if he had merited this he would have merited the hypostatic union, which Augustine openly denies in *Predestination of the Saints* 15, and which we too denied a little before.

Further, Christ could have easily merited to be judge of the world. For if Christ's merits had not been sufficient for him to become judge of the world, much less would they have been sufficient for reconciling the whole world. For it was greater and more difficult to expiate the sins of the whole world than to be made judge of the world. And yet in *1 John 2* Christ's blood is said to be the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only but even for those of the whole world.

END

PRAISE TO GOD AND THE VIRGIN MOTHER MARY